How Can the U.S. Balance Rivalries in South Asia?

China-India and U.S.-China rivalries in South Asia have broad implications for the global balance of power. A Corporation-supported paper outlines how the U.S. can collaborate in the region and protect its national interests

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As the world shifts from a U.S.-dominated, rules-based international order to a more multipolar system, geopolitical rivalries among the major powers are intensifying. These renewed strategic competitions threaten to heighten insecurity among parties, with increased risk of military confrontations and growing turmoil. 

The Corporation-supported Center for Preventive Action (CPA) of the Council on Foreign Relations aims to help policymakers devise timely and practical strategies to prevent and mitigate armed conflict around the world, especially in places that pose the greatest risk to U.S. interests.  

CPA executes this through in-depth reports, convening meetings of experts, and consulting with governments leaders, international organizations, and other institutions. The center’s Global Conflict Tracker provides the public with consistently updated information about threats to international peace and security. CPA has also developed the Managing Global Disorder Discussion Paper Series, made possible through a Corporation grant, which explores ways to promote stable and mutually beneficial relationships among the major powers and facilitate greater cooperation on pressing global and regional challenges. 

The sixth and most recent paper in the series, Major Power Rivalry in South Asia, is authored by Tanvi Madan, senior fellow in the Brookings Institution’s Foreign Policy program and director of Brookings’ India Project. With Beijing increasing its presence and influence in almost every South Asian country and the Indian Ocean region, the China-India and U.S.-China rivalries are likely to have the biggest effect on the region, both in terms of risks and opportunities, according to Madan. While the rivalry between China and India is playing out across multiple domains, including geopolitical, economic, technological, and ideological, most significant is the boundary dispute, which arises from the longest non-demarcated border in the world that exists between India and China and their competing territory claims.

The outcome of these rivalries will have broader implications for the global balance of power, Madan writes, and will require the U.S. to collaborate with allies and partners, compete with rivals to protect national interests, grapple with the risk of conflict, and, when possible, explore growing cooperation with China. What can the United States do to avoid escalation of conflict and ensure national security? The paper offers the following recommendations:

  • Help India and Partner Nations Deter and Counter Growing Chinese Assertiveness The United States should continue efforts to strengthen India’s overall national security and defense posture in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness. This includes bolstering its capacity to deter Chinese military actions as well as its ability to defend itself through the provision of military equipment and intelligence. Elsewhere, the U.S. should prioritize improvements to bilateral interoperability and enhanced information sharing. In addition, India and the U.S. should help partner countries in the region strengthen their national security capacities to deter and respond to traditional and nontraditional security challenges, including potential interference and coercion.
  • Encourage the Peaceful Resolution of Territorial Disputes Washington should support ongoing efforts by Delhi and Beijing to de-escalate border tensions. As India and China do their part to reassess current agreements and the Line of Actual Control along the disputed India-China border to render it less prone to violent clashes, the U.S. ought to facilitate those efforts and offer technical or other assistance. For example, the U.S. could help enhance India’s ability to monitor and verify China’s compliance with agreements at the border, which could have a stabilizing effect.
  • Bolster Crisis Preparedness and Management Since Washington and Delhi’s best efforts to prevent a crisis could ultimately be unsuccessful, they should have open discussions to consider how Sino-Indian crisis scenarios could develop, to improve the capacity to detect and react to sudden changes in the status quo, and to review and, if necessary, update various contingency plans. This will be vital to effectively raise concerns, clarify interests and intentions, and identify mechanisms and processes for crisis communication and potential coordination.
  • Promote Continued Development of Regional Institutions and Partnerships Further than simply deepening its own ties with allies and partners, the U.S. should encourage and facilitate cooperation among them – even if that means no Washington involvement. For instance, the U.S. could support Australia-India cybersecurity consultations or India-Japan collaboration for the development of regional infrastructure. Arguably the most important initiative to balance China and promote other U.S. regional initiatives is the U.S.-Australia-India-Japan quadrilateral grouping, known as the Quad, which holds tremendous potential for maritime security, for example. The Quad could become further institutionalized through regular meetings at various levels, a calendar of military exercises, working groups, and liaisons or point persons in each country. For example, the Quad might work with South Korea on supply chain resilience, France on maritime security, or the United Kingdom on tech.
  • Explore Areas of Cooperation with China The desire for greater cooperation with Beijing should not lead to accepting or ignoring malign behavior or unilaterally ceding U.S. interests. Maintaining realistic expectations will be necessary, but Washington and Delhi’s concerns about Beijing’s behavior should not preclude discussions about cooperation on shared concerns such as climate change, health security, global financial stability, and nonproliferation as well as some regional ones such as stability in Afghanistan and Myanmar. 
  • Upgrade U.S. Management and Coordination of South Asian Affairs Washington should foster closer coordination among leading players. While the creation of the Indo-Pacific coordinator position at the National Security Council is a step in the right direction, regular exchanges between bureaus and their counterparts in the region could be beneficial. The Biden administration should also encourage diplomats to serve across organizations to develop a deeper pool of experts on the Indo-Pacific region. Further, it would be helpful if U.S. policy, business, and academic communities invested in better understanding the strategic, economic, and political landscape of South Asia and the Indian Ocean region as well as China’s regional interests and intentions.

To learn more, read the full discussion paper Major Power Rivalry in South Asia.  


TOP: Workers walk inside the Nechiphu Tunnel during construction in October 2021. The tunnel will shorten travel time to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state that is the site of a boundary dispute between India and China. (Credit: Money Sharma/AFP via Getty Images)


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