From maintaining direct lines of communication to uniting for peace, grantees and experts on Russia, nuclear security, and international affairs offer perspectives on how to avoid further international conflict
As a foundation with a historical commitment to improving the ability of the United States to understand international issues and foreign countries, Carnegie Corporation of New York has solicited expert views on three critical questions provoked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022: How is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine likely to alter the post-World War II international order? How can we avoid further escalation of the international conflict? And what knowledge is needed for the United States to navigate the foreign policy challenges of today and tomorrow?
Experts on Russia, nuclear security, and international affairs more broadly, offer their views on each of these questions in a series of three articles. This article addresses the second question through brief perspectives, with each answer limited to 100 words or less.
In the spirit of the Corporation’s mission to promote the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding, the responses shed light on developments that will impact national policies and international relations for the foreseeable future. – Deana Arsenian, Vice President, International Program, and Program Director, Russia and Eurasia, Carnegie Corporation of New York
Nuclear escalation dangers in the Ukraine war have been significantly limited by the United States’ and its partners’ decision not to send troops to Ukraine. The small but real residual risk stems largely from regime and domestic politics within Russia and from President Putin’s apparent propensity for risk-taking — factors that the rest of world cannot control. Ending the war is the best way to avoid escalation. If President Zelenskyy’s efforts to negotiate with Russia produce an agreement that he believes is in his country’s interests, Ukraine’s friends should be prepared to offer Russia the sine qua non of sanctions relief.
The best way we can avoid further escalation is for the United States to keep its own objectives and involvement limited. If we restrict ourselves to providing Ukraine with sufficient aid to stymie Russian offensives and encourage a settlement, we have a reasonable chance the war will not escalate vertically or horizontally. If we aim to drive Russia from Crimea, put U.S. or North Atlantic Treaty Organization boots on the ground, or otherwise inflict a humiliating defeat on Putin, the chances of escalation will be quite significant.
If we restrict ourselves to providing Ukraine with sufficient aid to stymie Russian offensives and encourage a settlement, we have a reasonable chance the war will not escalate vertically or horizontally.
The end of the conflict will need a process that will take into account the "motivations" of the countries involved. The search for a "full victory" for any side will lead nowhere and can be very dangerous indeed. Certainly, we will need a ceasefire as soon as possible. Then the part of the Ukrainian population who speaks Russian will need to be protected either by being included in Russia or by defining an internationally controlled autonomy for them. Crimea is already a de facto part of Russia. The ceasefire and the border zones should be controlled by the United Nations or other international institutions. The reconstruction of Ukraine needs to be strongly supported internationally. NATO membership should be ruled out for Ukraine, while the European Union membership of Ukraine should most likely be considered.
In the wake of President Putin’s provocative nuclear warnings and decision to heighten the alert status of Russia’s nuclear forces, U.S. and NATO leaders wisely chose not to reciprocate. Still, the risk of a direct Russia-NATO military conflict, which could quickly escalate to the nuclear level, is significant. Senior U.S., NATO, and Russian military and political leaders should maintain direct lines of communication, resume the U.S.-Russian strategic stability dialogue and talks on New START follow-on agreements, refrain from provocative actions – such as moving tactical nuclear weapons from storage and toward operational deployment — and work with Ukraine to effect a ceasefire.
Explore more questions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as answered by experts and our grantees
To prevent the Ukrainian war from escalating into a broader European war the current NATO-Russian proxy war must remain a proxy war. That requires confining the war to its current south-east Ukrainian front. For that, Ukrainian forces must be able to fight Russian forces to a stalemate, and the West must give them the means to do so. If, out of either desperation or renewed self-confidence, Russia again widens the war, all bets are off, and an unpredictable escalation cycle resumes, including the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction, bringing closer a direct NATO-Russia war.
The U.S. should privately remind Russian military leaders that nuclear use against a city is a war crime and that they, not just Putin, would be held accountable.
All states not party to the war should seek a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) “uniting for peace” resolution mandating action supporting a ceasefire and de-escalation and negotiations for a European nuclear weapon free zone and Russian tactical nuclear weapons non-deployment. Separately, prohibit use and threat of use of nuclear weapons (see the 1995 UNGA draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons), make it a war crime under the International Criminal Court (previously proposed by Mexico), and require a United Nations Charter Article 26 Military Staff Committee plan regulating arms with “least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.”
The likelihood that Russia will use a nuclear weapon in its war against Ukraine decreased when Putin shifted his war aims from overthrowing Zelensky’s government and conquering Ukraine to seizing and annexing the Donbas. But the risk is still not zero. The U.S. should privately remind Russian military leaders that nuclear use against a city is a war crime and that they, not just Putin, would be held accountable. The U.S. should also develop credible military response options to follow any Russian nuclear use, to escalate the war directly against the Russians, while using conventional weapons only.
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