OPPORTUNITIES MISSED, OPPORTUNITIES SEIZED
Carnegie Corporation of New York established the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in May 1994 to address the threats to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. The Commission is examining the principal causes of deadly ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster or deter their outbreak. Taking a long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts that are likely to emerge, it seeks to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented. The Commission is also looking at the strengths and weaknesses of various international entities in conflict prevention and considering ways in which international organizations might contribute toward developing an effective international system of nonviolent problem solving. The series grew out of the research that the Commission has sponsored to answer the three fundamental questions that have guided its work: What are the problems posed by deadly conflict, and why is outside help often necessary to deal with these problems? What approaches, tasks, and strategies appear most promising for preventing deadly conflict? What are the responsibilities and capacities of states, international organizations, and private and nongovernmental organizations for undertaking preventive action? The Commission issued its final report in December 1997.

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Foreword

The end of the Cold War raised hopes for a more peaceful international order. Many of us thought that much of the conflict in the world had its origins in the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and with the end of that rivalry countries could be brought closer together. As the case studies in this book demonstrate, we were too optimistic. Since 1990 over two dozen deadly conflicts have produced more than nine million casualties and doubled the number of refugees around the globe from 12 million to 25 million.

No issue facing the world today deserves our attention more than conflict prevention. We need to foster a sense of urgency, a new way of thinking that gives precedence to the prevention and not simply the management of conflict, to avoid disaster rather than merely dealing with its consequences. The contributors to this volume provide illuminating descriptions of the actions that prevented some crises from becoming violent. They also provide agonizing details of violence that could have been prevented and carefully demonstrate what could have been done to prevent it.

Our task is to build on studies like this one and develop practical steps and a renewed commitment to preventive diplomacy and preventive defense. We need a strategy similar to the Marshall Plan after World War II, which successfully prevented the conditions that could have led to another war. A broad strategy using political, economic, and military tools can influence the world away from violence and deal with the parade of challenges that threaten our survival and cause great disruption, pain, and bloodshed.

During the Cold War we succeeded again, with policies of deterrence and containment, which must not be abandoned. After all, the North Koreans and the Iraqis— to mention two obvious examples— are not going to disappear. Russia is on the brink of chaos and could conceivably lose control of its nuclear arsenal. China could grow hostile and uncooperative. The planet is overrun with weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism is on the rise. We continue to need military forces able to deter aggressors and win wars quickly and decisively.

Early warning is essential to conflict prevention. Mass violence has well-
known causes and seldom occurs unexpectedly. Where there is no democracy, where there is alienation of major groups in society, gross economic imbalances, exclusion or discrimination of groups, or historical grievances, the risks of conflict are very high. Conflict occurs in states that are undergoing major transition. It springs from strong perceptions of inequity, uneven distribution of the good things in life, disputes over resources, repression, corruption, or a decline in the legitimacy of government. Then there is the human element. We must always expect that a Hitler, a Stalin, a Pol Pot, or some other charismatic, inflammatory leader lurks just offstage, eager to take advantage of the social stresses in society in ways that almost guarantee new conflict. Violence usually results from human decision, not blind fate. Recognizing this reality is a necessary precondition for preventing conflict.

Early warning must be followed by timely action. The international community needs a capability for preventive action, the ability to deploy civilian personnel to mediate problems and to provide emergency economic relief. Most fundamentally, the international community, through the United Nations and other multilateral institutions and nongovernmental organizations, must address the underlying political and economic causes of conflict. The world community must support political reform and the development of responsive and accountable government. Institutions of civil society such as political parties, trade unions, independent media, and the rule of law provide important safeguards for protecting human rights, fighting corruption, and fending off political demagoguery. At the heart of prevention must be a strong system of justice, legal systems available to all, that produce a sense that conflicts will be resolved fairly.

We know that conflict prevention requires the participation of the entire international community. No one leader, country, or institution can carry the load. Preventive action must be tailored to fit each situation, with a plan, close coordination of all the actors, internal and external, regional and international, civilian and military, public and private, official and nonofficial.

Having said this, it is necessary to stress that the primary responsibility for conflict prevention within countries lies with the government and the people of those countries. The next responsibility lies with the international community, with countries within the region assuming the greatest responsibility for maintaining or restoring peace.

Sovereignty always figures prominently here. Nations do not accept outside intervention lightly. But today the international community believes that with sovereignty comes responsibility. When nations cannot manage conflict, or do not show respect for international standards and commitments, the international community sometimes steps in—as has been the case in Iraq.

I have come to the view that the international community needs some means of responding militarily to deteriorating situations in order to prevent conflicts, some kind of multinational, multifunctional rapid reaction standby capability, probably within the United Nations. I do not underestimate the difficulties of creating such a capability, but I believe we must begin to explore ways and means
to achieve that capacity. There is no inherent contradiction between the preven-
tion of violence and the use of military force. To the contrary, armed personnel
have played a constructive role in Bosnia, Cyprus, Haiti, Macedonia, Western
Sahara, and elsewhere. If we do not develop this rapid reaction force, the United
States, as the power with the most developed intervention capabilities, will be
called on again and again.

Americans often ask, why should we care? My answer is that we should care
because sometimes our vital national interests are at stake, as in the Persian Gulf.
We care about human values and human life, as in Somalia, where we could not
tolerate the horrible pictures of starving children. We care because waiting will
only make the costs go up— in deaths, the scale of relief efforts, and the damage
to international standards.

A domestic challenge is illustrative. Today we spend one percent of the Amer-
ican health care budget on prevention. Yet experts are virtually unanimous in
their judgment that we could save many lives and much money if we devoted a
greater percentage of our total health care costs to prevention. The same is true
of conflict prevention. Preventive action can save money and lives. It can also
promote American political, diplomatic, and economic interests.

U.S. training and education programs for foreign military establishments
(IMET) bring nations together to learn how military establishments function in
a democracy. It is striking to see officers from the former Soviet Union or from
Latin American countries learning about the primacy of civilian authority, re-
spect for human rights, the rule of law, and the role of a popularly chosen legis-
lature. This is conflict prevention in action.

We soon complete the twentieth century. It is a century of wars— the first in
which world wars were fought. It is also a century in which men and women of
good will, because of the devastation of the world wars, have wrestled with the
idea of conflict prevention and world peace. We have glimpsed that peace is pos-
sible because it is necessary. We have not won the day, but we have begun to un-
derstand what peace and conflict prevention can mean— quite simply, it can
change the course of history and the life of human beings more than anything
else we know or can do. We may not be able to rid the world of conflict, but we
can make the world more livable. What more important task do we have on our
agenda? What more important legacy is there for our children and grandchil-
dren than a less violent world, a world of concord, not conflict?

Lee H. Hamilton, Director
The Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars
Preface and Acknowledgments

There is no more important challenge facing the international community than preventive diplomacy. What this challenge entails is to be neither underestimated nor overestimated. This means on the one hand refraining from glib criticisms and rhetorical condemnations that do not give sufficient analytic weight to the very real difficulties of preventing ethnic wars and other deadly conflicts. It also means not subscribing to historically deterministic theories or accepting at face value claims by policymakers and others about failed attempts at prevention that nothing more or different could have been done.

It is along the lines of this analytic balance that this book has been written. Our primary goal has been to assess the feasibility of preventive diplomacy, case by case for the ten cases we study as well as more generally with regard to broader analytic patterns and policy lessons. The book includes not only cases in which preventive diplomacy failed, but also ones in which it largely succeeded—opportunities that were missed as well as ones that were seized. For the former our authors knew that they needed to make the argument that opportunities in fact were there, that something more or different could have been done which could have made a significant difference. As with any effort at counterfactual analysis that is to be more than speculation or ex post argumentation, this requires ample empirical substantiation, well-reasoned and realistic alternative policy proposals, and plausible delineation of alternative policy processes. For the latter the problem was akin to cases in which deterrence is said to have succeeded, yet we can't know for sure that war otherwise would have resulted. Here the empirical evidence and analysis are geared to showing that these cases quite plausibly could have become deadly conflicts, and that preventive diplomacy was a key reason they did not. In every case the authors met these empirical and analytic standards, providing a sense of the problems of, but also the prospects for, preventive diplomacy.

Our book thus provides both original case studies that add to the respective case literatures and a comparative analysis that addresses core theoretical de-
bates about post–Cold War international conflict and security and provides the basis for broader policy lessons. It is by no means the last word or the definitive word on preventive diplomacy, but we do see it as a contribution to the broader effort to build the literature, establish the empirical basis, develop the core concepts, and delineate the key strategies.

Credit for the genesis of this project, as well as for so many others in this burgeoning field, rests with the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Under the sagacious leadership of cochairmen David Hamburg and Cyrus Vance, and with enormous credit to Executive Director Jane Holl, the Carnegie Commission has done more than any other single organization to foster work on post–Cold War conflict prevention and resolution. Its special capacity as “bridger” and “convener” has brought together key groups and individuals from an impressively wide range of relevant communities—the academic community, government, multilateral organizations, NGOs, the press—and with a genuinely international scope. I have had the privilege of participating in a number of these meetings and projects, and I have found the exchanges of views and the opportunities for collaboration to be of immense value. And while other organizations and individuals also have made important contributions, a solid share of the credit for what is becoming a rich and extensive literature on post–Cold War conflict prevention and resolution goes to the Carnegie Commission.

I also would like to acknowledge Alexander George. Alex is a member of the Carnegie Commission and the person who in his own signature style of gentle firmness drew me into this project. Alex also has been the single most influential voice for building bridges between the academic and policy communities, an effort of which this project is a part. Thanks also to Esther Brimmer and Thomas J. Leney of the Carnegie Commission staff for their help in organizing and administering the project, to Bob Lande, who was a valued partner in editing and managing the manuscript, and to Anita Sharma, for editorial assistance and management of the page proofs. Valuable input, insights, and criticisms came along the way from participants in panels at conferences of the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association, and at conferences at Ditchley House (Oxford) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Comments and criticisms from Janice Gross Stein, Don Rothchild, and Fen Osler Hampson and three other outside reviewers also were very helpful. Laura E. Larson, our copy editor, helped smooth out and improve our text, and Jennifer Knerr of Rowman & Littlefield provided valuable guidance and valued support throughout the publishing process.

Special thanks and gratitude go to our authors. Too many edited volumes start out pledging internal coherence but end up as papers united by little more than being bound together under the same cover. Our goal was to establish and maintain an integrative framework that would provide the structure necessary to identify and substantiate patterns, but without becoming a straitjacket confining the unique aspects of individual cases. I appreciate the authors’ willingness to work with me in this process as we tried to strike an optimal balance. I
also appreciate their forbearance with the much greater than anticipated time it took us to complete the project and publish the book.

As I was working in late 1998 on this book’s last chapter, I was feeling somewhat hopeful that for all the decade’s ethnic cleansing and genocide and other horrors, perhaps lessons had begun to be learned, and would be applied preventively to the next conflict or conflicts. I was seeing less writing about intractable problems and ghosts of the past, hearing less pontification of self-styled realism, and even witnessing former and even current government officials admitting that mistakes had been made. But then came Kosovo, yet another ethnic cleansing, yet another missed opportunity for preventive diplomacy—and in many respects, the peace agreement notwithstanding, even more discouraging since claims of having been surprised by and unfamiliar with the nature and dynamics of post–Cold War conflicts were even less credible at the end of the decade than earlier.

So where is the hope, one might reasonably ask, that the challenge of preventive diplomacy ever will be met? What will it take, and where, if not Kosovo, to motivate and mobilize the will and capacity? As discouraged as one can get, I also have not yet forgotten the lessons the students in my Contemporary American Foreign Policy class taught me circa the mid-1980s. In one of the last classes of the term I used to ask the students to think about what kinds of changes might be possible in international affairs. When one responded that he thought the Berlin Wall might come down, I tried to compliment him on his idealism while dutifully warning him about the delusions of youthful naïveté. I reacted similarly to the student who said she thought apartheid would end and Nelson Mandela would become president of South Africa, and to the one who speculated on a peace between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. But the ostensibly naïve proved quite realistic, the impossible became possible. There is no reason to think the same cannot prove true for preventive diplomacy.
### Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
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<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
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<td>AID</td>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>ANCCP</td>
<td>All-National Congress of the Chechen People</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>armored personnel carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBTG</td>
<td>Broad-based Transitional Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCPDC</td>
<td>Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Comité pour la Défense de la République (Rwanda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMEA</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNS</td>
<td>Conférence Nationale Souveraine (Congo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoM</td>
<td>Council of Ministers (CSCE/OSCE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COREU</td>
<td>confidential correspondence among EU foreign ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Confédération des Syndicats Congolais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Committee of Senior Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Conseil supérieur de la république (Congo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAM</td>
<td>Department of Administration and Management (UN Secretariat)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
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<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECM M</td>
<td>European Community Monitor Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EXIMBANK</td>
<td>Export-Import Bank</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
<td>Forces Armées de Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBIS</td>
<td>Foreign Broadcast Information Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEWER</td>
<td>Forum for Early Warning and Early Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLECA</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of the Enclave Cabinda (Angola)</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIEMS</td>
<td>Global Information and Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCNM</td>
<td>High Commissioner on National Minorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>highly enriched uranium</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>NATO Implementation Force (Bosnia)</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMRO</td>
<td>International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav People's Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosova</td>
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<td>MCDDI</td>
<td>Mouvement Congolais pour la Démocratie et le Développement Intégral</td>
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<td>MDR</td>
<td>Mouvement démocratique republican (Rwanda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINATOM</td>
<td>Ministry of Atomic Energy (Russia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRND</td>
<td>Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (Rwanda)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute for International Affairs</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>National Intelligence Council</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>Neutral International Force</td>
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<td>NKVD</td>
<td>People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs</td>
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<td>NOREPS</td>
<td>Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Resistance Army (Uganda)</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>National Secret Service (Somalia)</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>OPIC</td>
<td>Overseas Private Investment Corporation</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Social Movement</td>
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<td>PCT</td>
<td>Parti Congolais du Travail</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive</td>
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<td>PDP</td>
<td>Party for Democratic Prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDPS</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (Congo)</td>
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<td>RFE/RL</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
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<td>Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Rwanda)</td>
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<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UPADS</td>
<td>Union Panafricaine pour la Démocratie Sociale (Congo)</td>
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<td>U.S. Information Service</td>
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<td>Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party</td>
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<td>YPA</td>
<td>Yugoslav People’s Army</td>
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Part One

Overview
Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytic Framework

Bruce W. Jentleson

The basic logic of preventive diplomacy seems unassailable. Act early to prevent disputes from escalating or problems from worsening. Reduce tensions that if intensified could lead to war. Deal with today’s conflicts before they become tomorrow’s crises. It is the same logic as preventive medicine: don’t wait until the cancer has spread or the arteries are fully clogged. Or, as the auto mechanic says in a television commercial as he holds an oil filter in one hand and points to a seized-up car engine with the other, “pay me now or pay me later.”

Indeed, over the course of the first years of the post–Cold War era, invocations of the need to expand and enhance the practice of preventive diplomacy were heard from virtually all quarters. They came from the United Nations, as with the communiqué issued in January 1992 at the first ever heads-of-state summit of the UN Security Council calling for “recommendations on ways of strengthening . . . the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping,” and the ensuing report by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, which devoted a full chapter to preventive diplomacy. They were sounded from the very outset of the Clinton administration, as in the emphasis by Secretary of State Warren Christopher in his confirmation hearings on the need for “a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises . . . rather than simply manage them”; the advocacy by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake for “greater emphasis on tools such as mediation and preventive diplomacy”; and the emphasis in the 1994 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement on “preventive diplomacy . . .
order to help resolve problems, reduce tensions and defuse conflicts before they become crises."

Similar statements and initiatives also marked post–Cold War shifts among major regional multilateral organizations. The Conference on (now Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) committed in its 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe to “seek new forms of cooperation . . . [for] ways of preventing, through political means, conflicts which may emerge.” A number of new CSCE/OSCE structures were established, such as the High Commissioner on National Minorities and its “missions of long duration,” which took on preventive diplomacy responsibilities. So, too, in 1992-93 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) launched its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution. While couched in qualifiers about “non-interference in the internal affairs of States” and functioning “on the basis of consent and cooperation of the parties to a conflict,” it still marked an important recognition of common regional interests in seeking to prevent conflicts that threaten regional security irrespective of their original venue.

A broad range of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also have made clarion calls and taken extensive preventive actions. Indeed, NGOs have become so significant to preventive diplomacy, both as key actors in their own right and—all too often—as those left to try to cope with the consequences of prevention failures, that a number of recent studies specifically focus on their role. Think tanks and elite associations also have been quite involved both in issuing studies and setting up unofficial “Track” action groups. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, which commissioned this study, has been prominent among them.

Yet for all these invocations and early initiatives, the record of these first years of the post–Cold War era has been mixed at best. On the one hand, the past decade has borne witness to some of the deadliest conflicts of an all too deadly century. The breakup of Yugoslavia added a new term, ethnic cleansing, to the lexicon of warfare, and left an estimated quarter million people dead, another two hundred thousand wounded, over one million displaced, and general devastation and destruction throughout Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the case of Rwanda, for all the semantics international leaders tried to play, there was no denying the genocide. In Somalia the political order already had largely collapsed and the killings and mass starvation had been taking their heavy tolls long before the international community finally started to pay attention. In Nagorno-Karabakh, in Chechnya and in numerous other cases, ethnic and other versions of internal war raged. Indeed, one authoritative estimate comes to thirty-seven major armed conflicts in the 1990s and casualties exceeding four million.

On the other hand, albeit smaller in number, there have been cases in which prevention has succeeded in limiting if not precluding deadly conflict. Macedonia had its own significant ethnic tensions and vulnerabilities amid the breakup of Yugoslavia, but it did not fall into mass violence. Congo (Brazzaville) had its sharp tribal and regional divisions but managed to limit the political violence surrounding its 1993 elections, and it could well have done the same in 1997 had...
the preventive diplomacy strategy pursued earlier not been abandoned. The tensions in Russian–Baltic (Latvia, Estonia) relations surrounding the demands on the one side for the withdrawal of Russian troops and on the other for safeguarding the rights of Russian ethnic minorities could well have led down a more conflictual and dangerous path. The same was true in Russian-Ukrainian relations with their myriad of tensions and, particularly, the high-profile issue of nuclear weapons possession to resolve. Then there were other cases such as the 1994 nuclear proliferation crisis with North Korea, the peaceful resolution of which should not lead us to forget the ominous risks and severe potential consequences had preventive diplomacy failed.

The central objective of this study is to assess why some post–Cold War conflicts have been prevented from leading to war and other deadly conflict, but not others—why, in effect, some opportunities for preventive diplomacy have been missed, but others seized. In pursuit of that objective, we have brought together a group of distinguished scholars and diplomats as contributors to this book. The ten cases just mentioned—Croatia-Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Macedonia, Congo (Brazzaville), Russia-Latvia/Estonia, Russia-Ukraine, North Korea—are the ones on which we focus. They represent different types of conflicts that characterize the post–Cold War world, as well as a mix of successes and failures—i.e., opportunities missed and opportunities seized—that is important for testing arguments about what strategies work and which do not, and why and how they succeed or fail.

In the rest of this chapter, I present the structure of the study and elaborate on theoretical, conceptual, definitional, and methodological aspects that provide the context and framing for the case studies. The cross-case analytic comparisons, theoretical implications, and policy lessons are taken up in the final chapter.

The Realism of Preventive Diplomacy

That preventive diplomacy has been “oversold,” its difficulties underestimated in a number of respects, is a fair criticism.10 But to simply write it off would be to commit the mirror-image mistake of those too eager and uncritical in their embrace. We have here “an idea in search of strategy”—a basic concept that has a solid inherent logic and a potentially valuable utility, but that needs both a deeper conceptual grounding and a fleshing out of its policy relevance.

As part of this, it is important at the outset to confront the critique of preventive diplomacy as “unrealistic.” While virtually no one disputes the desirability of preventing ethnic cleansing, genocide, and other deadly conflicts, “realist” and other critics question both the viability and the value of preventive diplomacy. With regard to the former, aren’t many of these conflicts just the playing out of history—of “Balkan ghosts” that still haunt the region, of precolonial African tribal hatreds, of other deeply historical animosities? And as to the latter, is it sufficiently in the interests of major powers such as the United States that they should run the risks of trying to do so? And, after all, aren’t most taking place in locales that, as a former U.S. ambassador to Somalia put it about that country, just are “not a critical piece of real estate for anybody in the post–Cold
War world?” Why not just wait and see, and if needed resort to later stage conflict management?

Yet for all its self-styled realism, this line of argument is to be questioned with regard to its assessments both of the viability and the value of preventive diplomacy.

The Viability of Preventive Diplomacy

The question of the viability of preventive diplomacy is rooted in the broader debate over the principal sources of post–Cold War conflicts, ethnic conflicts in particular. In its essence this is a debate over historical determinism. The assumption of an overwhelming inevitability to these conflicts that is inherent to their characterization as a playing out of history is indicative of what is called the "primordialist view," in which ethnic conflicts are seen primarily as manifestations of fixed, inherited, deeply antagonistic historical identities. In this analysis the end of the Cold War stripped away the constraining effects of the strategic overlay of bipolar geopolitics, releasing the "Balkan ghosts" and other historical hatreds to their "natural" states of conflict.

If the primordialist theory were valid, then it truly would be hard to hold out much prospect for preventive diplomacy. Yet as a number of studies have shown, ethnic identities are much less fixed over time, and the frequency and intensity of ethnic conflict much more varying over both time and place, than primordialist theory would have it. As David Lake and Donald Rothchild argue, "the [primordialist] approach founders on its inability to explain the emergence of new and transformed identities or account for the long periods in which either ethnicity is not a salient political characteristic or relations between different ethnic groups are comparatively peaceful."

Michael Brown delineates such other variables as political institutions and socioeconomic factors that are less historically deterministic but still possible "underlying" sources of ethnic as well as other internal conflicts. He and others show that states with weak political institutions are more prone to political violence than institutionally stronger ones as measured by both the legitimacy of the authority they claim and their capacity to exercise that authority. Socioeconomic factors come into play in a number of ways, including the general destabilizing effects that poverty can have, the disruptive effects of major economic crises, and the compounding of ethnic and other political-cultural divisions by corresponding economic discrimination and inequitable distribution of wealth.

However, while these underlying factors are helpful in identifying dispositions toward political instability, they still leave us short of understanding why deadly conflict results in some cases but not others.

The existing literature on internal conflict does a commendable job of surveying the underlying factors or permissive conditions that make some situations particularly prone to violence, but it is weak when it comes to identifying the catalytic factors—the triggers or proximate causes—of internal conflicts. ... [W]e know a lot less about the causes of internal conflict than one would guess from looking at the size of the literature on the subject.
There is no question of the importance of having a comprehensive picture of the sources of conflict and the full lists of social, political, economic, demographic, environmental, and other underlying factors. But these almost always end up both over- and underdetermined in their explanations of the fundamental reasons why violence actually occurs. This is why, as David Carment concludes from a literature review, “no two scholars seem to agree on the exact causes of ethnic conflict.”

The optimal analytic approach both for avoiding the historical determinism fallacy and for getting beyond underlying factors to proximate, violence-trigging factors is through a “purposive” view of what the key sources of deadly conflict are. This approach acknowledges the deep-seated nature of ethnic identifications and the corresponding intergroup tensions, animosities, and unfinished agendas of vengeance and retribution that carry forward as historical legacies. But it takes a much less deterministic view of how, why, and whether these identity-rooted tensions become deadly conflicts. It focuses the analysis on forces and factors that intensify and activate the dispositions as shaped by history into actions and policies reflecting conscious and deliberate choices for war and violence. The dominant dynamic is not the playing out of historical inevitability, but rather the consequences of calculations by parties to the conflict of the purposes served by political violence. These are, as another author put it, “the purposeful actions of political actors who actively create violent conflict” to serve their own domestic political agendas by “selectively drawing on history in order to portray it as historically inevitable.” The Carnegie Commission in its Final Report, makes its own strong statement of the purposive view: “[M]ass violence invariably results from the deliberately violent response of determined leaders and their groups to a wide range of social, economic and political conditions that provide the environment for violent conflict, but usually do not independently spawn violence.” The key, therefore, is to get at why these determined leaders choose deliberately violent responses.

It is important to note in this regard that the sense of purposiveness goes beyond just posing these conflicts as a particular manifestation of the larger problem of the “security dilemma.” The notion here is that the parties are driven to military action less out of strict aggression than the uncertainty of the situation in which, given the conflicts that do exist, neither side feels confident the other won't strike first. A similar conceptualization is of this as a “commitment problem,” of situations in which “two groups find themselves without a third party that can credibly guarantee agreements between them.” Still we know that some security dilemmas and some commitment problems are resolved or at least ameliorated without resorting to or devolving into warfare. The key, therefore, is to get at the purposive choices as made by the leaders of the principal parties to the conflict. These choices and the “conflict calculus” that results from them involve assessments as made by these leaders of the interests at stake and the potential costs-risks and gains-benefits of alternative options for achieving those interests. While hardly done as memolike net assessments or strategic plans, and notwithstanding all the accompanying vitriolic rhetoric and historical legacies, the dynamic is a deliberate, calculated, purposive one.

It is in seeking to influence this calculus by which parties to the conflict take
their purposeful actions that preventive diplomacy has its potential viability. This is, to be sure, hard to do. But it is possible to do. Both points are integral to a genuine realism. The empirical-analytic evidence from our cases will be seen to be strongly supportive of this argument. The claims are not that some policy X surely would have prevented ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, or some policy Y smoothly rebuilt the Somali state, or some policy Z prevented genocide in Rwanda. But it also is not to accept the assertion that nothing else could have been done, that no more or nothing different was viable than the policies as pursued. There were missed opportunities.22 And in those cases in which deadly conflict was averted, the key point is that success was not a given, that failure was a very real possibility had not the opportunities for preventive diplomacy been seized.

The Strategic Value of Preventive Diplomacy

A second point in the critique of preventive diplomacy as not realist is the high risks and costs and low interests said to be at stake. Yet here too there are both theoretical and empirical bases for questioning the critique.

If it were the case that the fires of ethnic conflicts, however intense, would just burn upon themselves and not have significant potential to spread regionally or destabilize more systematically, or if the options for later action had the presumed pragmatic preferability, then in strict realist terms one could argue that major powers could afford to just let them be. But that is not always or even frequently the case. First, as numerous cases have shown and as much of the literature substantiates, spread is much more common than self-containment. This occurs through various combinations of direct “contagion” through the actual physical movement of refugees and weapons to other countries in the region, “demonstration effects” that even without direct contact activate and escalate other conflicts, and other modes of conflict diffusion.23 Consequently, among other things, when there is no prevention, the real estate in question risks getting bigger. Whether because the conflict then takes in areas that are more strategic or simply because a larger area is in crisis, outside powers can find their interests much more at risk.

Second, the costs and risks thus are not attached just to preventive action; wait-and-see also has its costs and risks. The conflict dynamics often end up narrowing the available policy options over time and working against later stage conflict resolution in other ways as well. Part of this is the “Rubicon effect” by which the onset of mass violence transforms the nature of a conflict. The addition of revenge and retribution to other sources of tension plunges a conflict situation down to a fundamentally different and more difficult depth, where resolution and even limitation of the conflict become much more difficult. Certain international strategies that might have been effective at lower levels of conflict are less likely to be so amid intensified violence.

This thus ends up as another version of the classic problem for statecraft that the more extensive the objectives, the greater and usually more coercive are the strategies needed to achieve them.24 Preventing a conflict from escalating to violence is a more limited objective than ending violence once it has begun. The logic is the same as for the distinctions made by Thomas Schelling between
deterrence of a proscribed action from occurring and compellence of its cessation once it has begun. Options thus do not necessarily stay open over time; a problem can get harder down that road to where it has been kicked. The truly realistic policy question most often thus is not involvement “Yes or no?” but “When and how?” It is in this sense that opting for early resorts rather than having to fall back on last resorts can be the more realistic strategy.

One of the key tenets of the argument for not acting early has been that when the time comes, what is needed to be done can be done. Yet the experience has been that ending the conflicts has been one thing, putting such severely shattered societies back together quite another. It is a problem, to draw on other work by William Zartman, of “putting Humpty-Dumpty together again.”

A final point concerns the basic fallacy in the dichotomy so often drawn between idealism and realism. We long have seen that one of the persistent frustrations for realists generally with regard to American foreign policy has been that it never has been strictly a matter of “interest defined as power,” as in Hans Morgenthau’s classic formulation. Indeed just a few years after laying out this and other aspects of realism in his Politics among Nations, Morgenthau felt compelled to write another book, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy, lambasting American statesmen for not thinking and acting in this manner and instead being “guided by moral abstractions without consideration of the national interest.” Yet in the most fundamental sense, “the distinction between interests and values,” as Stanley Hoffmann argues, “is largely fallacious... a great power has an ‘interest’ in world order that goes beyond strict national security concerns and its definition of world order is largely shaped by its values.” To this should be added Joseph Nye’s conception of “soft power,” by which as a pragmatic and indeed quite realist calculus the values and ideals for which the United States stands are not just virtuous but also a source of international influence.

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To be sure, affirming the possibility of preventive diplomacy must not be done without also recognizing the difficulties that inhere in moving from the possible to the actual. In our case studies the authors are quite deliberate and explicit in presenting the evidence and developing the analysis in support of arguments about what was and was not possible. In the final chapter I draw general analytic conclusions and policy lessons regarding the key requisites and conditionalities for successful preventive diplomacy. It is this balance between not dismissing the difficult as impossible and also acknowledging the difficulties that is the essence of genuine realism.

Defining Preventive Diplomacy

It is true, of course, that all diplomacy seeks to be preventive. Michael Lund attributes the coining of the term “preventive diplomacy” to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in 1960 with reference in the Cold War context to UN efforts
“to keep localized international disputes from provoking larger confrontations between the superpowers.” Yet while this use and others convey a sense of what is meant, in strict definitional terms there still is “no agreed-upon meaning among practitioners and scholars.”

In recent years it has been applied to an unmanageably broad range of activities, objectives, and policies, including people-to-people conflict resolution dialogues, crisis prevention mediation, war de-escalation and termination, democracy building, economic development, the eradication of poverty, and environmental preservation. No wonder one former State Department official referred to it as being “a buzz word among diplomats.”

Lund’s definition is as “action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change.” This is helpful but requires further focusing for our purposes with regard to the stage of the conflict cycle being focused on. The problems here are both how far back and how far forward to go. With respect to the former, it can be argued that prevention requires attacking the deepest roots of conflicts— as the Commission on Global Governance put it in its 1995 report, “a comprehensive preventive strategy must first focus on the underlying political, social, economic and environmental causes of conflict.” This is what the Carnegie Commission calls “structural prevention,” addressing “the root causes of deadly conflict,” as differentiated from “operational prevention,” which is “undertaken when violence appears imminent.”

Our concern in this study is more at the operational end, with diplomacy geared principally to the proximate and pressing causes of conflicts.

The other part of the stage-of-the-cycle issue is how far forward past the point at which violence breaks out one can still speak of conflict prevention rather than conflict management or conflict resolution. While demarcating a precise boundary is just not possible, an excessive blurring takes away from the meaningfulness of the conceptual distinction as well as from potential policy lessons for assessing how timing affects the relative utility of different strategies. This was a problem with the definition of preventive diplomacy in Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace, which started with “actions to prevent disputes from arising” and continued on to “prevent existing disputes from escalating,” but then also went on “to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” The first two fit much better within the prevention stage, while the latter gets more into conflict management. Our focus thus is on the period in which violence is imminent or early but still short of mass deadly conflict— i.e., going not too far back and not too far forward.

With this as our focus, we differentiate among three components of preventive diplomacy: early warning, key decisions on early action, and strategies of action. These are somewhat but not strictly sequential, and more analytically than operationally distinct.

**Early Warning**

Early warning is, as aptly put in another study, “sounding alarm bells at the right time and in a salutary and appropriate manner.” As Alexander George
and Jane Holl observe in their chapter, while “specialists may disagree on the scope of preventive diplomacy and ... in their assessments of policies and strategies ... there is no disagreement, however, on the importance of obtaining early warning of incipient or slowly developing crises if preventive action is to have any chance of success.”

Effective early warning entails overcoming two distinct but interconnected problems: (1) the informational problem of obtaining the necessary quantity and quality of intelligence in a reliable form and timely manner, and (2) the analytic problem of overcoming various barriers that can impede or distort the accuracy of analysis. Even more than the traditional problem of the “signal-to-noise” ratio of such classical intelligence problems as an impending surprise attack or major advances in an adversary’s military capabilities, the nature of what constitutes early warning of ethnic and other post–Cold War conflicts is more difficult to ascertain in a number of respects. Take, for example, the “indicators of states at risk” cited in the Carnegie Commission Final Report and based in large part on a study by the State Failure Task Force, a group of scholars working with the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC). Among the indicators deemed particularly relevant were demographic pressures, a lack of democratic practices, elite/mass ethnic divisions, serious economic problems, and “a legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance.” Yet not only does each of these have its own ambiguities and degrees, but there is even less definable specificity or regularity to what constitutes the “critical mass” for a “credible” warning. The “challenge for early warning systems,” as put in another study, “is not so much in identifying societies at risk, in general, but in recognizing patterns of change that will lead to the acceleration of conflicts.”

It is in the sense of the latter part of this statement that early warning is not just an informational problem but also an analytic one. Some sense needs to be provided that the conflict in question is not just a potential one but has a significant likelihood of occurring. This entails averting both the “underwarning” problem of missing developing conflicts and “overwarning” — ending up, as it’s been said, predicting eight of the next three coming deadly conflicts.

Even when the analysis is made, there is the question of whether recognition of the signals and conveyance of their import will bring rewards or run risks. The intelligence analyst who would push early warning risks “shoot the messenger” reactions of being blamed for the bad news even if it is accurate. Or, if inaccurate, the “cry wolf” label may follow, an appellation that can be professionally damaging as well as bring personal disdain from colleagues. Similarly, one veteran ambassador offered the following assessment of the “habitual behavior” and “mind-sets” of the career Foreign Service officer: “The habits of planning ahead, of taking strategic diplomacy beyond just the issues of the week, are not deeply ingrained. Preventive diplomacy requires the ability to sniff trouble in its early stages and then take steps to avoid it. This does not happen routinely or predictably.” These bureaucratic dynamics also pertain to the United Nations and other international organizations and their respective efforts to build institutional capacity for early warning.

Humanitarian relief organizations and other NGOs also can play important
early warning roles, but they too have certain obstacles to overcome. “The hallmark of NGOs,” Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss write, “is their activity at the grass-roots level … working on the front lines.” Thus, by both location and activity, NGOs often are the first external actors to become aware of conflicts in their early stages. The reputation for nonpartisanship that many have earned can give information they provide and warnings they sound substantial credibility. Yet they may lack formalized and systematic channels through which to convey such warnings. There also may be serious disincentives for doing so, such as being seen by host governments and other local actors as interfering in ways that can both compromise NGOs’ missions and put their field workers in danger. In addition, particularly with large NGOs, there also have been indications of the Weberian “iron law of bureaucracy” setting in and getting in the way of effective functioning for early warning.

Key Decisions on Early Action

Even if early warning is achieved, there remains the problem of what George and Holll call the “warning-response gap,” of the need for key decisions to be made to take early action. Whereas the early warning problem is one of a failure of intelligence, the warning-response gap is one of a failure to use intelligence. The warning is there, but either explicit decisions are made not to act or inaction results from decisions bogging down or otherwise not being made. Cognitive, bureaucratic, and political factors all may contribute to this problem.

George and Holll cite relevant findings from psychological research on how and why cognitive dynamics can impede both the disposition and the capacity for acting despite evident warning signals. Precisely because most of these cases involve interests that while arguably important are less than vital, policymakers are inclined to treat conflict warnings as “discrepant” information. There is a natural cognitive tendency to discount information that is discrepant from expectations, or at least to make it “meet higher standards of evidence and to pass stricter tests of admissibility.” This reflects an anticipatory assessment of the costs of having to act on a signal as exceeding the probable rewards for doing so. Because warning often “forces policymakers to confront difficult or unpalatable decisions,” George and Holll emphasize, “early warning does not necessarily make for easy response.”

The bureaucratic dynamic can have a number of aspects. The inherent difficulty of mobilizing for new initiatives, especially when a crisis is only potential or incipient, is more another Weberian axiom than a criticism of any particular bureaucracy (be it one or another U.S. administration, the United Nations, etc.). There also may be the “full plate” problem of other more pressing issues occupying policymakers. This was a problem, for example, for much of the international community and especially the United States in 1990-91 during the Gulf War with regard to both Somalia and Yugoslavia. It also has been a problem for the United Nations, which in the early 1990s had between fifteen and twenty peacekeeping forces scattered around the world, as well as twenty special mediators, all to be managed by the Secretariat.
Then there is the question of political will. While the essence of the strategic logic of preventive diplomacy is to act early before the problem becomes a crisis, it often is the same lack of a sense of crisis that makes it much more difficult to build the political support necessary for taking early action. This comes back to the earlier point on the prevailing view of preventive diplomacy as inconsistent with realist foreign policy. It is natural and normal, given this perception, for major powers not to muster the will for action: e.g., in the case of the United States, for presidents already under pressure to limit attention to foreign policy to give priority to those issues most imminent in their effects on U.S. interests; for Congress to be even less inclined to fund policies the rationale of which is principally about threats that might be there in the future; and for the attention of the American public to follow the ups and downs of the "CNN curve."

Of course, the political-will problem also pertains to other international actors, as we will see for France in cases such as Congo and for Russia in Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh. For the United Nations, as well as for regional multilateral organizations, in one sense it involves basic decision rules and bureaucratic barriers to concerted action. In another sense it is an extension of the political-will problem of the major powers.

Strategies of Action

It surely is not enough, as Stedman pointedly argues, to succumb to "the urge...to do something, anything." Not only are such reactive actions unlikely to achieve their objectives, but they run what might be termed the "quagmire" risk of incurring costs and setbacks more burdensome and damaging than if nothing had been done, as well as the "syndrome" risk of a paralysis carrying over to future situations, including some in which early action may actually have worked.

To be sure, there cannot be a standard preventive diplomacy strategy, one size fits all, any more than there could be a single strategy for any other area of foreign policy. In terms of overall strategy, preventive diplomacy usually will require "mixed strategies" combining both coercive elements capable of posing a credible deterrent, and inducements and other reassurances that provide positive incentives for cooperation. On the one hand, those who would resort to purposive violence need to be deterred from doing so. On the other, reassurance may be needed against the uncertainties of the security dilemma and the commitment problem, and there must be something positive to show for taking the cooperative route. Some situations may require more of a coercive component, others more of an inducement one, but both need be encompassed conceptually. The tendency in much of the preventive diplomacy literature to focus more on the inducement-cooperation dimension than on the coercive-deterrence one is the mirror image of the overemphasis on the latter and often exclusion of the former in the Cold War-era deterrence literature.

Diplomacy and force can be antithetical, but they do not have to be. An Agenda for Peace, for example, includes preventive military deployments as one of its preventive diplomacy strategies. Whether or not the threat or use of force constitutes an act of diplomacy depends on a number of factors such as the purposes for
which force is being used and the normative legitimacy and international legality of the act. Our approach thus does not exclude the threat or use of military force from the range of preventive diplomacy instruments and strategies. In this respect it is consistent with other studies that also define the parameters to encompass mixed strategies, such as Lund's, whose "preventive diplomacy toolbox" includes military and nonmilitary measures, coercive and noncoercive diplomatic measures, and the Carnegie Commission's Final Report, which in total serves as a quite comprehensive inventory.

In taking this approach, our focus is particularly on the roles of international actors. It is of course impossible to analyze the dynamics of any conflict effectively without paying attention to both its domestic and international dimensions. However, it also is necessary as a practical research design question for any study, especially a multicase comparative one, to establish a priority focus. This does not at all mean excluding domestic actors; indeed, they are key parts of the story in all of our cases. It is more a matter of focus and emphasis. As such we group the key international actors into five categories: (1) the United States, which as the major world power warrants individual focus; (2) other major powers (e.g., Russia, France, United Kingdom); (3) the United Nations in a number of capacities, including the role of the secretary-general, Security Council resolutions, UN peacekeeping forces, and relevant UN agencies (e.g., the UN High Commissioner for Refugees); (4) respective regional multilateral organizations (e.g., the OSCE, the OAU); and (5) NGOs, both those on the ground in conflict areas and those exerting political pressure on governments and international organizations.

Case Selection, the Comparative Case Analytic Framework, and Other Methodological Considerations

As noted earlier, our study includes ten cases: Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia) and the Russian troop withdrawal-Russian minority issue, Russia-Ukraine, Croatia-Bosnia, Macedonia, Somalia, Rwanda, Congo (Brazzaville), and the 1993–94 North Korea nuclear crisis. In considering which cases to include, we were guided by three principal criteria.

First was a priority on those cases that became or had the most significant potential to become deadly conflicts. The definitional problem with preventive diplomacy was noted earlier. At one end of the conceptual spectrum, even the regular and regularized consultations of day-to-day diplomacy are in their essence preventive in nature. At the other end, the preventive claim also is made for such long-term strategies as sustainable development, fostering of civic society, environmental protection, population planning, etc. Our concern in this study is the particular one of tensions and conflicts that are of greater magnitude than the norm of diplomatic disputes, on the one hand, and more proximate and pressing than long-term problems, on the other. This is akin to the operational prevention/structural prevention differentiation formulated in the Carnegie Commission Final Report.
Second is that we sought to include a range of different types of conflicts characteristic of the post-Cold War world. This cross-cuts our case sample in two ways. One is geographic with cases drawn from the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and Africa. The other is in inter- and intrastate terms, albeit with the necessary fluidity in setting these parameters and allowing for mixed cases in this sense as well. The main contrast is between heavily ethnic conflicts such as the three African cases and the closer to classical interstate ones such as North Korea and Russia-Ukraine. The other ex-Soviet ones and the ex-Yugoslavia ones are more mixed with internal ethnic divisions as well as interstate dimensions. These variations in the cases allow us to consider how differences in the type of conflict may affect the problems posed and responses needed. They also must be borne in mind, though, so as not to overgeneralize, a point we come back to in the final chapter.

Third is that the case set includes both successes and failures. Here, too, this is in part a methodological consideration of providing sufficient variation in the outcomes of the cases to deepen the analysis and test the arguments. Also, all of our attributions of success and failure are made with two caveats in mind. One is that these are relative and not absolute measures, marking the sides of a continuum and not categories of a dichotomy. There are few successes that are purely so, whether it be in the study of preventive diplomacy or other areas of international affairs. Even in dismal failures certain policies that were efficacious can be sifted out analytically. The other is a sense of the potential transitoriness of these measures. This also can work in either direction: i.e., a policy that initially appears to have achieved its objectives then breaks down at a later date; a policy that initially seemed to have failed but becomes more successful over time. In the former case, the key analytic-evaluative question is whether the breakdown in prevention can be attributed to flaws inherent in the original strategy or comes about because of later mistakes that do not take away from the original success (in fact may even further confirm it). In the latter case, it is whether the policies in question or some other factors were most responsible for the deferred positive impact.

Comparative Case Analytic Framework

The essence of a comparative case study is to identify patterns rather than just single-case phenomena. The uniqueness of every case is to be respected, but the emphasis is on developing more general conceptual formulations, middle-range theories, and policy lessons. This amounts to more of an analytic than descriptive approach to the writing of case studies, with less need to “tell the whole story” of each case than to structure and focus treatment of the case on a set of analytic questions. The cases as such are less ends in themselves than means to the ends of developing “conditional generalizations;” a series of propositions with some general validity within and according to specified factors and parameters.
Accordingly, an initial set of case study guidelines was developed by the editor, and then modified based on first drafts and discussions at an authors' conference. These guidelines sought to strike a balance between establishing a sufficiently common framework to ensure cross-case analytic comparability, while avoiding a rigid framework that would preclude adaptations to fit the unique aspects of each case. A flexible yet focused structure was the goal.

The basic case study structure has five parts. It begins with a case summary, ends with a concluding section on lessons for both theory and policy, and includes sections on each of the analytic components of preventive diplomacy: early warning, key decisions on early action, and strategies of action. From the outset we stressed the flexible-but-focused analytic balance, allowing for different degrees of emphasis on different stages as warranted by different cases as well as some author discretion to modify the structure, but not to the point of fundamentally departing from the basic comparative framework.

Case Summaries

It is a given that each case in this project could warrant its own book—indeed, some of our authors also have written books on their cases. Yet for the purposes of a single comparative case study, we had to set limits (or at least targets!) of about forty to fifty manuscript pages. In their classic study *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Alexander George and Richard Smoke faced a similar challenge and met it by starting each case with a short “résumé of the crisis.” We have used a similar technique.

These are the key points addressed by the case summaries:

1. **Nature of the Opportunity—Missed or Seized?** If a case of failure, was it largely inevitably so, or was it a missed opportunity in which preventive diplomacy could have worked—if so, why, how, and on what analytic and empirical basis is the argument to be made? If a success, was it fairly readily so, or was it an opportunity seized by international actors—and why, how, and on what analytic and empirical basis is this argument to be made?

2. **“Anatomy” of the Conflict:** What were the principal causes of the conflict? What were the central issues? Who were the principal parties? Here is where some attention can be paid to the structural/remote causes, although more as broad context than analytic emphasis consistent with the proximate-and-pressing focus established earlier.

3. **Key International Actors:** Who were the key international actors? What were their policies, and why? What was the broader geopolitical context in which this conflict occurred?

Early Warning

Was there early warning? Answers do not necessarily have to be strictly yes or no, neither for any particular international actor nor for the international
community as a whole. Whatever the answer, it was to be as well grounded empirically as possible in terms of what was known, or at least knowable at the time.

1. Early Warning Availability: Was timely and reliable information available to policy makers?
2. Assessment: To the extent that early warning was not available, how much was it an informational problem, how much an analytic one? Conversely, if early warning was not a problem, why and how were the informational and analytic problems overcome?
3. Lessons: What lessons with broader applicability are to be learned? Under what conditions are these most applicable?

Key Decisions on Early Action

To the extent that international actors really do not have significant interests at stake, then there is a realpolitik logic to restraint, and not much further explanation for decisions not to act or nondecision inaction is required. The case thus would be less a missed opportunity than a conscious decision based on an assessment of the interests at stake and the costs and risks involved to take only limited action—and that whatever the consequences for other parties, such a decision process has to be acknowledged as rational insofar as that international actor's ratio of interests to costs and risks is concerned.

However, as noted earlier, the realism of such assessments often is suspect. The calculation of interests, costs, and risks by policymakers does not have to be accepted at face value and is open to being shown as having been flawed.

The questions on what key decisions were and were not made then become both descriptive and analytic. To draw again on Alexander George's methodological work, the cases need to provide “process tracing,” rich and fairly detailed accounts of the policy processes of the key international actors. We want to show what the reasons were as policymakers saw them, as well as assess the logic of their self-explanations.

1. Missed Opportunity: In cases in which effective early action was not taken, we need to assess the relative significance of the cognitive and bureaucratic factors discussed earlier, as well as political will.
2. Seized Opportunity: In cases in which effective early action was taken, the questions are the complements to the above: How was it that cognitive disinclinations were avoided, bureaucratic barriers overcome, and political will effectively mustered?

Strategies of Action

This part of the analysis is intended more to get at the “what” of the strategies pursued, the impact of those strategies, and how, why and at whose initiative(s) they may have changed over time.
1. Key Strategies: What were the key preventive diplomacy strategies that were pursued; e.g., international mediation, other negotiating and bargaining strategies, preventive military deployments or other threats or uses of military force, economic sanctions?

2. Mixed Strategies: What was the particular mix of coercive and noncoercive instruments in these strategies; e.g., how juicy a carrot/how big a stick, what part incentives/what part disincentives, how much diplomacy/how much coercion? Was military force, or the threat thereof, used?

3. International Coordination: How effectively were strategies, initiatives, and roles coordinated among the various international actors?

4. Domestic Political Orders: For conflicts over domestic political orders, what were the operative state constitutive formulas; e.g., power sharing, autonomy, secession? How appropriate were those chosen to the particular conflict at hand?

Conclusions: Implications for Theory, Policy Lessons Learned

We cannot undo the mistakes made in Bosnia, Rwanda, or elsewhere. But we can learn from these and the other cases of this first decade of the post–Cold War era, as we set out on the next decade—indeed, as we enter a new century.

We do not make claims to truths, laws, foolproof strategies, or any other such grandiose achievements. But we are very much concerned with drawing conclusions and deriving lessons that go beyond each particular case. The key is ensuring that the conclusions drawn are consistent with both the scope and the limits of conditional generalizations, as delineated earlier. This is true both for theory and for policy. Some of this conclusion drawing is done by each of the case authors, generalizing as appropriate from their respective cases. It is developed more fully in the cross-case analysis in the final chapter.

Methodological Considerations for Counterfactual Analysis

In all of our cases, we proceed from the proposition that neither the failures nor the successes were given. In the former, success was difficult, but failure was not a given; in the latter, failure was a very real prospect, success not a given—opportunities missed, opportunities seized, but either way opportunities were there for preventive diplomacy.

Among the failures we also try to distinguish between situations that primarily were failures of actions taken and those that primarily were failures to act. In the former situations, the international community did take certain actions but the policies were flawed; in the latter, it was mostly a matter of inaction, passivity, a virtual if not total absence of efforts at preventive diplomacy. Often the reality is a mix of the two, which is to be expected and can be accommodated with intracase analytic distinctions. But whether intercase or intracase, the differentiation between failures of and failure-to has implications both for the explanation of the case in question and the more general policy lessons to be drawn.
All of this gets us into the realm of counterfactual analysis, of trying to make claims and offer explanations of what could have happened. This type of analysis brings potential benefits of important insights and policy lessons, but it also comes with attendant methodological difficulties. In their recent book on counterfactual analysis as applied to international affairs, Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin stress that while there is no strict singular method for this kind of analysis, it must be done substantively and according to explicit criteria if we are to be able “to distinguish plausible from implausible, insightful from vacuous arguments.”

Drawing in part on Tetlock and Belkin, we have held our claims of missed opportunities and other might-have-beens to five principal criteria:

1. **Specificity**: It is not enough just to say that something else could have been done; it is necessary to specify the policy or policies, act or acts, and decision or decisions that would have made a significant difference in the paths that the case followed and its outcome.

2. **Minimal Historical Rewrite**: Even when specific, the elements to be changed in the case history need to be kept to a minimum. Counterfactuals that require “undoing many events” or otherwise posit their own long causal chain are much weaker than those that focus on key drivers and watersheds.

3. **Plausible Causal Logic**: The argument needs to be made as to why the postulated change would have altered the case path and outcome. The plausibility of the causal logic depends on it being consistent with broader theoretical propositions that provide more general and independent support. For example, a claim that more coercive diplomatic measures might have worked in situation X would need to be consistent with theories of coercive diplomacy; a claim about an alternative negotiating strategy, with theories about mediation and bargaining; a claim about military intervention and peace operations, with this literature; etc.

4. **Knowability**: The information on which any of the prior arguments are made must have been knowable at the time. This means that it can be demonstrated either that the information was available to key policymakers at the time or that it could have been but wasn't for reasons that can be plausibly argued to have been within the control of key policymakers.

5. **Do-ability**: Again with particular sensitivity to being realistic to the dynamics of the moment, the case has to be made that the favored policy, action, etc., was “do-able” at the time. This means taking into account constraints that may have existed at the time, such as domestic politics, weaknesses in multilateral coalition, and other sources. Here too, though, it does not mean blanket acceptance of no-other-way rationalizations. The malleability or nonmalleability of constraints is to be approached as a matter for analysis.

For the failure cases and efforts to explain how they could have turned out better, all five criteria pertain. The more specific and minimal the assertions of
what could have been done differently, the more plausible the causal logic of why these differences would have had preventive effects; and the more convincing the evidence that the information on which such arguments are made was knowable at the time and that the proposed options were viable, the stronger the counterfactual claim.

In the success cases, the counterfactual analysis goes in the other direction. It asks how these cases might not have turned out as well as they did. The first three criteria still pertain largely in tact: specificity as to what the key differences could have been, the same minimal rewrite rule, and a plausible causal logic established for the alternative path. By definition knowability is not in doubt, so the analysis needs to be geared to why; so, too, do-ability is not to be taken as given but assessed for where the consequences might have been different.

The Cases and the Study

Two final points regarding the cases and the study. First, a number of the cases are based on original and primary source research. They thus both draw on, and add to, the literature. Second, some of our authors are principally academics, others principally practitioners. The blend makes for a richer study, as the reader gets the benefits both of analytic approaches based primarily on scholarly research and ones based primarily on firsthand experience. All are noted experts, their wealth of knowledge one of the lasting contributions this study makes to the developing literature on preventive diplomacy in the post–Cold War era.
2

The Warning–Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy

Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl

SPECIALISTS MAY DISAGREE ON the scope of preventive diplomacy and, more broadly, preventive measures of various kinds. They may differ also in their assessment of policies and strategies to ward off undesirable events. There is no disagreement, however, on the importance of obtaining early warning of incipient or slowly developing crises if preventive action is to have any chance of success.

The end of the Cold War has diminished neither the importance nor the challenge of obtaining early warning. Indeed, the intelligence community today monitors and analyzes an increasing number of factors, in addition to traditional indicators of potential conflict, such as environmental degradation, economic conditions, and population trends. The increased complexity of gathering, sorting, and analyzing data for early warning results from the pressing need to respond quickly, efficiently, and effectively to rapidly changing global events. In an era of increasing demands on limited resources, the task is all the more difficult.1

In recent years the problem of obtaining early warning has received a great deal of attention not only within the United Nations, regional organizations, and governments but also from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and research specialists.2 However, the more difficult problem of marshaling timely, effective responses to warning has received much less systematic attention. A major objective of this chapter is to highlight this need for more emphasis on developing effective responses for preventive action of various kinds.3 We also emphasize that the design and management of early warning systems should be...
intimately connected with the task of responding to warning. We base this view on the belief that an improved capacity to know about and correctly interpret events early will improve the responses that are brought eventually to bear—a belief that is shared by a range of policy professionals, government officials, and informed publics. We do not offer specific policy recommendations for overcoming the gap between early warning and effective response; rather, we provide a conceptual approach through which to analyze the problem. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of how warning and response interact in policymaking. When successful, that interaction can help avert violence. When unsuccessful, the result is often looked upon as a “missed opportunity.” We discuss such missed opportunities, but with reservations, not least because of the dangers associated with counterfactual analysis. However, well-crafted examinations of missed opportunities for preventive diplomacy can be useful in bringing to light and learning from past warning-response failures.

Toward an Integrated Warning-Response Framework

Too much of the considerable effort to develop improved warning indicators has been divorced from the problem of linking available warning with appropriate responses. One explanation for this separation may stem from the stark lines drawn between collection and analysis in the intelligence community. Perhaps there is reason for this separation, for this approach may be traced to the increased professionalization of the intelligence field, where intelligence analysts assiduously ward off any hint that they “do policy.” They focus their efforts instead on improving the ways in which information is acquired and analyzed. Another explanation may lie in the very difficulty of policymaking in today’s international environment. It may simply be beyond the capacity of any single office or agency to stay abreast of global developments in such a way as to anticipate, craft, launch, and manage intricate, multilateral policy responses.

But whatever the institutional causes of the warning-response gap, expectations that governments will act responsibly to help ward off possible crises are quite real. These expectations arise, in part, because an increasingly mobile world population combined with the explosion of global communications (the so-called CNN effect) have helped create and inform attentive, expert, and often activist communities in many countries who know about problems before they become violent. In part as a consequence, it has become less plausible for government officials to try to explain away policy missteps or failures by pointing to the lack of timely or correctly evaluated intelligence, although the urge remains almost irresistible.

The complexity of world events combined with the compressed time span within which decision makers are expected to craft and articulate a policy to deal with unfolding crises make it harder, yet at the same time more necessary, for intelligence analysts and policymakers to work within an integrated “warning-response” framework. Indeed, the need for such an integrated approach was the fundamental lesson drawn from the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and
provided the starting point for post–World War II efforts to design systems and procedures for avoiding such a lapse.\textsuperscript{8}

As with the need to respond effectively to avoid a surprise attack, preventive action to deter the outbreak of various post–Cold War crises also demands an integrated warning-response framework. Yet, for such crises, the warning-response problem is often more complicated and difficult than for avoiding surprise attack. In the latter case, policymakers have already determined that some set of observable hostile actions would be an unmistakable threat and have the strongest possible incentives to acquire timely warning and to respond to that threat in some way. The same cannot be said for many lesser contingencies, such as ethnic conflicts or patterns of gross human rights abuses. Since situations of this kind— even in crisis— pose a much less grave threat to the interests of a third party, policymakers are often less inclined to demand early warning or to take it seriously and respond to it.\textsuperscript{9}

But one may wonder whether there have been many crises for which no warning was available, however misperceived, misjudged, or ignored. Experts predicted war in Bosnia even as the Vance plan brought a cessation of hostilities between Croatia and Serbia in 1992. The violent spasm in Rwanda in 1994 wasanticipated months in advance, although the magnitude of the killing was not precisely foreseen. Even Saddam Hussein’s precipitous invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was no great surprise to those who watch events in the Middle East closely.\textsuperscript{10} If events such as in Bosnia, Kuwait, and Rwanda are known (and increasingly knowable, given the rapidly contracting nature of global interactions), why are they not prevented? No simple answer is possible, yet a partial explanation may lie in the examination of how warnings are recognized and transmitted to policymakers, and with policymakers’ assessments of the implications of such warnings for action.

The Problem of Receptivity to Warning \textsuperscript{11}

Receptivity to warning has been a problem not only for conflicts that occur on the margin of states’ interests but also for situations threatening a surprise attack. Although the reasons for inadequate receptivity and response to warning differ in some ways for these two types of threats, it will be useful first to review experience with the problem of receptivity to warning of possible surprise attack and, related to this, to unexpected diplomatic initiatives that trigger the possibility of war. Properly scrutinized and evaluated, this historical experience may be suggestive for the design and use of warning-response systems for preventive action for other types of crises.

Experimental research provides a useful starting point for analysis of factors that impede receptivity to warning. Laboratory studies of difficulties in perception of stimuli provide useful analogies to the problem of receptivity to warning of emerging threats in the international arena. The results of perception experiments, however, do not encourage hopes for easy or complete solutions to this problem. Studies of a person’s ability to recognize a stimulus that is embedded in a stream of other stimuli have shown at least three factors to be important:
1. The “signal-to-noise” ratio—i.e., the strength of the signal relative to the strength of the confusing or distracting background stimuli
2. The expectations of observers called upon to evaluate such signals
3. The rewards and costs associated with recognizing and correctly appraising the signal

One might assume that the stronger the signal and the weaker the background “noise,” the easier it should be to detect the signal; weak signals are simply not picked up. However, even controlled laboratory tests reveal the task of correct signal detection to be more complicated than this. The results of perceptual experiments that deal with relatively simple psychophysical auditory or visual stimuli indicate that detection of a signal is not simply a function of its strength relative to background “noise.” Indeed, the effect of a signal’s strength on the ability to identify it can be less important than the second and third variables mentioned above.

The complex environment of international affairs only complicates matters further, adding domestic and international overlays to the basic “map” of the crisis situation. A decision maker’s expectations and the rewards and costs associated with recognition of the signal may be more important in determining receptivity to and correct appraisal of information about an emerging threat.

But while expectations regarding both the emerging crisis and the potential responses play a key role in a decision maker’s receptivity to warning, the logic of warning and the logic of response conflict. The logic of warning can be summarized as “the sooner the better.” However, policymakers generally prefer to put off hard choices as long as possible. Thus, even if a leader expects a situation to deteriorate, additional information or warning to this effect may not prompt preventive action.

Because policy choices in a crisis are often so difficult to make, individuals (as well as small policymaking groups and organizations) may discredit information that calls into question existing expectations, preferences, or policies. It is well known that discrepant information of this kind is often required, in effect, to meet higher standards of evidence and to pass stricter tests of admissibility than new information that supports existing expectations and policies. As a result, it is disconcertingly easy at times for policymakers and their intelligence specialists to discount discrepant information or to interpret it in such a way as to protect a preferred hypothesis or policy. In the United States, the establishment of multiple intelligence organizations, with their capacity for redundancy and rich detail, was designed, in part, to counter this tendency. Yet the habit persists. Indeed, not only is the discrepant information still discounted, but entire intelligence organizations can be discounted.\textsuperscript{12}

The “reward-cost” aspect of correct signal detection, too, can sharply reduce the policymaker’s receptivity to information of emerging threats, for early warning does not necessarily make for easy response. On the contrary, warning often forces policymakers to confront difficult or unpalatable decisions. One means for avoiding such difficult decisions is to reduce one’s receptivity to warning signals. Moreover, the policy “background” against which new information is judged can strengthen
the tendency to ignore or downgrade incoming information that challenges existing beliefs or exacerbates decision dilemmas. Thus, once policy decisions have been made within the government, they tend to acquire a momentum of their own and the support of vested interests. Top-level decision makers are often reluctant to reopen policy matters that were decided earlier with great difficulty; to do so, they fear, can be taken as an indirect admission of policy failure and easily plunge the government once again into the turmoil of decision making.

The Korean War

Psychological mechanisms of this kind have contributed to a number of important intelligence and policy failures. Among them was the Truman administration's pronounced lack of receptivity to the ample warning available in the spring of 1950 of the forthcoming North Korean attack on South Korea. As studies have shown, had the warning been taken more seriously, the administration might have weighed more carefully whether the perceived stakes in Korea warranted U.S. military intervention. If an affirmative answer to this fundamental question had emerged, the administration might have undertaken to deter North Korea. As it was, the North Koreans acted as they did on the mistaken notion that the United States would not intervene militarily on behalf of South Korea. Thus, the Korean War, with all of its fateful consequences, qualifies as a genuine example of war-through-miscalculation. It was a war that might well have been avoided had Washington been more receptive to warning and acted on it.

This case illustrates how information processing within the U.S. policymaking system was impeded and distorted both by the expectations or mind-set of the administration and by the costs that greater receptivity to incoming information of the emerging threat would have entailed. Taking available warning seriously always carries the "penalty" of deciding what to do about it. In this case, it would have required President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson to reconsider the earlier decision that they had made in 1949 to draw a line defining U.S. security interests in the Far East to exclude Formosa, South Korea, and Indochina. The exclusion of Formosa was part of the administration's policy of disengaging from the Chinese Nationalists, a decision that was far more controversial within the administration and with the public than the exclusion of South Korea. So much so that a reversal of the existing policy of no military commitment to South Korea in response to the warning of a possible North Korean attack would have been politically inconceivable unless Truman and Acheson had also been willing—which they were not, prior to the North Korean attack—to extend a new commitment to the Chinese Nationalist regime on Formosa as well.

As this case and others show, the policy background at the time warning becomes available may subtly erode the policymaker's receptivity to it. A similar misfortune occurred later in the Korean War. During September and early October 1950, the administration eased itself into a commitment to occupy North Korea and to unify it with South Korea. But when repeated warnings came in that such a move would trigger Communist Chinese military intervention, the administration found itself so locked into its more ambitious war policy that it
dismissed the warnings as a bluff. To give credence to the worrisome indications of a forthcoming Communist Chinese intervention carried with it the cost of reconsidering and abandoning the war policy that had given rise to the danger. In this critical situation, wishful thinking contributed to the administration's grossly defective information processing. Once again the result was that Washington was taken by surprise when the Chinese launched their massive offensive in late November. A new war resulted that neither side had wanted, one that might have been avoided had Washington not misperceived and misjudged the evidence of Chinese intentions.15

The Blockade of West Berlin

Similarly, in the spring of 1948, most American policymakers refused to take seriously the possibility of a Soviet blockade of West Berlin despite mounting tension and the fact that the Soviets had recently imposed a temporary blockade of Western ground access to the city. Some of the same psychological dynamics that interfered with optimal processing of incoming information in the cases already described can be seen here, too. For U.S. policymakers to have taken available warning of a possible Soviet blockade of West Berlin seriously would have carried with it the "cost" of having then to face up to and resolve difficult, controversial policy problems.

At the time an American commitment to West Berlin did not yet exist. Officials within the administration were badly divided over the wisdom of attempting to defend the Western outpost that lay deep in Soviet-occupied East Germany. Under these circumstances, it was easier to believe the Soviets would not undertake serious action against West Berlin than it was to decide beforehand what the American response should be to such an eventuality. In this case, fortunately, although American policymakers were surprised by the Soviet blockade, Truman dealt with the crisis without backing down or going to war.16

The Gulf War

The August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait offers a more recent example of the difficulty of correctly reading an adversary's signals. By mid-July of 1990, U.S. intelligence had identified the buildup of some thirty-five thousand Iraqi troops and three hundred tanks on Kuwait's border. At the same time, Iraq was bringing charges before the Arab League that Kuwait had, among other things, broken Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil production quotas and stolen oil from Iraqi territory. In compensation, Iraq demanded an increase in the price of oil (from $18 to $25 a barrel), $2.4 billion from Kuwait, and a moratorium on Iraqi debts to other Arab states stemming from the Iran-Iraq War. Should the demands not be met, Saddam Hussein threatened that he would "have no choice but to resort to effective action to put things right and ensure the restitution of [Iraqi] rights."17 Through the latter portion of July, U.S. intelligence continued to monitor Iraqi troop advancements. By the end of the month, one hundred thou-
sand troops had been assembled on the Kuwaiti border, accompanied by strategic deployments of ammunition and supplies. These moves, together with other ominous signs, such as the continued buildup of biological and chemical weapons and strong evidence of a nuclear weapons development program, highlighted the threat posed to the region and vital U.S. interests.  

Analysis of Iraqi intentions differed within the intelligence and diplomatic communities. Even the Kuwaitis at first believed Hussein was merely bluffing to gain economic concessions. Analysts tracking the situation within both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) eventually concluded (by July 25 and July 30, respectively) that Iraq intended to invade Kuwait. Even at this late date, however, high-ranking officials in the intelligence and military communities remained skeptical of the invasion analysis, believing instead that Iraq was likely to make only a limited border crossing.

American diplomatic response to the Iraqi troop movements was equivocal. Bush administration officials repeatedly stated that the U.S. had no defense treaties with Kuwait or other Arab states threatened by Iraq. The U.S. ambassador to Iraq reportedly told Hussein that “we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.” At no point was Iraq told what the consequences would be should it attack Kuwait or other Gulf states. Many now believe that the absence of a clear response led Iraq to believe that its invasion of Kuwait would be met with little resistance by the international community and, more specifically, the United States.

These several lessons of historical experience regarding lack of receptivity and inadequate response to warning of surprise military or diplomatic actions are applicable also to the different kinds of threats in the post–Cold War world that effective preventive action must address.

Genocide in Rwanda

The Rwandan conflict offers another, brutal, example of the difficulties associated with generating effective responses to the types of conflict dominating the post–Cold War era— situations that do not threaten a nation’s vital interests.

“Most leading activists believe that the government has compiled lists naming people to be assassinated when circumstances require.” So reported Africa Watch in a 1992 report highlighting human rights abuses and tensions between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority in Rwanda. Beginning on April 6, 1994, these lists were used as part of a killing spree that would, in a matter of weeks, take the lives of nearly one million people. The significant presence of international organizations (the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity) and representatives of key donor countries (including France, Belgium, and the United States) ensured that warning of the developing crisis was received by prominent actors in the international community. Despite this significant presence and ample evidence of deteriorating circumstances in Rwanda, there was an acute failure to respond. A number of factors contributed to this failure. According to one report:
There existed an internal predisposition on the part of a number of the key actors to deny the possibility of genocide because facing the consequences might have required them to alter their course of action. The mesmerization with the success of Arusha [the 1993 peace accord between the Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front] and the failure of Somalia together cast long shadows and distorted an objective analysis of Rwanda.23

Among the more obvious warning signals were “hate radio” broadcasts directed at Tutsi and moderate Hutu, continued training of Hutu militia units, and government-sponsored killings. Yet none of the major outside actors formulated, let alone articulated, a response to the potential outbreak of widespread violence. According to Human Rights Watch consultant Alison Des Forges, a particularly important event was the February 1994 murder of a moderate Hutu cabinet member by government soldiers. Des Forges noted, “When they [Hutu extremists] saw they could get away with that kind of violence . . . it encouraged them to go ahead with the larger operation.”24

While the foregoing discussion of receptivity to warning has been necessarily brief, it indicates that the impediments are numerous and that they cannot be easily eliminated. For this reason, most specialists have urged that the problem of securing and analyzing warning should be linked closely with the problem of deciding what responses are appropriate and useful in the light of the available warning, however equivocal or ambiguous it may be. While high-confidence warning is desirable, often it is not available. But neither is high-confidence warning always necessary for making useful responses to the possibility of an emerging crisis.

Indeed, this discussion of receptivity to warning of emerging threats applies also to information about favorable developments elsewhere in the world that offer opportunities for foreign policymakers to advance positive goals. For many purposes, policymakers do not need or require high-confidence forecasts of emerging opportunities in order to explore and facilitate such openings and possibly to turn them to account. Thus, for example, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the enunciation at that time of the Brezhnev Doctrine, policymakers in Washington (as well as other observers) speculated that these events may have increased China’s anxiety regarding a Soviet invasion. Was this anxiety (which its ongoing border conflict with the Soviet Union could only have heightened) sufficient to make China interested in détente with the United States? We cannot be sure of Chinese thinking at that time, but the point that deserves emphasis here is that it did not require a forecast that could confidently predict Beijing’s readiness for détente to make it worthwhile for Washington to explore and encourage the possibility discreetly. Sensible steps could be taken to reinforce and activate any disposition for détente on the part of the Chinese. From the standpoint of U.S. policy, the matter of possible détente was “actionable” even in the face of considerable uncertainty as to China’s readiness and conditional willingness to reorient its policy toward the United States.25
The Warning-Response Gap

We have noted that policymakers are often not inclined to take early warning seriously or to act on it in situations that pose the possibility of severe ethnic and religious conflicts, humanitarian disasters, or gross human rights violations. A number of reasons exist for this passivity. The first is the relatively low stakes perceived to be at risk. At an early stage in their development, such contingencies simply are not perceived to pose grave threats to a given state's national interests. Moreover, whether a low-level conflict or incipient crisis will escalate in ways that would eventually engage major interests of individual states or the international community often remains problematic and difficult to forecast.

Second, despite efforts to improve early warning indicators of possible flare-ups, such events are likely to remain equivocal, subject to considerable uncertainty, and capable of diverse interpretations. It is not that potential major trouble spots cannot be identified; rather, the problem lies in understanding such situations well enough to forecast which ones are likely to explode and when. Experts and observers are likely to differ in their estimates of how serious a low-level situation will become, with what probability, and how soon.

Third, early warning indicators typically do not speak for themselves; they require analysis and interpretation. But the kinds of knowledge and theories needed for this purpose may be in short supply. As noted earlier, specialists have worked more on improving possible indicators than on developing better theories and models to assess and predict the significance of the indicators.

Fourth, even in a case in which there is relatively good warning, policymakers may be reluctant to credit the warning and to take preventive action because they have been subjected too often to the “cry wolf” phenomenon. Oddly enough, intense policy concerns that actions may be seen as premature or unnecessary—revealing an embarrassing policy naïveté, or worse, the possible unnecessary commitment of scarce resources—generate a real wariness of “false triggers.” These policymakers, typically preoccupied with a battery of other problems that require urgent attention, often give only the barest attention to new, low-level crises that may never develop into serious concerns.

Fifth, and related to this, overload induces passivity. Given the large number of simmering crises, and given the ever-growing limitation of resources, policymakers find it impractical to respond with preventive actions to all of them, thinking that is reinforced by the general lack of knowledge regarding what efforts would be effective. Early warning of an equivocal, uncertain nature in such situations is insufficient for costly or risky responses.

Thus, in many ethnic and religious conflicts, humanitarian crises, or severe human rights abuses, timely or accurate warning may not be the problem at all. Rather, for one reason or another, as noted, no serious response is likely to be taken solely on the basis of early warning simply because a simmering situation that threatens to boil over may not be deemed important enough to warrant the type and scale of effort deemed necessary to prevent the hypothetical catastrophe. Moreover, this reaction can occur not only when what is at stake is only dimly perceived or not foreseen at all, but also if the coming crisis is fully and accurately anticipated.
Indeed, sixth and finally, it may be that a reluctance to act in the face of warning at times results not because warning is not taken seriously but rather because decision makers take it very seriously but are nonetheless deterred by the prospects of a “slippery slope”—that is, inexorable (and potentially intractable) involvement in an already nasty problem. This dilemma is particularly poignant for political leaders who must weigh incurring political costs now (in addition to the human and material costs that action entails) for benefits that will accrue downstream, if at all, with no guarantees that they would be given credit for preventing a disaster, now a nonevent. Thus, even in cases where the prospect of a catastrophe is taken seriously, there may be a lack of “political will” to take timely and effective action.

Numerous observers have noted that governments often ignore an incipient crisis until it has escalated into a deadly struggle or a major catastrophe. All too often political leaders find it difficult to persuade their people to support potentially costly and risky operations before a disaster actually occurs. As one report put it:

> People throughout the world tend to be guided by the media—and they are predominantly Western media—in determining when a problem warrants international action. Television coverage of a situation has become, for many, a precondition for action. Yet for most commercial networks, the precondition for coverage is crisis. There has to be large-scale violence, destruction, or death before the media takes notice. Until that happens, governments are not under serious internal pressure to act. And by then, the international community’s options have usually been narrowed, and made more difficult to implement effectively.

But as noted earlier, even when events that could precipitate a major humanitarian or violent crisis are perceived in a timely manner and accurately evaluated, decision makers will often still defer taking preventive action. As we have seen, this inaction is either because the warning is not taken seriously, for the reasons mentioned, or because the warning is taken very seriously but decision makers are loath to confront the unpalatable choice of responses facing them. Particularly for the complex and seemingly intractable disputes that have characterized much of the violence of the post-Cold War period, it may be less the unfolding crisis that conditions how a decision maker processes warning than the implications of that crisis for action.

**Toward Better Use of Warning**

However a policymaker responds to warning, that response entails costs and risks of its own; indeed, some responses could even be quite harmful. There is clearly a need to search for responses to warning that are useful in the situation without posing unacceptable costs. Even ambiguous warning, for example, gives policymakers more time to consider what to do: to step up efforts to acquire more information about the situation, to rehearse the decision problem that they would face if the warning proves to be correct, to spell out the likely consequences if the equivocal warning to which low probability is assigned proves to be genuine, to review their commitments and contingency plans, and—not least in importance—to seize the opportunity to avert a possible dangerous crisis.
Thus, even ambiguous warning provides an opportunity to deal with the conflict situation and/or the misperceptions associated with it before it leads to a violent conflict.

Nevertheless, it is a truism to note that policymakers prefer to receive unequivocal warning before deciding whether and how to respond. But, as noted earlier, high-confidence early warning is seldom available, and it can be highly disadvantageous if policymakers defer action altogether until more conclusive warning is available. It is precisely because unambiguous warning is so difficult to obtain that policymakers must confront the question of what types of response are useful and acceptable, even though the warning is uncertain or equivocal.

As noted earlier, once the problem of warning is linked with its implications for action, it becomes significantly redefined. Early warning of a possible crisis is desirable not in and of itself but insofar as it provides decision makers with an opportunity to make a timely response of an appropriate kind that might be otherwise impossible. Warning gives the decision maker time to decide what to do and then to prepare to do it. Warning provides an opportunity to avert the expected crisis, to modify it, or to redirect it into some less dangerous and less costly direction. On occasion, warning may provide an opportunity to deal with a conflict-of-interest situation or misperceptions before they lead to a military conflict.

Consideration of the warning-response problem requires that we introduce another dimension into the analysis at this point. Since response to warning is never without cost or risk, the development of warning-response systems, contingency response options, or ad hoc responses requires careful consideration of the possible costs as well as of the expected benefits of each option, weighed, of course, against the costs and benefits of inaction. At the same time, there are undoubtedly some responses to early warning of an equivocal and ambiguous character that are less costly than others. One could, for example, quietly intensify the collection of intelligence and/or begin discreet consultations with selected allies to clarify an uncertain situation before “going public” with more assertive measures, such as placing forces at increased readiness.

Admittedly, some low-cost responses may make only a limited or uncertain contribution to dealing with a troublesome situation. There may be, in other words, a trade-off between responses that promise a great deal but are costly and risky, and responses of a more modest but still useful kind that do not pose large costs and risks. The experience with trade-offs of this kind in dealing with the problem of surprise attack may be suggestive. In part, the trade-off dilemma in these cases can be dealt with by developing a calibrated warning-response system, one in which the level-of-readiness response increases with the level or urgency of warning.

For special historical reasons related to the trauma of Pearl Harbor, as noted earlier, American analysts concerned with the warning problem have focused attention primarily on the danger of a surprise all-out military attack. Lesser types of threats and crises associated with the broader and, in many ways, more complex tasks of preventive diplomacy and preventive actions have not yet received as much systematic attention in efforts to develop warning-response systems. Thus, the major uses of warning contemplated by the U.S. planners in the
past have focused on (1) the use of warning to alert military forces in order to reduce their vulnerability and to shorten their response time; and (2) the use of warning to reinforce deterrence by signaling to the adversary a strong and credible commitment to respond.

A broader range of threats and types of crises should engage the interest of policymakers and specialists on crisis anticipation. Similarly, a broader range of response options than the two uses of warnings noted above should be developed. A longer, more diversified list of possible uses of warning would include, but not be limited to, the following (general response options are listed here without attempting to judge their utility in any particular situation):

1. Gather more information about the situation. Step up collection of intelligence and public information.
2. Reduce vulnerabilities. Alert forces and citizens abroad to reduce their exposure and susceptibility to attacks of all kinds. Increase readiness of standby forces and alert special forces for contingency operations.
3. Reinforce commitments. Strengthen deterrence, whenever necessary, by signaling credible “red lines” that should not be crossed, using diplomatic means and, if necessary, military demonstrations.
4. Engage the targeted state in sustained dialogue. Establish clear and reliable channels for exchange of communications.
5. Take measures to reduce potential political/diplomatic/economic costs that could result from the emerging crisis in the domestic or international arena.
6. Conduct consultations with key states and allies. Raise the issue in the United Nations and other appropriate international forums.
7. Undertake a public information campaign to inform populations at home and abroad of the unfolding circumstances. Prepare publics for possible coercive diplomacy or military action.
8. Conduct a decision rehearsal; i.e., rehearse the decision problem that one would be confronted with if the warning proved justified. A rehearsal involves (a) assessing the damage to important interests should the crisis erupt (something that policymakers have done very poorly in some past crises) and (b) anticipating the political and psychological pressures that are likely to be brought to bear upon policymakers should the crisis occur.
9. Consider and, if necessary, clarify one’s commitment to take action should the crisis emerge. Warning can have the useful function of encouraging policymakers to identify and assess the complex interests that may be jeopardized if the crisis develops. Such a review may also result in a timely redefinition or clarification of existing commitments, identifying and separating issues that are peripheral and negotiable from those that are central.
10. Review, update, and rehearse existing contingency plans. Improvise new policy options tailored to the emerging crisis, taking into account potential actions of other states with interests at stake.
11. Initiate formal negotiations, efforts at conciliation, or mediation. On many occasions, for example, the UN secretary-general’s office responds to early warning by sending out fact-finding missions or by extending “good offices.”
The preceding list of response options characterizes in general terms the types of responses available to decision makers and is intended for illustrative purposes. More specific options must be identified in policy planning tailored to the type of situation and problem that is envisaged by the warning. Obviously, different types of incipient crises will require identification of different response options.  

This brief list should not obscure the implied steps that each measure entails. For example, using military demonstrations to underscore one's seriousness of purpose must be balanced against the desire to control the level of engagement (and avoid a “slippery slope”).

So much of this list seems like straightforward policymaking. What we mean to emphasize, however, is the need for an explicit effort to map various responses to anticipated developments—before those developments occur—and to associate particular response options more closely with foreseeable cues.

Missed Opportunities

Those who call attention to failures to take timely, appropriate actions in response to early warning of an emerging crisis often refer to them as missed opportunities. The clear implication is that it might well have been possible to avoid or limit the development of a major crisis—whether a violent ethnic or religious conflict, a humanitarian catastrophe, or a gross human rights violation—if only the international community or an external actor had intervened.

A word of caution may be in order. “Missed opportunities” implies that the “misses” constitute important policy failures of various kinds. Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid the analytic conclusion that such “failures” contributed measurably to a worsened situation on the ground. This assumption, that a crisis situation is the measure against which policy decisions and their aftermath are judged, may contribute to analytic clarity, but it fails to represent adequately all of the factors that constrain policy decisions—especially in times of crisis. Indeed, as we have tried to illustrate, factors unrelated to the crisis situation (domestic elections, credibility and other strategic concerns, or other international problems) can affect a decision maker’s receptivity to warning more than the circumstances causing the alarm—even when warning is “loud and clear.” Moreover, these other factors are frequently perceived by decision makers not only to be legitimate to take into account, they are often seen as more legitimate considerations than circumstances on the ground. Indeed, decision makers most closely associated with many of these so-called missed opportunities resulting in policy “failures” often strongly resist that indictment, arguing instead that their action (or wise restraint) was in the best interest of the public that they serve. Thus, even as the following discussion focuses on the crisis situation as the main measure of the effectiveness of actions taken (or not), we recognize the tensions that exist within the full context of these situations.

The assertion that a missed opportunity occurred is an example of counterfactual reasoning, a practice that is very frequently resorted to in everyday life as well as in serious analysis of historical outcomes. However widespread and indeed indispensable, counterfactual analysis is recognized to be a very weak,
problematic method. This is not the occasion to discuss recent efforts by scholars to identify requirements for more disciplined uses of counterfactual reasoning. Suffice it to say that statements that missed opportunities occurred in cases of failure of preventive diplomacy must be evaluated carefully to distinguish highly plausible from implausible or barely plausible claims. Efforts to do so are necessary not merely to improve historical analysis of cases in which preventive diplomacy was not attempted or was ineffectual; more rigorous counterfactual analysis is necessary also to draw correct lessons from such failures.

A useful start in this direction can be made by distinguishing different types of missed opportunities. The following is a provisional (though no doubt incomplete) listing:

1. Cases in which there was no response to warning by policymakers, who either ignored the warning or regarded it as insufficiently reliable, too equivocal, or uncertain (example: Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait)
2. Cases of inadequate analysis of ample warning indicators and thus an inaccurate forecast of what was to occur (examples: the 1979 Iranian revolution; the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950)
3. Cases of inadequate response to warning, either too slow or too weak (examples: slow international response to the developing crisis in Somalia; slow, graduated sanctions against Serbia)
4. Cases of misused opportunity involving responses of a misconceived, harmful, inappropriate character (example: European Union recognition of Croatia without securing a prior guarantee of the rights and interests of its substantial Serbian minority)
5. Cases of inconsistent responses (example: in the unfolding crisis in Yugoslavia, European countries often acting at cross-purposes, such as in 1991 when they tried to serve as mediator between Serbia and Croatia while pushing international recognition of Croatia and the imposition of sanctions on Serbia)
6. Cases of incomplete response to a complex crisis (example: Somalia, where the international community undertook to deliver humanitarian assistance but refused to engage in peace enforcement efforts)
7. Cases of contradictory responses (example: efforts by some states to install peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh being undermined by other states opposed to such a move)

In addition to some such typology of different categories of possible missed opportunities, we need, as noted earlier, some way of assessing the merits of claims that there was indeed a missed opportunity to avoid a particular disaster that followed. Counterfactuals are a way of rewriting history (exploring the possibility of an alternative outcome) by conducting a mental experiment—i.e., “if only this rather than that had been done, the outcome would have been quite different.” Some counterfactual assertions are more plausible than others. Those of us who believe in the necessity for timely responses to early warning may inadvertently
exaggerate the plausibility of a missed opportunity in cases that developed into
major conflicts or severe humanitarian catastrophes.

Several suggestions can be made for assessing the plausibility of assertions of
a missed opportunity. A basic distinction needs to be made between two con-
nnotations of the word opportunity. One use of the term implies that a significa-
cantly better/good outcome would surely have been achieved if it were not for . . . ,
or if only this rather than that had been done. A weaker connotation of the term
opportunity is that a better outcome was possible; it might have been achieved if . . . . A still weaker connotation states merely that a better outcome was possi-
bile but without indicating what might have been done to secure it. In making as-
sertions of a missed opportunity, and of course, in evaluating such claims, it is
important to keep this distinction in mind. Frequently, critics who identify a
missed opportunity blur this distinction.

Admittedly, it is often difficult to judge the degree of confidence that can be
ascribed to what appears to have been a missed opportunity. Practitioners who
engage in efforts at preventive diplomacy may well regard these distinctions as
an academic exercise. It must be recognized that those who engage in preventive
actions often do so without demanding of themselves that they be able to pre-
dict outcomes with high confidence; they make what they regard to be appro-
priate efforts and use what leverage they have to influence the course of events.
They reason that when the stakes are high, one must make efforts to influence
the course of events even when prospects of success are highly uncertain. It is
only human to believe that adverse outcomes might have been avoided or mod-
erated, if only . . . .

Such explanations for what may be dubious claims on behalf of a particular
missed opportunity leave us with the task of developing reasonable ways of evalu-
ating them. To construct a good counterfactual analysis of a missed opportu-
nity one needs to start with a good explanation of the actual outcome of the case
at hand. This step is important, obviously, because the counterfactual changes
what is thought to be the critical variable(s) that presumably accounted for the
historical outcome. If one has an erroneous/unsatisfactory explanation for it,
then the counterfactual analysis that argues that a better outcome was possible,
“if only . . . .” is likely to be flawed. Both the historical explanation and the coun-
terfactually derived alternative to it are likely to be more correct or plausible if
they are supported by relevant generalizations (and theory).

In formulating hypothetical missed opportunities and in evaluating them, at
least two questions need to be addressed: First, was the alternative action possi-
ble at the time and known to be possible, or was it something that one sees only
in retrospect? If the latter, then the claim of a missed opportunity is weakened
since it rests on the argument that alternative action could have and should have
been seen at the time. Missed opportunities that rest too heavily on hindsight
carry less plausibility, but, of course, such claims should not be dismissed if one
wants to draw useful lessons from such experiences. An after-the-fact identifi-
cation of an action or strategy not known or considered at the time can still be
useful in drawing lessons.
Missed opportunities differ, too, depending on whether the alternative is a simple, circumscribed action or whether it is a sequence of actions over time. In the latter case, counterfactual reasoning involves a long, complex chain of causation involving many variables and conditions, all of which would have to fall into place at the right time for the missed opportunity to be realized. The plausibility of a missed opportunity is enhanced, in contrast, when the chain of causation is shorter and less complicated. A missed opportunity is obviously less plausible when it rests on the belief or expectation that a different set of actions could have occurred over time and overcome a series of obstacles, thereby achieving a successful outcome.

The second question: Was there at least one or a few decisive turning points? Those who take a “path-dependent” view of history point to the importance of “branching points” in a developing situation. At such points, once events start down a certain path, all possible future outcomes are not equally probable. If an analyst who asserts that there was a missed opportunity does not provide a plausible scenario of how the outcome would have been more favorable, then it is not yet a strong candidate for a plausible missed opportunity.

Those of us interested in assessing possible missed opportunities more rigorously may find it useful, if not indeed necessary, to keep such distinctions in mind. At the same time, we believe that the difficulties of assessing missed opportunities should not discourage us from efforts to do so. It is not that we are interested in rewriting history per se. Rather, careful study of possible missed opportunities is necessary if we are to learn from experience.34

Conclusion

In this chapter we have argued that policymakers must cultivate an integrated strategy that develops potential responses with anticipated warnings. The need to do so will only increase as publics increasingly expect their governments to do something about crises that they surely see coming. We believe that it has become implausible for Western governments to claim that they “didn’t know” that something on a scale of Bosnia or Rwanda could happen. Similarly, claims that “nothing could be done” ring hollow when coming from such advanced, wealthy states. These states cannot prevent every conflict, but they would do well to strengthen their ability to act responsibly and in a timely manner.
Part Five

Rogue State Aggression
Opportunity Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in Korea

Michael J. Mazarr

Case Summary

The North Korean nuclear issue clearly represents an opportunity for preventive diplomacy that was seized, not missed. In the minds of some, the Agreed Framework reached in October 1994 and other aspects of the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue represent an incomplete seizing of the opportunity—a problem-solving approach that left significant elements of the problem in place. On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that on the issue of nonproliferation—as perhaps on any of the preventive diplomacy issues examined in this book—an incomplete and tentative resolution may be the only kind that will be possible, especially in the early phases of an agreement. In this context, the preventive diplomacy pursued by the United States in Korea may well have represented the best possible solution to a very complex problem.¹

This is true in the Korean case in part because of the U.S. national interests involved. In this case, as in many others that involve nonproliferation, those interests demand some ambiguity in the means by which preventive diplomacy is pursued. The U.S. interest in nonproliferation, as I will argue, is not absolute; it is an interest that must be balanced against other national interests. In this case, that balancing involved weighing the importance of stopping North Korea’s drive for nuclear weapons against the very substantial U.S. interest in peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and in fact in some long-range engagement of North Korea to establish the foundation for a so-called “soft landing” in the North. This
balancing effort produced an agreement—the Agreed Framework—that represents probably the best possible resolution of this potential conflict at the time, but that has nonetheless been criticized by those who would have preferred a more unambiguous result. As I will show, however, seeking what some have called a tougher or better bargain with North Korea would have risked war and permanent crisis on the peninsula, something in which no U.S. government—Republican or Democrat—has any interest. Perhaps the most important lesson of this largely successful case, therefore, is that the architects of preventive diplomacy schemes must take careful account of the various conflicting national interests involved and aim at a bargain that respects that kaleidoscope of interests.

Not surprisingly, many other case studies in this volume convey the same idea. As Bruce Jentleson has written, “Even if early warning is achievable, there remains the problem of mustering the political will necessary to act;” and most often that political will is a function of the interests at stake. In Somalia during the Cold War, U.S. anti-Soviet interests prevented a stronger line on human rights, and later the lack of a true U.S. interest in peace compelled a withdrawal in the face of opposition. In the Baltics, only the 1990 Soviet crackdown on dissent galvanized U.S. policymakers to give more attention to the issue, but even then Washington refrained from a decisive intervention. In Rwanda, as Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones note in chapter 10, the “threshold of acceptable costs” for intervention among the major powers was very low. Indeed, Alexander George and Jane Holl point out that, as a rule, human rights abuses alone “pose a much less grave threat to a state’s interests” than other foreign policy issues and are thus less likely to provide the political will to act.

One of the most important things one learns from examining the nearly ten-year history of U.S. policy toward North Korea on the nuclear issue is the crucial importance of the concept, widely used in the preventive diplomacy literature, of “ripeness.” By 1994, the various parties involved in this dispute were ready to solve the issue, something that had not been true in 1989 or 1990, when the United States first settled on a strategy for resolving the nuclear problem on the peninsula. For North Korea, as of 1989 and 1990, the full extent of its decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union was not yet evident; for the United States, the risk of war in Korea was not yet fully appreciated; for South Korea, too, the potential stakes involved in the newly discovered North Korean nuclear program were not yet obvious enough to prompt decisive action. Both or all sides must want an agreement, and want it badly, before diplomacy (or in other cases mediation) will be meaningful. No side can perceive the situation as zero-sum, and both or all must see advantages for their own national interests in achieving an agreement. These commonsense conclusions were very evident in the Korean case, which strongly supports the idea that preventive diplomacy before the conflict or dispute is ripe for settlement may have little effect, while very similar actions taken months or years later when the parties have decided that a solution is possible may produce sudden breakthroughs.

The North Korean nuclear case’s real lessons lie not so much in the fact that action was taken at all as in the reasons for it. Because nonproliferation was
clearly a substantial U.S. national interest, and because Washington perceived North Korea as a significant threat, discovery of a North Korean nuclear program was bound to produce a powerful U.S. reaction designed to end it—to resolve the conflict, so to speak, between a North Korean nuclear program and regional stability. Rather, the North Korean case offers lessons for other cases in terms of the strategies for preventive diplomacy adopted by the various parties involved in the dispute, especially the United States. It points to a successful strategy of the “package deal,” or carrot-and-stick approach—not in a narrow, tactical sense, but based on the broader strategic notion of granting association with or forcing exclusion from the world community—that managed to avert a conflict. The lessons of this approach are especially meaningful because the U.S. strategy in this case appeared to work: It gained North Korean agreement to an accord that, if fully implemented, will end Pyongyang’s nuclear program. As I will argue, moreover, similar strategies adopted elsewhere have had equal success.

What, then, were the strategies employed by the United States and its allies? Why did they work? Can they be replicated in other cases of preventive diplomacy? After a brief review of the facts of the case, I will examine these questions in detail.

During the Korean War, the United States made several threats of nuclear use, threats that must have impressed North Korean leaders. After the war, Washington deployed a substantial number of tactical nuclear weapons in Korea. The cumulative result of these U.S. policies was to confront North Korea with a real and growing nuclear threat. By the 1970s, South Korea was flirting with a nuclear weapons program of its own, and from the 1950s through the 1970s, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung confronted repeated shifts and eddies in the stance of his patrons, the Soviet Union and China.

Faced with these compelling threats and uncertainties, North Korea displayed an interest in nuclear weapons as early as the 1960s. The preponderance of evidence suggests that the program, which Kim and his aides may have conceived shortly after the Korean War, gained real momentum in the first half of the 1960s, in part with support from the Soviet Union, including a small nuclear reactor for research purposes. By 1984, U.S. reconnaissance satellites detected the construction of a second, and larger, Soviet-style reactor at the North’s nuclear research facility at Yongbyon—a type that would be perfect for producing plutonium for weapons as a by-product. U.S. officials requested Soviet help in the matter, and in December 1985 Soviet officials persuaded North Korea to sign the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). After a series of mistakes in which the North was sent the wrong type of inspection agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finally provided the correct version in June 1987. But the IAEA’s eighteen-month deadline for signing passed in December 1988 without any North Korean action.

In 1989 U.S. intelligence made three more disturbing discoveries: North Korea was building a plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon; the North appeared to be conducting conventional high-explosive tests of the sort required to design and
build an implosion-style nuclear warhead; and construction had begun on a third, much larger nuclear reactor with an output up to two hundred megawatts. This giant facility, when operational, could produce enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons every year. By late 1989, therefore, officials in Washington and Seoul finally and fully appreciated the real and growing danger posed by the North Korean nuclear program. To develop a coherent strategy to deal with this threat, the Bush administration conducted a detailed national security review of the issue in 1990. Officials from all major national security agencies participated in the review, which represented—in terms of this case study—the fundamental U.S. recognition of the problem and decision on what to do about it.

The review produced a thoughtful, four-part strategy to coax North Korea into signing the IAEA safeguards agreement—now nearly two years overdue—as a first step toward ending the North's nuclear program completely. Part one consisted of the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, an initiative that grew out of President George Bush's September 1991 worldwide proposal on tactical nuclear weapons and a recognition that the flexibility of the U.S. nuclear arsenal made the presence of tactical bombs on South Korean soil unnecessary. To maintain its neither-confirm-nor-deny policy about the location of nuclear weapons, the United States had South Korea announce the fact that no U.S. nuclear weapons remained in the South, then said it had no objection to Seoul's claim. These statements were in place by the end of 1991.

Second, the United States moved to reiterate the strength of its military alliance with South Korea to discourage any North Korean efforts to use the nuclear issue to split the alliance. A tough line, and very bold U.S. reaffirmations of the security alliance, were highly in evidence at the twenty-third annual U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul in November 1991. Third, late in 1991, U.S. and South Korean officials began to make it clear that the annual U.S.-ROK military exercise, Team Spirit, would be suspended the following year if the North agreed to inspections. Fourth and finally, the United States agreed to a one-time diplomatic exchange with the North in New York, the highest-level contact since the Korean War.

This diplomacy had rapid and substantial results. In February, North Korean representatives meeting with the IAEA in Vienna initialed an inspection agreement, and it was ratified by the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly on April 9. North Korea provided the requisite information about its nuclear program weeks ahead of time, and when it arrived it appeared comprehensive. IAEA director-general Hans Blix visited Yongbyon for a fact-finding tour in May 1992, and the first inspection team arrived at the end of the month and worked into early June. The long-awaited inspections were under way.

In the second half of 1992, however, this process fell apart. Most fundamentally, North Korea received few benefits for its cooperation during the first half of the year and thus acquired little interest in a continuation of the inspection process. In the North-South forum to implement the inter-Korean nuclear agreement, South Korea sought wide-ranging powers of challenge inspection, something anathema to the North's closed system. Then, in the fall of 1992, three developments put the final nails in the coffin of the inspection regime: South Korea revealed an alleged
North Korean spy ring, Seoul and Washington decided to go ahead with Team Spirit in 1993, and the IAEA publicized information that its inspections had turned up discrepancies in the amounts of plutonium held by North Korea.

Despite many warnings from the North, based on the disturbing evidence gathered by its inspectors, the IAEA on February 9, 1993, demanded special or challenge inspections—inspections on demand of suspect sites not on a country's list of declared nuclear facilities—for the first time in its history. Just over a month later, on March 12, as a direct result of the agency's demand, North Korea—as it had threatened—declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT.

The initial U.S. and South Korean reaction was muted, but a crisis atmosphere quickly emerged on the peninsula. After much negotiation and brinksmanship, North Korea agreed on June 11 to "suspend" its withdrawal from the NPT.

More tough negotiations followed. The United States insisted on two conditions: fulfillment of the IAEA inspection regime and resumption of North-South talks. Gradually, another new issue emerged: the threat to the "continuity of inspections." Without access to Yongbyon, the IAEA could not continue to verify that nuclear material was not being diverted for weapons purposes. On a number of occasions during the fall of 1993, U.S. officials said that a loss of continuity would trigger sanctions, and a military crisis seemed imminent. Finally, in the first two months of 1994, the United States and North Korea reached a new agreement on IAEA inspections, which took place in March. North Korean officials once again prompted a crisis by denying the IAEA two key procedures, but eventually the agency was allowed back in to complete its work.

By the summer of 1994, a new source of disagreement arose: the issue of the spent nuclear fuel at Yongbyon. Despite U.S. warnings and entreaties not to do so, North Korea removed the fuel from its main reactor at Yongbyon that spring. If the fuel were reprocessed, experts believed it would yield up to four or five bombs' worth of plutonium. Heading off an unsupervised reprocessing thus became the major focus of U.S. diplomacy—diplomacy that placed a major new offer of benefits on the table in July 1994, just before the death of Kim Il Sung. This offer, which represented the true culmination of the 1990 U.S. policy review on North Korea, appeared to turn the tide. After Kim's funeral, North Korean officials made clear that they wished negotiations on the nuclear issue to continue; and in October, U.S. and North Korean representatives completed the Agreed Framework, in which the North pledged to cap and then reverse its undeclared (and angrily denied) nuclear weapons program in exchange for tangible benefits, most especially the provision of two new light-water-cooled nuclear reactors.13

In sum, this history should make clear that the North Korean nuclear crisis represents an opportunity for preventive diplomacy that was not missed. The United States and its allies successfully implemented a strategy for resolving this crisis as fully as possible given the conflicting national interests involved. To examine how this result emerged—how and why the United States and its allies made the decisions that they did—I will survey three phases of preventive diplomacy in Korea: early warning, the decisions on whether to take action, and the strategies of action adopted by the United States. These phases roughly correspond to the years 1985 to 1989 (in the case of early warning), 1989 to 1990 (decisions to take action), and
1990 to 1991 (formulating strategies of action). Through this six-year period from 1985 to 1991, the U.S. government worked with its allies to identify a potential and emerging conflict, decided quite rapidly to take what it hoped would be decisive action to resolve the conflict, and through two administrations—one Republican and one Democratic—formulated a consistent strategy of action that has succeeded, at least for the time being, in resolving the crisis. The following sections examine how this happened.

To be sure, U.S. policy was not perfect, either from a preventive diplomacy perspective or from the perspective of general diplomacy. As I shall argue, for example, in an ideal world the United States would have seen a North Korean nuclear weapons program coming long before its reactor was discovered in 1984. The Reagan and Bush administrations could perhaps have taken bolder steps between that discovery and the 1989 revelation of a true weapons program to head off the crisis. Once the United States had put its preventive diplomacy strategy in place, allowing the process to slow to a crawl in the second half of 1992 created unnecessary risks of conflict. Some have criticized the Agreed Framework itself as overly generous to North Korea, in particular in that it does not require Pyongyang immediately to allow the kind of challenge inspections that would help reveal whether it does in fact possess enough plutonium for one or more bombs.

My point in suggesting that the United States pursued the best possible policy toward North Korea is not to argue that this policy was flawless. Rather, my argument is that, given the numerous constraints on diplomacy and the immense challenge of dealing with a prickly and isolated dictatorship, successive U.S. administrations, particularly the Bush and Clinton teams, provided us with about as good an example of an opportunity for preventive diplomacy seized as we are likely to find in the real world, as opposed to the world of theory. If this is true, then, the Korean case offers important lessons for the practice of conflict prevention and resolution generally.

In Korea, violence was not as threatening in 1989–90 as it was in many other cases in this volume, where ethnic or tribal conflict already had turned, or seemed about to turn, violent. Obviously, each case will be slightly different in this regard; each will find its own place on the spectrum between truly imminent violence and somewhat more distant conflict, and accordingly, between policies to address the proximate and remote causes of that violence. One cannot say anything conclusive on these definitional points in advance, except that, in each case, they deserve careful attention so that policymakers can be sure they are applying the right tool to the right challenge. Preventive diplomacy may be ineffectual when mass violence is under way and crisis management or conflict resolution is called for, while those more urgent measures may in turn be unnecessary and counterproductive when a conflict is still more of a possibility than a reality.

Early Warning

The issue of early warning in Korea perhaps offers the fewest lessons for other cases of preventive diplomacy because the particular kind of early warning information available to the U.S. government in this case was relatively unique. Ar-
The architects of preventive diplomacy schemes will seldom have such detailed and relatively conclusive intelligence information about the exact character and timing of a conflict or dispute.

As noted in the earlier brief history, national technical means, particularly satellites, provided the lion's share of the early warning evidence to the U.S. government in this case. Washington achieved early warning through standard intelligence procedures of observing North Korean military activities—observations that revealed, in 1985, evidence of a North Korean nuclear reactor program, and by 1989 clear evidence of a nuclear weapons program as well. In this case, U.S. officials faced no substantial barriers to achieve early warning, because established procedures and military capabilities made such early warning basically inevitable. In chapter 2, George and Holl contend that "early warning indicators typically do not speak for themselves"—but in the Korean case, they very nearly did.

The indicators did not, however, speak up until the mid-1980s. In retrospect, one could perhaps argue that U.S. administrations beginning in the late 1960s should have considered more closely the possibility that North Korea would attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. The North faced a U.S. nuclear threat and appeared to have aggressive ambitions on the peninsula; a nuclear arsenal of its own seems now to have been an obvious response.

On closer examination, however, the reasons for this lack of an earlier warning are perfectly understandable. The simplest explanation is that U.S. officials did not believe North Korea had the technical sophistication to construct its own nuclear power or weapons program; in fact, one rarely finds North Korea on lists of proliferation suspects in the 1970s, largely because its technology was thought to be too primitive. The small Soviet-supplied nuclear research reactor obtained in 1965, for example, was too weak to produce much plutonium and generate immediate proliferation concerns, and was in fact under IAEA inspection thanks to a bilateral agreement with North Korea outside the terms of the NPT. This perception turned out to be correct: Not until the Soviet Union provided the North with a full-scale nuclear reactor did a proliferation risk emerge, and it was at that moment that national technical means supplied decision makers with early warning.

One can find other good reasons for a lack of earlier attention to the North Korean case. South Korea supplied one important distraction by pursuing a nuclear weapons program of its own, which emerged in the early 1970s and absorbed all the U.S. nonproliferation energies on the peninsula for the better part of the rest of the decade. Regionally, too, with the opening to China in the 1970s and the intensification of the Cold War during the first Reagan administration, the United States had more serious concerns at the time than North Korea. And finally, even if U.S. officials had appreciated the risk of proliferation, they would immediately have been faced with the question of what to do about it. Making preemptive concessions, let alone threats of sanctions, years before the proliferation risk had fully emerged would have been politically impossible. As in other cases, therefore, the idea that a problem might emerge does not constitute early warning, because busy policymakers will not be able to respond to
that level of alarm. Only with the discovery of a large, Soviet-supplied reactor in 1984 did a vigorous U.S. response become necessary.

That fact leads naturally to a related question: Why was the U.S. response to that warning in the mid-1980s not stronger? Why didn't the Reagan administration choose to move more decisively to head off a potential nuclear threat before 1989? Here again, the events of the time make clear why a more aggressive U.S. response did not occur. Once having received Soviet assistance in obtaining North Korean signature to the NPT in December 1985 (assistance granted, U.S. officials later assumed, because Moscow had no more interest in nuclear proliferation in an unpredictable and aggressively than the United States), Washington had little legal recourse but to wait. The IAEA process called for the agency to deliver a safeguards agreement to an NPT member, which then had eighteen months to return it. Since North Korea had an incentive to delay the process, it would most likely wait the full eighteen months before responding. The IAEA compounded this problem by sending an incorrect agreement. By the time the IAEA sent the correct version, the deadline for North Korea's response had slipped to December 1988, and it was only in 1989 that U.S. intelligence uncovered the more disturbing signs of a weapons program. For most of this period, then, the United States was simply waiting for a cumbersome legal process of the NPT to work itself out.

But there was another reason why the United States would have been in no position to make a stronger initiative during this period: heightened Cold War threat perceptions stood in the way of the concessions that Washington would eventually include in the package deal offered to the North. In the mid-1980s, for example, North Korea made frequent and pointed reference to the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea and called for multiparty negotiations on a nuclear weapon-free zone for the region. As of 1985, however, the United States was in no position to withdraw those alleged tactical weapons; U.S. officials continued to view them as essential components in a regionwide nuclear deterrent system. Similarly, the eventual U.S. offer of movement to a semiannual Team Spirit exercise would have been unthinkable in the depths of the Cold War. Another decisive roadblock to earlier action was thus the simple fact that during the Cold War the United States was not free to make the kind of offer that it could make in the early 1990s; and, as I shall argue, the lack of a ready alternative in preventive diplomacy can often forestall action. All of this relates once again to the issue of ripeness: Even had North Korea been ready to bargain away its nuclear program by 1985, the United States was not prepared at that time to offer the incentives necessary to achieve such an agreement. Nonetheless, when early warning and the ability to respond came together in 1990, the United States moved with admirable speed and purpose.

One must wonder, however, whether such a response would be forthcoming in cases in which the threat is not as clear as a nuclear weapons program. Established civilian nuclear programs, nuclear reprocessing centers, and international programs of acquiring nuclear-related technologies all give relatively unambiguous indication that a state is seeking nuclear weapons. Moreover, a particular kind of government often seeks a nuclear capability—most often the so-called rogue
states such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea that flout international norms and are known to have pursued nuclear capabilities for some time. Thus, proliferation is at once both a more discreet and a more observable phenomenon than many other kinds of conflicts appropriate for preventive diplomacy. In addition, the U.S. national interests threatened if Iran or North Korea acquired nuclear weapons are much more obvious than those threatened if a developing nation lapses into civil instability or suddenly suffers from a major famine that sparks social unrest. In the case of early warning, therefore, the North Korean case would appear to offer few concrete lessons for other kinds of preventive diplomacy.

The Korean case, however, does suggest that strong enough interests can overcome the well-known “barriers to warning” identified in the international relations literature and in other chapters of this book. George and Holl refer to the importance of “receptivity to warning” and the North Korean case bears out the significance of this idea: U.S. officials were enormously receptive to signals of a nuclear weapons program in the North because of the long-standing adversarial relationship with Pyongyang. In this sense, the U.S. response to early warning mirrors that sketched out by James Goodby in the case of Ukraine, where obvious U.S. national interests and the imminent risk of crisis combined to mandate a rapid response. As Goodby explains in chapter 6, the U.S. response to proliferation concerns in Ukraine was equally predetermined: “No lengthy and agonizing debate was necessary to decide what should be done” by Washington, he notes; in fact, “So popular in the United States is the nonproliferation regime that political leaders would have had a difficult time in following a different course.” This was precisely the case in North Korea as well, and such interests overrode the barriers to warning in Rwanda discussed, for example, by Suhrke and Jones in chapter 10—incrédulity (the evidence was clear enough), “shadows” (none were strong enough to prevent action), confusion about the message (North Korea left little doubt of that), desensitization (unlikely on such an issue), and wishful thinking (a possible problem even here, but unlikely when dealing with such an unpredictable regime).

Another definitional question raised here—and an urgent policy question that faced U.S. officials in 1990—was simple and yet maddeningly complex at the same time: What was the U.S. goal in the nonproliferation campaign? This volume examines preventive diplomacy to avoid imminent mass violence, but in the Korean case achieving that limited goal would have been simple enough: Arguably, the United States could simply have turned a blind eye to the North Korean nuclear program and thereby avoided the risk of crisis and war inherent in confronting Pyongyang over the issue. (Some would argue that nuclear weapons would make North Korea a more belligerent actor and thereby increase the risk of conflict, though that is a somewhat less direct risk of conflict.) Yet in Korea, as in many other cases of preventive diplomacy, the United States had more at stake than avoiding an immediate war: it had to balance that interest against others, including longer-term ones such as nonproliferation and relations with regional friends and allies. The substantial U.S. national interests involved in avoiding proliferation in either Korea ruled out such an acquiescent response.
Decisions on Early Action

These same factors make the decisions on early action taken by the U.S. government quite predictable. When faced with the possibility of nuclear weapons acquisition by a highly unpredictable and historically violent potential U.S. adversary, the U.S. government had no choice but to answer the threat with an action it hoped would be decisive. The key lessons of the Korean case will therefore revolve around the kinds of strategies adopted by the U.S. government and whether they succeeded or failed. Nonetheless, the way in which the early U.S. decisions to take action occurred and the role of various government decision makers in that process do suggest some secondary lessons.

It is fairly clear in this case how the U.S. government mustered the political will to take such early action and overcame the tendency toward restraint inherent in its overall foreign policy. The U.S. government perceived North Korea as a major security threat. The North's million-man army continued to threaten South Korea and the tens of thousands of U.S. troops (and thousands more American civilians) resident there; the North remained in the midst of a campaign of terrorist activities abroad; and the U.S. government continued to perceive Soviet support for the North as strong and substantial. Again, therefore, North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons posed an imminent and substantial threat to U.S. national security of the kind that will seldom be seen in other cases of preventive diplomacy.18 (This fact dilutes the value of pursuing counterfactual analysis in the Korean case; one can imagine the United States pursuing a very different strategy for dealing with the North Korean nuclear risk, and I will examine such possibilities here— but it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the United States would have chosen not to respond at all.)

Nonetheless, a few aspects of this early U.S. policy stand out as potential lessons for other cases. The first is the importance of obtaining North Korean signature to the NPT. For many years after the initial signing in 1985, this appeared to be a hollow achievement as the North continued to delay in signing the actual safeguards agreement with the IAEA that would provide for inspections of its nuclear facilities. Yet, in fact, this early North Korean agreement eventually provided the basis for later legal claims and strongly supported the U.S. position in preventive diplomacy. If this case is any guide, then acquiring a commitment to general principles at an early stage of negotiation— in another case, assent to peaceful resolution of a dispute, or a compact to abide by certain international standards of human rights or other criteria— while it may appear to be nothing more than a paper agreement for sometime, could in the long run become very important in establishing a legal foundation for actions by the United States or others in the service of preventive diplomacy. The North Korean case strongly suggests that international norms are, in some cases, much more than mere words; they can sometimes provide a basis for very real and constructive world consensus on the importance of resolving a crisis and doing so in a certain way. Obtaining agreement of the various parties to these principles in advance will go a long way toward preparing the ground for these eventual legal claims.

That this conclusion is at least generalizable to other cases of nonproliferation
emerges in Goodby's chapter on the former Soviet Union. "An international regime of nuclear constraints was well entrenched," he writes. "It defined for the principal actors, even Ukraine, the general course of action required to remain within the rules of this regime." Indeed, Goodby goes so far as to say that a "principal lesson" of the Ukraine case was that "international regimes of equal clarity that enjoy similar widespread support are a prime requirement for a successful U.S. foreign policy in the new world now being built."

A second lesson of the North Korean case in this context relates to the question of why the United States did not in fact see the nuclear threat coming earlier than it did. Most "postdiscovery" reviews of the North Korean nuclear program suggest that its nuclear ambitions had their roots in the 1960s, if not the 1950s. In retrospect, given the level of U.S. military and nuclear threat to the North and the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Korean War, U.S. officials perhaps should have anticipated this nuclear program before unambiguous evidence emerged in the 1980s. The lesson here, then, is that the U.S. government needs to do a better job of establishing institutionalized means for reviewing and understanding the historical and cultural bases of conflicts, what new conflicts they might spark, and how they might create new tensions and what implications they might hold for preventive diplomacy.19

In the Korean case, for example, one could argue that a more careful and earlier assessment of North Korea's likely reaction to a continued U.S. nuclear presence on the peninsula might have produced proposals for withdrawing those U.S. nuclear weapons much earlier than the 1990-91 time frame when they were actually withdrawn. Satellite photographs of a nuclear reactor under construction, and later of the elements of a nuclear weapons program, provided a clear rationale for urgent action by 1990. But the more qualitative and ambiguous evidence of the historical, cultural, political, and military basis for a nuclear program might have produced an earlier U.S. action that could have resolved this conflict without bringing it to the brink of war, as eventually occurred in 1993-94. As I argued earlier, there were powerful reasons why the U.S. government did not do that, and it may be too much to hope for long-term foresight on the part of governments in other cases as well. Still, the very enterprise of preventive diplomacy assumes that foresight is a good thing; to the degree it can be institutionalized, the Korean case suggests, admittedly slow-moving government bureaucracies can be shoved a little further in the right direction.

Third, the Korean case suggests that the ready availability of an obvious policy option is important to a rapid response. In some cases, such as Bosnia, where prior to mid-1995 all the major options—from "lift and strike" (lifting the arms embargo against Bosnian Muslim forces and attacking Serb units with U.S. or allied aircraft) to outright intervention—were considered "difficult or unpalatable" (to use George and HolI's phrase), early warning may have had little meaning because U.S. officials saw no viable means of acting on it. Certainly, in the Korean case, applying sanctions and risking war was both a difficult and unpalatable option, but offering a compelling package deal to the North was not—and served as an invitation to respond to the very clear warning provided by intelligence.

Fourth and finally, Washington's early discussions with the Soviet Union and
its later negotiations with North Korea over the NPT raised immediately an issue whose importance would become ever more apparent in the subsequent eight or nine years: For the process to be successful, the negotiators appointed by each side must enjoy substantial trust and respect within their own governments. In the U.S. case, throughout the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, Washington enjoyed the luxury of having its North Korea policy generally in the hands of diplomats and officials who were among the most respected and trusted in their governments. When the Bush administration, for example, dispatched State Department official Arnold Kanter to New York in January of 1992 to have the highest-level official contact with North Korean officials since the Korean War, it was sending a highly regarded, experienced diplomat close to the top national security decision makers in the administration. Similarly, during the Clinton years, the man charged with actually assembling the Agreed Framework—Ambassador Robert Gallucci—enjoyed substantial bipartisan respect as a talented and intelligent foreign service officer who had already won widespread acclaim for his work on dealing with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction during and after the Persian Gulf War.

One can find similar examples of the importance of individual diplomats in South and North Korea. There we find a somewhat more mixed history, as President Kim Young Sam's first foreign minister, Han Sung-joo, eventually lost his job to charges of being too soft on the North, and South Korea's diplomacy suffered as a result. One can perhaps also assume that, in North Korea, only officials with strong political backing throughout the regime would have the authority to conduct meaningful negotiations— an assumption one can easily support by quickly noting the rise to preeminence in the successor regime of Kim Jong-il of precisely those officials most closely involved in the nuclear negotiations under Kim Il Sung. The human factor will often prove decisive in preventive diplomacy, which is perhaps in its broadest sense another powerful argument for substantial investments in a talented, experienced, flexible, strategically minded diplomatic corps.

Strategies of Action

As I have argued, it is in the specific means of preventive diplomacy that the North Korean case offers its most important and useful lessons to other cases. In surveying the U.S. approach, I will examine three specific aspects of it: the strategy itself; its mix of threats and promises, carrots and sticks; and its use of international coordination.

To begin with, the Korean case suggests that, in formulating a strategy for action, officials must take into account the cultural context for policy. Psychocultural insights provided an important background to the Korean crisis, offering possible motives for the North Korean nuclear program as well as insights into likely North Korean responses to various strategies. The case strongly supports the conclusion of Marc Howard Ross that "often the emotional intensity of bitter conflicts is rooted in perceived threats to group and individual identity... Only when these identity issues are addressed can any progress on the substance
of the dispute be made." As it happened, the U.S. strategy addressed these issues by offering the North a form of identity politics that it had craved for decades: improved relations and the promise of full diplomatic ties with the United States.

The Strategy

Reduced to its essence, the U.S. strategy toward North Korea was to create a package of incentives and disincentives designed to make clear to Pyongyang that its national interests were best served by ending its nuclear weapons program. To show the potential value of agreeing to inspections, Washington held out the possibility of an expanded political and economic relationship with the North; to whet the North's appetite, the United States granted the tempting morsel of the high-level talks in New York of January 1992. To demonstrate that the North no longer needed a nuclear weapons capability, the United States withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from the South and took other confidence-building steps (such as postponing Team Spirit for a year). To show the potential costs of refusing to agree, the United States made noises about potential UN economic sanctions and, when Team Spirit did occur, packed the exercise with sophisticated weapons to remind the North of U.S. military prowess. In some broad senses, therefore—in its general approach of offering benefits for cooperation and implicit penalties for noncooperation—this approach was similar to the package deal offered to Ukraine, described in Goodby's chapter, though in that case Moscow rather than Washington provided the tacit military threats.

In retrospect, the Bush administration deserves enormous credit for thinking the issue through so carefully from the outset and for developing a package of incentives and threats that represented a moderate and intelligent approach to the problem. One can easily imagine another government focusing more on threats and warnings, taking its case immediately to the United Nations for a vote on sanctions, and refusing to admit that U.S. actions (such as the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea) had anything to do with the North's program. In many ways, this initial model of U.S. strategy became the template for a subsequent U.S. policy of moderate toughness toward the North; it quickly and efficiently complied with the essential preconditions for a solution (most especially the tactical nuclear withdrawal); and it helped lay a foundation of thoughtful reactions to North Korean provocations that encouraged restrained U.S. actions in later crises.

In this approach, the Bush administration was operating in recognition of one important fact: nonproliferation is not so absolute a U.S. national interest that the United States necessarily would be willing to wage a major war in support of it. A U.S. president would certainly consider military action to halt an unbridled North Korean nuclear weapons factory, producing ten or fifteen bombs a year; but, shrewdly enough, Pyongyang stopped short of such an unambiguous threat. What was actually at stake by the early 1990s—the location of enough missing plutonium by-products from the main Yongbyon reactor for two to three bombs—justified a strenuous U.S. diplomatic effort but certainly not war.
Thus the enormous relief with which the roomful of U.S. officials, including President Bill Clinton, greeted the 1994 phone call from former president Jimmy Carter, who had traveled to North Korea as an unofficial envoy, indicating that he had secured an agreement with Kim Il Sung to forestall what looked at the time like an onrushing conflict. U.S. threats of sanctions and intimations of military action thus rang somewhat hollow, and this in turn mandated an approach that was fundamentally positive lest the North call the U.S. bluff. Here we can find another lesson for other cases of preventive diplomacy: Washington must think through the national interests it has at stake very carefully from the outset and shape its strategy to protect those interests, not exceed them.

Yet as much as the Korean model therefore suggests the value of a clear, coherent, and early review of policy and enunciation of strategy, it would be expecting too much to hope for similar approaches in most cases of preventive diplomacy. As noted earlier, a major reason has to do with the national interests involved; one has difficulty imagining all the key national security officials in the U.S. government gathered around a table for several days at a time, supported by extensive staff work, developing a strategy for resolving ethnic conflicts in Rwanda. In fact the Bush administration also benefited from a number of fortuitous circumstances in developing its Korea strategy: the existence, in key decision-making posts, of experienced and moderate diplomats; the happy coincidence that the U.S. military had come to its own conclusion that tactical nuclear weapons in Korea and an annual Team Spirit exercise served little purpose and could be bargained away; and, perhaps, a sense of urgency in Pyongyang to achieve a breakthrough in relations with the United States before Kim Il Sung passed into history. Had any of these circumstances been absent, this chapter might be discussing the North Korean case as a missed opportunity for preventive diplomacy rather than one that was seized.

Apart from the role of luck, the specific strategy adopted by the United States toward the North holds a few other important lessons. One has to do with the importance of a multifaceted approach whose fundamental tone is friendly and positive. Experts inside and outside the U.S. government frequently referred to the importance of "face" or pride in the Korean case. As much as this was said to be a "Korean" cultural issue of unique intensity, however—as perhaps it was (and is)—in fact only a small minority of major world cultures appear to place small emphasis on pride, recognition, and honor. Thus, whether one is dealing with Koreans, Latin Americans, South Asians, Chinese, North Americans, or almost anyone else, no state or group will easily accept proposals for preventive diplomacy phrased as demands and backed up by threats of sanctions if the demand is not accepted. Proposals couched as offers designed to meet the needs of all parties, in which inducements enjoy prominence while threats of sanctions (to the extent they are enunciated at all) lay well into the background, stand a much better chance of acceptance. This, in fact, was precisely the arrangement of the initial U.S. strategy toward North Korea: very public, friendly U.S. moves and offers, supported only indirectly by the reality of sanctions if the North demurred.22

In this same context, the North Korean case suggests something else about preventive diplomacy strategies: the value of unilateral concessions. The United States
gained a great deal from its decisions to remove its nuclear weapons from Korea, change Team Spirit to a semiannual arrangement, and meet with North Korean officials in New York. These moves directly paved the way for the IAEA inspections in 1992. Indeed, it was only when such concessions stopped later in the year that North Korea began the process of delay and accusation that would lead to the NPT withdrawal crisis of March 1993. Obviously, a permanent series of unanswered concessions would do little to promote an equitable settlement, and even in the Korean case, U.S. concessions were hardly offered out of pure goodwill: They were in fact designed to put enormous pressure on the North and marshal world opinion for sanctions if it refused U.S. demands. Nonetheless, the North Korean case strongly supports one of the central contentions of conflict resolution theory: that two actors can break out of a security dilemma with a single (or small series of) positive actions that create a self-perpetuating process of cooperation. 23

Indeed, the idea of a linked series of initiatives, a process of phased cooperation, emerges as an important strategic lesson of the North Korean case. Literature on game theory, conflict resolution, constructivism, 24 and a host of other fields generally agree on the point that building trust over time, through a number of linked and verifiable initiatives, will be more successful than discrete, one-time agreements between adversaries. In the North Korean case, the U.S. government employed packages of reciprocal moves both in the negotiation phase and in the Agreed Framework itself. So far, this approach has proven helpful in demonstrating to skeptical officials in Washington that North Korea is living up to each stage of the agreement.

The strong desire on the part of Pyongyang for good relations with the United States provided Washington with especially great leverage in this case, a trend one can also see in other examples of preventive diplomacy. Many developing nations see good relations with the United States (or other major powers), not only as an important symbolic achievement in their own right, but as the most essential precondition for access to the global marketplace. Recognition by Washington also confers political legitimacy and, in some cases, a certain sense of security; Ukraine, for example, demanded improved ties to the United States as part of the price for returning its inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal to Russia. 25 Whenever this issue crops up in negotiations, it will provide the United States with an important bargaining chip. In the North Korean case the U.S. package deal offered such recognition — indirectly at first, and later very explicitly — and in so doing provided the North with what one must presume was one of the fundamental goals of its nuclear program.

This is not to say that a broadly friendly approach will be desirable in every case of preventive diplomacy. The diplomacy that the United States might have applied to prevent an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the weeks before August 2, 1990, would presumably not have had a friendly tone at all: it would have consisted of threats of military and economic retaliation, large-scale movement of troops and equipment into the region, confrontational sessions with Iraqi diplomats in international forums, and the like. But apart from cases of imminent aggression, tough strategies like these will generally be more appropriate in the crisis phase, for conflict resolution or crisis management, than for preventive diplomacy.
Finally, the Korean case demonstrates that the willingness to spend resources—both financial and political—will often represent an important determinant of success in preventive diplomacy. While the initial set of benefits offered the North cost Washington little in purely financial terms, the final deal—the Agreed Framework—became highly controversial precisely because it required substantial expenditures on the part of both the United States and South Korea. (During 1996, indeed, the Republican Congress cut funding for the U.S. elements of the Framework in half.) Especially when dealing with governments or groups in developing nations with a strong interest in economic advancement, the United States will often face the need to spend money to impel or lock into place a settlement. U.S. officials should carefully assess these potential costs in advance and, to the extent possible, hammer out early agreements on cost sharing with international organizations or other major powers. This spending can become controversial among those who will see the final deal as insufficient, and officials need to think in advance about ways to answer such criticisms—in particular, to be very explicit about the costs of not pursuing preventive diplomacy.

Other chapters of this book, moreover, make clear that this same lesson holds true throughout the preventive diplomacy field. The cost of the Somalia intervention appears to have reached something like $4 billion; as Heather Hurlburt explains, resettlement aid for Russian officers played a key role in resolving the Baltic crisis; and Goodby documents how major infusions of U.S. assistance helped convince Ukraine to agree to a settlement. In short, preventive diplomacy has proven to be a checkbook enterprise as much as anything else, and there are few cases—Macedonia before the Kosovo crisis stands out as an exception—where the major powers pursuing an end to conflict have not had to spend liberally.

The Mix of Incentives

One important advantage of the “package deal” offered to North Korea was that it was, within a certain spectrum, all things to all people. Different observers looked at the same set of incentives and threats and, depending on their own experience or preconceptions, saw its mix of threats and inducements, of carrots and sticks, very differently. In fact, as suggested earlier, the approach was heavier on carrots than sticks, although the mix underwent numerous adjustments during the four-year course of diplomacy that led to the Agreed Framework.

When one talks with Bush administration officials about the initial mix of elements, for example, one finds several of them describing the strategy as an effort to “put North Korea in a box” and force it to agree to U.S. terms.26 In this model, Washington’s concessions were offered with a shrug and a clear recognition that the United States considered things like the tactical nuclear withdrawal as justified on their own merits, hardly “carrots” in any generous sense of the term. The threat of punishment looms large in the depiction of the U.S. Korea strategy by some Bush administration officials, many of whom did not expect North Korea to comply and who, therefore, assumed the eventual need for sanctions of some kind.
In contrast, some State Department career officials saw in the strategy a reflection of their own preferences for accommodating and engaging rather than confronting North Korea. The portrait that I have painted of the strategy, a portrait shared by many nongovernmental observers of the process, also takes the scheme’s offers as clearly more evident than its threats. In fact, the most common reaction to the overall process among many Republicans on Capitol Hill and in certain conservative think tanks has been that it represented nothing short of a sellout. This is, in my assessment, a shortsighted view (which, it should also be pointed out, is shared by virtually no prominent Bush administration officials) but one that, when placed alongside the comments of the officials who devised the initial strategy, shows how far afield perceptions of a single strategy can diverge.27

All of this is to suggest that participants not think of the mix of benefits and threats in any given preventive diplomacy strategy as an objective fact. Their meaning and interpretation—what the United States really meant by its vague security assurances to Ukraine, for example—are largely in the eye of the beholder. That ambiguity can work for good or ill; it is the task of the shrewd diplomat to ensure that it works for the good. The balance is a difficult one to strike. That same vagueness of the U.S. promises to North Korea, for example, while it may have allowed each side to read into the agreement what they hoped it would accomplish, now threatens to create severe tensions as the North increasingly recognizes that it and the United States meant very different things by “political and economic engagement.”

All the parties to the diplomacy would probably agree that the threat of military force most certainly played some role in U.S. negotiations with North Korea, but they probably fail to agree on just what role that was. The most obvious conclusion of the Korean case, drawn by all but the most pugnacious observers, was that the United States had no real military option. U.S. officials were centrally concerned about the missing plutonium; if North Korea had fashioned the material into bombs, a spiteful U.S. air strike on Yongbyon might produce a retaliatory nuclear attack on Seoul and still leave the North in possession of at least one nuclear weapon. Again, as I suggested at the outset of the chapter, the question of national interests was dominant. Although at times it seemed as if circumstances would push the issue into a crisis, and the crisis into a conflict, no reasonable analysis suggested that the United States ought to go to war over two bombs’ worth of plutonium.28

Military action becomes especially problematic in light of the sovereignty norm, an issue for any state contemplating an uninvited intervention into the affairs of another state. Even in cases of genocide or state collapse, the sovereignty norm can help discourage action by outside parties; members of the United Nations generally hesitate to endorse universal norms that might later be applied to them.29 Yet this barrier is nothing when compared with the effect of state sovereignty on proposed action to eliminate weapons of mass destruction or other national military capabilities. Without the justification of a collapsing or genocidal state, or a predator state such as Iraq defeated in war, U.S. officials may be hard-pressed to justify a clear and total violation of the sovereignty norm in cases of proliferation.
Yet what the military option did do, it seems, is rule out for North Korea some of its more extreme options. Some officials in Pyongyang must have had the sense that the United States would never allow them to withdraw from the NPT and turn Yongbyon into a rapid-fire bomb production factory, with the one reactor joined by others to be completed within a few years. Razing Yongbyon to the ground—had such an extreme act ever emerged in Washington as a viable policy option—would have ended that threat. Similarly, in other cases of preventive diplomacy, threats of overwhelming military response to an extreme departure from the overall peace process might be able to restrict one or more actors’ decision-making processes within certain boundaries. If the solution offered by mediators represents the best possible outcome for the actor within those artificially imposed parameters, then the threat of military action can indeed play an important role—not by overtly compelling signature to an accord, but by ruling out extreme policy options and forcing the parties to consider a narrower range of alternatives. Similar threats for a time served the same purpose in Macedonia, where a UN observer force and clear U.S. warnings helped prevent Serbian incursions.

Apart from the military option, however, the United States employed another probably far more important stick against the North: the threat of economic and political sanctions. Kim Il Sung and his top aides may not have believed that the United States would take military action against them, but they cannot have doubted that it would push for sanctions in the UN Security Council. And while China helped the North to fend off this pressure for a time, continued North Korean noncompliance with world norms would almost surely have forced Beijing into an abstention on a resolution of sanctions (as opposed to a veto). We cannot know how decisive the sanctions threat was to the North, and given the opaque nature of its decision making, we may never know. Certainly, as I have argued earlier, the threat was sufficiently weak that a purely threat-based approach to North Korea would likely have failed. But it is safe to assume that the threat played some role, complementing the offer of benefits with a clear price to be paid if the North refused to take up that offer. While the strategy offered its carrots more often and more broadly than it wielded its sticks, without the sticks the carrots would not have looked so good—and the strategy might not have worked. With no price to be paid for delay, North Korea might have held out almost indefinitely for a better deal.

The Effectiveness of International Coordination

In general terms, the United States coordinated world action on the North Korean issue very effectively. Washington encountered (and continued to encounter) the lion’s share of its difficulties in bilateral relationships with China and South Korea. For obvious reasons, both governments differed at times from the U.S. view of the best way to approach North Korea.

Yet here, too, the North Korean case may be unique among cases of preventive diplomacy for one simple reason. All the major actors in the drama apart from North Korea itself wanted the same outcome—an end to the North’s nuclear ambitions. For the United States, Japan, and South Korea, this goal involved
national security considerations of the highest order. But just as important, the goal also made sense, for less critical but still important reasons, to China, Russia, the European powers, and everyone else interested in the issue. Just as with U.S. policy, therefore, any disagreements in the world reaction to the North Korean crisis would center around means not ends. The end—nonproliferation—appealed to all major actors, something that will not be true in all other cases. As an obvious example, in many civil wars the simplest notion of all—achieving peace, for example—might not appeal to combatants who think that they can win through war but not through negotiation.

Still, the United States deserves credit for not bungling this strong hand—it generally managed international opinion and actions quite well. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations adroitly pushed tough language as far as China would allow it to go, while stopping short of proposals in the Security Council sure to trigger Beijing's veto. Both administrations also managed the touchy relationship with the erratic governments in Seoul—friendly to the North one moment, viciously hostile the next—about as well as could be expected given the two countries' differing national interests. This international coordination was especially important at a time, as I will argue below, in which multilateralism through U.S. leadership has been taking shape as the defining problem-solving model of the post–Cold War era. But the coordination was not painless, and the Korean case offers cautionary notes for future U.S. preventive diplomacy about two potential wrenches in the gears of negotiation: allies and international organizations.

In this case, it may be fair to say that, apart from North Korea itself, South Korea posed the single greatest hurdle to successful U.S. diplomacy on the peninsula. Understandably jealous of the role as North Korea's gateway to the world, condemned by the youthfulness of its democracy to suffer sharp swings in public opinion and government policy toward the North, South Korea consistently obstructed U.S. diplomacy, in public and in private. That it also agreed to the U.S. strategy, answered North Korea's brinkmanship moderately and responsibly and, in the end, advised Congress and anyone else who would listen to accept the Agreed Framework as the best possible solution to the conflict, is a great credit to a nation whose whole ethos is so bound up with the question of North Korea's future. Nonetheless, U.S. officials expended enormous amounts of energy in dealing with South Korean concerns, and it is no coincidence that the Agreed Framework resulted from a bilateral U.S.–North Korean negotiation. In future cases of preventive diplomacy where a U.S. ally is so closely involved, similar difficulties are likely.

Other far less intense complications emerged between the United States and Japan. For its own historical and economic reasons, Japan wanted more normal relations with North Korea. Tokyo strongly favored a negotiated rather than confrontational end to the crisis and disapproved of proposals for sanctions or discussions of military action. Here again the carrot-and-stick approach, beginning with a friendly and conciliatory tone, proved its worth: It addressed the allied request (and that of other major powers, including China) for a negotiated solution by testing North Korea's willingness to participate in one.
Finally, the Korean case suggests the growing influence of nongovernmental and international organizations, a trend with mixed implications for U.S. diplomacy. In this case, the IAEA displayed such an expanding role, from the outset enunciating very tough criteria for verifying North Korean nuclear-free status and refusing to accept North Korean assurances, even when U.S. officials would have preferred that the agency do so. Washington itself exacerbated these tensions when it tied its own policy to judgments of the IAEA in 1993 and 1994, saying that an agency declaration of broken “continuity of inspections” in the North would be grounds for UN sanctions. Having placed itself at the mercy of Blix and his inspectors, Washington had to plead with him not to make such an inconvenient finding, which would have prompted a U.S. drive for sanctions that Washington had no interest in pursuing at the time.

The lesson, then, is simple: International organizations such as the IAEA, along with nongovernmental groups (e.g., the Rockefeller Foundation, which funded Jimmy Carter’s visit to North Korea), are becoming increasingly assertive and independent actors on the world stage. They do not have broad-based national interests; most often they are single-issue groups dedicated to nonproliferation, human rights, or the environment, and their credibility derives from how successfully—and, often, how purely—they are seen to be pursuing those goals, as in Korea, where the IAEA’s stubborn insistence on objective standards of verification—in part an effort to make up credibility lost in Iraq before the Gulf War—complicated U.S. diplomacy. In other cases a badly timed finding that one party to a settlement is not respecting the rights of its minorities, or in fact has not stopped one company or another from polluting a river, could create severe problems for the architects of a preventive diplomacy settlement. In the ideal world, all such settlements would respect an uncompromising letter of the law on these issues. But in the real world, that will seldom be the case, and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other such groups working with a controversy-thirsty media can create substantial mischief. And if they are to work effectively, they must work together; coordinating the activities of all the various groups in war-torn areas has become a major challenge for governments. What this implies is the need to get such groups involved in the process from the outset, to provide them a stake in the process and deal with their concerns through negotiation and diplomacy—rather than attempting to manage the process exclusively through government channels, alienating other concerned groups and forcing them, in essence, to conduct their own policy through press releases.

**Lessons Learned**

The North Korean case holds a variety of large and small lessons for other cases of preventive diplomacy. One important theme it raises has to do with the role of national interests. At least in this case, they exercised perhaps the dominant influence on policy throughout the whole history that I have briefly surveyed. They caused the United States to respond the way it did to initial evidence of a North Korean nuclear program; they critically influenced the character and el-
elements of the package deal offered to the North; they ruled out immediate sanctions or military action; and, from the other side of the fence, they presumably accounted for North Korea’s decision to trade away its plans for an expanded bomb program in exchange for promised political and economic benefits. The lesson for other cases is clear enough: any U.S. preventive diplomacy strategy, no matter how persuasive the humanitarian or other arguments for U.S. involvement, must in the end rest upon a set of interests clearly understandable to an average member of Congress or U.S. citizen.

This is not to say that the Korean case recommends isolationism—far from it. It merely suggests that the U.S. role in legitimate actions of the world community must be calibrated and limited to the U.S. interests in the specific case, just as U.S. diplomacy in Korea—even on an issue of such overriding importance as nuclear proliferation by a demonstrated terrorist state—had its own limits. The alternative to such restraint may be a collapse of the entire U.S. role in preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. In the end, therefore, the U.S. experience in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program perhaps offers one overriding caution: A limited U.S. role in preventive diplomacy is better than no role at all.

The Korean case also suggests an overall template for preventive diplomacy strategies. That template has been well described by historian Paul Schroeder, who argues that the character of post–Cold War international relations turns, or should turn, on the question of “association versus exclusion.” Writing in the Washington Quarterly, Schroeder laments the trend toward an “enforcement” scheme in world politics, “a confrontation between alleged lawbreakers and supposed enforcers of the law.” Such a threatening and coercive approach, including sanctions and military threats aimed at the “lawbreakers,” risks tension and conflict, and as often as not will be summarily rejected by the target state. As an alternative to a pure enforcement or coercion model (a model that was not appropriate to the Korean case and will seldom be useful in other preventive diplomacy cases), Schroeder proposes a policy of “association-exclusion” that works “not by enforcing international law and punishing violators, but by forming and maintaining associations that include those who conform to group norms and exclude those who do not.” Gradually, Schroeder hopes, such a system might undermine irresponsible states that refuse to subject themselves to global standards of behavior.

This, in the end, is very much the strategy adopted by the United States in Korea—although perhaps with a slightly more obvious tone of enforcement than Schroeder would prefer—and it provides a useful model for other cases as well. It begins with the assumption that most states or groups want the political legitimacy and economic opportunity conveyed by membership in the world community of nations, with all that membership confers—admission to global economic and political forums, regular diplomatic contacts with the United States and other major powers, and the like. This fact provides the basic leverage for negotiators in preventive diplomacy: agree to a settlement, they can argue, and join the world community; refuse and remain (or become) a pariah. Besides North Korea, such an approach appears to have worked to a degree in
Bosnia, Ukraine, South Africa, perhaps Cambodia and Angola, and a handful of other cases. Modified and strengthened, it could also become the basis of a consistent U.S. approach to undemocratic or militant rogue states and to others as well.

The analysis of many of the other chapters in this volume suggests that the major powers already use this approach. In the Baltics, offers of international membership and recognition played an important role in obtaining the Baltic governments' agreements to compromises. The U.S. offer to Ukraine (as with North Korea) essentially offered it two paths, of association or exclusion with the major global and European trade and political institutions; Kiev chose association and abandoned its inherited nuclear arsenal.

Finally, these strategies will find their way into force through the new, post-Cold War model of international action—multilateralism under U.S. leadership. The end of the Cold War has diluted the very nearly hegemonic U.S. role atop the democratic world and created a requirement for a more equally shared multilateral approach to problem solving. It has not, however, undermined the need for U.S. leadership in such cases. The result is a daunting requirement for American leadership of a new sort—decisive but not onerous, consensual but not irresolute, formulating but not mandating a strategy for resolving the conflict, organizing but not dominating the effort to implement it. The United States achieved this delicate balance in the Korean case.
Part Six

Conclusions
WE HAVE HAD TWO principal goals in this book. One was to present expert studies of major cases that challenged the preventive diplomacy capacity of the international community in the first years of the post–Cold War era. Our authors have done that, providing important analyses and insights in each of the ten cases.

The other principal goal has been a comparative one, to discern and assess patterns across the cases in the successes and failures of preventive diplomacy. These patterns, and their implications for both theory and policy, are the focus of this last chapter.

The argument was made from the outset in the first chapter for the realism of preventive diplomacy: that it is a viable strategy and can be done, and that it has a strategic logic and should be done. With the evidence provided by our case studies, I return to this argument and show its substantiation. I then address the requisites for effective preventive diplomacy—how to do what can and should be done. The chapter concludes with a section considering the problem of political will, the difficulty of which is exceeded only by its essentiality.

The Viability of Preventive Diplomacy

The case studies strongly support the contention that preventive diplomacy is not just a noble idea, but is a viable real world strategy.
1. Missed Opportunities: The international community did have specific and identifiable opportunities to limit, if not prevent, the conflicts. But its statecraft was flawed, inadequate, or even absent.

Indeed, in many of the cases it was not just one point at which an opportunity for preventive diplomacy was missed, but in fact numerous points and instances. The errors were both of omission and commission, of the failure to act and the failure of action taken. This conclusion is drawn conscious of and consistent with the caveats concerning counterfactual analysis as discussed in chapter 1.

In the Somalia case Ken Menkhaus and Louis Ortmayer strike a sober balance as they steer “between the shoals of wishful thinking and fatalism.” They acknowledge that “no amount of preventive diplomacy could have completely preempted some level of conflict.” But they trace “a litany of missed opportunities,” presenting solid evidence “that timely diplomatic interventions at several key junctures might have significantly reduced, defused, and contained that violence.” They identify four distinct points at which opportunities were missed, a series of “cascading crises” through which Somalia descended into a “more violent and more intractable level of conflict.” They also cite instances in which misconceived actions taken by the international community “served to trigger conflict;” actually making things worse.

In the Rwanda case Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones also are able to substantiate a series of missed opportunities, including both the commissions of flawed actions and the omissions of inaction. They go back to 1989–90 when both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had gathered sufficient information on the increasing volatility of the worsening refugee problem (mostly Tutsi in Uganda) to seek to take a series of initiatives but got little support from the United States or Western Europe. They also stress as a key reason for the failure of the Arusha Accords the unwillingness of the international community to buttress them with tough and credible measures against violations and extremist violators. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) had “neither mandate nor capacity” to be an effective preventive military deployment. And on the eve and in the early days of the incipient genocide in April 1994, when the Hutu-dominated military still was somewhat divided, “an important factor in their decision to act was the failure of the international community to respond forcefully to the initial killings in Kigali and other regions.” Given these divisions within the military, “a more determined international response against the extremists would have found allies within [the military].” This conclusion also is strongly backed by Major General Romeo Dallaire, the UNAMIR commander, as well as in other studies.

Gail Lapidus makes a similar argument about the dysfunctional dynamic between the actions and inaction of the international community and the assessment of options and competition for influence among Russian elites in the Chechnya case. Here, too, while acknowledging the limits of the counterfactual, the emphasis is on the missed opportunity:

It is difficult to demonstrate conclusively that a more active Western role in the early stages of the conflict would have altered its course. However, it arguably might have created op-
portunity, space, transparency, and support for a serious negotiating process and strengthened the inhibitions against the resort to force. The existence of important divisions within the Russian elite, and therefore of potential allies of appropriate conflict prevention efforts, and the interest of a number of capable regional leaders eager to find a political compromise offered opportunities to influence the policy calculus that were never utilized.

So, too, in the Nagorno-Karabakh case, we get the balanced yet significant claim from Ambassador Jack Maresca that “a number of opportunities were missed that might have led to greater negotiating progress.” Indeed, this was a case in which there was a degree of early success, as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Minsk Group was able to bring all the main parties to the negotiating table in early 1992. But the process was allowed to “fizzle” over the course of the year, while the calculations of a number of key actors, both the parties themselves and the Russians, shifted in ways that shut the window on the opportunity for prevention.

As to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Susan Woodward is clear and unequivocal at the very outset of her chapter that “Few, if any, deadly conflicts in recent history that have provided more opportunity for prevention than the wars that engulfed the Balkan peninsula with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991.” Here, too, the analysis is both of failures in the actions taken — “so many actions taken with the intent of prevention, or justified as such, [that] rebounded perversely on the idea itself of prevention” — and of the failure to act as international actors self-justified their inaction with a view of the conflict as “inevitable” and of the parties to it “as intent on killing each other no matter what outsiders did.”

As to the Congo (Brazzaville), we had the intracase contrast between the 1993 preventive diplomacy success and the 1997 failure. William Zartman and Katharina Vogeli draw sharp contrasts between what was done in a timely and effective manner in 1993 and what was not done or was done highly ineffectively in 1997. They also show how the 1997 missed opportunities traced back to the failures to follow through on the 1993 seized ones, such as in not disbanding the militias, “an action that was absolutely necessary (and maybe even sufficient) to prevent the reexplosion of civil war.”

2. Case Evidence of Successes: In addition to the evidence of how the failures could have been successes, there are the successes that quite plausibly could have been failures, had it not been for preventive diplomacy.

The counterfactual works in the other direction as well, to show why the avoidance of major conflict in cases like Macedonia, Ukraine, the Baltics, North Korea, and at least initially in the Congo (Brazzaville) was not a given. Any or all of these could have become quite deadly in their own right — Macedonia, another ex-Yugoslav republic with a multiethnic mix sharing a border with Serbia; Ukraine and the Baltics, which each had their own bitter histories with Russia within which difficult issues had to be worked out; North Korea, whose hermit leadership and unpredictably aggressive track record sowed uncertainties and fears of any one of a number of possible cataclysms; and Congo, as it proved to be in 1997.
While there was some variation in the identity of the key international actors, in all of these cases preventive diplomacy had crucial impact. More of the who, what, and how from these cases will be brought out later in this chapter. For now suffice to say that we get an interesting cross-section: Ambassador James Goodby's emphasis in the Ukraine nuclear nonproliferation case on both the United States' role and the importance of a preexisting strong international regime with rules and norms of restraint; Michael Mazarr on North Korea, also emphasizing the U.S. role, although more in a carrot-and-stick bargaining context; Heather Hurlburt on Estonia and Latvia, with the focus on the CSCE/OSCE; Michael Lund on Macedonia, on a range of key international actors including the CSCE/OSCE, the United Nations, and the United States; and Zartman and Vogeli on Congo, crediting the OAU and especially Gabonese president Omar Bongo, who had an unusual combination of political and personal standing.

To attribute importance to preventive diplomacy is not to dismiss other factors, such as the roles played and decisions made by domestic actors. But as Lund puts it for Macedonia, "it is unlikely that the existing equilibria of interests and the fabric of relationships would have been able to contain serious outbreaks of violence for long without international preventive diplomacy." Moreover, in a number of cases there was an interactive effect by which domestic actors reached what I term a cooperation calculus, rather than a conflict one, in part because of incentives, assurances, and other support provided by international actors.

To be sure, as noted as caveats in the first chapter, any attributions of success are relative in two respects. First, the claim is not of total conflict resolution or the total absence or avoidance of violence and killing—but, yes, escalation to mass violence was prevented; the conflicts did not become horrifically deadly ones. Second, even that success can prove to be transitory, as in the Congo case, and as could have been the case as the Russian minority issue has kept coming up in the Baltics and as the 1998 Kosovo crisis pressured against Macedonia. However, unless it is demonstrated that the principal reasons for eventual failure were integral to the initial success of prevention, as an analytic matter such an eventuality would not totally negate the earlier success.

3. Purposive Sources of Ethnic Conflict: While all these conflicts have deep historical roots, the driving and dominant dynamic was more purposive than primordialist, much more the consequence of a volitional calculus than historical determinism. The cases strongly support the purposive side of this theoretical debate. To be sure, history has its legacies. The politics of identity—of who I am, who you are, and what the differences are between us—were driving forces in all these cases. But there was nothing inevitable about deadly conflict in any one of these cases. The conflicts were not strictly "these intractable problems from hell," as the prevailing Clinton administration view was expressed. They were fed, shaped, manipulated, directed, and turned toward the purposes of leaders and others whose interests were served by playing the ethnic card.

If identity were so fixed and conflict so inevitable, then one would hardly have expected, for example, for Bosnia and Herzegovina circa 1991 to have so much
intermarriage (more than 25 percent) and so few ethnically "pure" urban residents and ethnically homogeneous smaller communities, as Woodward points out in her chapter. The point also is made, albeit with some hyperbole, in a statement by a Bosnian Muslim schoolteacher that "we never, until the war, thought of ourselves as Muslims. We were Yugoslavs. But when we began to be murdered because we are Muslims things changed. The definition of who we are today has been determined by our killing." Suhreke and Jones could not be more unequivocal in their analysis that notwithstanding the deep historical roots of Hutu-Tutsi tensions, the Rwanda genocide was not primordialistic "mindless violence" but all too purposive: "planned ... fully prepared ... to retain political power and all that went with it." In Chechnya while giving due to the underlying legacy of antagonistic group histories and other factors inherent to the situation, Lapidus nevertheless also stresses the noninevitability of the war, that it was "deliberately launched by the Russian leadership." So, too, in the other cases in which we also see histories of ethnic and other intergroup tensions that fostered dispositions toward conflict but that in themselves were not deterministic and required calculations, decisions, and other purposive action by leaders and other fomenters to end up as mass violence.

4. Key and Unavoidable Role of International Actors: While not necessarily determinative, the actions and inaction of international actors have major impact on whether domestic actors make a conflict or a cooperation calculus. This means most importantly that there is no nonposition for international actors.

It follows from the previous point about the purposive nature of domestic actors that to the extent that international actors can be expected to raise the costs and risks for the violence options and/or raise the potential for gains from more peaceful conflict resolution routes, a moderating effect on the domestic actors' calculus is possible. If there is no such expectation, the calculus is left without a major constraint and is more likely to lead to violence.

Moreover, while international actors may profess neutrality, be it limiting their involvement to humanitarian rescue or simply staying out, there simply is no "nonposition" for the international community, in the sense of no impact one way or the other. If one party to the conflict assesses that it has the advantage in military and other means of violence over the other, so long as the other cannot count on international assistance to balance and buttress, it should be no wonder that it chooses war. In some instances the choice of war is at least in part a preemptive one, less out of outright aggressive intentions than as a manifestation of the "security dilemma," in which warfare breaks out from mutual insecurities and fears of vulnerabilities, which credible international action could have assuaged.

Our cases are strongly corroborative. Lapidus stresses that all along Boris Yeltsin still had "a considerable repertoire of tools and strategies" for Chechnya other than military intervention but made his choices in part based on knowing that the United States and others in the international community were not going to impose significant costs for using force. In Somalia, for all the "cruel and gratuitous criminality" that clannism took on, the fact that as late as the mid-1980s this still was "a country that was remarkably free of violent crime" runs
counter to the primordialist view of this violence as just an extension of historical tensions. Siyad Barre quite intentionally had politicized clan relations, and did so with U.S. Cold War–motivated support. The “conflict constituency” pattern by which General Mohamed Farah Aideed and other clan leaders pushed Somalia deeper into violence was not just an inevitability of state collapse; it was in part a consequence of international inaction and ineffective action that, however unintentional, was permissive and facilitative.

In the Nagorno-Karabakh case Maresca brings out a number of ways in which the West’s efforts to limit its involvement was consequential in its own right, as Russia saw that it had room to maneuver, and the conflicting parties on the one hand felt sufficiently reassured because of doubts about the West’s will to ensure the peace and on the other hand were not constrained from “deal shopping.” In Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina Woodward traces the numerous ways in which international actors not only failed to prevent or ameliorate the early stages of the conflict but exacerbated and worsened them. In Congo 1997 Zartman shows how the conflicting parties exploited the unwillingness of the international community to get involved in any serious way. As to Rwanda, the evidence of purposiveness and calculations of the international factor is exceedingly strong in the Suhrke-Jones chapter as well as from other sources.

5. Early Warning Availability: Where opportunities for preventive diplomacy were seized, it was in part due to the timely availability of reliable intelligence and other early warning information. Where opportunities for preventive diplomacy were missed, it was despite early warning availability. All told, and contrary to what often is argued, early warning was not the problem.

Goodby stresses how the Ukraine case was close to an early warning ideal type: no ambiguity as to the nature of the problem, a high-priority interest at stake, consensus on goals, receptivity to warning not impeded by problem recognition, no disincentive of having to consider military force as an option. So, too, in the North Korea case there was “detailed and relatively conclusive intelligence information about the exact character and timing of a conflict.” The early warning could have come earlier, but it was early enough, with the evidence of North Korean nuclear weapons programs beginning to mount in the mid-1980s and having become quite “clear” by 1989.

The timely and reliable intelligence and other information that constitute early warning was available to policymakers in every one of the ethnic conflict cases:

Rwanda: “information about the possibility of an oncoming genocide—or at any rate, civil violence on a scale that would undermine the peace process—was ‘in the system’ in ample quantity.”

Somalia: “Throughout the 1980s the international community witnessed visible signs of a worsening political crisis . . . there was no shortage of information warning of a deteriorating situation.”

Congo: “no lack of information”

Chechnya: “ample early warning,” for “both the parties to the conflict and the broader international community”
Baltics: “an almost ideal early warning”
Croatia-Bosnia: “there was plenty of early warning”
Nagorno-Karabakh: while “the international community did not foresee...the strength of Russian resistance to an international intervention on the territory of the former Soviet Union,” it was “despite clear early warning signals.”
Macedonia: initially “less like discrete alarms and more like general concerns,” but clearer and more clarion over time, and in plenty of time for the UNPROFOR-UNPREDEP preventive deployment of military forces.

This is not to go so far as to claim that any of these warnings were strictly unequivocal or self-evident. The “signal-to-noise” problem raised by Alexander George and Jane Holl was evident in a number of cases. This is a problem that in part goes back to the indeterminacy of the sources of conflict and the difficulty of ascertaining with reliable conditional probability whether incipient tensions and low-level violence will become major conflicts. It also is inherent to issues that may be major tomorrow but have to compete with imminently pressing issues for a spot on the usually full plate of policymakers’ action-oriented attention. The need for improvement in early warning is addressed later in this chapter. Still, the cases do show that early warning was less the problem than was response to those warnings.

6. Flawed Analysis, but Correctably So: A key part of the warning-response problem was misanalysis of some or all of the following factors: the likelihood of escalation to violent conflict, the impact on national and international interests, the risks and costs of inaction, and the viability of preventive actions. The case studies show this to be more a matter of faulty assumptions, inaccurate framing, and other correctable analytical flaws than of inherent problems of unknowability.

George and Holl make a case for the importance of quality analysis, the difficulties for achieving this, and some ways of improving the chances of doing so. This is one of the key links in the warning-response chain.

To an extent the problem was something of a first-generational one, in the sense of new types of issues bursting so quickly onto the scene in a period of historical transition. Not a lot of thinking had been done before Somalia about failed states. Yugoslavia was recognized to be a less than fully stable ethnic federation, but for it to descend into the mass murders, raping, and pillaging of ethnic cleansing? Or a country such as Congo, which never had had elections and campaigns before and thus provided little basis for analyzing possible scenarios and alternative strategies?

The analytic problems with these types of conflicts involved both assessments of the nature of the conflict and the probability that it would intensify and escalate. It is true that issues such as nuclear proliferation or Russian troops in the Baltics inherently have fewer analytic ambiguities and uncertainties. They also have the advantage of more apparent time sensitivity. However, we need be careful not to go from acknowledgment of the greater inherent analytic difficulties and explanations of why the analytic flaws occurred, to hands-thrown-up justification.
of unavoidability. The explanations tell us why analyses were flawed, but this does not mean that they had to be flawed. As Woodward writes in citing a Bush National Security Council official’s lament that they “simply knew of no way to prevent this from occurring”—“this explanation is insufficient; if something matters, one finds a way to act.”

It is in part the problem, as Menkhaus and Ortmayer put it, of being able “to think outside the box.” This is not easy to do, and not just for analytic-cognitive reasons but also for bureaucratic and political reasons, but it is doable. Making the analogy between Chechnya and the American Civil War, seeing the repercussions in domino theory terms, accepting at face value Russian officials’ “uncritically tendentious and self-serving analyses”—all are indicative of an “inadequate understanding of the situation” that, as Lapidus suggests, was not inevitable. The particular mix of these analytic problems varies from case to case. But whatever the mix, while things may not have been known correctly, they could have been.

Moreover, even if the first-generational argument is accepted, its very logic also constitutes its datedness. We now have had the experience of these conflicts with their various etiologies and dynamics, and we should be expected to have learned from them. Whether we have, though, remains in doubt, given the late and limited response in cases such as Kosovo. Once again the threat of concerted international action came only after the conflict had turned deadly and was more a matter of conflict management than conflict prevention.

A final point concerns the full-plate problem. This too is an explanation qua justification often made. This is a highly “inflexible” approach, as Maresca stresses: “The point is not to dispute the wisdom of maintaining such a hierarchy of priorities but rather to argue that it should be possible to maintain a sensible order of priorities and to seize opportunities related to lower-priority problems.” Given how often the full-plate justification is offered (e.g., the plate was too full in 1989–90 with the end of the Cold War to see Saddam Hussein’s aggression coming; the plate was too full in 1990–91 with Saddam to be able to deal with Yugoslavia or Somalia in their earlier stages; Yugoslavia was on the plate as Nagorno-Karabakh intensified), it is a problem that needs to be addressed. It is one of the reasons why policy-planning functions need to be taken more seriously and approached more systematically.

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In sum, there is ample basis of the viability of preventive diplomacy. Some opportunities were seized; many others (too many) were missed. It wasn’t that nothing or no more could have been done. It was that nothing, or at least not enough and not the right things, was done.

The Strategic Logic of Preventive Diplomacy

Still, though, the hard-headed question remains whether, even if preventive diplomacy is doable, it is worth doing. It may be viable, but does it have suffi-
cient value to international actors for them to run the risks and incur the costs of undertaking it? Why not just wait and see, kick it down the road, and a whole variety of other widely accepted saws that are premised on the ostensible pragmatic preferability of later-stage conflict management to early-stage conflict prevention? So the conventional wisdom has run. And so it continues to run.

The greater likelihood of concerted efforts at preventive diplomacy in cases that were predominantly interstate rather than intrastate in nature and that mostly involved geostrategic interests is one of the strongest patterns in our study. This is in part due to norms, a point we come back to, and in part due to interests. With Ukraine, North Korea, and the Baltics, salient geostrategic interests clearly were at stake. The action taken in those cases thus was grounded in realist strategic logic.

Our study provides a very strong basis, empirically as well as analytically, also making a case for the strategic logic of preventive diplomacy in the other cases as well—and for calling into question the conventional wisdom about the ostensible unrealism of preventive diplomacy in cases not self-evidently involving core strategic interests. The argument here is twofold: the need to reassess the standard calculus of low interests and high costs for preventive diplomacy in these situations, and an analysis of how the dynamics of these conflicts contradict the assumed preferability of waiting to see whether and when concerted action is necessary.

Reassessing the Interests-Costs Calculus

The low interests–high costs calculus so often cited as the strategic argument against preventive diplomacy underestimates the interests at stake for the international community and overestimates the cost differential between acting early and acting late.

1. Interests Underestimated: Even though many of these conflicts did not involve inherently strategic locales, the damage to major power and other international interests proved greater than anticipated.

In the introductory chapter I cited a number of studies that show how and why ethnic and other such deadly conflicts are more apt to escalate and spread than self-contain. While our cases show varying forms that this takes, the overarching pattern is a strong one.

The very terms ethnic cleansing and genocide leave no doubt as to the severity of the escalation of the conflicts in Croatia/Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda. Had these conflicts stayed at relatively low levels of violence, perhaps the realist calculus of limited interests would have held. But they did not, and so it did not. Nor does it necessarily matter in this regard whether one puts the miscalculation in underestimating the likelihood of escalation or in foreseeing this as a possibility but still holding to a limited interests assessment. Where the interests’ assessment went wrong was in sticking too much to standard measures such as locale (“not strategic real estate”) and resource endowments (“no oil”), and not taking into account how conflicts even in such places can have disproportionate impact on interests when they escalate to such extreme levels.
Diffusion, as noted earlier, refers to the spread of the conflict to other countries, particularly neighboring ones. The Rwanda case became virtually a classic example of this, in terms of the direct and intense interconnection of the consequences of the Rwandan conflict and the precipitants of the Zairian one. This is not to ignore the much deeper causes of Mobutu's fall. Nor is it any way to imply that the end of the Mobutu kleptocratic dictatorship was at all a bad thing. But the conflict diffusion point is about how violence begat violence.

The 1998–1999 Kosovo crisis and war in my view exemplified the demonstration effect that one conflict can have on another. In this analysis Milošević’s decision to resort to aggression in Kosovo in 1998 reflects his calculus of how the West would and would not respond based in significant part on what the West did and did not do in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, the damage to Western and other international interests from the preventive diplomacy failure in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was further exacerbated by this delayed but still directly connected spread to Kosovo. This is yet another way in which the “no-dog-in-that-fight” calculus by which the United States consciously refrained from serious efforts at preventive diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia, and the comparable flawed calculations by the Europeans, proved more shortsighted than hard-headed.

The Chechnya case makes evident another permutation, what might be termed a boomerang effect. Whereas the main rationale for nonprevention was the greater weight given to maintaining good relations with Russia, not adding to the instability Russia already faced, and being sensitive to the domestic political pressures to which Yeltsin had to respond, this very strategy ended up boomeranging against these very goals. As Lapidus stresses:

- economic and human resources that could have gone into economic development were siphoned off...;
- Yeltsin's own stature was weakened, and with it his capacity to deliver on other important issues;
- the military establishment was left demoralized, impoverished, and embittered;
- and the dishonesty and cynicism of officialdom exposed by the war further drained the already meager residue of public trust in institutions and leaders.  

The point here is a straightforward pragmatic one, distinct from other normative criticisms and the like: that nonprevention was counterproductive to the very interests it was to serve.

This is not to totally reverse the assessment of interests. It is not the case that preventive diplomacy always has an interests-based rationale for outside powers. Some conflicts may not escalate to ethnic cleansing and other genocide. Not all conflicts have the same likelihood of diffusion. There is some logic to giving greater weight to other factors in relations with a major power especially when the conflict in question embodies an asymmetry of motivations that leans toward that state's interests, a qualifying point that Lapidus also makes in the Chechnya case, as does Maresca in the Nagorno-Karabakh case. The central point, though, is that these are assessments to be made, not assumptions to be set. The same is true with regard to the ethical and values issues raised by these conflicts. To be sure, neither the United States, nor the United Nations, nor any other international actor, can or should try to right all wrongs. Yet it is not nec-
necessarily reducing foreign policy into “social work” to give national interest weight to humanitarian, justice, and other ethical considerations. Stanley Hoffmann is right when he argues that “the distinction between interests and values is largely fallacious . . . a great power has an ‘interest’ in world order that goes beyond strict national security concerns, and its definition of world order is largely shaped by its values.” Moreover, it is worth pondering whether in such a globalist age we want to become a people that does not feel a moral imperative to seek to prevent genocide and other mass violence and destruction just because it may be on a geopolitically unimportant piece of real estate. This too is both a moral question and a pragmatic one, as a “second image reversed” reverberation of how such hardening can affect domestic intersocietal relations.  

2. Costs Miscalculated: Whereas the costs of waiting tend to be assumed to be less than the costs of acting early, they have proven to be much greater than expected, and arguably more than those for preventive action would have been. In a sense policymakers are no different from most people in putting greater weight on immediate costs compared to anticipated ones. These costs, as Michael Brown and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat note, “are easy to measure and they have to be paid immediately,” whereas “the costs of inaction are much harder to measure and are usually realized only in the long term.” It always seems easier to pay tomorrow rather than today—thus the success of credit cards, and thus the disinterest in preventive diplomacy. There is the added probability calculus that perhaps the costs won’t have to be paid, the bill won’t come due, if the issue peters out or at least self-limits. Here too, though, in our cases we see the failure of these hopes, as the bills did come due, and when they did it was with the equivalent of exorbitant interest and late fees. “The cost of remedying a situation once it gets out of control,” as Sir David Hannay, British ambassador to the United Nations, stated, “is infinitely greater than the costs of . . . international efforts to head off such disasters before they occur.” At one level, this is substantiated by a host of statistics. In 1951 when the UNHCR was established, there were about 1.5 million refugees in the world; by 1980 this number was up to 8.2 million; by 1996 to 14.5 million, plus 23 million internally displaced persons. In 1971 the total expenditure by refugee, disaster, and humanitarian relief agencies was $200 million; in 1994 it was $8 billion. For the United States, in spite of overall foreign aid levels falling, the annual amount being taken by relief agencies has increased from $300 million in the late 1980s to $1.3 billion. At one point UNPROFOR was costing $1.6 billion per year, accounting for half of the United Nations’ total peacekeeping budget. The entire cost of the UNPREDEP Macedonia mission has been less than the per annum budget for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The less quantifiable aspect of costs is to the credibility of major powers and international institutions. There is a point to be made that credibility is not just about resolve but also about judgment and the capacity to discern when major interests are at stake and when they are not. This fits with the original interests calculus as an explanation of the disinclination to undertake preventive diplomacy. But just as this calculus was off, so too does credibility incur costs when, rather
than appearing prudent in not getting involved when their interests are not at stake, international actors appear to lack the judgment to discern that their interests are at stake and/or to lack the will to act when their interests are at stake. This in turn can undermine the credibility of other threats made and deterrence postures taken, as well as more general reputational standing.

Conflict Dynamics

The other set of reasons for the strategic logic of preventive diplomacy concern the dynamics of the conflict itself.

1. The Rubicon Problem: As difficult as preventive diplomacy is, the onset of mass violence transforms the nature of a conflict. A “Rubicon” gets crossed, on the other side of which resolution and even limitation of the conflict become much more difficult.

A former Croatian militiaman, who later turned himself in, reflected on his own killing of seventy-two civilians and command of a death camp. “The most difficult thing is to ignite a house or kill a man for the first time,” he stated, “but afterwards even this becomes routine.”19 The addition of revenge and retribution to other sources of tension plunges a conflict situation down to a fundamentally different and more difficult depth. The Croatia/Bosnia and Herzegovina conflicts never were going to be easy, but after all the killings, the rapes, the other war crimes, the tasks were vastly harder.20 So, too, in Rwanda, Somalia, and elsewhere where mass violence was not prevented. In contrast, one of the key reasons for the success in Congo in 1993 was that international action came relatively early, before levels of violence got too high.

One key reason lies in the “conflict constituencies” concept Menkhaus and Ort-mayer develop.21 Prevention is more difficult when the interests of major domestic actors are served more by perpetuation and intensification of the conflict than its resolution. The capacity of leaders who see their interests well served by the conflict to expand and maintain constituencies is that much greater when they have retribution and revenge to invoke. Similarly, leaders pushing nonviolence and cooperation have a harder time maintaining appeal. At minimum the security dilemma gets exacerbated as more and more people feel they have little choice even from a defensive perspective other than to mobilize for warfare. Moreover, the offense has the advantage as it is easier to attack than to hold, feeding the incentive to act preemptively.22 It is not quite a simple algorithm of the more deaths the stronger the conflict constituencies, but the direction of the arrow is evident.

Another aspect is that certain international strategies that may have been effective at lower levels of conflict are less likely to be so amid intensified violence.23 This point is part of the basis for the missed opportunities argument made earlier, and it is amply documented and defended in our case studies. Part of this is the classic problem for statecraft that the more extensive the objectives, the greater and usually more coercive are the strategies needed to achieve them. Consistent with both Thomas Schelling’s deterrence/compellence distinction and Alexander George’s work on coercive diplomacy, preventing a conflict from escalating to vi-
olence is a more limited objective than ending violence once it has begun. This is a key reason why, for example, Woodward concludes that certain EC strategies “might have been very effective . . . had they been applied earlier.” It is also why Maresca argues that “the most promising opportunities for conflict resolution by the international community may occur at the very beginning of an outside intervention while it [the outside intervention] is still credible and before it bogs down.” Comparable arguments are made in the other cases.

It is in this very crucial sense that options do not necessarily stay open over time, that a problem can get harder down that road to where it has been kicked, that when you wait you may end up seeing a much more difficult problem than you first saw. Other related literature shows a similar dynamic. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley, in their study of 97 disputes of various types involving 364 separate mediation attempts, found a declining success rate for mediation as fatalities increased. David Carment shows a much greater chance for third parties to help achieve “definitive” rather than “ambiguous” outcomes to civil wars and other internal conflicts when they intervene at an early rather than a middle stage. In a later and larger study on ethnic conflict, Carment and Patrick James acknowledge that “while there are no guarantees that early action will be successful, the prospects for success decrease over time.” David Smock, surveying a number of African cases, simply and clearly concludes that “starting early is better than starting late.” Roy Licklider goes further, arguing that once civil wars get going a military victory tends to be a more stable “solution” than a negotiated settlement. While each of these studies has its own way of trying to identify where the Rubicon is, as do our cases, the specifics are less important than the basic pattern of mass violence marking a Rubicon, on the other side of which resolution and even limitation of the conflict become much more difficult.

This point also has implications for the theory of “ripeness.” As developed by Zartman in his other work, as well as by others, this is an important and powerful theory. The central idea is that there are points in the life cycle of conflicts at which they are more conducive to possible resolution than others. When a situation is not “ripe,” as determined in large part by the extent to which the parties to the conflict are disposed to even seriously consider an agreement, international strategies have much less chance of succeeding than others. But while ripeness theory is helpful in counseling prudent assessments of when and where to engage so as not to overestimate the chances of success, it sometimes gets interpreted and applied in ways that underestimate the risks and costs of waiting. Natural processes do not only work in one direction; they can move toward ripening but also toward “rotting.” The crops can be left in the fields too long, as well as harvested too early; the conflict may be intervened in too early, but it also can deteriorate over time, grow worse, become too far gone.

Moreover, the whole natural process metaphor may be misleading. Farmers do have their almanacs, but they also apply the methods of agricultural science both to help the process of ripening and to hinder rotting. While every farmer knows the limits of what he can do to alter nature, he does what he can—irrigates, fumigates, fertilizes—to shape the natural processes in his favor. So, too, with preventive diplomacy and other aspects of conflict resolution. The dynamics of conflict
cycles, with phases that vary in conduciveness to external intervention, need to be taken into account. But they should not be treated strictly as parameters that fix the options. Here too there needs to be “cultivation” of ripening-helping and rotting-hindering forces and conditions.

2. The Humpty Dumpty Problem: Putting such severely shattered societies back together again is enormously difficult, hugely expensive, very risky—and, very possibly, just not possible.

One of the key tenets of the argument for not acting early has been that, when the time came what was needed to be done could be done. Yet the experience has been that ending the conflicts has been one thing, putting the societies back together quite another. It is a problem, to again draw on work by Zartman, of “putting Humpty-Dumpty together again.”

As noted at the outset, while the principal purposes of this study are geared to a primary focus on the proximate precrisis time frame of prevention, there also is the longer view that goes back to more deeply rooted political, social, and economic causes. This is the operational prevention/structural prevention differentiation made by the Carnegie Commission and by others in analogous terms. To be sure, the challenges posed by the structural/longer-term factors are formidable even under “normal” circumstances, i.e., without the added divisions and devastation of deadly conflict, with just the inherent problems of trying to build democratic political institutions and foster sustainable development in societies in which there is little supportive history and numerous obstacles.

Take, for example, the statement of the goals for fostering civic society by an NGO in Poland: “A society in which ordinary citizens trust each other, organize voluntarily to achieve common ends, expect local government to respond to their needs, and participate generally in the public life of the community.”

Such goals are hard enough to foster in societies that “only” have their past legacy to deal with, let alone societies that in the present are being torn asunder by mass violence. It is a sufficiently formidable task to find and foster “social capital,” in Robert Putnam’s term, when there is little history of having accumulated it, but to destroy what there is makes the problem even worse.

The same argument holds in economic terms. The baseline from which post–Cold War development has been starting generally has been a low one. Transitional economies face complex economic problems, and they do so amid cross-cutting international and domestic pressures for growth and equity. Again these are formidable problems by definition and assuming peaceful transitions, without adding on the problem of economic reconstruction. The point has been made earlier that part of the purposive nature of these conflicts is economic, that conflicts over the distribution of wealth and the availability of economic opportunity often closely correlate and connect with ethnic divisions. The economic devastation of years of conflict means that reconstruction has to go on along with redistribution.

Even providing the basic relief of humanitarian aid to societies once they are war-torn has been difficult and dangerous. The Rwandan case illustrates how food distribution and other humanitarian assistance risks ending up getting politicized, feeding the conflict as it tries to feed the people. Relief agencies allowed the exiled
Hutu government to reconstitute itself in the camps, thinking that they would help with food distribution and maintenance of order. Instead, though, the militants made their own people their hostages and used their control of food and other relief supplies as weapons in their continuing struggle. According to one report:

the Hutu former government even instituted a system to tax the refugees, taking a chunk of international aid material, selling it on the black market and using the profits to enrich itself and buy guns. In one camp alone the Hutu government generated $6 million a year for weapons purchases. . . . Hutus who expressed the wish to return to Rwanda peacefully were harassed and sometimes killed.  

The very safety of relief workers has been precarious. The most glaring case was the murder of six International Red Cross workers in Chechnya, sleeping in their beds in a hospital—the worst atrocity against the Red Cross in its more than 130-year history. A rash of attacks on humanitarian workers in Rwanda in January–February 1997, including the ambush and killing of a five-member UN human rights team, prompted UNHCR to withdraw all its monitors from that part of the country. In March 1998 the Red Cross felt compelled to withdraw its workers from Kosovo because of death threats. Overall estimates are of several hundred relief workers being killed every year.

And how devastated these wars have left their economies and societies. At the time of the signing of the Dayton Accord, industrial output in Bosnia and Herzegovina was only 5 percent of its 1990 level. World Bank chairman James D. Wolfensohn summarized the situation: “A quarter of a million men, women and children killed; another 200,000 wounded; a third of all health facilities damaged . . . [also] half of all educational facilities and two-thirds of all housing . . . 9 out of 10 people dependent on humanitarian assistance.”

With regard to trying to establish a sense for and standard of justice, where does one start? With justice against war criminals?—but then there was the fear that arresting the likes of Karadžić and Mladić would reantagonize the Bosnian Serbs and destabilize the situation. With returning refugees to their homes?—but then what about Vukovar where, rather than the envisioned showcase for reintegration, there has been what an OSCE official called “administrative ethnic cleansing” as returning Croats have sought vengeance against the Serbs? What of Rwanda, where there were more than seventy-five thousand war crimes suspects still in jail two years after the genocide? And the estimated two to five thousand children born of rape? Moreover, the killings continued on, not only in the spread to Zaire/Congo but also within the internal vicious cycle as with the report of 350 Hutu killed by the Tutsi-led army in January 1997. The “thirst for vengeance” and how to quench it in a way that both establishes accountability for the past and a basis for moving toward the future has been a wrenching moral dilemma.

Many pieces shattered, on the ground.

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One of the more controversial debates in the conflict resolution literature has been over proposals for partition and mass population transfers as the optimal
approach in cases of particularly deadly conflicts involving peoples deeply divided on ethnic and other lines of identity. The rationale, as Chaim Kaufmann puts it, is that we need to acknowledge that some of the solutions to ethnic conflicts that may be desirable are “impossible,” while those like partition and mass population transfers that we reactively dismiss are the only ones that really are “possible.” The point here is not to resolve this debate. But the very fact that such far-reaching proposals are on the table is further reason why prevention is so important. A world that gives up on the values of social integration and societal heterogeneity would be headed in a dangerous direction. The key is to avoid ending up in situations in which the choices are between a bad and a worse option, and especially where that which is desirable may have become impossible and that which is possible is not very desirable.

The Requisites of Preventive Diplomacy

Having established the viability of preventive diplomacy (that it can be done) and its value (that it should be done), the follow-up question is how to do it. We use the term requisites only in a broad sense of guidelines that have sufficient generality to constitute the parameters of a strategy but also are to be adapted for specific application on a case-by-case basis.

Early Warning

While early warning did not prove to be a major problem in our cases, much more still can be done to improve international early warning capacity. The UN has a number of early warning mechanisms that it continues to develop on its own as well as in conjunction with national governments and NGOs. A number of entities are working together in the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), although its mandate is primarily the prevention of humanitarian emergencies. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has its own early warning for refugee-related emergencies, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has its system, the Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS), for droughts and other food-related emergencies. But as David Carment and Karen Garner point out, “no such global entity exists that is capable of monitoring politically generated catastrophes.” Yet as we have seen in this study, these are the key.

Another key aspect is better using the working levels of embassies and national foreign affairs establishments. One veteran U.S. ambassador worked in 1993–94 to add to the standard letter of instructions from the president to newly assigned chiefs of mission a statement urging them “to practice preventive diplomacy, to anticipate threats to our interests before they become crises.” The intent was to create the expectation that ambassadors and their staffs should be “thinking and acting in terms of preventive diplomacy.” Of course, a mere sentence in an instruction letter is not nearly enough to change habitual behavior and mind-sets. But in a sense that is the point. When greater proactivism does get achieved at the working level, it can make a major contribution. This is
stressed in a study by Herman J. Cohen, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Africa, showing the benefits from giving ambassadors “maximum leeway” to play active roles, keeping Washington informed but not always requiring pre-clearance to take conflict prevention and resolution initiatives.\textsuperscript{39}

The bigger problem is closing the warning-response gap. We stressed the analytic problems in our cases and in the George and Holl chapter, and also that they were correctable problems. This is in part a problem of political will, in the information being available but there being limited political incentives and in some instances outright political disincentives to responding with proposals for early action. We address this later in discussing political will. Here the point is the need for more systematic analytic capacity for developing policy responses.

In the U.S. case one possible improvement would be to enhance the role in preventive diplomacy of the State Department Policy Planning Staff. The Policy Planning Staff was created in the early years of the Cold War with George Kennan as its first director based on recognition that there needed to be an entity within the State Department that had as its primary mission two functions not provided by either the geographic bureaus (Europe, Asia, Latin America, etc.) or the functional ones (Economic Affairs, Political-Military Affairs, later Human Rights, etc.). One was to think integratively, across regions and functional areas; the other was to think a bit longer term, not futuristically but also not so immersed in daily cable traffic and immediate issues as to be strictly in-box, firefighting, crisis managing. It has been very difficult for Policy Planning to play this role effectively. But the need for it especially as we now are in another historically transitional era, just as when it was first created, is quite acute. There needs to be an entity that has as a primary portfolio providing policy analysis and developing policy strategies for issues that are not yet pressing, but have the potential to become so.

The United States is used as an example here, not an exclusive case, as proposals along these lines also could be developed for other major powers, for the United Nations and for regional multilateral organizations.

Diplomatic Strategies

While there is no single conceptualization of preventive diplomacy strategy that is generally accepted or self-evidently optimal, other studies have provided quite comprehensive inventories of the range of diplomatic strategies that can be used for conflict prevention. Lund’s “toolbox” in the appendix to his book Preventing Violent Conflicts includes both noncoercive diplomatic measures such as fact-finding missions, third-party mediation, and Track Two diplomacy, coercive diplomatic ones such as economic sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, and declarative denunciations. Brown and Oudraat include some of the same as well as others such as confidence-building measures.\textsuperscript{40} David Cortright’s study also for the Carnegie Commission focuses particularly on incentives.\textsuperscript{41} And the Carnegie Commission Final Report provides a quite comprehensive inventory.

Based on our cases, six general patterns regarding diplomatic strategies are to
be emphasized. One is the importance of mixed strategies, combining both coercive measures and inducements, wielding sticks and offering carrots. This is not to expect reflexive Skinnerian-like responses, and what Goodby calls "tactical flexibility" is advice to be heeded. But the general point is the need to avoid the dichotomies that so often get drawn between coercive threat-based strategies, on the one hand, and positively inducing strategies of cooperation, on the other. A "viable theory of deterrence," as Alexander George and Richard Smoke argued back in the 1970s in the Cold War context, requires less of an "exclusive preoccupation with threats of punishment" as the sole means for influencing an adversary's behavior, and more of "a broader theory of processes by which nations influence each other, one that encompasses the utility of positive inducements as well as, or in lieu of, threats of negative sanctions." 42 Similarly post-Cold War theories of cooperation that focus too exclusively on positive inducements and fail to encompass the utility that threats and negative action can have on facilitating cooperation also lack the necessary complexity and dynamism. 43

Within this overarching dynamic a number of factors are key to an effective negotiating strategy. First, the negotiators must gain and then keep the trust of the major parties. For this reason and others it often proves best to tackle the easier issues first (note the relative use of the term as few issues in these conflicts are easy). Incentives are important but tend to work best when either linked directly to their own conditionalities or at least tactically strategized so as to lead to compromises and concessions. To the extent that multiple international actors are involved, as often is the case, coordination is very important. Major powers and international organizations need to work together. How they do this, and who the "they" is, will vary from case to case. The coordination may be formal, it may be loose or it may be left tacit. But the kind of "deal shopping" that Maresca decries in the Nagorno-Karabakh case, or the reverse triangulation by which the United States and Europe and the United Nations got manipulated by several of the parties in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, need to be avoided.

A second factor is the importance that the terms of negotiation allow all sides to derive and to be able to show their domestic constituencies gains from cooperation and conflict management. For reasons laid out at the outset of the book, our emphasis intentionally has been on the roles of international actors. But ultimately preventive diplomacy has to interconnect with the domestic politics of the target state, so diplomatic strategies need to be attuned to the dynamics of the domestic political situation. Conflict constituencies and other aspects of the "spoiler" problem have to be limited and managed. 44 Those leaders and groups that are more prone to nonviolent and cooperative measures—the cooperation constituencies—need to be strengthened. The particular domestic political constitutive formula will vary, power sharing in some situations and majority rule or other structures in others. 45 The key is to gauge diplomatic efforts so as to reinforce and be reinforced by the cooperation over the conflict constituencies.

Third is the major role played by special envoys and other lead diplomats as negotiators and mediators. In many of our case successes, substantial credit is attributed to key individuals. Gabonese president Bongo, with his "patient listening and avuncular counsel" and personal and familial ties to the protagonists,
as well as OAU special envoy Mohamed Sahnoun, played key roles in Congo 1993. Ambassador Goodby understates his own role in the Ukraine–Trilateral Agreement case, but more as modesty than as empirical accuracy. Mazarr gives due credit to Ambassador Robert Gallucci in the North Korea case.

Other studies also are corroborative on this point as well. A series of U.S. Institute of Peace studies affirmed that the “credibility and character of the mediator are even more critical in internal conflicts than in interstate conflicts.”

A Carnegie Commission study by Cyrus Vance and David Hamburg stresses the role that UN special representatives and personal envoys have played, calling for “a more activist approach” in their use for preventive diplomacy. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for ending albeit not preventing the war, Richard Holbrooke generally is acknowledged to have played a key role in the Dayton Accords. And, historically, one finds any number of examples. None of this is to lapse into “great man” theories of history, but it is to stress the key roles that individuals that bring personal standing and diplomatic expertise to the task have had and can have.

Fourth is that the action taken be early, early, early. One of the strongest, least conditional conclusions we can draw is that the longer you wait, the more there will be to do and the more difficult it will be to do well. Strategy $X$ may work at point in time $T$, but at $T + 1$ strategy $X + 1$ may be necessary. There is the Rubicon problem. There also is the risk that irrespective of the rationalizing rhetoric, the limits of the commitment made by international actors and the weakness of the political will they actually demonstrate are unlikely to go unnoticed, with consequent effects on their credibility.

Fifth concerns economic sanctions. In the North Korea and Russia-Baltics cases the threat of sanctions was an important part of the mixed strategy, the stick accompanying the carrot of other incentives and inducements. In the Serbia case Woodward shows the counterproductive effects of sanctions as they helped provide Milošević with means and motives for consolidating his grip. In cases such as Somalia and Rwanda the sanctions also were ineffective if not counterproductive. Nevertheless, for reasons that I develop more extensively elsewhere, the question remains whether some of these findings are “false negatives” in which the policy failures may have been more attributable to flaws in other parts of the strategy (e.g., lack of a credible military threat) or in which sanctions might have worked had they been imposed more effectively.

One of the main findings in the sanctions literature is that for reasons both of disruptive economic impact and conveying credibility, sanctions are more likely to be effective if imposed comprehensively and decisively and enforced tightly rather than imposed partially and incrementally with limited real effort at enforcement. Yet partial-incremental sanctions with lax enforcement later were much more common than comprehensive-decisive and tightly enforced ones.

Sixth is how the “lure of membership” in major international and regional organizations is an increasingly influential instrument. Woodward stresses the too early and too unconditional offering of diplomatic recognition, the most basic form of membership in the international community, to the former Yugoslav states as a key problem. Conversely, the Council of Europe postponed Latvia’s
admission until the Russian minority issue was worked out.* Mazarr stresses the lure of recognition and engagement in the North Korea case, also more generally citing work by Paul Schroeder on broad conceptions of association and exclusion as incentives and disincentives for state behavior.51 The converse of expulsion from membership also can work in parallel fashion.

Seventh is that no one international actor is singularly vital to preventive diplomacy; many have roles to play across the range of cases. In some respects it might be easier if we could point to one international actor as the optimal key player. But neither the literature nor our cases support this.52 Different cases involve different international actors playing different roles.

Major International Actors

With regard to the United States, its role continues to be an essential one much more often than not. There are cases such as Congo in 1993 in which preventive diplomacy succeeded without a significant U.S. role. But in most cases the U.S. role is necessary to preventive diplomacy success. The United States played the lead role in the Ukraine-Russia Trilateral Agreement and in the North Korea case. In the Baltics and Macedonia, while the CSCE/OSCE also was a major factor, the U.S. role was a vital one. Conversely, in all the failure cases, a substantial share of the blame was attributed to U.S. actions and inaction. There is debate over how much, and there is some America bashing that sometimes gets thrown in, but the core criticism stands up empirically and analytically.

The optimal role for the United States is as the leader of multilateral action. Because of both the nature of many of these issues and the structure of power in the post-Cold War era, unilateralism is more the exception than the rule. Yet multilateralism on its own lacks reliable capacity for proactive diplomacy. Whether through international institutions and organizations, or on a more ad hoc basis, leadership is needed, and that leadership needs to come from the United States as the major power. Among other things this requires finally getting beyond the simplistic political debate within the American domestic political scene over unilateralism versus multilateralism.

A more concerted commitment to preventive diplomacy also is needed from the Western European powers. The aspiration to a Common Foreign and Defense Policy as proclaimed at Maastricht in 1991 are still recovering from the national interest-based approaches to Yugoslavia. Indeed it was within days of Maastricht that the quasi-competitive recognitions of the new Balkan states began. Woodward shows quite effectively the European preventive failures, individual state and collective, well before this. Such criticisms are in addition to, not instead of, criticisms of U.S. policy. The Rwanda and Congo cases were others in which the European powers and France in particular came under substantial criticism.

The United Nations brings two great strengths to preventive diplomacy. One is...
its unique normative role for “collective legitimation.” No other body can claim comparable legitimacy for establishing global norms and for authorizing actions in the name of the international community, be it diplomatic intermediation or military intervention. The other is its network of agencies such as the UNHCR that provide it with significant institutional capacity to help cope with refugee flows, relieve starvation, and perform other humanitarian tasks. Yet the ambitious role outlined in Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 An Agenda for Peace has proven too far-reaching in a number of respects, politically and strategically, and as manifested particularly in Somalia, Croatia/Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda. Slowness of response fairly consistently has been a major institutional problem. This in part is a function of the United Nations’ own bureaucracy, which, while reforms are helping, remains ineffective and inefficient, and in part of its own version of the problem of political will. On the one hand, the heads of state of the Permanent Five Security Council members all agreed at their first-ever summit in 1992 on a communiqué calling for “recommendations on ways of strengthening ... the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.” But in actual practice each in its own way on its own issues has been reluctant to endow the Security Council with needed capacity to act decisively.

The increasingly important role of regional multilateral organizations (RMOs) is indicative of the shifting geopolitical dynamics of the post-Cold War era by which major sources of instability tend to be more regionally rooted than globally transmitted. There also is increasing recognition of the link between regional security and the peaceful resolution of ethnic and other internal conflicts because of the problems of escalation and spread as discussed earlier. Yet as with the other international actors discussed, we seek to discern both the strengths and weaknesses RMOs bring to preventive diplomacy.

A cross-case comparison of the role of the CSCE/OSCE in a number of our cases helps identify some key characteristics of RMOs. We get a critical view of the CSCE/OSCE in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Croatia/Bosnia and Herzegovina cases, a mixed view in Chechnya, and a positive assessment in the Baltics and Macedonia. The successes are attributable to two main factors. First, a number of CSCE/OSCE resolutions had established a normative basis for preventive action to an extent including intrastate issues. “We are convinced,” the 1990 Charter of Paris declared, “that in order to strengthen peace and security among our states, the advancement of democracy, and respect for and effective exercise of human rights, are indispensable.” The Paris Charter went on to commit to “new forms of cooperation ... in particular a range of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes, including mandatory third party involvement.” A nother example was the concluding document of the 1991 CSCE Conference on National Minorities, which strengthened norms affirming minority rights and set up various practices and offices to seek to assure their observance.

That leads to the second point, which is the range of instruments created for preventive diplomacy practice and implementation. Most prominent has been the High Commissioner on National Minorities, which played a crucial role in the Baltics as well as in other cases. There also are the missions of “long” and “short” duration to more than twelve countries that provide firsthand information-gathering for early
warning, and increasing transparency and accountability in ways that can help deter greater repression and escalation to violence. Indeed, the 1994 name change from CSCE to OSCE ("Conference" to "Organization") reflected the effort to move toward being an operational organization.

Where there were problems we see three principal causes. One was the first-generation learning curve, as in Nagorno-Karabakh, which was the CSCE’s first conflict prevention/conflict resolution case and which suffered from the growing pains of not even initially having a staff or support structures, among other things. Another was too partial a strategy being pursued, not sufficiently proactive, with too little sense of how to follow on after such initial actions as fact-finding missions. Third were unwieldy decision-making procedures, involving rules of consensus and other delays and waterings-down, and especially problematic when as in Chechnya the actions were to be taken against and/or required the cooperation of a member state, and a big and powerful one at that.

With regard to Africa and the OAU, the cases also show mixed results and provide a comparative basis. An important reference point is the June 1993 creation of a "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution." The undeniable of regional security consequences of conflicts traditionally considered domestic had reached the point that, as Edmond Keller puts it, African leaders felt it necessary "to seriously reconsider the norms of external intervention for the purpose of settling domestic disputes." The 1993 resolution still had significant qualifiers about "non-interference in the internal affairs of States," "the respect of sovereignty," and functioning "on the basis of consent and the cooperation of the parties to a conflict." The invitation to intercede in Congo in 1993 helped overcome these constraints, and with beneficial results. Where there has not been this invitation, though, the constraints have been more limiting. Nevertheless, in relative terms there is some sense here as well of strengthening through recognition of common regional interests in seeking to prevent conflicts that threaten regional security irrespective of their original venue.

While not always in an explicitly coordinated fashion, NGOs can play key roles, often achieving what governments cannot. This is a delicate relationship in a number of ways, as we have noted a number of times before. NGOs need be careful about becoming or even being perceived as being too close to governments or the United Nations. Yet they have a number of advantages both inherent in their non-governmental status and also as manifestations of their capacity to be "more flexible and creative." Their role in Track Two diplomacy encompasses a number of aspects, including the ongoing preventive work of developing interethnic and other understanding and cooperation, the facilitating of unofficial talks when official ones are stymied, and the building of the structures and practices of civil society that ultimately are crucial to long-term peaceful conflict prevention and resolution.

Credible Preventive Military Force

We stressed earlier the fallacy of excluding military force and other coercive measures from the realm of preventive diplomacy instruments and strategies. To do so, as some analysts and advocates do, lapses into the trap of positing force and diplo-
macy as antithetical. They of course can be, but they do not have to be. Indeed more often than not, as our cases and others show, the diplomatic components of a preventive strategy need to be backed by a credible threat to use military force, in terms both of the will to take military action and the potency of the action threatened.

This is essential for both the deterrence and the reassurance objectives threats of military force have in these types of situations. As a matter of deterrence, given what we have shown to be the purposive nature of these conflicts and the deliberate calculations made by certain parties to them that they can prevail militarily at acceptable cost, the credibility of the international community's threat to respond coercively is a crucial factor.\(^58\) Prevention is not fundamentally different in this sense from other deterrence situations in which threats to use force are part of a broader bargaining strategy in which the objective is to dissuade so as not to have to reach the point of trying to defeat.\(^59\) As a matter of reassurance, with regard to the ways in which the parties may be driven to military action less out of strict aggression than the security dilemma and “commitment” problem uncertainties of the situation, the protection that only international actors can provide is key to the reassurance needed for the parties to feel secure in restraint and agreements.

The guiding requisites for seeking this balance should be along the lines of a fair but firm strategy. On the one hand, the parties to the conflict must have confidence in the fairness of international third parties, with fairness defined as a fundamental commitment to peaceful and just resolution of the conflict rather than partisanship for or sponsorship of one or the other party to the conflict. But fairness is not necessarily to be equated with impartiality if the latter is defined as strict neutrality even if one side engages in gross and wanton acts of violence or other violations of efforts to prevent the intensification or spread of the conflict.

Impartiality is relatively straightforward in genuinely humanitarian situations, as in responding to starvation, disease, and displacement caused by natural disasters. So, too, in genuine peacekeeping situations, meaning those in which the parties have reached agreement such that there is a peace to be kept and all parties need to feel reassured that they will not be disadvantaged if they abide by the peace. But when the parties are still in conflict, what does it mean to be impartial? To apply the same strictures to both sides, even if these leave one side with major military advantages over the other? To not coerce either side, irrespective of which one is doing more killing, seizing more territory, committing more war crimes? In such situations, it is a “delusion,” as Richard Betts puts it, to think that absolute impartiality should be the standard.\(^60\)”In some cases,” as Adam Roberts also makes the point, “impartiality may mean not impartiality between the belligerents, but impartiality in carrying out UN Security Council decisions... the UN may, and perhaps should, be tougher with one party than another or give more aid to one side than another.”\(^61†\) The parties to the conflict

must know both that cooperation has its benefits and that those benefits will be fully equitable, and that noncooperation has its consequences and that the international parties are prepared to enforce those consequences differentially as warranted by who does and does not do what. In this regard fairness and firmness go together quite symmetrically.

The case study evidence is strongly corroborating. The arguments made and evidence provided in the cases that sufficiently credible threats and/or earlier and more decisive uses of military force would have made a crucial difference make for very plausible counterfactuals. Similar analyses are provided and conclusions reached in related studies, such as Carment's that among intrastate conflicts “rare is the intervention where third parties have not relied on some form of coercive diplomacy to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table.”

On the other side, the Macedonia case shows how effective preventive deployments can be. First as a division of UNPROFOR and then with its own mandate and moniker as UNPREDEP, these troops were on the ground at an early stage in the conflict cycle. Their size and mission were limited, but their presence was felt. Nordic countries and Canada took on the bulk of the burden, while the U.S. troops, despite their small number and their being confined to low-risk duties, were disproportionally important as “a signal to all those who want to destabilize the region,” said Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov.

To be sure, like all cases, the generalizability of the Macedonian preventive deployment must be conditional. Different situations always have to be assessed as to whether preventive military action or the threat thereof is likely to have positive effects as deterrence and/or reassurance, effects or to be exacerbants to the conflict. However, the usual assumption of using force only as a last resort does need to be questioned. “Preserving force as a last resort implies a lockstep sequencing of the means to achieve foreign policy objectives,” Holl argues, “that is unduly inflexible and relegates the use of force to in extremis efforts to salvage a faltering foreign policy.” Force rarely if ever should be a first resort, but it needs to be more of an early resort.

The requisites this poses are formidable. To the extent that there is an asymmetry in the interests at stake for the local party vis-à-vis the outside one(s), as is often the case, it is that much more difficult for the latter to establish credibility. The issue always is whether the message sent is the one received. It thus is not enough simply to make believable threats; they must be believed. Nor can this be resolved just by tougher talk. The potential preventer also must have the military capabilities to deliver on the threat, to carry it out with sufficient impact so as to shift the conflict calculus away from warfare and other violence. None of

‡One exception to be noted is Chechnya, for which neither Lapidus nor other analysts argue that the United States or the international community should have used or threatened military force. This points to the involvement of a major power as a direct party to a conflict, particularly one within its own territory, as a limiting condition for the efficacy of military force. This is not intended, however, as either a normative endorsement of Russian claims as made in the Chechnya case (see the section that follows on sovereignty) or as a blanket prohibiting condition to be extended to future such conflicts involving Russia or, for that matter, some other major power.
this is easy to achieve. Yet achieving it is essential if preventive diplomacy is to be more effective in the coming decade than it has been in the current one.

One of the keys to this is decisiveness. Decision-making processes must not get drawn out, deflecting real action from one meeting to the next, be it of the UN Security Council, ad hoc groups such as the Contact Group, and/or within the U.S. government itself. Those who would or have begun to turn to violence must know with minimal uncertainty that international threats to use military force will be delivered on. And if and when they do need to be delivered on, this must be done as quickly as possible, through preventive or at least early deployments.

Any such forces must be given a robust mission and appropriate training, equipment, and organization to carry such a mission out. The characterization of many of the interventions undertaken as humanitarian accurately describes the consequences of the conflicts more than their causes. Back in April 1991, when a deadly cyclone hit Bangladesh, killing 139,000 people and doing $2 billion worth of damage to this already impoverished country, and U.S. military forces were sent to help provide relief and reconstruction, this genuinely was a humanitarian mission. But the starvation in Somalia and the massive refugee flows in Rwanda, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina all were politically precipitated humanitarian crises. To be successful, and indeed to be credible, given the nature of the instability they had to deal with, military action needed to have been sufficiently strong and assertive in terms of the scope of the mandate authorizing military action, the size of the forces and the rules of engagement to overcome the reluctance of the target to comply.

Proposals for a standing UN rapid reaction force have never really received serious attention. By that I mean getting beyond the rhetorical dimension of the debate in which opponents rail against black helicopters and the like, while proponents pay less attention to the difficult operational details than to the value of such a force as the embodiment of the will of the international community. Proponents see such a force in terms of Article 43 of the UN Charter and its call on member states “to make available to the Security Council . . . armed forces, assistance and facilities . . . necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” They see its potential strategic value in alleviating the need to try to mobilize a new force on a crisis-by-crisis basis, helping avert the problems of long delays in deployments, and providing a ready force for those conflicts in which the major powers may not have sufficient interests to go one of the other routes. Achieving these aims, however, would require institutional capacity that the UN never has had and that many believe it should not have, such as a standing operational headquarters, training facilities, standardized or compatible equipment, strategic planning capacity, and logistical support mechanisms. UN forces always have been much better at traditional peacekeeping than at other more coercive and more robust peace operations. Moreover, the political constraints within the United States are exceedingly problematic and likely to continue to be so, although the potential for political shifts should not be totally dismissed.

NATO needs to have a key role in Europe and also in its immediate “out-of-area”
environ. Post–Cold War NATO doctrine has begun to change, explicitly recognizing that security threats are less likely to come from “calculated aggression against the territory of its Allies” than from the risks of “the adverse consequences that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.” In the former Yugoslavia case, however, insofar as prevention was concerned, NATO was enmeshed in the Transatlantic “collective buck-passing,” as Joseph Lepgold puts it. Once it did take concerted action in mid-1995, it did have coercive impact. This reinforced the view that had more credible military threats been made earlier, the Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina conflicts might have been limited and prevented from sinking to the deadly levels that they did. Calls for NATO to take on more of a global role may be going too far, insofar as any extensive use of its military capacity to prevent conflicts in other regions is concerned. But in its own region, including areas of Europe outside the territories of NATO members, NATO’s role is vital.

The Kosovo crisis raised the issue of the extent to which NATO needs to act only under a mandate explicitly granted by the UN Security Council. Even within NATO there were differing views on this, with the United States and Britain being the strongest voices for the sufficiency of a basis in broader international law. Russia and China strongly objected both with regard to the Kosovo action per se and the broader claim to non–Security Council international legitimacy. This raises the issue of the dangers in precedents for individual states or groups of states taking military action on their own and making their own claims for international legal and normative justification. Yet the problem in the Kosovo case as in others is the difficulty in achieving consensus let alone decisiveness through the UN Security Council on issues on which interests diverge among the Permanent Five.

Africa is the region other than Europe in which there has been the most effort to develop regional capacity for preventive military intervention. The Liberia intervention by ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group), with regional power Nigeria in the lead, was too late to be considered preventive but rather was more about conflict management; and it was not very successful. More along the preventive lines has been the U.S.-sponsored African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which is supposed to provide military and other assistance to train and equip African forces for regional multilateral preventive deployments and other peace operations. It remains to be seen, though, whether this initiative can overcome the obstacles it faces and dispel the doubts about its potential efficacy.

In sum, the difficulties in establishing the modes and mechanisms for more credible preventive military threats and action must not be underestimated. But unless these difficulties can be better managed and overcome, preventive diplomacy strategy will lack the coercive component essential to success in most cases.

Establishing the Norm of Sovereignty as Responsibility

Norms matter. They provide an internationally recognized standard against which policies are measured and to which behavior is held. They legitimize in-
ternational action against states or other offenders whose actions violate those standards. As such, norms have power.

Goodby in particular and Mazarr as well stress the importance that the strong well-established nonproliferation norms had in the Ukraine and North Korea cases. Hurlburt also emphasizes norms in the Baltics case, in this instance the norm of minority rights as ensconced in key OSCE agreements. This norm was strong enough to be a key factor in Estonia agreeing in 1992 to allow OSCE monitoring, which was “the first time that a state had agreed to subject itself to this intrusive procedure, a milestone for international scrutiny of such internal matters as citizenship laws.”

Yet in other cases, the normative basis for international action has been severely restricted by “strict constructionism” of the norm of state sovereignty. By that is meant a conception of sovereignty recognizing each state as having its own jurisdictional exclusivity and giving very limited and narrowly construed bases of legitimacy for some other actor, whether another state or an international institution, to seek to insert itself in the domestic affairs of a state. Yet the need is increasingly apparent, given the intrastate nature (in whole or in part) of the vast majority of post–Cold War conflicts, to value sovereignty less as strictly a right and more as a “responsibility.”

State sovereignty strict constructionism as prevailed for the 1945–90 period was geared to the two principal factors that defined the international system of that era: anticolonialism and the Cold War. In these contexts the affirmation of the rights of states was largely consistent with the rights of the individuals within those states to self-determination and to living free from external repression or worse. Now, though, anticolonialism and major power geopolitics no longer define the international system. Moreover, it is the actions of state governments against their own people, much more than foreign powers, that pose the major threats to the rights of individuals.

The conception of responsible sovereignty as advanced by Francis Deng, Bill Zartman, Don Rothchild, and colleagues requires states “at the very least ensuring a certain level of protection for and providing the basic needs of the people.” Neither Deng et al. nor others are necessarily arguing for international trusteeships, protectorates or other such extreme measures. The concept of sovereignty, as James Rosenau makes the point, allows for gradations, conditionalities, and other combinations. Moreover, any abridgements of state sovereignty would need to avoid becoming guises for power politics and maintain the utmost consistency with their normative bases. But the key point is that the scope of a state’s right to sovereign authority is not unconditional or normatively superior to the right to security of the polity.

Strict constructionists are quick to cite Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter—“nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Yet numerous other portions of the UN Charter provide normative and legal basis for the individual as the “right and duty bearing unit” in international society. A rticle 3 affirms that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person”; Article 55 commits the UN to “promote . . . universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms”; Article 56 pledges all members “to take joint and separate action” toward this end. Further affirmations of the inalienability of basic human rights are ensconced in the Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international covenants that make no distinction as to whether the offender is a foreign invader or one's own government. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan reminds us that

the [UN] Charter was issued in the name of “the peoples,” not the governments of the United Nations. . . . The Charter protects the sovereignty of peoples. It was never meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity. Sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power.74

Annan goes on to stress the legitimacy of interventions based on the Chapter VII provision for preserving international peace and security even when the locus of the conflict is intrastate. Similar duality pertains to the macro level of regional and international security. Even Article 2 (7) is qualified with “the important rider that ‘this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.’ In other words, even national sovereignty can be set aside if it stands in the way of the Security Council’s overriding duty to preserve international peace and security.”75

In fact, some important precedents have been set in the 1990s of Security Council–authorized interventions abridging sovereignty strict constructionism, such as with UNSC 688 (1991) authorizing a peacekeeping mission protecting the Kurds in Northern Iraq, and the “all necessary means” authorization (1994) of the U.S. military intervention in Haiti. Most cases, though, have been to protect refugees and for other humanitarian purposes. Indeed, the doctrines of refugee protection and other humanitarian intervention have been taking on increasing legitimacy.76

However, with regard to preventive diplomacy, the norm remains much weaker. We see this very clearly in this study. In cases such as the Baltics, as well as Macedonia and Congo in 1993, the international involvement was at the invitation of the host government, and thus the normative constraint was more avoided than overcome. Requiring an invitation in, however, also means that such an invitation often will not come, with the consequence that intrastate conflicts get “protected” from international action.

In his Ditchley Foundation lecture, Secretary-General Annan makes note of the shifting ratio of civilian to soldier casualties over the course of the twentieth century’s wars. In World War I about 90 percent of those killed were soldiers, only 10 percent civilians. In World War II, even counting the Nazi Holocaust death camp casualties, he puts the ratio at about 50 percent/50 percent. But “in many of today’s conflicts civilians have become the main targets of violence,” and estimates are that their share of the casualties is around 75 percent.

State frontiers . . . should no longer be seen as a watertight protection for war criminals or mass murders. The fact that a conflict is “internal” does not give the parties any right
to disregard the most basic rules of human conduct. . . . While paying full respect to state sovereignty, we assert the overriding right of people in desperate situations to receive help, and the right of international bodies to provide it.  

The norm of sovereignty as responsibility as it pertains to preventing intrastate violence needs to be strengthened sufficiently to legitimize early action to prevent, and not just respond to, genocide and other deadly violence and humanitarian crises.

The Question of Political Will and the Evolution from Idea and Value to Strategy

Almost every study of preventive diplomacy concludes that when all is said and done, the main obstacle is the problem of political will. As an explanatory statement, this is largely true. Governments have not acted because they have not had the political will to do so. But the analytical question that follows is whether this is to be just accepted as a fixed parameter or acknowledged as a severe constraint but a potentially and partially malleable one?

To be sure, there should be no illusions about the difficulties of mustering political will for the kinds of actions in the kinds of situations required by preventive diplomacy. Inertia and inaction are much more natural states for democratic governments not confronted by clear and present dangers than mobilization and action. Nor in the United States is this just a post-Vietnam or post–Cold War dynamic, lest we forget that in October 1941 a Gallup poll showed over 70 percent of Americans still opposed to entering the war against Nazi Germany. Some point to the modern media as a major factor, but as a study by veteran BBC foreign correspondent Nik Gowing shows, the media can be more of a hindrance than a help to conflict prevention. Even so, there is more room for maneuver, potential malleability, and more basis for the political will to act in these ways and for these situations than often is assumed. In the U.S. case, poll after poll shows the American public to be much more internationalist than isolationist. This doesn't mean that it will support every international commitment made, but it does mean that there is a basic understanding of the need and desirability of maintaining an active role in the world. Public support for the United Nations has recovered from the post-Somalia fallout and generally runs better than 60 percent. Even on foreign aid one study showed that much of the opposition was based on the misperception of how much was spent. My own studies of public opinion on the use of military force show a "pretty prudent public" that is neither gun-shy nor trigger-happy but rather makes distinctions according to the principal purposes military force is to serve and supports or opposes accordingly. The tolerance for casualties is not very high, but it is not as low as often gets assumed, especially when the Somalia political firestorm is the case from which generalizations are made.

Still part of the problem is the "gap" in what public opinion is and how the U.S. Congress perceives and regards it. The Congress is definitely a problem, for numerous reasons including the divided government of the split in partisan
control of the two branches, as well as the even greater insularity of this generation of congresspeople among whom, according to one estimate, only about 25 percent had their own passports prior to taking office. Yet it also must be recognized that the problems also are partly attributable to the Clinton administration’s handling of its relationship with Congress on these issues and more generally, and thus here too one cannot assume that the limits and problems as seen in recent years are strictly inherent ones. With respect to Western Europe, the insularity in European parliaments is not as bad but still is a factor when international priorities have to compete with national and local ones.

The key, as it always has been and always will be, is executive leadership. This is one of those statements that sounds pretty simple but which is the sine qua non for so much in foreign policy. Foreign policy is about making choices. The choice for preventive diplomacy is politically difficult, the political constraints are serious ones; but they are potentially malleable and the choice is not inherently unsustainable politically. In this regard we also come back to the argument developed earlier about the strategic logic of preventive diplomacy. One of the main reasons why leaders have been so reluctant to take on preventive diplomacy is that they have held to the conventional wisdom critique of its lack of realism, that the costs to be borne and risks to be run are too high and the interests at stake too low. In challenging this conventional wisdom and showing the realism of preventive diplomacy as a strategic calculation, we address this crucial aspect of the political will question on its own terms. This is not just inveighing against inaction on moral grounds. It is not just trying to place policy over politics. Rather, it is to argue that politics and policy are more complementary than assumed, that the reason for arguing that there can and should be political will for preventive diplomacy is that political and policy interests both are better served.

All this speaks to what is possible. Whether it ultimately becomes actual is for policymakers to choose. As that is done, and as we think about the work—intellectual, political, strategic—that lies ahead, we also should bear in mind some other lessons to be learned from the early post–World War II era. When Bernard Brodie and others first began developing the theories on which the dominant deterrence paradigm was to be based, the basic idea was relatively simple and straightforward: Preserve the peace through fear of retaliation. That core idea got further developed, refined, elaborated, modified, adapted, extended—indeed, it became a major component of an entire paradigm that dominated U.S. foreign policy and most of international affairs for a generation. So too, here in the post–Cold War era do we need to work with the core ideas of preventive diplomacy: Act early to stop disputes from escalating or problems from worsening. Reduce tensions that if intensified could lead to war. Deal with today’s conflicts before they become tomorrow’s crises. Much more development, refinement, elaboration, modification, adaptation, and extension are needed. For if we know one thing for sure, it is that the need for prevention is not going to subside anytime soon. It is with this inescapable truth and these goals in mind that this study has been conducted.
Part Two

The Dissolution of the Soviet Union
3

The War in Chechnya: Opportunities Missed, Lessons to Be Learned

Gail W. Lapidus

Case Summary

The dissolution of the Soviet Union—though remarkably peaceful by comparison with Yugoslavia—has nonetheless been accompanied by a number of serious and, in some cases, deadly conflicts. While the overwhelming majority of potential confrontations have been managed peacefully, serious armed clashes have broken out in twenty cases, and another six conflicts escalated into regional wars involving regular armies and heavy arms.¹ Even before the brutal destruction in Chechnya, the toll mounted to some sixty thousand dead or missing, over one million refugees, and severe economic devastation, not to mention the crippling effects of these conflicts on the development of democratic political institutions throughout the region.

Along with the civil war in Tajikistan, the war in Chechnya has been the most serious conflict fought on the territory of what was once the Soviet Union since World War II, with casualties approaching one hundred thousand,² refugees and

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homeless numbering in the hundreds of thousands, and the capital city of Grozny—as well as countless smaller towns and villages—virtually destroyed. Whether the peace agreements negotiated in the fall of 1996 and the spring of 1997 will bring a long-term resolution of the conflict remains uncertain.

The war has not only had profoundly destabilizing repercussions in the Caucasus as well as in Moscow; it has also raised broader and disturbing questions about Russian politics and policymaking, about civil-military relations, and about Russia's reliability as a partner to a whole range of international agreements. Moreover, the failure of Western governments and of international institutions to respond effectively to the mounting crisis raise equally troubling questions about the possibilities and limits of preventive diplomacy when the behavior of a major power is at stake, when the issue is framed as an internal rather than interstate conflict, and when other political priorities take precedence.

This chapter argues that the war in Chechnya was deliberately launched by the Russian leadership in the context of an ongoing struggle over Chechnya's ultimate political status and over the process by which it would be determined. The conflict turned on the question of whether, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Chechnya was automatically to be considered part of the Russian Federation, as Moscow insisted, or whether its membership in the federation required its formal and explicit consent. The disagreement was linked to broader ambiguities concerning the political and juridical basis of the Russian Federation itself and the scope and limits of power sharing between the center and the republics. By contrast with conflicts such as those in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the dispute initially engaged a relatively small circle of elite actors in Russia and Chechnya; it did not involve the eruption of highly mobilized masses acting on the basis of ethnicized identities or animosities. Moreover, an analysis of the events leading up to the use of military force by the Russian government in December 1994 makes it clear that the Russian leadership's decision was by no means a "last resort" after all avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict had been exhausted. Finally, notwithstanding the fact that the conflict unfolded over an extended period of time, that a number of Russian and foreign observers and commentators considered a military confrontation a real possibility, and that in view of what was known both of the condition of Russian forces and of the requirements of an operation in Chechnya, a brief and effective "surgical strike" was highly problematic and unlikely to succeed, virtually no serious efforts were made by Western governments or international organizations to warn against military action in advance or to protest its use in the immediate aftermath.

As the growing literature on preventive diplomacy suggests, peaceful outcomes to disputes are more likely when third parties apply unequivocal pressures to negotiate before the conflicting sides mobilize politically or deploy armed force. Although the Western reaction to the escalating violence in Chechnya became increasingly anxious and outspoken over time, a number of political considerations to be explored at greater length militated against the application of serious pressure on the Yeltsin government to alter its policy until the scale of casualties, and the media attention to the wanton targeting and destruction of the civilian population of Chechnya by Russian forces, reached a point where it became a political embarrassment.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the conflict, focusing on its underlying causes, its more immediate precipitants, and the major stages in its development from 1991. The second section examines the failure of conflict prevention, focusing on missed opportunities by the parties themselves as well as by international actors. A third section examines the responses of key international actors, including the United States, to the Russian military intervention and the concerns that drove them. In the conclusion I argue that these responses were based on a flawed assessment of interests, costs, and risks.

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Although shaped by a long history of Russian-Chechen antagonism whose origins date to the Caucasian wars of conquest of the eighteenth century, the current conflict over the political status of Chechnya was triggered by the economic and political transition that culminated in the dissolution of the USSR. The ideological and political liberalization introduced by President Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, with their emphasis on glasnost and democratization, had far-reaching, though unintended, consequences in the non-Russian republics of the USSR, precipitating a growing wave of national self-assertion. The contradiction between the allegedly federal nature of the Soviet system and the reality of a highly centralized state became a growing target of national movements in the non-Russian republics that adopted anti-imperial discourses and increasingly linked demands for political reform and democratization with calls for republic sovereignty and, in some cases, for outright independence. These trends were legitimized and given further impetus by Gorbachev's belated efforts to transform the highly centralized Soviet system into a genuine federation.

Growing assertiveness, however, was not limited to the fifteen union republics that were the highest units in the Soviet ethnofederal hierarchy; lower-level autonomous republics in Georgia (Abkhazia), Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), and the Russian Federation itself (Tatarstan and Chechnya, among others) were also engaged in efforts to elevate their status. The election of Boris Yeltsin as president of Russia in June 1990, which joined the personal and political conflict between Yeltsin and Gorbachev to a struggle over the nature and future of the Union, created additional opportunities for republic elites to exert pressure for ever greater economic and political autonomy. These demands came to focus on the claim to "sovereignty," a vague and highly elastic term in Soviet usage, but one that was enthusiastically embraced by republic after republic in 1990 in a "parade of sovereignties" that were given legitimacy and support by the June 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty of the Russian Republic itself. Moreover, in his effort to win the support of autonomous republics in his struggle against Gorbachev and the "center," Yeltsin's speeches in August and September 1990 in Tatarstan, Bashkoria, and Komi encouraged local elites to "take all the sovereignty you can swallow." When the then Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic issued a Declaration of State Sovereignty on November 27, 1990, it appeared little more than one additional manifestation of a broader trend.
The failed coup of August 1991 effectively undermined the prospects for reforming the Union, discredited the considerable number of regional and local elites who had supported the putsch, and contributed to the further unraveling of the Soviet system. In Grozny, the executive committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (ANCCP), headed by Dzhokar Dudayev, with initial support from Moscow, used the occasion to force the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Checheno-Ingush republic (led by Doku Zavgayev), which had supported the coup. But as the increasingly radical tactics of Dudayev and his supporters aroused opposition in Grozny and increasing alarm in Moscow, the Russian government moved from negotiations to ultimatums, provoking Dudayev and the ANCCP Executive Committee to organize presidential elections. On October 27, Dudayev was declared president, notwithstanding challenges to the legitimacy of the election both in Moscow and in Grozny, and on November 1, almost two months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and international recognition of the Russian Federation as a successor state, the Law on State Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic declared the de facto secession of Chechnya from the USSR.

The rapid and unanticipated unravelling of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 was initially viewed by many as a liberating event. For the Russian Federation leadership, however, it also brought with it a sudden and traumatic loss of empire, provoking exaggerated—indeed obsessive—fears of the possible disintegration of Russia itself and contributing over time to a shift within the Russian political elite from liberal democratic orientations to increasingly statist and neoimperial ones. As the new Russian state struggled to create novel constitutional and federal institutions, efforts to halt the centrifugal tendencies that had been unleashed during the Gorbachev reforms became a key priority in Moscow, and a major source of conflict in center-periphery relations. This conflict would take its most extreme and intractable form in relations between Moscow and Chechnya.

A number of factors explain the particularly sharp tensions in relations between Moscow and Grozny. First and foremost was an underlying legacy of antagonistic group histories dating from the Russian conquest of the Caucasus and the particularly stubborn resistance to Russian imperial expansion during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Indeed, the Caucasian wars became a legendary theme in Russian culture thanks to the literary classics of Tolstoi and Lermontov, among others, while the Chechens became a symbol of heroic struggles by the mountain peoples to preserve their independence. This historical experience could be mobilized as a resource in the construction of a contemporary identity.

World War I occasioned new but again thwarted efforts at national liberation. While the mountain peoples temporarily threw their support to the Bolsheviks, disillusionment quickly followed, and the struggle against Soviet rule continued well into the 1930s. The harsh repressions associated with Stalinism, including the forced collectivization of agriculture and the massive resettlement of kulaks, took particularly brutal, and ethnicized, form during World War II. Suspecting the Chechen and Ingush of collaboration with the Germans, the entire population of the republic—roughly half a million people—was rounded up in Febru-
ary 1944 and forcibly deported to Kazakhstan, and the republic itself abolished. Over a quarter of the population died in the process, and many of those who escaped deportation were brutally massacred by NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) troops. The collective trauma of deportation and exile was a key formative experience for many members of the present Chechen elite, including Dudayev himself, who made their way back to the Caucasus only after Nikita Khrushchev denounced the deportations as one of the crimes of the Stalin era and allowed the "punished peoples" to return to their homelands.

A second contributing factor in the emergence of a Chechen national movement was the structural legacy of Soviet nationality policy, with its built-in contradiction between the principle of ethnoterritorial federalism and the actual repression of national aspirations.\textsuperscript{11} Soviet policy had created a hierarchy of ethnoterritorial units that provided a framework for the development of national elites and cultures while sharply constraining their economic and political expression. By the late Brezhnev period, the rising aspirations of increasingly educated and capable elites of the titular nationalities had become a source of tensions and competition with Russians for key positions not only in the union republics but also in the autonomous republics, many of whose elites had long pressed for an elevation of their status to that of union republics. As political constraints were lifted by the liberalizing impact of Gorbachev's reforms, national loyalties and solidarities displaced communist ideology and became a potent basis for political mobilization around a combination of ethnopolitical and national demands.

Both historical experiences and the impact of Soviet policy had served to consolidate and reinforce group identity and solidarity among Chechens, a solidarity in which identification with Islam played an important role.\textsuperscript{12} The preservation of strong clan structures and group identity was further strengthened by the bitter experience of exile itself, which nourished a shared memory of attempted genocide and a common sense of national destiny. It was also facilitated, after the restoration of the republic, by its relatively low level of industrialization and the correspondingly low level of Russian settlement, which was largely concentrated in the capital city. At the time of the 1989 census, of all the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, the Chechen-Ingush republic had the second highest concentration of members of the titular nationality in the total population (70.7 percent)\textsuperscript{13} and the highest proportion of those who considered the language of their titular nationality their "native" language and the language of everyday communication.\textsuperscript{14}

Finally, geostrategic factors played an important role in raising the stakes in the conflict over Chechnya. The emergence of independent states in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia, and the new possibilities for exploiting the rich energy resources and major transportation routes through the region, enhanced the importance of the republic and made its status a major concern to Russian elites. At the same time, the fact that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Chechnya, unlike Tatarstan, had an external border made secession a real possibility and a sovereign or independent existence more viable.

But the mere fact of serious tensions in the relationship between Moscow and
Grozny was not in itself sufficient to account for the escalation of conflict into violence. A decisive factor in the escalation of conflict was the far-reaching process of political and economic transition itself and its attendant political fluidity, policy incoherence, and elite conflict in both Russia and Chechnya.

The growing controversy over Russia's federal structure fueled by fear of disintegration, combined with changes in the composition and policy orientation of Russia's political elite, made issues of center-periphery relations highly contentious. A poorly institutionalized policymaking process, exacerbated by bitter struggles between elites as well as conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, distorted policy debate and complicated the resolution of a whole range of issues. Even the much-hailed bilateral treaty regulating relations between Russia and Tatarstan, finally signed in February 1994 and later touted as a "model" for Chechnya, was the outcome of protracted and contentious negotiations, and it was bitterly criticized by influential political actors in both capitals, Moscow as well as Kazan.

The political fluidity, lack of institutionalization, and unresolved issues of governance in Moscow contributed to the crisis over Chechnya in a number of ways. The failure to create a clear, legally based federal structure and the continuing ambiguity about the status of the 1992 Federal Treaty (which Chechnya and Tatarstan had refused to sign) and the 1993 constitution (which a number of republics rejected in the December 1993 referendum on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the Federal Treaty) left unresolved basic issues of institutional legitimacy and power sharing between the center and the republics. The mounting crisis was further exacerbated by the ad hoc and improvisational nature of the entire policymaking process and the low degree of professionalism surrounding it. Inadequacies in the flow of information to policymakers, including the president, led to decisions based on unreliable and distorted assessments rather than on those of knowledgeable experts on the region. A few figures around the president exercised disproportionate influence, and there was little coordination among different institutions and actors involved in nationalities and regional policy. The divergent and conflicting interests of a variety of ministers and presidential advisers, the absence of an effective working relationship between the executive and the parliament, and the corrosive conflict between government and opposition all made policy toward Chechnya hostage to the struggles for political advantage. Sober assessment and public discussion of the actual threat posed by the situation, and of the political and economic instruments available for dealing with it, were largely absent.

The failure to develop and institutionalize clear norms of civil-military relations, particularly regarding the use of armed forces in internal conflict, and the independent role of security forces not subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, created additional problems. It made the constitutionality of President Yeltsin's use of military force in Chechnya as dubious as its wisdom, and it contributed to the insubordination of key military actors in the initial phase of the war. Finally, a weakly developed civil society proved incapable of organizing constructively to oppose or alter policy notwithstanding the lack of wide or strong pub-
lic support. Despite significant opposition to the use of force in Chechnya, as reflected in public opinion polls throughout the conflict, and despite the criticism regularly expressed by parliamentary deputies, some regional leaders and, above all, the media, no broadly based movements emerged to oppose the war, nor was a bitterly divided parliament able to offer a coherent policy alternative.

The problems of policymaking in Moscow were compounded by political weakness and elite conflict in Chechnya. Limited institutional development, leadership experience, and economic resources inhibited the ability of Chechnya to function effectively as a state and created incentives and opportunities for a variety of illegal activities, including substantial trade in weapons and drugs. These problems were compounded by Dudayev's own political inexperience, mercurial temperament, provocative behavior, and poor judgment. His defiant use of anti-Russian sentiments to consolidate his domestic political support and weaken the opposition in turn played into the hands of hard-line political and military groups in Russia who favored "settling" all Caucasian problems by force. The hardening of positions on both sides thus created a set of elite interactions that exacerbated the entire conflict.

By the spring of 1994, the shift to the right in Russian elite politics, which gave additional influence to advocates of a unitary Russian state as well as alarmist warnings about Russia's imminent disintegration, not only influenced the terms of debate about Chechnya but provided support for covert efforts to assassinate Dudayev and to undermine his power. Exaggerated reports of secret plans by the Dudayev administration to incorporate the entire Caucasian region under its control, and to expel Russia from the Caucasus and close off its access to the Caspian Sea, presumably leaked to the media by intelligence sources and figures within Moscow's "power ministries," embellished descriptions of the "criminal regime" in Grozny and were used to justify the use of military force to overthrow Dudayev.

In short, a weakly institutionalized political process in both capitals resulted in policy by improvisation, and the preeminent role of both presidents and their immediate entourages in decision making gave exceptional political weight to personal traits and subjective assessments. Under these circumstances, the effort by political figures close to Yeltsin to turn him against Dudayev and to delegitimize Dudayev's rule effectively blocked the prospect for high-level negotiations between the two presidents to seek a political solution.

The Conflict Unfolds: Major Stages and Turning Points in Russian Policy

Russian policy toward Chechnya, and the developing conflict between Moscow and Chechnya, can be broadly divided into six distinct stages. In examining the possible role of preventive diplomacy, I will focus here on the second and third stages, which particularly lent themselves to a variety of preventive measures by local as well as international actors. Once Russian military forces were introduced in the fourth stage, actions taken by the international community necessarily shifted from conflict prevention to conflict mitigation and conflict termination, and these will be explored in the subsequent section.
Abortive Military Intervention: November 1991

The first stage in the unfolding conflict involved the emergence and radicalization of the Chechen national movement in the late 1980s, the election of Dudayev to the presidency, and the declaration of sovereignty of November 1, 1991. Moscow's erratic response, shaped as it was by the rivalry between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, culminated in an abortive military intervention. Although Yeltsin's declaration of a state of emergency was quickly reversed by the USSR Supreme Soviet, and troops were swiftly withdrawn, the episode served to rekindle hostility toward Russian domination, to consolidate support around Dudayev, and to raise the political costs of any renewed military action.24

Benign, But Profitable, Neglect: January 1992 to Spring 1994

The failure of the intervention, and the breakup of the Soviet Union shortly afterward, brought with it other more urgent priorities. The second stage in relations between Moscow and Grozny lasted from January 1992 to the spring of 1994, a period of what might be termed “benign but profitable neglect.” Reflecting the broader incoherence and elite conflicts characteristic of Russian policy more generally, behavior toward Chechnya took two contradictory directions. On the one hand, as the political and economic situation in Chechnya began to deteriorate, hard-line segments of the Russian leadership sought to exploit the growing political cleavages within Chechnya to vilify the “criminal regime” in Grozny, challenge the legitimacy of Dudayev’s rule, and unify opposition figures around a campaign to unseat him.25 At the same time, other Russian government and parliamentary figures engaged in a variety of official dealings with Grozny throughout this period, and also pursued intermittent, though unsuccessful, negotiations with a range of Chechen politicians, including Dudayev’s rivals.26 Not only did officials in the two governments collaborate on a range of economic and political issues; corrupt and criminal groups in Chechnya also worked in partnership with their counterparts in Moscow to use the unstable situation to profit from trafficking in weapons, oil, and drugs and to engage in money laundering, facilitated by a large number of unregulated international flights from Grozny’s airport.27 Indeed, these criminal activities constituted a crucial though still obscure aspect of the complex and symbiotic relationships between Moscow and Grozny.

The Failure of Efforts to Overthrow Dudayev: Spring through Fall 1994

In the summer and fall of 1994, major changes in the configuration of Yeltsin’s government prompted a shift in policy toward Chechnya. This shift coincided with a hardening of Russian policy in a number of other areas as well: toward the West, toward the “near abroad,” and toward issues of internal economic reform. Although knowledgeable specialists on the region favored the continuing use of political and economic instruments to isolate Dudayev, anticipating that the deteriorating situation in Chechnya would lead to his replacement by the
Chechens themselves, the Russian government turned toward a policy of actively seeking to assassinate or overthrow Dudayev by providing political, and increasingly military, support to opposition forces.\textsuperscript{28}

The shift in policy was attributable to several factors: the growing influence of nationalist and authoritarian attitudes and hard-line political figures in Yeltsin’s entourage, along with his estrangement from his earlier, more liberal supporters and advisers; the conclusion of the treaty with Tatarstan in February 1994, which refocused attention on Chechnya as the major remaining challenge to the authority of Moscow; and the growing strategic importance of the entire region as Western contracts to exploit the massive oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Basin were portrayed as a threat to Russian influence in the whole region.\textsuperscript{29}

These factors contributed to an environment in which the former communist leader Doku Zagayev, backed by hard-line figures in the “power ministries” and the president’s entourage, succeeded in winning support for more active intervention in Chechnya to “free the Chechen people of the illegitimate and dictatorial rule exercised by Dudayev and his bandit formations.” On May 27, 1994, a sophisticated and powerful remote-control car bomb was set off in Grozny that would have killed Dudayev if he had occupied his usual place in the automobile procession.

The scale of this effort escalated in the course of the summer and fall under the influence of a group of high-level hard-line officials in the cabinet and the presidential apparatus informally dubbed the “party of war.”\textsuperscript{30} Using political clashes within Chechnya during the summer of 1994 as evidence that Dudayev’s regime lacked real popular support, the Russian government threw its backing to a Chechen Provisional Council headed by Umar Avturkhanov as the “only legitimate power structure in Chechnya” and sought to unite a variety of opposition figures around it. At the same time, a coordinating group under Nikolai Yegorov, his senior deputy, Aleksandr Kotenkov, and a colonel from the Federal Counterintelligence Service arranged the covert provision of substantial military supplies to the council, including heavy armored vehicles, aircraft, and tanks and tank crews especially recruited for the purpose. The group also began to recruit Russian officers for the covert operation, promising them an easy victory and substantial remuneration. When a separate (and from Moscow’s viewpoint, highly unwelcome) effort to storm the city of Grozny by Ruslan Khasbulatov\textsuperscript{31} encountered little organized opposition, it was taken as a sign that the time was ripe for the Moscow-supported effort to extend its control from northern strongholds to the capital itself.

An armored march on Grozny, launched November 26 in the expectation that Dudayev’s forces would be incapable of real resistance, turned into a fiasco; the opposition forces were routed and over half its tanks were destroyed or seized.\textsuperscript{32} Humiliation compounded defeat when, in the face of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev’s denial of any knowledge of or involvement in the operation, the Chechen government paraded captured Russian military personnel live on television. But the humiliating defeat of Moscow-supported forces in Grozny, far from inviting a reexamination of assumptions and strategy, served to provoke still more drastic action. On November 29, 1994, a secret meeting of the Russian Security
Council made the decision to shift from covert to overt military action and to use Russian military forces to subdue Chechnya.\textsuperscript{33}

The Resort to Military Force: December 1994

The failure of efforts to coerce the Dudayev government to capitulate or to compel its replacement, and the humiliation suffered by their sponsors, strengthened the determination of key figures in the Russian leadership, and of Yeltsin himself, to demonstrate Moscow’s power and resolve by crushing Chechen resistance. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev would later explain that those like himself who supported or acquiesced in the decision were persuaded by the military officials at the Security Council meeting that it would be an almost “bloodless blitzkrieg” that would be over in a week.\textsuperscript{34} The decision also reflected the belief among Yeltsin’s entourage that a “small but victorious war”\textsuperscript{35} that consolidated Russia’s statehood would reverse the erosion in Yeltsin’s popularity and increase his chances in upcoming elections.

Following a series of ultimatums by Yeltsin, last-minute attempts to restart negotiations were aborted by the intervention of military forces on December 11.\textsuperscript{36} The entry of Russian forces at once radically altered the situation in Chechnya. It rekindled memories of the 1944 deportations, created a surge of popular support for Dudayev’s government, now inseparably linked to the defense of the homeland, and undermined the opposition, which now appeared, in effect, as Russian accomplices. As the population of the republic rallied in its defense, the premises of the entire military operation dissolved; the effort to force the replacement of the Dudayev leadership turned into a war indiscriminately directed against the population and infrastructure of the Chechen republic.

In the initial days of the operation, large numbers of civilians, including women and children, sought to block the passage of troops, leading several Russian officers to refuse to continue the operation. The heavy-handed and indiscriminate shelling and bombing, which led to mounting civilian casualties, Russian and Chechen alike, evoked a growing storm of criticism. Moreover, the Russian and foreign journalists covering the conflict provided daily refutations of official propaganda that sought to minimize the scale of the war and conceal casualties; the media coverage offered a vast audience graphic footage of the unfolding carnage.

Notwithstanding Defense Minister Grachev’s assurances, on January 2, 1995, that an operation to “mop up” Grozny would take only five or six more days and that residents who had fled the city would be able to return home shortly, the violence continued for almost two more years and resulted in some hundred thousand casualties and nearly four hundred thousand refugees, one-third of the republic’s population.\textsuperscript{37}

Moreover, the assumption that decisive military actions by the government would win widespread popular support proved profoundly mistaken. The intervention provoked a wave of criticism from broad circles in Russian society, with public opinion polls indicating that over 60 percent of the population opposed the use of force, and about 25 percent were prepared to recognize Chechnya’s independence.\textsuperscript{38} The heads of a number of other republics issued harsh
criticisms of the intervention, neighboring regions feared its destabilizing impact on their own territories, and Generals Aleksander Lebed and Boris Gromov warned the war could turn into another Afghanistan. The brief and successful surgical strike promised by its advocates turned into a massive, brutal, and protracted war that devastated the republic of Chechnya, weakened Yeltsin’s leadership, and had far-reaching consequences for the Russian state.

Protracted Conflict: 1995 to August 1996

As the violence escalated in the face of widespread and unanticipated resistance, Russian troops found themselves confronting guerrilla warfare in which virtually the entire civilian population came to be seen as the enemy. Over the next two years, massive violations of human rights and extreme brutality would be documented by Russian journalists and political figures, as well as by Russian and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). As a number of commentators pointed out, the purpose of the entire operation had become quixotic: to demonstrate that Chechnya was a part of Russia, it was treated as a foreign enemy.

The failure to achieve the capitulation of the Dudayev government, or to win legitimacy for the Moscow-supported regime of Zagayev, and the growing domestic and international concern ultimately produced a two-track approach in which intermittent and half-hearted attempts at negotiation were combined with a relentless pursuit of military victory. Over the next two years, daring efforts by Chechen militants to use hostage taking and other terrorist acts to force the Russian government into negotiations produced a succession of cease-fires and talks. But any agreements reached were quickly undermined on the Russian side by hard-line opponents of a political settlement. Moreover, evidence of cleavages and even insubordination within the armed forces began to surface, as a military initially skeptical of the intervention became increasingly committed to victory.

When Yeltsin’s assurances that bombings or other military actions had been suspended were contradicted by journalists on the scene, it was often unclear whether the duplicity was deliberate or whether key actors were operating quasi-independently.

The presidential election campaign in the spring of 1996, as well as the impending Group of Seven meeting scheduled to take place in Moscow in April, appeared to give new impetus to the search for a negotiated settlement of the politically unpopular war. On March 31 Yeltsin laid out a plan for resolving the crisis, committing himself to a cease-fire and peace talks. Escalating military operations once again called into question Moscow’s intentions, and when Dudayev was killed by a Russian rocket attack on April 22, the process appeared to have stalled once again. A surprise pre-election visit by Yeltsin to Grozny re-launched negotiations, which culminated in the Nazran agreements on a cease-fire, Russian troop withdrawals, and prisoner exchanges. But the most decisive event of all was Yeltsin’s decision to further strengthen his position in the second round of the presidential elections by appointing third-place contender Lebed to be secretary of the Security Council and putting him in charge of the peace negotiations.
With Yeltsin's election victory, Russian forces returned to the offensive with a new wave of bombings and renewed claims from Moscow that Russian forces had won the war and were engaged in a final mopping-up operation. The Chechens responded by launching an assault on Grozny on August 6, on the eve of Yeltsin's inauguration, in an effort to force Moscow back to the negotiating table and to demonstrate that the war was by no means over. The massive defeat and humiliation of Russian forces left no realistic option short of totally destroying the city to retake it. Amid bitter recriminations and debate in Moscow, Lebed visited Grozny as presidential envoy and reached agreement with the Chechen leadership on a cease-fire.

A Negotiated Peace Agreement: August 1996 to May 1997

The successful negotiations, which culminated in the Khasavyurt peace agreements signed on August 31, 1996, the election of Aslan Maskhadov as president of Chechnya in January 1997, and the signing in May 1997 of the agreement “On Peace and the Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,” were made possible by three key developments. First and foremost was the massive defeat of Russian forces in Grozny, in which their presumed control over the city was challenged overnight by a surprise rebel offensive. Recognizing that any effort to retake the city was tantamount to its complete destruction by bombing, the Russian leadership finally acknowledged the futility of its military campaign and prevented the military from launching a new offensive. The military situation in turn created an opportunity for the more liberal group of advisers around Yeltsin who had regained influence during his election campaign to win control over policy toward Chechnya. The third factor was the personal role of Lebed, whom Yeltsin had appointed to bring an end to the conflict.

The terms of Lebed's appointment gave him both a personal and a political stake in achieving a settlement. He also benefited from having had no responsibility for the war: Lebed was in the fortunate position of being able to admit others' mistakes rather than his own. Recognizing, in August 1996, that the war was both unwinnable and wrong, that constitutional order could not be established by air strikes and artillery shelling, that extremists on both sides had to be neutralized, and that the Chechen leaders were responsible negotiating partners who would honor agreements they had entered into, Lebed's commitment to a negotiated settlement was unequivocal. To this task he brought a degree of personal courage, sensitivity to the psychology of the Chechen side, and decisiveness that won the respect and the confidence of his negotiating partners and made the Khasavyurt agreements possible. Overcoming intense resistance in Moscow proved an even greater challenge; charged with committing high treason in agreeing to the dismemberment of Russia, Lebed attacked the planning and conduct of the entire war and directly accused Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov of responsibility for the disaster. While a seriously ill Yeltsin initially distanced himself from the agreements, their ambiguity on key issues (in particular, their deferral of decisions on the status of Chechnya for five years) and the
broad domestic and international acclaim that greeted them eased his ultimate acceptance.

A Fragile Peace

The four-sentence Treaty on Peace and the Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria signed in May 1997 acknowledged the “centuries-long antagonism” between the two sides and committed both to the renunciation of force “forever” in resolving disputed issues and to building relations in accordance with “generally recognized principles and norms of international law,” a formula that each party could interpret in its own way. While the agreement ended the fighting and brought about the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, no significant progress has been made to date on resolving the underlying conflict over Chechnya’s status.

On the Chechen side, the Russian troop withdrawals and the peace agreements are viewed as tantamount to recognition of Chechnya’s independence, de facto if not de jure; postponement of the final decision on status is regarded as a device to allow the Russian leadership to gradually accommodate itself to the reality. The republic’s leadership has pointedly rejected any participation in Russian Federation political institutions and has been actively seeking to expand its regional and international ties and to win international recognition. However, such recognition, and the hoped-for membership in international organizations, is unlikely to be forthcoming absent Moscow’s agreement.

The Russian leadership, for its part, continues to insist that Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation, despite its inability to exercise real control over the region. Moreover, both conciliatory and coercive approaches to Chechnya still have their advocates in Russian elite circles. Advocates of conciliation, such as Ivan Rybkin, former secretary of the Russian Security Council and Yeltsin’s special representative for Chechnya until his removal in October 1997, have floated proposals for a loose “associated status,” a formula that might earlier have been acceptable to moderate segments of the Chechen leadership, but it is difficult to elicit political support for it in the current environment. They have also urged that Moscow sidestep the issue of status and focus on concrete economic agreements that could help restore the republic’s devastated economy and rebuild ties to Russia. Such proposals, however, have foundered on severe budgetary constraints in Moscow and unwillingness to devote scarce resources to an unreliable region.

At the same time, advocates of coercive measures to isolate the republic or to increase the political and military pressure on it retain real support in influential political and military circles. Remnants of the old “party of war” continue to portray Chechnya as a hotbed of instability and the spearhead of an Islamic insurgency threatening the entire North Caucasian region and beyond. While a renewed resort to large-scale violence seems unlikely, continuing intraelite struggles in both capitals, combined with growing instability in the North Caucasus more broadly, make it difficult to envision a negotiated agreement on Chechnya’s status in the foreseeable future.
Both scholars and practitioners concerned with preventive diplomacy have devoted increasing attention in recent years to the need for early warning of incipient or developing crises if violent conflict is to be forestalled. Even more important, they have begun to focus attention on the need for, and impediments to, marshaling timely and effective responses to warning. A close analysis of the evolution of the conflict in Chechnya suggests that both the parties to the conflict and the broader international community had available to them ample early warning that the conflict was escalating, as well as a broad array of possible responses, but that for reasons to be explored here, timely and appropriate measures were not adopted.

Moscow and Grozny

The assertion of the Russian government that military force was used as a last resort, after all other options for a peaceful resolution of the conflict had been exhausted, is not supported by the record. A considerable repertoire of tools and strategies were available to the governments of Russia and Chechnya for dealing with the conflict by means other than military force, but as this account has argued, these options were not seriously explored or utilized. This assessment is shared by a number of responsible figures in the Russian political establishment with firsthand knowledge of policymaking in the developing conflict. Emil Pain, a leading specialist on nationality policy and adviser to Yeltsin during this period, has written:

In democratic societies, there are a number of conditions under which the use of force is the only permissible way for a state to resolve regional conflicts. This is true, above all, when peaceful means of resolving conflicts have been exhausted and society has agreed to incur casualties and material losses, as well as when society is confident of the army's ability to act not only effectively but also in a civilized manner. These conditions had not been met before the Chechen war began.

A similar view is advanced by Sergei Kovalev, the prominent human rights advocate and, until his resignation over the war in Chechnya, Yeltsin's special adviser on human rights. In testimony before the U.S. Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, he asserted that "for quite some time both before and after the outbreak of fighting it would have been possible to solve the problem of Chechen separatism by political means. All attempts to do so were systematically and deliberately torpedoed by the military high command and by others in the government in Moscow."

Direct bilateral negotiations between officials of both governments at the highest level were never conducted. Indeed, a number of critics of Russian policy, including Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shaimiyev, have focused on the demonization of Dudayev, and Yeltsin's refusal to meet with him, as a major policy error. As Shaimiyev argued, like it or not Dudayev represented Chechnya and...
should therefore have been dealt with. However, the successful efforts of hard-line advisers around Yeltsin to convince him that Dudayev was neither a serious nor a legitimate political actor ruled out the direct negotiations for which Dudayev had repeatedly called. Other Russian officials have added that the conditions proposed by Moscow and the names of those appointed to conduct talks with the Chechen side were further proof that the government did not pursue the negotiations seriously.

In view of the obstacles to constructive direct negotiations between the two parties, the involvement of other actors as mediators or facilitators might have contributed to productive discussion and added a degree of transparency to the contacts that did take place, an important contribution of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) presence during the 1996 peace talks. Indeed, Dudayev repeatedly proposed and supported third-party mediation. While discreet discussions of such options went on behind the scenes, the highly charged political atmosphere in Moscow blocked third-party mediation by other actors within the Russian Federation, such as regional governors or republic presidents, or by other leaders from the Commonwealth of Independent States, even though several possible candidates were available and willing.

Moreover, there was considerable scope for negotiation of possible arrangements short of full independence but going beyond the “Tatarstan model,” including agreement to postpone a final solution to the contentious issue of status. Although Russian officials have argued that the Chechen leadership was unyielding in its insistence on complete independence, there are several reasons to question this view. For one thing, the Dudayev government clearly sought, and indeed assumed, continuing economic links to Russia and continuing participation in the ruble zone. The Chechen leadership never sought to cut economic and political ties by closing the border with Russia or introducing its own currency in place of the ruble, as, for example, the secessionist leaderships in Transdniester and Abkhazia had done in their conflicts with Moldova and Georgia. To this day a substantial Chechen diaspora continues to reside in Russia and contributes to the support of families in the North Caucasus.

Some skepticism is further warranted because of the repeated tendency of some Russian officials to exaggerate the threat of dismemberment. Although the 1994 power-sharing treaty with Tatarstan would later be held out as a model for compromise that the Chechens rejected, Moscow’s negotiations with Kazan were themselves extremely difficult and protracted. Even the more modest demands of the Tatarstan side were viewed with alarm and provoked the threat of economic sanctions and even of Russian military intervention in March 1992.

It should also be noted that both Russian and Western analyses often add to the confusion about the intentions of the Chechen leadership by treating the Russian terms for sovereignty and independence as if they were interchangeable. In fact, the Chechen constitution adopted in 1992 referred only to “state sovereignty”; the term independence was not used. In view of the rather broad and vague connotation of the term sovereignty in the former Soviet region throughout these years, it remains an open question whether a loose form of associated status might have been acceptable to the Chechen side before the war.
itself further embittered relations. Whether such proposals were seriously made at the time remains a subject of some dispute. But it is notable that Russian Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov admitted, in September 1997, that Moscow and Grozny had never discussed what precisely the Chechens meant by "independence." 49

Clearly, a serious negotiating process, and particularly one that used the good offices of foreign governments or international organizations, would have clarified the scope for compromise. The Dudayev leadership, fearing imminent Russian military action, made a number of appeals (before as well as after the Russian military intervention) to the United Nations, to President Bill Clinton, and to the governments of a number of other countries, outlining the escalating Russian efforts to use military force against Chechnya and urging that their influence be used to press the Russian government to refrain from further military actions and to resume negotiations. 50 It remains unclear whether these appeals were sent through appropriate channels and reached the intended recipients. 51 In any case, there is no indication that the Russian government was prepared to cooperate, and absent that support neither the United Nations nor the OSCE would have contemplated action. The attitude of the Russian leadership was curtly summed up by Foreign Minister Kozyrev in December 1994 when he commented to the Russian press that "settlement of the Chechen crisis is an internal affair of the Russian Federation. We need no foreign mediators for that." 52 Why the Russian government in the fall of 1994 was unwilling to use available mechanisms for conflict prevention is relatively clear; why the international community failed to play a more active role in deterring or preventing the escalation of the conflict deserves attention.

International Actors

Even prior to the summer and fall of 1994, there was ample warning that the growing conflict between Moscow and Grozny could erupt into open violence. The North Caucasus had long been viewed as the most turbulent region of the Russian Federation, and as we have seen, the dispute between Moscow and Chechnya began even before the dissolution of the USSR. Both in the fall of 1991, when the Russian government troops threatened Grozny and Dudayev ordered full-scale mobilization, and again in November 1992, when Russian troops massed along the Ingush border and entered Chechnya, military confrontation seemed imminent. 53

The lack of serious Western or international attention stemmed in part from Chechnya's relative obscurity in a region that had never elicited significant Western expertise and media attention, in part from the absence of a constituency that could give it political saliency, and in part from the view among officials in Western governments that because the conflict had no interstate dimension, it was unlikely to affect broader regional security. The protracted conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which had attracted considerable attention and involvement by the international community, was given high visibility in the West, and in the United States in particular, by the presence of a large and politically active
Armenian diaspora, while the attention devoted to the political status of Russians in the Baltic states was fueled by the intense pressures brought to bear by Moscow. By contrast, the only significant efforts by the NGO community to focus international attention on the situation in Chechnya were those of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), which was widely viewed as an organization prepared to support indiscriminately virtually any minority group, and of International Alert, which undertook a fact-finding mission to Moscow and Grozny in October 1992 at the invitation of Valery Tishkov, director of the Institute of Ethnography of the Russian Academy of Science and at that time chairman of the Russian State Committee on Nationalities Affairs.

In its final report, the mission urged both sides to engage in a broad bilateral dialogue over the entire range of economic, political, and security issues and suggested that such a dialogue could best be facilitated by an outside organization or group of individuals acceptable to both sides, but these recommendations were neither followed up nor implemented.

By the spring of 1994, the relationship between Moscow and Grozny displayed virtually all the signs of "unstable peace" that pointed to the need for preventive diplomacy: high or rising potential that coercion might be used to resolve political differences; the absence or breakdown of policies and institutions at a regional or national level that could handle disagreements and maintain a process of orderly resolution; and the explicit request, on the Chechen side, for third-party involvement in mediating the conflict. A broad repertoire of tools had been developed over the years that might have been brought to bear on the situation, from fact-finding missions by NGOs and efforts to involve both parties in informal or track-two dialogue to utilizing the good offices of the UN secretary-general's office or the OSCE to create favorable conditions for direct negotiations and provide them with a degree of transparency. Indeed, ample precedent already existed for the use of such mechanisms in the region: a number of them had been brought to bear in the Baltic states, often in a highly intrusive way, in response to charges by the Russian government of discrimination against the Russian communities of Estonia and Latvia.

Nor was reliable information about the steady escalation of the conflict lacking. The Russian media tracked this process in considerable detail and with great frankness throughout 1994; serious investigative reporting regularly challenged official accounts of events in the region, exposing, for example, the fact that Russian conscripts and officers were being recruited for secret combat operations on the side of the so-called Chechen opposition and that Russian aircraft and heavy weapons were being provided for its operations. A few individuals and NGOs expressed growing concern about the possibility of military escalation, and the UNPO in particular appealed for international efforts to avert it. In October and November 1994, explicit appeals were sent both by President Dudayev and by Foreign Minister Yousef to President Clinton and to U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. But Western analysts and government officials appear not to have focused on the conflict and generally minimized the likelihood of resort to force. To the extent the issue received attention, it seems to have been assumed in official circles that it would be madness...
to attempt a military campaign in of Chechnya. There seemed no reason to
doubt the repeated assurances by Yeltsin and his aides throughout the summer
and fall of 1994 that the conflict would be resolved by peaceful means. At a
time when Western governments, and the United States in particular, were pre-
occupied with a number of serious problems in relations with Russia and
preparing for the important OSCE meeting scheduled for December 1994 in
Budapest, there appears to have been an expectation that even if some elements
of the Russian security or military establishment were threatening force to com-
pel Dudayev's political capitulation, it would not actually be utilized.

Western perceptions of the unfolding conflict over Chechnya were also sig-
nificantly affected by the way in which the entire issue was framed by the Russian
leadership. Lacking extensive knowledge of and direct experience in the re-

region, some Western analysts and actors, including some in the U.S. government,
were perhaps too willing to accept uncritically Moscow's effort to portray the
struggle between Moscow and Grozny as an issue exclusively involving internal
law and order rather than an ethnopolitical conflict focused on issues of self-de-
termination. Undeniably, allegations that Chechnya had become a center of cor-
rupt and criminal activities had a serious basis in fact. It was equally undeniable
that Dudayev was a difficult figure to deal with and that his regime lacked a
broad base of popular support. But the mixture of information and disinforma-
tion spewed out by official Russian sources, as well by nationalist propagandists,
tended to neglect the obvious collusion between Russian and Chechen elites
that had contributed to the situation and portrayed the Dudayev leadership as
nothing more than a criminal conspiracy without popular support or legiti-
macy, manipulating separatist political slogans to disguise its real goals. It was,
moreover, permeated with ethnic stereotyping and scapegoating that came
close to treating Chechens as a criminal population. Misleading and exagger-
ated characterizations of the situation in Chechnya emanating from Russian
sources, which bore all the earmarks of counterintelligence service disinforma-
tion efforts, were by no means limited to the extremist publications and
speeches of right-wing nationalists; they were all too often voiced by scholars
and high-ranking officials like the minister of defense and by Yeltsin himself. This propaganda campaign may well have contributed to the tendency in Wash-

ington and elsewhere to view the Chechens, and Dudayev in particular, as the
troublemakers and villains in the unfolding tragedy. When Russian military actions were actually launched on December 11, Western governments appear to have been taken by surprise. Having given great
weight to Yeltsin's private and public assurances in the summer and fall of 1994
that the use of force was unthinkable in the Caucasus, Western capitals seemed
unprepared for the development. No prior notification appears to have been
given by the Russian government, nor was the prospect of imminent military ac-
tion raised by Russian officials at the December OSCE meeting in Budapest.

In view of the obvious disarray of Russian military forces, Western intelligence
may also have accepted too uncritically official assertions that a surgical strike was
not only feasible but was assured of quick success. Even analysts who predicted the
possibility of protracted guerrilla warfare in the mountains of Chechnya appear
to have assumed that Russian forces would rapidly subdue Grozny itself. Not only
was the disorganization and disarray of Russian forces underestimated; so was the
capacity and determination of Chechen militants to defend their country and
unite around its leadership in response to the Russian military intervention. It was
only after several weeks of clumsy and failed military operations, enormous civil-
ian casualties, and wanton destruction that questions began to be raised about the
underlying assumptions of the military operation and its goals. Before December
1994, preventive diplomacy was not even attempted.

Key Decisions and Strategies of Action

In considering the response of the international community to Russian military
actions in Chechnya, we need to focus our attention on three key sets of actors:
the United States, European governments, and the OSCE. But before turning our
attention to their response, it is important to bear in mind that these Russian
military actions constituted a serious violation of a number of international
commitments. Most notably, they violated Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (CSCE) agreements of 1990 and 1992 involving prior notifi-
cation of major military activities, and they were a direct and clear challenge to
the principles enshrined in the Budapest Code of Conduct signed less than two
weeks prior to the Russian intervention. But broader principles were at stake
as well. Underlying the entire history of the Helsinki process was the principle
that the international community had an important stake in the way govern-
ments treated their own populations and that violations of human rights and of
other international obligations were not merely an “internal affair” but behavior
for which governments could and should be held accountable. These u nder-
standings were largely ignored in the initial Western reactions to the Russian in-
vasion of Chechnya; indeed, it took almost one month for the U.S. government
to formally acknowledge that Russian actions violated these commitments.

Weak Responses: The U.S. Government

The initial American reaction to the Russian invasion was a statement by
President Clinton on December 11 at a press conference in Miami that “it is an
internal affair, and we hope that order can be restored with a minimum amount
of bloodshed and violence.” Secretary of State Warren Christopher went even
further in conveying tacit support for Russian actions, and for Yeltsin person-
ally, in stating, “It’s best in such matters to leave it to the judgement of President
Yeltsin; it’s a democratic society; it’s not the old Cold War. I’m sure he thought
through what he was doing before he did it, and it’s best we let him run such
things.” Christopher went on to add, “We would not like to see the disintegration
of Russia. We think that might lead to much more bloodshed.... I’m sure he took
this action only when he felt he had no other alternative.”

This attitude of cautious neutrality verging on outright support for Russian
actions was reiterated in a succession of State Department briefings and press
conferences over the next two weeks. The American government, in effect, put
itself in the position of supporting a military action opposed by a majority of Russian citizens, as well as by Russia’s most outspoken supporters of democracy and human rights. It also elicited a sharp response from Republican critics of the administration; as Christopher Smith, Republican chair of the congressional Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, admonished, “The eradication of a people and its territory is not an internal matter.”

The official commentary was notable in several respects. First, it tended to echo the framing of the issue emanating from official Russian sources—namely, that what was involved was no more than the legitimate effort of a state to restore order on its territory—and the hope that this would be accomplished swiftly and at low cost. In none of the initial statements was there any indication that the issue was not Russia’s territorial integrity—it was never questioned—but of the methods by which it would be maintained. It failed to make clear that how the Russian government deals with its internal problems is a matter of enormous concern to the international community. A strong case can be made that “the failure to act in a more decisive fashion had the effect of granting the Russian government before and during the first stages of the conflict a de facto license to flagrantly disregard the most basic principles of international law, including those reiterated in the Code of Conduct.”

Second, to the extent that the issue of Chechnya’s status was addressed, the press commentary emanating from Washington largely repeated apocalyptic Russian statements that sought to justify military action by warning that what was at stake was the fragmentation or disintegration of Russia itself. A State Department briefing on December 14 virtually echoed Russian statements about the threat of dismemberment: “we have no interest and the world has no interest in seeing a splintering or dismembering of the Russian Federation. That would be enormously destabilizing. It would produce the possibility of large-scale refugee flows.” Moscow’s assertion that Chechnya posed a threat not merely to the territorial integrity but to the unity and stability of the entire Russian Federation, and that it could set in motion a “domino effect” with repercussions throughout the country, appears to have been accepted uncritically, without much consideration for the distinctive features of the Chechen context. Moreover, it may have heightened concerns in the intelligence community over the potential for loss of control over nuclear weapons and armed forces. The possibility that a resort to military intervention in the North Caucasus was more likely to increase rather than reduce instability was not publicly addressed.

Yet another striking feature of the American reaction were the analogies drawn—however inept and misleading—between the Chechnya conflict and the American Civil War, with the implied or explicit parallel between Lincoln and Yeltsin. This rationale for military action, used to particular effect by Foreign Minister Kozyrev addressing an American audience on Meet the Press, was an attempt to legitimate Russian policy toward Chechnya while sidestepping the actual conduct of Moscow in the conflict. Ignoring as it did the long history of antagonism, including issues of ethnicity, conquest, and repression, this analogy was not only inappropriate; it was also strikingly reminiscent of Gorbachev’s efforts in 1990–91 to invoke the American Civil War as justification for Moscow’s
resistance to Baltic independence, and of equally uncritical acceptance of Gor-
bachev's argument by some circles in Washington at the time. In effect, the dis-
cussion focused almost exclusively on the goal of preserving territorial integrity
without much consideration of the process by which this was to be achieved.

As the scale of military actions escalated over the next few weeks, adminis-
tration sources continued to avoid harsh attacks on Russian conduct, confining
criticisms to the humanitarian aspects of the conflict. State Department brief-
ings focused on specific and limited concerns, such as "individual instances in
which we think there has been indiscriminate use of force," or the fact that In-
ternational Red Cross relief efforts were being obstructed. Or they called upon
the Russian leadership to refrain from attacks on civilians, when such attacks
were clearly an integral feature of the whole operation.74

Obviously, the press commentary did not necessarily reflect the administra-
tion's internal assessment of the situation, nor did it preclude continuing private
efforts to convey to Moscow that its actions were jeopardizing the bilateral rela-
tionship. A good deal of it represented an attempt at damage limitation aimed at
domestic audiences—an effort to prevent opponents of administration policies
toward Russia from using the war in Chechnya to promote their goals. The re-
action of the U.S. administration reflected two overriding goals. The first was to
prevent what was viewed as a marginal problem from derailing progress on
high-priority issues in Russian-American relations; the second was to support
Yeltsin politically, out of a conviction that his continuation in office, and friendly
personal relationship with Clinton, was indispensable both to continuing eco-
nomic and political reform and to Russian-American partnership on a broad
range of issues.

High administration officials repeatedly insisted that Russian behavior in
Chechnya should not be allowed to stand in the way of continuing Russian-
American engagement over a whole range of urgent problems, from nuclear
proliferation to the war in Bosnia, or detract from the achievements of the
Yeltsin administration in political democratization and economic reform. De-
fense Secretary William Perry, for example, in responding to questions about
Chechnya in connection with his meeting with General Grachev on December
16, asserted that "provided it [the intervention] is not destabilizing beyond the
scope of that activity, I do not see it as affecting our desire to have a pragmatic
partnership with Russia."75 Indeed, State Department spokesman Michael Mc-
curry expressed irritation with the media's focus on Chechnya in a State De-
partment briefing on December 12:

We have been aware for some time, for months, of the conflict that exists in Chechnya,
the efforts that the Russians have made to control violence there, to deal with what has
been a very crime-ridden and corruption-ridden province. . . . We are certainly well
aware of the situation and how the Russians have been responding to it. But by no means
does Chechnya define the broad parameters of the U.S.-Russia partnership. . . . I caution
anyone here [not] to elevate the question of Chechnya just because it happens in the
headlines and in your heads today into something that is on a par with the question of
NATO expansion or of the other issues in which we have a very important and focused
engagement with the Russians.76
To preserve a good working relationship with Yeltsin, the administration apparently refrained from raising the issue in high-level bilateral discussions until the foreign secretaries’ meeting in January 1995.77

Weak Responses: European Governments

The initial response in Western European capitals to Russian military actions in Chechnya was similarly restrained. The European Union refused to issue a strong condemnation on the explicit grounds that support for the process of democratic reform deserved higher priority than demanding compliance with norms of human rights, and that the establishment of democratic institutions was the best guarantee that intrastate as well as interstate conflicts would be resolved peacefully.78 The reports of Russian military actions, however, quickly gave rise to second thoughts about the ability of Russian forces to conduct a carefully targeted operation. The London Times gave most direct expression to the unspoken consensus:

A nation cannot accept the threat of an armed conflict within its country. Negotiations backed by a threat of force would have been the best choice. But there is no turning back now. If force is used it must be coordinated and overwhelming. Half-measures will only increase resistance and lead to bloodshed. But the current political confusion in Moscow and the unsuccessful military operations in Chechnya make a quick and effective operation increasingly unlikely.79

When a European Parliament resolution adopted on December 15, 1994, accepted that Chechnya was part of the Russian Federation but deplored Russia’s use of armed forces against “national minorities,” the Russian Duma issued an angry response, denying the allegations and insisting that the issue was exclusively one of disarming illegal military formations armed with tanks and rocket launchers.

The noted Russian political analyst Andrei Kortunov summed up the initial Western reaction in mid-January 1995:

So far, the events in the North Caucasus have not led to any even halfway serious crisis in relations between Russia and the West. If one doesn’t count the symbolic gesture by Denmark, which has frozen military cooperation with Moscow, our leading Western partners have, on the whole, reacted to the “pacification” in Chechnya with Olympian calm. Action has been limited to a modest proposal to get the mechanism of the OSCE involved in an effort to solve the problem, a few outraged editorials in the liberal press, and some caustic cartoons of Boris Yeltsin.80

Rising Criticism

As reports accumulated of the brutality of Russian actions and the indiscriminate shelling of civilian targets, and as the blatant lies dispensed by Russian officials were exposed daily by the news reports and television coverage from Chechnya, the European response became increasingly critical. As the military
correspondent of Moscow's Segodnya put it on January 5, Moscow has failed to justify "the hopes of Western politicians that a rapid and not too bloody elimination of the hotbed of separatism in Chechnya would allow them to keep silent. The events of the past few days have made the democratic countries radically change the tone of their comments." Although no major European leaders challenged the view that this was Russia's internal affair, a growing number of prominent figures began to speak out, criticizing Russian actions as uncivilized, unacceptable, and in clear violation of international law. The Swedish foreign minister, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, proclaimed that "what is now happening in Chechnya is unacceptable." Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany on January 9 called it "complete madness," and France's foreign affairs minister, Alain Juppé, declared, "Russia must know that the bombing of civilians with aircraft and hundreds of tanks is not a concept included in the European democratic model." As criticism and demands for explanation mounted, European Union Foreign Affairs Commissioner Hans van den Broek announced that the European Union would delay implementing the partnership agreement with Russia pending consultations. "We don't dispute that Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation," he insisted, "but we do have serious concern — verging on indignation — at the way a political problem is being addressed by military means." 

The Role of the OSCE

Ultimately, however, the OSCE was the institution most centrally affected by the conflict in Chechnya and had the clearest mandate for engaging in preventive diplomacy. But the OSCE was itself constrained by Russian resistance to its involvement in what the Russian leadership insisted was an internal matter. In the face of Russian opposition, member states declined to press proposals to use the OSCE human dimension mechanism to organize a fact-finding human rights mission. Seeking to avoid open confrontation and to elicit Russian cooperation, the then chairman in office, Hungarian foreign minister Laszlo Kovacs, sent his personal representative, Istvan Gyarmati, to Moscow on January 9–10, 1995, to solicit Russian support for sending a small OSCE team of experts to Moscow and Grozny. A first mission of four, accompanied by Russian officials, visited the region on January 26–29 and succeeded in securing the agreement of both sides to visits to prisoners by the International Red Cross. In an effort to avoid antagonizing the Russian leadership, the mission confined its statements to expressing deep concern over the tragic events in Chechnya; indeed, Gyarmati commented at a press conference that "identifying individual human rights violations was not part of my mandate." A second visit took place on February 22, and delicate negotiations combined with continuing pressure from Western governments led to an unprecedented agreement by the Russian government to allow an OSCE presence — officially titled "Assistance Group," in deference to Russian sensitivities — to be established in Grozny. A critical role in this process was played by the European Union, which insisted on the establishment of an OSCE mission as a condition for signing the interim trade agreement with Russia.
The OSCE Assistance Group operated under extremely constraining guidelines insisted upon by Moscow, which had acquiesced in its creation to avoid further jeopardizing Russia’s ties to Western countries but sought to limit and control the group’s activity. Despite the barrage of criticism to which it was regularly subjected, and notwithstanding the extreme delicacy of its position over the course of the following two years, and particularly under the able leadership of Tim Guldimann, the Assistance Group succeeded in gaining the trust of moderates on both sides and ultimately in brokering direct negotiations. While it was not in a position to influence directly the political and military choices that resulted in a continuation and escalation of the conflict, the group played a highly constructive role in facilitating the delivery of relief supplies and exchanges of prisoners, in focusing international attention on human rights violations, in promoting dialogue between the two sides and providing an element of transparency, and in facilitating later cease-fire agreements and competitive presidential elections in Chechnya. By offering unwavering support to the principle that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was both essential and possible, the OSCE presence strengthened the position of moderates on both sides and paved the way for the direct negotiations that ultimately produced the peace agreement.

As the war continued and the violence escalated, a variety of governments, NGOs and individuals pressed Moscow to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict. Most significantly, the Council of Europe froze consideration of Russia’s admission, making settlement of the Chechen conflict a condition of membership and establishing a special commission to monitor progress. As European officials and parliamentarians visited Moscow and Grozny, notwithstanding the outrage such visits provoked in right-wing circles. A decision at the foreign ministers meeting of the European Union similarly delayed the signing of an interim trade agreement with Russia until a settlement was reached in Chechnya. Pressure continued to be exerted to permit humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross to send relief convoys to the region.

Despite the failure of these efforts to bring about a change in Russian policy toward Chechnya, the imposition of formal sanctions or indeed of more stringent forms of economic conditionality was rejected. Suggestions that International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank loans be refused or delayed were turned down, as were proposals to curtail or make conditional U.S. Export-Import Bank credits, U.S. Agency for International Development programs, or private investment. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) never brought up Russian behavior in Chechnya as a subject of board discussion. Other forms of linkage were also resisted; for example, the Clinton administration avoided using Russian behavior as additional justification for NATO enlargement. Even symbolic sanctions were shunned; Clinton went ahead with a planned visit to Moscow to celebrate the anniversary of victory in World War II, albeit with an understanding that the traditional military parade would not be part of the ceremonies in Red Square. Indeed, continuing Western financial support for Russia in the face of the war, and at a time when the Russian government was failing to collect over 30 percent of the tax revenues owed
to it, led a number of figures inside Russia as well as in the West to accuse Western governments and the IMF of indirectly helping finance the war.\textsuperscript{90}

As in the United States, there was in European political circles a widespread and considered judgment that the political survival of Yeltsin was crucial to stability and progress in Russia, and that his fall would allow antidemocratic forces to come to power in Moscow. A whole array of major issues required Russian cooperation, from NATO to Bosnia, and indeed the efforts to develop a new security framework in Europe depended critically on Russia's partnership and constructive engagement. Whether or not the personal embrace of Yeltsin went as far as it did in Washington, political leaders across the continent were wrestling with the broader dilemma of how to balance political support for Yeltsin with criticism or opposition to threatening behavior emanating from Moscow. The war in Chechnya further exacerbated an already difficult quandary.

Moreover, for a number of governments not only was the conflict considered to be largely of local importance without broader geopolitical consequences for the region, but they did not wish to see any precedents established that would weaken their own efforts to deal with troublesome issues of minority secessionism or terrorism.

Analysis: Constraints on Early Action

As this analysis has demonstrated, a number of factors played a role in constraining the use of various instruments to try to prevent the resort to military force or to deter its escalation. First, the norm of sovereignty and territorial integrity takes on particular importance where the behavior of a major power is at stake. Western governments and international organizations have been prepared on a number of occasions to play an intrusive role in the internal affairs of smaller states, including those of the former Soviet region. In the cases of Estonia and Latvia, the situation differed in two important respects: the domestic issue was a source of tension in interstate relations between the two capitals and Moscow, and the Baltic governments were prepared to accept the international involvement. Whether or not these institutions' mandates would have permitted such action, as a practical matter, no action by the United Nations or the OSCE could be undertaken without Russian acquiescence.

The reticence of the United Nations in the crisis deserves particular attention. As mentioned earlier, President Dudayev appealed directly to the international community, including the United Nations and the Security Council, but Russia's envoy to the United Nations, Ambassador Sergei Lavrov, had opposed any discussion of the crisis in the Security Council, insisting that it was purely an internal matter. During a visit to Stockholm shortly afterward, in response to a question about UN failure to seek to restrain Russian military action, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali replied very simply, "We are bound by the U.N. Charter."\textsuperscript{91} He was presumably referring to Article 2(7), which excludes from the competence of the United Nations "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of any state. As the secretary-general had himself argued in another context, however, certain kinds of internal conflict could jeopardize international order: when
conflict within a state threatens to cross borders, when it creates a grave humani-
tarian emergency, or when it challenges fundamental principles of the interna-
tional order.92 The reluctance to adopt a more expansive definition of responsi-
bilities in the period leading up to the Russian military intervention, and the
inaction of the United Nations subsequently, cannot be explained purely with ref-
ence to the norms of sovereignty and the formal limits to UN jurisdiction; it re-
fects as well the deference to a permanent member of the Security Council and
the limited tools available to the secretary-general other than his moral author-
ity.93 The ambitious vision of UN peacekeeping outlined by Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali in 1992 foundered on the reality of political and resource con-
straints.

In addition to the deference to Moscow, the willingness to acquiesce— at least
initially— in Russian actions was also influenced by a concern, however exag-
gerated, over the possibility that Chechnya represented not a unique situation
but one of a series of possible dominos that threatened to bring about the frag-
mentation and even disintegration of Russia, with all its ominous consequences.
This deep concern with preserving Russia's territorial integrity was joined to ob-
vious ambivalence about the principle of national self-determination, and the
lack of any consensus whatsoever on the conditions under which it could legit-
imately be invoked. The fear of unleashing centrifugal forces throughout Eu-
rope, or of legitimizing a variety of insurgencies, contributed to an emphasis on
stability and existing borders, and to the neglect of emerging new norms that
link respect for sovereignty with the internal conduct of governments and lead-
ers. It is particularly striking in the case of the American response that none of
Washington's early statements conveyed any indication that the actions of states
within their borders are subject to any limitation whatsoever. But the failure of
the OSCE to speak out on behalf of Helsinki norms, as well as the Budapest
agreements, was especially striking.

The deference to Moscow was further reinforced by the extreme resistance of
Russian political elites to outside involvement in the conflict. For several years,
in connection with a number of conflicts on the territory of now independent
states that were formerly republics of the USSR, Moscow had made it amply
clear that it considered the entire region of what it pointedly called the "near
abroad" to be a sphere of Russian security interests and had actively fought to
exclude or limit the involvement of outside states and actors in the region.
Clearly, resistance to such involvement within what was considered the territory
of the Russian Federation was even greater, and the very suggestion of foreign
involvement provoked hostile reactions in conservative political circles.94

Second, the delicate political situation in Moscow further contributed to the
extreme circumspection of Western governments and officials. Fearing that crit-
icism of the war in Chechnya would strengthen the communist-nationalist op-
position to Yeltsin, and conceivably even bring to power forces far less favorable
to economic reform, political democratization, and a responsible foreign policy,
Western governments were inhibited in bringing pressure to bear on Moscow to
influence policy. (It should be added that these governments were equally reluc-
tant to provide ammunition to their domestic critics; with programs of U.S. as-
sistance to Russia under attack by conservative Republicans, the defense of
Yeltsin was inextricably linked to the defense of Clinton administration policies
toward Russia more broadly.)

Third, the priority of other issues requiring the cooperation of the Yeltsin gov-
ernment, from nuclear dismantlement to START II ratification, and from joint
peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia to NATO enlargement, served as a further con-
straint on the willingness of Western leaders to press Russian officials very hard
over an issue they initially considered marginal. The failures of Russian policy,
revealed and magnified by the powerful media coverage from Grozny, forced the
issue to center stage. But only when it became clear that Yeltsin’s policy in Chech-
nya was undermining his own political effectiveness and authority, jeopardizing
his prospects of reelection, and threatening to derail the whole process of re-
form, could criticism of the war in Chechnya be presented as congruent with
support for Russian reform.

Fourth, the emphasis on inclusionary strategies for influencing Russian do-
mestic and foreign policy is an important factor in its own right because it mil-
itated against the use of political or economic sanctions to influence Russian be-
havior. Indeed, precisely because support for democratization and economic
reform implied continuing political and economic engagement by the West, the
imposition of sanctions was seen to be counterproductive.

Finally, inadequate understanding of the situation in both Moscow and
Grozny—as reflected in the tendency to underestimate the growing influence of
hard-line figures in Yeltsin’s entourage on policy toward Chechnya; to accept un-
critically tendentious and self-serving analyses of developments there by Russian
analysts and officials; to view the situation through the misleading prism of
the American Civil War; and above all to exaggerate the possible “domino effect”
of Chechnya without recognizing the specific features that distinguished the
case of Chechnya from that of other regions and republics—weakened the ca-
pacity of Western governments and institutions to devise more suitable re-
sponses to the crisis.

Lessons Learned

For the Russian government, the war in Chechnya constituted a major policy
failure. It was based on a serious misjudgment of the political situation in
Chechnya, of Russian military capabilities, and of public opinion. It was an ex-
ceedingly costly policy that exacted an enormous toll, weakening the Yeltsin
government domestically as well as internationally and projecting an image of
brutality, unpredictability, and unreliability that influenced policy toward Rus-
sia throughout the region. It has had destabilizing consequences throughout the
Caucasus and southern Russia, where a flood of refugees, weapons, and drugs
has exacerbated tensions and severely strained the capacity of local govern-
ments across the region. Moreover, the ferocity of the war not only made a po-
litical solution of the conflict even more difficult but further embittered
Chechen-Russian relations in ways that will have long-lasting consequences. In-
deed, the view that the effort to use military force to solve the Chechen conflict
was a major policy failure was ultimately embraced by Yeltsin himself. At a
Kremlin press conference in October 1995 he acknowledged, somewhat am-
bivalently, that the war was the biggest disappointment of his presidency,
adding, "I think we may agree with the criticism of Western states that the use of
force could have been avoided."96

For Western governments and international organizations, the critical issue
was not the failure to head off the conflict but the failure to try. It is difficult to
demonstrate conclusively that a more active Western role in the early stages of
the conflict would have altered its course. However, it arguably might have cre-
ated opportunity, space, transparency, and support for a serious negotiating
process and strengthened the inhibitions against the resort to force. The exis-
tence of important divisions within the Russian elite, and therefore of potential
allies of appropriate conflict prevention efforts, and the interest of a number of
capable regional leaders eager to find a political compromise offered opportu-
nities to influence the policy calculus that were never utilized.

Moreover, Western governments and international institutions had a consid-
erable degree of leverage, given Russian aspirations and vulnerabilities. Ulti-
mately, the West and the international community as well as Moscow and
Grozny paid an exceedingly high price for the war—a price that was initially not
anticipated—because of its adverse effect on other important interests: eco-
nomic and human resources that could have gone into economic development
were siphoned off in ultimately futile military efforts; Yeltsin's own stature was
weakened, and with it his capacity to deliver on other important issues; the mil-
itary establishment was left demoralized, impoverished, and embittered; and
the dishonesty and cynicism of officialdom exposed by the war further drained
the already meager residue of public trust in institutions and leaders. Not only
did the war fail to resolve the conflict which triggered it; it exacerbated tensions
and instability throughout the North Caucasus and compounded Moscow's
failure to develop a coherent approach to the region.97

Indeed, Western reactions surprised and disappointed liberal circles within
Russia, which had long viewed the West as inspiration and partner in the strug-
gle for human rights. As one Russian analyst put it, “One of the most surprising
consequences [of the Chechen conflict] was the fairly ambivalent attitude of key
Western countries . . . to massive violations of the human rights of Russian and
foreign citizens during the military phase of the conflict . . . . Western ambiva-
lence helped the Yeltsin regime considerably in pursuing the military option in
Chechnya for such a long time.”98 Adding to the disappointment, in his view, was
the perception that Europeans treated Russian public opinion just as the Russ-
ian elite did: as a factor unworthy of serious attention.

Once military actions were launched in December 1994, a more forceful in-
ternational response would probably not have been effective in deterring fur-
ther escalation or compelling a change in policy; not until a mutually hurting
stalemate had been reached, and a new constellation of political forces created
by the presidential elections in spring 1996, was there a new opportunity for a
negotiated solution. Even then it required the devastating rout of Russian forces
in Grozny in August 1996 and Lebed's decisiveness in acting on the belief that there was no realistic alternative to serious negotiations, for a peace agreement to be ultimately signed and implemented. But a case can be made that given the real divisions within the Russian elite over the resort to military force, and the lack of public support for it, the possible costs of speaking out frankly were exaggerated and the moral and political price of restraint underestimated.

Finally, the initial endorsement of Russian actions in Chechnya poorly served the larger long-term goal of building a democratic, law-governed state; it equated the views and interests of a particular group of hard-line officials with Russian national interests. Seven decades of arbitrary rule in which the state rode roughshod over individual rights and relied on force to maintain control is precisely the legacy from which Russia is attempting to distance itself. Under these circumstances, the principle that legitimate authority must be based on consent is the cornerstone of Russian democratization. The policy implications of this position were most eloquently expressed by Sergei Kovalev in his statement to the U.S. Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe:

Support for democratic reforms in Russia should be combined with equally serious and energetic opposition to any actions by government bodies in Russia which depart from the values of a democratic society. Only a selective and targeted combination of support and pressure can assist the transformation of the Russian state from its historical role as the bane of the Russian people into a guarantee of their prosperity and security, from a continual threat to neighboring countries into their reliable and equal partner.
The International Community and the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh

John J. Maresca

Case Summary

The modern conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis dates from about 1987-88 and has its roots in the existence of the historic Armenian-dominated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan under the USSR. The conflict escalated from a long-standing political argument to a violent confrontation and then a war as the bonds holding the Soviet Union together began to weaken.

The concept of uniting the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh with the Soviet Republic of Armenia became a rallying cry for Armenian nationalists, a kind of substitute for demanding independence, which was still viewed as an impossible dream. A “Karabakh Committee” was formed in Armenia in 1987, which was in fact an opposition political party, the precursor of the present-day Armenian National Movement. Led by the Karabakh Committee, huge demonstrations were held in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, and in Stepanakert, the main city of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijani resentment of these developments mounted and served as a focus for the nascent Azerbaijani sense of nationalism that was also growing stronger at that time. In 1989 demonstrations turned into riots and pogroms against the large Armenian minorities in Sumgait, an industrial city, and Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku. These events, in turn, spurred reactions on the Armenian side in a classic downward spiral of vengeance. Huge numbers of Armenians and Azerbaijanis fled each other’s republic, or were forced to leave.
The Soviet government in Moscow made half-hearted efforts to stem the tide of discontent. Direct rule of Nagorno-Karabakh was tried from January to November 1989 but failed. The Soviet Army intervened in Baku in January 1990, killing some Azerbaijaniis and provoking long-lasting resentment. Local Soviet army units began siding or cooperating with the locality where they were based, and weapons flowed easily to partisans on both sides.

In Stepanakert the Soviet of the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh voted first to secede from Azerbaijan, later to join Armenia, and finally simply to constitute an independent state, basing these actions on a clause in the Soviet constitution whose applicability in the particular circumstances of Nagorno-Karabakh has been debated ever since. Military confrontations began around the frontiers of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the conflict took on all the characteristics of a war. There were also incidents along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and several small enclaves on both sides of this frontier were eventually overrun.1

Before the breakup of the USSR, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was viewed as an internal problem of the Soviet state. Because of the Soviet Union's fierce hostility to any outside interference in its internal affairs, there was no thought in the international community of intervening in the Karabakh conflict during that period. Of course, no one foresaw the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union or predicted that the international community might eventually undertake a role in this conflict.

It was only when the newly independent states from the former USSR formally joined the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)2 at the meeting of its foreign ministers in Prague in January of 1992 that the international community began to consider a possible role. The international effort began almost as an afterthought before the closing of that meeting: the British delegate noted that a conflict existed between two of the new member states, suggesting that a CSCE fact-finding mission be sent to the area. The proposal was approved without debate.

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was viewed by some as an internal problem of Azerbaijan, by others as an international conflict between the newly declared state of Nagorno-Karabakh and the state of Azerbaijan, or between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This difference of appreciation of the very nature of the conflict made it extremely complex to deal with. In addition, it engaged key interests not only of the enclave itself, of Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also of Turkey, Russia, and the Armenian diaspora.

The Karabakh Armenians believed that they had exercised their right of self-determination and were fighting their war of independence; the Azerbaijaniis considered the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh an armed rebel group and believed the real war was with Armenia. Armenia was giving indispensable support to the Karabakh Armenians but held that it was not directly involved in the conflict and that blockades by both Azerbaijan and Turkey constituted unwarranted aggression. Turkey also denied that it had a role in the conflict but asserted that it could not ignore the suffering of its brothers and sisters in Azerbaijan, which was being pressured by Russia. Russia claimed that Turkey was
encroaching on its sphere of influence and that it alone had the responsibility to settle disputes in the trans-Caucasus. The Armenian diaspora, concentrated in Russia, the Middle East, Europe (particularly France), and the United States (especially California), supported both Armenia and (directly and separately) the Karabakh Armenians, but it was split between realists who wanted to end the war by acceptable compromise and fanatics who saw it as a righteous war to regain lost Armenian lands.

The conflict that emerged from this complex equation went through a phase of bloody warfare from 1991 to 1994. Numerous outside attempts at mediation failed, and while a cease-fire was agreed in Moscow in May 1994, it has been a fragile and tenuous one. About sixteen thousand people have died in the conflict, one million refugees have been left homeless because of it, and a large part of Western Azerbaijan remains occupied by Armenian forces.

The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has much in common with other local conflicts: long-standing hatreds; ethnic, religious and linguistic differences; the easy availability of weaponry; emerging nationalistic feelings that have long been repressed; weak governments and nationalistic leaders; a remote third world-like setting; an unsophisticated population; and exploitation and manipulation from both within and outside the area. In such cases it is sometimes difficult for the international community to agree on the nature, scope, and objectives of an intervention.

In the Karabakh conflict, however, the international community (except Russia) largely agreed on the approach but was unwilling to extend itself beyond certain modest limits to achieve a solution. Russia, on the other hand, worked hard to minimize and supplant the role of the international community, as part of a broader policy of retaining Moscow's influence and prerogatives as mediator and peacekeeper in the territory of the former USSR. These differences led to a unique competition between Russia and the international community for leadership in mediating and supervising a resolution to the conflict.

The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute does not illustrate the problem of early warning in a classic sense. When it loomed as a potential source of violent conflict, the entire region was part of the USSR; the international community considered it an internal problem not subject to international intervention. On the other hand, upon the breakup of the USSR, when the conflict was already active and involved at least two newly independent states, the international community correctly perceived it as having the potential to lead to a broader regional conflict. This was one of the central conclusions of the CSCE’s early 1992 fact-finding mission to the area and led the CSCE to launch a mediation effort, later recognized and implicitly mandated also by the UN Security Council.

The CSCE’s negotiating process, which became known as the “Minsk Group,” began energetically and at first looked very promising. But the effort fizzled after its first (and still important) success of getting the conflicting parties to the negotiating table. Russian negotiators made repeated efforts to undercut it, while high-level Western attention was focused on the former Yugoslavia, and there was an unspoken tendency to leave the problems of the former USSR to Russia. A number of opportunities were missed that might have led to greater negotiating progress.
Although this international community intervention has been unsuccessful so far in finding a political solution to the conflict, it has laid an essential basis for such a solution by creating a credible and sustained negotiating process. This process has been an element in the durability of the 1994 cease-fire and may yet help the parties to resolve the conflict.

This chapter examines the problem of early warning as it applies here, describes the strategies followed by the Western countries and by Russia as they have tried to mediate the war, explains the key decisions taken (or not taken) by outside players on possibilities for early action, and analyzes some of the most prominent missed opportunities. The following broad elements run throughout the Karabakh negotiating experience and help explain the international community’s inability to arrange for a permanent cease-fire, introduction of peacekeeping forces, and a political solution for the status of Nagorno-Karabakh:

• The unwillingness of the conflictin g parties to make concessions as, encouraged by their friends, each of them continued to hope that they could “win” the conflict.
• The lack of sustained high-level Western interest in the conflict, which led the conflicting parties to mistrust the West’s will to ensure the peace. The absence of a U.S. commitment to participate in a possible CSCE peacekeeping force made the parties seriously doubt the credibility of such an operation.
• Russia’s determination to keep the international community out of the “near abroad,” which produced unilateral Russian cease-fire proposals undercutting international plans and permitted “deal shopping” by the parties.
• The unwieldy procedures of the CSCE and its “Minsk Group” negotiation, which guaranteed that a peacekeeping force could not be provided promptly.

Early Warning

By the time the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict emerged on the international stage, it was already violent; the warring sides and the issues that separated them had been largely defined. The challenge for the international community was neither one of foreseeing the conflict nor of preventing it from becoming violent. The problem of early warning was thus not the same in this case as it is with a conflict that begins and grows as a potential problem for the international community.

“Early warning” is nonetheless relevant here, since the international community needed to understand the possibility that the conflict could spread, spark similar conflicts elsewhere, or draw regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, or Russia into a larger confrontation. Countries that were interested in the Karabakh conflict correctly understood the warning signals on this point and considered it essential to try to head off a larger conflict. This was why the international community became involved.

When the CSCE first sent a fact-finding team to Armenia and Azerbaijan in February 1992 to report on the Karabakh conflict, the fact that the conflict had
for so long been an internal Soviet one, in a distant region that was little known and of limited interest to the West, meant that no ready specialists and ideas on the conflict were available to the governments that were in a position to contribute to a solution.

But the deeper involvement of Turkey or Iran could have brought Western interests into play. If Turkey, a NATO member, had become directly involved in the conflict (inevitably on the side of Azerbaijan), NATO could easily have found itself in a confrontation with Russia (which has had the historic role of defending the Christian peoples of the Caucasus against the Turks and has given essential support to Armenia). Similarly, an Iranian intervention could have prompted a larger conflict by directly challenging Russian and Turkish interests.

Such factors encouraged Western governments to intervene in some form, but the difficulties involved, the lack of expertise on the region, and the many other problems competing for attention dictated that any Western intervention would have to be severely limited in scope and depth. Fact-finding and mediating assistance appeared as the most likely types of intervention, with observation of a cease-fire added later. It was only after considerable effort had been invested that the provision of a peacekeeping force was also broadly accepted. Thus, early warning signs of potential escalation were heeded, but only minimally, as a CSCE negotiating process was initiated in the spring of 1992. The significance of early warning was understood, but commitment to decisive action was lacking.

What the international community did not foresee, despite clear early warning signals, was the strength of Russian resistance to an international intervention on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russian resentment quickly evolved into a major dispute over who should have responsibility for mediation and eventually peacekeeping in the Karabakh conflict—Russia or the international community as represented by the CSCE. In Moscow there was little agreement on how to deal with the former Soviet republics, but there was a strongly held opinion, especially among the military and other security organs, that maintaining peace and stability on the territory of the former USSR was the exclusive prerogative of Russia. This view resembled the possessive attitudes of virtually all colonial powers with respect to their former colonies, but it was perhaps felt even more strongly in the case of Russia because of the country’s historic xenophobia, particularly toward the West. Many Russians see their country as having a unique role across Eurasia and do not accept that outsiders have any place in this area.³

Many in the West were instinctively suspicious of Russian “peacekeeping” efforts on the territory of the former USSR, but no country was prepared to take the lead in replacing the Russians. Westerners were therefore not in a position to criticize the only country ready to step in, regardless of the Russians’ methods or motivation. Westerners were also hopeful that an emerging democratic Russia would not revert to an imperialist policy and were inclined to give President Boris Yeltsin the benefit of the doubt in the “near abroad.” The fact that Russian peacekeeping in the former USSR was to be conducted under the guise of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) confused some Westerners, who may not have perceived the differences between this emerging organization and the democratic
structures of Western institutions such as the European Union. The result was confusion over the significance for Russia of the relationship with the near abroad and the appropriate Western response. The danger signals of Russia’s hostility toward international intervention in the former USSR were only partially understood in the West, and the international effort to find a resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh continued without the serious high-level efforts that were needed to work out a satisfactory basis for cooperation with Russia. The resulting dispute about roles and Russian-CSCE cooperation delayed the mediation process and thus prolonged the military standoff over Nagorno-Karabakh.4

Strategies for Action

There have been two basic outside strategies for dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: that of the international community (essentially the Western members of the CSCE) and that of the Russians.

International Community (Western) Strategy

At the outset of the international community’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there was no strategy—either national or international—on the part of the Western countries. The initial CSCE fact finders visited the region with an extremely vague mandate, and they did not even know what kind of report was expected of them. The general view was that fact-finding would naturally lead to the development of a strategy, which it did, but only in a very haphazard way.

The United States also did not have a distinct “strategy” for the Nagorno-Karabakh problem; rather, the U.S. government tended to see this and other conflicts on the territory of the former USSR as aspects of its overall policy toward Russia. In its Russia policy, the United States had a hierarchy of issues. For example, control of nuclear weapons ranked very high, as did encouraging progress toward democratic institutions and free-market economies. Resolution of disputes in areas of intense Russian interest, such as the trans-Caucasus, was relatively low in this hierarchy. The American tendency was therefore to handle such disputes in the context of international organizations such as the CSCE and to follow policy lines that were developed through discussion among a number of like-minded countries. Any action would be taken in conjunction with the international organizations so that it would not be an exclusively American action.

After two CSCE fact-finding missions and one by the United Nations, the Western governments with an interest in this conflict (primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Turkey, and later Italy and Sweden) began to formulate some ideas that, from the spring of 1992, gradually jelled into a tacitly agreed strategy whose principal elements were as follows:

1. The Karabakh conflict was not a high priority for Western countries, and because of Russia’s primary interest in the region, the conflict would be subject in large measure to the priorities of Western countries in their relations with Russia.
2. In this situation there was a tendency to give Russia leeway or to let it take the lead in conflicts in the near abroad. For the West, Nagorno-Karabakh and other conflicts within the former USSR took a distant second place behind the strong preoccupation with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

3. It was clearly understood among the Western participants in the CSCE mediation effort that the CSCE could intervene only in limited ways (mediation and limited cease-fire observation/peacekeeping) in the area of the former USSR, in order not to provoke a Russian response, and in view of the limited resources available for such interventions at a time when political attention was committed to the Yugoslav problem.

4. It was well understood among the Western participants in the mediation itself that the international community’s effort should be led by the Minsk Group under the aegis of the CSCE, as part of a de facto division of labor among international organizations. At the time the UN Security Council was overloaded with other mediation and peacekeeping operations, and a division of labor appeared sensible. It was generally recognized that the Security Council would in any case have to create something like the Minsk Group, with its unique composition, to pursue negotiations. Security Council resolutions recognized the leading CSCE role and gave it something of a UN mandate.

5. It was largely agreed that the Western countries involved in this effort should take the role of neutral mediators and should work within the Minsk Group.

6. The Western mediators agreed that they should work closely with Russia and Turkey, but they should keep Iran out of the negotiating process. Iran was not a member of the CSCE and was therefore not bound by the principles that guided the other participants, and it was generally assumed that Iranian participation would not be helpful.

7. The possibility of exerting greater pressure on Turkey and the Armenian diaspora to play a more positive role was tacitly rejected. Turkey was seen as a relatively positive participant in the peace process and not easily subject to pressure. The Armenian diaspora was highly politicized and divided on the Karabakh issue, and it would have been difficult for the diaspora Armenians to agree on how to proceed.

8. The Western negotiators aimed for a cease-fire as the top priority objective for the negotiating process, coupled with whatever would be necessary to get the parties to agree to the cease-fire (e.g., the lifting of blockades, the return of occupied territories, the return of refugees to their homes, and some form of international “guarantee” of the cease-fire, such as a peacekeeping force).

9. The Western negotiators believed that, following agreement on a cease-fire and the necessary associated measures, it would be easier to encourage the parties to negotiate a political settlement to the conflict. The possibility of making an early compromise proposal for a political status for Nagorno-Karabakh was rejected, since it was thought that the existence of such a proposal would sharpen the disagreement among the parties and make the negotiating process more difficult.
10. The Western negotiators recognized the necessity of preparing for a decision in the broader CSCE to send a CSCE monitoring mission (later a peacekeeping force) to oversee the cease-fire.

11. While some of the other participants in the negotiating process, as well as Armenian-American groups, would have liked to see a greater U.S. role, most recognized that this was unlikely because of the area's remoteness from U.S. interests and the possibility of provoking Russia. One possibility that was repeatedly suggested was the appointment of a special U.S. envoy to help mediate the dispute, such as the United States has long had for Cyprus, but this idea was not approved by the Clinton administration, since it wished to avoid deeper involvement.

Russian Strategy

The disarray in Moscow made it difficult to find any credible, authoritative, and complete statement of Russian policy toward conflicts in the newly independent states of the former USSR or the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in particular. It may be that there simply was no centrally developed or approved policy concept or list of policy objectives. What seems more likely is that there was simply an accumulation of separate actions by different ministries and power groups, all seeking to reflect and anticipate what they saw as the tendency of political opinion or to impose their own conceptions in the absence of official policy. These efforts from time to time received at least the tacit approval of President Yeltsin.

By observing Russian actions and the aims that Russian negotiators pursued in their dealings with the newly independent states and in the negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh, it was nonetheless possible to draw up a representative list of policy directions and the strategy implicit in them.

1. Reestablish Russia's great power role. In the first instance this required maintaining or regaining Moscow's influence over or control of the evolution of events in the area of the former USSR, and ensuring that this was recognized by the rest of the world. Moscow continued to aim for acceptance as a European great power, with legitimate interests in all European affairs. Controlling the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and ensuring that the international community did not take control of its resolution, was essential to the development of this strategy.

2. Control the outer frontiers of the whole of the former USSR. The Russians pointed out that there were no marked or even surveyed internal borders in the former USSR, and to establish them now would be very costly. By their logic, a better solution was simply to leave the "internal" Soviet borders unmarked, to reestablish the old outer frontiers of the USSR, and to man them with Russian border forces, as was still the case on many of these frontiers. Exceptions included the Baltic states and Azerbaijan, but in the latter case the Russians were actively pressing for reintroduction of their border guards along the frontier with Iran. The desire to control the Azer-
bajian-Iran border was one of many strong incentives for the Russians in their effort to regain dominance of Azerbaijan through a “peacekeeping” role in Nagorno-Karabakh.

3. Maintain military bases throughout the former USSR. After the Russians forced Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze to invite Russian forces into Georgia, and after agreement on withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic states, the only former Soviet republic where basing of Russian forces was an unachieved objective was Azerbaijan. The newly independent Azerbaijani government under President Abulfaz Elchibey forced the Russians to leave in 1993, and even its relatively pro-Moscow successor clearly did not want the Russians back. Russia exerted strong pressure on the government of Azerbaijan to agree to the reopening of its large base in Gandzha, a step that would be required for logistic support of a Russian peacekeeping force.

4. Exercise economic and financial control. Russia was pressuring the governments of the newly independent states to join the CIS economic and financial agreements, under which each member yielded to Russia key decision-making powers. Azerbaijan, with its potential oil wealth, was a key element for achieving this objective.

5. Control natural resources throughout the former USSR, particularly energy resources. Not only did Russia itself need these resources, but they were also a prime source of hard currency and could emancipate some former colonies from Russian control. The Russian technique for gaining control over resources was not very subtle; Russia simply demanded a share and also insisted that pipeline routes from the Caucasus and Central Asia should cross Russia. Russian determination to control regional oil and gas resources was a major reason for the attack on Chechnya. Here again, Azerbaijan, with its vast oil and gas reserves, was a major Russian target.

6. Keep the international community out. For Russia the international community meant the United States and its surrogates, and Russian xenophobes, were determined to exclude American influence, as well as Turkish or Islamic influences to which Russia was particularly sensitive along its southern frontier. The Caucasus was traditionally viewed from Moscow as Russia’s “soft underbelly,” where Islamic penetration was a real danger. This was yet another reason for both Moscow’s invasion of Chechnya and its interest in domination of Azerbaijan and the trans-Caucasus.

7. Finally, the Russians were determined to preclude a breakup of the Russian Federation itself, the “empire within an empire.” Some peoples within the Russian Federation had already begun to demand greater degrees of autonomy for their regions, drawing inspiration from the actions of minorities in the near abroad. The favored technique for ensuring Russian control over Russia was to reestablish control over the whole of the former USSR through “reintegration” of the former USSR. This would reestablish the traditional buffer zones and theoretically insulate the Russian Federation from unwelcome potential instabilities.
Key Decisions on Early Action

Because of the dispute between the CSCE and Russia over leadership of the mediation/peacekeeping effort for Nagorno-Karabakh, the action undertaken by the international community in the CSCE became a Western decision/action process more than one representing the international community as a whole. This was true even though Russia was a part of the CSCE’s activities and participated actively in its decision-making process. A distinction must therefore be made between the international decision process in the CSCE, representing essentially a Western intervention, and the private Russian decision process, representing Russia’s pursuit of its own interests apart from the international community.7

The two key decisions on the taking of early action on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict after its appearance as an international problem were (1) the decision of the CSCE in January 1992 to undertake the fact-finding effort that led to a modest intervention, with the support given to this CSCE role by the UN Security Council,8 and (2) the internal Russian decision, taken about December 1992 to January 1993, to oppose international involvement in the settlement of the conflict. Each of these decisions was accompanied by decisions that were not taken and that resulted in missed opportunities for advancing the peace process.

The CSCE Decides to Intervene . . .

As the suddenness of the CSCE decision to become involved suggests, the organization was ill prepared to take on a role and responsibility for the complex Karabakh conflict. The CSCE had never before undertaken a conflict prevention or conflict resolution role; it did not even have a permanent staff, much less the kinds of support structures required to carry out a sustained conflict mediation or resolution effort.

No thought was given to the implications of even the modest step of sending a group of fact finders, despite the experience that any initial intervention by an outside party in a local conflict leads to longer and more serious involvement. Politically it is very hard to shrug off responsibility for a conflict after an initial step has been taken, even if that step is a modest one. In view of the fact that no major outside government, with the possible exception of Turkey (which openly supported Azerbaijan), was prepared to accept more than minimal responsibilities in mediating the conflict, the CSCE decision was ill considered. It is ironic that some CSCE leaders defended the Nagorno-Karabakh effort because they thought it could serve as a means to construct ad hoc those structures that they believed the CSCE needed but that the member states were unwilling to establish in the abstract.

There was also a total lack, among Western political leaders, of any policy investment in the conflict—political positions taken and defended, for example. On the contrary, there was widespread ignorance of the issues, or even of the vocabulary peculiar to this particular conflict. Political people had very shallow views, or no views at all, on the matter and could hardly even discuss it. This explains why simplistically pro-Armenian positions were taken on the Karabakh conflict in a number of Western institutions during 1990-92, the result of lobbying efforts by
Armenian diaspora groups among uninformed politicians. A prime example of such actions-in-ignorance was Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1992. This clause was openly hostile to Azerbaijan and prohibited direct U.S. aid to the government in Baku, even for humanitarian purposes. Section 907 was intended as a retaliation against Azerbaijani and Turkish blockades of Armenia, but it ignored the suffering also present on the Azerbaijani side. The basic effect of Section 907 was to prevent U.S. policy from appearing truly impartial, and thus to hinder U.S. mediation efforts.9

Perhaps the one advantage of the international community's previous ignorance of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was that the West came into this problem with relatively little political "baggage," in terms of past positions or engagements. It thus had roughly balanced credibility with both sides, in spite of Section 907 and other pro-Armenian legislative positions—e.g., in the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe. While the Azerbaijaniis believed that the West would, under domestic political pressure, favor the Armenian side, the Armenians were concerned that the West, particularly the United States, would tilt toward the interests of their Turkish allies. Moreover, suspicions on both sides were somewhat allayed by even-handed reports from the first CSCE fact-finding missions to the region.10 The West also benefited from a contrast with the Russians, up to then the only power seemingly interested in the problem, who were the subject of deep suspicion and resentment on all sides, even though they were needed and courted by everyone.

Despite the problems for an international intervention, the CSCE at its meeting in Helsinki on March 24, 1992, agreed that there should be an international "Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh" to settle the dispute and that this conference should be held as soon as possible in the Belarusian capital, Minsk. When it proved difficult to convene the conference, the United States insisted that the designated Italian chairman organize "emergency preliminary" negotiations to prepare it. These "emergency preliminary" negotiations became known as the Minsk Group. The Minsk Group included the small number of CSCE member states that had volunteered to participate in the Minsk Conference for various reasons (e.g., because they held or would shortly hold the rotating CSCE chairmanship, or, in the case of Belarus, because they had offered to host the conference). Only a few of these participants had real interest in the issue. The members were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States.

It is worth noting that the informal Minsk Group and its negotiating process were not created by the CSCE decision, which established only the formal Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh; they were created by high-level U.S. insistence that "emergency" negotiations begin.11 To make early negotiations possible, the United States also brokered an agreement under which both the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of Nagorno-Karabakh would participate separately in the Minsk Group, though not as sovereign states.

The Minsk Group was initially quite successful; it managed to bring all the parties to the conflict together around a single negotiating table. This was in spite of the resistance of the Azerbaijani representatives, who did not want to
give even implicit recognition to the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh, and of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians themselves, who wanted to sit at the table as a sovereign state. The Minsk Group also developed a negotiating vocabulary accepted by all parties, a key step in any negotiating process, and a generally accepted set of negotiating objectives and sequencing, which eventually became known in the Minsk Group’s jargon as the “Adjusted Timetable of Urgent Steps to Implement Security Council Resolutions 822 and 853.” This included a cease-fire with troop withdrawals and lifting of blockades, return of refugees, and introduction of international observers, followed by negotiation of a political settlement at the Minsk Conference.

... But Does Not Seize the Early Opportunities

In many ways the early period of the Minsk Group’s work (June–December 1992) was the most opportune moment for a comprehensive solution. But in spite of the group’s early success, the full opportunity of this period was not seized. Western conflict resolution credibility was at its highest level, since it had not yet been identified with the failures in former Yugoslavia and was not yet understood to be limited by Russian policy to areas outside of the former Soviet Union. Even the CSCE still had credibility, because its capabilities and limitations were unclear. Also, the parties to the conflict were uncertain of their ability to withstand concerted international pressures.

At the same time, Russian possessiveness about conflict resolution and peacekeeping within the territory of the former Soviet Union had not yet emerged as a major Russian policy thrust. On the contrary, following several failed attempts to resolve the Karabakh conflict, either alone or in partnership with Kazakhstan, Moscow’s insistence on managing conflicts within its former empire was at its lowest level. Russian officials were therefore reasonably cooperative with the CSCE’s initial efforts to mount a peace process for the Karabakh dispute.

Even the situation on the ground at the time was relatively propitious for a compromise. The Karabakh Armenians were still weak militarily. Their capital, Stepanakert, was under daily bombardment, which gave the Armenians an incentive to end the fighting. The Azerbaijani army appeared to be the stronger military force and threatened to overrun the Karabakh Armenians. There was no land corridor yet from Armenia to Karabakh through which military supplies could be shipped. The situation of the Karabakh Armenians was thus precarious, and the Armenian government, led by the moderate President Levon ter-Petrossian, still had important influence over them.

In Baku the regime of Soviet-era holdovers was replaced by a popularly elected government led by the anti-Soviet dissident and nationalist Elchibey, who was seemingly in a somewhat better position to lead the country toward a settlement. Azerbaijan had not yet suffered the subsequent military defeats that revealed its army to be incapable of mounting a serious offensive and thus challenged the country’s national pride. The number of Azerbaijani refugees from Karabakh was relatively small and so did not constitute an insuperable political obstacle to compromise.
There was also a degree of high-level Western interest in the Karabakh conflict during this period which would not be seen again for almost two years. Secretary of State James Baker personally intervened with the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers during a conference in Lisbon in June 1992 to pin down the essential agreement on how Nagorno-Karabakh would be represented in the Minsk Group negotiations.

A full cease-fire agreement was elusive but was finally reached late in the night of December 14, 1992, on the fringes of the meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in Stockholm. It was decided that the agreement would be presented for endorsement by the CSCE foreign ministers the following morning to receive their backing. This was as close as the Minsk Group got to a cease-fire during this period, however, because at 8:00 A.M. on the following day, the Azerbaijani foreign minister without explanation withdrew his country’s agreement and the whole deal fell apart. This concluded the first phase of the Minsk Group’s work with a profound disappointment and a very public failure.

Why were the opportunities of this early period missed? The first reason, and the one with the most direct impact, was that each of the parties to the dispute still harbored ambitions for winning the conflict, either by using military means or by outwitting their adversaries. The fatigue of combat had not yet taken its toll, and the famous exhaustion factor had not yet set in. Also, neither side was strong enough politically to risk being accused by its domestic opposition of a sell-out. This was probably why the Azerbaijanis backed away from the Stockholm agreement. As appeared later, both sides had plans for military action to advance their cause.

The Karabakh Armenians, with encouragement from elements of the Armenian diaspora, wanted political recognition as a part of any agreement, even if it was only a cease-fire. Such recognition would have provided the rationale for continuation of what they viewed as their war of independence, whether that effort would be waged by war or through negotiation. The Azerbaijani government, encouraged by Turkey to take a hard line, was determined to avoid any such political recognition, even if it was only implicit. By refusing to recognize any political status for Karabakh, it maintained its justification for continued efforts to suppress the uprising. Even details such as the question of whether representatives from Nagorno-Karabakh should have a nameplate at the negotiating table, and what title might be inscribed on it, were loaded with symbolism and were thus very sensitive. Essentially, neither side was yet ready to find a compromise.

The second major factor that caused the opportunities of this period to be missed was the lack of clear and sustained high-level interest in the issue in the West. This was especially true as the Minsk Group’s early success brought it closer to a possible cease-fire agreement on the eve of the December 1992 Stockholm CSCE foreign ministers’ meeting. Concerted efforts by the foreign ministers in the period before and at Stockholm could have made the difference and resulted in a cease-fire agreement at that time. But no foreign minister, let alone the group of them, made this a priority for the Stockholm meeting. The chair-
man of the Minsk Group did not even attend the Stockholm meeting; his absence signaled that no important developments were expected and ensured that the ministers would not focus on this issue. The Russians did not even send their Minsk Group negotiator to Stockholm, and they were represented in all Karabakh-related discussions by a mid-level official who was only informed in a very general way of the issues and who was not in a position to exert pressure or join in initiatives.

The absence of high-level interest in Stockholm was the culmination of consistent low-level interest from the creation of the Minsk Group. The chairman was a little-known Italian politician who had served only as deputy foreign minister and did not speak any of the languages of negotiation. The representatives sent to the negotiations by the Western countries were low-level diplomats, some from their local embassy, or retirees brought back to service. Despite the fact that the Minsk Group had been created because of a high-level U.S. intervention, the U.S. representative in it received little support. It was clear to the negotiators who represented the parties to the conflict that the Western countries were not very interested in the Karabakh war.

Moreover, these factors, combined with the rules fixed by the CSCE itself at its summit meeting in Helsinki in the summer of 1992 regarding its role in peacekeeping operations, created serious doubts as to whether the CSCE could or would actually provide the monitoring force that was an essential element of any cease-fire agreement. There was, of course, no peacekeeping or monitoring force immediately available or credibly in the offering. But in addition the CSCE’s rules were so complex and torturous that it was difficult to see how a force could be provided, much less to convince the very suspicious parties to the conflict to trust in such an operation.13

The Minsk Group, though informal, was a subsidiary of the CSCE. It therefore operated on the assumption that if it could arrange a cease-fire, the CSCE would be the organization that would provide the international force to supervise and guarantee it. But the CSCE’s Helsinki-agreed procedures were unrealistic and self-defeating: consideration of a possible force by the CSCE could not begin until the parties agreed an operational concept, and even if the full CSCE, after its usual laborious debate and the consensus decision of more than fifty countries, approved deployment of a force, it could not go to the area until a cease-fire was stable. From acceptance by the parties to deployment would take weeks, possibly months, during which the parties were expected to stabilize the cease-fire by themselves. Yet everyone was aware that without a firm commitment from the CSCE to provide a force promptly, acceptance by the parties would not materialize, because the parties knew that a cease-fire would not last unless outsiders supervised it.

The effect of all this was to make the work of the Minsk Group look unreal; the parties had little faith that an agreement negotiated in such circumstances would hold, and they had little incentive to negotiate in good faith, let alone to make serious concessions or join in a compromise. The final failure of this early period, in Stockholm, was the result of all these factors.
Russia Decides to Keep the International Community Out

The initial success of the U.S.-backed Minsk Group—combined with increasing outside influence, especially Turkish, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and other inroads by the international community into what the Russians considered their “sphere of influence”—led to an internal shift of Russian policy in late 1992 or early 1993. The new policy, though never announced publicly, was aimed at minimizing external influences anywhere in the former USSR. The first place where its effects could be clearly seen was in the mediation efforts for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Here the Russians did all they could to complicate and obfuscate the international process, of which they were ostensibly an important part, while developing proposals of their own that they presented privately to the parties.

Russia’s decision to keep the international community out of the former USSR was signaled to the world by Foreign Minister Kozyrev’s hard-line “mock speech” at the December 1992 ministerial session of the CSCE in Stockholm. With respect to Russian policy in the “near abroad,” Kozyrev said:

> The space of the former Soviet Union cannot be viewed as a zone where the CSCE norms can be applied in full. This is in effect a post-imperial space where Russia has to defend its interests by all available means, including military and economic ones. We shall firmly insist that the former republics of the USSR immediately join the new federation or confederation, and this will be discussed in no uncertain terms.\(^{14}\)

An hour later, possibly because journalists were sending off dramatic reports of the event, Kozyrev explained that it was all a hoax; he just wanted to show his colleagues what Russia’s policies might be like if hard-line nationalists gained power.

Yet the policies of the Yeltsin government began to evolve rapidly from that time, especially on a few leading-edge issues such as the Karabakh war. A new period began partly because of the failure of the Minsk Group’s first phase of work, and partly because of the much broader policy change by Russia toward the principle that all conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts on the territory of the former USSR should be the responsibility of Russia, through the CIS. This change was heralded by Yeltsin’s assertion, in a speech on February 28, 1993, that:

> Stopping all armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR is Russia’s vital interest. The world community sees more and more clearly Russia’s special responsibility in this difficult undertaking. I believe the time has come for distinguished international organizations, including the United Nations, to grant Russia special powers as guarantor of peace and stability in regions of the former USSR.\(^{15}\)

The beginning of 1993 thus marked the start of the strange competition between Russian and international mediation efforts on Nagorno-Karabakh that undercut any potential for finding a solution by encouraging “deal shopping” by
the parties. The Karabakh equation was complicated enough without this competition; with it the negotiating process became nearly impossible.

In fact, before the end of 1993, Russia's "real" policies closely resembled the hard-line nationalist policies of Kozyrev's "mock" Stockholm speech. In particular, Russia's ambitions to maintain its monopoly on the leadership role throughout the territory of the former USSR had become obvious.  

This new policy manifested itself through a gradual separation of Russia from the work and proposals of the Minsk Group, even when the Russian representative had played a major part in drafting them. Separate unilateral Russian proposals began to surface, first privately to the parties to the conflict without any information to the other Minsk Group negotiators, and then more openly, in stark contradiction to the joint work of the group. In addition, Russian officials began to publicly ridicule the Minsk Group.

Russian-CSCE disagreement eventually focused on who would provide, and control, a monitoring or peacekeeping force. Russia's proposals were based on the concept of a Russian or Russian-controlled CIS "Separation Force" that would be inserted between the warring sides and would be authorized to use force to suppress any violations of an accompanying cease-fire. This was very different from the international proposals (supposedly also supported by Russia) that were for an internationally controlled monitoring force not authorized to use force.

The Azerbaijanis steadfastly opposed a Russian-controlled force, or even a large Russian contingent in an internationally controlled force, mainly because of their 1990 experience of Soviet troops using force to quell rioting in Baku, with numerous casualties. Upon gaining independence, Azerbaijan set as one of its top political objectives obtaining the removal of all Russian troops from its territory. This was largely accomplished during the government of the nationalist president Elchibey. With the prospect of significant revenues from their oil, the Azerbaijanis did not believe that they needed the Russians, and any leader who advocated the return of Russian troops risked being overthrown.

Armenia, on the other hand, needed a close relationship with Russia to offset its powerful traditional enemies, the Turks. Armenia therefore did not seek the removal of Russian forces when it became independent. A Russian army division continued to be based there, and Russian border troops continued to guard Armenia's Turkish frontier. As Armenia's economic situation deteriorated with its traditional energy sources and markets cut off, its dependence on Russia increased. At the same time, Armenia sought friendly relations and economic assistance from the West, and from the diaspora, so it kept channels open in this direction too. This led Armenia to indicate that it could accept a peacekeeping force from any source; the Armenian government's principal objective was to find an acceptable end to the war and to rebuild its economy.

The Karabakh Armenians were in a different position from Armenia itself. Their principal concern in approaching any agreement to end the conflict was their own security. As a small enclave with a population of about 180,000, the Karabakh Armenians could not afford to relinquish either military or political
positions without being certain of their security. They were also dependent on Russia for the military supplies essential for the war. They had little contact with the West and no commitment to it, except the Armenian diaspora, which primarily encouraged them to maintain a hard line. All of this led them to opt for the Russian offer of a separation force, both because it came from Moscow and because it entailed a mandate to use force and therefore looked more likely to ensure Karabakh's security.

With the concerns of the Karabakh Armenians in mind, the West beefed up its concept of a CSCE “Monitoring Mission.” A more senior officer was designated as the prospective commander and military experts visited the region to see first-hand how such a mission would operate. A Planning Group of experienced military officers began to work on detailed plans for the Mission at the CSCE’s headquarters in Vienna. But the concerns of the Karabakh Armenians about a CSCE Monitoring Mission grew as international efforts in Bosnia were revealed as weak and indecisive. In addition, a highly publicized Turkish offer to provide half of the troops for the international force deeply worried all Armenians because it evoked images of the genocide of the early years of the century.

Moreover, there were no public commitments by major countries of important troop formations for an international Monitoring Mission; the commitments that were made tended to be for small units from smaller countries (e.g., a Swiss offer of a medical team). The United States made it clear early in the CSCE discussions that U.S. troops would not be involved, though there might be a few U.S. monitors. There was never any question of a NATO role, because it was generally recognized that a NATO intervention on the territory of the former Soviet Union would be provocative to Russian nationalists and could be broadly counterproductive.

In these circumstances, the Karabakh Armenians continued to favor a Russian separation force, while the Azerbaijanis continued to oppose it. The Russian approach added to Western concerns about the neoimperial implications of the overall Russian attitude toward the near abroad, so that there was a growing divergence between the Russians, who were increasingly insistent on recognition of their special responsibilities for peacekeeping in this area, and the West, which was ever more reluctant to accept it.¹⁸

No Effort to Reach High-Level Agreement on Cooperation with Russia

Even without the change in Russian policy, 1993 was not a promising year for the effort to reach a peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Beginning in the early spring, Karabakh Armenian forces, with active support from the regular Armenian army, began a series of offensives by seizing most of the territory between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia (the Kelbajar area north of the Lachin corridor). Further offensive thrusts lasting through October gave the Karabakh forces control of all of southwestern Azerbaijan, south to the Iranian frontier and east to Agdam and Goradiz (constituting about one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s national territory). Throughout this period the Minsk Group labored on its “Adjusted Timetable of Urgent Steps;” while the CSCE worked on its plans for a cease-fire monitoring mission.
Russia's growing insistence on playing the key role in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict might have been harnessed in a positive way during this period, as part of the CSCE effort, if a concerted attempt in this direction had been made at a very high level. But such efforts were too low-level, too general, or too after-the-fact to really engage the Russians, to allay their suspicions, and to gain a positive response.

Since it was apparent that outside countries, especially the United States, would be extremely reluctant to send personnel to oversee a cease-fire in this remote region of the Caucasus, in conditions that would be expensive, difficult, and dangerous, it seemed logical to try to co-opt Russian interest in the area and to engage the Russians to constitute the bulk of an international force under CSCE control and guidance. The Russians had many assets that would make a major contribution from them virtually essential for the success of an operation around Nagorno-Karabakh. Without Russian support any peacekeeping operation in the trans-Caucasus would have a difficult time; but with Russian participation such an operation could have a good chance of success.

At first, prospects for enlisting Russian cooperation seemed promising. The Russian military appeared to be reluctant to undertake another intervention in the Karabakh area without a mandate from the CSCE (or, better yet, from their point of view, the United Nations, which could authorize them to use force). Also, "sphere of influence peacekeeping" had not yet become a public issue of such principle that combined activities were out of the question. In the summer and fall of 1993, therefore, the U.S. representative in the Minsk Group discussed privately with the Russian representative a list of seven conditions for joint supervision of a cease-fire that could have made a cooperative Russian-international venture possible under the auspices and control of the CSCE. To compound the difficulties, this discussion took place just as the internal U.S. government debate on a new approach to peacekeeping was at its most intense stage. This situation made it even harder for Washington to take a forceful position on this specific peacekeeping issue.

But the Russians were unresponsive, and their bad faith became increasingly obvious. It was clear that it was their deliberate intention not to cooperate, thus ensuring that their own proposal would be understood by the parties to be the only concrete offer available, and ultimately to supplant the international negotiating process. Moscow did not want to share responsibility for a peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh with anyone; it was even prepared to make a peaceful settlement more difficult if that would help to ensure Russian control.

Foreign Minister Kozyrev summarized the Russian view succinctly in an article published in September 1993:

Presently we are on the verge of making a similar choice [similar to the choice of a peacekeeping force for Abkhazia] in Nagorno-Karabakh. There is no alternative to a Russian peacekeeping contingent there, which is to acquire the status of UN forces as soon as a settlement mechanism is in place and is to be reinforced by UN units from neutral European countries which are members of the CSCE. Here, both we and the United Nations must perform our historical duty. Shrinking from it would be irresponsible.
Budapest CSCE Summit Not Fully Used

Following the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian offensives of 1993, an uneasy military stalemate set in on the ground. The Karabakh Armenians were at the limits of their small army's ability to control territory, while the Azerbaijanis were preoccupied with refugee problems and unable to mount an offensive. These factors led to a cease-fire agreement among defense ministers, signed in Moscow on May 12, 1994, under the auspices of the Russian minister of defense. There had been many previous cease-fire agreements, but this one held tenuously because of the de facto stalemate in the war, and it once again gave hope that a fuller and more formal agreement might be reached. CSCE discussion of a joint CSCE-Russian operation to oversee the cease-fire intensified accordingly.

A major opportunity to arrange for a cooperative CSCE-Russian endeavor came in the summer and fall of 1994, in the lead-up to the December 5–6 Budapest summit of the CSCE. During this period the issue of sphere of influence peacekeeping or “third-country peacekeeping” had come into sharp focus, and interest had grown in the general concept of using the CSCE to sponsor peacekeeping efforts. The arrangements for a future force to oversee the cease-fire around Nagorno-Karabakh were under active consideration as the sole current possibility for a model CSCE venture to oversee a cease-fire. At the same time it had become clear that if the international community role was to be meaningful in comparison with the Russian offer for a separation force, it would at minimum have to comprise a classic peacekeeping operation, rather than just the Monitoring Mission which had been the earlier concept.

On September 16 the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE agreed to seek approval of a UN resolution authorizing the CSCE to organize a peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh. In contrast to the earlier Monitoring Mission, the peacekeeping force would be larger and armed and would play a more active role in controlling a formalized cease-fire agreement. While specific rules of engagement for the force were not finalized, it was apparent that CSCE peacekeepers would only be authorized to use force in self-defense, not for suppression of violence as in the Russian concept.

The Nagorno-Karabakh issue had gradually risen to the top of the international agenda because of its implications for the future scope of CSCE conflict resolution activities, and it was even discussed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at their September 1994 meeting in Washington. In a discussion reminiscent of the one between the two countries' Nagorno-Karabakh negotiators more than one year earlier, Clinton pressed Yeltsin to accept a major but less-than-dominant Russian role in a CSCE force, while Yeltsin argued that Russia was the only country willing to take effective action to resolve the dispute and held out for an arrangement that would put Russia in control. The two leaders could not reach agreement.

As the CSCE summit approached, it became clear that the CSCE’s ability to field a genuinely internationally controlled peacekeeping force for the Karabakh conflict would be a key test of the summit in giving the CSCE a meaningful post-Cold War conflict resolution role. The Russians also had a stake in this issue, because they had publicly presented their vision of the CSCE as the central in-
ternational organization for Europe, in which they foresaw a major role for themselves. Had concerted international pressures been applied at the highest level prior to the Budapest meeting, it might have been possible to reach agreement on a structure and guidelines for a CSCE force, including an important but subsidiary Russian contingent. At their September meeting, Yeltsin and Clinton were not that far apart; the essential differences were only the percentage of Russian troops in a peacekeeping force and who would command that force. Several hundred fewer Russians would probably have made the Russian contingent acceptable, and a face-saving device (as was later found for the Russian contingent in the NATO Implementation Force for Bosnia [IFOR]) could have been arranged for the command structure. Inducements like these would have made it difficult for Yeltsin to refuse.

But such pressure was not applied. On the contrary, Clinton almost did not go to the Budapest meeting at all. Despite the fact that the Budapest CSCE summit had been on the international calendar for two years, the White House planned a reception for one of the very same days, and then said Clinton could not leave Washington because of a “previous engagement.” Clinton eventually attended, but for only one day.

The initiative on the third-country peacekeeping issue was left to the Russians, who used the occasion for Yeltsin’s now-famous warning to Washington not to try to “direct” events in Moscow’s sphere of influence, or risk opening up a period of “Cold Peace” between Russia and the West. Seen in hindsight, this was clearly a warning not to interfere with Russia’s attack on Chechnya, which occurred one week later, as well as a rebuff on Nagorno-Karabakh. A general agreement was reached at Budapest on the principle of a joint CSCE-Russian peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh, but essential “details” were left to later negotiations. Moreover, simply equating the international community, represented here by the CSCE, with one country, Russia, was a step backward; Russia had participated as one of several members of the Minsk Group, but in Budapest it was recognized as having a special role in the Caucasus. The implication was that this was, indeed, Russia’s “sphere of influence.”

Despite the general accord on a combined force, final agreement was blocked by dispute over two familiar “details”: who would control the force, and the percentage of the force to be provided by Russia. The Russians continued to insist on commanding the force themselves, while the other members of the CSCE wanted it to be under CSCE command. The Russians also wanted to supply the major portion of the troops, while the other CSCE members wanted Russian participation to be limited to less than 50 percent. Whether the Azerbaijanis would accept a large percentage of Russians, even if it was less than 50 percent, remained to be seen.

There were several reasons why the opportunities of this period were lost. The most important was the policy change in Moscow toward keeping other countries out of the Russian sphere of influence. Beginning in early 1993 the U.S. representative in the Minsk Group repeatedly warned both his Western partners and his superiors in Washington of the broader implications of the shift in the Russian position in the Karabakh negotiations. But senior levels of governments
in Washington and the West had other priorities, and preferred to put their faith in the very general "assurances" that were being given by the Russians at higher levels. The new Russian policy on peacekeeping in the near abroad only became evident to government leaders in the fall of 1994, too late to avoid the failure in Budapest.

Another factor was the Russians’ simple inability to engage in responsible negotiations on the Karabakh issue. Throughout the period under discussion here, obvious disagreements persisted between the Russian foreign and defense ministries, to the extent that the Russian negotiator on Nagorno-Karabakh, who was supposed to have an interministerial mandate, sometimes learned about the activities of Russia’s defense minister in the area from Western newspapers. Also, when the U.S. representative finally was able to hold direct discussions with senior officials at the Russian Defense Ministry, the Russian Karabakh negotiator was not permitted to attend (nor was anyone else from the Foreign Ministry).

In addition, the strong U.S. leadership role in the early period of the Minsk Group's work may have added to Russian concerns about losing their influence in the region. Particularly worrying for Moscow was the American effort to engage Turkey to share responsibility for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The increased Turkish role rang ancient alarm bells for the Russians and may have encouraged their effort to keep the international community out.22

Period of Stalemate, Lasting Cease-Fire, and Russian Overload

The Russian attack in Chechnya in December of 1994 added an important new set of factors to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. The attack made Russia’s role in the Caucasus a much more central world issue, put Russian peacekeeping credentials in the region into much more serious doubt, and saddled Moscow with a major military effort that made the possibility of undertaking another operation nearby less plausible. Russia now had a significantly greater need for international legitimacy and cooperation in any role it might take on in the Karabakh conflict.

At the same time, broad new opportunities had opened for making progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiating front. The Russian-arranged cease-fire had held for a significant period of time—much longer than any previous cease-fire—thus meeting a key condition for introduction of CSCE peacekeepers. For the first time since 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh had an elected leader with a solid popular mandate, its "president," Robert Kocharyan. Azerbaijan's leadership was also stabilized after President Gaidar Aliev repulsed a nascent coup attempt in the fall of 1994 and sidelined his one major potential rival in Baku, former prime minister Surat Husseinov. Discreet bilateral discussions had become routine among senior officials of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey.

In addition, a degree of war weariness had begun to set in on both sides. While each party had its fanatics, who continued to favor seeking "victory," there were also voices of moderation. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan needed a settlement desperately for economic reasons; Armenia's economy was being destroyed by
the continuing blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey, and Azerbaijan was under increasing pressure to be able to use the prospective earnings from its oil to rebuild war-torn regions. Both countries, as well as the Karabakh Armenians, had been alarmed by Russia’s attack on Chechnya, an event that was closely related to the Karabakh conflict and other wars in the Caucasus region. After Chechnya, any country in the region had to understand that in a certain set of circumstances, “it could happen here.”

Russia was made cochair of the Minsk Group in January 1995 in a further attempt by the CSCE to ensure Moscow’s cooperation. Russia was still interested in playing the dominant role in the settlement of the Karabakh dispute, but it was bogged down in the Chechen war. The disarray in Moscow on how to deal with the Caucasus had become intense after the attack on Grozny. This, of course, made Moscow’s decisions on Chechnya much more difficult but put Nagorno-Karabakh on a relative back burner. The situation was ripe for new efforts to find a joint basis for a proposed peaceful solution. This point seemed to be recognized within the CSCE, and in August 1995 the CSCE’s chairman in office appointed a Polish diplomat as his “personal representative” (i.e., official mediator) for the conflict.

But international efforts were still unlikely to work without sustained high-level Western, particularly U.S., insistence, and the Karabakh dispute continued to carry a low priority in Washington’s and the West’s overall list of Russian issues. As in earlier periods, it seemed impossible for Nagorno-Karabakh to be treated with the active leadership that it required. Just as the Russian venture in Chechnya was not seriously challenged by the West, the attitude of Western leaders toward the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was to continue to accept a dominant Russian role.

Lessons Learned

We may draw many lessons from the experience of the international community in attempting to deal with the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Some have already been suggested here. The principal lessons relate to the themes that appear throughout the Karabakh negotiating experience.

First, an international intervention in a local conflict, even after violence has begun, can be useful in balancing local factors, providing incentives for a peaceful settlement and establishing a framework within which the conflicting sides can negotiate. But it must have the demonstrated, continued backing of international leaders to be successful. Without this, an intervention may not have enough clout to push through to a resolution and may then risk stabilizing an undesirable situation in an unresolved state.

Second, even well-intentioned and seemingly well-based outside initiatives will be unsuccessful as long as the parties to the conflict are not themselves prepared to make the concessions necessary for a compromise solution. Natural unwillingness to compromise can be exacerbated by local political leaders who seek to capitalize on actual or latent nationalistic feelings to gain or maintain power, and by external forces pursuing their own interests.
Third, the most promising opportunities for conflict resolution by the international community may occur at the very beginning of an outside intervention, while it is still credible and before it bogs down, but this is precisely the period when outsiders are usually most hesitant about taking bold action. Early warning needs to be combined with the political will to take early action, or its potential may be wasted.

Fourth, the hierarchical approach to issues, which currently dominates the West's approach to dealing with Russia, is too inflexible and in practice discourages initiative taking and seizing of opportunities to resolve issues that are lower down the list, even if they may be important and dangerous in themselves. The point is not to dispute the wisdom of maintaining such a hierarchy of priorities but rather to argue that it should be possible to maintain a sensible order of priorities and to seize opportunities related to lower-priority problems.

Fifth, Russia's strong desire to be the leader in mediation and peacekeeping on the territory of the former USSR is a problem for the international community if it wishes to carry out such activities in this region. A way must be found to integrate Russia's ambition to play an important role, and its physical capabilities, with the impartial legitimizing character of international institutions, so that Russian efforts do not devolve into neocolonialism.

Sixth, if the CSCE/OSCE is to play a serious mediation and peacekeeping role in conflict resolution, it must develop a reliable structure and more effective procedures, so that its efforts will be taken seriously by parties in conflict.

Finally, the U.S. role is often crucial for international conflict resolution efforts; with active U.S. leadership much is possible, but often the chances of success are small without it. The approach of participating in an international effort, as an alternative to an independent U.S. intervention, is a useful one, particularly in regions where an obvious U.S. role might be viewed with suspicion. But even in such circumstances the United States must be prepared to play an energetic leadership role, backed strongly at the highest level, or the effort will be wasted.
5
Preventive Diplomacy: Success in the Baltics
Heather F. Hurlburt

Case Summary

ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA had enjoyed a relatively privileged status in the West during the period of their incorporation into the Soviet Union (1940–91). That incorporation was never officially recognized by the United States and many other Western governments. Active émigré groups were also successful in giving them a level of public visibility closer to that of Poland or Hungary than to that of the other Soviet republics. Baltic independence movements became increasingly vocal during the period of Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, setting the stage for high levels of Western concern and involvement in the process that led to their early declarations of independence, Soviet military crackdowns in 1991, and eventual independence that same year.

Even so, the West did not move immediately to grant the Baltic states security guarantees, extensive tariff breaks, or massive financial and military assistance in 1991. The several reasons—concern over the Soviet response, fiscal parsimony at home, the primacy of concerns with German unification—have been extensively analyzed and debated. But the West was keenly interested in Baltic

This piece draws on the author’s experiences as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from 1990 to 1994 and as a negotiator on Baltic issues. It was written while she was on staff at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not reflect U.S. government policy.
security. Efforts to work within limited fiscal and diplomatic parameters gave rise to creative uses of incentives: targeting of aid to regional flashpoints and marshaling the resources of various international organizations to shape Baltic—and Russian—behavior. The Western “friends of the Baltics” found ways to use already existing procedures, status in international organizations, and those organizations’ norms and standards as reinforcement for bilateral incentives—and as incentives in their own right.

This method of influence was one with which European states had some experience in the field of human rights. However, the particular state of Baltic-Russian relations was so novel in 1992 that considerable room for experimentation existed. Thus, several new instruments or new uses of old instruments were tested, with some success, in the Baltic case. The United States had been in the forefront of efforts to open European institutions to democracies emerging from the Soviet bloc and, of course, had been their champion through the Cold War. Although some other countries of the region—the Nordic states in particular—were perhaps more sensitive to Baltic concerns, it fell to the United States to take the lead in galvanizing a response.

By mid-1992, initial Russian acquiescence or even support for the statehood of three small neighbors was turning to hostility, presenting the international community with a new dilemma. Russia had begun to turn to international organizations—chiefly the United Nations and the OSCE—with allegations of human rights violations in Baltic policies toward ethnic Russian or Russophone residents. Not only were substantial elements of the Russian elite and Russian military unresigned to the loss of the strategic slice of Baltic seacoast, but Baltic leaders, in their actions and rhetoric, repudiated all of the preceding forty years and refused any responsibility for their results, including for the individuals arrived from Russia during the Soviet period.

Russia’s lowered status was thus painfully reinforced, and Russian politicians were not long in seizing on this. The Russian parliament threatened Estonia with sanctions as early as July 1992. Debates over eligibility for citizenship, voting rights, and permanent residence, particularly in Estonia and Latvia, brought long-repressed nationalist sentiments to the fore in Russia and the Baltic states. Latvia had only a slight majority of ethnic Latvian residents, and Estonia and Lithuania were both home to sizable Russophone minorities. Ensuring primacy of the national language and culture was a priority across the political spectrum, with extremist elements calling for the expulsion of Soviet-era settlers, particularly those with military or security service connections.

Ex-Soviet troops remained in all three countries, as did large numbers of ethnic Russian civilians, concentrated in heavy industries. In addition to the problem of encouraging the parties to reach agreement on the forces’ withdrawal, the status of individuals who wanted to remain—particularly retired military personnel—was hotly contested. The two issues were thus conflated.

Inevitably, the Baltic governments’ relationship with Russia became a potent issue in their domestic politics. In Russia too, even moderate politicians could not hear with equanimity the calls of some Baltic politicians for the expulsion of ethnic Russians. Nationalist Russians responded with calls for the reoccupa-
tion of the states, or at least for strong nonmilitary pressures on them. President Boris Yeltsin halted the troop pullout first in December 1992, attempting to strengthen his nationalist credentials. Lithuania, it should be noted, was able to come to agreement with Russia on relatively lenient citizenship laws, having a much higher percentage of ethnic Lithuanian residents and consequently less hard-line nationalist pressure. Russian bargaining on troop withdrawal was therefore easier. An agreement was signed September 8, 1992, and the troops departed in August 1993. The Estonian and Latvian response—intensified calls for assistance from and ties to NATO and other Western institutions—increased Russian resentment. This cycle raised fears of new extremism on both sides. One victim was moderate foreign minister Janis Jurkans of Latvia, whose “weak” nationalist credentials forced his resignation during late 1992 debates between moderates and hard-liners over the troop withdrawal negotiations.

Western governments viewed the problem as one of ensuring peace and the long-term survival of the Baltic states without exposing Yeltsin and Russia’s moves toward democracy to dangerous pressure from Russian nationalists. Initial hopes that the West would commit itself militarily to the Baltics’ defense were dashed; only Carl Bildt, then prime minister of Sweden, even alluded to such a possibility. The United States was determined to balance support for Russian democracy and Baltic independence. It repeatedly rebuffed Baltic requests for security guarantees. In 1992, the prospect of NATO and European Union (EU) expansion remained distant, and neither organization had been forthcoming in responding to Baltic approaches. With a presidential campaign under way, the Bush administration was harshly criticized by Baltic-American and other Eastern European ethnic groups for its insensitivity to their concerns; the administration was also sensitive to charges that it had been too slow to support Russian democracy and Yeltsin. These opposing pressures soon made it clear to the Baltic countries, perhaps even more so than the admonitions of State Department officials, that U.S. support would not be unlimited. But it also kept up the administration’s interest in making demonstrable progress to stabilize the region.

Left with a limited arsenal, international organizations and governments worked together to offer several different incentives, which became salient features of the international community’s response. Membership in or association agreements with European organizations—the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the European Union—were conditioned on Baltic adoption of liberal citizenship laws and residence procedures for residents belonging to other ethnic groups—chiefly, though far from uniquely, Russians. The need for Russia to limit its attempts to influence Baltic policies as it too strove for Council of Europe acceptance and Western financial support was also made clear. Assistance with housing was offered to Russia in exchange for the withdrawal of Russian forces. Western oversight of any continuing Russian presence—specifically, the Skrunda radar facility in Latvia—was promised to help Estonia and Latvia make the difficult compromises required to obtain troop withdrawal. These policies helped produce some significant results. Russian troops withdrew completely from the Baltic countries, and the governments of Estonia and Latvia revisited problematic citizenship and naturalization laws.
Two sets of consequences for preventive diplomacy theory emerge. One concerns the possibilities for multilateral preventive action. International organizations played a particularly important role in this case, and here again the sides benefited from the existing structure of institutions that reinforced international norms and could offer rewards if the norms were followed. The institutions also provided the possibility of pooling scarce resources and building additional support for national concerns—or helping put bilateral issues into a wider context.

A second lesson for preventive diplomacy here concerns the role of the United States, or any country playing the chief role in a multilateral effort. This case showcases how much help favorable preconditions can be and points up the importance of specific and limited goals. Although targeted strategies were used to achieve those goals, they were not restrictive; rather, concerned policymakers in the West, the Baltic states, and Russia were creative and flexible in using all the forums at their disposal to achieve a favorable outcome. This made extra work to ensure that different organizations or states could not be played off against each other, but the resulting united front was a critical part of a positive outcome. This case also suggests, though, that although getting in early is advisable, it in no way guarantees that getting out early will be easy.

Early Warning

Ironically, the violence that accompanied the Baltic states' bid for independence in August 1990 provided an almost ideal early warning of the tensions that followed. It caught the attention of policymakers, crystallized the issues, and provided a graphic foreshadowing of what a violent conflict would entail, with bloodshed in Vilnius and Riga and fights over key structures, such as television towers and parliament buildings. The Soviet crackdown itself dramatized hard-liners' visceral distaste for the loss of the three republics, as well as the existence of pro-Soviet hard-liners within each state. The crisis made clear Baltic determination to press for independence at any cost, and it dramatized the divergence of views within the Soviet power structure. Its aftermath saw the trading of harsh ethnic rhetoric on both sides, and Baltic determination to move forward.

The three countries had always enjoyed a high level of recognition among "captive peoples" of Eastern Europe. The violent Soviet crackdown of August 1990 gave them Western recognition and status akin to Solidarity in Poland or Andrei Sakharov in the Soviet Union. Western governments responded. The long-standing U.S. policy of providing extensive briefings on OSCE meetings for Baltic-American organizations, and often putting members of such organizations on official U.S. delegations, had created natural channels for heightened awareness, and sometimes political pressure, during and after the drive for independence. When contrasted with the lower profile taken by most European countries (most of which had recognized the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR), U.S. support for Baltic activists made it inevitable that a leadership role in Baltic security would fall to Washington. The admission of the three into the OSCE in September 1991, a long-standing goal of Baltic organizations
in the West, was a case in point. Just nine months earlier, a complaint from Gor-
bachev had been enough for host President François Mitterand of France to
banish them from the November 1990 Paris summit of the OSCE. But now
Gorbachev was caught between Baltic activists and Soviet hard-liners. U.S. pres-
sure for Baltic recognition and German concern to support Gorbachev brought
the OSCE’s then thirty-four foreign ministers to Moscow for a quickly sched-
uled meeting to mark the three countries’ entrance, at the opening of a human
quickly followed, and the Council of Europe initiated its admission process.

Baltic representatives and their advocates in the United States and Western
Europe thus had plenty of places to raise their concerns. The fact that these con-
cerns were wrapped up with the withdrawal of Soviet forces—an issue with both
strategic and symbolic importance for the United States—left U.S. policymakers
well primed to receive them. Moreover, the clear hostility of Soviet hard-lin-
ers toward Baltic independence had established a clear connection for Western
policymakers between promoting Soviet (later Russian) moderates and pro-
tecting Baltic independence. When Yeltsin pronounced himself in favor of sov-
ereignty for the three in 1990, he caught headlines around the world. This battle
among Russian policymakers caused the Baltics to be seen as a bellwether for
the region’s prospects.

Their strategic location, of course, only increased their interest to both Rus-
sia and NATO. The Soviet Union had relied on their ports heavily for exports
and defense—indeed, and particularly if allied with NATO, they could
cripple Russian access to the Baltic Sea. For NATO countries, of course, their in-
dependence and neutrality would help lower the immediate military threat that
Russia posed to the Nordic states.

The handful of Baltic specialists in government and Congress suddenly found
themselves in great demand. Because this group tended to be small but expe-
rienced and emotionally committed to the Baltic cause, they were able to make
an immediate impact. The Baltic states had built up strong support in Congress
over the years, and through the independence struggle a series of hearings and
congressional delegations kept the issue alive before Congress and the pressure
on the executive branch. The idea of the Baltics as “rightfully European” also
played a role in keeping Europe’s interest, ensuring that the situation was being
monitored more carefully than were other “ethnic hot spots” previously marked
by violence such as the Fergana Valley in Central Asia, minority-populated ar-
eas of Georgia, or Nagorno-Karabakh.

The immediate result was a continued U.S. focus on the region and a willingness
to keep it on the agendas of NATO and the OSCE. High levels of outside interest in
the withdrawal of Soviet troops continued, for obvious reasons. Somewhat more
surprising, perhaps, was the level of detailed interest in the controversies over citi-
zension and naturalization laws in Estonia and Latvia. The surprising degree of in-
volve ment and awareness in these domestic issues can be traced to the develop-
ment of new and intrusive mechanisms in both the OSCE and the Council of
Europe—and to the interest of those bodies, and the United Nations, in being key
players in a new Europe built on shared ideals and cooperation, as the rhetoric of
the 1990 OSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe had it. The Council of Europe had initiated in late 1991 a program of visits, reports, and inspections of laws to ensure that the three applicants measured up to its extensive standards. This was a routine part of the council’s application process. But Russia seized on the Council of Europe review, and the ongoing possibilities to raise human rights issues at the OSCE and United Nations, to protest as “human rights violations” strict proposed requirements for naturalization and the exclusion of noncitizens from elections.

Estonia, the first of the three Baltic states to bring citizenship proposals before the legislature, was persuaded in late 1992 to invite an OSCE rapporteur mission’s visit—a procedure designed to foster international scrutiny of human rights cases and situations. This was the first time a state had agreed to subject itself to this intrusive procedure, a milestone for international scrutiny of such internal matters as citizenship laws. The mission itself reported that the “Constitution of Estonia as well as other laws examined by the mission meet the international standards for the enjoyment of human rights.” This assurance gave the OSCE credibility within Estonia and gave the Estonian government a positive reference to use in dealing with the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and numerous other international as well as Russian interlocutors.

So, to recapitulate: the stakes in the disputes over the status of ethnic Slavs in the Baltic states were very visible—and, in Western eyes, very high. Indeed, a textbook case for successful early warning would involve committed pressure groups in the United States; a region or issue with strategic as well as symbolic importance for a major power and its allies (the United States and NATO in this case); and mechanisms, whether through international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or the media, for extensive and relatively unbiased information to emerge and be correctly interpreted. It is worth pausing to note here that active nongovernmental advocacy made Western government intervention palatable and added strength to the perceived threat of further Western involvement. By cooperating, as well as pursuing their traditional roles, NGOs can strengthen U.S. positions with respect to foreign governments—if the governments understand the American system of pressure groups and the domestic dimension that those groups add to American foreign policy. All of these conditions pertained in the Baltic states in 1991-92. While it is unlikely that these conditions could be recreated elsewhere, policymakers and advocates might be well advised to frame the case for action in these terms and work to build similar constituencies.

Key Decisions on Early Action

With the international community mobilized on behalf of Baltic independence and Russian reform as described earlier, the decision to be involved came fairly easily. The U.S. government less chose preventive diplomacy consciously than greeted new sources of tension—proposals for laws on citizenship and naturalization—as possible obstacles to the goals of strengthening the three states and Russian democracy while achieving a complete pullout of Soviet troops from the Baltics. This realpolitik approach infuriated the Baltic-American lobby,
which wanted support for the moral correctness of its position. The U.S. belief that support for the Baltic states reinforced Russian moderates at the expense of Russian hard-liners was strengthened in December 1992. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev of Russia, a moderate and much liked in the West, arrived at the OSCE ministerial meeting in Stockholm and gave a mock presentation, full of threats to the sovereignty of all Russia's neighbors, to dramatize his concern that Russia's moderates were not receiving enough support. This message, and its reinforcement privately, helped convince the Clinton administration to continue a policy of support and strong involvement in Baltic issues.

Two unusual—and crucial—elements did make their way into decisions on early action. First, the United States, the party with the most influence on all sides, actively sought to work with other states and international organizations—and to use the legitimacy that those organizations had to offer as an incentive to the parties. Second, the actions chosen moved firmly into the internal affairs of the states concerned. The laws of the three Baltic states became subject to international scrutiny and recommendation to an unprecedented degree, one that the international norm of noninterference usually makes impossible to contemplate. How did this come about?

Because OSCE commitments had touched on internal affairs since the Helsinki Final Act's 1975 provisions on human rights, and because the Baltic states in particular had benefited from Western scrutiny into their treatment within the Soviet Union, all sides accepted some international scrutiny of the countries' domestic policies. It is worth emphasizing that this condition, so crucial to the success of outside preventive diplomacy, was the result of fifteen years' hard labor in what were hardly hopeful circumstances. Indeed, only in October 1991 had all OSCE states agreed to an explicit commitment accepting that human rights are "matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned."

So the Baltic states were attached to their status in international organizations as a symbol of their independence and sovereignty. At the same time, the organizations' Western members—and the organizations themselves—were anxious to find a place in the post-Cold War order and to test out the unity of purpose and commitment to common ideals that had been on display in international summits and conferences from New York to Moscow and Paris to Helsinki. The international organizations thus came to the fore as never before, and their representatives played an important role in determining when action needed to be taken and in strategizing.

**Strategies of Action**

The discord between Russia and the Baltic states as both also looked to the West for approval and support gave the United States and its Western European partners unusual influence over both sides. The West had extensive possibilities for carrots and sticks, choosing most prominently access to financial assistance and to international organizations (and playing down security guarantees). But international organizations participated in preventive diplomacy as actors as well as rewards. All
the parties badly wanted to be well perceived within the United Nations and the OSCE, particularly to be seen as meeting human rights standards to permit entry into the Council of Europe, which some had described as the anteroom of the European Union.

It is also worth noting an important difference between this case and other, less successful international responses to crises on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Baltic decision makers were familiar with the OSCE and with the way the United States had used it to support Baltic dissidents during the Cold War and the cause of Baltic independence thereafter. This helped them be confident in their claims and use of sovereignty and in their own negotiating skills. On the contrary, chapters 3 and 4 in this volume by Lapidus and Maresca both demonstrate that the OSCE and its norms lacked the necessary leverage, trust, and determined Western support in Chechnya and the Caucasus. That is, international organizations were on more familiar ground in the Baltics and could offer real and valued benefits.

Washington's commitment to support both Baltic independence and Russian reform seemed to rule out explicitly "punishing" one party or the other. Failure to provide increases in aid and lukewarm support for membership in international organizations seem mild sanctions compared with those contemplated and used elsewhere. Yet they worked. With the United States in the lead, the international community took advantage of Russia's eagerness to press its case in international organizations and the Baltics' desire for status within those same organizations. This was a rare moment when the political leadership on both sides wanted to "do the right thing."

The two issues which arose—citizenship and naturalization policies and Soviet troop withdrawal—were linked by Russia, which conditioned its agreement to withdraw on permission for Red Army retirees to stay behind under conditions that would permit them to obtain citizenship. The Estonian and Latvian governments objected to Russian interference in debates over the policies. They were further hemmed in by their own nationalists who actively campaigned for the expulsion of Russians. 19

The OSCE initiated a permanent presence in Estonia in February 1993 "to promote stability, dialogue and understanding between the communities in Estonia." 20 Thus, Russia also had results to point to in domestic and international debate. This dual result gave the OSCE an entrée to both parties, as each had gained from the mission. With the OSCE on the ground, and Council of Europe consideration continuing, the international community was well placed when tensions rose over citizenship requirements and, later, a draft law on the status of aliens. The Council of Europe was able to insist that changes be made in existing and proposed laws before Estonia would be accepted. The exclusion of noncitizens (most of the Slavic population) from voting in national elections was strongly questioned, and the eventual acceptance of Estonia included the following stipulation:

[The Council of Europe] expects the Estonian authorities to base their policy regarding the protection of minorities on the principles laid down in Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an additional Protocol on the rights of minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights. 21
The alien law, in its initial form, left numerous elements of its application and implementation unspecified and required that noncitizens obtain work and citizenship permits within two years or face deportation. The Council of Europe expressed concern. OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel bluntly noted that the lack of clear procedures, avenues for appeal, and a broad promise of citizenship to preindependence residents could raise concerns “to such an extent that it could lead to a destabilization of the country as a whole” and urged the reconsideration of such measures.

The OSCE and Council of Europe statements were followed with high-level calls and démarches from the United States and other Western governments. Russia weighed in by interrupting the flow of natural gas to Estonia—a threat not lost on anyone. President Lennart Meri of Estonia refused to sign the law and asked the Estonian parliament to revise it. The revisions clarified some of its vagaries and assured ethnic Russians that they would not arbitrarily be deported while unemployed.

It seems clear that international support and the threat of its withdrawal, as well as efforts to direct Western assistance to ease intercommunity friction, made the internal decision to withdraw and revise the law easier for Meri and the parliament. Heightened Western interest in Estonia included the direction of U.S. credits toward enterprises in Russian-populated regions and promises of more, both soothing the Russians and giving the Estonian government a card to play with its own hard-liners. On the Russian side, the high profile of international involvement, and international willingness to criticize the Estonian proposals, allowed the Russian authorities to claim something of a success. Estonian government officials did likewise. The international incentive structure of norm-based membership that brought with it tangible and intangible rewards had, in this case, functioned well.

Tensions rose to a similar level in Latvia the following year when a draft law on citizenship was promulgated. In the Latvian case, the lack of a citizenship law had already led the Council of Europe to postpone Latvia’s admission. When a draft law including quotas limiting annual naturalization of residents to a percentage of the growth rate of the Latvian population passed its first reading on November 25, 1993, the international community became actively involved. The Council of Europe criticized the text as “vague,” “arbitrary” and ultimately “not in line with European standards.” The OSCE high commissioner said:

If the overwhelming majority of non-Latvians in your country is denied the right to become citizens, and consequently the right to be involved in key decisions concerning their own interests, the character of the democratic system in Latvia might even be put into question. In this connection I refer to the 1990 CSCE Copenhagen Document, which states that the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all governments is the will of the people.

Shortly thereafter, the troop withdrawal negotiations (discussed at greater length later) also reached an impasse, and the success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his heavily nationalist party in Russia’s December 1993 elections caused the
West to look on Baltic-Russian tensions with greater concern. The new harshness of Russian rhetoric toward the “near abroad” included pressure on the other post-Soviet states to negotiate dual-citizenship agreements and the creation of organizations with strong Moscow ties to press for “ethnic Russian rights” in all the former republics. Russian foreign minister Kozyrev’s relative moderation on these issues appeared to be losing ground.

Concern increased in Washington that, if the Baltic problems were not resolved soon, Russia’s commitment to withdraw the troops would falter. The United States allowed the Nordic countries, particularly Sweden, to take a strong public role on the issues and weighed in at key moments. Nordic and U.S. representatives took the lead in keeping the issues alive before the OSCE and Council of Europe. Most explicitly, Council of Europe officials went on record in spring 1994 with their belief that the draft law disqualified Latvia from membership. Gentle reminders that the Council of Europe standards would also be applied to applicants to the European Union had an effect as well.

When, despite these pressures, the Latvian parliament passed the citizenship law in 1994, the ground was well laid for international involvement. The OSCE high commissioner, the Council of Europe, and the European Union again reviewed the statute and again suggested that it did not meet European standards. Phone calls from Nordic leaders were followed by a well-timed visit from President Bill Clinton on July 6. Clinton promised to speed the establishment of enterprise funds for the Baltic states and called on Latvians to heed “the better angels” of their nature and make peace with Russian residents.

The sequence of events that followed was similar to the Estonian case: President Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia refused to sign the law. Although the resulting debate in parliament broke up the ruling coalition, the quotas were removed and other changes made. The revised law was signed on August 11. Latvia was then admitted to the Council of Europe in early 1995.

Again, the immediate results were favorable, but some longer-term costs had been incurred. One analyst wrote:

The major disagreements between Latvia and Russia have been resolved, but neither side is completely happy. Russia still believes that the citizenship law is too harsh but realizes that its complaints will no longer elicit a response from the international community. Many Latvians believe that the West forced [their] government to grant too many concessions ... but recognize that they were needed to overcome Russia’s intransigence.

Estonia and Latvia’s place in European organizations—and their right to that place, and to their aspirations toward eventual European Union, if not NATO, membership—had been secured. The posing of that place as a reward for modifications in laws also preempted many further Russian challenges. Indeed, although Russia did not stop accusing the two states of human rights violations, Russian attempts to condemn them or lower their status at international bodies diminished after these incidents. As such, the use of international organization affiliation as an incentive may have increased the confidence, and thus stability, of the two states considerably by allowing them the full integration into the Western
bodies they had sought and demonstrating that those bodies could hear and respond to their concerns, even if not in perfect accordance with their wishes.

Financial Incentives—Getting the Troops Out

As has already been noted, the elaboration of citizenship and alien laws proceeded in parallel with tendentious negotiations over the withdrawal of Russian (formerly Soviet) forces from the Baltic countries. In July 1992, the three countries and the West succeeded in wringing from Moscow, in the context of an OSCE summit meeting, an acknowledgment that the troops' presence “without the required consent of those countries” constituted “a problem from the past” and a commitment to an “early, orderly and complete withdrawal” of the troops.\(^{32}\) The stage for longer-term international involvement was thus set. The Baltic countries had presented numerous proposals for internationalization of the withdrawal. The inclusion of this particular section, over which Lithuania had held the entire summit document hostage for inclusion of a reference to the troops’ illegal status, was an early taste for the Baltic countries of the power and benefits conferred through the international organizations and was regarded as a major triumph for them.

Negotiations with Estonia and Latvia bogged down over Russian objections to the residence and citizenship policies of the two states as well as Russian demands regarding the fate of several military installations. Russia halted withdrawals in December 1992 and threatened to do so repeatedly, while pressing in bilateral and international forums for recognition of a direct link between the pace of withdrawal and adoption of citizenship and residency regulations more to Moscow’s liking.

The Nordic countries and the United States attempted to replicate the earlier U.S.-German policy of funding housing construction for departing Russian units. Denmark and Norway came forward with offers in December 1992, in response to Russia calling a halt to the ongoing withdrawal. Sweden offered assistance in retraining officers, noting that, as cooperation and aid programs were developed, Sweden and Russia “needed to solve the problems that had tarnished their relations in the past” and specifically to set a deadline for Russian withdrawal from the Baltic states.\(^{33}\) The United States appropriated $6 million in 1993 and offered five thousand to seven thousand housing units to Russia for returning soldiers in the hope that, as in the German case, military unrest would be blunted.\(^{34}\) The provision of housing took on an additional use in the Baltic case—dissuading Soviet Army officers from remaining in the Baltic countries out of fear that Russia held nothing for them.\(^{35}\)

Even these incentives proved insufficient to dissipate Russia’s remaining political concerns or to provide sufficient political cover for Russian leaders, who had seen “mistreatment” of Russians in the Baltics become a useful domestic issue for mainstream and nationalist politicians. Concerned that public and government opinion in Russia was moving toward neoimperialist views, the United States and its allies stepped up the search for ways to make compromise palatable to Estonia and Latvia.\(^{36}\)
This was a tough sell. As with citizenship, the Estonian and Latvian governments had a domestic opposition that vociferously opposed any compromise with Russia and particularly any admission of the rights or permanent status of ethnic Russians and former officers of the Soviet Army. The Baltic governments also complained vigorously that they were singled out for undue pressure by the international organizations, while many others—particularly Russia—were committing far worse “violations” of human rights. With money already tight in Western ministries and Russia apparently unmoved, the international organizations had little to offer. However, in 1992, the Baltic states had tried to obtain outside involvement in the withdrawal process. Russia had refused to accept international oversight, and the NATO countries had declined to press the point. In 1994, the idea of international monitoring resurfaced and was used to break crucial blockages in the withdrawal negotiations.

Latvia

Along with tremendous Western pressure to close on a deal immediately, Latvia was promised use of the OSCE mission to monitor and carry out subsequent inspections of the destruction of the Soviet radar site at Skrunda, which the Russians had rather hoped to keep. Also, inclusion of an OSCE representative in joint Latvian-Russian deliberations to oversee allocation of permanent resident status and civil rights to Russian military pensioners and their families was held out as a sweetener for Latvian acceptance of pensioners remaining in Latvia.

When an agreement was finally signed on April 30, 1994, Latvians, Russians, and the Western press alike pointed to the crucial role of outside pressure in reaching an accord. What had been made clear by the length of the negotiations and the strength of domestic feeling was that pressure alone would not have worked; the Latvian side had to walk away from the negotiations with palpable gains and assurances for its domestic constituencies. In response to the 1993 deadlock, the United States had been able to bring to the discussions in Latvia and Estonia an appropriation of $160 million in 1994 to assist the withdrawal, specifically to build housing for Russian officers and their families but also to assist in dismantling the Skrunda radar system in Latvia. A delegation of Latvian politicians from across the political spectrum had been hosted at the White House to provide additional persuasion, and both the U.S. ambassador and the American head of the OSCE mission to Latvia had been frequently involved. The offer of international oversight, while less important per se than bilateral pressure from the United States and Sweden, served as a carrot to counter that pressure.

Estonia

Recognizing the role Sweden in particular had played, Foreign Minister Kozyrev of Russia urged that it exert a similar influence on Estonia. The Estonian situation continued to escalate, however, with human rights charges and counter-
charges being made throughout May and June 1994. Estonia’s neighboring Nordic states established, at Russian urging, a Baltic Council “Commissioner on Democratic Rights and Institutions” for the region. Coming, as the appointment did, at the end of a meeting where Kozyrev again linked troop withdrawal and rights for ethnic Russians, it was perceived as a Russian triumph, an admission that a problem with democratic rights and institutions existed. Perhaps more important, it gave the Russian foreign ministry a triumph to claim for domestic consumption—although it also laid Western diplomacy open to the criticism, chiefly from the U.S. Congress and Baltic groups in the United States, that it cared more for placating Russian nationalists than for serious appraisals of the region’s problems.

However, the symbolic nature of this step was underlined when the first commissioner, Ole Espersen, was not involved in the last-minute withdrawal negotiations that followed. His mandate was crafted in such a way that he had no avenue to be directly involved, and he did not present his first report to the Baltic Council until the following year. Moreover, the last stages of the talks were held far from the very public atmosphere endemic to international fact-finding missions. Pressures and incentives were offered more quietly through local ambassadors and calls and visits from capitals.

Estonia reached a compromise agreement with Russia on July 26, 1994. Estonia had received both the reassurance it sought and a final push for compromise during a Baltic summit with Clinton (the first U.S. president to visit the independent Baltic states) in Riga on July 6. He came to the Baltics with a package of $50 million in business loans and $10 million to ease Baltic participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace—the latter a significant message to Russia and something of a security reassurance for Latvia. Preparations for the visit had provided ample opportunity for American diplomats to work with the Estonian and Latvian governments and to conduct similar consultations in Moscow. The summit rhetoric, stressing U.S. and Western commitment to the maintenance of Baltic independence, was backed up with quiet support and continuing pressure from international organizations. An environment was created in which the Estonian government could finally face down its own hard-liners and make concessions sought by Moscow, chiefly permitting military pensioners to receive residence permits as well as granting Russia extra time to dismantle military reactors at the Paldiski submarine base. These concessions, which had been the last sticking point of the talks, were further eased by the assignment of an international oversight and mediation role to the OSCE mission, which sends one member to the commission established by the Estonian government to make recommendations on residence permits for Soviet military retirees.

Russia balked in mid-July, however, threatening not to honor the Latvian agreement and not to go further on the Estonian withdrawal. In response, Clinton told Yeltsin that the continued presence of Russian troops threatened to become “a burden to the Russian-American relationship.” Other American officials pointed out, publicly and privately, that Russian intransigence would build pressure for NATO enlargement, both in the United States and among Central European countries. The U.S. Senate voted in July 1994 to suspend all aid to Russia until the withdrawal from Estonia was complete.
In both the Latvian and Estonian cases, the deliberative bodies have gone on to function with OSCE participation, although not without controversy. The efforts of the OSCE representatives—and Baltic governments' reactions to their suggestions—have periodically appeared on the agenda of OSCE sessions since 1994, and Estonia in particular has complained bitterly of "interference" by international representatives, while in Latvia OSCE officials had difficulties with Russian obstruction. However, Russian troops were completely withdrawn by the August 31, 1994 deadline, and the Skrunda radar was first downgraded to observatory purposes and then destroyed.

Lessons Learned

The Baltic experience has interesting implications for our understanding of the process of preventive diplomacy and for the possibilities of international organization involvement. I will deal first with the implications for process from an American perspective, and then turn to the specific roles of international organizations.

Undeniably the preconditions were highly favorable. The world's attention had been focused on the possibility of conflict in the Baltics, and its implications, by the bloody events of 1990. The involvement of the Soviet Army, with all its implications for Western security, was unquestionably the first factor that guaranteed the region priority attention. But the Baltic countries and their American supporters' concern with public support played up a sense of moral obligation, among policymakers and the public, which guaranteed that the Baltics would capture public imagination—as not every crisis does.

When decisions to respond were required, advocates could point to groups on all sides—Russian moderates, Baltic governing parties, international groups such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and its High Commissioner van der Stoel—that shared the goal of resolving problems pragmatically. Although there were extremists on both sides, both also had important economic and strategic reasons to compromise. The United States did not have to argue against the parties' own conception of their long-term interests.

Moreover, the Baltic nations' high visibility and popularity in the United States made early warning relatively unproblematic. The United States was engaged in the Baltic states before they were independent and had embassies in all three capitals shortly thereafter. A domestic constituency existed and clamored for support for the Baltic states, while another pressed for support for Russia's democrats. Within the foreign policy community, no one advocated leaving the new states to fend for themselves.

These successful early warnings also made it possible for the United States to get involved early. The 1990 violence in Vilnius and Riga had convinced the Baltic states to fear the new Russians as much as the old, while impressing on Moscow that the United States and others would respond vigorously to assaults.
on Baltic sovereignty. Further bloodshed, or any clashes during the negotiating period, would have been highly polarizing within the Baltic countries and would have made Baltic leaders’ attempts to broker compromises substantially more difficult. The United States would also have had to abandon the position of friend to both sides which it strove to maintain.

U.S. goals for its preventive diplomacy were fairly limited: to get Russian troops out and to settle the preconditions for ethnic Slavs to gain citizenship or permanent resident status. The United States by and large resisted being dragged into debates over borders, for example, and did not insist that the negotiating process continue until ethnic integration was visibly proceeding. This approach has meant that cries for U.S. involvement are still heard as ethnic difficulties continue, but it also meant that a set of agreements exists to regulate debates. And, most important, the situation is no longer destabilized by Russian troops. Of course, the United States remains engaged in Baltic security and in working with the OSCE and the governments to smooth the ethnic Slavs’ transition. But this is no longer preventive diplomacy, except in the broadest sense that all of managing an ongoing relationship is conflict prevention. It could not, in any case, be successful without the preexisting base.

The role of international organizations in this case is unusual and not easily replicated. The parties found consensus in the principles and methods of European human rights bodies such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE. The delicate balance between human rights and national rights, self-determination and territorial integrity negotiated in Helsinki in 1975 had long sustained reformers and nationalists in the Baltics and Russia. Thus, although these norms had always appeared more utopian than practical in East-West relations, both sides were eager to live up to the OSCE ideal to reap the benefits of access to “Europe.”

This “European consensus” that formed the basis for preventive action in the Baltics included limitations on the notion of noninterference and an emphasis on international involvement in human rights issues. The acceptance of limitations on sovereignty was a crucial precondition for the successful involvement of international organizations. Those limitations had been crucial to the Western pressure that had sustained Baltic leaders during the Soviet era and later helped reformers like Yeltsin and Kozyrev gain power. They thus had a stake in international scrutiny which is unlikely to be replicated in other instances—unless there is conscious forethought and attempts to put in place norms that are at once standards and goals.

Because Council of Europe membership was still pending and EU and NATO membership on the distant horizon for all the parties, status with European organizations could be used as an incentive itself. The immediate threat of denial of Council of Europe membership seemed to have the strongest effect in the Latvian case. U.S and European official démarches reinforced the idea that good-neighborly relations would be necessary for EU and NATO membership—and there is no question that Baltic leaders hesitated to antagonize the West for exactly this reason. The potential for NATO enlargement still seemed far on the horizon at the
time, but the EU offered an initiative, which became known as the “Stability Pact,” to make the links between neighborly relations and EU membership explicit. The EU goal was to set up discussion “tables” between applicants and their hostile neighbors to resolve problems before the countries were considered for membership. (Subsequently, this criterion was used for NATO accession as well; the two approaches found some success in moving central European states toward new treaties of friendship and cooperation.) But the Baltic “table,” initially unable even to meet, has contributed nothing concrete to stability in the Baltics. A similar effort with Hungary and its neighbors enjoyed mixed success—treaties were duly signed, but ratification was long resisted and bilateral contacts have grown slowly. In contrast to the process that unfolded around the Baltics, the EU offered no concrete incentives for treaty signature, could not provide any (even implicit) security guarantees to weak states such as the Baltics and entered situations such as the Hungary-Slovakia relationship, where by no means all players on either side were convinced that a treaty was in their best interests. The history of the Stability Pact should be viewed, therefore, as a cautionary tale: international organization membership may have its privileges, but offered alone and for the distant future, it is unlikely to offer sufficient benefits to move domestic leaders away from extreme positions that are popular at home.

Unlike the EU initiative, the OSCE and Council of Europe efforts benefited from already existing mechanisms for monitoring, reporting, and commenting on internal developments. These allowed a certain division of labor between governments and international organizations. The OSCE’s van der Stoel and Council of Europe officials took on the unpopular role of pressing the Baltic states to comply with international legal and human rights norms. Clinton, the Nordic countries and others were left free to urge compromise in more stately terms and to use their ability to provide economic blandishments. With Russia, the United States could press strongly for troop withdrawal and take a firm tack. At the same time, Russia was able to use the presence of OSCE and UN missions and discussions in the OSCE and Council of Europe as places where Russian views on human rights “violations” could be publicly aired and given some legitimacy. Responding to Russia through these forums appeared to give Russian claims more legitimacy and thus served as an incentive in its own right.

Thus, political and economic capital could be brought to bear on the problem from many different angles. When one entity was distracted or suffering from budget shortfalls, the presence of others helped maintain the initiatives. A second benefit of the mingling of political capital was to convey a united front to all parties and to keep international organization goals consistent with national interests. If anything, international officials tended to go further in pressing for Baltic compromise than U.S. officials. The international organizations generally took their independence very seriously and were not eager to bring recommendations in line with each other, let alone national governments, but this served a useful role by allowing U.S. suggestions to appear moderate. The end result gave every party opportunities to claim victory, while the would-be preventors never deviated from their goals of full withdrawal and civil peace.
This combination of proposals and incentives developed by embassy and international organization representatives on the ground with central goals that all actors shared was what made conflict prevention in the Baltics successful. It did spark resentment among Balts and Russians, and it has not prevented citizenship issues from flaring again in the region. But it did address a comprehensive set of problems with a broad set of incentives and persuasions, carrots and sticks. It got the parties through a tense time and gave the Baltic countries breathing space to build inclusive polities.

It may be argued that the number of preconditions—both in the United States' ability to respond and the preparedness of the international community to play a role beyond the traditional limits posed by national sovereignty—makes this case less generalizable. Instead, the case suggests the utility of establishing similar preconditions elsewhere. In particular, it reaffirms the importance of groups, international or nongovernmental, that can bring early warnings to prominence with the United States and other governments.

This case also affirms the usefulness of the standard-setting side of international affairs, and of the international bodies themselves, for giving those involved a stake in the process. Few of the diplomats who framed Helsinki's human rights provisions, or those who defended Baltic nationalists in the 1980s using Helsinki provisions, imagined that one day those provisions would be used to justify international scrutiny of independent Baltic citizenship laws—and to oversee the permanent departure of Russian troops. But so it was.
Case Summary

Early warning of an impending crisis over control of nuclear weapons was inherent in the process that led to the disintegration of the USSR. The warning was, therefore, a matter of observing political developments and drawing reasonable conclusions more than it was a matter of intelligence indications. The crisis posed three potential dangers: (1) loss of control over the possession and use of nuclear weapons and fissile material; (2) an increase in the number of declared nuclear weapon states; (3) rising tensions between Ukraine and Russia, caused in part by disputes over possession of nuclear weapons. With more than thirty thousand warheads, the Soviet Union had deployed short-range (tactical) weapons in most of its fifteen republics. The four republics that became the independent states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine had long-range (strategic) weapons.

The strategic judgment underlying the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was that any increase in the number of nuclear weapon states would threaten international peace and security. New strategic circumstances had emerged by 1992: the bipolar global order no longer existed, signs of a turn to quasi-isolationism in the United States had appeared, and the independence of Ukraine had become a key element in calculations about European security. But the Bush administration revalidated the nonproliferation regime in the strongest possible terms and conducted effective preventive diplomacy to uphold it using a mix of coercion and incentives to deal with the situation that developed as the Soviet Union collapsed.

In the fall of 1991, President George Bush ordered that U.S. short-range nuclear forces be drawn down, thus providing political cover for Mikhail Gorbachev and, later, Boris Yeltsin to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons to Russian territory where some would be destroyed. This withdrawal was accomplished by June 1992. But it dealt only with tactical and not strategic nuclear weapons.

An agreement that committed Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to become nonnuclear weapon states and to transfer all strategic warheads to Russia was negotiated by Secretary of State James Baker and signed in May 1992. This agreement was dubbed the Lisbon Protocol for the locale of the negotiations and indicated its addition to the already negotiated first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). As such, it was an important affirmation of the continuation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime into the post–Cold War period.

In this chapter, in recognition that two distinct sets of problems had to be addressed by governments, I distinguish between two phases of the case. The warning, decisions, and actions described earlier will be identified as “Phase I.” The second phase of the nuclear succession crisis, clearly discernible by the summer of 1992 and initially overlapping in time, focused mainly on Ukraine and reached its peak intensity during 1993. Early warning of the second phase came when leading Ukrainian politicians, most of them members of the Ukrainian parliament, the Supreme Rada, questioned giving up nuclear weapons. This was thus a more open challenge to the old order than the first phase had been. Ukraine had become the world’s third largest strategic nuclear power by mid-1992, with over 1,900 strategic warheads.

Tensions rose between Ukraine and Russia. Ukrainian politicians emphasized the status accorded nuclear weapon states in the international community and also the potential threat posed by Russia. On the other hand, from Moscow’s standpoint, Ukraine did not own the nuclear warheads and was making unreasonable demands on Russia, the true owner of the weapons. Furthermore, nationalists in Russia voiced concern about ethnic Russians stranded in the newly independent states. There were several other irritants in the Russian-Ukrainian relationship: the long connection of the Russian navy with Sevastopol, the problems over dividing the Soviet Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine, and anger among Russians over the way Khrushchev’s “gift” of Crimea to Ukraine had backfired.

Ukrainian fears of a confrontation with Russia were heightened by the spectacle of President Yeltsin’s struggle with the Russian Congress of People’s
Deputies, where claims to the territory of Ukraine were publicly voiced. At the same time, the president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, was losing his authority over the Ukrainian parliament. His ability to fulfill promises made to the United States and Russia was increasingly cast in doubt as his own power ebbed and the situation in Russia looked more ominous.

The Clinton administration, just as devoted to revalidating the nonproliferation regime as the Bush administration had been, reacted promptly to the new crisis. The Clinton administration's policy toward denuclearization in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was established in one of President Bill Clinton's first national security decisions in March 1993. The policy and the diplomatic actions that flowed from it initially took the same uncompromising stance that the Bush administration had adopted in its final months in office. But by May 1993 the Clinton administration decided that an intense focus on only one issue in its relations with Ukraine was unproductive in solving that one issue and that it neglected too many other important elements in the relationship. A decision was made to broaden the dialogue, resulting in an almost immediate improvement in the tone of the relationship.

After a period in which the United States deferred to Russian assurances that Russia and Ukraine could work out the nuclear problems, Washington recognized the validity of Ukrainian desires for a more active U.S. role. From its self-described role of catalyst, Washington moved from mediator to active participant in the negotiations. This shift to a fully engaged U.S. preventive diplomacy was essential to its success. In the fall of 1993 a very active period of diplomacy began that included the highest levels in all three of the governments concerned and trilateral as well as bilateral channels. On February 3, 1994, the Ukrainian parliament gave its approval to ratification of START I and its protocol. In Budapest, on December 5, 1994, the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine exchanged instruments of ratification for START I and on the same day Ukraine deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT. On June 1, 1996, pursuant to these agreements, the last nuclear warhead crossed the Ukrainian border for dismantling in Russia.

The negotiations that led to these results represent an opportunity seized. Neorealist theory predicts that a new nation such as Ukraine would insist on being a nuclear power if it had the capacity to do so. Ukraine did not do so, despite a strong presumption that if it chose to keep the nuclear weapons within its borders it could have done so. There were, in fact, two major ingredients in the recipe for success: active and persistent U.S. diplomacy as well as an international regime of nuclear constraints that was well understood and well entrenched. This regime defined for the principal actors, including Ukraine, the general course of action required to remain within the rules of this regime. With the help afforded by this regime, preventive diplomacy, using a combination of steady pressure and incentives, was skillfully conducted by the Bush and Clinton administrations. The success of this diplomacy meant that the nuclear constraint regime developed during the Cold War had survived the passage to a different era.
The advent of Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made possible a series of dramatic negotiations on nuclear arms reduction with Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush. Gorbachev's recognition of the need for a fundamental change in Moscow's relations with the United States and Reagan's determination to achieve deep reductions in nuclear weapons created an opening for serious negotiations. A first dramatic success came with the exchange on June 1, 1988, by Reagan and Gorbachev of ratification instruments bringing into force the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), by which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear weapons, principally U.S. Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles and Soviet SS-20 ballistic missiles.

The next step was START I, signed by Bush and Gorbachev on July 31, 1991, which limited the United States and the Soviet Union to 6,000 accountable strategic nuclear warheads and 1,600 nuclear delivery vehicles on each side. After that came a framework agreement for a second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), approved by Bush and Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin on June 17, 1992. This agreement was intended to reduce the number of warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500 on each side and correct the failure of the earlier Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev negotiations to ban land-based MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) missiles in the SALT I agreement of 1972. The greatest disarmament program in the history of the world, measured in terms of destructive potential removed from deployment, began during Reagan's second term and Bush's single term. It was made possible by the end of the Cold War and the new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation, inaugurated by Gorbachev and carried forward by Yeltsin.

However, the very changes that made possible these remarkable agreements presented a fundamental challenge to the global nuclear restraint regime that had been constructed over more than four decades. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had three immediate consequences: first, fifteen newly independent states emerged, in many of which nuclear weapons had been deployed; second, a once highly structured society with a well-defined sense of identity and values began a disorderly and economically difficult transition to an unknown future; third, relations between Russia and the other newly independent states became at best unsettled and at worst antagonistic. These developments threatened the nuclear restraint regime. "Yugoslavia with nukes" was the image Secretary of State Baker used to describe the nightmare that could result from a loss of central authority and control over these nuclear weapons.

The possession of nuclear weapons by additional states would automatically weaken the NPT, not only by increasing the number of countries in the category of nuclear weapon states, but also by placing pressure on neighboring countries to acquire nuclear weapons. Newly independent states bordering on a nuclear
weapon state with imperialistic traditions were bound to consider—and they did—how nuclear weapons might help in their struggle to remain free and independent. The transition from authoritarianism to nascent democracy was almost bound to include—and did include—outbreaks of violence, considerable disruption in the machinery of government, and a breakdown in social discipline with consequent rise in criminal activities. Opportunities for theft and smuggling of nuclear materials and the lack of suitable employment for scientists and technicians skilled in Soviet nuclear weapons research and development would clearly be a special problem for the nuclear restraint regime. A new and ominous nuclear proliferation problem began to appear with the looming collapse of the Soviet state: the potential leakage of nuclear weapons or materials from Soviet government control to groups able to steal or buy them, whether those groups were criminal or terrorist organizations, rogue military units, or purchasing agents representing other governments. This problem was seen in the United States by people in and out of government as a major potential threat to the security and stability of all nations, including those emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union.3

As Ukraine and other republics of the Soviet Union moved toward independence, the Bush administration realized that START I and, perhaps, the NPT might become unintended victims of the collapse of the Soviet state. The dominant fact in the equation, for the Bush administration and later the Clinton administration, and for the U.S. Congress, was that if Ukraine failed to ratify START I, the treaty would be dead. Russia's Congress of People's Deputies resolved in November 1992 that START I should be ratified but that the instruments of ratification should not be exchanged until Ukraine had acceded to the NPT. The situation that seemed to be shaping up, as the Bush administration saw it, would call into question the solidity and continuity of the non-proliferation regime at a particularly inopportune time, with the NPT global review conference scheduled for 1995. Nor did they believe that Ukraine's possession of nuclear weapons was either necessary or even useful to its security interests.4

Key Decisions—Phase I

Right away, in 1991–92, the U.S. National Security Council's interagency committees actively considered the issue of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. Secretary of State Baker, aided by Undersecretary Reginald Bartholomew, took a leading role in shaping policy and conducting preventive diplomacy. The essential point to underscore about this period is that U.S. government officials never seriously considered any alternative other than a nonproliferation policy. The U.S. government was prepared to support a transition from a Soviet to a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nuclear force if such a force were centrally controlled, as Moscow had proclaimed. This would have meant little practical change since the Russian military would still have controlled the force perhaps with a veto of uncertain value exercised by other members of the CIS.

The Bush administration reacted very promptly to indications that mounting disorder within the Soviet Union might jeopardize centralized control of
nuclear weapons in that country and create additional nuclear weapon states. Several preventive steps were taken in rapid succession. Bush announced the first on September 27, 1991, little more than a month after the attempted coup against Gorbachev that, while put down, became the key precipitant to the breakup of the Soviet Union. The initial Bush strategy was summarized as follows:

The United States would withdraw all its nuclear artillery shells and all nuclear warheads for short-range ballistic missiles to the United States. These and any similar warheads currently stored in the United States would be dismantled and destroyed. All tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear-armed cruise missiles, would be withdrawn from U.S. surface ships and attack submarines. Nuclear weapons associated with land-based naval aircraft also would be removed. Many of these weapons would be dismantled and destroyed and the remainder placed in secure central storage areas. All strategic bombers would be removed from day-to-day alert status and their weapons returned to storage areas. All ICBMs scheduled for deactivation under START I would be taken off alert status. The single warhead ICBM would be the sole remaining U.S. ICBM modernization program; certain other nuclear weapons programs would be terminated. President Bush called on the Soviet Union to take comparable, although not identical measures.5

On October 5, 1991, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would take reciprocal actions. For this analysis the most important were as follows:

All nuclear artillery ammunition and nuclear warheads for tactical missiles would be destroyed. Nuclear warheads of anti-aircraft missiles would be removed from the army and stored in central bases; part of them would be destroyed. All nuclear mines would be eliminated. All tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from surface ships and multipurpose submarines. These weapons, as well as weapons from ground-based naval aviation, would be stored, with part being destroyed.8

The Bush initiative provided political cover to Gorbachev and then Yeltsin for withdrawing Soviet tactical nuclear weapons from republics that were suddenly no longer securely a part of the Soviet Union and in some of which ethnic conflict already had broken out. This is one of the best examples of decision making in the field of preventive diplomacy in recent years.7

Another excellent example was initiated by the U.S. Senate during the same period. Legislation sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) in 1991 provided for $400 million to be reprogrammed within the Department of Defense fiscal year (FY) 1992 budget and another $400 million from the FY 1993 budget to provide assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to expedite dismantling of nuclear weapons systems called for under START I and to strengthen nonproliferation programs.8 This gave the Bush and Clinton administrations new tools to strengthen the nuclear restraint regime and deal with the problems that began to emerge as the republics of the former Soviet Union began their long transition period.

The Bush-Gorbachev decision did not affect the large numbers of long-range, strategic nuclear weapons that were still deployed outside Russia, over 1,900 in
Ukraine alone. On December 8, 1991, the chiefs of state of Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia issued a declaration that created the CIS and placed military affairs under joint command of these three states. Kazakhstan joined the CIS a short time later. Responding to these developments, on December 12, 1991, Secretary of State Baker gave a crystal-clear statement of the Bush administration’s views in an address at Princeton University:

[W]e do not want to see new nuclear weapons states emerge as a result of the transformation of the Soviet Union. Of course, we want to see the START Treaty ratified and implemented. But we also want to see Soviet nuclear weapons remain under safe, responsible, and reliable control with a single unified authority. The precise nature of that authority is for Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and any common entity to determine. A single authority could, of course, be based on collective decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons. We are, however, opposed to the proliferation of any additional independent command authority or control over nuclear weapons.

For those republics who seek complete independence, we expect them to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states, to agree to full-scope IAEA safeguards, and to implement effective export controls on nuclear materials and related technologies. As long as any such independent states retain nuclear weapons on their territory, those states should take part in unified command arrangements that exclude the possibility of independent control. In this connection, we strongly welcome Ukraine’s determination to become nuclear-free by eliminating all nuclear weapons from its soil and its commitment, pending such elimination, to remain part of a single, unified command authority.9

A few days later, on December 17, 1991, President Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would cease to exist as a unified state by the end of the year; he resigned on December 25. On December 18, 1991, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan declared that they would abide by the provisions of START I. On December 30, 1991, the CIS members signed an agreement specifying that joint command of strategic forces would be implemented under the unified control of the CIS commander (a Russian) and the Russian president in agreement with the heads of state of the CIS nuclear states. The Ukrainian government, however, refused to acquiesce in Moscow’s demand that the Russian CIS commander have administrative as well as operational control over strategic offensive arms that had not yet been returned from Ukraine to Russia.

Washington’s first reaction to these developments was that Moscow should take the responsibility for working out the relationship of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the provisions of START I. The four governments quickly showed that this would not be easy to do. Russia viewed itself as the only nuclear weapon successor state to the Soviet Union and therefore entitled to a privileged position in arms control negotiations. Ukraine disagreed. On February 20, 1992, President Kravchuk declared that Ukraine must be an equal partner with Russia in these negotiations. The Bush administration decided that U.S. bilateral negotiations directly with the newly independent republics would be necessary.

A third big decision was made by the Bush administration late in 1992: an offer to purchase five hundred metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
from dismantled Soviet warheads. The United States was to guarantee that the material would be used only as fuel for civilian nuclear reactors, and Russia was required to agree with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine on an equitable sharing of the proceeds ($11–12 billion). The amount due each country would depend on the amount of uranium extracted from warheads deployed in each of the three republics and the expense borne by Russia in preparing the HEU for civilian use. Measures of transparency were to be put in place in Russia to ensure that the uranium came from dismantled warheads. Initially, U.S. officials presumed that blending down to low-enriched levels for use in fuel rods would take place in the United States, but the Russian government preferred that this process be carried out in Russia, which was accepted by the United States.

The plan had several advantages. It would not cost the U.S. government anything; money spent on the HEU would be recouped from sales of the blended-down fuel through the commercial nuclear fuel market. It provided an incentive to the new republics to return warheads to Russia since they would not be paid until they did. It provided badly needed economic assistance to each of the states participating in the program. Since the HEU would no longer be available for refabrication into weapons, the deal would make the dismantling of warheads irreversible and, to some extent, transparent.

The HEU decision was one of the key elements in the effort to save and strengthen the nuclear restraint regime. The Clinton administration ultimately relied heavily on the HEU offer to broker the agreement that led to Ukrainian acceptance of START I and the NPT.10

**Strategies of Action—Phase I**

As noted earlier, because of the Bush-Gorbachev initiatives, all Soviet short-range nuclear weapons systems were relocated to sites within the Russian Federation by June 1992, leaving only long-range strategic nuclear systems with associated warheads still deployed in the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The U.S. talks with all four states ensued through several channels, including both Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. The talks were given urgency in the spring of 1992 by several factors. The United States and Russia had made some headway in what would become START II, and the Bush administration wanted to complete START I. Moreover, START I was showing some signs of unraveling. Ukraine had briefly halted the shipment of tactical nuclear warheads to Russia. Although the transfer of these warheads was completed in May 1992, strategic warheads still remained. Furthermore, Kazakhstani president Nazarbayev said on May 5 that he wanted security guarantees from China, Russia, and the United States before fully giving up nuclear weapons. And, of course, 1992 was an election year in the United States, with one major event being a Yeltsin visit to Washington planned for the summer.

The negotiations on START I obligations and the successor state question were successfully concluded in Lisbon, Portugal, on May 23, 1992, when a protocol to START I was signed. The Lisbon Protocol, signed by the foreign ministers of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Russia, and the United States, committed
the first four of these countries to assume the obligations of the former USSR under START. They therefore became successor states for the purposes of START I. But in the case of the first three countries, an obligation to adhere to the nonproliferation treaty as nonnuclear weapon states in the shortest possible time (Article V) meant that they would not be successor states to the Soviet Union as nuclear powers. This article was later to be challenged by the Ukrainian parliament. Each of the chiefs of state of these three countries also appended letters to Bush. Kravchuk wrote, “Ukraine shall guarantee the elimination of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, located in its territory in accordance with the relevant agreements and during the seven-year period as provided by the START Treaty.”

Although the contract and details pertaining to the HEU purchase were not completed for many months, the deal was immediately of great interest to Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM). Naturally, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine found it interesting too. Russian-Ukrainian negotiations on sharing proceeds began late in 1992 and almost immediately ran into problems over when compensation to Ukraine would be handed over. In addition, political pressure from the Ukrainian parliament required the Kravchuk government to ask for compensation for the tactical nuclear warheads that already had been shipped to Russia by May 1992.

The three preventive diplomacy decisions taken by the Bush administration were timely and indispensable to subsequent diplomatic moves. The tactical nuclear initiative resulted in the removal to the relative safety of Russia of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads that might otherwise have been in harm’s way. Because of this, the proliferation problem was limited to three new republics instead of several. The Lisbon Protocol committed Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to becoming nonnuclear states and provided the legal basis for subsequent negotiations regarding the denuclearization process. Purchasing five hundred tons of HEU provided significant leverage for the United States, besides offering substantial economic relief to the four new independent states.

To sum up the situation at the end of the Bush administration, Kravchuk had made quite clear to American officials what Ukraine would need politically and financially to proceed with the transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia and to complete the elimination of strategic offensive arms in Ukraine. There were three conditions: security assurances from at least Russia and the United States; compensation for the nuclear materials contained in the warheads transferred to Russia, including the tactical nuclear warheads already transferred to Russia in the spring of 1992; and tangible economic and technical support to offset the cost of eliminating strategic offensive delivery systems on Ukrainian soil.

The Bush administration had responses on the negotiating table to each of these Ukrainian requirements by January 1993 when the Clinton administration took over. U.S. suggestions for security assurances were offered to Ukraine in January 1993 and discussed even earlier than that. Nunn and Lugar, during a visit to Kiev in November 1992, had told Kravchuk that between $100 million and $150 million could be made available to Ukraine from the Nunn-Lugar program for dismantling nuclear delivery systems. Bush wrote to Kravchuk on December 5,
1992, promising up to $175 million for assistance to Ukraine from Nunn-Lugar funds. And the HEU deal was already under negotiation between Ukrainian and Russian officials by that time.

These three elements were the same three that were at the heart of the U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian trilateral accord concluded by Clinton, Yeltsin, and Kravchuk in Moscow on January 14, 1994. An explanation of what happened during the period from mid-1992 through 1994 can best be offered in terms of a second phase of early warning and rapid decision making in response to these events.12

Early Warning—Phase II

Kravchuk had dominated the Ukrainian political scene from the days when he led Ukraine to independence in December 1991, but his authority began to be challenged by the parliament in the summer of 1992. Kravchuk’s decision to sign the Lisbon Protocol and to transfer over two thousand tactical nuclear warheads to Russia without compensation in May 1992 was the last time that he could take such important actions without much hindrance from the parliament.

By the end of 1992, Kravchuk was stressing the three conditions that would have to be met if Ukraine were to proceed with its obligations to surrender nuclear weapons on its territory. The Ukrainian parliament also declared that Ukraine was the owner of all nuclear weapons on its soil and a successor to the Soviet Union in this respect. This prompted rage in Moscow and heated exchanges between officials of the two governments. The Russian government declared that the Ukrainian position was completely unacceptable, and the Congress of the People’s Deputies resolved that START I could not come into effect until Ukraine had ratified it, including its protocol, and had acceded to the NPT.

Kravchuk continued to speak publicly of “an unchanging commitment to becoming the first nation in history to destroy voluntarily all its nuclear weapons and become a non-nuclear state,” but this view did not go unchallenged in Ukraine. Although it was a small minority, a faction in parliament had come to favor retaining some nuclear weapons, focusing particularly on the modern, made-in-Ukraine SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). One of the most influential spokesmen for this view was General Volodymyr Tolubko, a respected deputy in the parliament, a former division commander in the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), and nephew of a former SRF senior commander. For him, security alone justified Ukraine’s retention of modern nuclear forces. Deputy Yuri Kostenko, later minister of the environment, also stressed Ukraine’s security and the possible role of nuclear weapons. Other deputies believed that Kravchuk had erred in letting the tactical nuclear warheads be transferred to Russia without compensation. They argued that this must not be repeated in the case of the more than 1,900 strategic warheads located in Ukraine. Later, in April 1993, 162 deputies signed a letter to this effect.

These attitudes were gaining strength partly in response to a growing worry about developments in Russia. As seen from Kiev, Yeltsin’s struggles with the Congress of People’s Deputies displayed a Russian political scene increasingly more nationalistic and hard-line, with a weakened Yeltsin fighting a desperate
rear-guard action against neo-Sovietism. In December 1992, the Russian Congress resolved to reexamine the status of Sevastopol. Difficulties had arisen over use of the port of Sevastopol by the Russian navy and over division of the Black Sea fleet between Russia and Ukraine. Russian vice president Alexander Rutskoy angered Ukrainians by extravagant pronouncements about Russia’s rights in Crimea and with respect to the Black Sea fleet. The Russian Congress also insisted that the U.S.-Russian umbrella agreement for Nunn-Lugar assistance, signed by Bush and Yeltsin in June 1992, should be subject to its approval, thus calling into question the whole basis for Nunn-Lugar cooperation. This reflected conservative and nationalist suspicions that the Americans were gaining unfair advantages, including access to state secrets, through cooperation in the nuclear field.

Ukrainian hopes that independence would automatically bring economic support and security assurances from the West also had not been met by the summer of 1992. This, too, caused a feeling of disillusionment and some despair in a society where economic distress was serious and strikes were being called in protest. Nor were the political rumblings only from Ukraine. Kazakhstan officials also were having second thoughts. Hearing the speeches being made by politicians in Kiev and Moscow, they reconsidered their own readiness to renounce nuclear weapons. Only in Belarus, where 70 percent of the fallout from Chernobyl had been deposited and where nationalist feelings were not strong, did the Lisbon Protocol and the NPT continue to enjoy strong support.

The policy of the Bush administration in its last weeks in office was to insist that agreements had been signed and the United States expected they would be carried out. The Congress strongly supported this policy. Nunn-Lugar legislation, in fact, required that the administration certify that recipients of assistance were committed to compliance with arms control agreements into which they had entered. A strategy to ensure that this would happen would have to be developed by the incoming Clinton administration.

Key Decisions—Phase II

The starting point for the Clinton administration’s review of policy toward Ukraine was the Lisbon Protocol, which required that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan eliminate all the nuclear weapons located on their territories. In March 1993, Clinton decided to maintain the policy of denuclearization that he had inherited from Bush, and he issued instructions to that effect. Very little help would be given to these states until they had fulfilled their promises to ratify START I, including the Lisbon Protocol, and had acceded to the NPT. For an administration that regarded nonproliferation as one of its highest foreign policy priorities, this was a quite natural strategy. As was the case with the Bush administration, at no time was there any consideration given to adopting the position that Ukraine should become a nuclear power. Ukraine’s basic security problems were seen as economic and social, not matters that could be cured by acquiring a nuclear deterrent.

It quickly became apparent that the Clinton administration’s hard line toward Ukraine was not working. The perceived lack of support from the United States
caused a political climate in which a U.S.-Russian agreement on the details of the HEU purchase in February 1993 was seen as a form of betrayal; Ukrainian officials felt that the United States was making deals with Russia that significantly affected Ukrainian interests without adequately consulting them, even though it had been made quite clear that the contract would not be signed by the United States until a revenue-sharing formula had been worked out. Similarly, the Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting in Vancouver on April 3–4, 1993, was seen in Kiev as a U.S. tilt toward Moscow that rankled in an already touchy environment. Particularly noticeable in Kiev was a sentence in the Vancouver Declaration that said “the Presidents stressed their expectation that all countries of the former USSR which are not already NPT members will promptly confirm their adherence to the treaty as non-nuclear states.” Yeltsin’s government added to the Ukrainian concern when, the day after Vancouver, it issued a statement that “recently the situation around nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine has sharply deteriorated . . . the position of Ukraine . . . is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences . . . nuclear weapons cannot and must not be an object of political games.”

Amid these and other signs that U.S. policy toward Ukraine was not working, the administration initiated a major review of U.S. policy toward Ukraine, with one of the ablest of the National Security Council (NSC) staffers, Rose Gottemoeller, in the lead. Changes were recommended that included more sensitivity to Ukraine’s own problems, greater willingness to offer Ukraine incentives, and a broadening of the U.S.-Ukrainian dialogue. Support for these changes was widespread in the administration. This review led to a changed Clinton administration policy toward Ukraine which included a more proactive U.S. role in direct talks with Ukraine. From May 1993 onward, the U.S. position changed significantly in ways that made it easier for the Ukrainian government to engage in serious talks with the United States.

Strategies of Action—Phase II

The U.S. decision to broaden the U.S.-Ukrainian dialogue to embrace economic, political, and other types of cooperation led to a visit by Ambassador-at-Large Strobe Talbott to Kiev in May. The visit and its message were seen in Kiev as a turning point in U.S.-Ukrainian relations. In June, the specifics of the U.S. position on START ratification and NPT accession as a condition for Nunn-Lugar assistance also began to change. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin conveyed to Russian defense minister Grachev and then to Ukrainian defense minister Mo­rozov a proposal that Ukraine proceed immediately to deactivate the strategic offensive arms on its territory by separating the warheads from their delivery vehicles. The idea was not appealing to Grachev, who was concerned about storing warheads in facilities in Ukraine, even temporarily and even under Russian guard. Morozov, on the other hand, found the idea quite interesting.

The U.S. proposal, provided to the Russians and the Ukrainians through several high-level channels, was fine-tuned over time to meet Ukrainian and Russian concerns. Basically, the proposal called for deactivation by removal of the warheads and temporarily storing them in Ukraine under joint Russian and Ukrainian
supervision, perhaps with some international observers, pending their removal to Russia for prompt dismantlement. Ukraine would then be compensated for the value of the HEU in the warheads. The United States saw what it called “early deactivation” as a step on the way to Ukrainian compliance with START and the NPT, not a substitute. All three nuclear weapons systems on Ukraine’s territory would be included—weapons associated with heavy bombers, SS-19s, and SS-24s.15

In June 1993 the United States changed its position on the conditions that Ukraine would have to meet to receive Nunn-Lugar assistance. Up until then, Nunn-Lugar assistance was held up because of the conditionality to START I ratification and NPT accession. Now, though, Ukrainian ratification of START and accession to the NPT would no longer be necessary to receive assistance for dismantlement. If the Ukrainians would agree to begin early deactivation by removing warheads from one regiment each of the SS-19s, SS-24s, and heavy bombers, the United States would agree to begin providing Nunn-Lugar assistance for dismantlement when removal of these warheads had begun. A pilot project to dismantle SS-24 missile systems would also be started.

Ukraine responded to the changes in the U.S. position in various ways. One way was to begin in July the dismantling of SS-19 missiles, initially two regiments in agreement with the Russians. Many of the SS-19s were approaching the end of their service life and could not be deployed much longer without major refurbishment in any event.

Ukraine also decided to accept a visit by the U.S. delegation on safe and secure dismantlement (SSD) at the end of August to discuss the Nunn-Lugar umbrella and implementing agreements. The most important of the implementation agreements was one that would provide up to $135 million for dismantling assistance. Even while Nunn-Lugar assistance had been held up, technical talks had proceeded and had achieved some initial understandings on lists of equipment and financial offset measures. To this point, however, the unilateral SS-19 dismantling was taking place essentially at the expense of the Ukrainian government. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian-Russian negotiations on disposition of nuclear warheads were coming to a head. These talks had been under way since November 1992 but had failed to make progress. The subjects under negotiation were schedules and methods for removing warheads from Ukraine, compensation to Ukraine for the value of the nuclear materials in the warheads, including compensation for tactical nuclear warheads removed in 1992, and security assurances. Problems had arisen over when compensation would be provided to Ukraine, whether tactical nuclear warheads should be eligible for compensation, and whether security assurances should refer to the CIS and its reciprocal obligations.

By August 1993 the talks had been so successful that three papers were ready for signature at a meeting of the Russian and Ukrainian presidents, prime ministers, and other high officials. These included understandings regarding removal of nuclear weapons, revenue sharing, and ideas about compensation for tactical nuclear weapons. The accords were signed at Massandra, in Crimea, but their implementation was temporarily delayed when a Ukrainian official sought to leave open the question of which was the governing document, the original START or the Kravchuk letter included in the Lisbon Protocol. The difference
was that a Ukrainian interpretation of START required only partial elimination by Ukraine of its strategic offensive arms. The Kravchuk letter, with the Lisbon Protocol, required Ukraine to eliminate all strategic offensive systems. The reasoning of this senior official was that the Ukrainian government should not preempt the decision of the parliament. Injecting this issue into the discussions resulted in immediate derailment of the accords.

This was not the end of the Massandra accords. The negotiations between the Ukrainians and the Russians continued after Massandra and were based on the agreements reached up to that point. Indeed, the Massandra agreements would be contributing elements in the final January 1994 trilateral accord. They were an essential part of the implementation of the trilateral accord and a main reason why a trilateral follow-on was not required. The Ukrainians and Russians had already prepared the ground for agreements on compensation and a timetable for withdrawal.

The Ukrainians remained convinced, however, that compensation agreements and security assurances should include the United States in some fashion. Agreements that included only Russia and Ukraine would not be acceptable. This was probably another reason for Kiev's conclusion that the time had come for U.S.-Ukrainian negotiations on deactivation and dismantlement of strategic offensive arms. The first U.S.-Ukrainian meeting on Nunn-Lugar cooperation took place from August 30 through September 1, 1993. The second followed on October 21-26, 1993, and the third took place December 2-6, 1993. The results of these meetings included the Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement, the implementing agreement on dismantlement of strategic offensive arms, and the first notice from the Ukrainian government that it intended to deactivate all of its SS-24s in fairly short order by removing their warheads. In the August meeting, the United States welcomed the agreement between Russia and Ukraine to start deactivating two regiments of SS-19s and asked that the process be continued beyond that. Noting that Washington wanted heavy bombers and SS-24s also included, the U.S. delegation suggested alternative methods for deactivating missiles and proposed talks on methods of eliminating the SS-24s. Nunn-Lugar resources would be available for this. The Ukrainians were assured that the United States would not sign the HEU contract until a revenue-sharing agreement had been worked out with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. As regards timing of compensation for Ukraine, it was the U.S. view that Ukraine should be compensated when the nuclear warheads located in Ukraine had been dismantled in Russia. Discussions on the Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement and the dismantling assistance agreement revealed some problems concerning audits and the status of American citizens working on these programs, as well as a desire that Ukrainian enterprises provide some of the necessary equipment.

The October meeting took place just prior to and during the visit of Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Kiev. The United States wanted progress on the SS-24s and hoped that Ukraine could decide on what deactivation option it would like to pursue. However, the Ukrainian government was not ready to define exactly what deactivation or dismantling procedure Ukraine would be prepared to accept. Obviously, Ukraine had not reached a satisfactory conclusion at
that point in its negotiations with Russia over compensation and security assurances. At the last moment, Kravchuk and Christopher agreed that an effort should be made to overcome the remaining problems in the Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement and they instructed their negotiators to do so. At one point in the evening, Kravchuk, Christopher, and Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis joined the negotiators to emphasize in no uncertain terms what was expected. This had the desired result. The remaining issues were resolved by 6 A.M. on October 26, and the umbrella agreement was concluded. Although the deactivation of SS-24s was left as an open question when Christopher left Kiev, it was clear that this issue now demanded a solution urgently. Christopher stressed the point in a subsequent message to his Ukrainian counterpart and suggested that the next visit of the U.S. delegation in early December would be an occasion to discuss it.

It is likely that Kravchuk's decisions in this period were encouraged by Yeltsin's success in eliminating for a time the threat posed to his authority by the Russian legislature. Yeltsin was seen as at least tolerant of Ukrainian opinions, while the Congress of People's Deputies was seen as hostile to Ukraine at a very fundamental level, including the issue of Ukraine's territorial integrity. Yeltsin's dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies, with the help of the Russian army, relieved Kravchuk of one source of concern and assured him that his Russian negotiating partner would be around for a while.

These same considerations may have played a part in the next major development in the negotiation. On November 19, 1993, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a resolution ratifying with reservations START I and the Lisbon Protocol. However, the ratification resolution also had what many observers feared was a "poison pill" in a provision that declared inter alia that the article of the Lisbon Protocol that committed Ukraine to adhere to the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state was not binding for Ukraine and that this issue would be left to be addressed later by the parliament. The Russian government was highly offended by the parliament's action, which was interpreted in Moscow as a reversal of the whole denuclearization process. But the resolution, while affirming that START required Ukraine to reduce only 36 percent of the nuclear delivery vehicles and 42 percent of the warheads in Ukraine, also stated that "this does not preclude Ukraine from eliminating additional delivery vehicles and warheads on the basis of procedures stipulated by Ukraine." Other reservations related to long-standing Ukrainian requests for security guarantees, financial and technical assistance, verification of warhead dismantlement in Russia, and compensation.

Nevertheless the resolution did give Kravchuk the authority to proceed with SS-24 deactivation and to move toward a settlement of some other issues. Shortly after passage of the parliament's resolution, Kravchuk was able to inform the United States that warheads were being removed from some SS-24s. In a discussion in Kiev with the U.S. SSD delegation early in December, the Ukrainians promised that by early 1994 all forty-six SS-24s would be deactivated.

Several questions needed to be resolved before Russia, Ukraine, and the United States could agree on what would ultimately happen to the warheads removed from the SS-24s. First, the HEU compensation issue had to be settled. Second, Russia had to help in maintaining and securing the warheads removed
from the SS-24s. Third, the United States had to help Ukraine obtain security assurances from Russia. A meeting between Clinton and Kravchuk, which had been under discussion for some months, had to be scheduled. As to the necessary Nunn-Lugar agreements, the U.S. delegation was informed that the umbrella agreement could enter into force shortly. The implementing agreement on strategic systems dismantlement was signed, which made available up to $135 million for deactivation and dismantling assistance.

The next step was to inform the Russians of this breakthrough and seek their cooperation. The head of the U.S. SSD delegation met with Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin and other Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials in Moscow on December 6 for this purpose. U.S. Ambassador to Russia Thomas Pickering discussed the report from Kiev with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One Russian participant in the MOD talks speculated that the Ukrainians were simply engaged in maintenance procedures, but Kokoshin immediately sensed that the situation had changed. Although surprised by the news, the Russians understood that the opportunity should be seized to resolve the outstanding issues. Of prime importance was the long-stalled revenue-sharing agreement in connection with the HEU purchase. Russian-Ukrainian negotiations on the safety and security of the nuclear warheads and a schedule for transferring the warheads to Russia for dismantlement also had taken on new urgency. The Massandra agreements had paved the way for what, at least in Washington, was seen as the last stage of the negotiations.

The Trilateral Accord

To move the process forward decisively, U.S. vice president Al Gore and Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and their experts became directly involved. Gore and Chernomyrdin were to meet in Moscow on December 15–16, 1993, in the framework of a U.S.-Russian commission on technological cooperation in the fields of energy and space that had been created at the Vancouver summit. Moving rapidly to take advantage of the Ukrainian move, Secretary of Defense Perry, Ambassador-at-Large Talbott and other senior U.S. officials used the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission meetings to discuss with Russian counterparts the framework of a possible trilateral agreement, of which a big part was revenue-sharing under the HEU deal. Undersecretary of State Davis and her senior adviser, James Timbie, were key players in these talks. Timbie had been responsible for much of the creative energy behind the major decisions concerning Ukraine throughout the period discussed in this chapter. These discussions were followed immediately by a meeting with senior Ukrainian officials and Russian deputy foreign minister Georgy Mamedov in Kiev, taking advantage of an offer by Perry to use his airplane to facilitate the initiation of trilateral talks. The same U.S. interagency group accompanied Perry, and, again, the conversations were promising and fully in line with the decisions Kravchuk had made in late November. The Massandra agreements were clearly very much in play in the Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in the view of Ukrainian officials.
The outlines of the trilateral agreement that was beginning to emerge left important matters to be resolved, mainly by the Ukrainians and Russians, but they also seemed to put Ukraine firmly on the track to ratifying START and acceding to the NPT. In late December, Clinton approved the approach that his negotiators proposed to reach closure. A trilateral meeting, chaired on the U.S. side by Ambassador Talbott, was held in Washington on January 3-4, 1994. Considerable progress was made, so much so that issues like presidential visits and the timing of the Ukrainian parliament’s ratification of START became ripe for discussion. A key element became a U.S. offer of a $60 million advance payment to Russia on the HEU purchase so that Russia could begin fabricating fuel elements to transfer to Ukraine. This allowed Kravchuk to claim a tangible, short-term benefit for Ukraine’s precarious energy problem.

A meeting between Clinton and Yeltsin had been scheduled for January 13-14, 1994, in Moscow. It now was possible to plan for a trilateral meeting with Kravchuk to settle on an arrangement that would satisfy all parties. Clinton approved the plan and during a visit to NATO headquarters on his way to the Moscow meeting, the Americans preemptively announced that an agreement had been reached and that the president would meet with Kravchuk in Kiev before traveling on to Moscow. The final stage of summit diplomacy was successful and the Trilateral Accord, including all the elements that had been under discussion since 1992, was issued in Moscow on January 14, 1994. The agreement included the following elements:

- The Presidents look forward to the entry into force of the START I Treaty, including the Lisbon Protocol and associated documents, and President Kravchuk reiterated his commitment that Ukraine accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state in the shortest possible time.

- Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin expressed satisfaction with the completion of the highly-enriched uranium contract, which was signed by appropriate authorities of the United States and Russia.

- The three Presidents decided on simultaneous actions on transfer of nuclear warheads from Ukraine and delivery of compensation to Ukraine in the form of fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations.

- Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin informed President Kravchuk that the United States and Russia are prepared to provide security assurances to Ukraine...once the START I Treaty enters into force and Ukraine becomes a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. . . .

- President Clinton reaffirmed the United States commitment to provide technical and financial assistance for the safe and secure dismantling of nuclear forces and storage of fissile materials...including a minimum of USD 175 million to Ukraine.

This was not the end of the story. Several steps had to be taken to implement the Trilateral Accord and a failure to agree on the details of those implementing measures could have negated the whole agreement. Each of these challenges was met. First, the Ukrainian parliament ratified START, including the Lisbon Protocol, on February 3, 1994, thereby endorsing the proposition that the Trilateral Accord met the conditions that the parliament had laid down in November.
Second, the Ukrainians and Russians reached an agreement a few days later on compensation, on maintenance and security for nuclear warheads, and on a schedule for the transfer of the warheads to Russia for monitored dismantlement. This agreement resolved the outstanding issues between Ukraine and Russia and made unnecessary a further trilateral meeting.

Not everything went so smoothly. The Ukrainian government hoped for security guarantees in the form of a treaty, and this went well beyond the assurances that the United States was prepared to offer. From the first discussions with Ukrainian officials in 1992 Washington had made it clear that a treaty commitment was not possible. The assurances that the U.S. government was prepared to offer were drawn from the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and assurances given by the United States in connection with the NPT. The trilateral agreement also recorded the fact that the United Kingdom, the third depository state of the NPT, was prepared to offer the same security assurances to Ukraine once it became a nonnuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

One other element played a part in the preventive diplomacy of 1993–94. The Ukrainian government, and Kravchuk personally, had expressed a serious interest in an international fund to support dismantlement. Working with its NATO allies, Japan, and interested European governments, the United States assembled a package of assistance programs to offer Ukraine prior to the convening of the new parliament in March 1994. On February 21, 1994, the ambassadors of fourteen countries met with Kravchuk in Kiev to present a statement endorsing Ukraine's intentions to become a nonnuclear weapon state and offering pledges of tangible support. The countries represented in this international effort were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This show of international solidarity with Ukraine and its decision to renounce nuclear weapons was well received and no doubt helped to reinforce the Ukrainian government's determination to proceed.

An official visit to Washington by Kravchuk also had been part of the negotiating equation for months. The invitation now was issued and the visit took place on March 3–5, 1994.

Kravchuk was defeated in the Ukrainian presidential elections of June 1994 in a campaign fought primarily over economic issues. He was replaced by Leonid Kuchma, former director of a missile production complex in Ukraine. On disarmament the new president adopted the same position as his predecessor and the first fruits of his stewardship became the last act in the negotiating drama played out in November and December 1994. It involved drawing to a close the long debate about security assurances. Becoming finally reconciled to the reality that a treaty was impossible, Ukraine settled for the type of political document foreshadowed in the Trilateral Accord and which had been discussed with the Ukrainians long before that. On November 16, 1994, the Ukrainian parliament voted overwhelmingly (301–8) to endorse Ukraine's accession to the NPT. The instrument of accession was deposited on December 5. On that same day the parties to the Lisbon Protocol—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States—exchanged instruments of ratification of START I at a
ceremony in Budapest. The security assurances document was signed at the same time by Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\textsuperscript{18}

The agreements that in various ways involved Russia, Ukraine, and the United States in HEU sales, in revenue sharing, and in protection, maintenance, and transfer of warheads for monitored dismantlement in Russia were effectively implemented despite occasional “bumps in the road.” On June 1, 1996, the last nuclear warhead crossed the border of Ukraine for dismantlement in Russia. In a statement issued on the same day, Clinton remarked, “In 1991 there were more than 4,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads in Ukraine. Today there are none. I applaud the Ukrainian government for its historic contribution in reducing the nuclear threat.”\textsuperscript{19}

**Lessons Learned**

Skillful preventive diplomacy by two U.S. administrations was essential to the success of this venture. That is the main story described in this chapter. Another requirement for success in these negotiations should not be overlooked. Two U.S. presidents and their administrations made quick and effective decisions according to the logic of the nuclear restraint regime.

Explanations justifying this course of action to the public were readily available. No lengthy and agonizing debate was necessary to decide what should be done. The facts associated with the end of the Cold War—and of the bipolar order—could have pointed to a different solution. No longer essential as a prop to the bipolar order, the policy of blocking any increase in the number of nuclear weapon states might have given way to a toleration for some limited increase, especially in the cases of nations whose sovereignty and independence was important to the United States. In fact, little or no attention was given to alternative strategies. Consistency and steadiness, combined with tactical flexibility, are hallmarks of any successful diplomatic campaign. These characteristics were clearly present in U.S. diplomacy on the nuclear succession question during 1991–94. This too is the result of adopting a strategy in harmony with well-understood and broadly supported rules of behavior.

Diplomacy was successful in the situation described in this chapter because the conceptual thinking and the rules flowing from this thinking had been established years before, an example of what preventive diplomacy really means. While many other familiar guideposts of the Cold War had been washed away by the revolutions of 1989–91, the framework for decisions provided by the nuclear restraint regime remained. The logic of the regime was understood by the U.S. political leadership and supported by public opinion. A principal lesson of the experience is that international regimes of equal clarity that enjoy similar widespread support can be a crucial contributing factor for a successful U.S. foreign policy in the new world now being built.

The nuclear restraint regime encouraged Russia and the United States to cooperate because they both had been operating within its confines for many years. This was essential to the success of the negotiation. Tactically, the two governments preferred different approaches, but strategically, they were as one. Ob-
viously, this made a substantial impact on Ukraine, where the underlying assumptions of the nuclear restraint regime also had broad public support, even amidst the nationalist politics of the Rada. The tangible and intangible benefits given to Ukraine during the course of the negotiations of course also were essential, but it nevertheless is noteworthy that Ukrainian leaders kept coming back to the theme of Ukraine's duties to the international community.

In conducting their diplomacy both the Bush and the Clinton administrations used a variety of techniques: promises of help, threats that help would be denied, charges of reneging on previous agreements, appeals to noble instincts. The Yeltsin government did much the same but relied also on economic pressure, particularly exploiting Ukraine's dependence on energy supplies from Russia. Russia at first was reluctant to have the United States involved directly with Ukraine, but eventually the U.S. role moved from catalyst to mediator to active participant. Without this evolution in its attitude towards the negotiations, there would have been no agreement, despite the strength of a nuclear restraint regime.

Appendix I: Resolution of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine


— Taking into account the specific measures undertaken by the President and Government of Ukraine during the period November 1993–January 1994 to implement the provisions of the resolution of the Supreme Rada of November 18, 1993;

— Based on the results of the meeting between the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and the Russian Federation in Moscow on January 14, 1994, and the Trilateral statement and the Annex thereto, signed by them;

— Considering the fact that Ukraine has received confirmation from the Presidents of the U.S. and Russia of their willingness to provide Ukraine with National Security guarantees following entry into force of the START I treaty and Ukraine's accession to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state, and considering the obligations of the United States of America, the Russian Federation, and Great Britain in regard to Ukraine: To respect its independence, sovereignty and existing borders, to refrain from the threat or use of force against its territorial integrity or political independence, to refrain from economic pressure, and their obligations not to use any weapons against Ukraine;

— Taking into account the confirmation by the Presidents of Ukraine, the U.S. and Russia that the relations between them will be based on respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of each state and the
confirmation of their willingness to provide assistance in developing an effective market economy in Ukraine;

— Taking into account that in accordance with the Protocol entitled “On the Procedure for Verifying the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons Removed from the Territory of Ukraine to Industrial Enterprises of the Russian Federation,” representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will verify the disassembly and destruction of strategic nuclear warheads on Russian territory which will preclude re-use of components of these warheads for their original purpose;

— Also taking into account Russia’s obligations to ensure the maintenance and safe operation of nuclear warheads;

— Proceeding from the premise that Ukraine will receive just compensation for the value of highly enriched uranium and other components of all the nuclear weapons which it owns;

— Taking into account the agreement that the Russian Federation and the United States of America will provide just and timely compensation to Ukraine for the value of highly enriched uranium as nuclear warheads are removed from Ukraine to Russia for disassembly, and that the acts of removal and provision of compensation to Ukraine will take place simultaneously;

— Proceeding from the premise that the United States of America, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine will scrupulously comply with the accords set forth in the trilateral statement of the Presidents and the Annex thereto, both existing agreements between them and agreements which have yet to be concluded with respect to nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine;

— Believing that the foregoing makes it possible to fulfill the conditions and reservations made in the Resolution of November 18, 1993,

Resolves:

1. Taking into account the specific measures adopted by the President and Government of Ukraine with respect to implementation of the provisions of the Resolution of the Supreme Rada of November 18, 1993, and the reciprocal steps on the part of the U.S. and Russia, to withdraw the reservations regarding Article V of the Protocol to the START Treaty, signed in Lisbon on May 23, 1992.

2. To instruct the Government of Ukraine to exchange instruments of ratification of the START I Treaty and begin activities to conclude specific international agreements ensuing from the reservations in the Resolution of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine on ratification of the START I Treaty.

February 3, 1994

Appendix II: Memoranda on Security Assurances in Connection With Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Budapest, December 5, 1994

The United States of America, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Welcoming the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state,

Taking into account the commitment of Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its territory within a specified period of time, noting the changes in the world-wide security situation, including the end of the Cold War, which have brought about conditions for deep reductions in nuclear forces, confirm the following:

1. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.

2. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

3. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

4. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

5. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.

6. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will consult in the event a situation arises which raises a question concerning these commitments.

This memorandum will become applicable upon signature, signed in four copies having equal validity in the English, Russian and Ukrainian languages.
Part Three

The Breakup of Yugoslavia
7

Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive Diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1985–1991

Susan L. Woodward

Case Summary

FEW IF ANY DEADLY conflicts in recent history have provided more opportunity for prevention than the wars that engulfed the Balkan peninsula with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991. Early warning was abundant. Institutional interests in demonstrating a new capacity for crisis management with the end of the Cold War were strong, in Europe and in the United States. Public opinion was mobilized throughout the world—by the extensive reporting in electronic and print media of atrocities, forced population movements that added a term to the lexicon of civil war (ethnic cleansing), and other indignities visited upon civilians—to demand that governments take action. And the fact that each of the wars occurred singly and moved in time from one region to the next provided ample opportunity to learn lessons from one war that could be applied to prevent the next.

The case of the wars of independence for two of the country’s six republics that began in Croatia in August 1991, after the Slovene war of June 28–July 8, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina after March 1992, before the war in the Kosovo province of Serbia appeared imminent in spring 1998, demonstrate instead that the conditions for effective action are very demanding. If early warning is based on faulty analysis of the conflict, if interests in early action do not place higher
priority on the prevention of violence than on other, competing interests, and if
instruments are not suited to the moment when they are mobilized, then action
aimed at prevention can in fact make matters worse. The failure, in fact, in the
Yugoslav cases of so many actions taken with the intent of prevention, or justi-
fied as such, rebounded perversely on the idea itself of prevention. In place of
analyzing the reasons that so many opportunities were missed, the external ac-
tors involved began to view the conflict as inevitable and the parties as intent on
killing each other no matter what outsiders did. And when new decision mak-
ers struggled to overcome that impulse in the case of Kosovo and to learn from
their mistakes, they still failed to seize a host of opportunities for prevention,
re-
peating nearly all of their previous steps.

There were numerous opportunities to prevent the violence in former Yu-
goslavia, but they occurred before crisis management mechanisms swung into
place, between 1985 and March 1991. At that time, governments that had the
power or interest to act were nearly unanimous that the outbreak of violence in
former Yugoslavia—even horrendous and massive violence of the kind that did
occur—would not be sufficient reason to intervene. The questions asked by pol-
cymakers were not whether there would be violence, but would it affect them?
Would their legislatures vote the money? Would they gain politically at home
from acting early? The answer to all three questions was no.

In the Yugoslav case, there was no perceived interest in preventing distant vi-
olence, no national glory and political benefit from prevention, and little way to
override politicians' normally short-term calculation of costs (both financial
and political). Yet the direct cost to the major powers of not acting early with an
eye to prevention—in terms of the moral credibility of key international orga-
nizations (especially the United Nations and NATO), of their own soldiers' lives,
and of expenditures for diplomatic, military, and relief activity to reduce the
number of Bosnian deaths and then implement a peace agreement—was in the
end very high.

The Roots of the Conflict

In 1979–81, the government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, like
many other third world countries, began a decade-long struggle to resolve a for-
eign debt crisis and restore liquidity and growth to its import-dependent econ-
omy. Recognizing that the immediate crisis was due largely to external shocks, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) created a new, three-year facility on the con-
dition that the government would introduce a strict macroeconomic stabilization
program and begin an economic reform to liberalize foreign trade, promote ex-
ports, restore financial discipline, and in general make the economy attractive to
capital markets and foreign investment. Although quite conventional for devel-
oped market economies, the program required a nearly total reversal of the in-
dustrial and trade policies of the 1970s and the extensive economic-policy and fi-
nancial decentralization of the preceding thirty years. As a result, the economic
reform and accompanying financial and budgetary austerity would affect each re-
public and province differently, producing different economic interests and political positions. One aspect they had in common, however: the requirements to return control over monetary policy and foreign exchange (on which investment and modernization depended) to the National Bank in Belgrade and to impose discipline on the republic banks (and thus on their primary clients, large firms). The reform goal of improving federal capacity for macroeconomic management of a liberalizing economy would deprive each republic of the control over resources they had come to assume was theirs by right.

Opposition to reform was strongest in Slovenia, as the wealthiest and largest earner of foreign exchange, but the effect of austerity and the shift to Western markets also raised serious discontent in republics whose economies were more oriented to domestic producers or Eastern markets, such as Serbia, Montenegro, and the poorest republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. To maximize export revenues, the stabilization program even proposed a division of the country into separate policy spaces: a northwestern area (primarily Slovenia) of “highly modern, technically advanced export industries” and a south of low-wage, labor-intensive industries producing primary commodities and absorbing higher levels of unemployment. Croatia quickly reoriented public investments to the first category, while Serbia began to slip rapidly from the first to the second. At the same time, the demand restrictions and rising unemployment (already at 14 percent when the reform began) seriously eroded economic security among core beneficiaries of the regime (highly skilled industrial workers and the urban middle class), and even threatened the ultimate safety net, food from a guaranteed rural plot. Because of the structure of the Yugoslav political system, the resulting politics of reform played out at three levels. In each republic, leaders of the ruling party and in government positions mobilized arguments against those parts of the reform they disliked and in support of keeping control or increasing local resources to pay for rising costs of new investment and social welfare. At the federal level, where all discussion and policy occurred through consensus among equal representatives of each republic and province, their conflicts of interest and disagreements over economic policy and institutional reform led increasingly to stalemate, to rule by temporary measures (essentially fiat by the federal cabinet), and to mutual recrimination. And since the country was not an electoral democracy, the enormous popular unease was expressed instead directly, in quarrels over who had rights to public employment and incomes, youth rebellion, a revival of church activity, industrial strikes, ethnic scapegoating, and simmering resentment of secure politicians and the regime.

The harshness of the stabilization program made no difference. By 1985, the currency registered triple-digit inflation, and the trade deficit had worsened. Deliberations on constitutional reform among party leaders at the federal level began in conditions of deep economic recession. In place of the need for social consensus and a sense of common purpose among the republics, the pressure to increase resources intensified their differences and a growing assertion of republican interests, legitimized in the constitutional language of national rights. Slovenia and Croatia began to link up with regional associations in central Europe and Italy and to rebel against federal taxation and policy on the grounds that it violated their
sovereign rights. Slovenia sought to protect Slovenes' full employment and incomes by expelling non-Slovenes (primarily Bosnians and Kosovar Albanians) from the workforce, while Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodina complained about the waste of their tax dollars on a federal administration in Belgrade, a standing army, and development aid to the south and the need to protect their economies against exploitation by others. In Serbia, the economic crisis ripped open a long-festering resentment of the 1974 constitution that had given such extensive autonomy to its two provinces that the republic government received no revenues or share of federal transfers to the provinces and the provincial governments could use their veto at the federal level against any Serbian legislation. Already facing a political crisis over renewed demands in 1981 from the Albanian population in Kosovo (a territory given Serbia by international conference in 1912 and considered the historic homeland of the Serbian nation, but nearly 78 percent Albanian by 1981) for full republic status, thus secession from Serbia, and the growing demands from minority Serbs in the province for protection from Belgrade against what they claimed was national discrimination by the Albanian government, Serbian elite opinion began to see the only solution to their declining economic fortunes to lie in constitutional changes to reverse the two provinces' autonomy.

Although the primary focus was on money, reversing economic decline, and disputes over macroeconomic policy, the emerging debate over constitutional reform provided packaging that was much more useful politically but also much more confrontational. Positions began to solidify into two camps: confederalists, who sought to preserve and enhance the powers of the republics and provinces, and federalists, who sought to create the conditions for an all-Yugoslav market and a more effective central administration. But the politicians' rhetoric of national rights became ever more explicit, joined first with the crude Marxism of officialese to become a language of national exploitation, and then with the anticommunist nationalism of intellectuals and youth (most openly in Slovenia and Serbia) who saw the moment for radical change and began increasingly to shape the public discourse of discontent.

Moreover, there was no way that an economic reform aimed at improving global competitiveness and an economic opening to Europe could be kept separate from the political changes taking place in that world. By the mid-1980s, the strategic conditions under which socialist Yugoslavia had built its national independence of both Cold War blocs while benefiting economically by balancing between the two superpowers were rapidly unraveling. The European Community (EC) was moving toward complete financial integration by 1991. Soviet economic and political reforms were taking major steps forward under President Mikhail Gorbachev. A new Polish pope began a Vatican crusade against communist regimes and for new converts in Eastern Europe. Aggressive NATO posturing in the eastern Mediterranean threatened the Yugoslav army, while NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries were beginning conventional arms reduction talks. The EC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) resumed economic talks interrupted in 1979. In this altered strategic context, the new goal became European membership, and Slovene politicians led the way.

Public opinion polls taken in 1990 and spring 1991 show that a clear major-
ity of the population did not want a breakup of the country, with the most inten-
sese views held in Bosnia, followed by Montenegro, and then parts of Serbia
and Macedonia. By the late spring of 1990, a federal “shock therapy” program of
macroeconomic stabilization had brought the hyperinflation down to single
digits, and middle-class incomes began to improve. But the Slovenes had already
rejected federal authority in the republic with amendments to its constitution in
1989, and the Serbian president was using mass demonstrations to install sup-
portive regimes in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro and impose direct rule
in Kosovo. In January 1990, the Communist Party had simply collapsed, when
the Slovene delegation walked out of an extraordinary congress—demanded by
the army in hopes of restoring the ruling party and political order—when they
did not win support for their plan to transform Yugoslavia into a confederation
of independent states and parties.

By April 1990, multiparty elections for republican governments began (in
Slovenia and Croatia, with the other four republics bringing up the rear in No-
vember and December). Elections moved the agenda of the confederalist
camp—Slovenia and Croatia—to independence, as parliaments elected in April
announced in July that they would choose independence if a loose confedera-
tion was not adopted within one year. In Croatia, the previous parliament had
already adopted a new constitution that declared the republic a Croatian na-
tional state, and the new government of President Franjo Tudjman campaigned
to “de-Serbianize” all public functions, beginning with Serbs in the police force
in border areas. Right-wing, anticommunist Croat émigrés returning from the
West were beginning to change the political scene in the capital. The president
of Serbia declared that if confederation won, he would demand the redrawing of
borders between the republics so that Serbs, like Slovenes and Croats, would re-
alize their right to a national state by including within the Serbian state those
Serbs concentrated in border areas of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In
August, Serb resistance against the policies of an increasingly discriminatory
government in Croatia turned violent in border areas. At the same time, Kosovar
Albanians held a referendum on independence and were rewarded with the
closing of their provincial parliament.

The year between July 1990 and July 1991 was jammed with efforts by the fed-
eral government to reverse these developments, from a promised federal election
in December that Slovenia vetoed, to efforts by the federal army to disarm para-
militaries in Croatia that the Croatian government called illegitimate, and nu-
merous meetings of the presidency and among republican presidents to find a
compromise to the constitutional stalemate. All were abruptly terminated on June
25, 1991, when the parliaments of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence
and mobilized the armies they had been creating in secret to defend their decision.

Foreign Explanation of the Conflict

The policy debates that ensued in major Western capitals about whether and
how to intervene in the Yugoslav conflict were based on three competing explana-
tions. First, the ancient ethnic hatreds school saw a pattern of historical conflict
between Serbs and Croats and ethnic hatred characterizing the Balkans for centuries that could no longer be contained once long-ruling dictator Josip Broz Tito died and the Eastern European revolutions lifted the lid of communist repression from the region. Harking back to the Balkan wars of 1912–13, the assassination in Sarajevo that sparked World War I, and the civil war provoked by World War II, this school opposed any intervention except perhaps humanitarian aid to civilians because the conflict was inevitable and had to burn itself out.

A second historical school focused instead on nationalism and the inevitability of nation-states in the modern world. With the collapse of imposed communist regimes in Eastern Europe, it argued, countries could resume their strivings for national self-determination as a natural continuation of goals begun in the nineteenth century. From Germany to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, if populations voted for independence, it should be granted as fast as possible. The fact that all these countries were mixtures of nationalities could be handled by diplomatic pressure on a new state to guarantee minority rights.

The third school focused instead on nationalist (or predatory) leaders whom they saw as stirring up violence and planning aggression to hold on to power. In this interpretation, ruling communists opposed reform and would use any methods necessary (including virulent nationalism) to prevent their loss of power. Among the original Yugoslav protagonists, Slovene President Milan Kučan was seen as innocent because his regime appeared the most democratic and market-oriented in the country and because little violence occurred in Slovenia. Although the violent consequences of Croatian President Tudjman’s nationalism were transparent to those who heard his rhetoric against Serbs and his territorial claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina, his anticommunist rhetoric seemed to give greater credibility to his claim to be democratic, European, and fighting for freedom against Belgrade oppression. This left Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, who not only did not deny his ideological leftism, and thus by this school must be opposed to reform, but also clearly could be accused of encouraging Serb rebellions in Croatia and in Bosnia with his use of Serbian nationalism in the reform fight. The war between the federal army and Slovenia, and the war between Croatia and the federal army and Croatian Serb radicals must, by this reasoning, be a result of Milošević’s planning, including an alliance forged with the federal army and with Serb paramilitary gangs and criminals to create a Greater Serbia. The policy solution was to assist Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in their wars for independence from Yugoslavia and to stop and punish Serbian aggression.

In the face of violence and pressure for action, all three interpretations began to converge into one, that of Serbian aggression. Accordingly, this stage of the old Serb-Croat conflict was initiated by Serbia; Milošević was the obstacle to the national rights of Slovenes and Croats; and to stay in power, he was willing to use force and provoke war.²

But, however useful as a guide to policy in the crisis stage after June 1991, these interpretations bear little connection other than rhetoric with the actual society and its conflicts up to that point. None would have aided prevention, except as a forewarning of what might occur without it. Yet there were many opportunities for
the main international actors—the United States, the EC, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Germany, Britain, France, NATO, or neighboring states such as Austria—to defuse the crisis and prevent the violence. Faulty analysis, lack of national and collective interest, fundamental disagreements about whether to act, who should act, and how to act, mixed messages to the local parties, inappropriate instruments for the issues momentarily at stake in an evolving conflict, inexcusable delays between actions—all these factors contributed not only to a failure to prevent what was preventable but also to exacerbating the tensions spiraling toward war.

**Early Warning**

Most discussion of preventive diplomacy in the Yugoslav case focuses on the period between July 1991, when violence threatened to escalate in Croatia, and March 1992, when violence erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was a period of crisis management, however, in which preventive diplomacy had even less of a role. Although serious attempts at preventive diplomacy in the period preceding the crisis might not have forestalled a crisis, it could have unfolded very differently—without the paroxysms of violence, unwillingness to compromise, and radicalization that had not yet stopped by 1998. There were many opportunities to act when no action was taken, and also to act differently, in the many cases in which outsiders were involved.

Early warning mechanisms were built into Yugoslavia's strategic position during the Cold War. From 1949 on, the internal political stability of Yugoslavia was of great concern to the Western powers because of its critical role in the policy of containment. This concern did not prevent the United States, which had crafted this buffer role of Yugoslav “national communists” defending their land against Moscow and its allies, from withdrawing support unpredictably, such as when Congress gave higher priority to its anticommunist campaign or was angered at Yugoslav nonalignment if it appeared too anti-American. For the most part, however, the aging of Tito and concern for the Western consequences of Yugoslav instability made the fate of the country after Tito a subject of nearly constant assessment.

Because this early warning mechanism was focused on the question of leadership succession, however, its credibility suffered a near fatal blow when Yugoslavia appeared not only to survive Tito's death in May 1980 but to survive it well without any noticeable trauma. Intelligence agencies and academic experts seemed to have cried wolf about Yugoslavia's demise too often. The collective presidency composed of one representative from each republic and province plus the army that Tito designed to replace him was working. More telling indicators of systemic disintegration did not enter the radar scope of Western foreign policy—for example, the serious erosion of federal institutions visible in parliamentary stalemate, the declining authority of federal legislation and judicial decisions, and the discarding of mechanisms that the political elite had considered critical to the regime's legitimacy as a multinational state (such as disregard for the national quota in the choice of cabinet ministers, and bargaining over the order of rotation among the republics of the position of prime
minister) that were taking place in the 1980s under the pressure of the IMF stabilization program and conflicts over reform.

The origin of the concern for Yugoslav stability in anticommunism and containment of Moscow also clouded the judgment of its early warning mechanism. The dramatic rise in unemployment, such as among youth, and in the state's capacity to finance social programs and welfare commitments on which allegiance to the regime was based were either ignored or dismissed as necessary to stabilization. Yet even if notice had been taken, the results would have been welcomed (as they were further east) for hastening the delegitimation of communist rule. It was only after 1991, as a result of postcommunist reform experience in Eastern Europe and in Latin America, that recognition was given to the crucial role of social safety nets in winning political support to ride out the early hardships of stabilization policies and marketization. It was then too late for Yugoslavia. Even Tito's death had lost its gravity in the excitement at the time over the Solidarity movement in Poland and the inclination to view the early signs in 1981–82 of popular or intellectual nationalism in Kosovo, then Slovenia, and Serbia in a positive light.

The dual role of Western intelligence agencies toward communist countries contributed to this bias. The still controversial revelations about the role of German intelligence services in supporting Croatian nationalists (and particularly persons in Croatian intelligence who played a critical role in Croatian secession in 1990–91) demonstrate clearly that the dispassionate analysis needed for early warning and good policy was compromised by Western agencies' simultaneous task to engage in counterinsurgency. As early as 1985, Yugoslav politicians began to warn loudly about the threat to the survival of Yugoslavia from Slovene nationalism and a resurgent identification in Slovenia and Croatia with Roman Catholicism and central Europe, but the link between anticommunism and democracy in Western Cold War thinking created blinders against the dangers of anticommunism. Moreover, the causes of these leaders' concern were in part coming from the West, in the anticommunist rhetoric and activity of émigré communities and the Vatican, or were approved as dissidence by intellectual and church groups in Yugoslavia. This mind-set tended to give an advantage in the West to nationalists in the Roman Catholic, former Habsburg areas of Slovenia and Croatia over nationalists in Orthodox or Muslim, former Ottoman areas such as Serbia, Bosnia, and Macedonia. By the time that Slovenia and Croatia were declaring independence, their skillful campaign to identify their nationalism with democracy and to persuade foreign governments and publics that Yugoslavia was an artificial, communist creation and that their wish to leave it was a legitimate democratic impulse had succeeded.

Another difficulty with the early warning mechanism was its tie to Yugoslavia's strategic role. Thus, the mechanism became less sensitive during the 1980s as developments in the Soviet Union and East-West negotiations on arms control and economic relations began to erode the need for a Yugoslav buffer. Instead of recognizing that Yugoslav domestic stability and prosperity were tied to its international position, and thus the danger posed by a change in that international position, the mechanisms for analysis and early warning became less alert the more they were needed. The critical early warning period for effective
preventive diplomacy was 1985–89. The first real warnings of impending violence occurred in late fall of 1990.5

Key Decisions on Early Action

Conventional wisdom about the Bosnian war is that Europe failed. By 1991, the Bush administration had decided that Yugoslavia was Europe's problem, and this remained the judgment of many members of Congress and the U.S. political elite thereafter. In fact, the key responsibility for early action lay with Washington.

Yugoslavia's strategic role was based on a special relationship with the United States, which included U.S. influence over international financial institutions and, as late as 1982–85, a program to reschedule and refinance Yugoslavia's foreign debt organized by Ambassador David Anderson and the State Department with a consortium of six hundred banks. Some European states were direct participants in the domestic conflict as a result of their separate pursuit of national interests and, national competition in a rapidly opening European scene in the 1980s, such as the active encouragement of Croatian independence from the Vatican by 1985, the increasingly vocal support that Austria gave economically, psychologically, and politically to the Slovene independence cause, and the economic aid that Italy gave to the federation in 1987–89. By 1989–90, Norway and Germany were giving counsel to Croatia; Switzerland had joined its voice to Austria's; clandestine procurement and sale of weapons for Slovene, Croatian, and (later) Bosnian armies were being arranged on Austrian soil; and the Hungarian government contracted to deliver fifty thousand Kalashnikov rifles to Croatia. But collective European action to meliorate the crisis did not begin until the spring of 1991. The very idea that Europe should act on strategic matters independently of the United States was being cautiously raised (and rejected) only in 1990, after Hungary abruptly opened the wall dividing Europe and the Warsaw Pact had dissolved.


Effective early action by the United States would have had to address the void being created in Yugoslavia's geostrategic position after 1985. Few had any reason to know or care how much the political and economic order of Yugoslavia was tied to its international position, and some might have hailed the greater cross-border economic relations, such as Alpe-Adria (a regional tourist and cultural association of counties in northern Italy, western Austria, and the Slovene and Croatian republics), Austrian banks opening in Ljubljana, or cooperation and conflict over water and ports between Greece and the Macedonian republic, as evidence that a post–Cold War Europe was developing. Yet, the first serious confrontation between Slovenia and the federal government was over the federal army and defense policy.

The spirit behind the narrowly institutional terms of East-West (interbloc) talks, that of pan-European détente and cooperation, made inclusion of Yugoslavia—a Helsinki signatory, with one of the largest armies in Europe and association agreements with the EC and European Free Trade Association
(EFTA)—both natural and essential. Discussion about the place of Yugoslavia could have been (and should have been) coordinated with European allies once the momentum in East-West talks made the noninclusion of neutral Yugoslavia transparently dangerous. Instead, the opportunity was lost to nip in the bud the primary concern driving Slovene independence after 1989 (whether it would be included in the new Europe if it remained in Yugoslavia) and thus to gain time for the economic reform, for compromise on the federal constitution, or even for negotiations over the country’s dissolution.

This missed opportunity led to another: the missed opportunity to lay a foundation for EC influence over developments in 1989–91, by explicit consideration at this time of the role of Yugoslavia in the new Europe. If the EC, NATO, or CSCE had done that necessary political preparation, the EC would have been externally credible in insisting, or affirming, in 1991 that Yugoslavia would be admitted to European institutions only as a whole and that Europe would honor its own Helsinki commitment to the territorial integrity of existing states.

Instead of inclusion, the Reagan administration pursued an aggressive NATO strategy toward southeast Europe at the very time that an IMF-sponsored stabilization program to overcome Yugoslavia’s foreign debt crisis was requiring cuts in the military budget and the Yugoslav defense ministry and general staff were preoccupied with the country’s lack of defense preparation in the face of rural depopulation, rapid urbanization, and budgetary stringency. It was those concerns that were driving reforms of military organization, conscription, and federal-republic relations against which Slovene youth first organized resistance and that provided the mobilizing emotion on which the republic government and Slovene activists organized their arguments against the federal government in the initial steps toward secession. The constitutional conflicts behind the final breakup of Yugoslavia, and the particular reforms that the Slovene government opposed, originated in a package of reforms required by the IMF in exchange for a three-year standby credit (and restored ratings in foreign capital markets which would follow). Under pressure from the U.S. Treasury and an emerging global debt crisis in 1982, the IMF had also toughened its bargaining stance and the terms of its conditions for loans, such as on financial discipline, bank restructuring, and demand-deflation austerity. And in 1987, on the eve of even tougher IMF demands for federal administrative and financial reform, Washington simply announced in diplomatic communications with Belgrade that the special relationship (and thus financial support of the federal government in exchange for Yugoslavia’s strategic role) was over.6

Ironically, perhaps, the only concrete attention to the Yugoslav government in this period of rapidly changing international and regional conditions was from bankers concerned about the country’s ability to service and repay loans. They were the only foreign actors with a clear interest in keeping Yugoslavia together, apparent in the conditions they imposed for new loans. If the republics had to be individually responsible for repaying their debts (as financial reforms in 1977 had made them constitutionally), then the three southern republics—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia—would surely default. Bankers would
more than regret having lent to Yugoslavia at rates calculated on the capacity of the export-earning republics of Slovenia and Croatia. Yet the conditions creditors set were similar to those of the IMF conditionality programs because they followed the same theoretical understanding of the Yugoslav problem. In demanding greater central bank independence and discipline over the republican banks, a more efficient federal administration, structural readjustment to Western markets, wage and price controls, and so forth, they reinforced the political and social conflicts over macroeconomic policy, over proposed revisions of the 1974 constitution (opposed by Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo, and desired by Serbia, Montenegro, the federal government, the army, and probably Bosnia and Herzegovina, though it was less vocal) and over the relative regional and distributive burdens ("who was exploiting whom") of the induced recession and market transition. The idea that new countrywide political mechanisms to manage these conflicts (other than vague platitudes about democracy) might also be critical to the reforms was not then, nor is it now, a part of such external advice or insistence. The result of creditors' concern, therefore, was only to strengthen the centrifugal forces of the economic and political crisis and to bolster Slovene determination to leave. The European Community would repeat this mistake in May 1991.

The next blunder and the last moment to mobilize early action, addressed at causes of the impending violence, was the fall of 1989, when the constitutional conflict between the federal and the Slovene governments over Slovene constitutional amendments revealed Slovene intentions to secede. The new prime minister, Ante Marković, was then embarking on a reform package that showed every sign of succeeding, if given the several years needed for its anti-inflationary successes to be accompanied by economic revival and political reform. At the end of January 1990, the Communist Party dissolved. The first of the multi-party elections initiated by Croatia and Slovenia, in April, brought independence-oriented parties to power in these two republics (but with less than 50 percent of the vote, they lacked the mandate that their leaders claimed). Between December 1989 and May 1990, Marković's policies had reduced hyperinflation to negative price growth. His personal popularity soared above all other Yugoslav politicians (including in public opinion surveys that paired him with each of the republican leaders7), and middle-class fortunes began to improve slowly. Nonetheless, in July declarations by Presidents Kučan and Tudjman and by the Slovene and Croatian parliaments confirmed the assessment made by Serbian leaders Borisav Jović (holding the chair of the collective Yugoslav presidency) and Milošević that the confederation platform had won and that Slovene and Croatian secession was inevitable. Adjusting their policies to the reality of the end of Yugoslavia, they shifted focus to the borders of the successor nation-states and their demand, first made public in March 1990, that the borders be redrawn.8

Thus, the four-day visit of Prime Minister Marković to Washington and New York in October 1989 was a critical moment—many would say the last—to assist the many forces in Yugoslavia that were moving against the nationalist momentum and toward a successful postcommunist transition. Marković's extraordinary
program of meetings, with banks, businesses, and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and then with President George Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, the secretaries of commerce, defense, and treasury, the presidents of the Export-Import Bank (EXIMBANK), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the World Bank, and the IMF, including three times in private with its president, Michel Camdessus, produced overwhelming verbal support for his economic and his political program from both the IMF and Bush. But this verbal support was never followed up. No financial or other support was forthcoming, and without U.S. government action, others—such as the banks, international financial institutions, and Europeans—would not act. The needed fresh money (about $1.2 billion) came too late, from the EC in May 1991. At the same time, in November 1990, the U.S. Congress voted to freeze all American aid in six months if there were no improvements in human rights violations in Kosovo.

The reason given in 1989 for this lack of support was that American governmental assessments gave Marković only a 50–50 chance of succeeding. The United States did not want to commit until it saw whether he succeeded, as if that commitment was not essential to his success. As David Gompert, special assistant to President Bush for national security affairs at the time, wrote later, “the prime minister wanted debt relief and a public signal of unreserved American political backing—commitments that seemed unwarranted in view of his government’s apparent terminal condition. . . . the Marković government was beyond help. . . . the Bush administration could not justify putting the dying Yugoslav federal authority on life-support systems.”

It is not clear why this faulty assessment was made. Gompert proposes two factors. Although “well aware of the potential of a violent dissolution of Yugoslavia,” “it simply knew of no way to prevent this from occurring.” This explanation is insufficient; if something matters, one finds a way to act, as the United States did toward the Baltic state secessions and the breakup of the Soviet Union because it had nuclear weapons. Apparently the danger of doing more damage by acting than by not acting was not discussed. But it does appear that as this likelihood of violent breakup came closer, in the fall of 1990 and spring of 1991, the absence among American and European policymakers of a perceived interest in the outcome fed a kind of policy laziness. The consequences of simply abandoning Yugoslavia were so profound and so knowable that this lack of policy attention should not be dismissed easily. This judgment is confirmed by Gompert’s second factor, which by 1992 was conventional wisdom: that there were too many other, preoccupying global issues of greater importance.

The timing of the Yugoslav crisis at the end of the Cold War made it, along with a number of African countries, from Liberia and Somalia to Angola, an “orphan of Iraq” — as Dame Margaret Anstee, United Nations undersecretary-general and the secretary-general’s special representative for the Angolan peace process in 1992–93, called the concentration of American effort on putting together the Desert Shield coalition in the fall of 1990. It was even more an orphan of preoccupation with developments in the Soviet Union and Germany and, secondarily, Eastern Europe. By 1991, the influence of timing on the ability to act in the Yu-
goslov crisis was even stronger, when institutional capacity in the European and international order was not ready for the actions that were proposed.


Relative insignificance among foreign policy priorities, including the assessment that its consequences would remain local and the fact that the Yugoslav crisis presented a new problem for which the major powers were not prepared, is sufficient explanation for policy failure. Early warning cannot by itself alter strategic thinking. As the crisis emerged, however, there were missed opportunities that could have been seized had the analysis also not been faulty. The American analysis, based largely on diplomatic reports and therefore local informants, had three faulty elements. It accepted the argument that the political choice in Yugoslavia was between democracy and unity, and between Slovenia and Serbia, rather than one between nationalists of all kinds and the non-nationalist forces in each republic and the federal government who could only prevent war by building cross-republican coalitions and democratic checks and balances. It accepted the argument of Kosovar Albanians and Slovene nationalists that the issue at stake was human rights and Serbian aggression against those rights rather than states’ rights (of provinces, republics, and the federal government) and economic reform. And in response to crisis, it supplanted its view of Yugoslavia as a modern, European state facing harsh economic reform and post–Cold War realities with an image originating in Western fears of a violence-prone Balkans consumed with historical grievances.

Failing to Distinguish the Rhetoric and Reality of a Prodemocracy Policy

First, American analysis accepted whole hog the Slovene argument, shared by Serbian liberals in Belgrade and exploited later by Croatian leaders, that the choice in Yugoslavia in 1990–91 was between “democracy” and “unity,” as U.S. ambassador Warren Zimmermann reports Secretary of State Baker’s words in June 1991. Gompert writes:

The basic choices were clear to the Bush administration early on: either Serbian leaders would have to be induced to embrace constitutional democracy and eschew domination of Yugoslavia, or else the Slovenes would have to be persuaded to abandon their hopes and stay in an undemocratic Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs.15

He continues, “Only a credible threat of force by the West would have been likely to halt Serbian power-grabbing, while nothing short of outright Western opposition would have tempered the Slovenes’ wish to get free of the Serbs.”

If democracy and unity were ever in opposition in the period of Yugoslav crisis, it was in 1983 when Slovenes proposed multi-candidate elections for the executive offices of the federal party and state. They faced resistance to these proposals especially from Croatia, where party conservatives ruled. What the
Slovenes wished to be free of in 1989–90 was a recentralizing economic and political reform dictated by the IMF and supported strongly by market reformers, including highly respected Slovene economists.

To the extent there was a Slovene wish to be free of the Serbs, it was only after the repression of the miners' strike in Kosovo in February 1989 when federal president Janez Drnovšek, a Slovene, and Slovene president Kučan began to support Albanian grievances in Kosovo, a province of Serbia, under the label “human rights.” But this policy was based on their conclusion that Albanian grievances would slow the accession of Yugoslavia to the Council of Europe and EC—the Slovene goal since 1985—and that Slovenia could get there faster alone. Behind what was a winning rhetoric on human rights was less an antagonism to Serbia than an assessment by the Slovene leadership, which was probably correct, that Kosovo—and Macedonia—were too poor and economically underdeveloped to win EC membership for all of Yugoslavia in the foreseeable future.16

Gompert's reference to “power-grabbing” by Serbia could only refer at this point not to land but to constitutional changes reducing the autonomy of its two provinces (Vojvodina as well as Kosovo) and the use of popular demonstrations to force changes in the party leaderships of Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro toward persons loyal to Milošević. But the goal of the constitutional changes in Serbia was the same economic and political reforms mandated by the IMF and the League of Communists for the federal government to enable effective economic management in an open economy. In this they were part of the same republican-centered interest politics occurring in Slovenia and Croatia. While it is difficult to imagine how Gompert's credible threat of force would be applied to invalidate constitutional changes, this proposal ignores the inconvenient fact that while Milošević initiated this radical solution to the constitutional problem of the provinces' powers, the decision to retract autonomy had to be formally approved by the federal party leadership of all the republics. In a log-rolling maneuver, moreover, the Slovene representatives gave their assent in exchange for approval of its contestable constitutional amendments (just as radical, but in the opposite direction, limiting the authority of federal legislation in its republic, these amendments and many in other republics were later declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court) and its demand that the next federal prime minister not be a Serb. Martial law in Kosovo was a federal police action in which units from all six republics initially participated.17

There is no doubt that the changes in party leaderships in October 1988–February 1989, which appeared to give the Milošević faction four out of eight votes in the federal party, were done in an outrageous fashion in the case of Kosovo and were frightening to many. Silber and Little may be correct that part of Slovenia's efforts to weaken the center were aimed at counteracting this development.18 But outsiders were in a position to be more discerning. The problem created was not Serbian hegemony but polarization in a political system based on consensus, and the further weakening of federal political capacity by both camps. To accept either the Slovene or the Serbian argument was to accept the nationalist fallacy. It also encouraged (as some states were already doing) the Slovene choice for exit over what needed supporting to prevent violence,
whether the country held or not. The country desperately needed to replace the irresponsible rhetoric and pressure tactics of nationalist politicians, the media, and mass rallies with new countrywide political institutions in which politicians moved to compete for the center, alliances formed on real issues of conflict and could shift in time, leaders were chosen by legitimate means, and there were legal channels for redress of grievances.

Gompert, in calling for "outright Western opposition" to Slovene independence, which he knew was unlikely, rightly recognizes that the time had come by 1989 for the West to act, when Slovenia began talking of independence and when Slovenes and Albanians reached for international support by claiming a conflict between democracy and unity and violations of their human rights. Opposition to Slovene independence would not have been necessary, however, if credible promises of European membership for Yugoslavia had been elaborated and accompanied by a credible threat that such membership would only come if the country remained united. The problem instead, as came clear in 1991, was that the West was divided and Slovenia had its supporters. Even the United States, in the person of Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger on a visit to Yugoslavia at the end of February 1990, less than two months before Slovene elections, told Slovenes that if Yugoslavia broke apart, "the United States . . . would have no choice except to live with it."19

The apparent misunderstanding by diplomatic analysts of the constitutional quarrel and fiscal revolt that were progressively destroying the federal government's authority after 1985, and of the role of Slovenia, Vojvodina, and Croatia, on the one hand, and of foreign creditors (including the IMF in its official mandate), on the other, is frequently attributed to a Belgrade-centered myopia of the diplomatic corps, from Ambassador Scanlan to Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and his staff. Warnings from academic analysts20 in the mid-1980s about the disintegration and coming political crisis are said to have been dismissed by persons in Belgrade and in Washington who, again it is said, had little knowledge of or sensitivity for Slovenia and Croatia (despite the extensively researched Croatian nationalist events of 1967–71), for the debilitating extent of economic decentralization in the 1970s, or for the tendency of the U.S. Counsel in Zagreb to Croatophilia.

Whether such alleged analytical biases prevented the formulation of policies before 1990, when such action would have been no more intrusive on sovereignty than IMF loan conditionality but that might nonetheless have been perceived as unreasonably interventionist, is a matter of vital foreign policy reform. More to the point, however, was the missed opportunity for a prodemocracy policy in 1989 when the democratic torch was being carried not by Slovenia but by the federal government. The great unknown regarding the path taken in Yugoslavia remains what would have happened if the countrywide referendum on the constitutional amendments scheduled for November 1988 and the federal elections planned to follow the republican elections in December 1990 had been held. Consider the facts: Prime Minister Marković's popularity; the pro-Yugoslav opinions of the majority of citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia proper; the unknown numbers in Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodina who
wanted to live in a democratic Yugoslavia; the reputedly large numbers in Croatia who did not realize that they were voting for independence in the referendum for republican sovereignty in May 1991; and the necessity of a countrywide alliance of pro-market and pro-democracy liberals to outnumber local nationalists or opponents to reform. Federal elections at the end of 1990, as many from former Yugoslavia insist, could well have made the democratic transition possible. The experience of the rest of Eastern Europe and of Russia strengthen this assessment. Instead, Slovenia reneged on its constitutional obligation and political promise by vetoing participation in both the constitutional referendum and federal elections, thereby preventing both, and no foreign power said a word. Nor did outsiders give any publicity or support to the numerous party leaders and officials in the army, courts, and administration who, in insisting on acting within the law and refusing political pressures from Milošević and others to act extralegally, demonstrated the potential there was within the country for a democratic and peaceful transition to the crisis.

If democracy had become the ultimate value in American policy toward Yugoslavia and if Slovenes were perceived to be the leading democratic force within the country, then the collapse of the League of Communists in January 1990 and the series of multiparty elections at the republic level between April and December 1990 would seem to have been an excellent opportunity to show real support for democratic institutions at the crucial moment of political transition. An inexpensive program of technical assistance, sending some three hundred technical advisers to the political parties throughout the country and observers on media freedom during 1990, might have created an entirely different atmosphere of transparency, international interest, and equal opportunity. Such programs were already under way toward Eastern Europe so they were not out of the realm of political imagination or feasibility. Given the European insistence in 1991 that any Yugoslav republic seeking recognition as an independent state meet democratic criteria, it is not clear why such criteria did not come to play in 1990 when nationalist fervor was breeding egregious electoral and human rights practices in all the republics and when the federal prime minister's program appeared to represent those European values and a democratic transition best.

West European political parties were actively supporting their counterparts in former East Bloc countries with financial, technical, and moral assistance, but none entered Yugoslavia to counteract the overwhelming advantage of nationalist parties in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia that benefited from the Communist Party organizational network or émigré financing and media skills. The most fateful missed opportunity to prevent violence was the early decision that Slovenes and Croats had a right to self-determination in their so-called "historical communities"—according to Germany's imperious position on Croatia and the referendums in Slovenia and Croatia—but that the citizens of Yugoslavia as a whole did not have that right. The primary obstacle to a pro-democracy policy supporting the federal government is said, retrospectively, to have been the more powerful momentum at the time in favor of self-determination. But this insistence on the historical inevitability of self-determination, most common among Germans and Americans, ignores the absence of
an operational definition for the principle of self-determination of peoples. Above all, it does not specify who the people are. No outsider chose to criticize Slovenia for denying the right of other Yugoslavs to vote on the fate of their country in 1989 and again in 1990. No country required Slovenes and Croats who wanted independence in 1991 to accept as condition for recognition that their compatriots also be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination and vote. The option of remaining in Yugoslavia was denied the rest of the population without any choice, once the rights of Slovenia and Croatia were accepted. Having decided that Slovenes and Croats but not Yugoslavs were "peoples," they then denied the same claims, made also in popular referendums, by Serbs in Croatia, Serbs in Bosnia, Albanians in Kosovo, and Macedonians. Taking these developments seriously as competing claims that would need to be negotiated was the precondition of peace.22

The frequent American diplomatic exhortations for democracy without real support for democratic forces also worsened the confrontation among republican political leaders by appearing to take sides. According to Jović, the federal president in 1990 and representative of Serbia, Serbian politicians (including Milošević) and the federal army leadership heard these exhortations for democracy as thinly veiled support for the "secessionists" and saw Western actions as a continuation of its anticommunist campaign, now aimed at destroying Yugoslavia. With Serbs already mobilizing around a nationalism of resentment and slight, this approach reinforced a growing stubbornness23 born in watching the momentum of power relations turn against them. Far from being able to act in enlightened self-interest, leading Serb politicians and pro-Yugoslav army officers felt only that these demands should be resisted at all costs.24 While outsiders reduced the incentive of Slovene politicians to compromise by encouraging them to believe that their path of independence would be rewarded, they also reduced that incentive among Serbian and army leaders who began in 1991 to adopt the same strategy and seek (un-successfully) outside support in the East. For all the criticism of a diplomatic corps too focused on Belgrade, they appeared to have rather little understanding of the recent causes of Serbian nationalism or the social and political bases of Milošević's policies. Foreign policies concerned more with condemnation than with understanding appear to induce more condemnable behavior.

There may be no better illustration of the consequences of taking sides than the major missed opportunity in March 1991 when opposition parties in Serbia organized demonstrations against Milošević's policies, particularly his control over the media. Just as international opinion was gathering to condemn Serbian aggression, draft evasions were skyrocketing in Serbia. Contrary to the propaganda that Serbia was an enemy of democracy in the country, there was a rapid mobilization of popular protests, antiwar groups, and political parties pushing for democratic reforms taking place in Belgrade and smaller cities.25 Although it is extremely difficult to predict what might have been the outcome of widespread international recognition of and support for these groups and individuals then, there can be no doubt that the path of the Yugoslav crisis would have been significantly different if they and the antiwar network connecting groups across republics had been acknowledged and strengthened.
Confusing Constitutional Autonomy and Human Rights

The second faulty element in American analysis was particularly damaging to the long-term ability to negotiate the crisis and an end to the violence that came. This mistake was a result of American domestic politics and, some involved argue, the ethos of its foreign policy. By the time that U.S. ambassador Zimmermann took up his post, in March 1989, the Albanian lobby in the United States, through Senator Robert Dole and Congressman Tom Lantos (for reasons of personal history) and Senators Alfonse D’Amato and Don Nickles and Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (for constituency reasons), had focused congressional and diplomatic attention on the abuses of Albanian human rights in Kosovo. The prior U.S. decision that Yugoslavia was no longer of strategic interest freed Ambassador Zimmermann to focus on human rights. A man unusually inclined by temperament to be outraged by events in Kosovo and fresh from heading the U.S. delegation at the two-year Vienna review meeting on human rights and arms control of the CSCE, Zimmermann focused much attention on Serbian domestic politics. But the Kosovo issue was not about Albanian human rights but the extent of provincial power in relation to Belgrade (as both republic and federal governments) and the human rights of Serbs within an Albanian-rulled autonomous province.

Like the republic leaderships in the mid- to late 1980s, Albanian activists began in spring 1981 to seek to maximize local control (by demanding full republic status, separating from Serbia) as a panacea for economic troubles, even though “the degree of autonomy for the Albanians in Serbia [after 1971] could serve as a model for minority rights anywhere in the world.” By 1986, Serbs in Kosovo had begun to rebel. Claiming years of indifference from authorities in Serbia and the other republics to their grievances of varying harassments and pressures to leave the province since 1971, they sought popular and parliamentary support in Serbia proper against the threat of “genocide.” Instead of an opportunity for Serbian democrats to develop political mechanisms for addressing both, admittedly formidable issues, the Albanian demands and Serb complaints were both seized by Serbian nationalists and anticommunists to build support for their campaign against Tito’s federal system and its marginalization through partition of Serbs in socialist Yugoslavia. At the same time, the newly elected party leader of Serbia, Milošević, broke the official silence on Serb complaints and began to use them as an instrument, mobilized in a series of mass rallies in 1988–90, to defeat his political opponents and justify changing the constitutional order of Serbia. When the 1990 amendments to the Serbian constitution did reduce provincial autonomy, the Albanians sought international attention by defining the issue as one of “human rights” and “communist aggression against democratic forces.”

For American officials to demand retention (and, after 1990, restoration) of Kosovo’s extensive autonomy as a human rights issue was to repeat the mistakes of Yugoslav authorities throughout the 1980s. Condemning direct rule over Kosovo was fine, but it avoided the issues that would have to be solved in 1990–91 if they continued to support the Slovene and Croatian campaigns. Moreover, this position was in conflict with the constitutional reforms that were
a condition of further IMF loans and the key to Prime Minister Marković’s program for functional reintegration of the Yugoslav space as the precondition of a market economy and multiparty democracy. The major focus of the 1980s reformers was to get rid of the 1974 constitution and its system of political contracting (dogovaranje) in the economy and control by provincial and republican party and government bureaucrats.

The single-minded focus on Kosovar Albanians did nothing to improve the human rights situation, for it addressed neither the cause of the Kosovo conflict nor the source of its use by the Slovene and Serbian leaderships. To be effective, the human rights campaign should have addressed the issue countrywide, as there were growing human rights violations in many parts of the country, most notably of Serbs in Croatia and of Albanians in Macedonia, which were part of the same constitutional and nationalist conflicts and would become causes of war. This differentiation, too, was a result of American domestic politics, reflecting the increasingly active and influential Croatian lobby in Washington. Yet its anti-Serbian message and preoccupation with Milošević was even more detrimental to an effective policy of prevention, for it succeeded in deflecting all policy onto one personality what properly should have been addressed to the legal and constitutional issues at stake, the interactive dynamic of nationalist conflict, and a pan-Yugoslav solution. Moreover, rhetorical criticism and the threat of sanctions do little to protect human rights. The primary guarantee of human rights is functioning and stable democratic institutions, in which individuals can fight for their rights freely and safely through political associations, free media, and independent courts. The slow but steady erosion of American support for federal reform and abandonment of the federal prime minister were thus deadly blows to human rights.

In this regard, one missed opportunity stands out with particular poignancy in early 1991 because of the lateness of the hour. This begins with the inexplicable American warning to the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija, or JNA) in January not to intervene in the domestic conflict. The scene had moved to Croatia. In a pattern similar to the Kosovo conflict, the antifederal campaign for greater home rule and resistance to federal taxation in Croatia had increasingly adopted explicitly nationalist rhetoric. By 1988, there was serious harassment of minority Serbs in areas of mixed Croatian-Serb population such as upper Dalmatia. Growing violations of Serb human rights and frightening rhetoric in an area where fascists had unleashed a genocidal terror against them in World War II became easy bait for the Serbian nationalist intellectuals and media in Belgrade. Milošević’s call to protect Serbs at risk outside Serbia, begun in Kosovo, was given credibility by the extremist rhetoric of Tudjman’s electoral campaign, which extolled the World War II state and included a pledge to “de-Serbianize” the republic. Once elected, moreover, he moved to require loyalty oaths of Croatian Serbs, to replace all Serbs in local police forces in border areas with ethnic Croats, and to use the counterorganizing of Serbs in those areas as an excuse to disarm them all (in a region in which gun ownership was a tradition). By August 1990, there were armed confrontations between Croatian internal security police and local Serbs in this krajina region, and paramilitary groups were forming among rural Serbs and right-wing Croats, including Croat volunteers from Bosnia and Herzegovina. By late
1990, moreover, army intelligence reports and Western newspapers were reporting that both Slovenia and Croatia were secretly creating independent armies and purchasing weapons abroad—in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Uganda, and the open market. In January, the federal minister of defense told the presidency that the army had caught the Croatian minister of defense and Croatia's representative to the federal presidency in a plot to import weapons secretly through Hungary and Austria and to prepare a military defense of independence.31

As in Kosovo in 1989–90, what should have been treated as a serious issue of Serb human rights, so as to deprive nationalists of their credibility, had become an internal security matter and a possible threat to the constitutional order. But this time the efforts by the federal presidency to deal with the problem—by offering a special police unit created from all the republics to secure communications and civil order in krajina in the fall of 1990 and by demanding in January 1991 the disarming of all paramilitary groups in Slovenia and Croatia—or to have the army do it, were rejected by Croatia on constitutional grounds as illegitimate interference in the republic. Although the domestic deployment of an army is plausibly grounds for external intervention within the terms of the Helsinki Final Act to condemn—if one assumes that a threat of force is tantamount to the use of force—and Yugoslavia was a signatory, the federal government had no other instrument than the federal army to enforce its ruling against noncompliant republics and to protect the constitutional order against sedition and escalating violence while its reform was being negotiated. The American warning was in effect supporting Croatia's defiance of federal authority, on a decision in which its own representative to the presidency had participated. It did not accompany this warning with demands that Croatia respect its citizens' human rights equivalent to the demands on Serbia (regarding Kosovar Albanians), with support for groups to counteract the media frenzy, especially in Belgrade and Zagreb, by taking the allegations to court or demanding police investigations, or with any warnings to Slovenia and Croatia about the consequences of their preparations for war.

In fact, the threat to Yugoslav stability was so clear by this time that it would seem to have been an obvious moment for external powers to mobilize allies in some preventive action to assist the federal government in developing a capacity to act on the collective security problem within the country.32 Even if the issue by then was dissolution of the country (although the United States publicly, and Britain and France both publicly and privately, had not yet accepted this eventuality33), the prevention of violence required an alliance with the army leadership, not its further vilification and isolation. The mistake of ignoring Yugoslavia in the CFE negotiations, then of NATO's unilateral reclassification of the JNA from friend to foe, was being repeated again, reinforcing the JNA's liminal status. Active management of the crisis was needed at this point, when Slovenia had made its intentions fully clear and violence was on the rise in Croatia. Under intense pressure to act domestically—in Kosovo, Croatia, and Belgrade in March 1991—the army was not only a potential ally of a peaceful resolution, demonstrating late into the summer of 1991 its preference for a peacekeeping role; through its floundering and lack of clear direction after June 25, its own dissolution into nationalist armies led by
well-armed and trained officers, and its decision during the fall to fight for a new state for itself, tinged with resentment at the humiliations of the Slovene and Croatian tactics, it also became one of the most serious motors of war.

Balkan Determinism

The third analytical error in the American assessment was a kind of deterministic Balkanism that captured Washington and European capitals as events moved closer toward violence. In the view of most State Department insiders and analysts during 1990, this was the primary analytical obstacle to action. Gompert confirms this when he writes, “More fundamental still, those American officials who knew the Balkans best believed that no external power, not even the sole superpower, could prevent Yugoslavs from killing each other and destroying their country, much less impose a fair and lasting peaceful solution.” This was a profound shift in perspective. From a Cold War ally, which two generations of American students and diplomats, German and British tourists, and political activists drawn to its participatory socialism had come to know as a part of their world, if somewhat too hospitable for their own economic good, Yugoslavia was now seen as a geographic region of ancient hatreds steeped in a history of bloodshed, “an intractable ‘problem from hell’ that no one can be expected to solve. . . less a moral tragedy. . . and more a tribal feud that no outsider could hope to settle.”

The shift was rapid, inexplicable except as an excuse not to act, but ironclad in its reasoning that prevention would be futile. Western unwillingness to take the threat of violence seriously had found its justification.

The result was one of the most tragic ironies of this period: a growing gap between analysis and fact as the possibility of violence came nearer. The more the crux of the issue for Yugoslavs was positioning their nation in the new European order being created after 1985, and especially after 1989, the closer outsiders came to treating the Yugoslavs as “non-European,” “Balkan.” During 1990, when Slovenia and Croatia were already moving from a fight over federal powers to a plan for independence, the EC preoccupation with a faster road to integration—the Maastricht Treaty—“made Slovenians and Croats feel that there was no time to lose in the process of transition.” As an acute observer of the Yugoslav scene explains, “There was always little doubt in Slovenia and Croatia, that underdeveloped regions like Kosovo or Macedonia would never make their way into an integrating Europe. The speedy way to Maastricht changed this feeling into a last minute panic.”

Whereas it is easy to understand how the Western alliance could miss the opportunity in 1985–86 to include Yugoslavia in discussions about a new structure emerging in pan-European security and economic relations, this was no longer possible in late 1990 and early 1991, after the Paris summit of CSCE and more than a year after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Yet the opposite was occurring. Renegotiations in 1989–91 of the 1982 EC agreement (which had better terms than the one negotiated with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in 1991) floundered in 1989–91 and were in serious trouble beginning in July 1990, when Greece blocked the agreement. The EC’s aid program for Eastern Europe (called PHARE), set up
for Poland and Hungary in July 1989, was extended to the rest of the former Eastern bloc in April 1990 but did not include Yugoslavia. The NATO ministerial in November 1990 decided not to get involved in Yugoslavia because it was “out of area.” This formal reaffirmation of the original geographic limits of its collective security was also a political statement about the position of Yugoslavia in the evolving European order. The decision of the CSCE summit the same month that the conflict was an internal matter, and that statements by American and EC foreign ministers that Yugoslavia should remain united, were interpreted in Yugoslavia as part of Western efforts to keep Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, out. Combined with the lack of real support for the Marković reforms and the failure until late May 1991 of the Marković-Lončar attempts to replace semiclientage to the United States with European aid, these signals only strengthened Slovene determination to leave and try (successfully, it turned out) on its own.

Disunity and Mixed Signals from Europe

As Slovenia moved the agenda of the conflict decisively toward secession between July and September 1990, Croatia witnessed armed clashes in August, and diplomats and intelligence estimates began to warn of the violence that would follow Yugoslavia’s dissolution, individual states became increasingly active in attempting to shape the course of events. The trouble was, these actions were often in conflict and sent mixed signals to the parties. The conflicting messages both increased the uncertainty within Yugoslavia about outsiders’ likely actions and encouraged each party to expect support for their own interests and intentions, without having to work out some compromise and solution at home.

The call for a collective European response to the crisis did not come, however, from any recognition that they were individually working at cross purposes and thereby exacerbating the conflict. It came from European bureaucrats who saw an opportunity for European institutions to develop an independent foreign and security policy from a retreating United States by accepting the challenge, sent loud and clear for almost a year, that it considered the Yugoslav crisis a European matter. In December 1990, the secretary-general of the West European Union (WEU), Willem van Eekelen, proposed immediate action in Yugoslavia with a WEU-mounted division composed of national brigades. Winning support by February 1991 from all WEU members except his own Netherlands (under Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek), van Eekelen met stiff resistance from the United States. In the Bartholomew letter (also called the Dobbins Démarche) to the WEU ministerial, the United States rejected any cooperation on European defense outside the context of NATO. And without some U.S. military participation, British military planners in the Ministry of Defense calculated, European states simply did not have the military capacity to mount independent action. They made the same calculation in July 1991 when France called for a European interposition force in Croatia based on provisional plans for a EuroCorps, and at the momentous WEU ministerial in September 1991 when the Europeans definitively rejected military intervention. In addition to the regrouping of forces taking place after Operation
Desert Storm, European militaries did not have a headquarters and other institutional bases separate from NATO.

Diplomatic leadership was possible, however. The Council of Europe changed course and began overtures for Yugoslav membership on the first condition among several, presented by a delegation to Belgrade on February 6, that federal parliamentary elections be held. More important was the European Community, which was moving toward adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991, and a commitment, in place of the EU’s majoritarian foreign policy mechanism, European Political Cooperation (EPC), to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In part to repair the embarrassment of intra-European quarrels over whether and how to participate in the Persian Gulf operation, the Europeanist president of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, seized on the Yugoslav conflict as an opportunity for the first test of CFSP. He had the commission draft guidelines in March for an aid package in support of Marković’s economic reform program, and in mid-May 1991, he and President of the EC Council of Ministers Jacques Santer took it to Belgrade in a round of diplomatic conversations with the federal government and Slovene president.

Nonetheless, Delors, too, encountered resistance to a united position from member states. Although he offered an EC accession proposal to Yugoslavia if it remained united, the European parliament had already voted, on March 13, to support the independence of the federal units, Germany’s foreign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, was consulting daily with the Croatian foreign minister and frequently with the Slovenes in a posture increasingly supportive of independence similar to that of his Austrian counterpart, Alois Mock, who had been on the hustings for Slovenia for more than a year. Three weeks before Delors and Santer arrived in Belgrade offering the $4.5 billion requested by Prime Minister Marković (although with stiff conditions on progress on market reform and on continued unity), the United States was poised to stop all aid to Yugoslavia as required by the Nickles amendment to the foreign operations appropriations act voted by Congress in November 1990. If improvements on human rights abuses in Kosovo did not occur between November and May 5, 1991, it read, the United States would end all economic assistance and backing in international financial institutions. Although Secretary Baker used discretionary authority to stop the action, the message to Slovenia, focused on the “Kosovo albatross” for EC membership and on disagreement within the transatlantic alliance, was disastrous. Britain followed by blocking the EC aid package championed not only by Delors and Santer but also by Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis.

De Michelis was also operating a separate initiative to forge a common policy with Austria (and eventually Germany) by creating in May a joint group to monitor the crisis, in hopes of reining Austria in, and, early in the year, a five-nation regional grouping for economic coordination, the Pentagonale, to counteract the influence of the northern Italian-initiated regional association for trade and tourism, Alpe-Adria, that had been working for more than five years with Slovenia and Croatia alone. Austrian Foreign Minister Mock and his staff were promoting a Croatian idea to establish a special commission, a Council of Senior Elders, to negotiate the conflict. And on June 21, despite American insistence during
all of 1990 that this was a European problem and an open shift in Congress in early June to support for Slovenia and Croatia by exempting the two from its aid embargo on the rest of the country. Secretary Baker made a last-minute, whirlwind stop in Belgrade on an independent mission to dissuade Slovenia and Croatia from unilateral secession and the army from the use of force.

**War in Slovenia**

On June 26, Slovene territorial defense units (the republican half of the Yugoslav armed forces, which had been secretly transformed into a Slovene “national army” over the preceding eighteen months) took over Yugoslav customs posts on the Slovene border with Italy, Austria, and Croatia. On June 27, the federal parliament (under uncertain legality) ordered the federal army to protect Yugoslav territorial integrity by retaking control of those posts. Their “ten-day war” left about sixty-eight dead and more than three hundred injured, a toll falling disproportionately on Yugoslav army conscripts and including some foreign truck drivers used as hostages by Slovene forces to attract international attention.

Coincidently meeting at an EC ministerial in Luxembourg, European foreign ministers moved on June 28 to activate crisis management mechanisms and to assume the leading role in mediating the conflict. The EC “Troika” of governing foreign ministers met with the federal prime minister and foreign minister and the republican presidents of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. At the request of Austria under the rubric for “unusual military activities,” the CSCE convened on July 1 an emergency meeting with Yugoslav parties of its Conflict Prevention Center (established November 21, 1990, it had only just opened shop in Vienna on March 18, 1991). On July 4, it sent its Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), the new CSCE mechanism for crisis mediation adopted the previous November, to join the EC Troika in providing “good offices” to facilitate political dialogue among the Yugoslav parties. In unfathomable logic except to display the leverage it had available, on July 5 the EC imposed economic sanctions on the federal government, suspending almost $1 billion in aid, and an arms embargo on the country, even though this step ran directly contrary to its view that federal reform efforts needed to be strengthened and that the army should not intervene. Negotiations bore fruit on July 7, when a cease-fire was signed on the Croatian island of Brioni between the Slovene government and the Yugoslav army on a three-part package proposed by the Yugoslav prime minister that attempted, in fact, to turn the clock back to June 25 and to buy a three months’ delay.

Assuming the EC presidency on 1 July, the Dutch now made a serious effort to deal with the conflict. Based on an assumption that the country could not be saved, Foreign Minister van den Broek proposed on July 13 in a COREU (confidential correspondence among EC foreign ministers) that the EC initiate full consideration of the legal issues—borders, assets, debts, and monitors deployed to areas not yet at war—that are involved in the dissolution of a state. As a “very tentative attempt . . . at structuring our discussion on the future of Yugoslavia, with a view to developing a common position which may serve as guidance for
possible Troika involvement in the Yugoslav negotiating process,” the Dutch
government proposed the necessity of a “comprehensive solution which
involves all republics and the federal government” and a “voluntary redrawing of
internal borders as a possible solution.”

While effectively replacing the federal government and legitimizing Slovene
goals, however, the EC ministers could not yet recognize that their actions at
Brioni had altered the situation fundamentally and that peaceful management
of the crisis required confronting their internal disagreements. Not one of the
other eleven would even consider discussion of the conflict, laid out clearly in
the Dutch report, between the principle of self-determination and the existing
internal borders, should they become international borders. Instead, they could
only agree, as part of the mission they set up to monitor the Brioni Agreement
in Slovenia (the European Community Monitor Mission [ECMM]) to deploy
some of the thirty (later fifty) unarmed West European observers to neighbor-
ing Croatia to monitor the situation there.

Disagreement over whether the country could (and should) remain united was
even stronger within the CSCE, although it was institutionally more suited for
conflict resolution and crisis management. The CSCE reversed its position of
November 1990 that this conflict was an internal affair of a sovereign state, to a
decision at its June 1991 summit in Berlin to intervene on the grounds that the
interest of regional stability favored Yugoslav unity and the Helsinki principle of
territorial integrity. But this declaration was entrusted to its mediating mecha-
nism, the CSO, which was chaired by German foreign minister Genscher, now
publicly partisan in favor of Slovene and Croatian independence and pressured
by a Bundestag resolution to extend immediate recognition. Moreover, the Soviet
Union withdrew its objection to intervention the previous November, but on the
condition that the consensus rule for CSCE decisions remain, thus enabling the
Yugoslav government to veto the CSCE proposal for a peace conference.

Slovene authorities had prepared long for this moment, and they were ready
both militarily and politically, with nearly 90 percent support from their popu-
lation. It had no border dispute with Croatia (though one emerged later), and
Austria had championed its cause for several years. Only with Italy, among its
neighbors, were there quarrels, and these were not of the kind to lead to violence.
Croatian authorities, by contrast, had done little to prepare militarily or admin-
istratively for independence, and the nationalist project of President Tudjman
had received only 41.5 percent of the vote in April 1990. That project was ex-
clusionary, above all toward 12 percent of the population of Serb nationality of
whom more than one-third lived in mixed Croat and Serb communities along
the border with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tudjman's party had orga-
nized among Croats in the Serbian province of Vojvodina and in Bosnia, and he
had made clear at his party’s first congress on February 24, 1990, and in the
spring 1990 electoral campaign that the historical territory of Croatia reached
in the east to Zemun (a former Habsburg town in Vojvodina, Serbia, facing Bel-
garde across the Danube) and in the south to most of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The border between Croatia and Serbia (in eastern Slavonia and western Srijem/Srem) had been hotly disputed when the republican borders were drawn af-
ter World War II. Already in July 1990, T udjman had initiated a series of talks with Serbian President Milošević on how to partition Bosnia between them, while Milošević went on record demanding new borders for a Serbian state in the event that Yugoslavia broke apart. The southernmost tip of Croatia was actually federal land on which the Yugoslav navy had its primary base (the Preljaka Peninsula, guarding the northern coast of the deep-water Gulf of Kotor in Montenegro), and access to the sea that was critical to the economies and sense of security of three of the remaining Yugoslav republics was through Croatian ports. (Macedonia, the fourth, oriented its trade through Thessaloniki, until Greece closed its border in two successive embargoes in 1992 and 1994 aimed at preventing Macedonian independence.)

War in Croatia

By separating the case of Slovenia from the rest of the country, the EC had abandoned any possibility of preventing war in Croatia. In fact, its actions in Slovenia probably had the opposite effect, of encouraging both sides to risk war.

To the Croatian side, the Brioni Agreement signaled victory for the Slovene strategy: willingness to use force (and to arm in preparation), while laying bets with a propaganda war aimed at foreign audiences to persuade them that the Croatian choice was legitimate and its use of force, therefore, defensive. De facto recognition of Slovene claims, on top of support for Croatia in major capitals in Central Europe (particularly Austria and Germany), implied it was only a matter of time before they won, too. The task was to hold out, encourage Croatian extremists to instigate violence, and nurture the image of being helpless victims of Serb ruthlessness. The fact that the EC did not hold Slovenia to its commitments at Brioni helped them further. The Serb bloc in the Yugoslav presidency did implement its agreement to seat the Croatian representative, Stipe Mesić, as chair, making president a man whose stated agenda was Croatian independence from Yugoslavia, but he then used his new authority and Slovene noncompliance with the Brioni Agreement to freeze moves toward independence and to unfreeze the blockade of JNA barracks and order the JNA to leave the republic altogether.

To the opponents of Croatian independence (at least, within its republican borders)—the federal army, the Serbian leadership, the terrified Serb population in border areas of Croatia, and the Bosnian leadership—the failure of the Dutch efforts to get a European-sponsored negotiation of borders and succession at the start and the rapid move away from support for Yugoslav territorial integrity by the United States and Britain by June 27 left them alone. The EC trade embargo on Yugoslavia and its decision to mediate left the federal government with only military means to act, at the same time that the decisions of the United States not to intervene, of Britain to oppose the European use of military force, and of Germany (which could not constitutionally deploy military force) to take the lead as patron of Croatia further weakened any deterrent against those who would risk the use of military force to achieve their political goals.

The civil disturbances in Croatia over the preceding two years escalated after
the declaration of independence in June. Extremists fanned the flames of fear and violence, families armed to defend their homes, and mixed local communities began to divide ethnically, each attempting to secure control of their village or town by expelling members of the other group: primarily, Croats expelling Serbs, and Serbs expelling Croats. Despite its humiliation in Slovenia, the federal army apparently attempted to play the role of peacekeeper during much of July and early August, removing barricades, sheltering civilians, interposing between armed groups, and attempting to disarm paramilitary groups (both Serb and Croat) as they had been instructed to do by the Yugoslav presidency in January.49 Despite this information from their monitoring mission and plenty of evidence that behind the outside agitators and a spiraling dynamic were tens of thousands of people who did not want to fight or were fighting as Serbs and Croats together against outsiders, EC diplomats refused to talk to the army. Indeed, just as in January–May, the Europeans lost invaluable time again in July–September while they bickered among themselves over what to do and whether to act at all.

Fighting worsened dramatically during August, as the war for territory shifted from incidents of local terror and expulsion (what came to be called “ethnic cleansing” during the Bosnian war) to direct confrontations between the federal army and a mobilizing Croatian army. By the second week of August, fighting had claimed three hundred lives and displaced seventy-nine thousand Croats. In the next two months, three hundred thousand Serbs (and many Croats) were expelled or fled from eastern and western Slavonia into Bosnia. On August 12 Serbian president Milošević convened a meeting of Serb leaders from Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to write a constitution for a rump Yugoslavia. On August 22, President Tudjman issued an ultimatum to the JNA to leave the republic or be treated as an occupying army. After July, the rest of the country had no choice but to focus on its political future. The prospect of a Yugoslavia without the counterbalance of Croatia, and the threat to Bosnia of Croatian nationalism, left few options, if any, to the leaders of Macedonia and of Bosnia and Herzegovina except to move toward independence.

War in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina was, like Yugoslavia, a multinational republic. Three nations—Muslims, Serbs, and Croats—had equal constituent status (giving each rights of self-determination and parity or proportional representation in the distribution of public offices and goods). Unlike all other Yugoslav republics, there was no majority nation: each was numerically a minority (in the 1991 census, Muslims were 43.7 percent of the population, Serbs 31.4 percent, and Croats 17.3 percent, while 5.5 percent declared themselves Yugoslav, in commitment to Yugoslavia or its socialism and as a refuge from exclusive ethnic identities for those—largely urban Serbs in 1980s Bosnia, and countrywide, many younger people—of an educated, cosmopolitan identity). The census, moreover, reflected very little of daily reality, where more than one-fourth of all marriages were mixed, there were few if any urban residents of pure background, and less than one-third of the population lived in homogeneous communities.50 The republic was also the backbone
of the country’s defense strategy, from strategic routes and airfields to armaments factories and military stockpiles.

With the greatest concentration of loyalists to the system created by Tito and Yugoslav socialism, the Bosnian population had rapidly to fill the political vacuum being created after January 1990 when the Communist Party collapsed. In June 1990, a large majority believed that ethnonational parties should not be legalized; by November, they had voted overwhelmingly in the first multiparty elections for nationalist parties—Muslim, Serb, and Croat. As in Croatia, these national parties had not confined their activities within republican borders. The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) of Bosnian Muslims had first organized a substantial following in the Sandjak, an area of Serbia, spilling over into Montenegro, which is majority Slavic-speaking Muslim and had provincial status in the Ottoman Empire. The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of Bosnian Serbs was a branch of the largest Serb party in the border areas of Croatia already at war. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) of the Bosnian Croats was a loyal branch of President Tudjman’s party in Croatia. While the three formed a coalition government based on federal Yugoslav principles of parity, proportion, and consensus, tensions developed during 1991 at the local level, where governments tended to be dominated by one group.

More important, the republic could not remain isolated from events elsewhere in the country. In the meetings of the federal presidency and republican presidents during the spring of 1991 to seek a solution to the political crisis, discussion included proposals from the presidents of Croatia and Serbia for dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina between them or for its cantonization into three parts. Serbs in the krajina area of northern Bosnia, along the Croatian border, began in April 1991 to imitate their fellow party members in Croatia in establishing autonomous regional parliaments, and by June 24, to cooperate on a common political future. In August and September, the Croatian war spilled over Bosnia borders through refugees, Serb fighters seeking respite in the Bosnian krajina, and federal army and Montenegrin combat operations against Croatia in the Dalmatian hinterland and up the Neretva Valley to Mostar, and Bosnian Croats joining the Croatian army.

In November 1990, the president of the main Bosnian Muslim party, Alija Izetbegović, had declared that Bosnia would never remain in a rump Yugoslav state. By July 1991, as its elected president (i.e., chair of its seven-person collective presidency), he began to seek foreign support for independence, including a personal tour of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. But he also had to negotiate independence with his coalition partners. Discussions over the wording of a referendum on independence proceeded all summer and fall. The Serb parties were actively opposed. When their Muslim and Croat partners allied to outvote them on a memorandum on sovereignty in mid-October, despite the rule of consensus, they left the parliament and held a plebiscite on November 9–10 in which Serbs voted overwhelmingly to remain in Yugoslavia. The less numerous Croats chose Bosnian independence as the first step of secession and eventual union with Croatia. As for Muslims and many who thought of themselves as Bosnians, an independent Bosnia was their only choice in a new world of na-
tion-states, and the effort to make themselves into a majority with a civic, multiethnic definition of Bosnian citizenship the surest route.

Already by September, paramilitary gangs from Serbia began stirring up trouble against non-Serbs in villages on the Bosnian side of the Drina River, and Herzegovinian Croats were integrating the municipalities they dominated into the political and economic order of neighboring Croatia, adopting its new currency and much domestic legislation, and building an army under Croatian army tutelage. Local authorities of all three parties began to distribute stocks of territorial-defense-force weapons to their supporters, and arms dealers went from one village to the next spreading fear of imminent attack from neighboring villages so as to sell guns for “self-defense.”53 Within days of the Serb plebiscite, Bosnian Croats declared a statelet called Herzeg-Bosna. While President Izetbegović and federal army officers were attempting throughout the fall and early winter of 1992 to negotiate terms of the JNA’s demobilization and loyalty to a Bosnian state, Izetbegović was also secretly importing weapons from Slovenia, organizing a Muslim elite paramilitary force, and, in November, ordering localities to ignore the army’s call for mobilization. He appears not to have put much thought, however, to an all-Bosnian defense. In early December 1991, Croatia and Serbia imposed economic boycotts on Bosnia to cripple what remained of the republic’s economy.

Nonetheless, there were no preventive actions taken against war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even the mild proposal made by the Dutch presidency of the EC during the Brioni accord negotiations July 7–8 to flood Bosnia with unarmed monitors, as a part of its mission in Slovenia and Croatia, was rejected on grounds of financial cost. The same month, the annual meeting of the G-7 powers called for a UN peacekeeping force for Bosnia, and some Western career diplomats and intelligence specialists (including Americans) joined the calls of intellectuals in Bosnia and Serbia for a United Nations protectorate over the republic. The UN Security Council, however, continued to insist that the conflict was an internal matter. This was behind its decision September 23 to universalize the EC arms embargo (imposed in July), as well as the secretary-general’s decision on October 8 to send a special envoy, Cyrus Vance, to assist the EC in negotiating a cease-fire in Croatia. The EC set up a peace conference at The Hague on September 7, but it and the shuttle diplomacy of its envoy, Lord Peter Carrington, and Vance focused on negotiations between Croatia and Serbia. The CSCE rejected President Izetbegović’s appeal in September for aid to retire the army, including a retirement fund for senior officers. In October, the Serb bloc now dominating the rump Yugoslavia urged the UN to send four hundred monitors to the Bosnian border with Serbia, and in November, Izetbegović requested UN peacekeeping troops. Although the U.S. State Department had many bilateral talks during the fall with Izetbegović (and Gligorov of Macedonia), both requests were ignored.

Whatever their intentions, the EC and UN unwillingness to create border monitors or send peacekeeping troops was sending a message about very weak commitment to Bosnian integrity. As late as March 1992, when war was imminent, the headquarters for UN peacekeeping troops sent to monitor the Croatian cease-fire was set up in Sarajevo (with a logistics base in the northern Bosnian town of Banja
Luka) as “an act of symbolic solidarity” with the people of Bosnia, but it did not have the intelligence and information capacity to act as a true preventive deployment. Had the UN had the latter capacity, military assessments at the time were that ten thousand troops would have been sufficient (later assessments stated that perhaps a thousand might have been enough) to prevent war from entering Sarajevo, if not to protect the rest of the republic.54

If the fate of Yugoslavia held no interest for Western powers, then Bosnia and Herzegovina was barely visible. In fact, the view was emerging in Europe under German pressure that Slovenia and Croatia deserved independence but that the remaining four republics of Yugoslavia should form a third state. The direct spark to war in Bosnia, tragically, was what Germany called (in its lobbying within the EC from July to December 1991) “preventive recognition” of Croatia and Slovenia. It is not clear what Foreign Minister Genscher intended to prevent. War had come and gone in Slovenia; UN envoy Vance had negotiated a cease-fire in Croatia by November 23. Public letters sent to Genscher in late November and early December from Vance, Carrington, UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and U.S. secretary of state Baker all warned in the clearest terms that recognition of Croatia before a settlement for the entire former country was complete would lead directly to war of the most horrendous violence in Bosnia.

It may be, however, that the Bosnian war was inevitable once the EC foreign ministers rejected the Dutch proposal on July 29 to reconsider the borders in relation to the principle of national self-determination.55 At the least, they could have devised leverage over Croatia and Serbia, or protections, up front, for the Bosnian and Muslim populations. That they did not shows how developed support for Croatia (or antagonism to Serbia and the army) had come, as is suggested by the apparent shift in tactics by President Izetbegović during November, from pleading against premature recognition to pursuing independence and an alliance with Croatia. The EC peace conference proposed what they considered a compromise between the existing republican borders and national claims of self-determination: a loose confederation along the lines of the Slovene proposal of 1989–90 (which Croatia cosponsored in October 1990). Republics would be recognized as separate states, linked by a customs union, and special status would be granted to the two territorially concentrated minorities in Croatia (Serbs) and Serbia (Albanians). But this was an implicit recognition of statehood for each of the six republics, according to their borders within the former Yugoslavia. Then, by detaching the Slovene and Croatian cases from the comprehensive settlement that Lord Carrington insisted was necessary, the German policy deprived the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the avenue left to prevent war—the bargaining room to obtain a settlement prior to independence on the internal constitution of political power and national rights.56 President Milošević had opened the way to a solution of the Serb question in Croatia in proposing special status for krajina Serbs, which the Hague negotiators incorporated into the EC draft treaty as a general principle, although Milošević was not yet ready to accept this for Kosovo. It is particularly clear with hindsight how much difference this would have made for the entire conflict, but this missed opportunity to revive negotiations, however long they took, and avoid war in Bosnia would have required
pressure on Croatia. Without a guaranteed agreement on that status prior to Croatian independence, however, Serbs in Croatia would never accept it.\textsuperscript{57}

Nonetheless, Germany succeeded at the EC ministerial of December 16 in persuading two of the three remaining holdouts of the twelve, France and Britain,\textsuperscript{58} to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. It then discarded its doubts about Bosnian independence in a quid pro quo that gave the other four republics the “equal right” to independence as well, if they made the request within one week. In addition, the EC’s Arbitration Commission—set up the previous August to arbitrate intra-Yugoslav economic disputes—was requested to rule on the republics’ eligibility for recognition. When the commission ruled that Croatia did not yet meet European criteria, Genscher obliged Tudjman to adapt its constitution and spell out the rights of Serbs. But Chancellor Kohl reneged on the commitment to wait, recognizing Croatia on December 23 for domestic effect, and thereby gave up any effective leverage over Croatian compliance (which Serbs in Bosnia were watching carefully) as well as over all other terms of the Hague draft treaty that obliged mutual obligations and economic cooperation among the new states.\textsuperscript{59}

The EC did respond to Bosnia’s request for recognition, made by President Izetbegović without consulting coalition partners or members of parliament from opposition parties, with a separate negotiating mission during February and March 1992 to facilitate an internal agreement among the three Bosnian ruling parties on territorial governance and power-sharing prior to being granted independence. The EC’s Arbitration Commission advised that a citizens’ referendum on independence be held first,\textsuperscript{60} which the EC scheduled for February 28–March 1. But just as the German policy toward Croatia had fatally handicapped the EC peace conference, so the U.S. secretary of state now began a successful campaign of pressure on European allies for immediate recognition of Bosnian independence, regardless of the Lisbon talks. Wanting to yield to pressure from the Croatian lobby to recognize Croatia, the United States needed a principle on which it could abandon its previous opposition. It then compounded the problem, however, by adopting the German justification—that recognizing Bosnia immediately would prevent war.

Izetbegović appears to have drawn the same lesson from EC recognition of Croatia that Croatian President Tudjman had drawn from the EC agreement at Brioni on Slovenia: avoid explicit preparation for war, prepare a public relations campaign about defenseless victims, and await recognition and the international military assistance that would follow.\textsuperscript{61} On March 3, he announced independence, and on April 4, on the eve of American and EC recognition of Bosnian independence on April 6–7, Izetbegović declared war on Serbs. Perceiving this growing hostility and the diplomatic shift against them, Bosnian Serb leaders made a classic (and tragic) calculation that it was better to fight sooner rather than later.\textsuperscript{62} Using Izetbegović’s announcement and the occasion of murders of members of a Serb wedding party in the center of Sarajevo, they abandoned hopes for a negotiated settlement and began their artillery siege of the city that would last three and one-half years. The war for and against Bosnian independence, and to “redistribute” the population into nationally dominant territories that could act as sovereign units, began.
Strategies of Action

The time for preventive diplomacy in Yugoslavia, either to give the country a chance to make its complex domestic and international transition successfully or to prevent its dissolution from being violent, saw no such action. Particularly striking were the explicit abandonment of Yugoslavia by the United States, after thirty years of a special relationship for NATO's collective security, and the failure by Western Europeans to seize any of many opportunities to embrace Yugoslavia in their overtures toward and assistance of other countries in Eastern Europe. Major contributing factors to the final outcome, moreover, were the particular conditionality required for IMF credits and debt repayment during the 1980s, and the interested policies of Austria, the Vatican, and eventually Germany, Hungary, and Italy toward the two northwestern republics that seceded.

The failure to act, or to act with positive effect, was not due to a lack of information or early warning but to faulty analysis of the conflict and a perceived lack of national and collective interests or threat in even a worst-case scenario (as occurred). Granted, good policy advice would have required sensitivity to the changing character of the conflict and therefore a time-sensitive flexibility for appropriate policies. But at every stage the observers were looking through lenses—whether of ideology (e.g., anticommunist), partisanship (e.g., pro-Albanian, pro-Croatian, pro-Catholic, pro-Slovene), or ignorance (e.g., of the sources of internal nationalism or in the application of Helsinki norms of human rights, nonuse of force, and self-determination to the Yugoslav conflicts, without any adjustment to the circumstances)—that prevented helpful action.

When intelligence analysts and normal diplomatic correspondence did bring attention to the conflict, it was already at crisis stage. Although some room remained to prevent the violence, if not perhaps the country's dissolution, such prevention by then required assertive engagement, either in actively strengthening and supporting the federal government and aiding antiwar groups and opposition parties within society, or in taking over responsibility to manage the breakup peacefully and enforce alliance cohesion as leverage against the parties. Few were willing even to contemplate either role. When actions were discussed or initiated, they tended to remain at the rhetorical level, followed by months of inattention that wasted valuable time and left diplomatic efforts constantly behind the pace of events. Despite—perhaps because of—the lack of interest in serious action, however, governments were rapidly taking positions on the conflict that sharply limited the alternatives they could entertain. Indifference to what was at stake is exemplified by the failure of foreign offices to supplement meager in-house expertise with academic experts and of EC capitals to take seriously the reports that were being sent back from the field by the monitoring mission (ECMM) they had created for just such a purpose.63

Most tools available were deployed at some time, beginning in late 1990, but emphasis was placed on fairly weak, noncoercive diplomatic tools. There were frequent rhetorical statements from individual governments and from regional organizations about the standards of behavior expected by Yugoslav parties (such as respect for human rights in Kosovo, the nonuse of force by the federal
army, or the right to self-determination), either without backing or with the threat of economic punishment (such as the withdrawal of U.S. aid in regard to Kosovo and the EC economic sanctions accompanying their mediation in July), and in all cases with insufficient specificity to the targets. Fact-finding and monitoring missions sought increasing transparency, but with such erratic follow-up by outsiders and with such double standards that they could do little in the way of deterrence. Diplomatic mediation began with economic incentives (such as loans in exchange for market reform and unity), graduated slowly to the weakest diplomatic tool, “good offices,” to facilitate dialogue among the parties, and then graduated to mediation by teams of foreign ministers or special envoys from regional organizations (the EC and the CSCE) and international organizations (the UN) to negotiate cease-fire agreements in parallel with the first of several international conferences to negotiate a political settlement, and finally to international recognition and its conditions (a referendum, constitutional amendments). Each instance was hampered by fundamental disagreements among the mediators and their sponsoring capitals, the sending of mixed and even contradictory signals at the same time, and the outright defection (in the case of Germany) from agreements made, including to accept the judicial advice of the EC’s Arbitration Commission set up for the purpose. At each stage, they were out of date, demanding behavior appropriate to an earlier stage of the crisis. Most important in the period of crisis management, the major powers threw away the one serious tool of leverage they had to prevent war in both Croatia and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina: the power to grant international legal sovereignty and thus to set and enforce conditions prior to recognition. And while countries were willing to impose an arms embargo, commit military forces to supervise a cease-fire agreement (in Croatia), and eventually deploy along a border where conflict might erupt (in Macedonia), they contemplated but rejected any multinational military deployment to interpose between armies or to stop the violence.

Although this catalogue of tools suggests an active effort at prevention, it formed no political strategy. With the possible exception of the Dutch proposal of July 13, 1991, that the EC accept that Yugoslavia was finished and help negotiate the needed change in borders for stable nation-states (dismissed out of hand by the other eleven on July 29), at no time was there a clear idea of how to approach the problem. There was not even recognition that the absence of such an approach was a serious hindrance. Actions were often mutually canceling, such as promises of economic aid by some and threats to withdraw economic aid by others at the same time, or counterproductive, such as installing the Croatian representative to the Yugoslav presidency as its chair (president) after Croatia had declared independence, imposing economic sanctions on the federal government when it needed strengthening, and declaring an arms embargo when it insisted the army not act, all in the space of four days, July 1–5, 1991. Actors failed to create appropriate instruments and settled instead for what was readily available or habit—economic conditionality and diplomatic suasion in the case of the EC, for example. Timing in relation to the nature of the conflict was not assessed. These EC instruments might have been very effective, for
example, had they been applied earlier, after 1985 but even as late as 1989. By 1991, the EC needed more explicitly political instruments, possibly with a threat of force. Moreover, the decision-making rules on common EC foreign and security policy were themselves in a state of flux and out of sync with national positions on the conflict: shifting during 1991 from the EPC, in which interested states could take the lead and those less interested would defer, to the CFSP, which required universal consensus, after consensus was no longer possible because some influential member states had taken on a position of advocacy toward one or more of the Yugoslav parties.

Preventive action was largely stymied by quarrels over who should act. Because rationales for intervention were tied to particular institutions, these rivalries produced indecisiveness. Led by the decision of the United States that Yugoslavia was out of area for NATO and an internal affair for the CSCE, efforts to act in 1990–91 were confined to national and organizational interests that had little to do with conflict prevention. The decision on who should act defined their perception of the conflict, rather than the nature of the conflict being the determinant of who should act and how. Thus, it was not an issue of European collective security, and its instability was an internal affair of a sovereign state, not a threat to regional instability. For reasons having nothing to do with Yugoslavia, French opposition to NATO action reinforced the U.S. position, as did Soviet opposition to CSCE involvement. Similarly in 1991, decisions to act were motivated by institutional interests, such as the efforts by WEU and the EC to expand their roles and capacities in European security by acting in Yugoslavia. Far more influential than developments in the Yugoslav conflict itself, these institutional interests led the European parliament (in March), then the EC Commission and Council of Ministers (in March through May), and finally the CSCE (in June) to reverse the position of 1990 and decide that the conflict was a threat to European and regional security after all, justifying intervention. But because their rationale for intervention had little to do with Yugoslavia, it was possible to avoid the work of structuring a peaceful outcome and, instead, to pursue containment. Their growing Balkan determinism persuaded policymakers that they could not prevent Yugoslavs from fighting, but they could prevent wider consequences of the violence.

Most significant in the failure to prevent, however, was the inability of outside actors to help facilitate the political transition in Yugoslavia: to support democratic development, to be rule- and institution-minded instead of party- or personality-minded, and to assess the domestic impact of their rhetoric and actions. They appear to have dismissed repeatedly the idea of using Yugoslavs themselves to help find an internal solution—such as by recognizing their fateful mistake of ignoring, and then accusing, the army instead of making it into an ally of peace or allowing it to be neutral; by missing the opportunity to support middle-class moderates when the turnaround in their economic conditions in mid-1990 began to give them a stake in Marković’s reforms, or in 1991 when they formed antinationalist and antiwar movements; or even by failing to deploy the Cold War techniques of counterinsurgency and radio propaganda (Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, etc.) against the ultranationalists in the service of pluralistic, tolerant forces.
This inability to address the political questions at stake and to craft a political solution occurred as well in the process of breakup. The brief Dutch attempt notwithstanding, all diplomatic efforts in the spring and summer of 1991 (before and after the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence) chose the form of mediation. They were unwilling, in other words, to define an outcome or even a framework, let alone impose one on the parties. When the EC shifted from mediation to peace conference, in September 1991, and Eurocrats in Brussels even drafted a treaty for the country’s dissolution, the principle of mediation still shaped their approach—starting from the positions of the parties with whom mediators talk and excluding any alternatives from society, experts, or a broader, regional or strategic perspective. In this case, mediation by diplomats obeyed diplomatic tradition: they thought in terms of state actors rather than embedded systems of interwoven local, national, and international aspects and actors, as was clearly the case in an unraveling Yugoslavia (or Soviet Union) and its international context. The simple outcome of dissolution into its federal units, negotiated among those who were, or were soon to be, at war, did nothing to alter the terms of the conflict that had seemed to require third-party mediation in the first place.

The mediator’s habit of looking for such “counterparts” is vulnerable also to thinking in terms of allies and therefore in taking sides with one party or another. This vulnerability is greater where powers do not perceive strategic interests and so calculate strategically in terms of alliances elsewhere that will be helped by their position toward the conflict. Such habits of mind provide few checks against a mediator who takes on the national interests of his or her country. But third-party mediators can only succeed if they are perceived as fair-minded and as detached providers of information. From the European parliament resolution of March 13 recognizing the internal borders as legitimate international borders, to the EC declaration on August 27, ten days before the start of the Hague conference aimed at providing a comprehensive settlement for the country, that the cause of the wars was Serbian aggression, the EC and CSCE had taken a position toward the conflict. This gave them no leverage over Slovenia and Croatia, which had assurances that they would win without making concessions on key provisions of the drafted treaty—a customs union, minority rights, or succession issues—and it gave them no leverage over Serbia, Serbs, and the army, whose views were denied legitimacy from the start and who stood accused without a hearing.

Under the circumstances, the EC, CSCE, UN, Germany, or the United States—the diplomatic actors in this period—would have been far better off taking any position, as long as they agreed, and imposing it on all parties to the conflict. Then there might also have been room for calculation of what would have been necessary to obtain compliance—either Scitovskyian compensation to Slovenia and Croatia (in which Serbia and Serbs in Croatia bribed the two republics not to secede) or Kaldorian compensation to Serbia and Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (in which Slovenia and Croatia paid them compensation for the consequences of their exit). In fact, a position did emerge from the way outsiders handled the crisis—that each republic was eligible for sovereign status and that the internal borders were not subject to negotiation—
that created definite losers: Serbs in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, many self-identified Yugoslavs and people of mixed identity, eventually most Bosnians, and potentially Albanians in Serbia. But this position was never imposed because the powers were unwilling to back their decisions with military force against the losers or to accept that the losers had legitimate claims which had to be addressed. In conceding to German pressure, EC states worried only about a common position, not about making their decision stick without provoking violence. Those Yugoslavs with different, stated preferences were offered no compensation, and negotiators never made it possible for the Serb leaders they condemned to back down from their nationalist position, give them assurances that they would be safe, or provide Milošević a way to save face. Instead of handing them inducements to make it easier, they were handed punishments, and they responded in kind.

The rapidly changing positions of the Western powers in response to intra-alliance politics, to events in the Soviet Union, and to their own domestic politics also seriously obstructed the critical role of mediation—providing detached information, reducing uncertainty, and clearing up misperceptions. Because they would not do the alternative, to impose a settlement, the power relationship was reversed: the mediating countries became dependent on consent of the parties. The more diplomatically engaged was the EC during the summer and fall of 1991, the more it ran into obstacles from the parties: a Slovenia and Croatia that reneged on their promises to Secretary Baker not to secede unilaterally; a Yugoslav federal government that refused to accept a CSCE proposal in July for a peace conference and was unable to agree on appointments to the Arbitration Commission; a Slovenia that simply ignored its signed commitments at Brioni; a President Tudjman who obstructed all EC efforts to negotiate a cease-fire between September 6 and late November 1991 because he refused to talk with the JNA; and a President Milošević who refused the EC’s proposed treaty convention for a confederation. Yet the self-interested behavior of the parties is hardly surprising when the EC negotiators themselves spoke of recognition as a tactic to strengthen the hand of those they perceived to be at risk (the Croats, and then the Bosnian Muslims), as if recognition were not an irreversible decision, and when EC member states ignored international law (on the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia) and the legal judgments of its own arbitrators (on the conditions for recognition of Croatia and of Bosnia and Herzegovina) when it suited national interests or alliance politics.

The literature on negotiated settlements to civil war emphasizes two major issues: the “ripeness” of the parties to negotiate—the “hurting stalemate” that will bring them to the table—and in implementing a settlement, the danger of “spoilers” among them. The Yugoslav case suggests that in preventive diplomacy, the same issues apply to the outside interveners: the problem of their “ripeness” to intervene, which reduces the chances of early action, and the potential for “spoilers” among the foreign powers, who can sully any efforts at prevention that require collective action. As David Owen rightly concludes, the characteristic of international action toward former Yugoslavia was “a divorce
from responsibility": those who exercised their power over the conflict were un-
willing "to bear the military consequences of their political decisions," and those
who "did accept responsibility . . . never exercised power." If an influential in-
ternationalist in the U.S. Congress can say in August 1991, before the war be-
came serious in Croatia and before war had begun in Bosnia, "If war continues,
if the violence spreads and more people are killed, then we'll pay a lot more at-
tention," then motivations for preventive diplomacy are still at a primitive
level. Those aiming at prevention must be ready to act before such violence, or
at the earliest stages of such violence, when the dynamics of war have not taken
over. If Germany can unilaterally undermine all EC collective diplomatic efforts
and then withdraw immediately after doing the damage, followed by the same
behavior toward Bosnia by the United States, there need to be constraints
against willful spoilers among interveners as well as the warring parties.

A Word on the Conventional Wisdom

A word should be said about the conventional wisdom on preventive action in
the Yugoslav case, for it differs from what has been presented here. There appears
to be consensus that Western powers should have acted either at the time of the
battle over Vukovar, a Croatian town on the Danube and the border with Serbia,
which lasted from August to November 1991, when the town was totally de-
stroyed, or at the time of the shelling of Dubrovnik, a city on the Dalmatian coast
of Croatia designated an internationally protected cultural site by UNESCO. Had
European or American forces bombed the JNA either at Vukovar or Dubrovnik
(the latter chosen more for its recognition value that might have more easily mo-
bilized public opinion in Western capitals than the level of destruction, which was
insignificant in comparison with Vukovar), then, the argument goes, the JNA
would have been deterred from further shelling. The Croatian war would have
ended, and the Bosnian war would not have begun.

The argument is extremely important because of the overwhelming consen-
sus after five years of war: first, that the international use of military force early
on would have prevented war; second, that no diplomacy succeeds (particularly
preventive diplomacy) unless it is backed by a credible threat of force; and third,
that powers can avoid committing ground troops in cases of internal war and
rely on air power (or its threat) alone.

A decision to bomb the Yugoslav army at Vukovar (technically very compli-
cated and likely to be resisted by the responsible military authorities), or to
bomb the navy at sea off the coast of Dubrovnik, would have clearly required a
level of commitment by NATO powers that they were unwilling to make at the
time. Assuming that such a decision could be taken quickly, which is unlikely,
such bombing would certainly have altered the international side of the situa-
tion fundamentally. It could not have stopped the war in Croatia much earlier
than the cease-fire negotiations did, but it might have prevented the war in
Bosnia. Its shock value would not have been enough even in September, how-
ever. The outcome would have depended on what else foreign powers did.
Prevention of further war could only have resulted if the states that decided to bomb, either singly or as NATO, had been willing to accompany the bombing with the very political strategy and ground presence that they were until then resisting. Would they have agreed to impose the EC draft treaty being discussed at the Hague? This would have required ground troops, to fight a war against the Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina—a simple task but nonetheless a war, with casualties. Additional levers would have been needed to impose economic cooperation on Slovenia, which had succeeded in resisting everything else that it did not agree to; to persuade Germany to abandon its policy toward Croatia which was by then quite entrenched, supporting full independence without special status for Serbs or reassuring links to former Yugoslavia; and to prevent Kosovar Albanians from seizing the moment to strike preemptively for independence (for special status in Serbia was not their goal). It is difficult to imagine preventing war in Bosnia by this bombing action in Croatia, moreover, unless some form of international protectorate was established to provide the umbrella for domestic negotiations among the three ruling parties, holding off recognition until then. This would have required making a special case diplomatically of Bosnia and imposing an agreement on President Izetbegović (who had only two months' earlier rejected the Muslim-Serb agreement reached between Zulfikarpašić and Karadžić). The integration between Herzegovina and Croatia was at a sufficiently early stage that it might have been reversed, but not without explicit action to do so and without further levers to impose acceptance of the Bosnian border on Croatian president Tudjman.

Bombing alone would not have stopped the war, in other words, because the political issues were real and were perceived as vital—a matter of life and death and of the long-term survival of a people—by all of the Yugoslav parties at war (first the Slovene government and population, then the Croatian government, many Serbs in border Croatia, the Serbian government, and the Yugoslav army, and eventually all three Bosnian political leaderships). By the time of Vukovar and Dubrovnik, the country could not be put back together again, and the issue was one of borders, security, and guarantees of human rights in the new states. Citizens had been forced to declare loyalties and take sides by then so interveners would have had to rebuild the popular support that was available earlier for a new Yugoslavia or a peaceful dissolution that provided means to retain old connections in the economy, infrastructure, and multiple residences in several “countries”; a convention on visa-free, open borders such as the Schengen agreement among EU states so that friends and relatives could continue to visit, and so forth.

The questions are, Could the decision to bomb have been taken quickly, within days, and only a month after the September 17 debate within the WEU when military intervention was rejected because there were insufficient troops without the participation of the United States? And would the taking of such a decision have succeeded in overcoming EC resistance only three months' earlier, when proposed by the Dutch presidency, to political management of the entire crisis? Bombing followed by ground presence would certainly have forced
EC states to take seriously the information coming from their monitors, and it might have enabled professional investigation of the conflict and parties independently of propaganda, lobbying, and national preferences. They would have learned from the monitors or from Special Envoy Vance and his team, for example, that by then, the issue for the army (separate from local Serbs) was the forty thousand troops and their families who were barricaded in their barracks all over Croatia, held in humiliating and inhumane circumstances. Release of the soldiers and their families would have ended the war in Croatia, but the obstacle was President Tudjman, whose refusal to negotiate with Minister of Defense Kadijević on this matter and on numerous other diplomatic efforts to end the war was an equal or greater problem than the army or Serbs at the time. Investigation of the facts on the ground might also have opened up the necessary but missing dialogue with the army. But without a political strategy and capacity to implement it after bombing, the act of bombing alone would have failed at its goal and would have drawn the Western powers into either a long occupation or a war in the Balkans. It was this commitment that was missing at the time, either to seek genuine compromises and compensations (and recognize the facts necessary to such an effort) or to create a field operation. The question left unanswered is, Would the decision to bomb have forced the powers to make either commitment?

Some Lessons to Be Learned

Few cases of deadly violence in recent history have evoked such consensus that the international community failed by not acting early to prevent violence as Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is some—truth to this, but three points that are less often given due emphasis are key. First, the failure to act preventively traces back into the 1980s and involves opportunities that were potentially more propitious for prevention and are crucial for understanding what transpired beginning in 1991. Second, the problem was not just inaction but actions that were partial and otherwise flawed. The concept of missed opportunity includes misuse as well as neglect. Third, the fatalistic assumption rooted in Balkan determinism and other theories of ancient hatreds—that there was little if anything that the international community could do—was fundamentally flawed. In fact, the actions of the international community contributed to war and made it more intense.

In explaining (albeit not justifying) the policies that were pursued, it was clear that in their hierarchy of goals, external actors gave low priority to the prevention of violence. More important were defense of their status quo national economic and security interests, repayment of Yugoslavia’s foreign debt, economic and political reform to open Yugoslav markets to foreign investors, responding to voting constituencies (such as émigré lobbyists seeking favor for their particular community in Yugoslavia), demonstration of a European ability to act collectively on foreign policy and defense, and simple conflict avoidance among the major powers. Nor did they learn any lessons from these early failures, for
they never adjusted their behavior in later periods from the stop-gap mentality: they ignored the consequences of actions in one locale for areas not yet at war, and they thought little about the durability of cease-fire agreements.

The lessons of the former Yugoslavia case, in particular Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, are many. Early warning is not sufficient to obtain early action. An institutional capacity to act must be agreed on and precede the conflict, and it must obligate collective action and a coherent message even when the leading powers perceive no national interest and disagree about the nature of the conflict.

The direct and long-term consequences of internal violence anywhere in the world to the major powers and their mutual relations must be given greater attention so that the major powers give prevention higher priority. Policymakers hid behind the argument that violence in Yugoslavia could not be prevented if the people themselves were determined to fight, and that in any case, they did not know how to prevent the violence. If they had perceived a vital, collective interest in prevention, one can assume that these arguments would have vanished.

A substantive understanding of the nature and dynamic of such internal conflicts is still insufficient to mobilize policies of prevention when much can be done—long before the indicators of impending violence are siren red and long before calculation and behavior are driven by the dynamic of violence and war itself. Early warning signals must be based on such an understanding of the political dynamic, not static indicators of potential conflict, and of how to intervene. The international community does not yet pay enough attention to the political capacity necessary for effective economic management of open economies and the danger of political disintegration, nor does it know how to intervene in support of democracy, human rights, and an environment that enables domestic actors to achieve radical political transitions peacefully. The diplomatic mind-set long established for interstate conflict is not only inappropriate but often harmful, helping to escalate internal conflict and to miss opportunities for prevention. Exhortations are not sufficient, and taking sides in a nationalist conflict, exacerbated by incoherence and mixed messages, will nearly guarantee violence.
Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992–1999: From Containment to Nation Building

Michael S. Lund

Case Summary

The Republic of Macedonia shared with the other Yugoslav republics the economic decline, rekindled nationalisms, and weakening federal institutions that in 1991 and 1992 led Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia into secessionist wars. Yet it alone among the six republics achieved independence without violent conflict and emerged as a multiethnic democracy. The common explanation is that, in contrast to the international response to Croatia and Bosnia, timely initiatives by the United Nations and other third parties toward Macedonia prevented the outbreak of violent ethnic conflict.¹ These efforts are held up as a model of effective international preventive diplomacy.² But skeptics can observe that whether national political disputes become violent or are resolved peacefully might be explained by other factors. If the clash of interests is not sufficient to create a serious threat of violence, or a threat arises but is regulated by the protagonists themselves, then third-party preventive diplomacy may make little difference. Third-party efforts may also unintentionally preserve an unstable status quo without transforming it or even increase tensions beyond what they otherwise would reach.³ This chapter first gauges the potential for violence of the main trouble spots that were believed to threaten Macedonia’s ability to survive after it declared independence in 1991. These threats existed in Yugoslavia-Macedonia
relations, Greece-Macedonia relations, ethnic Macedonian and Albanian relations within Macedonia, and Serb-Albanian relations in the Kosovo area of Yugoslavia. The chapter then assesses the extent to which third parties prevented their violent escalation and fostered the conditions for a self-sustaining peace.

The findings indicate that this exemplar of preventive diplomacy met some of the skeptics' criteria, but not others. In brief, although the arenas of tension in and around Macedonia were often described as a "powder keg," none was an imminent explosion. But four significant conflicts did heat up, and many people were killed in one. Three of them were kept below the level of mass violence, armed confrontation, or war, however. The fourth, in Kosovo, was contained until early 1998 but then escalated rapidly to a civil war. The comparative restraint of these conflicts cannot be explained by historical or cultural legacies that were untypical of the Balkans. Violent escalation was avoided in part because of recent conditions, interests, and tactical calculations that generally outweighed the incentives or abilities of governments and ethnic group leaders to employ violence to pursue political differences. But these local equilibria were all tenuous, and they would not have endured for long without the preventive actions of international third parties.

Initially, the international response toward warnings of possible South Balkan conflicts was unhelpful if not harmful. Subsequently, the degree and depth of international engagement across the four fronts varied considerably. Nevertheless, the preventive efforts have been mostly successful, at least so far, for they have dampened periodic incidents of low-level violence and rising tensions and fostered political dialogue and negotiated settlements. By engaging, pair by pair, most of the potential antagonists in the South Balkans and interdicting several of its potential source points, the missions and mediation initiatives reduced the overall risk the much-feared South Balkan scenario would start somewhere or, if it did, would spread. On the Kosovo front, however, prevention largely failed. This was not because of total international neglect but because the preventive efforts made there were too weak and incoherent compared with the forces inclining toward deterioration. It is too early to judge whether this gap in the otherwise significant international preventive engagements on behalf of Macedonia will undo the achievement on the other three fronts. In short, a combination of external preventive efforts and localized conflict inhibitors explain why Macedonia has survived peacefully as a fledgling multiethnic democratic state—at least so far.

But the preventive diplomacy inside Macedonia and Kosovo also has had unintended King Midas-like effects. By acknowledging certain groups' grievances, third parties raised their expectations and increased the incentives to continue nationalist political causes through ethnic mobilization, while failing to undercut or circumvent local tendencies to ethnicize all domestic and foreign policy issues. The policy lesson is not that benign neglect would have been the better course. Rather, to avoid merely ingraining ethnic polarization, preventive action has to go beyond containing and muffling violence, supporting power sharing, and even facilitating political dialogues. It must also modify the basic incentives driving popular politics by fostering new domestic social and economic interests and organized groups, creating broad stakes in participating in the international system, and helping build self-regulating national dispute management processes and interstate relations.
This requires incorporating into a wider range of programs that are already operating on the ground specific conflict and peacebuilding procedures.

Pre-Independence Background

When Macedonia severed its ties to Yugoslavia, the potential for violent conflict increased because its political identity had never been clearly defined, yet the new state was emerging amid contending nationalisms. Ethnic Macedonian, Serbian, and Albanian political movements within and across the new state’s borders each aspired to create various identity-based polities. The overriding question was not ideological, economic, or even cultural but political: would Macedonia become one or more ethnically based governing authorities, or would such models be outweighed by the advantages of a multiethnic state? Three other Yugoslav republics were failing to reconcile the same pressures short of going to war.

Before 1991, the area within Macedonia’s current boundaries, known as Vardar Macedonia, had never before had its own sovereign government. From the time of Alexander the Great until the end of the Greek civil war in 1949, the larger region called Macedonia was the field of battles, insurgencies, and terrorism. For centuries, its changing political status was defined by waxing and waning empires and, more recently, by the new, insecure states of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria as well as rival greater powers. A distinctly “Vardar Macedonia” national consciousness, roughly congruent with the present boundaries, arose in the late nineteenth century, when poets and intellectuals articulated a distinguishable local culture, and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) arose to fight for that area’s independence from the Ottoman Turks. But even its leaders such as Gotse Delchev were brought up under Bulgarian influences, and in 1903, the Turks brutally crushed the self-declared Krushevo Republic in western Macedonia. Although Turkey was expelled in 1912 in the first Balkan War by Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria, Bulgaria tried to take the area until, in the second Balkan War, it was pushed out by its erstwhile allies. The Bulgarian reoccupation of Macedonia in World War I was reversed by the Versailles treaty, but Macedonia was then placed under a new Kingdom of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes, where it was called South Serbia. After its occupation again by Bulgaria in World War II, it was put under the new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Only when Yugoslavia’s leader Josip Tito made Macedonia an autonomous republic with its own constitution in 1946 did a Macedonian entity congruent with the present state receive its first lasting legal and political foundation. To unify Yugoslavia while curtailing the Serbs’ hegemony, Tito granted more cultural autonomy and political authority to all the republics and thus their dominant ethnic groups. Though Macedonian previously had been regarded as a dialect of Bulgarian, he recognized it as a distinct and official language. The Republic of Macedonia encompassed Albanians, Serbs, Turks, and other groups, but it was more tightly tied to the ethnic Macedonian majority, who were Orthodox Christians, when Tito made the Macedonian Orthodox Church autocephalous in 1967. The 1974 federal constitution bestowed greater financial, judicial, and educational autonomy to the republics, granted them authority over their own defense forces,
and created the autonomous areas within Serbia of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which meant they held seats in the federal collective presidency. All these devolutions heightened the sense of territorial ownership felt by the ethnic Croats, Slovenes, Bosni ans, Macedonians, Albanians, and Hungarians who predominated in each jurisdiction, but they also increased resentment among the Serbs.

Following Tito’s death in 1980, with the Cold War waning, the West reduced the economic and military aid that also had kept this central European buffer state together. Western donors required more market discipline in Yugoslavia’s centralized but increasingly inefficient system of local economic self-management. The resulting centralized economic reforms, austerity, and unemployment increased the competition between and within the republics to maintain their standards of living, and it accentuated their considerable economic disparities. In the name of democracy, the republics’ discontent and rivalries were directed at the federal government, where Serbs were gaining even greater influence. From 1987 to 1989, Slobodan Milošević and his clique wrested control of Serbia’s Communist Party and most federal institutions. In mass televised rallies, he heightened the Serb insecurities and fueled their nationalism. The collapse of the Yugoslav Communist Party in January 1990 led to multiparty elections in the republics that brought leaders to power who, to varying degrees, played to prevailing local ethnonationalist sentiments. In some places, this led to severe discrimination against local Serb, Albanian, and other minorities.

Despite the trend toward ethnically defined republics, however, Macedonia’s own independence was impelled more by external forces than by native nationalism. Both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were poor and heavily dependent on federal redistributive policies, so their presidents, Alija Izetbegović and Kiro Gligorov, were not inclined to secede. Most ethnic Macedonians at that time were profederation and shared with Serbia a wariness toward the ethnic Albanians who straddled the two republics. But in the spring and summer 1991, as discussed in more detail in chapter 7, Yugoslavia’s dissolution was occurring de facto through armed hostilities between Slovenia and Croatia, on the one hand, and the Belgrade government, on the other. The two presidents concluded that unless their republics seceded, too, they would be left as minorities in a Serb-dominated rump Yugoslavia.

In September, Macedonian authorities held a referendum in which 95 percent of the people who voted approved independence (72 percent of eligible voters voted in the referendum, including ethnic Macedonians living abroad). The republic’s Albanians as well as Serbs boycotted. The government declared sovereignty in November and requested European Community (EC) recognition and UN membership.

Postindependence Disputes: Issues, Parties, and Evolution

To ethnic Macedonian nationalists, Independence Day, September 8, was the culmination of their quest for their own sovereign state. They were finding more
and more roots of a distinct culture in the region's past. But the new state also encompassed a sizeable number of Albanians and several smaller groups, including Serbs. Albanian, Serbian, and Bulgarian nationalisms were active in the region and could unsettle Macedonia's uneasy domestic ethnic relations and/or invite intrusions from neighboring states. The new country stood exposed to threats principally on four fronts: (1) the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), if Serbian nationalists pushed the Belgrade government to recover or subvert Macedonia on behalf of a "Greater Serbia"; (2) Macedonia's relations with Bulgaria and Greece, especially the latter, due to irredentist fears; (3) tensions within the country between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, who had political support from Albania; and (4) Kosovo to the north, where increasing Serbian repression of the Albanian majority and/or a popular uprising could cause Albanian refugees to flow into Macedonia, unsettle its ethnic balance, and provoke Albania and Serbia as well as their regional allies. While each possible flashpoint had specific issues and antagonists, they were intertwined, so worsening one could worsen others.

To judge the actual threat of violent escalation from these arenas, we can examine their basic sources and trace their levels of intensity from 1991 to early 1998. We do the latter by using gradations that lie in between peaceful cooperation, at one extreme, and all-out war, at the other. These intermediate levels include (1) institutionalized nonviolent political conflict, as expressed in conventional interstate diplomacy or normal national-level public policy disputes; (2) diplomatic or political tensions and occasional violence around particular issues, largely managed by ad hoc diplomatic or extraparliamentary negotiations; (3) nonengagement and polarization of disputing parties, with occasional confrontations and outbreaks of mainly covert political violence; and (4) frequent covert or overt political violence and military action.

**Macedonia-FRY: A Separate Peace?**

The greatest initial concern was a hostile reaction to Macedonian secession by a contracting Yugoslavia. One vision of a Greater Serbia promoted by Serbian ultranationalists favored uniting not only the areas outside Serbia where ethnic Serbs predominated, such as the krajina in Croatia, but also areas such as Kosovo and Macedonia that had few Serbs but historically were viewed as Serbia. Many Serbs still referred to Macedonia as South Serbia. They viewed Macedonians as having no distinct identity and their language as Bulgarian. The Serbian Church had not recognized the Macedonian bishopric.

Yet in late 1991 and 1992, hostilities between Macedonia and Serbia did not break out. Pursuing a policy it called "active neutrality," the Macedonian government pledged friendly relations with all neighbors. After parliament voted that the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Nardona Armija [JNA]) should leave, Gligorov negotiated an agreement whereby it completely pulled out by April 1992. Because the JNA took every weapon and piece of equipment it could carry and destroyed the rest, the new Macedonian state was defenseless. But a peaceful secession was largely possible because, while Milošević
could not afford both to keep troops in Macedonia and to fight the Bosnian war, he also believed that he could let Macedonia go without giving up on its later becoming part of a Greater Serbia. Left economically dependent and exposed to the depredations of what were known as the “three wolves” (Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece), Macedonia would crawl back to Serbian protection. His view was reinforced by the collateral impacts on Macedonia of the UN economic sanctions against the FRY of November 1991 and May 1992.

While independence provoked no immediate reaction, when the Bosnia war continued into 1993 and 1994, there were grounds for believing that changes in the Serbs’ fortune might prompt them to recapture Macedonia or help it fall apart from within. The FRY had not recognized the new state or agreed to an international border in place of the internal boundary. As late as 1994, Macedonia was still perceived in Belgrade as a seceding republic whose departure led it to economic disaster and possible disintegration, owing to the pressures from Albania and Bulgaria and the internal plotting of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia.

The behavior of FRY troops along Macedonia’s border seemed to corroborate the notion of persisting Serbian designs. Despite the UN preventive deployment force that began patrolling the border in early 1993 (discussed later), small contingents of the Serb Army would penetrate across, occupy a spot for hours or days, and eventually retreat, but only after tensions arose and negotiations were required. In June 1994, Serbian soldiers took over for several weeks a mountaintop in the northeast known as Hill 1703, an especially strategic vantage point toward Macedonia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. Macedonia gathered troops in the area, and for a while, the Serbs refused to leave or negotiate.

Though Serb forces were at least testing the Macedonian government and the peacekeeping force, the evidence is circumstantial and ambiguous as to whether Belgrade wanted or was able to go beyond minor troublemaking to invade or intimidate Macedonia. Several factors may have restricted the border troops to no more than nuisance activity. Though in control of the FRY government, Milošević could not risk losing support within the Serbian electorate by taking on difficult and costly ventures. Although Serb provocateurs had attempted to organize them, the small Serbian community in Macedonia was not feeling so oppressed that they publicly agitated against the government and appealed to Serbia for support. The Serbs in Serbia and Macedonia also shared with ethnic Macedonians not only the Orthodox religion but, more immediately, the feeling of a threat from the Muslim Albanians. President Gligorov also labored to avoid provoking Serbian nationalists into a fight. A former communist technocrat, he lived up to his nickname, “The Fox,” by adeptly maneuvering to independence and negotiating the FRY’s disengagement. Also important was the advantage of Macedonia’s allowing oil to “leak” through the UN embargo to Serbia, which gave it fuel for its trucks and tanks and gave Macedonia a useful black market. Until more is known about Belgrade’s military and political capacities and constraints, it cannot be said how much Milošević actually wanted or could pursue revanchism or whether he approved occasional border harassment just to mollify the ultranationalists.

Still, a changing course in the Bosnian war might have tempted or pushed Milošević, whatever his own inclinations, to reap credit from weakening Macedonia.
Following the war's end in 1995, some thought he might still turn to the Macedonian project—an analysis that gained more plausibility later when he launched a military campaign in Kosovo (see below). In short, while a direct Serbian threat to Macedonia was not self-evident, it could not be entirely dismissed. Looking from south of the border, the signs made it reasonable to worry for sometime.

In terms of the gradations of conflict, Macedonia-FRY relations moved from diplomatic tensions and special negotiations to somewhat more stable international relations. Following the negotiation of the JNA withdrawal, border incidents created occasional tensions but did not escalate beyond small confrontations. Following the Dayton Accords, the FRY recognized Macedonia and economic traffic was fully restored. Macedonia is one of the FRY's major trading partners. The border issue has been taken up by the Macedonia-FRY border commission, although it has proceeded very slowly because of Serbian delays. An agreed boundary remains undecided, but bilateral commitment to the negotiations was renewed in late 1997.

Macedonia-Greece Dispute

The first arena to erupt into the open was the least anticipated. Upon Macedonia's request for EC recognition in December 1991, Greece vehemently objected to its name, flag, and the white tower on its currency, which was similar to a famous landmark in Thessaloniki. The constitution spoke of the country's concern for the status and rights of ethnic Macedonians in neighboring countries, such as a largely assimilated group in northern Greece who locally were called "slavophone Greeks." All this conjured up the ancient kingdom of Alexander the Great's father Phillip II, which included much of present-day Greece.14 The ancient symbols were still provocative because of Macedonian-Greek distrust remaining since the Greek civil war. Suspicions that Macedonia harbored designs on Greece and Bulgaria reemerged in the late 1980s when Macedonian nationalists circulated maps showing a greater Macedonia encompassing parts of these countries but barbed wire marking the present borders, as if outlying areas were under foreign occupation. In early 1992, these issues evoked mass Greek demonstrations in Athens and patriotic gatherings by Macedonians in Melbourne and Toronto.15

In January 1992, the Badinter Commission of the EC (renamed that month the European Union [EU]) recommended that Macedonia be recognized. But although Macedonia's parliament amended the constitution to pledge noninterference in the internal affairs of its neighbors, Greece successfully pressed the consensus-governed EC to deny recognition,16 thus also blocking Macedonia's eligibility for International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other aid. The government fell later that year in part because it failed to get recognition from more countries. After Greek prime minister Constantine Mitsotakis showed some flexibility in early 1993, UN negotiators obtained a partial settlement in April that allowed Macedonia to join the UN under the temporary designation "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM), but without its flag flying at UN headquarters. This passed Macedonia's parliament with only weak support, however,
and in Athens, more mass demonstrations and pressure from the militant Panhellenic Social Movement (PASOK) brought down the Mitsotakis government in September. Socialist Andreas Papandreou became prime minister in October with a twenty-vote majority, and Greece left the negotiation table. In December, six members bolted from EU policy, and over one hundred nations soon recognized Macedonia. When the United States also moved toward recognition in February 1994, Greece again broke off negotiations and imposed an economic blockade on Macedonia that severely reduced its vital north-south trade route.

Clearly, the intense feelings that Macedonia's chosen name and symbols stirred up in the two countries and their ethnic diasporas showed this was a serious diplomatic confrontation and economic crisis, no mere semantic squabble. Though military hostilities were unlikely, escalating local incidents of violence could undermine the stability of the newer of the two states. Ultimately, the Greek government realized the embargo was economically damaging, and it was unpopular with the Greek business community. Greece also stood to gain from having a stable buffer state between it and Yugoslavia. Were the Bosnian war to spread to Macedonia, Greece might have to host thousands of refugees, with all their ethnic implications. But the persistence of the Macedonia-Greece dispute showed how patriotic fervor could outweigh for some time the two countries' trade and security interests.

Eventually, this dispute progressed to intergovernmental relations that are deeper than Macedonia's with the FRY. Negotiations starting in 1992 reached nearly a complete settlement by 1995. Diplomacy, travel, trade, and other relations are now considerable. Macedonia is seeking to join Greece in NATO.

**Macedonia's Ethnic Relations**

Independence also raised the issue of the political status of ethnic groups within Macedonia. With about 23 percent of Macedonia's 1.9 million population, ethnic Albanians have been the most vocal minority and have felt discriminated against by the Macedonian Slavs, who constitute about 65 percent. When the 1991 constitution referred to the Macedonians' historic struggle for a nation and described Macedonia as "a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence... is provided for Albanians" and other nationalities (though omitting Serbs), the twenty-five Albanian parliament deputies absented themselves. Equal rights were guaranteed for all citizens, but the Albanian, Turk, and other minorities understood the distinction between them and a nation-constituting people—which in communist-era doctrine had the legal right to self-determination—as relegating them to second-class citizenship.

Albanian leaders also complain of specific discrimination. They believe they would have more MPs and government portfolios were the communist-era voting districts changed to apportion the population more fairly and local governments made stronger. Other grievances concern lack of a proportional number of jobs for Albanians in the military, police, courts, civil service, and state media and resistance to their desire for more cultural and educational autonomy. On their
part, many ethnic Macedonians fear the Albanians’ higher birth rate will increase the pressure to achieve autonomy for western Macedonia or union with Albania, similar to the demands of Kosovo’s Albanians, and they see Albanian cultural rights as inviting other such minority demands. The most nationalistic Macedonian party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNU), vocalized and heightened the anxieties of the Macedonian population, putting pressure on the government coalition parties to avoid obvious bending to Albanian demands.

Periodically, these ethnic controversies have flared up in demonstrations or riots that have resulted in some deaths. In November 1992, the killing by police of an Albanian teenager in the old Bit Pazar shops area of Skopje led to rioting by ethnic Albanians and the wounding of policemen. When police shot dead three Albanians and a Macedonian, the feeling arose in both communities that a wider conflict was imminent. Larger demonstrations arose in December 1994. After Kosovo’s Prishtina University was closed in 1989, because the national universities in Skopje and Bitola taught only in Macedonian, Albanian activists and students decided to create an Albanian university in the city of Tetovo, west of Skopje. A government court rejected their initial request for recognition on constitutional grounds. At a rally announcing the opening of classes in February 1995, the Tetovo university’s rector referred to possible resistance with guns and grenades if police stopped the action. Arrests of the organizers led to a street confrontation that left one Albanian student dead and about twenty injured. When the government in spring 1997 initiated instruction in Albanian at Skopje University’s Pedagogical Institute for teacher training, ethnic Macedonian students reacted by starting a hunger strike and demonstrations. When the dean then delayed implementation of the decision, Albanian students went on strike.

Ethnic relations were put under additional strain by the drastically declining standard of living due to the cutoff of Macedonia’s main trade by the UN sanctions, economic reforms, and the Greek embargo. Privatization actually may have hit ethnic Macedonians harder than it did Albanians, because they hold more jobs in state-owned industry whereas Albanians are engaged more in agriculture, but each group tended to assume it was the more victimized.

But here again, Macedonian-Albanian relations were kept from totally deteriorating by countervailing economic and political realities. In addition to the black market and smuggling, the inclination of Albanians living in western Macedonia to invite active interference from Albania has been tempered by the fact that, although Macedonia’s Albanians are less urban and educated than its ethnic Macedonians, they enjoy a higher standard of living on average than their kin across the border. The sharing of political power in the government has been an additional restraint. Executive and legislative power sharing was required as early as the 1990 elections because nationalist parties competed not only against each other but with nonethnic parties, and no party gained a majority. After July 1992, the government consisted of a coalition that parceled out portfolios among three parties. The political weight of ethnic Macedonians is not only partly counterbalanced by Albanians; both groups face some pressure from Turks, Serbs, and other ethnic minorities. Because it is not monoethnic, the government has been inclined
to relatively even-handed policies. Regarding Albanian education and employment grievances, government officials agree there is serious imbalance but point to modest changes that are in fact showing up, such as in teacher training, police training, and the composition of the army.

Government and party leaders also have stepped in at critical moments to discourage escalations by voicing moderate words and taking diplomatic action. After the Bit Pazar riot and an arms-smuggling episode, Albania’s president Sali Berisha exchanged assurances with Gligorov, and they met several times to pledge mutual respect for the two countries’ borders. When the Tetovo demonstrations flared up, the chair of the ethnic Albanian coalition party, the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), went on television to urge Albanians to stay off the streets.

Coalition government has not abated ethnic politics, however, especially since 1997. The main ethnic parties have split into moderate and more nationalist parties, and the government has come under increasing criticism. In the October 1996 local elections that were interpreted as a litmus test for the governing coalition, the more nationalist Albanian “PDP-A” party swept several municipalities in the western areas. Victorious local officials felt emboldened to declare a kind of de facto Albanian autonomy and fly Albanian flags at government buildings. When political authority broke down in Albania in March 1997, annexation by Albania lost its attraction, so its weak economy and government now provide little inspiration to the Albanian cause inside Macedonia. But Albanians in Macedonia now could feel even more insecure vis-à-vis ethnic Macedonians, whose nationalist leaders could also become bolder, thus moving Albanians to more desperate methods. Though earlier scattered instances of arms smuggling from the abundant supply in Albania were interdicted, the flow across the border, as well as into Kosovo, increased.

Overall, although Macedonia has avoided violent politics and completely polarized political camps, it is hard to judge whether the continuing ethnic ferment means its institutions and political processes are weakening or gradually becoming stronger. By continuing to pursue its political and public policy disputes within formal institutions, Macedonia’s domestic politics may be slowly maturing. Though ethnic controversies still provoke tense demonstrations, they are still mainly pursued through the cabinet, parliament, the Constitutional Court, the bureaucracy, and elections, or they prompt special negotiations on particular issues. Rather than boycotts, the 1997 elections saw several political parties aligning, campaigning vigorously, and incorporating their more radical youth wings. A tax scandal was followed by cabinet reshuffling, and the prime minister initiated direct talks with opposition parties. Even more noteworthy, in the parliamentary elections of fall 1998, a coalition won that included the Macedonian nationalist party that had boycotted the 1994 elections and the Albanian nationalist DP Party that had sparked the flag controversy.

On the other hand, the pace of disputed policy issues through official channels is very slow, and Albanian nationalism has not abated. In sum, the basic stability of the Macedonian state still seems relatively secure, but it remains too vulnerable to a security or political crisis, such as that in Kosovo, and thus the breakdown of the fragile ethnic alliance.
Kosovo: From Polarization to War

The tensions between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, especially since the late 1980s, were from the start the most palpable threat to young Macedonia's territorial integrity and internal stability. It was long feared that a worsening Kosovo conflict would put Macedonia at risk because under Yugoslavia, Kosovar Albanians were tied through family, economics, and frequent travel to those in Macedonia. Many Albanian leaders studied or taught at Kosovo's Prishtina University, and after its closing in 1989, they migrated to Macedonia. Widespread fighting in Kosovo could generate masses of Albanian refugees pushing into Macedonia and upsetting the ethnic Macedonian-Albanian balance, and Kosovo's brethren Albanians in Macedonia and Albania might move through Macedonia against Serbia, possibly causing Serbia to attack.27

While Serbs regard Kosovo as the cradle of their culture, Albanian nationalism also grew up there. With the highest birth rate in Europe, and because of economic outmigration by Serbs, Albanians comprised 90 percent of the 1.2 million population by 1993. The demands for local control that the Albanians in Kosovo had voiced since the late 1960s, punctuated by occasional attacks on individual Serbs, became increasingly threatening to most Serbs.28 In 1988 and 1989, the federal government under Milošević assuaged the rising Serbian resentment of the gains made by other groups, especially the Albanians, by banning the use of Albanian in official affairs, pushing out local Albanian officials, and revoking Kosovo's autonomous status. The resulting marches and strikes were met by crackdowns that left an estimated sixty people dead. As a welter of opposition parties emerged, the Albanian writer Ibrahim Rugova galvanized much of the Albanian political leadership in the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). In May 1992, the Albanian political movement elected its own parliament with the LDK dominant, and it established the "Republic of Kosova" with Rugova as president. Rugova explicitly adopted a strategy of nonviolence inspired by the Eastern European civic movements, Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King. Kosovo soon had an alternative government, school system, social institutions, health services, and a fledging media, staffed by unemployed workers and professionals who volunteer their labor and financed by taxes on Albanian workers in Western Europe. With Serb acquiescence, two parallel communities and governments operated in uneasy relations for years.29 The LDK's program called for reclaiming Kosovo's autonomy, which they expressed as the right to their own republic or independence. In the meantime, Rugova variously called for an international administration and UN protectorate.

The cycle of action and reaction between an insecure oppressor and an oppressed but determined people put Kosovo at a high level of distrust and hostility.30 Here, too, though, the imminent prospect of a rebellion was blunted by economics and power: Kosovar Albanians are Muslim and Serbs Orthodox, but religious differences are not compounded by huge economic inequalities. The UN economic sanctions affected all in Serbia. Kosovar Albanians have been allowed to travel and emigrate to work in Western Europe via Skopje and Ohrid, and the remittances of workers' earnings has helped maintain the area's standard of living. The FRY and Macedonian governments saw the value of this safety valve. In addi-
tion, street violence was kept at a low level simply because the Kosovars were overpowered by Serbian security forces and the JNA. FRY MiG jets occasionally flew closely over the capital, Prishtina, to remind the population who was in charge. Although the LDK's nonviolent doctrine made a virtue out of a necessity, it helped keep a volatile situation from escalating into all-out revolt.

After November 1995, however, the basic political dynamics in Kosovo began to change, raising the chances of an outbreak of violence. The Dayton Accords accepted Croatian and Bosnian ethnically defined borders achieved in battle but did not require Milosevic to address Kosovo human rights violations. With the Kosovars exhausted by years of martial law, unemployment, deteriorating health, and other basic community needs, Albanian activists began to question out loud whether the LDK's patient nonviolence had failed by not reaping its due international reward. The established LDK leadership came under pressure to show the value of its strategy of peaceful parallelism.

In 1996 and 1997, an alternative Democratic Forum emerged on one side of a widening political spectrum. One of its leaders was a popular anticommunist Albanian dissident, Adem Demaci. Imprisoned by the communists for twenty-eight years, he is described as Kosovo's Nelson Mandela, for he advocated that the Albanians pursue federal or confederal relations with Serbia and criticized the LDK for its rigid, all-or-nothing focus on Kosovo's constitutional status. Another leader of the Forum came out in favor of a more assertive strategy of civil disobedience modeled on the Palestinian intifada.

Meanwhile, on Rugova's other flank, a new group emerged to press for secession by violent means. Beginning in April 1996, bomb explosions and shootings killed Serb police and officials as well as alleged collaborators in the major towns. Although the source of these incidents was at first not clear, in May 1997, a shadowy group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) announced it was behind the more recent killings. This clandestine organization was reportedly raising money among the seven hundred thousand Albanians abroad in order to buy arms. By late 1997, Serb police no longer went into certain hill areas over which the group had assumed de facto political control. But the KLA was clearly too weak to wrest control of Kosovo from the Yugoslav military, so its effect was to provide Milosevic with an excuse to finally break the back of the vexing Kosovar cause.

With Rugova under pressure and Milosevic seeking entry into international institutions, the two leaders signed an agreement in October 1997 to reopen the Albanian schools. However, a joint commission failed to carry it out. A year after it was signed, the Kosovar Albanian student organization carried out a series of demonstrations in Prishtina that pressed for the agreement's implementation. From February to June 1998, Albanian-Serb hostility escalated to an unprecedented level of confrontation, violence, and military action. By mid-June, over three hundred Albanians had been killed, including many women and children, and sixty thousand refugees were pushed into Albania and Macedonia seeking safety and shelter.

Evidently, having lost influence over Montenegro and facing a worsening Yugoslav economy, Milosevic was trying to shore up his political support by either vanquishing a budding Albanian guerrilla movement or provoking a higher-
stakes international crisis from which he might exact needed economic and diplomatic concessions. The LDK held a new round of elections March 22. While Rugova’s leadership and popularity were confirmed, dissension was never more evident in the party ranks. The escalation had shifted the Kosovo crisis from a nonviolent and repressive modus vivendi to an entirely different threshold. Thousands of radicalized and emboldened Albanian youths were now willing to die in an all-out civil war. Familiar features of an escalated conflict came into play: attacks and counterattacks by “thugs” and “terrorists” spiraling the violence; world media coverage; expatriates financing increased arms shipments and sympathizers lining up on both sides; the UN-sponsored Contact Group on Bosnia-Herzegovina holding high-level meetings; UN Security Council sanctions and threats of further actions; divided international responses; and on-again, off-again mediation initiatives. The key question by mid-June was whether, even presuming that they would recognize the mutual costs of continuing armed combat, the negotiating parties could reach any compromise that would be accepted by their riled-up constituencies, especially the emboldened KLA. In the fall an agreement was reached that led to a large and hastily deployed Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observer mission, but cease-fire violations led to its breakdown and another failed settlement at Rambouillet, France, in February 1999. This was followed by NATO bombing of Serbia, massive ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, and a settlement by early June.

Marked since the early 1980s by demonstrations and police repression, the conflict in Kosovo was the most heated to threaten Macedonia. A certain equilibrium lasted until Dayton highlighted the lack of political movement on the persisting issues, thus inviting political fragmentation and more extreme actions. A momentary political engagement on the education agreement was thus soon overtaken by mass demonstrations, political violence and military action.

Local Inhibitors: Benign Legacies or Contemporary Interests?

During a post–Cold War period of exceptional global upheaval, the four South Balkan potential issues that threatened Macedonia did not all explode, unlike other Yugoslav disputes. Instead, they followed differing trajectories. All simmered, but only one boiled over, and two cooled down.

Before ascertaining the possible impact of international preventive actions in controlling the conflicts, how much discounting must be made for the impacts of indigenous conditions and actors? For example, perhaps the conflicts were restrained because they did not inherit divisive historical and cultural legacies like the other Balkan arenas that did explode. Such a thesis would contradict two recent influential analysts. One sees “Balkan ghosts” of past ethnic hatreds still haunting Macedonia. The other notes how Macedonia and Kosovo lie on top of a deep cultural fault line that divides two clashing global civilizations. Both analysts judge Macedonia to be especially prone to recurring turmoil because the powerful undercurrents of past group animosities and abiding cultural divisions will tend to override any short-term influences. In view of these analyses, the moderation of recent years appears all the more remarkable.
In fact, however, the current influence of the Balkans, notoriously violent history and divided cultures varied across these conflicts.\textsuperscript{34} It appears that while past hostilities and cultural differences may create different potentials for further conflict, they cannot fully account for their recent levels. Situational and contemporary factors determine the actual ability or motivation of parties to take up violence. One of these moderating influences was the effect of economic interest as a safety valve or prospective gain. Serb-Kosovar and Serb-Macedonian relations were tempered by the mutual need to make the best of UN economic sanctions through smuggling and worker remittances. The embargoes and economic reforms also had a leveling influence on Macedonia's internal ethnic cleavages. Albanian leaders within Macedonia also have been guided by the tacit conclusion that, notwithstanding that their people have legitimate grievances regarding government policy and these can be effectively pressed through nationalist rhetoric, maintaining their constituents' standard of living and political position is better served by remaining a discontented pressure group in that country and keeping an active hand in Macedonia's mainstream national politics than by being a smaller minority in a greater, but poorer, Albania, especially after its 1996 near-collapse. Though Greek government leaders had to respond to their people's outrage at Macedonia's chosen symbols and some abetted it, they also understood that their country's basic interests ultimately required that chauvinist passions not upset a minimally stable Greece-Macedonia relationship. By the same token, landlocked Macedonia has pursued economic ties with Greece and all the countries in the region, with which it carries out over one-third of its trade.\textsuperscript{35}

The low levels of violence were also determined by distributions of military and political power that largely decided for the leaders of group and states whether "playing the ethnic card" to encourage violence best served their constituencies and thus their own tenure. Defenseless Macedonia in 1991–92 had no choice but deference toward the FRY and neutrality in the Yugoslav wars. But Gligorov also capitalized knowingly on the FRY's military limitations in early 1992 and negotiated the JNA's withdrawal. He profited from the demographic circumstance that Belgrade lacked a fifth column of discontented Serbs in Macedonia. Within Macedonia, ethnic demographics encouraged power sharing and intergroup cooperation. Although less enduring, a similar calculation of power realities explains Rugova's practice of nonviolent politics. Until 1998, the Albanians' leverage was weak because FRY police power was dominant.

In sum, structural arguments about historical and cultural givens point to reservoirs of enmity that might be tapped where other circumstances make violence feasible and useful. But most contending states and ethnic groups in the South Balkans of the 1990s kept their political disputes generally under control because several more immediate factors superseded these legacies.

\textbf{Early Warnings and Initial Decisions}

Local and regional incentives and disincentives made it possible to move most of these conflicts toward more regularized management, but the protagonists'
fragile modi vivendi would not necessarily generate that movement. The risk remained in all the arenas that incidents of low-level violence, border provocation, and public controversy, if left unaddressed, would escalate sooner or later. We now describe the timeliness and features of international preventive action to judge whether outside third parties had a significant impact.

First Warning: Denying a Friend in Need

Major international actors first responded to Macedonia when they had to decide in 1991 which independence declarations they would recognize. Their first significant response was prompted by diplomatic events, not early warnings of rising tensions. Western concern about Yugoslavia had been expressed in the 1970s with regard to what would happen when Tito died. Warnings in the late 1980s of Yugoslavia’s possible breakup identified the most likely troubles as Bosnia and the “Albanian question,” meaning Kosovo and its implications for Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania. But from 1989 to 1991, except for U.S. senator Robert Dole and others who visited Kosovo and discussed human rights abuses, none of Yugoslavia’s potential conflicts received the attention of high-level U.S. officials. The prevailing view was that, in Secretary of State James Baker’s words, the United States had “no dog in this fight.” Instead, the United States was focused on obtaining allies for the Persian Gulf War and on the breakup of the Soviet Union. It urged the Europeans to take more responsibility, and it helped the EC’s efforts.

Despite the fact that its own Badinter Commission advised against recognition for Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina but recommended it for Macedonia, the EC in January 1992 flip-flopped these recommendations for the sake of EU solidarity. Relenting to intense German pressure from Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, it recognized Slovenia and Croatia and supported their admission into the United Nations but turned down Macedonia. Bosnia was recognized in April. When Greece pleaded that blocking Macedonia’s quest for recognition was a vital national interest, the EU went along, for its members wished to avoid a falling out so soon after the Maastricht Treaty in November committed them to a common foreign and security policy.

When U.S. State Department staffers weighed these decisions in February and March 1992, however, several factors disposed the United States to recognition. U.S. officials viewed Milošević and Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman more or less as scoundrels but viewed Bosnia’s Izetbegović and Macedonia’s Gligorov as more reasonable. When Gligorov had visited Washington in January to urge attention to Macedonia’s vulnerabilities, he was readily received by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. Macedonia set up a Washington liaison office, and the country’s enterprising new temporary representative, Ljubica Acevska, a Macedonian American, spoke effectively on behalf of her birthplace. In addition, the U.S. officials handling Yugoslav affairs included not only a former ambassador to Yugoslavia in Eagleburger but also several staff members in the Policy Planning Staff and Eastern European bureau who had more than a passing knowledge of the Balkans’ potential for turmoil. These
officials concluded that all the republics, including Macedonia, should be recognized, and in late March, identical letters were readied for the secretary of state's signature.

But these considerations did not win the day. On the virtual eve of the recognition decision's announcement in April 1992, interventions by the Greek foreign and prime ministers—respectively at the highest State Department and White House levels—led the United States to deny recognition to Macedonia but confer it on Croatia. As one disappointed U.S. staffer put it, "The winner of the Badinter beauty contest didn't even get a prize." Eagleburger and the White House had accepted Greek prime minister Mitsotakis's argument that three months were needed to prepare Greek public opinion. After the announcement, however, the Greek embassy began what U.S. officials describe as a deliberate campaign among Greek Americans against recognition of Macedonia. With the presidential election coming up, this pressure and the efforts of U.S. senators such as Paul Sarbanes, Democrat of Maryland and a Greek American, kept the matter alive.

The argument may have been voiced that an intense Greek reaction to U.S. recognition might cause a Macedonian overreaction, thus escalating this dispute. But the decision evidently did not flow from any such calculation of stability in the region. More likely, it disregarded the possible turmoil were Macedonia's lack of diplomatic protection to be exploited by Albanian activists or neighboring countries. Nor was the issue simply crowded out by competing agendas or unable to garner enough bureaucratic or public "political will." A course of action was proposed by the normal policy apparatus and addressed at the top, but the recommended action was reversed. An allied government exercised a veto on foreign policy professionals because of the influence of a domestic pressure group in an election year.

In short, the earliest responses were governed by ulterior factors, not early warnings. While available early warnings were not discrete alarms but more like ongoing concerns, Kosovo and Macedonia had long been pinpointed as vulnerable spots. But the response to the first opportunity to preempt possible conflict was shaped more by the European precedent and domestic political considerations than to what might reduce the chances of escalation. Nor was the first response preventive. "Preventive recognition" had been tried to avoid war in Bosnia but done harm. In Macedonia's case, this option may have eased the situation, but it was not tried.

Second Warning: Balkan "Domino Theory"

The concerns of U.S. Yugoslavia specialists did begin to shape a preventive policy in late summer 1992. Again, however, this was because of ulterior factors, not specific events in Macedonia or Kosovo. Department of State and National Security Council (NSC) staff were focused on the outbreak of the Bosnian war, the associated NATO naval blockade, and United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operations. The Deputies Advisory Committee of the NSC had begun to meet on Bosnia twice a week. The presidential election campaign once again played a role, this time more positively than regarding recognition. To cut a distinctive figure in foreign policy, candidate Bill Clinton struck the theme that the
United States needed to go “beyond containment” and exercise leadership even regarding crises generated within countries.

As the Bosnian war continued into fall, top Bush administration officials began to worry that it might spread the violence of the Yugoslav breakup even wider. The long-envisioned southern Balkan nightmare scenario now started to hit home. The most telling point for the United States was that, if Greece got involved, its rival Turkey might feel compelled to do so, thus dividing NATO just when that body was searching for its post–Cold War reason for being. In fact, the argument was advanced in the NSC that in terms of vital U.S. interests, the Bosnian theater was less important than the South Balkans. Ending the war in Bosnia might be too difficult, but it could not be allowed to cause wider regional instability. NSC director Brent Scowcroft expressed the “burnout” theory, which saw the United States willing to tolerate continued Bosnian war until the protagonists exhausted themselves but needing to draw some “line in the sand” to keep any new war fronts from opening up in the east and south.

The new impetus was not prompted by specific cables or intelligence alerting policymakers to potentially explosive events in Kosovo or Macedonia. Action was being considered not because Macedonia itself was suddenly threatened; similar tensions or prospects of conflict had arisen in Kosovo and Macedonia in 1989 and 1991, months before specific preventive measures were taken. Rather, the Bosnian war served as a wake-up call for taking the South Balkan scenario more seriously. This known scenario was having new impact because the war made it more plausible for policymakers to envision a regionwide conflagration with strategic import.

Thus, the turn to Macedonia was facilitated in part because the United States and other governments had become more focused on and invested in the nearby Bosnian war—in some cases, with troops on the ground. Policy analysts could make a conceptual link between the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and potentially escalating ethnic tensions in Kosovo and Macedonia, which reduced the informational, bureaucratic, and decision-making barriers that otherwise might block the launching of a preventive response, de novo, toward an incipient crisis in an asset unengaged locale. Conceivably, if the major actors had not viewed the Serbia-Macedonia-Greece-Kosovo cocktail as a possible third Yugoslavian explosion in the making, there might have been less attention to Macedonia and the South Balkans or, at best, a more belated, less vigorous preventive response like that taken toward Croatia and Bosnia. And if Milosević had been less interested in Bosnia or had had a more powerful army, it is possible to imagine war breaking out in the South Balkans in early 1992. As we shall see, however, this sensitization to the region did not prompt deeper engagement in post-Dayton Kosovo.

International Strategies of Action: Foster Care for a Young State

Once Bosnia did focus the United States and other governments more directly on Kosovo and Macedonia in the fall 1992, they undertook several initiatives rather quickly that were explicitly preventive. The next focus is the actions they took and whether they influenced the four conflicts.
Actors and Policy Instruments

At first, major powers acted mainly through multilateral organizations. The United States then launched some solo initiatives, which were followed by those of U.S.-based and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).\textsuperscript{46}

The CSCE/OSCE: Long-Term Monitoring Mission and Roving Envoy

In late summer 1992, President Gligorov requested international observers to monitor the border with Serbia. In early fall, President George Bush urged the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to place observer missions in Macedonia, Kosovo, and other still-peaceful areas of rump Yugoslavia to discourage the emergence of ethnic tensions and alert the international community to their earliest signs.\textsuperscript{47} The CSCE Council of Ministers (CoM) authorized the CSCE Spillover Monitoring Mission for Macedonia on September 18 and gave it the job of monitoring the northern border. U.S. officials saw the CSCE mission as a way to get some U.S. presence in Macedonia and the region, and the mission was headed from 1992 to 1996 by a succession of three experienced U.S. diplomats. These officials paid visits where border incidents occurred and periodically consulted Macedonia’s leaders and neighboring capitals, including Belgrade, ensuring that their presence was known to local and international media.

Macedonia’s domestic tensions were soon seen as a greater problem than aggression from the north, and border watching was increasingly assumed by the subsequent UN peacekeeping force. The CSCE mission thus extended its broad mandate into Macedonia’s domestic ethnic affairs. With a staff of six to eight, the mission has continuously tracked economic, social, and political events in the country and observed its demonstrations and political rallies. It has established contact with the major political parties, held roundtables to encourage dialogue among government officials and party leaders, and helped conciliate policy disputes regarding minority interests.\textsuperscript{48} It holds a weekly meeting in which staff of the UN mission, the CSCE/OSCE, and international humanitarian organizations have exchanged information on national and regional developments. A fortnightly report is sent to the CoM. The staff also plays local liaison for various outside organizations, including arranging the frequent visits of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).

The office of the HCNM was designed to get directly involved in ethnic policy issues throughout the OSCE member countries before they escalate. Paying short visits lacks the advantages of an ongoing presence in the country, but the energetic, widely respected first incumbent, former Dutch foreign minister Max van der Stoel, has used the discretion and relative visibility of his roving portfolio to visit Macedonia, Albania, and Bulgaria frequently. Addressing the differences among government, party, and community leaders, including Albanians and Serbs, the HCNM has pressed for better employment and educational policies, and he promoted a continuing roundtable between the government and minority groups.\textsuperscript{49} In November 1993, he publicly pressed the government to
speed up efforts to accommodate demands for Albanian language teaching at the Pedagogical Institute. Particularly when local controversies flared up that could exacerbate the poor relations of the two communities or risk spreading civil unrest, the HCNM has usually been able to wield his prestige to allay tensions, such as when he proposed that the Tetovo issues be handled through a new law on education.50

The United Nations: Preventive Military Deployment and Resident Special Representative

The idea of preventive deployment of UN forces in vulnerable areas had been proposed in Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace in June 1992. Addressing the General Assembly in September, President Bush stated that “monitoring and preventive peacekeeping, putting people on the ground before the fighting starts, may become especially critical in volatile regions.”51 The idea of a rapid deployment force to head off crises was also advanced in the presidential election campaign by candidate Clinton.52 Visiting UN headquarters November 11, President Gligorov requested a UN peacekeeping force to help buttress the weak Macedonian army. Although a similar request by President Izetbegović of Bosnia the year before had been turned down, the cochairs of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), Lord David Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg, suggested a fact-finding team be sent.53

What the team recommended departed from the view of the Macedonian government that the force was needed simply for defense. They judged that the claimed direct military threat from Albania was unlikely but regarded Serbia's intentions as unclear, noting it had not agreed to a common border. Sufficient warrant existed regarding the Albanian unrest in Kosovo, if spillover from the north created a pretext for Albania's entry into Macedonia. The team also realized it could not avoid Macedonia's domestic politics. The Serbian border, hitherto internal and completely open, now was international but supposed to be closed owing to UN sanctions. If Macedonia's army and police alone assumed border monitoring, because of the extensive smuggling they would continue to enforce regulations on a predominantly Albanian population, for whom passage back and forth from Kosovo had long been taken for granted. Albanians had been killed in smuggling incidents arising from the black market, so such a role might exacerbate Macedonian-Albanian domestic relations. Consequently, the team recommended that UN civilian police work with Macedonian police along the border.54

The UN secretary-general (UNSG) proposed a battalion of about seven hundred men as an extension of UNPROFOR in Croatia. Resolution 795 passed the Security Council with no opposition on December 11. The world's first multilateral preventive deployment55 arrived in January 1993 composed of five hundred Canadians, who were soon replaced by seven hundred Swedish, Norwegian, and Finnish troops.56 It was separated into a distinct command from UNPROFOR, with the name United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), in March 1995. By far the largest international mission in the
country, the military contingent was 1,050 persons strong at its height in 1996, having been supplemented by U.S. troops in 1993 (discussed later).\textsuperscript{57}

The deployment’s mandate was to patrol the Macedonian side of the 240-kilometer Serbian and 180-kilometer Albanian border, to monitor and report developments that could threaten Macedonia, and “by its presence, deter such threats from any source, as well as help prevent clashes which could otherwise occur between external elements and Macedonian forces, thus helping to strengthen security and confidence in Macedonia.”\textsuperscript{58} Troops were positioned at a string of temporary border posts, from which small patrols were sent out. Their instructions were to report specified threatening events but retreat from any significant attack, returning fire only in self-defense. The patrols approached intruders in nonprovocative ways to inform them of the agreed administrative line and request their return, which usually occurred.

The mission’s civilian police currently work with Macedonian police and civil authorities in border areas with large proportions of ethnic minorities. Although not funded through their regular budget and done off-hours, military and civilian commands have conducted extensive visitation and started humanitarian and other projects in local communities to create goodwill. The aim is to help villages with vulnerable populations from falling through the government’s safety net.\textsuperscript{59}

The six-month reports of the UNSG in 1992 and 1993 saw the mission as still needed for external threats but noted the effect of a military presence in calming the country itself. Subsequent reports emphasized the possible threat from internal political tensions. In March 1994, the Security Council gave UNPREDEP an explicit mandate to focus on internal issues.\textsuperscript{60} The resident special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) was encouraged to use his good offices in cooperation with the country authorities to foster political dialogue. As the head of UNPREDEP, SRSG Henryk Sokalski has engaged in active consultations with the political forces and ethnic groups in the country, often behind the scenes, and maintained contacts with high officials in Albania and the FRY. He has offered suggestions relating to the rights of ethnic communities. The civilian staff have continuously monitored and analyzed internal political developments.

The United States: Threat of Force, Peacekeeping Troops, and Third-Party Mediation

The U.S. government initially got involved in Macedonia primarily through promoting and staffing multilateral missions, but it also took two significant unilateral initiatives, both involving military action. To buttress the CSCE mission in Kosovo, Bush issued a “Christmas warning” in December 1992 to Serbian president Milosević against increased Serbian internal pressures. This stated that in the event of conflict caused by any Serbian action, the United States was prepared to make air strikes against strategic targets in Serbia. These warnings were repeated by President Clinton in February 1993 and by the State Department that October.\textsuperscript{61} In addition, in July 1993, although not requested by the secretary-general, three hundred U.S. troops were added to UNPROFOR to man the Serbian border— a further message to Serbia to stay out of Macedonia.
Why, without being solicited, did the United States provide ground troops under UN command, though they had been consistently denied for Bosnia? Coming into office, the Clinton administration committed itself to go “beyond containment.” Secretary of State Warren Christopher pledged at his confirmation hearings to have “a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises, rather than simply manage them.” But the U.S. decision to join UNPROFOR did not flow from these goals. It was a reflex action after its efforts to take a more robust approach to Bosnia failed.

As National Security Adviser Anthony Lake argued in early 1993, Bosnia was dangerous both in regional terms and globally because of its Christian versus Muslim overtones. UN Representative Madeleine Albright also believed the United States should lead in promoting multilateral peacekeeping. When media stories of ethnic cleansing came out of Bosnia in early April, the administration felt increased pressure to follow through on its campaign rhetoric, having criticized Bush’s cold, strategic approach to human crises such as Haiti. But during Christopher’s May trip to Europe, the new administration’s first major proposal for Yugoslavia, “lift and strike,” totally failed to persuade the Europeans. A fall-back action was to add U.S. troops to buttress the containment of possible spillover from the Bosnia war into Macedonia. Clinton’s critique of Bush’s strategic containment had resulted in an ethnic war containment policy of his own.

In addition, U.S. military analysts saw Macedonia differently. A peacekeeping doctrine was emerging that held that American troops should be used only where they could make a difference. Adding peacekeepers in Bosnia would simply place them in an already largely unmanageable situation. No clear line existed between warring combatants, and U.S. power could not substantially alter the military equation. In Macedonia, however, there were no hostilities between Macedonia and Serbia, so a clear line for deterrence could be drawn. The mission would not breach a state’s sovereignty. Besides, the Macedonia mission needed more troops and from the United States in particular. Fifteen thousand troops from the United Kingdom were already in Bosnia, and France felt it had no more to spare. The United States coming to Macedonia would blunt the repeated criticism from European capitals that the United States was urging them to take tough actions in Yugoslavia but was unwilling to put its own troops on the ground.

Regarding the Macedonia-Greece dispute, in response to the Greek embargo that followed U.S. recognition, Clinton appointed a special envoy in spring 1994. The United States had three goals: (1) to remove the Macedonia-Greece controversy from the headlines so U.S. foreign policy would not be whipsawed from more inflammation by a domestic lobby; (2) to preempt the involvement of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey; and (3) to stabilize Macedonia by enabling it to get into multilateral programs.

The chief U.S. negotiator sought to hammer out a draft agreement by holding official but nonpublic negotiations in New York City involving back-and-forth discussions between the governments, rather than face-to-face exchanges. This method allowed the parties to explore several options but discouraged detrimental public leaks. Even though it had little aid money or threats to induce an
agreement, the United States undertaking these talks was important in itself. The inherent, increasingly apparent practical advantages of getting beyond the dispute were highlighted to both sides. Intensified pressure from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke finally nudged the negotiations to the interim accord of September 1995. Macedonia redesigned its flag and removed objectionable constitutional language. Greece agreed to end its trade embargo, commit to open trade, and stop using its power in the OSCE and EU to block Macedonian membership. Both agreed to end offensive propaganda and establish normal relations and technical cooperation. The name issue was deferred, however, and discussions have continued. The United States established full diplomatic relations immediately prior to signing the agreement, and it sent an ambassador to Skopje. Macedonia has been admitted to the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the Partnership for Peace, and it is receiving IMF and World Bank loans.

NGOs: Civic Society Demonstration Projects and Track Two Diplomacy

Below the level of the national political leadership at which UNPREDEP and the OSCE operate in Macedonia, U.S. and other nongovernmental organizations launched conflict resolution training and civil society promotion projects at the national and grassroots levels. These began in the year following the governmental organizations’ arrival. Initially, Search for Common Ground tried dialogue projects with ethnic leaders and the government’s Parliamentary Council for Ethnic Relations, thus playing a role similar to the UNPREDEP and the OSCE. Subsequently, it turned to cross-ethnic projects to build civil society, including a TV series and investigative journalism project, conflict resolution training on education issues with journalists and in schools in conjunction with Skopje University’s Ethnic Conflict Resolution center, and a student environmental clean-up project. The U.S.-based Center for Ethnic Relations has done problem-solving workshops, and the Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiation trained trainers in conflict resolution in spring 1995. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is sponsoring local parent association school projects that cut across the Macedonian-Albanian social divide. The National Democratic Institute provided technical assistance in organizing the 1994 elections, and the International Republican Institute advised nationalist parties how they could broaden their electoral appeal for the 1998 elections. The Soros Foundation gave seed money to independent newspapers when they lost their government subsidy.

In essence, these projects aim to plant role models in Macedonian society that both embody and support processes through which democratic, multiethnic societies and nonethnic states are expected to carry out civic functions such as public dispute resolution, education, the press, elections, and local community affairs. Specific approaches are not imposed since the intent is to encourage Macedonians to evolve particular methods and corresponding norms on their own, an indigenous culture of peace. The theory is that if Macedonians develop their own stakes in these procedures and values, strong barriers are set up to the violent escalation of political controversies.
NGOs also sought to fill the gap in international engagement in Kosovo. The Bush and Clinton warnings to Milošević sought to deter increased repression, and UNPREDEP provided an uncertain bulwark against massive refugee flows into Macedonia. But the FRY authorities held the upper hand in Kosovo and, unlike the Macedonian government, did not initiate further international government missions after ejecting the initial OSCE mission in July 1993. Because the FRY’s legal sovereignty limited how much the international community could become involved politically, on-the-ground engagement was confined mainly to humanitarian relief for the badly deteriorating health and social conditions through Mercy Corps International, Oxfam, and the CRS. But with no fewer than thirteen governmental initiatives and sixteen NGO efforts tried from 1992 to 1997, it cannot be argued that Kosovo escalated because of simple international neglect. The problem was that no robust and sustained effort was made to address the political sources of the continuing tensions.69

Following Dayton, Track Two initiatives approached the Kosovar leadership and Milošević to urge dialogue. After a failed EU initiative in early 1996, discussions by the Italian NGO Comunità di Sant’Igido, with EU and U.S. government encouragement and U.S. funds, achieved a breakthrough education agreement between the LDK’s Rugova and Milošević on September 3. This called for reopening all levels of the Kosovo government schools to Albanian students and teachers, including the teacher-training colleges and faculties of the University of Prishtina. The plan was to start within a month under the supervision of three representatives from both sides. The parties were both under increasing pressure to produce results for their constituencies. Milošević’s party was coming up for reelection in November, and he earnestly sought access to World Bank and IMF funds for Yugoslavia (removal of the “outer wall of sanctions”). The talks also allowed Rugova to produce concrete benefits for LDK supporters who were hearing criticisms of his leadership. The United States also negotiated to place a U.S. Information Service (USIS) cultural office in Prishtina in June 1996, to establish an official U.S. presence in Kosovo.

But Albanian students only began to return in some numbers after the conflict escalated over a year later. It was not until the escalation of the conflict in spring 1998 that high-level and sustained attention and robust action were undertaken by the United States through a mediation effort, and new sanctions were pressed by a UN contact group composed of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. Though the new Serb armed activity clearly fit the criteria of the Christmas warnings, no U.S. military actions were taken until NATO air maneuvers sought to back up a mediation initiative by President Boris Yeltsin. Aimed as they were at stopping the spiral of violence, these all were reactive efforts and, though necessary, testified to the failure of prevention.

Containment Verging on Nation Building

This array of preventive activities deployed on behalf of Macedonia were initially justified as containing “spillover” from the Bosnian war in the form of aggression from Serbia or a Kosovo explosion. Clinton’s public letter to the UN
explained the purpose of adding the U.S. troops as deterring an attack on Macedonia. But because of the Albanian ethnic ties across Macedonia's borders, the international activities quickly went beyond building a firewall against the spread of a raging external fire. Conflict retardant was applied first within the country, next on a possible brushfire in the vicinity, and, finally, on the growing conflagration next door.

In the aggregate, the multiple initiatives buttressed the weak capacities of the financially and institutionally impoverished new Macedonian polity to carry out basic functions. Since Macedonia lacked many of the capabilities normally possessed by states, the international community brought a “welcome wagon” to its door with some start-up provisions for national defense, police, domestic political processes, community affairs, social services, economic policy, and even regional diplomatic and defense relations.70 Once a strategically placed country was deemed vulnerable to attack or subversion and it requested assistance, it quickly became the object of a kind of international foster care that, though not constituting an international protectorate, more than substituted for the embassies that were not established in 1992–93 when Macedonia was refused recognition. This was a significant breaching of Macedonia’s sovereignty, albeit voluntary.71 Under the rubric of preventive diplomacy, the international community was nation building. Although this helped realize the dream of ethnic Macedonians for a state, the model it promoted was that of a liberal and civic state, based on economic and other interests, not ethnic identity. Few third parties honored the notion that a single people should form the basis of a state. The thrust was rather to preserve existing multiethnic states and strengthen them mainly through buttressing their official functions and linkages.

Evaluating Third-Party Impacts

To so characterize international preventive actions is not to demonstrate their actual effectiveness. To do that, we must find observable or plausibly inferred inroads into the sources or course of the conflicts, weigh them against any negative effects, and judge whether the benefits are enduring.

Macedonia-Serbia: Political Tripwire

Once UNPREDEP arrived, the minimum criterion was whether international actions deterred cross-border aggression and kept violence from escalating. UNPREDEP’s most tangible effect was snuffing out sparks of potentially violent border incidents. When a Serbian force took over Cupino Brdo, for example, the risk of a larger confrontation was avoided when the UN commander conducted shuttle diplomacy between the two sides to mediate their joint withdrawal. After the Serbs withdrew, a Nordic battalion was placed in the position. However innocuous seeming, even initially small-scale incursions with no larger intent might have unleashed a train of events leading to wider hostilities between Macedonians or Albanians and Serbs. Unless UNPREDEP’s continuous presence and modulated defensive procedures dampened these low-level, poten-
tially violent episodes, it was unlikely either side would have been able to keep
them under control.

What if border confrontations nevertheless did escalate further or were
stepped up deliberately? Some argue that UNPREDEP's lack of firepower and a
mandate to meet a more threatening military contingency, such as advance au-
thorizations for Chapter VII action, made it merely symbolic. Because it could
easily be overrun by Serbian forces, it presented no credible tripwire. Only
when this bluff was called would the true test of UN preventive deployment have
come. The thousand-person force would be no match for an all-out Serbian in-
vasion, but did it deter something less?

By having enough force in position to signal international interest and provid-
ing a presence that could alert of a crisis quickly and itself be in harm's way, UN-
PREDEP did create a meaningful political and psychological barrier sufficient to
that situation. The forward monitoring position and base of operations already in
place reduced the political and logistical difficulties of establishing a new beach-
head to counter an invading force. It is one thing to dispatch troops anew, another
to reinforce the numbers already there. Also, incursions across the border would
be aimed directly at the Western and other national forces as well as the civilian
personnel from many member states in several multilateral organizations. After
spring 1993, about five hundred American troops were added to the deterrent, and
they are regarded by most analysts as the backbone of UNPREDEP. Moreover,
UNPREDEP put Western and U.S. resolve on the line when it was already being
questioned, and considering other strategic interests the Western governments
saw at stake, such an action would likely have triggered the buttressing of the force
or other countermeasures such as air strikes on Serbian territory. Finally, military
incursions would violate norms against international aggression that, while not
guaranteed, are now widely and firmly accepted. Though not recognized by the
EU or the United States until 1994, once Macedonia became a member of the
United Nations in 1993 and was recognized by many governments, it was a virtual
state. Because of the collective security commitment under the UN Charter, this
added impetus to protecting Macedonia from aggression, which the Security
Council would feel compelled to support. When later recognized as a state by
many others, the potential costs to an invader increased further. At the very least,
an aggressor would know there would be no easy victory, and it might be Pyrrhic
because of damage to its international image.

Thus, the source of UNPREDEP's deterrence was not strictly military power
but the psychological or political threshold created. A Serbian military thrust
would have brought Serbian-Western relations to an entirely different level of
direct confrontation. The chances of triggering more vigorous involvement or
further countermeasures—i.e., U.S. and other military intervention—were
probably too great a risk to run for any but the most heedless aggressor. In com-
bination with recognition as a state and the other international missions in
place, UNPREDEP did in fact draw a "line in the sand" that would be enforce-
able and thus has been effective. Vis-à-vis Milošević, this presence bought
Macedonia time until after the Bosnia war. Even if he had felt the need to dis-
tract attention from losses in Bosnia and Serbia's economic problems, it raised
the price considerably of advancing to the south, thus probably closing off that option.

Macedonia-Greece: Better Late Than Never

Initially, the EU and the United States increased the risks of turmoil in Macedonia by undercutting its effort to find international legitimacy and, combined with the collateral effects of the UN sanctions against Serbia, put it under considerable socioeconomic strain. Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis and President Gligorov may have been able to reach a resolution if U.S. or other support had invigorated the UN negotiations earlier than spring 1994. This might have obviated the fall of the Mitsotakis government and the Greek elections that consolidated a more hardened position. Whether it was politically impossible to make inroads against Greek-American pressures is unknown, but earlier initiatives were not undertaken in part because U.S. officials underestimated the anxieties and emotions this stirred up. They tended to see the Greek reaction to a name and flag as silly.

Although belated, the eventual UN and U.S. mediations still catalyzed the reconciliation. The negotiations shielded the dispute from Greek or Macedonian nationalists and the Greek-American lobby, so they no longer defined the terms and intensity of the controversy. They provided an opportunity to negotiate that both sides would have found politically inexpedient to initiate on their own. The parties could engage on substance rather than only symbols, the economic disadvantages each side felt could be weighed in, and the parties could consider mutual concessions. Clearly, the mediation was responsible for reaching an eventual settlement, making further confidence building possible.

The skills of the negotiator were also essential for getting the parties to the point of agreement, but the UN talks did not actually reach a settlement until the stepped-up U.S. involvement in 1994 added urgency, and a final boost by a higher-level official made the difference between talking and agreeing. This opened the door to other international aid, security guarantees, and closer regional economic relations.

Intra-Macedonia Relations: Confidence and Security-Building Measures

As with the border threat, the CSCE and UN missions also provided deterrence and violence avoidance for domestic relations. First, the presence of an international military force provided the basic undergirding of public security that arguably deflated domestic efforts to subvert domestic politics by terrorism or covert force. The force allayed the insecurities of the ethnic communities that opponents could exercise this option. The UN force in effect provided a neutral police function whereby minorities had an implicit watchdog on the government's security operations and the majority Macedonians had further protection against minority provocation or terrorism. More assured, the ethnic communities could pursue civil politics with less fear. This presence reinforced indigenous moderate elements who sought to encourage professional conduct by the army and police.
Second, the international missions helped keep potentially inflammatory political events from triggering violence, or low-scale violence from escalating, through providing quick and accurate public information against rumors, immediate and direct contacts with the governmental and other leaders to encourage calm responses and consultations, and policy ideas for their discussions. Incidents such as the attempted assassination of Gligorov in 1995 do not automatically cause major explosions. Similarly, the provision of humanitarian aid in areas not well served by the government reduced the chances that local political manipulation of public services could create ethnic controversies.

Furthermore, through ethnic roundtables, continuing contacts with government and party leaders, the visits of the HCNM, and other means, the international missions kept up pressure on the government, provided channels to address minority ethnic issues, and submitted policy ideas. Here again, such channels would have been politically difficult for either side to initiate by itself.

Yet the ability of UNPREDEP and the OSCE to foster a self-animating nonethnic domestic politics has definite limits. Their leverage is dependent largely on particular controversies arising within the official circles that allow them to play a role. But the government has resisted uncomfortable levels of pressure, on the grounds that issues are internal matters. International “conflict resolution” NGOs approached ethnic issues more indirectly, by modeling alternative forms of civic culture, which governmental entities would find difficult. Their strategy of slowly diffusing an inherently attractive conflict resolution method has the potential for being internalized by a growing network of host country citizens and thus with commitment. But NGOs have no major carrots or sticks to use against the political and economic environment, and thus their models can take root and spread only if national politics are fairly stable and economic opportunities increase. UNPREDEP’s umbrella was essential for the NGOs to work with some effect. Resource-poor NGOs are also severely limited in how much of a population they can reach. Local NGOs need to take over this work, but the latter are few and even more poorly funded.

Kosovo: The Lid Blows Off

As long as Serbian forces were occupied elsewhere, the Christmas warnings helped discourage more overt Serb oppression in Kosovo. But after Dayton, this disincentive was outweighed by Milosević’s perceived political gains from trying to crush the KLA. Until then, international actions toward Kosovo maintained a nonviolent but vulnerable status quo. Human rights reports, along with the travels of Ibrahim Rugova, helped keep the plight of the Albanians before the U.S. and other governments. But though some third parties such as U.S. congressman Elliot Engel advocated Kosovo’s self-determination, international views generally neither encouraged the hopes of Albanians for more political control nor discouraged them. The humanitarian aid of NGOs kept the high level of tension in Kosovo from becoming a popular rebellion by offsetting the worst social effects of the crisis. Because the aid was directed largely at the beleaguered Albanians, however, it did little for political reconciliation and may
even have been divisive. And no efforts sought vigorously to channel the Serb-Albanian standoff into dialogue or provide sufficient motivation to reach settlement, as had been done in the other cases.

Not until the Track Two mediation of the 1996 Milošević-Rugova education agreement did major powers press the sides to move beyond stalemate to negotiations. More recent efforts to convene Serbian officials with Kosovo leaders and opposition groups have been unsuccessful because no real pressures were put on the stronger party. Combined with FRY martial law, the LDK’s nonviolent philosophy, and the political and psychological separation of the two communities, the international stance perpetuated a nonviolent but stagnant equilibrium. Absent any meaningful engagement, Kosovo was left susceptible to incrementally rising turmoil, and the parties quickly became entrapped in mutual destruction, for which the blunt deterrence strategy was ill prepared. In the end, the least attended conflict arena put at risk the other more elaborate preventive provisions on behalf of Macedonia.

In sum, the progress in preventive terms achieved by third parties varied greatly across the three arenas. Macedonia’s relations to the rump Yugoslavia and Greece were moved from single-issue negotiations to various interstate relations. Unlike in the Greek conflict, however, the international community has not yet made vigorous efforts to settle their border dispute and thus move Macedonia-Serbia relations beyond a basic stability. The intrastate ethnic disputes within Macedonia are still regulated through institutional channels but not abated in intensity or transformed into other issues. But the conflict in Kosovo was allowed to become more inflamed than it ever had been. In these two domestic arenas, international efforts seem to have provided, on the one hand, a political platform that increased incentives for ethnic nationalist competition, but without channeling the politics that they approached into strong indigenous institutions that can resolve nonviolently the heightened ethnic issues, much less transcend the pervasive ethnicization of politics in both settings.

These differing results should not obscure the aggregate benefits of the several preventive efforts for Macedonia. The most evident in most arenas was keeping intergroup or interstate differences from escalating by deterring or containing any initial violent manifestations. More broadly, the critical mass created by the UN and other international presence testified concretely to a wider global interest in Macedonia and its environs, thus lowering the general level of anxieties and reducing regional interstate uncertainties—“giving everyone a sense of comfort,” in the words of one U.S. diplomat. This gave Macedonia itself a safer haven for its national politics to work in. There and in the other arenas, preventive diplomacy also fostered interparty dialogues, negotiations, and eventually two agreements, one of which has been implemented. Even after Kosovo escalated, the Albanians in Albania and Macedonia saw at least restraint in their short-term interest. By controlling the volatility and tackling over time the substantive issues in most of the potential hot spots that comprised the feared Balkan scenario, preventive efforts decoupled several of these threats from each other so they were less contagious, thus lowering the overall likelihood of the scenario unfolding.
Crisis Management in 1999

With the escalation to civil war in Kosovo in late 1998 and 1999, the limits of preventive diplomacy that does not loosen up existing ethnic political balances of power and standoffs was revealed, not only in Kosovo but also in Macedonia. Within a few months, the refugee exodus and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and the NATO reaction in the form of a bombing campaign, led to enormous suffering and destruction in Kosovo as well as Serbia. They threatened the destabilization of Macedonia through their impact on its internal ethnic relations.

For one thing, Macedonia was put in the role of an antagonist toward the rump Yugoslavia because it is associated with the NATO presence and policies. In late 1998, NATO troops replaced UNPREDEP in patrolling the country's borders. After the bombing of Serbia commenced in March 1999, Serb troops captured three U.S. soldiers along the border and held them as prisoners of war. Since then, more NATO troops have arrived. Demonstrations against the NATO presence have apparently been attended by ethnic Macedonians as well as Serbs. Second, Macedonia's unexpected but necessary reception of over 247,000 Albanian refugees escaping the Kosovo conflict not only meant a financial and logistical burden but threatened to provoke its fragile internal ethnic Macedonian-Albanian modus vivendi. In less than three months, the Albanian percentage of the population increased from the estimated 26 percent to about 37 percent, many of whom were staying with Albanian families rather than in refugee camps. Macedonian farmers protested violently against the appropriation of their land for refugee camps. The forced nighttime expulsion by Macedonian police of thousands of refugees from the temporary Blace camp, and their deportation to other countries, took the international humanitarian organizations by surprise and threatened to provoke reactions from Albanian citizens in Macedonia and their representatives in the government coalition. Government officials made public claims that the KLA was recruiting soldiers from among the refugees and that caches of weapons were being discovered.

Although NATO has pledged protection of Macedonia from external attack, and donors have pledged compensation for its recent costs and lost trade with Yugoslavia, that war may yet unravel the achievements of the internal preventive measures that have been moderately successful so far, owing to the strain on the domestic political fabric on which Macedonia's survival as a state has so far relied.

Key Ingredients

Certain features help explain these impacts: quick deployment, continuous on-the-ground presence, multidimensionality, and goal cohesion. When third parties first turn to a potential conflict, protagonists may step up their hostilities to improve their bargaining position in anticipation of third-party arrival. But at least in late 1992, turnaround time between the first public consideration of international missions and their arrival was comparatively short—only a month for the OSCE and one and a half for UNPROFOR. Once in the country, as with the border monitoring, the mission's response time to potentially explosive local
incidents was short because early warnings could be both issued and answered in-country. Local and national incidents that held the potential for violence, and provocative events that might spawn divisive rumors, were tracked virtually daily and could be treated quickly. The information shared through the weekly meetings among UN, OSCE, and other organizations is disseminated both laterally on site and vertically to central UN and OSCE headquarters, making it possible to marshal outside organizations' resources, such as technical experts, to deal with potentially troublesome incidents quickly.

Another key ingredient was the mix of "hard" and "soft" instruments that were brought to bear on the several faces or fronts of the conflicts. UNPREDEP, the OSCE mission, the ICFY, the Council of Europe (CoE), the HCMN, the U.S. negotiations, and NGOs together targeted the several geographic fronts in and outside Macedonia and, within Macedonia, the subnational as well as national leadership levels. Several sources of potential violence were thus addressed—external military threats, ethnic intergroup and party politics, and local community ethnic interfaces—any of which might drive tensions upward. Toward these problems, they deployed a range of carrots and sticks, as well as facilitating methods. Especially important from the start, but often lacking in attempts at prevention, was the protection of basic security that UNPREDEP embodied.80

Finally, these multifaceted actions in and around Macedonia all had a shared preventive purpose, owing perhaps to the prod to action from the Bosnian war. That focusing, strategic concern led to starting up the first missions quite simultaneously in the fall of 1992 and early 1993, rather than adding them bit by bit over time. As a military presence, UNPROFOR/UNPREDEP inherently seemed to command respect and perhaps attract other activities. Rather close working relations also have existed between the multilateral missions, with UNPROFOR/UNPREDEP being the implicit first among equals.81

A Sustainable Peace?

Following the Dayton Accords, the UNSG continued to see the need for the UN presence for both external and internal reasons. In late 1996, the Russian government persuaded the Security Council to begin a gradual reduction in UNPREDEP. The downsizing was suspended when Albania erupted into turmoil in March 1997. But in late 1998, the Macedonian government chose to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, having been offered billions of dollars in economic aid. In response, China vetoed the UN Security Council decision to renew the mandate of UNPREDEP, and the mission ended.

A useful benchmark of whether preventive efforts have had lasting effects and the third parties can exit is the extent to which they have moved conflicts from simply violence avoidance into self-energizing, institutionalized political conflict or interstate relations. New violence would be unlikely because local dispute management is self-regulating. In these terms, the two interstate conflicts are the most stable because they evolved from ad hoc to regular diplomacy and are likely to achieve further deepening. In the two internal conflicts, however, though basic stability was addressed, the underlying dynamics were allowed to persist and grow.
Macedonia may backslide to potential crisis without further attention. Albanian and other minority demands are still processed mainly through parliamentary and governmental politics, but how long governmental institutions can keep ethnic issues largely under their wing is uncertain. Discernible results are slow, and meanwhile, the political and psychological gulf and prejudices between the ethnic communities have not narrowed substantially. Indeed, each policy issue and sometimes third-party initiatives often become new occasions for ethnic mobilization and further polarization, especially perhaps by the Albanian nationalists. Riffs in both ethnic-oriented parties could still make national politics more volatile, as each group's leaders within the government face more radical flanks. The risk persists that when Gligorov retires and other leaders depart, or a serious political or security crisis drags on such as in Kosovo or unstable Albania itself, the cooperation and tenuous legitimacy achieved by the governing elite could erode, and they could succumb to pressures from political outbidders from Albanian radicalism and/or backlash against the Albanians from Macedonian extreme nationalists.

Whether or not it is NATO, some force may need to take over from UNPREDEP to maintain the guarantee of security and signs of international concern for Macedonia. But to make its exit eventually possible, a deepened indigenous effort has to cut more sharply across the ethnic infrastructure and create a non-governmentalized public politics.

The persisting underlying problem is that Macedonian public life and policy debate are too imbued with ethnicity. National politics monopolizes public discourse, and that politics is riven with divisive ethnic disputes. Macedonian society is pluralistic only in the sense of being vertically fragmented almost exclusively on ethnopolitical lines. What policy movement occurs depends too heavily on ad hoc bargaining among small groups of leaders, and thus the skill of the country's respected first president and a handful of ministers and party leaders, rather than on more self-energizing institutions that are subject to broad and diverse popular pressures. The official and interparty channels have difficulty transcending or circumventing ethnicity through economic and social peace building, and neither the international governmental nor NGO activities have engendered an indigenous politics that can manage political disputes and exercise policy leadership. What is now requisite for this more vigorous, differentiated politics is growing local businesses and industries that can generate more jobs and tax revenues as well as interest associations and voluntary giving. More local governmental bodies and nonethnically organized indigenous civic bodies, national and grassroots, would help dissolve ethnic political tensions by taking over from central government more of the burden of tackling Macedonia's society-wide public problems, such as health, poverty, housing, and the environment, thus moving them out of the national ethnopolitical arena into other venues.

International pressure and presence has been necessary to resolve ethnic and other issues and to help forestall a serious political or internal security crisis. But by focusing the international spotlight on national issues and giving them a public stage, the third parties themselves have contributed to some extent to politicizing ethnic issues. Nevertheless, deeper measures might be possible be-
cause several governments and multilateral organizations have become invested in Macedonia and seem committed to stay alert and involved.

In Kosovo, the risk of a violent outbreak was perpetuated because public security was not buttressed and political dialogue was not progressing. The Milošević-Rugova education agreement opened a new avenue for accommodation which might have led to further agreements and preempted new rounds of violence sparked by the rising expectations of Kosovo’s restive youth—half of Kosovo’s population is under twenty-five—and backlash from the fears of further roused Serbs. But because it lacked a means of enforcement, the plan was not implemented. Since no other strong channels existed for going beyond political stalemate to ongoing engagement, Kosovo’s prolonged psychological and political standoff persisted as a possible flashpoint.84

Admittedly, the motivation for moving toward such cross-group engagement, especially on the Serb side, was poor. Even if the Together alliance that demonstrated against Milošević in 1996 and early 1997 had not fragmented and more democratic forces had come to power, Serb Kosovo policy would not necessarily have become more progressive, since none of the opposition movement showed support for Kosovo autonomy and would have actively addressed the issue. Left as it was, therefore, the Kosovo situation escalated into civil war, whose consequent refugee flows and incitement of ethnic insecurities in Macedonia have put to a serious test all the other regional preventive efforts.

Lessons Learned

This close look at a model case of international third-party preventive diplomacy reveals mixed but, on balance, positive results. The sources of restraint in the South Balkans from 1991 to 1998 do not derive from lack of historical and cultural potential for conflict. Violence-inhibiting contemporary interests and actions that were local to the “Yugoslavia exception” did provide fertile ground for international engagement, but these restraints alone could not reduce the risk of violent escalations arising from provocative incidents. Though at first unresponsive and unhelpful, international third parties were uncharacteristically proactive in reducing the risks of conflict from several threatening external and internal disputes. In all but Kosovo, they applied appropriate and sufficiently robust preventive measures that filled political needs beyond what the protagonists themselves could accomplish. These multiple instruments not only deterred or short-circuited incipient violence but also facilitated negotiations among ethnic and state leaders that reached agreements, thus alleviating potentially explosive disputes.

But this model case has failed so far to meet the further test posed of creating sustainable peace so third parties can exit. Despite their geographic and functional range, the third-party measures mostly engaged sovereign or quasi-sovereign states and built official diplomatic and military regional relations, rather than redirecting the main forces driving their respective national politics. Significantly, the state-oriented approach neutralized most, but not all, of the interlocked potential sources of the feared South Balkan scenario. But it has not engendered a sufficiently nonethnic politics within Macedonia, and it missed an
opportunity to change the terms of Serb-Kosovar relations. Indeed, to some degree, third parties exacerbated these domestic conflicts, thus making an exit from the region soon highly risky. The case also yields larger hypotheses that undercut conventional wisdoms about the emergence of conflicts, early warning, “political will,” and preventive action.

Contrary to structural arguments, even regions with bloody histories and group identities that are organized into ethnonationalist causes are not predestined for war. Such legacies or even current signs of interethnic tensions are not necessary precursors of conflagration. Whether smoke will mean fire depends on the circumstances and policies that influence a particular ethnic dispute’s unfolding. Thus, whatever their so-called “root” causes, ethnic conflicts in weak and emerging states are more immediately struggles among rival elites and the competing factions within them for control of the state, its policy benefits, and international recognition. Such struggles can be violent or peaceful, but the leaderships of mobilized and democratized ethnic communities face continuing pressures from “outsiders” who advocate more extreme approaches. In states that lack a strong institutional framework and broad-based, cross-cutting electorates, these struggles are all more or less uncertain and potentially violent.

To assay the specific likelihood of violence and capacities for peace in any one case requires close analysis of the particular direction that certain generic factors take in that context. Rather than focusing only on discrete “early warnings” of potential violent explosions, ongoing tracking is needed of key local and regional socioeconomic realities and the ups and downs of political dynamics, using finely calibrated measures. Peace and conflict are not dichotomous states but rather graduated conditions along a spectrum. Because it catalogues the items only on the causes side of the ledger, the conventional method of diagnosing conflicts—which is borrowed from studying full-blown violent conflicts—may generate “false negatives” when applied to simmering political disputes, as well as ignore opportunities for buttressing peaceful trends. Thus, it must also monitor indigenous potential conflict inhibitors.

Among the critical variables is international action. Local inhibitors may indicate promising entry points in vulnerable societies where third parties can cost-effectively buttress local incentives for conflict prevention by reinforcing conditions, institutions, and actors that are favorable to peaceful change. Local peace preservers cannot be taken for granted indefinitely, and reinforcing international action may be necessary. Even where there are no signs of imminent eruptions, significant risks exist, and taking out conflict insurance may be well worth a relatively small premium.

But as the initial EC and U.S. decisions regarding Macedonia recognition, the UN sanctions and the Dayton Accords showed, international actions do not always provide that preventive help. Just as domestic and regional factors and conflict protagonists may work to prevent violent escalation of local tensions, as well as precipitate them, so also international factors and actors can worsen the potential for violent conflicts, not simply stem them. In short, diagnosing whether conflicts are likely to take peaceful or violent courses is roughly analogous to calculating the result of a mathematical equation that is composed of several dis-
distinct but interacting functions, each with differing magnitudes and signs, negative or positive, in particular cases.

Conventional wisdom imagines discrete early warnings arising from troubling events in a country with possible conflict and then being transmitted to distant capitals. There, analysts consider policy options and decision makers respond if they can muster “political will.” But we found no such mechanical sequence of local stimulus-third party response. Ulterior interests largely decided whether and when responses occurred. At the first opportunity to act specifically toward Macedonia, the need for multilateral consensus blocked EU preventive recognition; the U.S. response was vetoed by the same ally in NATO and its domestic lobby. Only when major powers perceived that broader symbolic or strategic concerns dear to their capitals might be at risk—such as a regionwide war, NATO unity, and the reputation of U.S. Bosnia policy—did warnings get a response.

Even then, a local invitation was the immediate prompting. This helped greatly overcome barriers to third-party entry that would otherwise be posed by sovereign prerogatives of unwilling protagonists or a dangerous situation. By requesting international observers and a peacekeeping force, Gligorov and other relatively moderate political leaders in the region were possibly the sine qua non of the international missions. Third parties saw a “feasible” opportunity where they could be relatively comfortable that they were not getting embroiled in an unmanageable intercommunal conflict. If the United Nations, the Nordic countries, and later the United States had had to override a country’s sovereignty and/or face more antagonistic local parties, it is much less likely they would have acted at all, or as early as they did, and through a military force. International prevention that lacks such local consent and amenable politics may fail to gain sufficient support to even happen or be more costly and ineffective. This barrier explains why the opportunity in Kosovo following Dayton was missed. It was less open to outside involvement, and what was done in the name of prevention there proved insufficient.

Multifaceted, resource-intensive international prevention seems to happen additively. The fact that international actors are in the neighborhood may have a quickening and aggregating effect that enhances their responsiveness and effectiveness in adjacent areas because policymakers and publics are more receptive to more proactive efforts in the same locale. First, once international efforts started elsewhere in Yugoslavia, the South Balkans were more salient than they might otherwise have been. Outside actors were already significantly engaged in nearby Macedonia on the ground and had some vested interest in the region. Third parties develop stakes in not wanting the conflict to spread and their policy officials are exposed more directly to the signs and implications of its spread. They can appeal to avoiding “another Bosnia.” Because of these ways third parties got engaged, the problem of mustering “political will” did not arise.

Second, once in Macedonia, prevention missions attracted other governmental and nongovernmental initiatives by creating the need to report on the situation, generating information and attracting more attention by governments and professionals to the idea of preserving former Yugoslavia’s only peaceful multiethnic state. A cumulative process adds to the effectiveness of international efforts, since
the more foreigners on the ground, the more attention is focused on local actors' behavior, deterring them from actions world opinion finds unacceptable. Taking the pulse of a country through regular fact gathering on the ground not only helps separate major from minor warnings and set priorities but also reduces response time to real trouble. The “feedback loop” linking troubling event, early warning, analysis, and response is localized and smaller, making possible both early detection of problems and their treatment. This assumes local agents of international organizations have discretionary authority to take specific low-intensity actions, as the OSCE mission, the UN SRSG, and HCNM did. Finally, exposure on the ground encourages the deepening of activities into local societies.

The arrival on the scene by international preventive diplomats can also create another platform on which the nationalist political game can be played. Just as the international actors can wield incentives and disincentives that dissuade or encourage local players to act less or more violently, ingenious leaders of protagonist communities can play to international audiences so they back their cause in the local struggle.

In confronting this, international governmental preventive measures have a qualitative limitation, while nongovernmental approaches have a quantitative one. In Macedonia, UNPREDEP was essential to a favorable climate for a new Macedonian national politics, so the temptation to undertake political violence could be displaced by legitimate channels for political struggle, including generally nonviolent street demonstrations. In fact, UNPREDEP and the OSCE have been unusually involved in the domestic and local-level politics of a more or less willing sovereign state, even if often informally and behind the scenes. Their hybrid of official diplomacy with Track Two dialogues belied somewhat the notion that intergovernmental bodies cannot deal effectively with nonstate actors. Nevertheless, they tended to deal inherently with national-level political actors. Their policy tools thus require supplementary efforts that can strengthen national and local institutions and procedures for dispute resolution and implement economic programs to alleviate material needs and thus gradually take the heat out of ethnic group grievances. Lacking these measures, diplomacy will perpetuate the incentives to wage the zero-sum game of ethnic group one-upmanship, even beyond its usefulness for the interests of the members of the groups involved. In Kosovo, the politics of parallelism provided neither political engagement nor reliable security. Thus, the humanitarian NGO efforts, though important in their own terms, could only preserve the status quo, and any progress by Track Two diplomacy was determined by whether the side with the upper hand found it convenient. In short, neither of these approaches alone can create a dynamic domestic politics and self-sustaining civil society.

All things considered, preventive action needs to be reconceptualized. It may work best not when viewed and organized as a hierarchical process through which special high-level early warning and preventive units launch “one-time” interventions that are triggered by alarms about specific events that augur a looming local outbreak of violence. Rather, it can work best as a rolling process that is carried out locally by many outside and local actors. This process involves continuous tracking or monitoring of peaceful and conflictual conditions and
repeated responses, both to deter and to quell potential violence as well as buttress the forces of peaceful transition. To provide sufficient incentives and disincentives to foster the desired regulated forms of political conflict and social change, preventive action must draw wherever possible on all available programs that may be appropriate to particular situations, including those in economic development and reforms, democratization, military affairs, trade, and education, for example, as well as diplomacy. To be put to work to build on peace and act against violence, these functional programs need to adopt specific conflict impact and peace-building indicators and decision procedures that fine-tune the timing, targeting, and distribution of resources of their relevant operations. Without awaiting a specific invitation, peace-building and violence prevention functions need to be built into the routine operations of the governments and multilateral organizations wherever they are already operating in the various authoritarian and clientelist systems that are now being challenged by the global trends toward economic and political liberalization.
Part Four

Ethnic Conflicts in Africa
Somalia: Misread Crises and Missed Opportunities

Kenneth Menkhaus and Louis Ortmayer

Case Summary

IN JANUARY 1991, AFTER fifteen years of worsening political decay and three years of civil war, the final remnants of the Somali state disintegrated. In its wake arose a fractious mosaic of militia fiefdoms, Islamist enclaves, mafiaesque commercial empires, and large zones of lawless, predatory banditry. The prolonged civil war and marauding warlordism that followed the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime left most of the country in ruins and spawned widespread famine in the southern portion of the country. This descent into chaos was so profound that even a massive international intervention, replete with thirty thousand UN peacekeeping troops and a multibillion-dollar budget, was unable to promote national reconciliation and resuscitate the failed Somali state. When the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) withdrew in 1995, Somalia was left as a collection of fluid, highly localized polities that together fail to add up to anything approaching a conventional state and in which sustainable peace is elusive for all but a few fortunate regions in the country.

Explanations of “what went wrong” in Somalia vary widely. Many analysts pin blame on individual leaders. The former Somali dictator, Siyad Barre, is held responsible for repressive, divide-and-rule tactics that stoked the flames of clan conflict, while post-Barre political and militia figures in Somalia are accused of self-aggrandizing pursuit of power at the expense of their own countrymen. Other analysts hold the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States...
accountable for the exceptional militarization of conflicts in the Horn of Africa and for shoring up the oppressive Barre regime for two decades.³ In addition, a virtual cottage industry has developed around critiques of international actors in Somalia—the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the United States, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and others—for sins of omission and commission as the Somali crisis evolved. The inexplicable inaction of the international community during critical early phases (1988–91) of the Somali crisis has been widely criticized in postcrisis analyses.⁴ Even harsher assessments have been leveled at the subsequent 1992–95 humanitarian interventions in Somalia that fared so poorly. One such critique finds fault with the “naïveté” of international attempts to marginalize factional and militia leaders and with the failure of the United Nations to maintain neutrality in the conflict.⁵ A rival school of thought blames the failure of international peace-building efforts on the United States and United Nations for legitimizing Somali “warlords” who were seen as the cause of, not the solution to, Somalia’s conflict.⁶ Others simply criticize the poor quality of international diplomacy in Somalia, which they conclude was uninformed, incompetent, and inconsistent and which as a result sometimes fueled the very conflicts it sought to mediate.⁷ Despite their differences, these assessments share a common premise—that the Somali crisis could have been significantly contained had more appropriate and astute policies been pursued there.

At the other end of the analytic spectrum are more fatalistic critiques that contend that attempts by the international community at preventive diplomacy and peace enforcement in Somalia were misplaced and probably doomed to fail. Some of these arguments question the relevance of liberal, Western notions of conflict resolution and power sharing in intractable ethnic conflicts in the third world.⁸ Others take the position that the Somali conflict has simply not been ripe for resolution; that is, the protagonists to the dispute have not reached a “hurting stalemate” and are thus not amenable to outside mediation.⁹ Finally, some argue that the Somali crisis is rooted not in a mere power struggle between competing factions but rather in the complete collapse of the state structure, an event that was bound to produce endemic conflict not easily amenable to outside mediation.¹⁰

Analytically sound discussion of the missed opportunities for preventive diplomacy in Somalia must navigate between the shoals of wishful thinking and fatalism. The point of departure for this analysis is that a period of profound political crisis was indeed inevitable in Somalia and, even in a “best-case scenario,” would have produced sharp and probably deadly communal and factional conflict. But what actually transpired in Somalia—the prolonged and utter collapse of the state, the destructive civil war that left most of southern Somalia in ruins, and the rise of an economy of banditry and plunder that produced massive famine and refugee crises—unquestionably constitutes a “worst-case scenario” that could and should have been avoided. While no amount of preventive diplomacy could have completely preempted some level of violent conflict during the crisis of state involution in Somalia, available evidence suggests that timely
diplomatic interventions at several key junctures might have significantly reduced, defused, and contained that violence. Once those windows of opportunity were missed, however, Somalia was lost to a downward spiral of violence and warlordism from which it has yet to reemerge.

Anatomy of the Somali Conflict

Though many factors have played a part in Somalia’s descent into prolonged warfare and communal violence, several underlying causes are most significant.

Involution of the State

A strong case can be made that the central force driving the conflict was and remains the crisis of the state in Somalia. As early as the 1970s, Somalia was on a collision course with a period of profound political involution and social crisis linked directly to the unsustainability and artificiality of the Somali state, which had grown bloated on extremely high levels of Cold War–inspired economic and military assistance.11 By the mid-1980s, 100 percent of Somalia’s development budget was externally funded, and 50 percent of its recurrent budget was dependent on international loans and grants.12 At the height of Somalia’s foreign aid dependence in 1987, one analyst calculated that total development assistance constituted a stunning 57 percent of Somalia’s GNP.13 Somalia, one of the poorest countries in the world, had become “a ward of the international community” and its state a house of cards.14 This windfall of “rent” derived from Somalia’s strategic location and its humanitarian misery enabled Barre to finance and sustain a vastly oversized civil service and one of the largest standing armies in sub-Saharan Africa. The hundreds of thousands of jobs and access to government coffers that this entailed served as an ideal vehicle through which to dispense patronage and buy off potential opposition. Worse still, one of Somalia’s other top sources of revenue—remittances from migrant workers—was vulnerable to the vagaries of the oil market and external politics.15 Thus, both Somali society and the Somali state were living far beyond their modest means in the 1970s and 1980s.16 The reckoning finally came with the end of the Cold War, when Somalia’s strategic value plummeted. By 1988, serious human rights abuses in Somalia, which had previously been downplayed by Western donors, became the justification for freezing aid to the Barre regime. By 1989, Somalia was almost entirely cut off from outside foreign assistance; in January 1991, the Somali state completely collapsed.

In sum, the dramatic expansion of Somalia’s “national cake” by external sources enabled the Barre regime to use patronage as the cement to bind together a fractious Somali polity; and the dramatic shrinkage of that cake at the end of the Cold War produced an inevitable and fierce conflict for the few resources that remained. Diplomats and other peacemakers seeking to defuse this conflict were thus working within the parameters of a far more serious crisis
than a mere dispute over power sharing or a more equitable allocation of resources. Preventive diplomatic efforts that focused on striking a deal for power sharing within the state missed the central point— that the state itself was in profound crisis. Conventional preventive diplomacy confronted in the Somali state’s rapid and total collapse a fundamentally new type of crisis for which it was not conceptually and tactically prepared.

Centrifugal Forces

Another critical factor in Somalia’s crisis was, and remains, the centrifugal forces— political, economic, and social— pulling at the seams of national unity. Both colonial and postcolonial state structures in Somalia have struggled, with only limited success, to superimpose their authority on historically stateless Somali society. The single most powerful centrifugal force in Somalia is segmentary lineage identity, or clan.

Clannism is a fundamental element in the current Somali conflict. But its virulent contemporary manifestation in Somalia is poorly understood, leading some observers to attribute all of Somalia’s woes to clannism even while others deny its relevance. Like all ethnic identities, clannism in Somalia can be mobilized or (less easily) demobilized by enterprising political elites; it can play a useful and healthy role or can be uniquely divisive and destructive; and it has the capacity to be highly flexible, fluid, and even inventive.\(^\text{17}\)

Clannism possesses a proclivity toward fissure and fragmentation that renders political alliances and pacts very transient. Indeed, since 1991, nearly all of the most deadly armed conflicts have pitted Somalis of the same clan-family against one another. Holding together the subclan rivalries and antagonisms within clans occupies most of the day-to-day energies of Somali political and clan leaders. For those outside mediators and Somali peacemakers seeking to prevent or contain conflict, clan politics proved to be a vexing force to work against.

When Siyad Barre came to power in a coup in 1969, one of his early pronouncements was the “outlawing” of clannism. But Barre himself increasingly relied on divide-and-rule tactics between Somali clans to maintain his hold on power. He was, moreover, widely credited as a master of the game, enabling him to keep opposition divided and off-balance through skillful manipulation of intricate clan rivalries. Barre’s “survivalist, divide-and-rule tactics,” concludes I.M. Lewis, “relied heavily on the unreliable expedient of bribing and arming friendly clans to attack the claims of his opponents.”\(^\text{18}\) The long-term cost of this strategy was high; many observers fault Barre for creating such deep-seated clan animosities and grievances that opposition forces were unable to overcome their own clan divisions to form a government of national unity after his overthrow. While conflict in Somalia could at no point be reduced to a simple clan formula— class, region, generation, commercial interests, and other factors also helped shape and complicate the pattern of politics— clannism came to take on a dynamic of its own independent of the political leaders who aspired to manipulate it for their own benefit.\(^\text{19}\)
Repression

Another highly combustible element in the Somali crisis was the level of political repression under the Barre regime. To maintain his grip on power, Barre relied not only on patronage and divide-and-rule tactics but also on terror. The often capricious targeting of real and potential enemies for imprisonment, torture, and execution created a climate of fear, violence, and vengeance that at least partially explains how a country that was remarkably free of violent crime up to the mid-1980s descended so quickly into an abyss of cruel and gratuitous criminality in the 1990s. As with so many of Somalia's woes, this too was an externally supported phenomenon. The fearsome security forces—the National Secret Service (NSS) and the “Red Berets” (drawn almost exclusively from Barre's Marehan clan)—were created and trained by advisers from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries during the 1970s.20

The high level of political repression employed by the Barre regime had additional political fallout: it came to reinforce in the minds of Somalis the perception of the state not as an instrument of governance but as a tool for domination and expropriation by one group over others. Control over the state was seen in increasingly stark, zero-sum terms by Somalis. While some constituencies, such as former civil servants, were desperate to resuscitate the state, most Somalis viewed the prospect of a revived state with fear, and hence they distrusted national reconciliation efforts that included the rebuilding of a transitional government as a goal. Mediators seeking to cultivate a spirit of power sharing as a positive-sum game were thus tilling rocky soil.

Militarization

Mounting political tensions in Somalia over the course of the 1980s played themselves out against a backdrop of one of the most militarized regions of the third world. Over the course of three decades, the Soviet Union and the West poured several billion dollars in total military assistance into Ethiopia and Somalia. Tragically, most of this hardware and training was directed by those two governments against their own people.

The 1991 collapse of both the Barre regime in Somalia and the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime in Ethiopia triggered an enormous outpouring of weaponry and ammunition into public hands, so that the entire Horn of Africa was awash in inexpensive weaponry at the precise moment that the Somali state collapsed. Most Somali males over the age of twelve owned and carried a weapon. This meant that every instance of communal tension had the potential to quickly escalate into a much more lethal conflict. By empowering armed youths and marginalizing clan elders, the militarization of Somali society undermined the central peacemaking role that elders traditionally played. It also meant that virtually every Somali constituency was sufficiently armed to exercise veto power over any agreement or peace process with which it did not agree. And, because most Somali constituencies held inflated notions of their relative importance, size, and right to rule, their ability to exercise veto power at the point of a gun made preventive diplomacy and peace building even more difficult.
The Crisis of Legitimate Authority

At every phase of the Somali crisis, a central obstacle to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking was the problem of identifying leadership that enjoyed legitimacy as representatives of their alleged Somali constituencies. In fact, leadership and representation were constantly contested. In the absence of legitimate, authoritative Somali representatives, diplomatic efforts to defuse or contain crises ran aground.

The absence of legitimate authority was most acute following the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, when political authority was in chronic dispute, and tended to occur along two distinct fault lines. The first was intraclan. When reconciliation efforts were pursued between two or more clans, it was often difficult to secure representatives who were acceptable to all subclans within their lineage. But a second, more intractable dispute over representation pitted leaders of factions and militias versus a loose collection of “grassroots” community leaders composed of elders, clerics, intellectuals, businessmen, heads of local NGOs, and others. While relations between these leaders were complex and variable, each claimed to be the sole legitimate authority and representative of the community. As a result, many external efforts to promote reconciliation or prevent conflict actually served to trigger conflict within Somali communities over who among them had the right to negotiate on behalf of the rest. Indeed, securing the right to negotiate on behalf of one’s group was often of greater political consequence to aspiring Somali leaders than the actual outcome of the negotiations, as it helped legitimize and solidify their leadership claims against internal rivals.21

But even prior to the collapse of the Somali state, representation was a contentious matter. Leadership within dissident groups opposing the Barre regime was in constant dispute, as was the size and composition of the opposition they claimed to represent. And in the final two years of the Barre regime, the rise to prominence of a peaceful, multiclan, civic opposition group known as the “Manifesto Group” was undermined in part by accusations that the collection of over one hundred business leaders and former politicians disproportionately represented some clan interests over others and represented a clique of former elites from the 1960s rather than the broad Somali populace.

Conflict Constituencies

A final element in this anatomy of the Somali conflict is the rise of groups whose interests were increasingly linked to ongoing conflict rather than peace and stability. Their vested interest in interclan tensions, armed violence, and the breakdown of law and order complicated preventive diplomacy and peace building. Once significant political actors came to associate their political survival and economic prospects with conflict rather than with reconciliation, peace building was transformed from an exercise in negotiation and mediation (i.e., the art of reshaping the Somali protagonists’ perceptions of their interests) to the much more problematic assignment of either marginalizing recalcitrant players (which the United Nations attempted in its war on General Aideed in
1993, with disastrous results) or transforming their interests from conflict to peace through programs of reconstruction and demobilization.

By far the most significant “conflict constituency” in the early phases (late 1970s to 1988) of the Somali crisis was the Barre regime itself; its survival depended on the fomenting of divisions, distrust, and vendettas between other clans. Having made far too many internal enemies, Barre and his supporters knew that reconciliation leading to political accommodation and power sharing was a formula for their removal from power.

Once the crisis exploded into full-scale civil war in northern Somalia in 1988, other conflict constituencies arose. Within the Somali military, officers guilty of committing or ordering atrocities against the Isaaq clan of northern Somalia understood that a cessation of hostilities and a political reconciliation carried the risk of inquiries into their war crimes. At lower levels in both the military and the various liberation fronts, young soldiers, most of whom were recruited from poor and remote nomadic regions, found that ongoing conflict provided them with opportunities to secure lucrative war booty from towns and cities far exceeding any other economic prospects for illiterate herders. For these young men, peace promised little more than unemployment and marginalization. Merchants of war also profited from continued conflict, thanks in large part to the international economy. Some merchants found the arms trade highly lucrative; others profited from the looting and dismantling of the country’s infrastructure for resale as scrap metal abroad; still others found the diversion and resale of emergency food relief, and the business of extortion of international relief agencies, an irresistibly profitable enterprise; and still others, including international concerns, found Somalia’s statelessness and anarchy an attractive environment for illicit activities such as toxic waste dumping. Finally, the worsening environment of conflict and insecurity produced a host of aspiring factional and militia leaders, whose power base rested on fear and force, not popular referendum, and whose status within their constituencies would quickly be eroded if their primary service—protecting the clan against enemy threats—was no longer needed.

The emergence of conflict constituencies—groups with tangible, sometimes vital interests in ongoing or heightened communal conflict and warfare and who risk significant political or economic losses in peace—exponentially increases the difficulties of reconciliation and peace-building efforts. Importantly, these interests could and did change over time. Many bandits, having acquired property or wealth, grew to favor peace and rule of law as a means of protecting their new assets; some factional and militia leadership had similar conversions. Yet this process of transformation was very slow. The destructive role that conflict constituencies played in Somalia once they developed serves as yet another reminder why timely preventive diplomacy is imperative in countries threatened by civil war.

Early Warning and Strategy of Action

At four distinct periods since 1979, opportunities arose for the international community to play a role in preventing or containing a series of worsening political conflicts in Somalia. In each instance, opportunities were missed. And with every
missed opportunity, Somali passed one “point of no return” and entered into a new, more violent, and more intractable level of conflict. Somalia's descent into complete state collapse and civil war was thus a sequence of cascading crises, each of which offered brief windows of opportunity for timely diplomatic intervention.

Significantly, each of these opportunities for preventive diplomacy was lost for quite different reasons. In 1979–80, geostrategic imperatives, fueled by heightened Cold War tensions in what National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski termed the “arc of crisis” from the Horn of Africa to Afghanistan, overrode concerns about Somalia's internal political conflicts. In 1981–88, strategic priorities were joined by bureaucratic incrementalism in both the U.S. government and other donors, which worked against any policy change calling for linkage of aid to political reforms and reconciliation. From 1988 to 1990, missed opportunities were a function of reduced international interests and lowered priorities in Somalia. In addition, while external actors had ample access to information on the growing political crisis in Somalia in 1988–90, they were working within the parameters of an inadequate analytic framework; that is, they assumed that the Somali situation was a conflict over power sharing within the state, not a crisis of the state itself. As a result, the very nature of the crisis was fundamentally misread by virtually all involved, including the Somali protagonists.

The final window of opportunity for preventive diplomacy, from January to November 1991, was utterly lost to a constellation of factors. These included international indifference to a low-priority region in the post–Cold War era; risk aversion in a country whose politics were seen as fraught with peril; lingering hostility toward and fatigue with Somalia on the part of key international actors; concerns over sovereignty in the confusing new context of a collapsed state; and a lack of both reliable information and a reliable analytic “road map” for diplomacy in a stateless society. Collectively, these factors resulted in an astonishing absence of international efforts to mediate in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Somali state. The subsequent explosion of heavy fighting in Mogadishu in November 1991, and the complete destruction of much of the capital, represented the final “point of no return” for a battered country.


In the immediate aftermath of its disastrous loss to Ethiopia in the 1977–78 Ogaden War, Somalia entered a short period of severe political crisis, but one that constituted a window of opportunity for preventive diplomacy. The opportunity was lost because potential Western patrons were preoccupied with geostrategic and geopolitical matters. The only conditionality imposed on the Barre regime at this time was intended to modify a Somali foreign policy—its continued military incursions into the Ogaden region of Ethiopia—which was a source of diplomatic complications for the United States.

Early Warning

Abandoned by the Soviet Union in 1978 and kept at arm's length by an ambivalent and divided Carter administration, the Barre regime was for two years
without the direct support of a superpower patron. Opposition to the regime flared up in the wake of the military loss and the power vacuum created by the departure of Barre's Soviet patrons. In large part, political opposition reflected grievances that had accumulated over the course of the first decade of the revolutionary government. Throughout the 1970s, notes Africa Watch, the army and security forces "sought to stamp out dissent and to prohibit criticism of government policies and leadership by extreme and systematic repression. The government's response to any political opposition was excessively and indiscriminately violent."23

From 1978 to 1981 the regime was consumed by accusations, arrests, executions, and coup attempts. Two insurgency movements were formed, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), composed of the Mijerteen clan, and the Somali National Movement (SNM), composed of the Isaaq clan.24 Meanwhile, the economy was in free fall, and hundreds of thousands of refugees from the war were encamped in Somalia. Barre was vulnerable and in a poor bargaining position had external powers insisted on initiatives that would have defused political tensions—expanding power sharing in the government, ending repression of peaceful opposition, negotiating with the armed opposition groups, and containing nepotism.

Strategies of Action

The key external player in this instance was the United States, which, having been expelled from Ethiopia by the revolutionary Dergue in 1977, was pondering "playing the Somali card" as a means of restoring a U.S. presence in the Horn of Africa.25 Had it offered aid to Somalia, but linked that assistance to political reform and reconciliation, it is possible that the Barre regime would have been forced to come to terms with its internal opposition. But establishing closer ties to Somalia was problematic and the subject of protracted debate within the Carter administration. One of the constraints was concern over the diplomatic fallout from close association with a virtual pariah state in Africa, a status that Somalia earned through its long-standing irredentist claims on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Any outside power that provided military assistance to Somalia while its irregular forces continued to cross the Ethiopian border would face serious diplomatic fallout in Africa. The Africa Bureau of the Department of State (DoS) was thus especially reluctant to embrace a relationship with Somalia, and it vigorously objected to Pentagon and National Security Council proposals to establish a U.S.-Somali military relationship.

Twice in 1977 and 1978, U.S. agreements to provide military aid to the Barre government were reached, only to be quickly withdrawn when evidence revealed Somali military presence inside Ethiopia.26 No arms would be provided, reiterated U.S. diplomats, until the Somali government terminated its involvement in the Ogaden.27 Conditionality was thus established as an important feature of U.S. aid to Somalia but directed only at modifying its foreign policy.

By 1979, however, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan elevated American security concerns in the Persian Gulf and
strengthened the hands of those who sought right of access to the airstrip at Berbera in northern Somalia. Geostrategic imperatives overrode lingering diplomatic doubts about the reliability of Somalia as an ally, and by 1980 the United States was committed to the provision of "defensive" military assistance to Somalia and a package of economic assistance that soon expanded into the largest U.S. aid program in sub-Saharan Africa. Once military and economic aid began to flow from the United States and its allies, an emboldened Barre regime had little incentive to negotiate with internal opposition. 28

American and other Western diplomats knew that the Barre regime faced internal opposition on a number of fronts, including several that led to failed coups. Indeed, the conventional wisdom in published analyses from 1978 through the early 1980s was that Barre’s rule was reaching its final days. 29 But most observers believed that Barre would be replaced in a coup mounted from within his own government; the armed opposition fronts in exile in Ethiopia were weak and in disarray. U.S. diplomats were primarily concerned with insuring that whoever replaced Barre would be friendly to Western security interests. In this they were reassured by the fact that such a successor would have little choice but to continue to embrace the new alliance with the West, since a return to Soviet patronage was out of the question. The hope and expectation was that new leadership would be more inclined to seek reconciliation with the disaffected northern clans, the Isaaq and Mijerteen, and would broaden clan representation in the government. This element of wishful thinking—that Somalia’s political conflicts would subside with the departure of Barre from the scene—clouded the thinking of diplomats, academics, and Somali dissidents alike.


Throughout the 1980s, the international community witnessed visible signs of a worsening political crisis in Somalia, particularly in northern Somalia, where the army imposed a brutal military occupation targeted against the Isaaq clan. A handful of outside observers—human rights groups, the U.S. Congressional Subcommittee on Africa, and some independent analysts—voiced concern about the political cauldron inside Somalia and questioned the appropriateness of foreign aid to the Barre regime. But once major military and economic assistance programs to Somalia were put in place, agencies developed their own powerful organizational interests in maintaining operations and were thus reluctant to consider linkage of aid to political reforms. 30 Notably, Western donors were willing to link aid to economic reforms in Somalia and were equally willing to use aid as an enticement to coax Somalia into a peace process with Ethiopia. 31 But no policy of linkage was developed to modify the regime’s worsening political behavior toward its own people. Thus, the last opportunity for initiatives that might have headed off the outbreak of full-scale civil war in the north of the country was missed.

The failure of international preventive diplomacy in this period was more than a sin of omission. The substantial economic and security assistance provided to
the Barre regime during this period actually exacerbated the conflict by providing Barre with the means to suppress, terrorize, and divide his growing opposition. The euphemism employed by American officials—that the United States provided only "defensive" military weaponry to Somalia—obscured the fact that Somali military operations were directed almost entirely against Somali citizens.

**Early Warning**

Signs of imminent political crisis were abundant throughout the 1980s; published political analyses annually forecast the demise of the regime. Speculation that Barre would be replaced in a coup was heightened in the aftermath of his 1986 auto accident, in which he suffered serious injuries. Meanwhile, political tensions in the country were increasing. As early as 1983, Africa Confidential reported that "politically and in terms of security the regime is losing control: large regions of the country are now in a state of virtual anarchy." Some of the intermittent armed conflict in the countryside represented clan resistance to military intimidation, extortion, and human rights abuses; but in other cases it consisted of interclan conflict sparked and nurtured by the Barre regime itself.

By far the most serious signal of impending civil strife was in northern Somalia. In response to the rise of an armed insurgency movement (the SNM), the government in 1982 placed the northwest of Somalia under a state of emergency and established what amounted to a military occupation in the region. Isaaq clansmen were shut out of positions in local politics, were displaced from commercial activities, and lived under a state of emergency. They were harassed, detained without trial, extorted, held for ransom by the military, tortured, and subjected to the whims of a notorious military court, which was implicated in mass executions. General Morgan, the military commander of the region, referred to "a campaign of obliteration" against the Isaaq in a leaked report in 1987. In addition, the government took advantage of the refugee crisis from war and drought to relocate tens of thousands of Somali Ogadeni refugees from Ethiopia into northern Somalia, where it used the camps as recruitment bases to arm Ogadeni clansmen against the Isaaq. For the Isaaq clan, the entire situation was increasingly unbearable and proved a recipe for civil war.

Nowhere were signs of impending crisis more apparent than within the Somali military. First, the top ranks of the military became the exclusive domain of the Marehan and an increasingly narrow band of allied clans, reflecting the political exclusion of most of Somali society. Second, forced conscription by the military became more and more prevalent in the 1980s, a practice that antagonized broad sections of civil society and contributed to mutiny and desertion in the armed forces. Third, army units came to be defined along clan lines, a practice that allowed Barre to pit one clan against another but that ultimately proved explosive. But most important, the military's main preoccupation over the course of the 1980s was not national defense but rather suppression, control, extortion, and expropriation against its own people, a fact that could not have escaped the notice of U.S. military advisers.
These warning signs were noted and publicly discussed, but misread; they were generally seen as indicators of an impending coup or internal power struggles rather than foreshadowings of civil war. Especially in the aftermath of Barre's serious car accident in 1986, U.S. and other analysts devoted most of their attention to the political intrigues within Barre's inner circle, awaiting a move that would replace Barre and thus improve the political climate. At the time, this interpretation of events seemed reasonable; the Somali opposition movements, for instance, did not exploit the confusion following Barre's accident but were instead very quiet, which most observers took to be a sign that they were waiting to enter into a dialogue with a successor administration. In the end, however, it was clear that throughout the 1980s the donor community consistently exhibited what David Rawson terms a "baseless optimism... with little apparent regard for the political undercurrents tugging at the Somali state." He attributes this collective misreading of Somalia's prospects for political and economic reform to a combination of factors, including the "studied ambivalence of Siyaad's zig-zag tactics," bureaucratic inertia, and a "groupthink" dynamic within the donor community. Melissa Pailthorp concludes that this was less a case of misreading than of geostrategic expediency, arguing that "despite blatant corruption, human-rights abuses and inconsistent cooperation in [economic] policy reform, donors continued to support a government financed almost exclusively by external sources in order to uphold foreign policy agendas."

A few external actors voiced concern about the broader implications of Somalia's political crisis, but to little avail. Within the U.S. government, the House Subcommittee on Africa was the most persistent critic, charging that the State Department (DoS) was downplaying worsening human rights abuses and repression by the Barre regime. But those objections generated little interest in a generally indifferent Congress and were no match for the powerful voices in the DoS, U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), and Department of Defense (DoD) that lobbied for continued close ties to the regime. DoD advocacy was animated by a broad strategic mission of maintaining rapid response capacity into the Middle East, while AID sought to protect its ambitious mission, the largest U.S. foreign assistance program in sub-Saharan Africa. With U.S. security assistance programs to Somalia totaling over $500 million in the 1980s, and U.S. economic aid to the country reaching $639 million over the course of the decade, powerful interests in the maintenance of those aid relations developed within key branches of the U.S. government. For their part, UN agencies and international NGOs also knew of worsening political conditions inside the country but rarely opted to speak out, as Somalia housed some of their largest and most ambitious aid projects. Thus, international development projects continued to be proposed, studied, funded, and (unsuccessfully) implemented in a business-as-usual manner. It was not until 1987, with the appointment of Frank Crigler as U.S. ambassador to Somalia, that the United States began to prioritize human rights as among the "opportunities for bilateral cooperation" in Somalia.
In contrast to the absence of international diplomatic efforts to head off Somalia's growing internal tensions, a great deal of international effort was devoted to resolving the long-standing conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. Throughout 1986 and 1987, diplomats from the European Economic Community and Italy dangled promises of hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to the governments of both Mengistu and Barre if a settlement on the Ogaden could be reached. For their part, both Mengistu and Barre also viewed an accord as an opportunity to shut down cross-border insurgency movements that each sponsored against the other. The two increasingly besieged regimes could then redirect their armed forces to deal with other trouble spots and rebellions.

Nearly all outside analysts believed that a Mengistu-Barre deal would seal the fate of the SNM as an armed insurgency group. This expectation was certainly shared by the Barre regime when it signed the Ethiopian-Somali accord in April 1988. Nevertheless, in yet another collective misreading of Somalia's politics, the opposite transpired. Instead of folding, the desperate SNM launched a full-scale attack on Barre's forces in northern Somalia in May, hoping to liberate enough territory to create a permanent foothold inside Somalia. It succeeded in pushing into the city of Burao and temporarily capturing most of the principal city of Hargeisa. Government forces responded with "appalling savagery," targeting the entire Isaaq civilian population with arrests, rape, mass executions, and indiscriminate shooting and bombing. Hundreds of thousands of Isaaq refugees fled for their lives across the Ethiopian border; government warplanes strafed them as they fled. As many as fifty thousand Somalis died and the city of Hargeisa was virtually leveled in what outside analysts depicted as a "genocidal" campaign by the Barre regime against the Isaaq. The civil war had begun, and the level of brutality it triggered boded ill for subsequent diplomatic efforts to contain and resolve it through negotiations.


The context in which preventive diplomatic efforts were pursued in Somalia from 1988 to 1990 differed dramatically from preceding years. Within Somalia itself, the civil war in the north was spreading into other sections of the country, so that preventive diplomacy was focused on the difficult task of reconciliation and power-sharing in the midst of armed hostilities. Simultaneously, the waning of the Cold War had a powerful but paradoxical effect on diplomatic initiatives in Somalia's crisis. On the one hand, it gave Western states much greater latitude to link foreign aid to political reforms and reconciliation, but at the same time it dramatically reduced Western interest in Somalia. The result was a policy of collective disengagement. Foreign aid was almost entirely frozen by 1989, but that linkage policy was accompanied by only a few, half-hearted diplomatic efforts to promote reconciliation in Somalia. Many analysts fault the international community for this passive and withdrawn response, and they consider the dearth of offers of international mediation in 1988–90 a "missed opportunity." Mohamed Sahnoun,
who served as the UN special representative to Somalia from March to October 1992, asserted that “if the international community had intervened earlier and more effectively in Somalia, much of the catastrophe that has unfolded could have been avoided.”

For the most part, international inaction in Somalia in this period was a reflection of reduced interests in the country; but it was also a failure of analysis. Simply put, no one—neither diplomats nor academic specialists nor Somali leaders themselves—foresaw the possibility that the Somali state would disintegrate and vanish entirely. Despite evidence that in retrospect clearly pointed to that possibility, there was in 1988–90 no precedent in the contemporary state system for a scenario of complete and prolonged state collapse. Unable to “think outside the box,” analysts could not predict what they could not imagine. Instead, the more plausible assumption at the time was that the combination of external and internal pressure on the Barre regime would force it to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement with opposition forces, probably one in which the Barre regime’s own future would be in political asylum elsewhere. That process would in turn create a new government that would garner enough external assistance to hobble along as one of many “marginal” states in Africa. Had observers foreseen the possibility of the total collapse of the state, and the enormous costs in human lives that that chaos would inflict on the Somali people, the international community might have been motivated to mount a more systematic and engaged preventive campaign to promote reconciliation and a “soft landing” for the shrinking Somali state between 1988 and 1990.

Early Warning

Throughout the final three years of the Barre regime, there was no shortage of information warning of a deteriorating situation in Somalia. The most dramatic warning sign was the shocking, genocidal campaign by government forces in the civil war in northwestern Somalia. But other signals of collapse were apparent as well. For instance, numerous reports were made public of a breakdown within the government military, including the dangerous balkanization of military units along clan lines; high rates of desertion, exceeding 50 percent; and actual firefights between rival clans within the military.

Moreover, in 1989 and 1990 the SNM was joined by new clan-based opposition fronts that began to attack government forces on multiple fronts. While the SNM continued to wage war in the northwest, the Ogadeni clan— which had supplied a large contingent of soldiers in the government army— broke away to form the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the Hawiye clan formed the United Somali Congress (USC). Over the course of 1989 and 1990, the government controlled less and less of the countryside, and international aid agencies were forced to evacuate more and more regions in the face of chaos, banditry, atrocities, and scorched-earth tactics by the retreating government forces. In the capital, a “feeding frenzy” broke out, with civil servants and the military systematically appropriating items of value. Vehicles, funds, computers, generators, and other valuables were grabbed up by government employees who
seemed convinced that their time at the foreign aid feeding trough was soon coming to an end. Exortion, kidnapping, and violence against aid agencies were also commonplace and led many NGOs to suspend operations.

Perhaps the most ominous warning sign of all, however, was the clannish and fractious nature of opposition movements. Not only was each opposition movement closely identified with a single clan, but subclan divisions within each movement were endemic. Under such circumstances, it was difficult to envision a viable coalition government to replace Barre.

Key Decisions on Early Action

The first and most prominent effort to prevent the Somali crisis from deteriorating came from the United States. Following a protracted internal debate in 1988, the United States froze military and economic assistance to the Barre regime until meaningful political reforms and reconciliation efforts were undertaken. Within two months of the outbreak of civil war in the north of Somalia, U.S. ambassador Crigler recommended freezing shipments of lethal weaponry to Somalia and placing political reconciliation at the top of U.S. objectives in Somalia, proposals that were supported by the State Department and approved by the White House but that met with resistance from the Department of Defense. The Pentagon rejected linkage outright, arguing that it needed to continue to nurture a military-to-military relationship to ensure access to the port and airstrip at Berbera, and voicing concern that U.S. credibility was on the line if it froze military aid to an ally in need. Indeed, in June 1988, the Pentagon signed off on the delivery of $1.4 million in lethal aid to Somalia that had been previously delayed for logistical reasons, a move that was widely criticized later.

But the more consequential debate over linkage of aid to political reforms in Somalia occurred between Congress and the DoS. It revisited the recurrent debate over the effectiveness of linkage of foreign aid in pursuit of behavior modification. On one side was the House Subcommittee on Africa, which threatened to freeze various economic assistance packages to Somalia unless the Barre regime ended human rights abuses and accepted political dialogue with the opposition. Congress, as well as vocal human rights organizations, argued that the United States was fueling the conflict by providing support to the Barre regime, which implicated the United States in the regime's human rights abuses and thus jeopardized future U.S. relations with a post-Barre government. But State Department officials countered that freezing economic aid would only reduce U.S. leverage with the Barre regime and make it more difficult to play a constructive role in political reconciliation. "People on the Hill need to be realistic," one official contended. "Foreign assistance gives very little leverage when you want one-for-one results." Another State Department official stressed the importance of "keeping faith with the [Somali] government" and "not applying undue public pressure" to maintain leverage. Nonetheless, Congress froze $55 million in economic assistance to Somalia by October 1988.
Between the summers of 1988 and 1989, an internally divided U.S. administration unintentionally pursued a multitrack approach to Somalia. Congress played the role of “hard-liner,” condemning human rights abuses and freezing foreign aid to Somalia; the Pentagon played the role of “good cop,” continuing joint military exercises with the Somali military in an effort to maintain good relations; and the State Department played the role of “honest broker,” making numerous efforts to coax the Barre regime into political dialogue with the SNM, insisting on the need for political reconciliation and respect for human rights, and promising renewed aid if improvements were made. A case could be made that this accidental division of labor played to the strength of State Department negotiators in efforts to move the Barre government toward dialogue with the SNM. But the greater strength of the U.S. bargaining position was the ripple effect U.S. policies eventually had on other bilateral and multilateral donors, most of whom began to suspend programs in Somalia. Most importantly, the U.S. policy strongly influenced the lending practices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, shutting Somalia off from multilateral donors as well. Though the Barre regime still enjoyed some assistance from Italy, Saudi Arabia, and Libya through 1989, a seal of approval from the United States was essential to win back adequate levels of multilateral assistance.

Until July 1989, the United States engaged in low-key discussions through its embassy in Mogadishu to prompt political dialogue and reconciliation. This reportedly included a 1988 offer of asylum to Barre, as well as promises to release funds to cover Somalia’s arrears to the IMF if progress was made on political reconciliation. The enticement of a resumption of aid partially succeeded with the desperate Barre government. In February 1989, Barre sent his prime minister, General Mohamed Ali Samatar, on a tour of the United States and United Kingdom to present an impressive set of political reforms. Samatar promised the release of all political prisoners, unconditional amnesty to all Somalis living abroad, an end to forced conscription of Somali refugees, an investigation into human rights violations, national reconciliation to end the war in the north, and privatization of the economy. But the implementation of these promises was often problematic. The investigation into human rights abuses, for instance, was to be conducted by a committee that included the director of the National Security Service, which was responsible for many of the worst abuses. And Samatar’s promise of national reconciliation was stillborn when it was revealed that the government refused to negotiate with the SNM leadership, which it viewed as a terrorist organization, but instead sought dialogue with selected northern “community leaders.” Samatar’s promises appeared to be yet another instance of Barre’s “zig-zag tactics” with the international community, empty pledges meant only to buy time and new aid packages from donors.

American efforts to foster political dialogue ended abruptly in July 1989, when the Somali military was implicated in several massacres in Mogadishu and...
unrest reached the streets of the capital. At that point, U.S. diplomats concluded that Somalia had crossed a point of no return, and U.S. efforts to play a major role in reconciliation would be futile.\textsuperscript{61} The State Department and Pentagon no longer pressed for resumption of aid, and instead the United States began a significant drawdown of embassy staff.\textsuperscript{62} Thereafter, although the Department of State continued to call for reconciliation, the United States played no significant diplomatic role in the spiraling crisis.

As the United States disengaged, few international actors stepped in to assume a more prominent mediating role. Italy and Egypt both attempted to convene a reconciliation conference in 1990. But those two states were perceived as having political agendas and preferences within Somalia that aroused suspicion on the part of one or more of the Somali groups; there was particular concern that such peace proposals were thinly disguised efforts to salvage the Barre regime.\textsuperscript{63} Other international actors, especially the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Arab League, were conspicuously absent. The Arab League was preoccupied with the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; the OAU was historically reluctant to involve itself in the internal conflicts of its member states; and the United Nations was unlikely to assume a high-level diplomatic role in the absence of a cue from the Security Council, which it did not receive.

An air of fatalism about the Somali crisis permeated embassies in Mogadishu. By mid-1989, Somalia was essentially left to its own devices by a preoccupied and frustrated international community.

Unfortunately, that policy of collective disengagement may have led to a missed opportunity for a constructive mediating role in Somalia. In May 1990, 144 prominent and respected Somali community leaders drafted and signed a manifesto calling for a return to civilian, multiparty rule and the convening of a national reconciliation conference to establish a caretaker government until elections could be held.\textsuperscript{64} It was clearly a courageous, last-ditch effort by a multiclan alliance of former politicians, businessmen, and community leaders to save the country from all-out, clan-based civil war in the capital. The "Manifesto Group" may not have been an ideal coalition—a number of criticisms were raised about its internal composition and agenda—but it nonetheless represented the last hope for a broad-based, negotiated, and peaceful process of political transition and succession in Somalia.\textsuperscript{65} Some observers contend that, had the international community provided vigorous and public support for the manifesto, Somalia might have been provided a window of opportunity to exit from its spiraling violence. But international support for the manifesto was muted, and the government response was to arrest and detain over fifty of the signatories.

Thereafter, Somalia clearly passed yet another point of no return. The descent into full-scale, clan-based civil war in the capital and violent anarchy throughout southern Somalia was swift and assured. A last-ditch effort by the Italian and Egyptian governments to convene a reconciliation conference in December 1990 was overtaken by events and canceled. The fact that these two outside brokers proposed a power-sharing arrangement that included a continued role for Siyad Barre only deepened the suspicions of opposition groups that Egypt and
Italy were not neutral but had ties to the Barre regime to protect. Such Somali fears that outsiders all had their own hidden agendas and tended to favor one clan over another were sometimes well grounded but often a reflection of a paranoia born of a brutal civil war. Nonetheless, perceived bias on the part of external mediators would complicate diplomatic initiatives in Somalia during the years of anarchy and intervention.

At no point in the spiraling crises of 1988–90 could a single diplomatic decision have dramatically altered the course of events in Somalia. But it is quite possible that a concerted, high-profile, and coordinated international strategy emphasizing both reconciliation and resources might have provided a “soft landing” for the conflict-ridden and shrinking Somali state. One lesson of special importance from this period in Somalia’s crisis is the complexity of linking foreign aid to preventive diplomacy. Freezing economic and military aid to the Barre regime did succeed in shocking the government into pursuing concrete political reforms, but at the same time was a key precipitating cause of the collapse of the state itself. Had donor states and their decision-making bodies been aware that the complete freezing of aid to Somalia would prompt the collapse of the state, they might have been better served by a more gradualist approach, one that ratcheted foreign aid levels downward slowly, to give the Somali state a chance to wean itself from external support.

Preventive Diplomacy in a Collapsed State: January to November 1991

The fall of the last remnants of the Barre regime in January 1991 was accompanied by total collapse of the state itself. In truth, most of the countryside had already been without even the pretense of state governance for a year or even longer, as the regime withdrew to major towns and the capital. Even where the “state” still had a presence, its primary activity was extortion, plundering, and terrorizing local populations, not governance. The collapsed Barre regime was succeeded by chaos, in which city streets and agricultural villages were raided by roving, armed bandits, and a spree of widespread looting left homes, businesses, government buildings, and embassies completely plundered. Meanwhile, Hawiye and Darood clan militias fought over a wide swath of agricultural land in southern Somalia, a war that featured as much pillaging of innocent villages as it did actual combat between the USC and SPM forces. When the Hawiye and Darood were not fighting one another, they were increasingly engaged in deadly quarrels among themselves. In particular, the Hawiye clan family was bitterly divided between supporters of Ali Mahdi (of the Abgal clan) and General Mohamed Farah Aideed (of the Habr Gedr clan) over leadership of the USC and the “provisional government” Mahdi claimed to head.

Early Warning

From the vantage point of outside observers, it appeared that Somalia had descended into a level of anarchy, gratuitous violence and destruction that far exceeded worst-case scenarios projected by analysts in 1989 and 1990. But this was
yet another misreading of the Somali crisis. However tragic and chaotic Somalia had become in 1991, it could, and did, get worse. In particular, simmering intraclan tensions, especially within the Hawiye clan family, threatened to explode into a level of violence that would virtually destroy the capital, Mogadishu, and hasten the arrival of one of the worst famines and refugee crises of the twentieth century. The ten months between January and November 1991 thus constituted a final window of opportunity to head off such a disaster. That opportunity was lost, primarily because of myopic leadership within Somali political factions themselves but also because of an astonishing absence of any appreciable international effort to mediate or provide good offices.

Indeed, with the exception of a handful of NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross working in dangerous conditions to provide emergency relief in a worsening humanitarian crisis, the world paid very little attention to the chaos in Somalia. Embassies and UN offices in Mogadishu were all evacuated and closed. The U.S. embassy, which in the late 1980s had over two hundred officials and contractors, was reduced to a single desk officer and one special relief coordinator for the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, both of whom monitored the situation from Nairobi, Kenya. In the words of former Ambassador Crigler, the U.S. had “turned out the lights, closed the door, and forgot about the place.”

Strategies of Action

U.S. diplomacy after 1990 was based on a preference to allow former colonial powers Italy and Great Britain to take the lead in policy on Somalia. But the United Kingdom was disinclined to get involved (and was at any rate always suspected of a bias in favor of northern Somalia, its former colony). By contrast, Italy retained a strong interest in the Horn of Africa, and in maintaining its cultural and commercial interests there. As a result, the Italian government sought to provide its “good offices” in 1991 to the various Somali factions. But Italy faced a number of obstacles. First, its neutrality continued to be suspected by some Somali factions, especially by General Aideed. Second, the Italian government itself was divided on policy preferences in the Horn of Africa along party lines, so that the coalition government in Italy pursued not a bipartisan policy but rather a “partisan bi-policy.” This led to some poorly conceived and nearly fatal diplomatic initiatives, including an October 1991 incident in which an Italian aircraft carrying Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Andrea Borruso was shot at by Aideed’s forces and prevented from landing in Mogadishu. Dissatisfied by Italian efforts, Somalis urged American officials to step up to play a lead role in promoting reconciliation. Jan Westcott, the OFDA special relief coordinator for Somalia, recalled, “By September [1991], I was being approached by Aideed, elders, local administration officials and businessmen on a continual basis and asked to urge the United States government to send a senior diplomat to assist them in reconciling their differences. Jimmy Carter’s name was brought up several times.” But no such initiatives were made.

The one promising opportunity for national reconciliation—the “Djibouti Conference” held in July 1991, supported by regional governments in the Horn of
Africa—received no assistance from the United Nations, OAU, or major powers, and hence lacked the clout to pressure all major Somali factions to attend and abide by the accords. It was not until a horrific war between two factions of the Hawiye clan leveled Mogadishu in November 1991, followed by massive famine, that the world began to take notice of, and eventually become embroiled in, the Somali crisis. By then, there was nothing left for preventive diplomacy to prevent.

Apportioning blame for this case of overwhelming collective inaction is easier than explaining that inaction. One of the most succinct and well-publicized critiques of the “failure of the collective response” directs the blame as follows:

> The unvarnished history of the UN’s role in Somalia is a tragic one of opportunities missed and strategic and operational blunders not justified by situational realities. Western donor governments did little better, and African entities—in particular the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—contributed virtually nothing to efforts to avoid calamity. . . . The perpetrators of Somalia’s misery are Somali. The passive accomplices, however, are officials of the UN, of other multilateral organizations, and of the governments of major powers who contributed to that misery by neglect, denial, evasion of responsibility, and bungling relief operations and peacemaking initiatives launched without cohesive strategy.  

But what explains this record of “neglect and denial” and the virtual absence of international diplomatic intervention into a major political and humanitarian crisis throughout all of 1991? First, international inaction was an accurate measure of international indifference. The world continued to be preoccupied by more important developments elsewhere; in 1991, the Gulf War and its aftermath was deemed of far greater consequence than civil wars in Africa. Though Somali faction leaders were slow to understand this, the end of the Cold War relegated Somalia’s intrinsic importance to global powers to near zero. Only international relief agencies placed Somalia on the “front burner” of their agendas. Indeed, some NGOs, frustrated by the inaction of the United Nations and major states, took matters into their own hands, sponsoring or assisting regional peace conferences in Somalia with mixed results.

The very chaos that posed as the problem to be solved in Somalia also proved to be a powerful disincentive to get involved. Diplomatic forays into the fractious, confused, and often paranoid world of Somali factional politics promised a high probability of failure. Diplomats who chose nonetheless to intervene with offers of good offices and mediation, such as the Italians, quickly found themselves enmired in disputes over legitimate representation within Somali society, and in short order were accused of favoritism of one group or another. As a result, risk-averse approaches that were limited to “monitoring and reporting” the situation were considered the more prudent and preferred course of action.

The physical dangers of chronic lawlessness and sporadic gun battles also led risk-averse states and international organizations to keep operations based in Nairobi, Kenya. For individual governments, the risk of kidnapping or assassination was too great to justify the reopening of embassies. One DoS security team member concluded that Mogadishu in 1991 was “worse than Beirut.”
dilemma was that diplomats who wished to play a constructive role in Somalia had to win the confidence of the Somalis by traveling in country. Mohamed Sahnoun, the UN special representative to Somalia in 1992, is widely acknowledged as having earned the greatest respect and confidence of the Somali people; yet his travel through the country got him temporarily kidnapped and nearly cost him his life.

The United Nations' almost complete absence from the Somali scene in 1991 has been the subject of considerable commentary and criticism, as many expected that organization to take the lead in both humanitarian relief and diplomatic initiatives. One prominent human rights group went so far as to proclaim that "Somalia is the greatest failure of the United Nations in our time." Many stinging indictments of the UN agencies charge that they preferred the comfort of their villas in Kenya to the difficult and dangerous relief work in Somalia, and thus they found a variety of excuses to justify their inaction. In response, UN agencies contended that their mandates do not allow them to work in open war zones; they are development agencies, not emergency relief organizations. Operations in war zones, they noted, were for specialized agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.

But the more puzzling UN absence was diplomatic, not humanitarian. The United Nations offered no assistance to mediate the conflict throughout all of 1991; indeed, a special representative to the secretary-general was not appointed to Somalia until March 1992. Following the disastrous outbreak of war in Mogadishu in late 1991, the United Nations was under heavy pressure to assume some diplomatic responsibility. But the envoy hastily sent to Mogadishu in February 1992, James Jonah, was so poorly briefed that the mission was universally seen as a disaster that actually worsened relations in Mogadishu and further reduced UN credibility.

A partial explanation for the United Nations' incompetence and absence until March 1992 can be attributed to the fact that unlike states, which possess embassies, intelligence agencies, and ministries of state to monitor and report on political developments in other countries, the United Nations has no such institutional intelligence apparatus, no country desk officers, and a short institutional memory. But if that can serve as a partial rationalization for the United Nations' mediocrity in preventive diplomacy in Somalia in early 1992, it does not explain its diplomatic absence from the Somali political scene throughout all of 1991. There, responsibility rests foremost with member-states in the Security Council, which did not even include Somalia on its agenda until the spring of 1992, when Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali embarrassed the Council by comparing its preoccupation with Yugoslavia, where it had just committed fourteen thousand peacekeeping troops, to its indifference to Somalia, triggering a public debate about racial double standards for global humanitarian crises. The United States had in particular sought to keep Somalia off the agenda; Secretary of State James Baker and his staff feared that the rapidly rising number and costs of UN peacekeeping operations would trigger a congressional backlash, and they did not want the United Nations to assume diplomatic responsibilities in Somalia that might well lead to an additional UN peacekeeping operation. A coalition in
the DoS, including the East Africa office, the Human Rights Bureau, and the OFDA, pressed for greater U.S. and UN involvement, but National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and the DoS assistant secretary for international organization affairs, John Bolton, were "against expending effort and scarce financial resources on an area peripheral to U.S. strategic interests." When Bolton allegedly argued "let's not try to right every wrong in the world" in opposing greater UN involvement in Somalia, he accurately reflected the sense of diplomatic triage the Bush administration used to cope with the worrisome outbreak of post-Cold War regional brushfires. Keeping the United Nations' agenda manageable and its peacekeeping budget contained overrode calls for greater U.S. and UN diplomatic involvement in Somalia.

Another explanation for the collective inaction of the international community was that some actors—particularly the United Nations and the OAU—were virtually paralyzed over the problem of sovereignty in the context of state collapse. Both organizations are founded on the principle of sovereignty and non-interference; yet in the absence of a recognized government, it was unclear through whom they would work. Many preferred to wait until such time as a recognized government was formed rather than deal creatively with this new condition of statelessness.

Finally, preventive diplomacy in 1991 was hampered by an absence of both reliable information about what was happening inside the country and a sound analytic "road map" providing guidance for diplomacy in collapsed states. Throughout 1991, very few foreigners were able to travel and live in Somalia, and those few relief workers who did could only garner information about very limited areas. Most of the country's politics had become terra incognita for international diplomats; even Somali faction leaders were groping to try to understand the new social and political forces they had helped to unleash. But even if better information had been available, the international community faced a fundamentally new type of diplomacy—diplomacy in a collapsed state—with which it lacked any experience. The most fundamental question of all—determining who represented whom in the fractious Somali polity—proved to be a more daunting challenge than state-centered diplomacy could handle. Unprepared for stateless diplomacy, the international community was unable to identify new avenues for diplomatic intervention. For instance, throughout 1991 the most dangerous crisis was actually regional rather than national—the growing tensions within the Hawiye clan over control of Mogadishu and the USC. What was needed at that time was preventive diplomacy at the subnational level, not national reconciliation. That observation seems self-evident in hindsight but in 1991 would have constituted a paradigm revolution for conventional, state-centric diplomacy.

Lessons Learned

In the absence of effective preventive diplomacy throughout Somalia's series of cascading political crises, the worst-case scenario came to pass—the destruction of the capital city in heavy fighting, the fragmentation of political authority, and the triggering of a massive famine and refugee crisis. Diplomatic efforts
thereafter focused on cessation of hostilities, national reconciliation, and the negotiating of safe passage of emergency relief to famine victims.

The sudden, intensive media coverage of the Somali famine in the summer of 1992, culminating in the dramatic decision to launch a major UN peace enforcement mission into Somalia in December 1992, constituted a stunning reversal of previous international indifference. And, while the massive U.S.-led operation succeeded in quickly ending the famine in southern Somalia, UNOSOM had far less success in promoting national reconciliation. Critiques of the failed UN mission in Somalia have tended to lay blame on the United Nations’ incompetence, and there is some truth to charges that UN diplomacy throughout the intervention was often mediocre, inconsistent, and short-sighted. But the dozens of failed peace conferences convened by the United Nations and by other parties between 1992 and 1995 were stymied by more than the United Nations’ shortcomings. They were also waylaid by the same structural impediments that plagued peace-building efforts prior to 1992. Both international and local peacemakers were frustrated by the dearth of legitimate authorities who could represent Somali constituencies at the negotiating table; the endless disputes within Somali society over who represented whom; and inevitable Somali suspicions of the political biases or agendas of external mediators, including the United Nations; the continued existence of conflict constituencies that, for economic or political reasons, worked to undermine any efforts at reconciliation; severe economic scarcity, which made conflicts over the shrunken “national pie” more difficult to resolve; the high level of militarization of Somali society, which enabled any community dissatisfied with peace accords to exercise “veto power” at the barrel of a gun; and the tendency for efforts aimed at reviving local and regional state structures (another mandate the United Nations was expected to fulfill) to undermine reconciliation efforts and exacerbate rather than reduce communal strife. In the eyes of most Somalis, peace itself was potentially a positive-sum game, but the reestablishment of state authority (which was usually linked to reconciliation talks) was viewed in starkly zero-sum terms and hence was a major obstacle to reconciliation. This seemingly paranoid view of the state was not unwarranted; past Somali experience suggested that the state was a blunt instrument that one clan monopolized at the expense of the rest.

As one of the first and most dramatic instances of state collapse in the post–Cold War era, Somalia provides potentially valuable lessons of immediate relevance for preventive diplomacy in comparable crises elsewhere. Unfortunately, the disastrous results of the UNOSOM intervention in Somalia have heavily politicized the task of “learning lessons” from that country. As a result, comparativists seeking to derive useful generalizations from the Somali crisis must proceed with appropriate caution.

On the basis of our analysis, a number of instructive conclusions from the Somali case may be drawn. We have broken them down into two distinct categories: misread crises and missed opportunities.

The chronicle of international involvement and noninvolvement in Somalia’s worsening crisis from 1979 through 1991 is a litany of missed opportunities. A number of lessons from this failure of the collective response are
noteworthy. First, a close reading of the chronology of the Somali crisis reveals that the country’s descent into chaos passed through several cascading “points of no return,” each of which offered increasingly narrow windows of opportunity within which timely outside diplomatic intervention might have spared the country from further conflict and collapse. Fortunately, each of those windows were missed, for very distinct reasons ranging from geostrategic imperatives to political indifference. Conceptualizing Somalia’s political conflicts as “cascading” crises proved to be a useful analytic tool of possible relevance in future conflicts; its strength is that it reinforces the notion that conflicts may provide multiple opportunities for constructive diplomatic intervention.

In addition, Somalia clearly confirms the need for a “multi-track approach where national, regional, and international actors complement one another” rather than working at cross-purposes. If, as most observers conclude, the United Nations must play a more assertive role in preventive diplomacy, then major powers in the Security Council must give the Secretariat direction by placing such crises on the Security Council agenda. Yet the United Nations’ woeful performance in Somalia in 1991 — clearly the most dramatic “missed opportunity” in the Somali debacle — suggests that that organization may lack the necessary resources and capacity to play a lead role in post-Cold War preventive diplomacy. Despite much discussion about prospects for enhancing the diplomatic role of either the United Nations or regional organizations in preventive diplomacy, there may be no substitute at this time for sustained diplomatic attention and engagement by the world’s most powerful nations. Those nations must in turn recognize that both their attention and inattention to simmering conflicts can have a powerful “ripple effect” on other international actors. In Somalia, U.S. policy decisions and nondecisions proved strong influences on the policies of other states and multilateral institutions in the Horn of Africa; the U.S. decision to freeze aid to the Barre government, for instance, triggered similar policies among other donors, and its decision to intervene militarily in December 1992 pulled dozens of other states into the intervention.

For marginal states like Somalia, however, prospects for commanding sustained attention from the United States is increasingly unlikely; on the contrary, most observers now assume that U.S. diplomatic engagement in peripheral regions of the world will continue to decline. Increasingly, attention is being redirected toward the potential for unconventional actors—nongovernmental organizations and “private diplomacy”—to play a more active role in preventive diplomacy. The U.S. Institute of Peace concludes that, “in the absence of extensive U.S. engagement and easily identifiable levers of influence, NGOs and private diplomacy have helped fill the void, often with the encouragement of officials and with Agency for International Development funds.” On this score, Somalia offers ample lessons and warnings. In the most critical phases of the crisis, from 1989 through 1991, when major state actors and the United Nations withdrew from active diplomatic efforts, NGOs and other avenues of private diplomacy missed opportunities to fill the vacuum and perhaps might have played a constructive role. Subsequently, however, NGOs have become much more committed to both direct and indirect peace building in Somalia, with
quite mixed results, in no small measure because of their limited institutional capacities to conduct diplomacy. Somalia's dozens of failed peace conferences since 1991—including several peace initiatives that actually worsened tensions—serve as a warning that peace building in collapsed states is a highly complex matter. Simply “subcontracting” unwanted diplomatic responsibilities out to eager NGOs, private foundations, and eminent persons is likely only to set them up to fail in much the same way that an unprepared United Nations was set up for failure in Somalia.

Somalia's worsening crisis throughout the 1980s and early 1990s was never properly understood and diagnosed, and hence effective strategies for preventive diplomacy in Somalia were never developed. The collective misreading of the Somali conflict was a function of the fact that it constituted a fundamentally new type of crisis—the collapse of an unsustainable state into protracted anarchy—which had not occurred throughout the Cold War era and which was thus beyond the radar screen of political analysts. Subsequently, variations of this sans état scenario have been at the root of several other crises—including Liberia, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Angola—suggesting that the collapsed state in Somalia was not unique but reflects instead a troubling new category of post–Cold War conflicts.

Efforts to prevent and manage conflicts that are neither interstate nor intrastate but rather stateless in nature, place a number of immediate demands on analysts and diplomats. First, the international community must be better equipped analytically to interpret early warning signs of partial or complete state collapse. Somalia's own early warning signals offer clues as to what might constitute identifiable underlying causes of possible or imminent state collapse elsewhere—a badly bloated state structure dependent on external aid for its funding, combined with a high level of political repression and an extremely weak domestic economy. Precipitating causes of state collapse are also well within our capacity to monitor, including the prospect of rapid and near total loss of access to external assistance (foreign aid, migrant labor remittances, export earnings). Refining these and other indicators might better serve analysts in recognizing “Somalia scenarios” elsewhere.

Second, diplomats and mediators must be convinced that conflicts born of state collapse are fundamentally distinct from “conventional” conflicts and hence require different diplomatic approaches. This observation seems self-evident to those who have worked within the chaos of such crises but is less apparent to those viewing these conflicts from a distance. Crises of state collapse often exhibit many of the same features as conventional conflicts, including virulent ethnonationalism, factionalism, and regionalism. But they are set apart by a number of distinct characteristics, including power vacuums in which armed elements are increasingly beyond the control of either government or rebels, endemic disputes over rights to represent constituencies in negotiations, the rise to prominence of a multitude of nonstate political actors (in Somalia, “clan elders”) with whom diplomats are unaccustomed to dealing, and humanitarian crises often associated with zones where state authorities have ceased to perform even minimal functions. An important task for the field of comparative politics
and political anthropology is to develop better understanding of the political dynamics in zones of statelessness, to provide diplomats and mediators with “road maps” in this new operating environment.

Third, analysts and diplomats must be better equipped with a “toolbox” of new techniques to prevent or contain conflicts linked to state collapse, and they must be prepared to discard approaches that are inappropriate in that environment. For instance, emphasis on power-sharing formulas may not be relevant where there is no state within which power can be shared. Emphasis on regional or local-level peace initiatives may be more fruitful than national-level reconciliation, as peace-building efforts in both the northwest and southern regions of Somalia suggest. And recognition of nonstate actors as often critical players in preventive diplomacy and peace building may be essential.

Once a simmering conflict is diagnosed as a potential instance of state collapse, macrolevel diplomacy can be better calibrated as well, especially with regard to the role of external assistance in the viability of a dangerously unsustainable state. Somalia’s crisis suggests that strategies of linkage of foreign aid to political reform must be handled as a fine instrument, not a sledgehammer, to ensure both that a regime is sent the appropriate message and that the economy and state is provided a “soft landing” rather than the crash landing that can accompany the total freezing of foreign aid. Unfortunately, that level of calibration of foreign aid is difficult to accomplish both at the international level, where bilateral and multilateral aid donors have distinct political agendas and are reluctant to coordinate aid strategies, and at the national level, where the dynamics of legislative politics and intradepartmental rivalries come into play.

Another instructive misreading in the Somali conflict had to do with assessments of the interests of the Somali protagonists, especially in the latter phases of the crisis (1989–91). Specifically, the rise of chaos and lawlessness in the country was accompanied by the simultaneous rise of “conflict constituencies” who, either for political or economic reasons or both, had a vested interest in continued instability, anarchy, and an economy of plunder. The overt hostility these conflict constituencies had to any peace accord was not fully appreciated by some outside mediators, who labored under the illusion that all parties to the worsening dispute could be accommodated if only the right power-sharing formula could be struck. Peace meant political marginalization for a number of warlords, economic marginalization for most of the bandit/militiamen, and an end to a mafialike economy for powerful merchants. Approaches to peace in zones of protracted anarchy must assess the scope and power of conflict constituencies and either work to transform their interests (e.g., through demobilization programs for militiamen) or marginalize them politically.

Finally, one of the most consistent and costly misreadings of the Somali conflict was the near-universal view that, as the Cold War ended, Somalia’s crisis constituted a low foreign policy priority that could be safely ignored while global powers attended to more pressing matters. Somalia and other recent complex emergencies should serve as a firm reminder that crude geostrategic calculations of a country’s relative political importance are poor gauges of the actual political im-
portance that a country may have in six months. With the growth of the media’s capacity to place remote trouble spots onto the foreign policy “front burner” through intensive and critical coverage (the so-called CNN effect), it is virtually assured that every American administration will be forced to devote considerable diplomatic and even military resources on political or humanitarian crises that they might otherwise prefer to ignore. An enduring lesson of the Somali catastrophe is that there is no longer any such thing as a “back burner” conflict for either the United States or United Nations. With the massive diplomatic resources at the international community’s fingertips, and with the costs of inaction so high in places such as Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia, it is increasingly untenable to embrace a policy of “turning out the lights and closing the doors” on brewing political crises in seemingly remote countries.
Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda: Failure to Act or Failure of Actions?

Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones

Case Summary

The case of Rwanda in the 1990s is a tale of opportunities missed that reveal fundamental restraints in the present international mechanisms for warning and preventive diplomacy. The striking fact of the Rwandan genocide is that it was devised, planned, publicly broadcast, and ultimately conducted in view of a UN peacekeeping force. The peacekeeping operation, in turn, was the result of a protracted and multifaceted international diplomacy designed to end the civil war that preceded the genocide in the second quarter of 1994. The fact that the largest slaughter of civilians since Pol Pot’s Cambodia could transpire in a context not of international inattention but of multiple forms of international engagement provides compelling evidence of just how weak are the existing multilateral systems for preventing the escalation of violence.

An analysis of early warning could begin with October 1, 1990, when an armed refugee movement, the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded Rwanda from southern Uganda. The invasion triggered the disaster in Rwanda almost four years later and was itself the culmination of previous strife of a type frequently seen in Africa: victims or losers in a conflict seek refuge in a neighboring country, which then becomes a base for invading the homeland.

In this case, members of Rwanda’s Tutsi minority, who had been the principal victims of political violence in Rwanda after decolonization transferred po-
litical power to the majority Hutu community in 1962, fled to the surrounding countries, with large numbers settling in southern Uganda. Repeated efforts by the refugees to return had been of no avail until a generation of Rwandans born in exile launched a new invasion in 1990. The objective was to permit full and free settlement in Rwanda—a demand consistently denied by Hutu president Juvenal Habyarimana—and to force the regime to accept power-sharing arrangements that would give the Tutsi significant political representation in the government. The attack was propitiously timed to take advantage of support from Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni and a decline in the political and economic fortunes of the Habyarimana regime.

The principal external parties to the conflict were regional states—with Zaire and Uganda lining up behind the government of Rwanda and the RPF, respectively—and two European powers that were engaged by virtue of colonial ties (Belgium) and continuous aspirations to play a major role in Africa (France). The Mitterand government supported the Habyarimana regime through special development funds and military training agreements of the kind normally given to French ex-colonies in Africa, and it marked its interests by sending a small number of troops to help the government when the RPF invaded. Given French concerns to keep francophone Africa as a sphere of influence, Paris viewed the RPF as particularly worrisome because of the movement’s ties to anglophone Uganda.

Formal denials notwithstanding, it was commonly known at the time and subsequently confirmed that Uganda served as a rear base for the RPF. The military leader of the RPF during most of the civil war, Major General Paul Kagame, was close to Ugandan president Museveni, and many RPF soldiers came from posts in the Ugandan army (National Resistance Army [NRA]) that they had deserted, taking along guns, trucks and all, often with the tacit support of their commanding officers. For Museveni, supporting the RPF enabled him to repay the Rwandan refugee leadership, many of whom had fought by his side in the early days of his own rebellion. By 1990, there was also growing resentment among Ugandans against the refugees; were the RPF to achieve victory, many would presumably leave for Rwanda.

None of the large powers had been engaged in this part of the Great Lakes region during the Cold War, nor was the one remaining superpower afterwards. Even during the years of globalized superpower rivalry, the United States had no military presence and quite limited interest in this small Central African country. It is indicative that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not begin tracking the country situation systematically until after the RPF invasion in 1990. Among top officials in Washington, only Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman Cohen took more than a passing interest in the civil war, in keeping with his general efforts to engage the United States in conflict resolution in Africa during his tenure. After Cohen left office at the end of the Bush administration, Washington’s tendency to assign Rwanda to a French sphere of interest resurfaced.

Notwithstanding the somewhat peripheral nature of Rwanda to the major powers, the October 1990 invasion triggered an extraordinary diplomatic activity that
demonstrated the vitality of international mediatory structures on the regional level.7 Just two weeks after the invasion, Tanzania called a regional meeting of the heads of state of Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire to discuss the situation and, fearing further refugee flows, remained actively involved and became host as well as “facilitator” for the subsequent peace talks. The secretariat of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was also active in recognition of the organization’s principle that African states had a primary responsibility to address regional conflicts. Soon other levels were informed or engaged — the (informal) Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region, the European Union, and more peripherally the United Nations. Also, the governments of Belgium, France, and the United States at various times helped move the process forward. The Belgian government became actively involved within days of the invasion, pushing forward a regional mediation process which achieved a first cease-fire within four months.8

The results did not match the level of activity, however. The initial success of regional diplomacy was short-lived. A formal cease-fire signed at N’Sele, Zaire, on March 29, 1991, lasted only to mid-April, when fighting resumed. The limits of regional diplomacy were revealed when a second cease-fire also broke down in early 1992. It required a push from France— supported by more limited but parallel diplomatic suasion by the United States led by Assistant Secretary Cohen—to move the conflicting parties to the negotiating table.9 In addition, the European Union, Canada, Switzerland, the Catholic Church and others counseled peace talks. The result was the launching in the summer of 1992 of the Arusha talks, named for the town in Tanzania that served as the locale. With Tanzania as facilitator and with backing from the OAU and, albeit somewhat belatedly, the United Nations and the major Western donor countries as observers, the Arusha process brought together the RPF, the Habyarimana regime, and opposition parties that had grown up during the period of civil war.

A comprehensive settlement was signed on August 1993. While on the one hand the Tanzanian government deserves credit for its sustained and skillful mediating effort, it had also required a decisive push on the battlefield to finalize the agreement. In February 1993, the RPF launched a major offensive to break Habyarimana’s opposition to the power-sharing formula tentatively negotiated in Arusha. The offensive shocked Kigali and threw the government forces into disarray. Rebel troops fought to within twenty-three kilometers of the capital, demonstrating the RPF’s military superiority. The offensive deepened the engagement of the French, who dispatched a small military reinforcement to stiffen the government side. In New York, the UN system responded to the disruption of the peace process as well: The secretary-general sent a goodwill mission that helped bring the parties back to the negotiating table, and the Security Council approved a military observer mission to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border. Designed to stop Ugandan supplies flowing to the RPF, which had established a stronghold in northern Rwanda, the small mission (UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda [UNOMUR]) was pitifully inadequate for the task, however.

As the negotiations neared completion, the role of the peacekeepers was extended. The Arusha Accords called for the deployment of a Neutral International
Force to oversee the implementation of the agreement, the principal feature of which was the creation of a transitional government encompassing some elements of the Habyarimana regime, the RPF, and various opposition parties that had grown up during the negotiation period. A new national army composed of units from both sides in the civil war was to be formed; the rest would be demobilized. Invoking Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council voted to deploy a UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to oversee the installation of the transitional government and other parts of the peace agreement, in particular, to assist in disarming and demobilizing the two armies.

Yet the signing of a peace agreement in August 1993 and the deployment of UNAMIR two months later—i.e., the initial success of what may be characterized as preventive diplomacy—did not prevent two developments that are highly relevant to the theoretical and policy concerns of this volume. The first was a transformation in the nature of the Rwandan conflict. Having started out in 1990 as a classic civil war between a rebel group and the government, the conflict spawned a genocidal attack by elements of the Rwandan state against both the moderate Hutu opposition and the Tutsi minority population. The second was a tremendous escalation in casualties, possibly the most massive of any conflict in modern history: from roughly six thousand deaths during three years of civil war to roughly eight hundred thousand deaths during three months of genocide. The failure to recognize the transformation of the conflict from a civil war to genocide and to anticipate the escalation in victims and, equally, the failure to possibly nip the genocide in the bud at two points in time, constitute the most critical missed opportunities of the Rwanda case.

The genocide was planned and to a large extent controlled by a tightly organized group of extremists within the Habyarimana power structure: members of the ruling party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND); leaders of the Presidential Guard; the interahamwe and impuzamugambi militias; and members of the hard-line political grouping, the Comité pour la Défense de la République (CDR). In the first days of the killings, this group massacred the Tutsi population of Kigali and wiped out the ranks of moderate politicians and civil society leaders, most of them Hutu. Over the next three months, unchecked by any international force, the extremists systematically slaughtered Tutsi populations across the country, killing hundreds of thousands of people before the RPF’s victory on July 17, 1994, drove them into final retreat.

The essential motive for the genocide was to retain political power and all that went with it. Given the history and ethnic composition of Rwanda, the political contest over who would control the government had developed along a deepening majority-minority divide. Members of the Hutu majority community that planned, organized, and directed the genocide stood to lose power as a result of the power-sharing arrangements negotiated in Arusha. Alternately, many feared that the RPF would use its legitimised entry into national politics and foothold in the new national army to engineer a coup. In either case, the Tutsi were perceived as the winners. The fear that this prospect generated among the Hutu population—and that took extreme forms among some of the power holders
and their followers—must be understood against the historical memory of Tutsi overlordship before and during the colonial period, and the practice of treating power transfer as a totalistic, zero-sum game and a "winner-takes-all" attitude. As the civil war neared an end and power sharing was on the horizon, Hutu extremist ideologues deliberately exploited this fear to whip up a frenzy of ethnic hatred. Just after the peace agreement was signed, Hutu fears were powerfully reinforced by events in neighboring Burundi, where Hutu were also in the majority and Tutsi in the minority. In October 1993, Burundi’s first elected Hutu president was assassinated, and tens of thousands of Hutu were killed in the ensuing violence in which the Tutsi army was implicated. The Hutu extremists in Rwanda portrayed the events as a warning of things to come in their own country, and gained ground.

While the conventional wisdom is that the international community “did nothing” to prevent the genocide, the fact is that the international community was active in Rwanda in several ways in the period preceding the cataclysm. It is not the failure to take preventive action that characterizes the international role in the period leading up to the genocide but the failure of actions taken. Only after the genocide was underway did the international community respond with manifest inaction, at least in the critical early phase. Both periods will be covered in this chapter. Up until April 1994, the critical question is why was a conflict, which attracted substantial conflict management and preventive diplomacy efforts, nevertheless allowed to escalate in such horrific fashion? Afterward, and certainly by mid-April when it was indisputably clear that massive and orchestrated killings were underway, the question is why were they not stopped?

Our central argument is that for several months before the launch of the genocide, information accumulated that would have allowed the main states involved, as well as the UN Secretariat, to anticipate a massive escalation in violence. Indeed, the UN Secretariat and the French, U.S., and Belgian diplomatic missions in Rwanda received clear warnings that the closer the Arusha Accords came to being implemented, the more the extremists were prepared to unleash a death campaign against supporters of the accords and the entire Tutsi community. An interlocking set of cognitive, bureaucratic, and political factors weakened these signals, however, and robbed them of their warning quality. More fundamentally, the signals were not heard because the principal actors focused on one set of issues—ending the civil war and implementing the peace accords—not fully realizing that success in solving these problems would engender new and more dangerous ones. From the perspective of preventive diplomacy, then, the Rwanda case is quite different from a situation in which diplomats labor to halt a countdown to war or culmination of crisis. International diplomacy in Rwanda was not designed to prevent a clearly perceived future calamity but, more conventionally, to restore a peace shattered by civil war.

It can be argued that even if the signals of approaching genocide had been heard, preventive action still might not have been forthcoming. When put to the test in April, and it was clear that massive, organized violence was underway, neither the United Nations nor the principal members of the Security Council acted to halt the killings. Arguably, the risks and costs of intervention at that time
were much higher than a firmer response earlier would have been. Yet, the argument is more complex in that the failure to react to earlier signals could have reflected three different conditions: (1) failure to assess the significance of the signals as pointing towards massive, genocidal violence—i.e., a failure of analysis; (2) a failure to assess the costs of such violence to the potentially intervening parties (including the downstream cost of a $1.4 billion bill for emergency relief during the months April–December 1994 alone); and (3) an assessment that, in the interests of the potentially intervening parties, the risks and costs of greater intervention at any time exceeded the costs of not doing so. While inaction due to points 1 and 2 is the result of misjudgment and miscalculation, the third scenario is one of deliberate inaction based on calculations of national interests. Whether such an interpretation of national interests itself is a “miscalculation” when judged against legal and ethical norms of international responsibility is another, although critical, question.

This chapter is divided into the periods before and immediately after April 6, 1994, when the genocidal violence commenced. During the three years prior to the genocide, when the international community was engaged in settling the civil war in Rwanda, early signals about an escalation of civil violence did not determine preventive strategies and key decisions. Rather, conflict management strategies influenced the reception of such signals. The case will therefore be considered in the following sequence: First, conflict management strategies for dealing with the civil war will be assessed from the perspective of their impact on subsequent violence and early warning thereof (“Strategies of Action”); second, the section on “Early Warning” will focus on the period that—we now know—was leading up to the genocide, with emphasis on attempts to implement the Arusha Accords; and, lastly, “Key Decisions” will consider the international response in the first critical phase during April 1994.

Strategies of Action

As noted, we cannot talk of strategies for preventing genocide in Rwanda; no such strategy existed. Yet the international community had multiple strategies for coping with the civil war and the parallel civil violence that became the prelude to the genocide. Three processes are of interest here: first, and centrally, regional, international, and multilateral actors collaborated on the Arusha process of political mediation; second, this mediation in time produced a UN peacekeeping force designed to secure the peace accords; and third, there was the issue of aid conditionality to reduce civil violence.

Diplomatic Strategy: The Arusha Political Negotiations

The diplomacy that settled the civil war was related to the subsequent genocide in a disjointed pattern resembling the decision-making behavior of large organizations when different units focus on functionally related tasks but do so in an uncoordinated manner by paying “sequential attention to goals,” as John Steinbruner has phrased it.12 In these cases, organizational theory tells us, rational outcomes...
are realized only in relation to the subtasks, not the overall design. This was precisely what occurred in the evolving Rwandan conflict.

The Arusha process has been referred to as preventive diplomacy and judged against the catastrophic violence that followed. Held against this standard, it is clear that the process failed. But the main objective at Arusha was not to prevent a perceived future disaster: rather, it was to end a civil war and construct a post-war peace agreement in a situation short of total victory and absolute defeat. This required a formula for immediate power sharing as well as agreement on a broad range of issues: the nature of the future political process, rules for demobilization and integration of the respective armies, and a system to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The closer the Arusha process came to ending the war and to defining the protocols that would structure future politics, the closer—most participants believed—they had come to achieving peace. In this calculus, the primary criterion for success was to obtain the signatures of both parties on a peace agreement. As it turned out, the historical dynamic worked in the opposite direction: the closer the Arusha agreement came to be realized, the more determined became the extremists to derail it by means of a coup and mass murder. But if the genocide in this sense developed dialectically from the peace agreement, was this because of the provisions of the agreement and, if so, why did the Arusha Accords take the form they did?

To get the Arusha process started, both the United States and France had put critical pressure on the Rwandan parties in early 1992. Viewing the civil war as one of Africa's more "solvable" conflicts, Washington bluntly threatened Uganda that aid would be cut off unless Museveni encouraged his Rwandan clients to negotiate. France, which had developed close patron-client relations with the Habyarimana regime and gave important support to the government during the war, persuaded Habyarimana to negotiate an exit from a war that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was convinced could not be won. In the formulation of the terms of a peace settlement, however, the two major external powers had less impact.

The final agreement dealt comprehensively with all the issues related to ending the war and opening up the political system. Yet the accords evidently did not rest on a newfound political consensus created by defeat, exhaustion, or the emergence of new political forces. The RPF and the domestic opposition drove home their demands on all key points. On the government side, Habyarimana had repeatedly announced his unwillingness to sign, and disinclination to uphold, this "piece of paper," as he disparagingly referred to the accords in November 1992. The accords thus formalized what André Guichaoua aptly has called "une paix militaire."13

While resembling a victor's agreement, the accords left the losing side with access to the state apparatus in an interim period, and hence the means for obstructing the implementation of a political order that was decidedly unfavorable to its interests. And while all parties share a part of the blame for the delays and eventual nonimplementation of the Arusha Accords, the established forces of the Habyarimana regime stood to lose most by implementation.

The accords moved Rwanda from a presidential to a parliamentary system of
politics, with an interim coalition government (Broad-Based Transition Government [BBTG]) that entailed significant loss of power for the Habyarimana forces. The hard-liners who surrounded Habyarimana—senior ministers in the ruling MRND party, senior military figures in the armed forces and the Presidential Guard, and members of the newly formed CDR—were largely denied power in the transitional institutions. The MRND forces also would lose power in local administrative structures and the judicial branch. The distribution of portfolios agreed to at Arusha accentuated the dramatic nature of the change. Ideologically and politically, the BBTG represented a frontal attack on the power base erected by the Habyarimana regime during twenty years of rule— it was a denial of authoritarian rule, of “Hutu power,” and especially northwestern-based Hutu power, which was the regional constituency and political backbone of the regime. The terms of the agreement formally signaled a pluralist state and a civil society, and the idea of a people united by a common Rwandan nationality rather than divided along ethnic lines into Hutu versus Tutsi.

The losses incurred by the existing power holders in the political sphere were paralleled, and thus sharpened, by equivalent losses in military matters. After the February 1993 offensive demonstrated the RPF’s military superiority, the government was eventually forced to accept a scheme that split positions 50–50 on the command level and narrowly favored the government in a 60–40 distribution of troops. Over twenty thousand government troops were to be demobilized, more than twice the figure for the RPF. The following question arises, then: Were the Arusha Accords indeed a “perfect agreement,” as the Tanzanian mediators called them at the time, or were there alternatives? In retrospect, it has been argued that the agreement far exceeded what the hard-line Hutu forces would accept and so helped provoke their violent reaction in form of genocide. Some Western diplomatic observers to Arusha made the same point. At the time, the discussion of this point centered mainly on the role of the extremist Hutu movement, the CDR, which was not included in the power-sharing formula of the BBTG or allocated seats in the transitional assembly despite demands from Habyarimana that they be represented. Both France and the United States advised the RPF that it would be a better tactic to co-opt the extremists than to exclude them, but the RPF absolutely refused. By focusing on the CDR, the advocates for a more balanced agreement stood on weak ground since the CDR was both an extremist movement and a nonparty; hence, its inclusion in the BBTG could be questioned with reference to the principles of the accords, as the RPF indeed did. It is also questionable if the extremists would have been consoled by a token seat or two in a transitional government that was structured to preside over the demise of the old northwest-based Hutu order (as close Arusha observers also noted out at the time). The Hutu extremists repeatedly denounced the agreement and had publicly threatened to bring about “an apocalypse,” as their spokesman, Colonel Theoneste Bagasora, declared during a session at Arusha when the power-sharing protocol was negotiated.

Perhaps more central was the radical loss of power, which the accords presaged more generally, for the ruling MRND as well as the army. As Belgian scholar Filip Reyntjens was quick to observe at the time, the accords represented
a veritable coup d'état for the RPF and the internal opposition. This broadened the appeal of the extremist fringe, which wanted to repudiate the entire agreement and planned to do so by the most direct means: a coup d'état combined with massive violence against the domestic opposition and the Tutsi community, as well as renewed war against the Tutsi-dominated RPF.

Why, then, was the Arusha agreement structured as it was? First, it reflected the actual forces on the ground. The RPF had shown its military superiority in the decisive offensive of early 1993. There was no one to rein it in. Uganda's erstwhile position as a critical backer had been weakened as the RPF had progressively established an autonomous base inside Rwanda. Efforts by the Ugandan government to observe international conventions by denying across-the-border support for the rebel force had reportedly angered the RPF. The United States, which in early 1992 had used threats of aid reductions vis-à-vis Uganda to help bring the RPF to the negotiating table, had contacts with the RPF but little bargaining power and made no evident efforts to increase its leverage. Apart from the CDR issue, the few who followed the Arusha process in Washington generally thought the agreement was good. Of other outside powers, only France was positioned to influence the negotiations by applying countervailing military force on the ground, and French military assistance was increased slightly during the 1993 offensive. But the poor performance of the Rwandan government forces, combined with broader strategic assessments in Paris that relegated Rwanda to a position of secondary importance in Central Africa, and certainly in comparison with Zaire, made the French government hesitate. While unhappy with some aspects of the Arusha Accords, Habyarimana's principal ally was unwilling to challenge the terms if that required a substantially greater military commitment.

There were also ideological and human rights considerations. The Arusha Accords incorporated well-established principles of Western thinking about the fundamentals of civic peace: power sharing, political pluralism, and democratization. On these and other issues (notably demobilization and the transitional government), the accords were patterned on other recent agreements that ended civil wars in southern Africa (Namibia and Mozambique) and Central America (El Salvador and Nicaragua). With the framework thus given, the main bargaining concerned the distribution of power within. Apart from France and Zaire— where support ranged from ambivalent to counterproductive— the Habyarimana regime had few foreign friends; rather, the government was in 1993 increasingly criticized by Western donors for persistent human rights abuse.

Given the weak or indifferent structures of external involvement, the Arusha Accords came to be determined mainly by the balance of power between the Rwandan parties. Here the RPF was politically as well as militarily ahead of the Rwandan government. The RPF negotiating team was extraordinarily strong, with discipline, preparedness and commitment that contrasted starkly with the factionalized, ill-disciplined, and ineffective government team. Representing a coalition that Habyarimana had been compelled to accept, the Kigali delegation was composed of some Habyarimana allies, but it was led by opposition party members and obstructed by recognized members of extremist factions who
went along to Arusha. With a divided delegation negotiating against the backdrop of a deteriorating military position, the government was forced back on all critical issues.

The imbalances of the accords would not have mattered if the losers, who were not co-opted, had been neutralized by other means. The thought was not foreign to those who set the terms of the peace agreement. The need for speedy implementation and a powerful international presence to oversee the process was fully recognized at Arusha and reflected in ambitious clauses of the accords that called for almost immediate deployment of a powerful international peacekeeping force. With international presence and rapid installation of the transitional government, supporters of the agreement expected that the extremists could be controlled and contained.

Military Strategy: The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda

The Tanzanian and OAU architects of the Arusha Accords had envisaged a Neutral International Force (NIF), as it was referred to in the Arusha texts, that could enhance security and facilitate the formation of the transitional government before the forces of opposition had time to consolidate. In some circles this was conventional wisdom at the time: delays in establishing a transitional government would increase the likelihood that the entire peace agreement would be derailed, the United Nations was told by several regional diplomats and the Rwandan parties to the agreement just weeks after it was signed.²⁰

Reflecting this concern, the Arusha Accords stipulated the deployment of NIF within thirty-seven days of the signing of the agreement. Moreover, the accords envisaged a mandate that in important respects went beyond a classic Chapter VI peacekeeping operation of the United Nations, particularly with respect to confiscation of illegal arms and by providing a general security guarantee for the entire country.²¹ This sense of urgency was lost in the UN Security Council’s authorization for a peacekeeping operation. Instead of quick deployment of an international force with teeth and a robust mandate, Rwanda got a small force, haltingly deployed and with a mandate that was not only conventional, but interpreted cautiously by the UN Secretariat when the force commander in the field wanted to stretch the terms.

In retrospect, the formation and deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda represented a critical juncture in the evolution of the conflict. A more decisive and robust demonstration of international force at that time might have restrained the extremist forces directly, or at any rate sent signals to the effect that the international community was fully behind the peace accords. Whether that would have been sufficient to avert the course of events which followed cannot be known, but it clearly would have heightened the stakes and costs to those seeking to undermine the agreement, as the architects of the Arusha Accords, various diplomats in Kigali, and the force commander argued at the time as well as in retrospect. Why, then, were the letter and spirit of the Arusha Accords not followed by those who authorized and deployed the force?
It was not a foregone conclusion that the NIF envisaged by the accords would be a UN force. When an international force was first discussed in early 1993, the OAU had sought to stake out a leading role commensurate with the position it had played in the mediation process. However, it soon became clear that the United Nations would not provide the requisite equipment and financing for NIF unless it also retained command and control over the force. In the Security Council, France was carrying the case for the United Nations, reflecting French suspicions that the OAU— which had limited peacekeeping capacity and was known to be more favorable toward the RPF than toward the Habyarimana regime, which Paris backed—would become a captive of the RPF. By comparison, the United Nations had a rapidly expanding record of peacekeeping operations. Through its Security Council membership, France would be able to exercise some control over a UN force at a time when its own military forces in Rwanda would be withdrawn, as stipulated in the accords. France had little difficulty in persuading the other Security Council members to back the United Nations rather than the OAU. The other member states had little if any interest in Rwandan affairs, although some of them cautioned that the French-sponsored resolution for a UN force in Rwanda (S/25400/1993) might be viewed as an attempt by Paris to salvage its influence in Rwanda and warned against sidelining the OAU. As might be expected, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali sided in favor of his own organization.

Thus, the NIF was realized in the form of UNAMIR. In the process, the understanding of the significance of the international presence and of the extremist threat to the accords which had been evident at Arusha was partially lost. An organizational disjunction, so to speak, opened up between the mediation and the implementation phase. It turned out to be a critical gap between a peace agreement that moved key players out of power and a peacekeeping operation that had neither mandate nor capacity to tackle the potential spoilers. In the months following the signing of Arusha, extremist forces used the gap to consolidate their opposition to the peace plan, develop their strength, and implement their plan.

Deliberating on the strength, mandate, and deployment schedule of UNAMIR, the UN Security Council and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the Secretariat (DPKO) settled for a small, interpositional force of the kind the United Nations was familiar with and tailored it to an optimistic scenario of future developments in Rwanda. Admittedly, the signals coming in were mixed. The Reconnaissance Mission sent by the United Nations to the region in August–September reported both positive and negative signs. The militant opposition to the agreement was well known, the society and the economy were reeling after three years of civil war, and while time was of the essence, the timetable for deployment called for in the Arusha Accords was unrealistically tight by UN standards. On the other hand, the situational prerequisites for an easy Chapter VI operation were present: a peace agreement had been signed, the local parties consented and cooperated, and—in a demonstration of reconciliation that greatly impressed the Security Council—representatives of the RPF and the Rwandan government jointly visited the United Nations to call for a peacekeeping force. Viewing a mixed picture, both the Security Council and the
Secretariat highlighted the rosy parts. To a United Nations that collectively looked for relief from the mounting troubles facing the peacekeeping force in Somalia at the time, “Rwanda seemed like a winner,” as the Canadian force commander, General Romeo Dallaire, later commented.23

Financial considerations worked in the same direction. Being assessed 31 percent of the costs of UN peacekeeping, the United States insisted on a minimal force. Emphasizing the bright aspects of the Rwandan situation, the cost-conscious U.S. delegation in New York suggested in September that a token mission of some five hundred men would suffice.24 The French mission in New York recommended a small force of around a thousand men, noting that the French contingent in Kigali was merely six to seven hundred men. In the end, the Security Council authorized a force of 2,548, which was clearly more than a token contingent and at that time considered quite acceptable by the force commander-designate, although his preferred option had been almost twice that size. UNAMIR was estimated to cost about $10 million a month, a very modest amount compared to larger UN peacekeeping operations.25

Despite a speedy start,26 the deployment of UNAMIR did not fully meet the schedule laid out by the Reconnaissance Mission or the Arusha Accords. The first UNAMIR battalion entered Kigali in late November, more than two months later than the admittedly unrealistic deadline for deployment specified in the Arusha texts. Putting together the rest of the mission also proved difficult. The force never received all the equipment authorized (including an armored unit and helicopters).27 UNAMIR’s budget was subject to the standard, lengthy UN decision-making process and was not formally approved until April 4, 1994.28 As a result, the mission was constrained by numerous shortcomings in personnel, equipment and disbursable funds (including petty cash), and even basics such as ammunition. Repeated field requests to New York to bring the mission up to authorized strength were of no avail. UNAMIR had weak or no capacity in two areas that were significant for its operation. With only a small civilian police unit and no human rights cell, the mission had very limited ability to investigate violent incidents. The force also lacked an official intelligence unit, a fact that was deplored by the force commander and led to some improvisation on the ground.

The stepmotherly treatment of UNAMIR reflected the overarching restraints of the nation-state system on the peacekeeping activity of the United Nations as a collective actor. Without critical support from Security Council members or other potential troop-contributing countries (TCC), the Secretariat had virtually no capacity for outfitting a force. Thus, when no member state came up with the authorized armored unit and helicopters, the DPKO had neither budgetary recourse nor ready suppliers of such equipment to compensate. The indifference of member states, in turn, reflected the strategic marginality of Rwanda to all but one of the major powers on the Security Council, and France—recognizing the changing political landscape after Arusha—had positioned itself in a secondary role. The neutrality of a UN peacekeeping force, moreover, made it difficult for France to help out UNAMIR, as the French delegation was quick to point out.

With no political patron in the Security Council and no institutional-bureaucratic “safety net” to catch it, the case of Rwanda fell into a yawning crack of
neglect. It remained so even when the situation clearly worsened in early 1994: the transitional government was not installed, civil violence mounted, and Kigali was "awash in illegal weapons," as a visiting Belgian minister of defense told the press in mid-March. In the face of the nonimplementation of the Arusha Accords, the only contingency planning made for UNAMIR in New York was to withdraw the entire force, thereby indicating the United Nations' chosen strategy in a future worst-case scenario.

Just as the terms of the peace agreement laid down some tracks for the post-Arusha period, so the strategy of mounting a bare-bones force in the interim period had consequences for the evolution of the conflict. UNAMIR had little ability to project power or deter violations of the accords. Instead, and—as we shall see—particularly in some key decisions immediately preceding the genocide, UNAMIR signaled inaction and limited presence. Moreover, when the situation radically changed after April 6, the force had minimal capacity to respond. Lacking defensive equipment and being thinly spread out, UNAMIR units could not even move securely through the city and were stopped at road blocks manned by paramilitary thugs. Weakness on the ground, in turn, became a major argument for withdrawing the entire force once widespread violence erupted.

Aid Strategy: Human Rights Conditionality

It is known in retrospect that those who organized and planned the genocide were involved in the earlier, mounting violence against civilians, especially from 1992 and onward. Such involvement, which included prominent figures of the Habyarimana regime, was also reported and repeatedly documented at the time. Here was an opportunity for the international community to check the escalating conflict by signaling that it would not tolerate massive human rights abuses. Some states and major nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) did express concern over the worsening human rights situation. Human rights NGOs and later the UN human rights system compiled reports documenting government involvement in systematic killings of Tutsi, particularly in northern Rwanda (see the section "Early Warning").

Acknowledging evidence of a deteriorating situation, certain donor countries formally made some efforts to correct it. While the United States did not stress, and France did not include, human rights issues in their policy toward Rwanda, other donors did. Belgium formally incorporated human rights criteria in its aid policy after the socialists came to power in 1992. Canada, another major donor, had done so all along. Also the representatives of Switzerland and the Vatican spent considerable time and efforts raising human rights issues.

In practice, however, almost all donors decided not to reduce aid despite human rights violations, even though these were recognized as severe. For instance, when four international human rights NGOs in March 1993 published an incriminating report, the Belgian government took steps considered extreme in the language of diplomacy. The Rwandan ambassador in Brussels was told that Belgium would reconsider its economic and military aid unless steps were taken to rectify the situation. However, Habyarimana made conciliatory state-
ments, and Belgian aid continued. The Canadian government announced that Rwanda would be phased out as a major aid recipient from 1992–93 onward, partly for human rights reasons, but mainly reflecting budgetary cuts and changes in bilateral programming.30

Why was human rights conditionality—an arrow in the quiver available to the international community—not pursued more decisively? One reason was that international pressure to democratize and institute “good governance” developed a special rationale in Rwanda: just as the Arusha process was a solution to civil war, so democratization came to be seen as a solution to the growing problem of civil violence. Support for democratization and the related peace process meant continuous economic and diplomatic engagement in Rwanda. From this perspective, the threat of imposing sanctions by withdrawing aid—as Western human rights organizations called for in 1992–93—would be counterproductive. Donors thus became hostage to their own policies. In France’s case, the alliance structure and perceptions of “the enemy” effectively ruled out any sanctions. Of all the donors, France had the greatest leverage by virtue of its military support for the regime, but for this reason was also the least critical. To French policymakers, the RPF, and not the Habyarimana regime, was the problem; any action that criticized or weakened the government was seen as playing into the hands of the enemy at the time of civil war.31

The scope for aid conditionality further narrowed as donors shifted development aid into relief assistance following the RPF’s 1993 offensive, which displaced several hundred thousand persons from the northern prefectures. The call for pledges of international humanitarian assistance went out in the UN system in March 1993, just at the time when four international NGOs published a report detailing the government’s involvement in massive human rights abuses and calling for human rights conditionality in aid policy. Faced with two humanitarian needs that appeared to be contradictory, the donors chose the one with most immediate and predictable results: provide immediate relief aid rather than cut aid in the hope that human rights would improve later.

Given the limited scope for human rights conditionality, donors instead looked to “positive conditionality,” in European Union terms, to promote democratization and human rights and later to have the Arusha Accords implemented. Aid was allocated to strengthen sectors deemed particularly significant for good governance, including administration in the Ministry of Justice, local human rights organizations, and a free press. Despite these efforts, the quality of governance declined markedly. In the Ministry of Justice, for instance, the assignment of foreign advisers could not make up for the fact that for most of 1993 there simply was no minister of justice. The one who was finally appointed toward the end of the year had a shady reputation that was subsequently confirmed.32

The changing political situation nevertheless produced substantial aid cuts in the end, but the signals sent in the process were not designed to restrain human rights abuses and possibly had the opposite effect. Multipartisme and fiercely conflictual politics in late 1993 over the implementation of the Arusha agreement turned administrative agencies into political fiefdoms of a more extreme kind than before. There was no accountability and project implementation had
become impossible, the U.S. Agency for International Development concluded, suspending its program in 1994. Germany did the same, citing insecurity in the countryside and the erosion of administrative efficiency. The European Union also put most of its four-year aid allocation to Rwanda on hold. By suspending aid with reference to bookkeeping and resource restraints rather than human rights criteria, donors sent the message that human rights issues were insignificant to the point of not being incorporated in aid policy at all.

Early Warning

Information: Multiple, Corresponding Signals

Looking back to the period between the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords and the genocide that commenced nine months later, it seems at first reading hard to understand how the development of a genocidal movement escaped the attention of the diplomats, UN officials and peacekeepers who were involved in Rwanda. The problem was not one of lack of information, and—compared to famous instances of misread signals in history, from the Zimmermann telegram in World War I to preparations for the attack on Pearl Harbor—there was in this case an abundance of overt information, accompanied by active lobbying to bring it to the attention of policymakers.

Considerable and growing evidence of Hutu extremism was collected by human rights organizations and concerned activists. It was well known that the combined peace and democratization process faced strong opposition within the country. By late 1992 and especially in early 1993, information had been compiled about death squads as well as "Network Zero" around the president, which reportedly was plotting to exterminate regime opponents and circulated death lists. The report of an International Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in early 1993 was widely circulated.33 The report documented state involvement in what was described as systematic killings directed against the Tutsi, and it estimated that about two thousand persons had been murdered in the 1990–92 period. Briefing reporters on its finding, the commission used the term genocide to describe the killings.

The diffusion of hate propaganda in Rwanda was also noted as an indicator of increasing tension and mounting "Hutu power." Hutu supremacist rhetoric became increasingly vocal and public. Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) broadcast hate messages that called on the people to rid the country of Tutsi. African diplomats remember CDR members proclaiming on the Kigali cocktail circuit that in the future there would be no Tutsi left in Rwanda. Referring to the RPF as the "historical overlords," the RTLM whipped up fear by claiming that once the RPF army was in Kigali— as provided for in the Arusha Accords—Tutsi troops would attack the Hutu population.

In this period as well, links between the civil violence and the peace process had become more explicit. At every important juncture and setback for the government, Tutsi were murdered. Clearly discernible in retrospect, the coincidence between killings of Tutsi and the rhythm of negotiations in Arusha was also rec-
ognized at the time by Kigali-based diplomats and variously interpreted. “We read the killings as a political negotiating tactic,” one diplomat later said. Others saw the violence more radically as an attempt to derail the entire peace process.

Signs clearly pointed to the consolidation of the power of the Hutu supremacists through the formation of what amounted to parastatal organizations. The CDR was formed in March 1992, bringing together military and political extremists from circles inside, or connected to, the Presidential Palace. The party militias (the interahamwe and impuzamugambi) were also formed at this time with direct support from the CDR, the ruling government party and the Presidential Guard. Both operated openly, and diplomats in Kigali readily recognized both as instruments of the ruling party. Yet, their precise function was open to various interpretations. Some observers accepted at face value that the militias were formed to defend the country against the invading RPF troops according to the doctrine of village self-defense. Subsequent intelligence information suggested that, possibly up until late 1993, this was indeed their main purpose.

The UN and NGO human rights monitoring systems also picked up important information. Having been alerted to the human rights situation already in 1992, the UN Commission on Human Rights discussed Rwanda in both 1992 and 1993 under its “1503 procedure,” the confidentiality clause used to initiate discussion on countries where serious problems are noticed. In 1993, the human rights NGOs who comprised the International Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights persuaded the UN’s special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, B.W. Ndiaye, of the need to visit Rwanda. His ten-day visit produced a report in August 1993 (E/CN.4.1994/7), which was presented to the commission early in 1994—i.e., shortly before the genocide took place. The Ndiaye report specifically referred to articles of the Genocide Convention to describe activities taking place in Rwanda.

State intelligence agencies took their own assessments. The Central Intelligence Agency, for example, undertook a January 1994 desk-level analysis of the Rwanda situation; its worst-case projection included scenarios of deaths on the order of half a million casualties. This indicated that there was enough information available about events in Rwanda for specialist analysts with access to all the data to develop reasonably accurate scenarios.

Finally, UNAMIR received key pieces of information about an extremist conspiracy from the field. Some was picked up by the small, unofficial intelligence unit set up by the Belgian 1st Paratroop Battalion deployed in Kigali under Colonel Luc Marchal. The unit was financed directly by Belgium after the UN Secretariat declined to do so and reported to the Belgian Ministry of Defense. During early 1994, the Belgian intelligence officers provided detailed secret information, including vouching for the bona fides of a key informant, detailing secret arms caches, and spelling out plans by MRND leaders, in cooperation with interahamwe units, to isolate, harass, and undermine the work of the Belgian UNAMIR contingent.

The signals were communicated unequivocally to New York in a cable from the UNAMIR force commander to the DPKO in the UN Secretariat on January
11, 1994: A “very important government official” turned informer had told him that “hostilities may commence again if political deadlock ends.” Violence was thus seen as a consequence of the event eagerly awaited by the international donor community—i.e., implementation of the peace agreement. The January cable had additional information. The Rwandan government informant had told UNAMIR of an extremist plan to assassinate politicians at the scheduled ceremony for swearing in of the transitional government. In the process, they would provoke an encounter with Belgian peacekeepers soldiers, expecting that by killing some, they could provoke the entire UN contingent to leave Rwanda. As the RPF would be instigated to resume war, 1,700 interahamwe who had been training in camps outside Kigali were staged to sow insecurity throughout the city; teams of forty each were organized within Kigali to kill all the Tutsi who had been registered by the militias. The informer estimated his units could kill one thousand persons per twenty minutes.

Assassinations on this scale were no longer of the order of a political tactic but were clearly genocidal. Moreover, the message dovetailed with a series of other developments, indicating that the situation was rapidly deteriorating. Thus, information about the possibility of an oncoming genocide—or at any rate civil violence on a scale that would undermine the peace process—was “in the system” in ample quantity. Yet, in New York, Washington, Paris, Dar-es-Salaam, and Kampala, the signals were evidently not “heard” properly: Key decision makers did not draw the conclusion that the possibility of a genocide existed. The principal concern was that the peace process would break down and civil war resume, as was evident when the Security Council voted to renew the mandate of UNAMIR in January and again on April 5, 1994 (i.e., one day before the violence was unleashed). In internal as well as official documents, and as recalled by close observers or actors later, there is little doubt that the scale, ferocity, and systematic nature of the genocide took the international community by surprise.

The reasons for failing to “hear” are familiar from studies of misperception in international politics, both the cognitive factors analyzed by Robert Jervis and the combination of bureaucratic barriers with cognitive structures detailed by Roberta Wohlstetter in her exhaustive study of Pearl Harbor. In the Rwanda case, the factors that impeded the transformation of information into intelligence fall into three main categories: cognitive, bureaucratic, and political.

Analytic Issues: Cognitive, Bureaucratic, and Political

Cognitive Factors

To begin with, the complexity of the local situation noted above blurred some of the signals coming out of Kigali, effectively constituting a sort of “noise.” The political scene in Kigali in the period before the genocide was extraordinarily complex, with a flurry of rumors and propaganda further complicating the picture. Key questions remain unclear even today, including the relationship between Habyarimana and the extremists. Was he a master or a victim of the hard-liners, and if he moved from one role to another, when did this happen? The
difficulty of distinguishing rumors from facts was exacerbated by the diffusion of propaganda that all sides resorted to as a weapon of war and politics. Similarly, raw information about organized killings in Rwanda did not dispel a certain confusion about who constituted the principal target. Some diplomats read the violence primarily as being politically directed against regime opponents regardless of ethnicity and were totally unprepared for the genocidal dimension of the violence. Others saw Rwanda's Tutsi minority as a hostage to the war between the Habyarimana regime and the RPF, and thus collectively being at great risk. This was the pattern of the early 1960s, when attacks by a previous generation of Uganda-based Tutsi refugees-turned-guerrillas brought fierce retaliation against the Tutsi who remained in Rwanda.

Some signals that were on the face of it more explicit were made ambiguous by the context in which they appeared and thus shaped by the cognitive filters of the listener. For example, the hate propaganda which in retrospect seems to have provided explicit information about the brewing crisis (e.g., calls to rid the country of all Tutsi) were interpreted by some foreign observers as efforts to put pressure on the RPF to make concessions at Arusha. Others dismissed it as exaggerated rhetoric or as a figure of speech in a complex culture. Even members of the RPF politburo acknowledge in retrospect that they underestimated the significance of the extremist radio broadcasts. A leading RPF member later explained, “What they said was so stupid; we did not take it seriously enough.” The comment recalls the reactions, some sixty years earlier, to Hitler's Mein Kampf. Also some Western and African diplomats said in retrospect they found the notorious RTLM so explicit and literal that they tended to dismiss it.

More specifically, four factors contributed to the misreading of the signals about the coming genocide.

1. Incredulity: Genocide is historically a rare occurrence. Its path of development was unfamiliar and difficult to discern. Despite the precedent of Cambodia, many associated the concept of genocide with the highly mechanized killing carried out by the Nazis. The idea that hundreds of thousands could be slated for execution in a poor, agricultural society, and that this could be carried out in a short time, seemed incredible.

2. “Shadows”: The listening process in the United Nations and among key actors was also influenced by events of the sort that haunt decision makers and distort perceptions through the formation of cognitive structures. We shall call them “shadows.” One was the shadow of hope: the concern, first, to conclude a peace agreement at Arusha and, then, to see it implemented, so preoccupied almost all the players that they tended to underrate the growing evidence of organized extremist movements intent on undermining that peace. The pursuit of the agreement, the hope invested in its effectiveness, and the eagerness to see it implemented dominated their attention right up until April 6.

Somalia was another shadow. The disintegration of Somalia and the shortcomings of the UN response had a strong influence in both Washington and New York. Mounting violence in Rwanda was interpreted as
signs of another “failed state” with anarchic dimensions—including spontaneous tribal violence. In fact, Rwanda was not a failed state; on the contrary, it was a well-organized state protecting, or at any rate allowing, extremist forces to plot a genocide.

3. Confusion about the message: At various points, different actors monitoring the evolving conflict—human rights organizations, the RPF, the special rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights—used the term genocide. But the term conveyed different meanings, which created confusion among the listeners. The problem with the term genocide as a signal comes in the different implications and illustrations of the legal and popular uses of the term. The use of the legal definition of the term in an accusatory sense arguably diminished the impact of the term in its function as a warning signal. If the killing of three hundred Tutsi constitutes genocide (in the legal sense), then warnings about potential genocide signal the potential death of a few hundred more. The linking of the deaths of “only” hundreds to the terms apocalypse and genocide throughout the civil war period diminished their impact as warnings. While significant in and of itself, early warning about genocide defined in legal terms led to very different thinking about consequences and reaction than would a clear signal of an impending genocide as defined in the popular sense of massive killings.

4. Desensitization: Only six months before the genocide occurred, massacres in Burundi claimed the lives of a reported fifty thousand to a hundred thousand persons. There was no worldwide outrage and little response. This failure of the international system to be startled or to respond reflected a preexisting propensity to expect disasters out of Africa. The threshold for international response seemed to increase accordingly: if one hundred thousand persons could be killed with impunity, the possibility of another massive slaughter did not seem so extraordinary, nor did it require particular responses. Hence, there developed a mental indifference to the possible consequences of the rising tensions in Rwanda. This was reinforced by the tendency to view the struggles within Rwanda as the recurrence of ancient conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi rather than as a product of a well-organized political machine bent on genocide. As one Belgian official later put it, “We’ve learned from our experience that whenever there is trouble in Rwanda, the Hutu and the Tutsi kill each other.”

Bureaucratic and Political Factors

Notwithstanding the dissonance and confusion, some strong signals were available to decision makers. Two of them—the Ndiaye report and the January 11 cable from UNAMIR—came from within the UN system itself and were thus free of the bias that sometimes accompanies signals from NGOs, states that are arm’s-length parties to the conflict, or the parties themselves. Yet even these signals were barely recognized and did not generate changes in policy.
The Ndiaye report on abuses in Rwanda was part of a thematic report for the UN Human Rights Commission on extrajudicial killings and did raise the question of genocide (E/CN.4/1994/7Add.1). Written in August 1993, the sensitive material contained in the report was not dealt with by the UN system until March of the next year, and even then it received only routine consideration by the commission. As a political body composed of UN members sensitive to sovereignty issues, the commission rarely discusses particular countries except those singled out for attention by a special rapporteur. Not being singled out, Rwanda was folded into a report that the commission only discussed thematically.

Another explanation lies in the nature of the report. Ndiaye supported the substance of the claims made a few months earlier by the International NGO Commission, in particular that the government was involved in the massacres of civilians. He further noted that the question of whether the massacres constituted genocide “has often been raised.” After a brief discussion—contained in four out of the report’s eighty-six paragraphs—Ndiaye offered an “initial reply”: since Tutsi have been the victims in the overwhelming majority of cases and have been targeted solely qua Tutsi, the Genocide Convention’s Article II(a) and (b) would apply. The language diminished the content of the message.

Finally, the human rights machinery of the United Nations had no capacity to relate human rights violations to a dynamic analysis of the social forces that produced them, and the monitoring process was sporadic, providing no follow-through on reports. As a result, this part of the United Nations became virtually irrelevant to the early warning process.

Elsewhere in the UN system, the most striking warning about impending disaster came in a cable from General Dallaire in Kigali, dated January 11, 1994. In a precise forecasting of things to come, the cable revealed detailed extremist plans for killing Tutsi in Kigali and provoking an attack on UNAMIR. Dallaire sent the coded cable to the chief military adviser of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, General Maurice Baril, who discussed it with senior officials in the DPKO. Concerned about the reliability of the informant, the DPKO asked Dallaire for further assessment on this point. Dallaire affirmed the informant’s reliability in a second cable on January 12. Nevertheless, the DPKO officials decided that the cable did not warrant any change in policy. Dallaire was instructed to inform the embassies of the United States, France, and Belgium in Kigali but was denied permission to search for arms caches on the sites identified by the information. No other action was taken, and the Security Council as a whole was not informed, despite later claims by the Secretariat to that effect. The cable also circulated to two other units in the Secretariat, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Political Affairs, where officials signed off on the cover sheet but did nothing else.

In Kigali the force commander thought differently. In the January 11 cable he requested permission to act within the next thirty-six hours by seeking out arms caches that the informant had identified. On three occasions in early February, Dallaire had made similar requests to carry out cordon-and-search operations to seize arms. Each time the DPKO turned down the requests. While UNAMIR’s mandate as specified by the UN Security Council did not mention and therefore
did not directly authorize confiscation of illegal arms at all, the DPKO invoked the rules of engagement formulated by the force commander and the Secretariat, which only permitted action jointly with the Rwandan army or the gendarmerie. Similar calls from the Belgian government to permit UNAMIR to interpret its mandate more proactively—issued after Belgian Defense Minister Leo Delcroix had visited Rwanda in mid-March—were likewise rejected.46

The different assessments by the field level and New York point to the influence of the broader policy context in interpreting incoming data. In New York, information from the field about extremist plans in Rwanda was assessed in light of what had just happened in Somalia. This made bad news worse: If Dallaire’s informant was right, UNAMIR was on the target list along with thousands of civilians. In that case, the United Nations would be facing a scenario that made Somalia look pale, and the UN peacekeeping in Somalia had officially been identified as a disaster by both the Security Council and the Secretariat. The new self-imposed rule in the DPKO was “don’t cross the Mogadishu line,” as a high-ranking official later said. The future of UN peacekeeping in Africa was seen to be at stake, and the concern to avoid becoming involved in “another Somalia” was palpable. A proactive policy in Somalia over confiscation of arms had triggered the conflict between the UN/U.S. forces and those of Somali general Aideed’s units; a similar chain of event must be avoided in Rwanda.47 Given that a proactive response was ruled out in advance, the information that would have suggested and underpinned such a response was also dismissed—deliberately or not.

The tendency towards “wishful thinking” seemed noticeable also in other respects. In the United States, development of the Presidential Decision Directive on peacekeeping (PDD 25) went forward in late 1993 and early 1994. Its main conclusion strictly limited American involvement in, and funding of, peacekeeping. If U.S. noninvolvement was nearly axiomatic, there was probably a tendency to screen out information about situations in which legal and moral obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention entailed intervention. Indeed, U.S. officials carefully avoided using the term genocide in April and May 1994. For France, which had the best access to information in Rwanda, recognition of information to the effect that Paris was supporting a regime under whose wings genocide was being planned would raise questions about the good judgment of French decision makers. Even the RPF, which had the most direct interest in determining and demonstrating the ill intentions of the Habyarimana regime, might have difficulties considering genocide as a possibility. RPF leaders have later admitted that they expected in 1990 that “thousands” of Tutsi would be killed in the aftermath of the invasion in retaliation, as had happened in the early 1960s.48 But given their very limited ability to mitigate, let alone stop, genocide of the Tutsi, to admit to its possibility would have either frozen them into impotence or forced them to accept a measure of historical coreponsibility for the slaughter.

The response of the UN Secretariat also reflected the United Nations’ limited capacity to collect and process information. After the reorganization in 1990, no central unit in the Secretariat was charged with collecting even “soft” intelligence, including the information available in the vast structure of UN agencies...
and organizations, and to translate assessments into policy options and strategic planning.

More generally, the problem in the United Nations was overload: the Security Council and the DPKO were dealing with a plethora of actual, as distinct from possible future, crises that competed with Rwanda. Similar conditions prevailed in national capitals, including Washington, which had the capacity to jolt the United Nations into listening more carefully to an area for which the Security Council had assumed peacekeeping responsibility. But Rwanda was so marginally important to the United States that Washington did not even listen to its own warnings. The worst-case scenario produced by the CIA in January 1994, noted earlier, did not fare much better. The report was not distributed widely, nor did it reach the higher decision-making echelons. The fate of the report illustrates the broader point that information does not constitute an early warning unless it is given political attention.

The Key Decision: The Fate of UNAMIR

The two weeks following the shooting down of the plane carrying President Habyarimana and associates on April 6, 1994, constituted a critical decision-making phase in the international response to the conflict. If there were any chances of reducing the scope of the genocide before it fully unfolded, this was the time. Recent analysis by a leading U.S. scholar on Rwanda, Alison Des Forges, suggests that the coup and simultaneous genocide were launched before the coup makers were fully prepared, hence the uneven tempo of the killings during the first week. Not until mid-April was it decided to extend the killings to Butare and the rest of the southern region. The decision, according to Des Forges, was taken at the highest level by members of the “Crisis Committee” in Kigali, and an important factor in their decision was the failure of the international community to respond forcefully to the initial killings in Kigali and other regions. Divisions within the military, moreover, suggested that a more determined international response against the extremists would have found allies within. The strategy attempted by the UN force commander before April 6 and his retrospective analysis reflect a similar assessment: a forceful response at the outset would have been a warning to the extremists and—at best—would have stopped them in their tracks.

Deployed as a bare-bones peacekeeping mission, and not strengthened despite signals of a worsening situation, UNAMIR had no capacity to respond forcefully. The weakness of the force—a mere two and a half battalions (about 2,500 people) for the whole country, of which one (the Ghanaian battalion) was deployed outside the capital, plus some military observers—was graphically depicted by General Dallaire in a cable to DPKO on April 8. His force was spread out and extremely short of ammunition, fuel, and water. Without resupply, it could function only in a limited and highly defensive manner, he wrote. Resupply was, of course, a possibility. The Kigali airport was initially secure, and several UN members had the means to intervene decisively, as France, Belgium, and
also Italy showed by launching efficient airborne operations soon after April 6 to evacuate their expatriates. The immediate response of the United Nations, however—both as a state system and collectively in the form of the Secretariat—was to emphasize the security of expatriates and the UN peacekeepers and preparation to evacuate both. The signals given were thus clear: Rwanda was abandoned to its fate.

During the first week of the crisis (i.e., until the middle of April), there were open divisions in the Security Council on the issue of UNAMIR’s future. The nonaligned states, led by Nigeria, argued for strengthening UNAMIR and on April 13 circulated a draft proposal to that effect. By then, however, it was too late and the option was not backed by offers to contribute. The draft resolution was not even tabled. The day before, the Belgian government had told the secretary-general that, following the murder of the ten Belgian peacekeepers in Kigali, the entire Belgian UNAMIR contingent would be withdrawn. The decision was communicated to the Security Council the next day. The decision deprived UNAMIR of its strongest unit and put the rest of the force in a precarious position. The secretary-general made the point bluntly in a letter to Security Council members on April 13: Belgian withdrawal will make it “extremely difficult for UNAMIR to carry out its task effectively…. In these circumstances, I have asked my Special Representative and the Force Commander to prepare plans for the withdrawal of UNAMIR.”

Having decided to withdraw its own contingent, the Belgian government lobbied hard to persuade the Security Council that conditions in Rwanda necessitated withdrawal of UNAMIR as a whole. The stance was widely seen as an attempt to legitimize its own withdrawal, but the Belgians were pushing on an open door. They were strongly backed by the United States; the United Kingdom and France, though less vocal, also favored withdrawal. No country came forward with troop contributions, and the Secretariat claimed later that informal canvassing at the time had produced negative results.

Three Options

The formal decision to withdraw was taken by the Security Council in the context of a choice between three options formulated by the secretary-general. In reality, all but one option had already been ruled out in the informal and officially unrecorded consultations in the council and its communications with the Secretariat, probably de facto almost a week earlier. In this situation, the language used by Boutros-Ghali when he presented the reinforcement option to the Security Council on April 20 seemed prohibitive. The situation in Rwanda could only be changed by “immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR…. [which would] require several thousand additional troops and UNAMIR may have to be given enforcement powers under Chapter VII” (S/1994/470, para.13). The alternative of complete withdrawal also seemed difficult. Given the “dimensions of the violence and mass killings over the last two weeks… the consequences of complete withdrawal, in terms of human lives lost, could be very severe indeed” (para.19). That left the middle alternative of reducing UNAMIR to
about 270 military personnel. These would take on a diplomatic role by promoting a cease-fire and, when feasible, assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief. On April 21 the Security Council approved this option over the recorded doubt, but with the votes of its nonaligned members (S/PV.3368, 1994).

By this time, the Security Council and the Secretariat had ample information to the effect that the killings in Rwanda were both massive and organized. As noted earlier, information suggesting genocidal massacres had been coming in for some time prior to April. After April 6, detailed information about mass killings was pooled in the DPKO’s Situation Centre, and the UNAMIR force commander reported already on April 8 that “a very well planned, organized, deliberate and conducted campaign of terror” was under way. The Nigerian draft resolution that circulated in the Security Council on April 13 expressed shock over “the death of thousands of innocent civilians.” The decision to withdraw was thus taken with considerable knowledge of the likely consequences on the ground.

The impact of the Somali experience is again important as a cognitive filter that shaped the assessment of the situation and the attendant risks and costs. Viewing Rwanda in the Somali lens, the Security Council, particularly the U.S. and the U.K. delegations and also senior officials in the Secretariat (DPKO), by this time perceived the situation as civil war combined with anarchic, or “mindless violence” (Res.912/1994), and took that to mean an all-or-nothing response: a forceful Chapter VII operation or withdrawal. What the decision makers did not see was the systematic killings of civilians, organized by a small but determined group of coup makers and carried out by lightly armed thugs and civilians. To respond effectively to the latter situation need not necessarily require a massive intervention armed with a Chapter VII mandate but a smaller force inserted with a mandate to protect civilians in designated sites. A mandate of this kind was in fact later drawn up and given to UNAMIR II when political pressure mounted for the international community to “do something” to mitigate the killings of civilians, thousands of whom were murdered daily in April and May.

Evidently recognizing that it was falling into a decision-making trap in early April, the Security Council commented critically on the failure of the Secretariat to come up with options other than an all-or-nothing response. The Security Council wanted options to go beyond the classic framework of Chapter VI versus Chapter VII, or a Somalia-type engagement versus withdrawal, as the British ambassador said on April 13. But the Secretariat, laboring under enormous pressure of time and scarce resources and lacking decisive leadership from the secretary-general during the first week of the crisis, failed to innovate under stress. Instead, standard concepts and procedures prevailed. The genocide was not distinguished from the civil war, and the latter overdetermined the analysis. Options to reinforce UNAMIR were always put in terms of a classic enforcement operation with full Chapter VII mandate, suggesting intervention between the two armies rather than maintaining or increasing troop strength to protect civilians. The Security Council, for its part, did not strike new directions on its own, and the political signals by the second week were clearly in the direction of withdrawal, particularly from the United States. This constrained the Secretariat further.
Withdrawal became a means to salvage a UN peacekeeping operation that had been tailored to a situation that had never really existed. But by largely absenting itself from the conflict in April, the United Nations simultaneously lost leverage to influence its future course—on the ground and diplomatically. External conflict management essentially came to a halt. When the United Nations subsequently reversed itself by authorizing on May 17 reinforcement and reconstitution of UNAMIR into a Chapter VI force that would primarily protect civilians, reentry proved slow, difficult and fundamentally too late. The point was fully understood by the UNAMIR officers who discussed options in the middle of the madness that was Kigali on April 21. Reducing the force to 270 men, which the Security Council was about to decide, meant “we can do little,” and “we will really not be able to come back,” the deputy force commander scribbled on a notepad.

Lessons Learned

Did preventive diplomacy fail in Rwanda? The question must be rephrased with reference to what was to be prevented. As we have shown, there was very considerable diplomatic activity designed to end the civil war and obtain a comprehensive peace agreement. This strategy was preventive in the sense that it sought to prevent the continuation of the civil war and associated violence against the civilians. In that sense, preventive diplomacy succeeded—for a short time.

Once the peace agreement was concluded, the task was to secure implementation. A preventive dimension is again evident. Clearly perceived at the time, the development to be prevented was a resumption of the civil war, with associated violence against civilians as had occurred before. In this regard, however, the international community clearly and deliberately invested only minimal efforts, as evidenced in the UN peacekeeping operation mounted for Rwanda. The minimalist response was reflected in the mandate, strength and outfitting of UNAMIR and—perhaps most clearly—in article 2 of the mandate, which made renewal beyond the initial three months dependent on progress toward implementation of the peace agreement. In other words, if there was no clear and positive movement toward peace, the United Nations would disengage militarily. Preventive diplomacy would be pursued, if at all, by other and less powerful means.

This was in fact what happened when the crisis broke in April 1994 and changed the context from one of preventive diplomacy to conflict management. The decision to effectively disengage at that time was a continuation of the previous strategy that presaged withdrawal if the peace agreement were not implemented. Retrospectively, very considerable consistency can be discerned in the decisions of the Security Council and the UN Secretariat in the period from October 1993 to the end of April 1994. At every step in the escalating conflict, the gains from involvement were juxtaposed against the risk and costs and found not to justify a stronger response.

The United Nations' low-cost and low-risk strategy in Rwanda reflected fundamentally the strategic marginality of Rwanda to the Permanent Five of the Se-
curity Council. Without decisive leadership from the Permanent Five, and absent vigorous leadership by the secretary-general, the United Nations as a collective actor was unable to sustain even a limited operation in the field peacekeeping operation.

The limits of preventive diplomacy in this second period therefore expressed a failure to act rather than the failure of actions taken. Judged against the objectives of the main actors at the time, preventive diplomacy can hardly be said to have failed, because it was not seriously attempted. By contrast, the period of active diplomacy during the previous Arusha process did not show a failure to act, and even showed some success when judged against the short-run objectives of the peace process. The civil war was terminated by a peace agreement as the peace process indeed intended.

In a broader historical and normative calculus, however, the overall failure of actions taken by the international community toward the evolving Rwanda conflict is inescapable. Intended or not, preventive diplomacy failed in the sense that actions taken did not prevent the eventual derailment of the peace agreement. Most starkly, an array of diplomatic, economic, and peacekeeping efforts did not prevent the occurrence of a genocide.

While international withdrawal and inaction in April hardly was the result of miscalculation, it arguably was a mistake. In relation to international legal norms governing crimes against humanity, the international community had various legal obligations to respond. The 1948 Genocide Convention specifically concerns the right of states to intervene to stop genocide and imposes at least a moral obligation to do so. To the extent that international legal norms reflect underlying principles conducive to international order and stability—as well as ethical principles of justice—the failure of the international community to respond more forcefully to the Rwanda genocide was “wrong” on grounds of both morality and realpolitik.

The response to the genocide also stands as an indictment of existing multilateral systems of early warning. The Rwanda case demonstrates that information about an escalating conflict does not translate into early warning or decisive early action unless the bureaucratic and political machinery is prepared to translate information into analysis, and analysis into warnings. The intelligence preparedness, in turn, is partly determined by perceptions of what policies the actors are prepared to undertake in line with their perception of national interest.

Apart from the underlying lack of strategic interest of the major powers in Rwanda, this failure reflected both misjudgments and miscalculations. Signals of escalating violence were read so as to filter out worst-case scenarios or—when violence manifestly occurred on a large scale—were interpreted according to axioms that distorted an accurate analysis and unduly narrowed policy options. The costs of inaction were also miscalculated. Apart from the greater relief costs “downstream” caused by massive violence against civilians, there was a miscalculation of the need to take some action in the face of an unfolding genocide and as prescribed by a signed and ratified international Convention on Genocide. Changing his stand, the secretary-general on April 29 called on the

The Rwanda case also reflects a paradox of post–Cold War Africa. As former U.S. assistant secretary of state Chester Crocker has noted, the end of the Cold War created both greater opportunities for negotiated peace (in the absence of Cold War competition by proxy) and simultaneously diminished international interest in providing the resources and political engagement necessary to secure such peace. Rwanda was caught in this dilemma. The strong international diplomatic response to the civil war reflected the capacity of local diplomats and the (traditionally weak) Africa departments of the various Western foreign affairs ministries to engage in mediation largely free from competitive rivalry—hence the positive experience of the Arusha process. However, when time came to secure the negotiated benefits of Arusha, the political interest to drive an appropriate, forceful military strategy to back the diplomatic gains was lacking. Limited political interest in Rwanda led to limited military engagement and limited capacity to “hear” early warning signals, and predetermined the nonresponse to the genocide. By the time the political level in the West was attuned to the crisis in Rwanda, it was too late to stop the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of civilian Rwandans.
Prevention Gained and Prevention Lost: Collapse, Competition, and Coup in Congo

I. William Zartman and Katharina R. Vogeli

Case Summary

RIOTS AND POLITICAL UNREST costing as many as five thousand lives between 1992 and 1994 left Congo (Brazzaville) dangling between state collapse and democratization; in 1997 the suspense ended with a death toll of an additional ten thousand and a return to authoritarian rule.¹ The turn to democratization in the first part of the decade was the result of timely intervention by a congeries of helpful mediators—President Omar Bongo of neighboring Gabon, Special Representative Mohamed Sahnoun from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), foreign embassies and ministries including those of France and the United States, and the Congolese Defense Ministry—plus the savvy and equanimity of newly elected Congolese president Pascal Lissouba. Some of the same players tried again but failed in the second part of the decade, their efforts undone by France, the United States, and Angola. They operated in a context defined by destructive elements—Congolese politicians’ personal militias, high stakes and high uncertainty in a new political system, a spoils system for the victors, easy fallback on ethnic support groups, and fluid regional politics, adding up to an explosive mixture.

Violence was not new to Congo. Since its independence in 1960, despite a quarter-century of Marxist single-party rule under the Congolese Workers’
Party (Parti Congolais du Travail [PCT]), Congo had suffered almost biennial coup attempts, five of them successful, and bloody retribution afterward. The fifth successful coup brought authoritarian stability under Denis SassouNguesso between 1979 and 1991. When the single-party rule collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s, the violence in Congo was over big stakes—control of the new competitive pluralist political system that emerged. A wave of democratizations swept through French-speaking Africa spearheaded by sovereign national conferences (Conférences Nationales Souveraines [CNS]) in which civil society seized sovereignty and reorganized government, beginning in Benin in February 1990 and extending to ten countries by the end of 1991. The process was marked by some violence in most states and was reversed by an entrenched regime in half the cases, but in the other five cases a democratic transition was accomplished.

A month after Benin held elections to choose a replacement for its fallen dictator, Congo opened its own CNS (meeting in March–June 1991) to end the power monopoly of the PCT. The CNS appointed a one-year transitional government of the Forces of Change, headed by André Milongo, to end in June 1992. Right away, though, protests against the replacement of entrenched single-party cadres with supporters of the new government led to mounting tensions, a truce, and then ethnic conflict and violence, as the rush to create political parties and the new competition among politicians channeled political mobilization along ethnic lines.

The new constitution was adopted by referendum on March 15, 1992, followed by five rounds of elections, beginning at the municipal level in May. These elections, however, were stained with fraud and violent protests and were marked by the transformation of the new multiparty system into ethnoregional parties. The two rounds of the national assembly elections in June and July produced no clear majority and a need for government by coalition. In between the two rounds, the opposition again claimed fraud and called for civil disobedience.

The two rounds of presidential elections in August brought a clear victory for Lissouba in the first round over past president SassouNguesso and in the runoffs over perennial opponent Bernard Kolelas. Within weeks, the alliance between Lissouba's Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (Union Panafricaine pour la Démocratie Sociale [UPADS]) and Sassou's PCT fell apart over the allocation of cabinet seats, and the PCT joined forces with its old enemy, Kolelas and his Union for Democratic Renewal (Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique [URD]), to form an opposition majority. Faced with a vote of no-confidence in his government, Lissouba dissolved the assembly on November 17 and called new elections.

Robbed of its parliament and in danger of losing its majority, the opposition again called for popular resistance and took to the streets. The decisive political intervention of the Congolese army chief of staff, General Jean-MarcMokoko, and Gabonese president Bongo brought the conflict back to its political expression and away from violence, as the party leaders turned to the preparation of new elections. The new general elections of May and June 1993, however, produced
the same violent reaction from the opposition, particularly since the results showed them to be losing their majority; international observers were much more positive about the free and fair quality of the elections, showing that the electoral mores and practices had improved over the year of democratization.

At this point, an array of national and international mediators swung into action. Bongo's intimate entrée into the system and past record of success, the international attention and "nest of mediations," plus the gradual exhaustion of the conflicting parties and the eventual realization that victory was unattainable, combined to produce the setting for a mediated agreement on August 4, 1993, at Libreville, the capital of Gabon. The special innovation of the Libreville agreement was an international panel of seven jurists to examine the charges of electoral fraud in a number of districts. The second round of the elections was rerun in October 1993, giving the presidential coalition 65 of the assembly's 125 seats; the jurists' panel reduced the contested seats from the first round in May to eleven, of which eight were annulled and rerun, only slightly reducing the government's majority. At a large Central African conference on the culture of peace organized by UNESCO and Congo in Brazzaville at the end of 1994, harmony was ostensibly ratified.

The Congo events of 1992–93 represent a mixed opportunity, not a missed opportunity. On a number of occasions, the parties stopped and made peace, initially on their own and then on two later occasions with increasing doses of outside help. It is uncomfortable to note that it was necessary to escalate both violence and peacemaking, in a ratcheting interaction, and nothing can prove that a better mediator might not have been able to convince the parties that they could not win alone and had better learn to play together. But neither were there obvious stones left unturned or preventive diplomacy measures untried that would have brought earlier reconciliation. At the most, the parties' unfamiliarity with democratic rules of the game and electoral practices should have alerted participants and observers to take more active preventive measures—preelectoral discussions, postelectoral monitoring, ongoing surveillance by international bodies.

In the process of learning the rules of the new game, three actions were particularly dangerous and avoidable. The initial fraud in the municipal elections of May 1992 by Interior Minister Alexis Gabou escalated grievances, sharpened conflict, and opened a pattern of action that was remembered even when behavior had changed. The shift of alliances by Sassou and the PCT compounded grievances with an ability to do something about them, but the error may well have been Lissouba's decision to shortchange the PCT in its share of government seats. The outside interference of French and Israelis in training and arming the militias was also an exacerbating action of particularly long-term consequences. Any other changes would require a change in the nature of the parties.

But the peace of 1994 was not to last. The next presidential elections were to take place on July 27, 1997, with the same principal candidates as five years previous. Sassou had been biding his time, building support for a return; twelve of his fifty-four years had been spent in the presidential palace and he missed it. Lissouba enjoyed the advantage of incumbency and the frustration of having
seen two of his five years in office wasted in conflict; at sixty-six, he had no hope of return if he were to lose, but he had no expectation of losing.

The conflict was larger than the egos of the contenders, for its real dynamic came from the uncontrolled groups of followers, the militia, who were not disbanded as the 1994 agreement had required they be. As campaign preparations intensified in the course of the year, a clash left sixteen dead on May 10 in the North, Sassou's territory, in the town of Owando, an enclave loyal to his northern rival and ally of Lissouba, former president General Joachim Yhombi-Opango. The president then banned militias and sent the army to Sassou's compound in Brazzaville to enforce the order on June 6, turning the city into a battlefield that remained divided (by the railroad tracks) into two warring parts until the final conquest of the city (and the country) by Sassou in October.5

The ensuing four months of civil war were interrupted by truce agreements mediated by the same figures who had gradually produced peace in the previous round. The increased seriousness of the conflict this time made it necessary to lock in the agreements with an external peacekeeping force, since there were no internal forces left to play a neutral role. On two occasions, designated external forces failed in their task—a French contingent left in June after having merely evacuated foreign nationals, and a U.S. veto in July prevented a UN peacekeeping force from being formed. When diplomats began considering an inter-African force in September, it was too late. The following month, military forces arrived from Angola, but their mission was to remove the forces of Lissouba and install Sassou in power, which they did brutally. Ripen moments had passed, and the great powers had defaulted in a clearly indicated preventive action.

Early Warning

As is perhaps common in regard to this topic, there was plenty of early warning of this crisis, and yet it took everyone by surprise. There was no lack of information on what was going on in the unprecedented events of the Congolese democratization process, and plenty of information about the ethnicization of the parties and their intensifying rivalries for power. It was evident as the parties emerged from the 1990 liberalization and 1991 Sovereign National Conference that the new or revived parties were all ethnic creations, concentrated in their own corners of the country. The surprise came from a general unwillingness to accept the commentaries of seasoned “Africa watchers” that none of the ethnic groups and leaders expected to lose in the newly opened contest for power and none was willing to settle for merely regional control. That unwillingness was not from ignorance; it was shared by as seasoned and native a player as Lissouba, who thought he could simply pay off the losers with local mayoralities, which ultimately he was able to do but only after the road of violence had been tried—and tried more than once. Like Sleeping Beauty’s uninvited aunt, it was the only unrewarded but most dangerous rival, Sassou, who reemerged to oust him. Again in 1997, the tightening tensions were visible to observers in Brazzaville, and the French Embassy was reported to have foreseen the explosion some time before it occurred.6
The problem was therefore an analytic, not an informational one, in which there was no precedent or experience with election campaigns and expectations to provide a basis for analysis. The case carries a new lesson about preventive diplomacy: not only do the people need to be educated about how to perform and what to expect in an election, but the same message needs to be borne to the political elites. It also indicates, about the warning-response gap, that adequate warning is not the same as adequate awareness of the preventive measures to be taken. The knowledge that Congo had a history marked by rivalries and revolts, that the parties were bound to be dominated by their ethnic clientele, and that parties were not permitted to enter other parties' electoral fiefs did not give any clue to the appropriate countermeasures. Nor, if appropriate measures could be identified, did it indicate how they were to be applied and by whom. Once the conflict began, however, the need and indeed expectation by the truced parties that a peacekeeping force would arrive were early discussed and clearly indicated but fell on irresponsibly deaf ears.

Key Decisions on Early Actions

The recurring waves of violence that accompanied the Congolese democratization process occasioned five domestic and three international exercises in preventive diplomacy in the first period and two ongoing domestic and five international mediations in the second period. These efforts were not fully anticipatory: Each responded to already rising levels of unrest. In the first period, they made an encouraging contribution to putting democratization back on track, to forestalling predictably worse violence, and ultimately to preventing impending state collapse, all in contrast to what occurred across the river in Zaire/Congo. In the second round, they were all attempts at crisis control, not preventive diplomacy; no cease-fire held for its agreed duration, and all initiatives were ground up by the machine of violence.

The drop of oil prices in 1986 had devastating effects on the Congolese economy. In spite of increasing oil exports, Sassou's regime was struggling to keep the economy afloat. As the Soviet Union started to liberalize in the mid-1980s, less support was coming to its African clients. The Congolese people started putting increasing pressure on Sassou's government to deliver on its promises of economic welfare. In search of a response, the Marxist state reapproached its former metropole, France, for aid, with promises to liberalize its economy. From 1985 onward the French oil giant Elf Aquitaine invested heavily in the development of Congolese oil fields and by the end of the decade virtually controlled the country's economy. But the infusion of foreign investment was not enough to revive the corrupt and indebted economy. By early 1990, Congolese society was literally up in arms over the mismanagement of public affairs by the ideological single-party regime.

In a context of world political change and under pressure of economic crisis, insistent calls for political liberalization opened a train of events whereby, for the first time in independent Congolese history, a government change was prepared by a collective political decision, not by coup and violence. Sassou's PCT government
was always running ahead of these calls, thereby inciting them to ever more strident demands. In parliamentary elections in September 1989, non-PCT candidates were included for the first time in the official election lists. The Confederation of Congolese Trade Unions (Confédération des Syndicats Congolais [CSC]) demanded the institution of a full multiparty political system, and the Ecumenical Council of Christian Churches called for a national conference free of PCT control. Not content with the pace of liberalization, the CSC attempted to disaffiliate from the PCT but was denied its independence. It called for a general strike in protest in September, followed by further riots and demonstrations by workers and students in October. Thus pressured, the central committee of the PCT decided to permit the registration of new political parties and then, under continuing pressure, appoint a transitional government in early 1991 to prepare a Sovereign National Conference that would decide on the country's constitutional future. The CNS convened on February 25, 1991, immediately adjourned until mid-March and completed its work on June 10.

From the beginning of the transition to a democratic political system, the political discourse was marked by rising ethnic rivalries yet required coalitions among rival groups—thirty-seven parties (most of them tiny personal groups) constituted the Forces of Change, and twenty-nine constituted the National Alliance for Democracy around the PCT. As a result, the CNS, the transitional government under the premiership of Milongo, and the ensuing electoral rounds played themselves, in one French official's word, as a "psychodrama." As Jeune Afrique put it during the election cycle, "The vote was regional, tribal, village, familial. . . . Congo has become a sum of villages." In aggregate, however, the country was split into four parts: the sparsely populated north (including the Mbochi people) represented by the PCT of Sassou and dominant in the army; the Congo River Pool around Brazzaville (and the southern quarter of the town) including the Lari, Bakongo, and Ba'Konde people represented by the Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development (Mouvement Congolais pour la Démocratie et le Développement Integral [MCDDI]) within the URD of Kolelas; the "Nibolek" (Niari, Bouenza and Lekoumou peoples) of the southwest represented by the UPADS of Lissouba; and the Kouilou around the Atlantic port and economic capital of Pointe-Noire in the south represented by the Rally for Democracy and Social Progress (Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social [RDPS]) of Jean-Pierre Thystère-Tchicaya. Nearly half of the Congolese live in Brazzaville and a quarter in Pointe-Noire. A different way of looking at the same situation is to characterize Congolese politics as a struggle for dominance over the national scene between two groups of rivals in a never-ending cycle—party leaders from the populous south (the Pool vs. the Nibolek) against army leaders from the north. Thus, leaders from half of the country made tactical alliances with leaders from the other part to defeat their regional rivals, then turned against their momentary allies to try to monopolize power.

In addition to the parties and their ethnic clientele, most leaders developed militias of their own during this period. In 1990, when threatened with removal, Sassou created his "Cobras," a personal militia of 1,500 soldiers, unemployed
graduates, and dropouts, with French support and training. Efforts of the Milongo transition government to gain political control of the army and then, when that failed, to delegitimize it with false coup charges turned it into an ally of its fellow northerner, Sassou. Milongo then established his own guard of Lari and Kongo people, led by army officers from the Pool and reportedly Israeli trained and South African armed; after the presidential elections of 1992, this guard went over to Kolelas, from the same region, and formed the spearhead of his 1,500 "Ninjas." Lissouba requested French assistance in establishing his own presidential guard after the elections; when refused, he turned to Israel to reorganize his Directorate of Military Intelligence. Although a presidential guard was not provided for in the new CNS constitution, Lissouba created one, as did his predecessors, and it was involved in a number of incidents in the electoral period. A Nibolek militia, known as the Zulus or the Aubevillois after one of its training camps, was also Israeli trained.

First Domestic Preventive Diplomacy (First Period)

Given the tradition of violence and the high unemployment levels while the new distribution of political power was being determined, the thoroughness with which the supporters of Milongo's transition government, the Forces of Change, took over the jobs of Congo's largest employer, the state, that had formerly been monopolized by the PCT provoked cries and meetings of protest and strikes among entrenched employees in the ministries. The first instance of preventive diplomacy of a domestic type occurred on December 2, 1991, when some independent politicians called a meeting of the leading politicians to declare a truce and lower tension. Extremists soon broke the agreement, and the politicians outside the mainstream party formations did not have the weight to do much about it. The transition government of Milongo was particularly inept, not only in dealing with the army and the civil service but also in doing the job of organizing the elections that was its raison d'être. Even before the first of the five electoral rounds—the municipal elections—had taken place on May 3, 1992, the government's slow progress in preparing the electoral process brought threats of civil disobedience from the new opposition coalition around the PCT. When the municipal elections were seen to be marked by fraud and corruption, further civil unrest and protest erupted.

Second Domestic Preventive Diplomacy

The transitional government's bungling of the electoral process led the Superior Council of the Republic (Conseil Supérieur de la République [CSR]), the CNS organ that served as a parliament until general elections, to fire Interior Minister Gabou, reconstitute the government as a government of national unity, and hand over the organization of the legislative and presidential elections to the army on May 16, 1992. The moderator of the CNS and defense minister, General Raymond Damase Ngollo, and the president of the CNS, Monseigneur Ernest Kombo, played a major role in mediating between government and opposition when the
“psychodrama” developed into a situation close to civil war. In this second instance of domestic preventive diplomacy, the steadying influence of two institutions—the CNS and the army—and their leaders was important in blocking the “rebel tendencies” of politicians who felt that new rules meant no rules in the struggle for power.

Despite broken promises between Kolelas and Milongo on who should be the presidential candidate of the Forces of Change, the presidential elections of August 2 were considered free and fair and produced clear defeats for Milongo (10.18 percent) and Sassou (16.87 percent) in the first round and a clear victory for Lissouba (61.32 percent) over Kolelas in the second round. The previous legislative elections in June and July, however, produced no clear majority but only an obvious need for a coalition government, with all potential coalitions in some way unnatural. The new political rules then favored negative coalition building, to unseat the natural adversary of the moment, rather than positive coalition building, to form a stable governing alliance among unnatural partners.

Following the first round of the presidential election, Sassou accepted his defeat, and his PCT went into alliance with Lissouba’s UPADS against their common opponent of long standing, Kolelas. All democratic institutions were in place when Prime Minister Maurice Stephane Bongho-Nouarra took his position as the head of government with a mandate to form a coalition government based on the UPADS-PCT parliamentary (and presidential) alliance. Lissouba was said to have indicated that he did not want to humiliate the losers and that each would be named mayor of the major city in his part of the country, beginning with Kolelas in Brazzaville.

Third Domestic and First International Preventive Diplomacy

Shortly after the new cabinet was announced, however, the PCT terminated the pact on the grounds that Lissouba had not given his PCT allies the ministerial posts they had expected. The PCT then went into alliance with Kolelas, leader of the MCDDI and URD. Now with a majority of seats in parliament, the new coalition demanded the right to form a new government and passed a vote of no-confidence against Prime Minister Bongho-Nouarra. In the middle of November 1992, barely four months after the country’s first legislative elections, Lissouba reacted by dissolving parliament and calling for new elections.

Dissatisfied with an electoral measure of their strength, the parties sought a test of strength by violence. Already on November 11, the new majority had again issued a call for civil disobedience and set up barricades in the northern and southern quarters of Brazzaville. Opposition party activists staged a demonstration in Brazzaville on November 30, demanding the resignation of the government and the rehabilitation of the National Assembly. Security forces killed three of the demonstrators and injured dozens; a military inquiry implicated members of the presidential guard in the deaths. In addition, rumors ran of an impending coup by army officers who were tired of the infighting and incapacity of the civilians and offended at being given the task of restoring order and risking civilian and military casualties.
As a result of the unrest, for a third time the chief of staff of the armed forces, General Mokoko, intervened and threatened a military takeover if the two sides would not form a transitional government to prepare the new legislative elections. Under such pressure, the parties of the presidential alliance and the opposition coalition came to an agreement on December 3, 1992, stipulating that Lissouba would create a Government of National Unity with 40 percent of the members coming from the presidential group and the rest from the opposition majority. The opposition was charged with setting up a commission to prepare new elections. The armed forces again received the mandate to monitor the implementation of this agreement, and individuals implicated in killings and the illegal possession of arms would not be included in an otherwise general amnesty.

On December 6, Lissouba appointed Claude Antoine Da Costa, an international civil servant, as prime minister charged with forming a new government that would lead the country to the elections. But disagreement over the distribution of cabinet seats between the presidential group and the opposition soon brought the ongoing negotiations to a deadlock. An escalation was needed in the mediation process.

The first international intervention occurred when President Bongo of Gabon, a close friend of Lissouba, for whom he had intervened to save him from the death penalty a decade earlier, son-in-law of Sassou, and member of the Batéké on the southern border with Congo, came to Brazzaville on December 22. The official reason for his visit was to promote economic cooperation between the two countries, but he spent three days discussing with and mediating between both groups. His efforts to bring the opposing parties to a consensus bore fruit, and Da Costa was able to present his new cabinet, and a number of joint commissions, on December 25. The crisis had been resolved and preparations for the new general elections were on their way.

There does not seem to have been any trick or angle to Bongo’s mediation. He did not invent the formula for the agreement (the 60–40 split in a government of national unity) but rather was instrumental in working out its detailed application. Above all, his intervention appears to have concentrated on convincing the principals that campaigning was better than fighting and that Congolese unity and an open political system were values to be supported. In view of subsequent events, it is important to note that in so doing, the mediator increased his own credentials and made himself a legitimate and effective player in extremis on the Congolese scene.

Fourth Domestic and Second International Preventive Diplomacy

The spirit of Bongo’s compromise lasted only as long as its letter, however. The first round of the general elections on May 2, 1993, generally judged free and fair, reversed the majority, giving the presidential coalition sixty-two seats and the opposition forty-nine, with eleven seats still undecided. The victory of Lissouba was largely the result of a vigorous campaign and an alliance with former general and former president Yhombi-Opongo, a northern leader and fellow Mbochi whom Sassou had removed on coming to power in 1979 and jailed for
a decade for high treason. Lissouba later appointed Yhombi-Opango prime minister on June 23. No less important to the electoral victory was the fact that Lissouba was able to pay the salary arrears of the civil servants twelve hours before the elections, thanks to a deal with Occidental Petroleum after Elf Aquitaine, the French company previously in almost monopoly control of Congo’s oil, refused any advance on its revenues.\textsuperscript{22}

Kolelas, the opposition leader, accused Lissouba of foul play and demanded a rerun of the elections in at least twelve electoral districts won by the presidential coalition where he claimed fraudulent voting practice had been uncovered. Lissouba invited mediation by Kombo and a colleague, bringing only temporary agreement on June 3, 1993, on the procedures for the runoff elections.\textsuperscript{23} The second round of elections in the eleven still-contested districts was set by the president for June 6; boycotted by the opposition, it gave the presidential coalition a comfortable majority of 69 out of 125, which in turn hardened the opposition of the minority and confirmed their option for violence. Rioting first erupted in Brazzaville on June 10 and quickly spread throughout the country. Kolelas went on national television to call for a civil disobedience campaign to force Lissouba to hold new general elections in the contested constituencies. When General Yhombi-Opango accused Kolelas of arousing an insurrection and warned of a crackdown, Kolelas called for a “military solution”—a veiled appeal for a coup—to the political crisis.\textsuperscript{24}

Lissouba insisted on a political, nonviolent resolution of the crisis. As the first democratically elected president, he realized that all of his actions would serve as a precedent on how to resolve future crises.\textsuperscript{25} He made several attempts to bring political and religious leaders together and to find a peaceful resolution of the conflict but failed. By mid-June, lawlessness and violence had spread throughout the country, party militias imposed exclusive control on quarters of the capital (some renamed “Sarajevo” and “Bosnia”) and parts of surrounding areas, and tens of thousands of civilians were displaced. Militias distributed arms stolen from army posts (sometimes with military complicity) or bought from unpaid Zairian soldiers.\textsuperscript{26} A week after Yhombi-Opango accused Kolelas of arousing an insurrection and warned of a crackdown, Kolelas called for a “military solution”—a veiled appeal for a coup—to the political crisis.\textsuperscript{24}

While the presidential group and the opposition found themselves in a political impasse similar to December 1992, the situation in the country deteriorated quickly. In mid-June, after the elections, Lissouba again asked Mokoko to preside over a roundtable between the two camps, but the attempt stumbled over the parties’ preconditions. A similar attempt by Kombo also failed.\textsuperscript{28} Since all direct talks between the presidential group and the opposition had failed, Lissouba imposed a curfew on Brazzaville and in mid-July asked General NGollo, the moderator of the CNS and defense minister in Lissouba’s new cabinet, to undertake the third internal mediation between the different groups
to search for a peaceful solution to the crisis. N Gollo received the explicit mandate to create conditions that would be conducive to a second international mediation. He was empowered to refer to any national or international body and was asked to form a mediation committee made up of Congolese as well as of foreigners. To restore public order throughout the country, the president decreed a fifteen-day state of emergency, dissolved the national commission for organizing and supervising the early legislative elections, and set up a crisis committee that was placed under the authority of Prime Minister Yhombi-Opango.

Having been asked to help directly by the Congolese head of state earlier in the crisis, a French mission led by Jean-Marc Simon, the deputy cabinet director of Cooperation Minister Michel Roussin, had already gone to Brazzaville in early June for talks with Lissouba and Yhombi-Opango, on the presidential side, as well as with the opposition leaders Kolelas and Sassou. The diplomatic community in Brazzaville had also held informal talks with the opposing parties throughout the spring of 1993. At the end of June several embassies issued communiqués relating to the crisis, urging reconciliation and nonviolence. They did not formally offer their services to facilitate talks between presidential group and opposition, however, until July 19, 1993, when Yhombi-Opango met with the diplomatic corps in Brazzaville.

According to French Ambassador Michel André and American Ambassador James Daniel Phillips, ensuing meetings of the diplomatic corps with government and opposition representatives were not coordinated among the different diplomats involved in Brazzaville, nor did they follow any particular strategy of action, but the diplomatic community in Brazzaville was so small that there was natural communication among the principals. They emphasized that the aim was not to suggest solutions but to calm the situation and facilitate dialogue so that the Congolese could find their own solutions. When N Gollo was authorized to call on foreign assistance, he first contacted France; even though France eventually declined to chair the international mediation effort in Congo, the Ministry of Cooperation under Roussin was deeply involved in the negotiations throughout the summer.

But nothing at this point produced any more progress than before, since there was no sense of a stalemate or an inability of any one side to win. As Ambassador Phillips put it, “Neither side was convinced that they were going to be the losers, and each hoped that they would still win.”

On Yhombi-Opango’s request, OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim proposed to test the newly authorized OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution by nominating a personal representative and sent three names to the Congolese principals—former Burundian President Pierre Buyoya, former OAU Secretary-General William Etéki Mibouma, and former OAU Deputy Secretary-General Sahnoun. Both sides unanimously chose Sahnoun (at the time a distinguished fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace), who was appointed special envoy on July 23, 1993. Sahnoun immediately invited Bongo to become involved, as the only figure with enough authority and close ties to both sides to bring them together. Two days later, Bongo sent a seven-person ministerial-level delegation to Brazzaville with a second formal mediation
Gabonese Minister Zacharia Myoboto met with Prime Minister Yhombi-Opango on July 25 and Kolelas on July 26, inviting them to meet under the auspices of the OAU in Libreville, where a Franco-African conference of foreign ministers was taking place.

Meanwhile, by July 26, NGollo was able to secure a cease-fire between the presidential and opposition groups, who finally signed a communiqué pledging to dismantle barricades, disarm and disband militias, and end looting and property destruction. They then boarded Bongo’s plane and arrived in Libreville on July 29. There Sahnoun shuttled back and forth between the two groups in different hotels, while Bongo and Roussin and their teams offered good offices and consulted daily with the parties on the course of action to take during the negotiations.

Negotiations focused on two issues: the dozen districts where irregularities were charged in the first round in May, and all eleven districts that the opposition boycotted in the second round in June. To resolve these issues, Sahnoun proposed an international judicial panel.

After a week of tough proximity talks, with the presidential group represented by Christophe Moukouéké, the opposition by Kolelas and Sassou, plus NGollo, upon Bongo’s special request, the Libreville Accord was finally signed on August 4, 1993. The conflicting groups agreed to submit the contentious election results from the first round for arbitration by an international jury made up of seven judges—three from Europe named by the European Union and by France, and three from Africa, named by the OAU and Gabon, and headed by Sikhe Camara, representing the OAU. The second round of elections was to be held again and were to be under the supervision of an international election committee, chaired by Mamadou Ba as the representative of the OAU, and with members from the EU, Gabon and France. Except for the contested twelve districts, the results of the first round of the elections were ratified.

The accord was greeted with hope and joy. Sahnoun played a particularly self-effacing role, and is little mentioned in public accounts. African media and French officials praised Bongo for his mediating skill. They attributed the successful conclusion of the negotiations to his determination and political experience. France was particularly pleased to have strengthened the capacity for diplomatic action in the Central African subregion by giving Bongo its full support. The OAU and its new Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in Africa was also reinforced; in fact, one of the purposes of Sahnoun’s mission was to test and advertise the new mechanism. The OAU gave the Libreville Accord a broader legitimacy and created for itself a precedent for future involvement in intrastate conflicts: “Until now it has been taboo to deal with internal problems,” Sahnoun stated. “There was the problem of sovereignty, noninterference in internal problems. We have moved on from there now ... and I think [the OAU] should be given the chance to see if it can resolve these problems before they are taken onto the international scene.” Sahnoun’s direct involvement came to an end with the signing of the Libreville Accord. But with the OAU director for political affairs, Mamadou Ba, as chairman of the committee to oversee the second round of the elections two months later, the OAU maintained an important involvement to monitor the progress of democratization.
The details of the multiparty mediation are still presidential secrets. Bongo and Sahnoun seem to have complemented each other, with the former’s family ties and presidential prestige fitting well with Sahnoun’s diplomatic skill and institutional prestige, and French pressure backing them both. In sum, the successful mediation appears to have had three components: a large supporting nest of international efforts to convince the parties that violence and confrontation had reached their point of diminishing returns, specific proposals and persuasive arguments by a few key actors (Sahnoun, Bongo, Roussin), and an independent realization by the parties that they had to reconcile and cooperate rather than fight for total control.

Fifth Domestic Preventive Diplomacy

The Libreville Accord provided the basis of the conflict resolution process, but locally in the Nibolek and in Brazzaville ethnic tensions remained so high as a result of the previous confrontations and the continuing operations of the militias that they produced their own sparks to ignite four months of incredible savagery beginning in early November. While the rival political leaders were undeniably—if ambiguously—involved, the mechanism was primarily “follower led” by unemployed youths, gangs, and militias, dragging in leaders to protect and avenge their followers. The conflict took on incredible personal violence during this phase—gang rapes, live impalings, pestled babies, bodies thrown in the Congo River—plus artillery bombardments of neighborhoods. Exhaus-
tion becomes the key to winding down such conflict and defusing an au-
tonomous grassroots enactment of the ethnic security dilemma.

To continue the Libreville process, Lissouba reappointed NGollo as a mediator, this time explicitly independent of government. Within two weeks after the conclusion of the Libreville Accord, fifty-six petitions for the annulment of the first-round results of the May legislative elections had been submitted to NGollo for investigation by the international jury (twenty-six from the presidential coalition and six from the allied URD of Milongo, twenty-two by the opposition, and two by independents). While the jury set itself to work, the international election committee prepared for the rerun of the second round elections in eleven districts in early October, giving three to the presidential group for a close majority of sixty-five seats and eight to the opposition, now numbering fifty-seven.

Tensions mounted again almost immediately after the election results were made known. Opposition parliamentarians boycotted the first session of the new National Assembly, and opposition militias and the national army had violent confrontations at the beginning of November. Within two days, about twenty URD activists were dead and thirty injured; for the first time the opposition appealed for dialogue. Chairman Ba of the international election committee called again for peace in meetings with both the chairman of the presidential coalition, Moukouéké, and the representative of the opposition parties, Kolelas. The Congolese mediator, NGollo, secured a pledge from Kolelas to make an appeal for calm and for an immediate resumption of all civilian activities in the opposition strongholds south of Brazzaville, and the National Assembly passed legislation dealing
with specific grievances, including access to the state-owned media and the provision of grievance procedures among political organizations. After a new wave of violence in mid-December, the leaders of both presidential and opposition camps, as well as the chief of staff and the Congolese Armed Forces, made a joint appeal for calm, and toward the end of the month, Lissouba called a “last chance” consultation among all parties. Instead, “ethnic cleansing” continued in the quarters of Brazzaville, making a death toll of about one hundred for December alone.

In response, on January 27, 1994, after a particularly heavy bombardment of a Brazzaville neighborhood, more than fifty deputies from both political camps, representing the four southern regions where most of the violence had taken place, created an interregional committee to achieve peace, chaired by an opposition deputy. The committee established a cease-fire to end the spiral of interethnic clashes that had engulfed the region since November, to be accompanied (again) by the disarming of the rival militias and the effective return of the displaced people to their permanent areas of residence. Three days later, the parliamentarians also agreed to create a national peacekeeping force to enforce the implementation of their agreement, and after a week, twenty top-ranking army officers submitted a plan for implementing the cease-fire. A four hundred-person mediation force was patrolling the streets of Brazzaville in less than two weeks, preparing the security conditions for the return of tens of thousands of internally displaced persons, and within two months, the mediation force had begun the collection of arms.

On January 31, the international arbitration jury finally announced its findings, annulling the results in eight of the fifty-six constituencies from which they had received petitions and recommending by-elections; since only three of the seats were held by members of the presidential coalition, the results were unlikely to affect the presidential majority. The opposition accepted the judgment, and almost immediately calm returned to the streets of Brazzaville.

In mid-1994, Lissouba announced plans for governmental decentralization, regional autonomy, and equitable regional allocation of resources, and he proposed the establishment of power-sharing institutions, on the South African model, criticizing the existing constitution, based on the French model, as favoring winner-take-all outcomes and contradicting the Congolese spirit of negotiation and dialogue. During the same period, Kolelas, Lissouba’s strongest challenger, was elected mayor of Brazzaville; Thystère-Tchikaya, mayor of Pointe-Noire; and Milano, speaker of the National Assembly, as proposed by Lissouba two years earlier. In August 1994, Kolelas appeared in public with senior representatives from the presidential group and together they paid tribute to those on both sides who had died during the 1993 disturbances. A symbolic international confirmation of the reconciliation was marked by the National Forum for the Culture of Peace, a regional summit sponsored by UNESCO and hosted by Congo in Brazzaville on December 19–23, 1994. Among its results was the creation of a multiparty commission to reorganize the armed forces and the judiciary.

It would be wrong to underestimate the importance of the Libreville Accord because of the continuing outbursts of serious violence that followed it. The ac-
cord created the foundation for further efforts and allowed those efforts to be undertaken on the national level, without resort to foreign intervention. By its multilayered international auspices, it engaged the leading politicians in a commitment that was more binding than the previous attempts. Not only were those previous engagements less solemnly sealed (even the first Bongo mediation produced an understanding among “brothers” rather than a formal international agreement), but the occasions to upset the earlier agreements were more compelling than the agreements themselves.

The post-Libreville situation was different. On one hand, the bloody bouts of ethnic cleansing in the quarters of Brazzaville were the rotting consequence of the preceding years of violence, but not their direct continuation. The ethnic security dilemma is a rational response to a paranoid perception, in which each ethnic group feels it must take measures to protect itself against other ethnic groups who are perceived to be bent on eliminating them. The vicious circle becomes one of eliminating the other before you are eliminated, and therefore of cleaning out the neighborhood to avoid being cleaned out. Thus, much of the worst violence at the end of 1993 and in January 1994 was no longer carried out by the troops of the two coalitions but by neighborhood mobs and gangs out of control, drugged, calling themselves invisible and invulnerable.

In addition, between the Libreville Accord of August 4 and the judicial panel decision of January 31, the October rerun of the second-round elections once again provided an occasion to revive the conflict in political terms. Each of the other agreements had been followed by rounds of elections that called the whole process back into question again, and in this case, too, the narrowness of the presidential majority made elections explosive as a resolution mechanism. Violence erupted again in the following months, until the neighborhoods were fully cleansed ethnically and the roving bands exhausted. It was good that the arbitration panel was given a four-month period after the rerun elections to make its decision and that that decision left no room for altering majority control of the government. The one remaining explosive issue was decided at the end of the period, in the judicial panel’s report. The group was not vulnerable to the same partisan challenges of earlier instances and its report was credible and balanced. It brought the conflict to an end, although it left a heritage of hatred and separation and a legacy of ethnicized political organization for the next (1997) round of elections.

Third International Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy in 1993 and 1994 presented an invaluable contribution to the prevention of all-out civil war and state collapse. The long-term success of the democratic process in Congo left a role open to the international community to help strengthen the democratic institutions, to build on the basic but fragile reconciliation worked out in 1992–94 between the antagonists. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) initiatives in building democratic institutions, the French support in integrating the different armed factions, and
the UNESCO effort to propagate a culture of peace are important sequels to the mediation efforts that led to the Libreville Accord and its implementation.

After 1994 the Congolese political parties started to define their programs in order to overcome the ethnic overtones of their politics. The NDI, an organization for overseas political assistance funded by the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, conducted workshops in Brazzaville in July 1995 that helped the parties gain an insight into democratic institutions and programs beyond the limits of their own national borders. The NDI observed that “despite recent signs of reconciliation between the major Congolese political actors, some parties seemed very apprehensive of the next presidential elections, scheduled for [July 27,] 1997.”

Given Congo’s history with Marxist ideology and reluctance among Congolese politicians to develop new ideologies, “the search [was] to strike a balance between the perceived negative sum nature of the nascent Congolese democratic system which was highlighted by the country’s winner-take-all system (and which [was] viewed by many as heightening regional and ethnic tensions), and its past history of highly ideological totalitarian rule.”

France offered help to integrate the different militias into a single army—not an easy task, as one French official expressed it, since “Congolese militias learned combat but no discipline.” In the spring of 1996 a mutiny by the Israeli-trained Zulus of Lissouba sent danger signals that old structures were still intact, and Kolelas’s Ninjas and Sassou’s Cobras remained present in Brazzaville and the North. All Congolese politics in the remaining years of Lissouba’s term focused on a rerun of the presidential contest in 1997.

First International Preventive Diplomacy (Second Period)

Following a campaign swing of Sassou in the Mbochi North, an armed clash between his and Yhombi-Opongo’s militias in Owanda on May 10, 1997, and the ensuing spread of violence in the region occasioned a presidential decree on May 29 banning all militias, repeating the engagement of the Libreville Accord three and a half years late. Two days later, UNESCO director-general Frederico Mayor, patron of the Culture of Peace Program, chaired a meeting where the country’s leading politicians signed a solemn engagement to “formally and solemnly renounce the use of arms as a means of resolving conflicts.”

In the following days, tension remounted; Lissouba announced the discovery of large illegal arms imports and then of a planned coup by Sassou. On June 5, troops encircled the former president’s compound to confiscate his Cobras’ arms and arrest two individuals charged with the killings in the North. Within two days the city was divided into two embattled territories, from which Sassou’s Cobras and Lissouba’s Zulus incessantly shelled and attacked each other, with the Bakongo or “Sarajevo” quarter of Brazzaville’s mayor Kolelas held out of combat by his Ninjas. The powder accumulating before the eyes of Congolese and international observers had been ignited.
First Domestic Preventive Diplomacy (Second Period)

Capitalizing on his ambiguously neutral position as head of the opposition but with ministers in the government, Kolelas immediately sought to negotiate a cease-fire, but it collapsed as soon as it was signed on June 8. Kolelas then created a National Mediation Committee on June 12, meeting sometimes at the French Embassy and sometimes in the city hall, with the assistance of French ambassador Raymond Cesaire, an active mediator who remained on post throughout the conflict. The French and U.S. ambassadors worked closely together throughout the mediations.

Second International Preventive Diplomacy

The Elysée immediate swung into action. Five hundred French troops already in Brazzaville in case of a need to evacuate foreigners from Kinshasa during the fall of Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko were strengthened by an additional unit of four hundred soldiers on June 10, rising the next day to twelve hundred; they were posted at the airport in Operation Pelican with orders to begin immediate evacuations from Brazzaville and then return to France. At the same time, French president Jacques Chirac by telephone obtained agreement in principle on a new cease-fire and a return to mediation by Gabonese President Bongo. Both Lissouba and Sassou broadcast orders to their militias to cease hostilities on June 11, without effect.

Second International and First Domestic Preventive Diplomacy (Reprise)

The various international and national mediation efforts joined together in Libreville under the auspices of Bongo on June 15. Joined by Sahnoun, then the special representative of the UN and OAU secretaries-general for the region, Bongo arranged terms including prolongation of the cease-fire (which had finally taken hold), joint patrols, and progressive removal of barricades. Sassou insisted on an international force, which could include French troops, to monitor the agreement. The mediators held nine hours of proximity talks in Libreville on June 16, but when the departure of the French forces from the airport was announced, the same day, the parties left Libreville to continue the combat. Operation Pelican flew away on June 16–21, its evacuation mission completed, despite requests to remain by the mediators.

While the Libreville meeting was taking place with Bongo and Sahnoun, the National Mediation Committee under Kolelas, meeting in the French Embassy with the French and U.S. ambassadors, negotiated another three-day cease-fire to begin on June 17; part of the agreement was the postponement of the presidential elections, but the nature of the government that would organize the elections thereafter was still under disagreement. At its expiration, the truce was renewed for a week, interrupted from time to time by shelling. The battle for the airport continued, along with discussions with the National Mediation Committee, where
Kolelas pursued a nine-point plan including a national union government and a UN peacekeeping force. Members of the parliament, called into special session by Lissouba to install a long-promised constitutional committee to postpone the election, set up their own mediation committee.58

As the battle for the airport and the competing national mediations slowly stalled, Bongo and Sahnoun’s efforts continued. Their terms were essentially the same as Kolelas’s, but the operative element remained a 1,000–2,000-person peacekeeping force, which the mediators proposed to the UN Security Council, with support on June 21 from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan; three African states (Niger, Senegal, Togo) and Bangladesh pledged their military participation. Meeting on July 3, the Security Council hesitated, asking for a further report from the special representative.

Bongo and Sahnoun obtained a cease-fire on July 5, and another on July 14; negotiations progressed, turning to the details of the new elections before the end of August but still stumbling on the designation of a prime minister, at the same time as sporadic fighting and shelling continued. With signatures on a cease-fire but uncontrolled militias continuing sporadic shelling across an unmoving battle line, the mediators and parties agreed that an interposition force placed in time between the cease-fire and the general peace agreement was the key to a settlement.

Contrary to the UN discussions, the Libreville proposal was for an Inter-African Force of seven hundred for six months, costing only $15 million; Bongo obtained a promise from Senegalese President Abdou Diouf of five hundred men and the commanding officer, while Botswana and Namibia pledged the remainder of the force. Former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard, a member of the European Parliament called in by Bongo, spent the period following the cease-fire obtaining pledges of financing from various members of the EU, supported by a decision of the European Council of Ministers on July 23. The council, however, ran up against the need for UN Security Council authorization for an international peacekeeping force.

Instead, the Security Council rebuffed the inter-African proposal and renewed examination of a larger peacekeeping force under UN control, which would have required two months of preparation and much higher costs. While the parties were straining at their cease-fire, marking time and awaiting a UN decision on the peacekeeping force, the Security Council took its time, and the mediators were told by U.S. representatives that the cost was out of the question. The mediators suspended their efforts on August 6. The Security Council on August 8 finally decided that neither a peacekeeping force nor lesser measures were “viable options” at that time; it recalled the preconditions, including a durable cease-fire, a political process, and security at the airport—all items that had been in place for nearly a month but that required a peacekeeping force to maintain. Both Rocard and Sahnoun have indicated that the time was ripe and the stalemated parties ready, and that a small force at a tiny cost (in international terms) would have ended the conflict.59 The decision was an abdication of responsibility similar to that of April 1994 when the same body (for the same reasons) refused to act to stop the Rwandan genocide.
Third International and Second Domestic Preventive Diplomacy

With the refusal of the Security Council, the combatants in Congo sought to break their stalemate by other means, turning elsewhere in the country, largely on the initiative of the various militia groups, and seeking outside reinforcements. After August 10, new violence broke out in the North, where the greater strength of Sassou’s forces and their reinforcement with ex-Forces Armées de Rwanda (FAR, or Rwandan Armed Forces) refugees allowed him to compensate for his growing weakness in Brazzaville.\(^{60}\) Lissouba, on the other hand, sought allies across the river, from the newly installed government of Laurent Kabila in former Zaire, now again Congo; the shift was difficult because Lissouba had formerly had close relations with Mobutu.

Stray shells had been falling on Kinshasa since the beginning of the conflict, although it was difficult to establish which side was firing the shots.\(^{61}\) New rounds crossed the river again in mid-August. On August 13, the “new revolutionary leaders” of the region—Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Pasteur Bizimungu of Rwanda—and then on August 16 Lissouba in turn met with Kabila in Kinshasa to launch their own peace plans, including a regional Inter-African Force from Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo-Kinshasa, and Uganda. Its financing was presumably left to the participating countries, and, in the event, neither the force nor the mediation ever materialized.

Mediation by Bongo and Sahnoun resumed, however, despite the fact that it was hard to keep Lissouba’s attention with the distraction of a potential and more favorable mediator in Kinshasa. On August 20 the fourth peace plan was issued from Libreville; it would keep Lissouba in office beyond his term’s expiry at the end of the month until elections could be rescheduled, and it purported to break the deadlock over the transition government by putting the prime and defense ministries in the hands of Sassou’s men. Lissouba rejected it and instead formed his own new government of national unity with Kolelas as prime minister. Although the new coalition involved the leaders of nearly three-quarters of the country, Sassou’s five seats were empty. By this time, Lissouba felt that not only was the Libreville mediation going against him but also the French government was turning to support Sassou.\(^{62}\) At the beginning of September, he traveled to France, only to be refused audience by the French president, premier, foreign and cooperation ministers, and in a telephone conversation with President Chirac was advised to take on Sassou as prime minister.\(^{63}\)

Continuing the mediation and to counter Kinshasa, a regional summit was held in Libreville on September 14 with the heads of state with close relations with France, from Togo, Benin, Central Africa, Chad, and Cameroon, along with Bongo and Sahnoun, to establish a new cease-fire and peace plan. Instead of attending, Lissouba visited Kabila, but with neither diplomatic nor military results. On the ground, the fighting stalemate again, with the more populous South in government hands and the North consolidated under Sassou’s control.

With extraordinary tenacity, equaled only by the persistence of the blocked but bloody shelling, Bongo and Sahnoun continued to work on a peace plan and cease-fire. The day after the special session of the UN Security Council called by
the United States on September 25 to study conflict in Africa, Sahnoun again asked for a peacekeeping force as the last chance, only to be told that a permanent cease-fire was a necessary precondition and the United States would not support any expenditures for the purpose. The new peace proposal was delivered to the rivals the next day, and Lissouba found its proposals for a presidential council and multiparty technical commissions acceptable. Lissouba and Kolelas traveled to various capitals of the Libreville and Kinshasa groups to engage their support for an inter-African force, alongside of troops from Congo-Kinshasa, where renewed shelling—judged initially to come from Sassou’s Cobras but later found to come from Lissouba’s Zulus—had resulted in twenty-one fatalities at the end of September. On October 9 Sassou initiated the peace plan and cease-fire, finally bringing both parties into agreement to end the conflict.

Preventive diplomacy was at the end of its rope, however, cut off by new developments on the battlefield. The day after bilateral agreement on the peace plan, the Cobras broke the four months’ military deadlock in Brazzaville and took the presidential palace. Two days later, neighboring Angola, one of Kabila’s closest allies, charged that Lissouba’s troops had attacked the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, off whose shores two-thirds of Angola’s oil was produced. Lissouba had a history of relations with Angola that was to prove disastrous. As part of his friendship with Mobutu and his antagonism to Marxist forces at home and abroad, he had long supported the two Angolan rebel groups, UNITA of Jonas Savimbi and the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave Cabinda (FLEC). On October 14, as the Cobras completed the takeover of Brazzaville, they were joined by Angolan troops in an attack on the main cities at the mouth of the river and entered Pointe-Noire, the oil capital. The operation was completed in two days. International intervention had indeed ended the fighting, but by providing a victory for the challenger over the elected president, not as a mediation.

Strategies of Action

The most striking feature of the domestic and foreign efforts at preventive diplomacy in Congo is their mutual support in the absence of any real coordination. The small size of the Brazzaville diplomatic community made specific coordination unnecessary, and there was very close collaboration particularly in the preparation of the Libreville Accord by Sahnoun, Bongo, and NGollo in 1993 and Kolelas in 1997. The possibilities of outbidding by competing mediators and the potential for undercutting among rival interests never materialized in 1993–94. As a result, the Congolese crisis was one of many cases of “layered mediation,” in which initial mediators were backed up by higher levels that could take up the effort when the previous level wore out.

In 1997, however, the clear position of the French in favor of Sassou and the great ideological rift down the Congo River during the collapse of Mobutu’s Zaire undercut the joint national and international mediation efforts and provided rival efforts by mediators in Libreville and Kinshasa (even if the latter never fully materialized). Bongo and Sahnoun were extraordinary in their pa-
tience, perseverance, and continual creativity. Equally extraordinary in its cata-
strophic effects was the irresponsibility of the United States and other members
of the UN Security Council who persisted, with exquisite timing, in refusing the
authorization of an intervention force at the very moments when it was most
promising and most needed.

The French Role

France has considerable economic interests in Congo; in 1993, it held 70 per-
cent of Congo's national debt, and in 1996, 80 percent. France was the most im-
portant investor in the development of Congo's oil industry, the fourth largest in
black Africa accounting for 85 percent of Congo's foreign exchange earnings,
where Elf Aquitaine held a near-monopoly position until the famous "Occiden-
tal deal" of 1993. By 1996, Elf was in control of 75 to 85 percent of Congo's oil
production, followed by Agip. This economic dominance, in the eyes of the
French, created a basis of trust among the Congolese players that laid the foun-
dation for successful preventive diplomacy. As one French official expressed it,
"La diplomatie préventive ne marche pas sans influence, et l'influence on doit la
payer" (something that, according to this official, the United States is not pre-
pared to do in Africa, an observation endorsed by the American ambassador at
the time). This trust across the board in 1993–94 was to turn into increasing
support for one side during the French paranoia over American influence in
central Africa in 1997.

France did not use its dominant economic position to play the peacemaker's
role. Its role was severely limited in the first crisis by the fact that it appeared to
have bet on the wrong horse. Historic French ties were with Sassou, and these
ties continued after the shift to democratization (a shift, in general, on which the
French position has been extremely ambiguous). While there are many French
players, both government and private, in Congolese affairs, and their specific
roles are probably not necessarily coordinated, the general Congolese and
Brazzaville diplomatic perception even in 1993–94, supported by pieces of real-
ity, was of French backing for the opposition and coolness to Lissouba. Sassou's
militia was reportedly French armed and trained; Elf rather archly turned down
Lissouba's request for a loan and then prepayment on a new oil field; and the nu-
merous French missions during the long crisis period of 1993–94 were not
marked by major initiatives at mediation until the Libreville meeting. The crisis
had its fallout on Paris: the president/director-general of Elf was fired, and the
director for Africa at the French Foreign Ministry was sent abroad for having
missed an opportunity to play a more positive role. By the time of the second
crisis, both France and Elf were missing the good relations they had enjoyed for
more than a decade with Sassou, and they moved to end the indecisive tenure of
his elected successor, seeing Sassou as more of a man of the new times and— as
ultimately shown—a bridge across the Congo River.

Although details of the French role are not known, the French at Libreville in
the first crisis appear to have been primarily filling the important function of
keeping the parties convinced that now was the time to make peace, while Sah-
noun and Bongo worked out the formula and details. Even though France gives
credit to the Congolese and to Gabonese president Bongo, many high-level French
delегations were sent to Congo, and Sahnoun shuttled to Paris, amid shuttles be-
tween the two protagonists’ hotels, in the conviction that the OAU alone could not
resolve the conflict and needed French and EU backing. In the second crisis, the
French role was more important in Brazzaville than in Libreville, thanks to A m-
bassador Cesaire’s tireless assistance to the Kolelas mediation, but these internal
efforts were soon overshadowed by the international effort in Gabon ultimately
undone from Paris (plus Luanda and Washington).

Bongo’s Role

Gabonese president Bongo’s quick intervention in the face of a deadlock be-
tween opposition and government in December 1992 proved to be effective in
bringing the democratic process back on track. When incidents of violence
again threatened to turn into civil war following the legislative elections in
spring 1993, OAU special envoy Sahnoun called on Bongo once more, this time
to convole the protagonists to his palace in Libreville and to keep them there for
a week until they signed a final truce.

Bongo proved to be an effective mediator and showed great commitment to-
ward bringing the opposing groups to a compromise. His skill was in patient lis-
tening and in avuncular counsel. As U. S. ambassador Phillips has de scribed
the process, “Africans work better as mediators with other Africans. The structure has
to be endless patience. Let everybody have their say. Let everybody say it three or
four times. Then finally a consensus emerges.” Bongo’s role was that of an elder
statesman who had the trust of all parties to the conflict and close relationships
with the main players of the two groups: “[The Congolese leaders] come to me for
really simple reasons. That is because I am related to the Congolese political play-
ners by blood ties, by emotional ties and by ties of alliance. And I am perhaps the
only one who can say what I think to Lissouba, Sassou and chairman Kolelas.”

Probably the most important aspect of this hearing and healing process was
Bongo’s authority in keeping the principals in the room for a week, rather than let-
ting them “bark and bolt.” The isolated venue of Libreville (at least away from
Congo) and the mediator’s insistence that the parties stay until they had an agree-
ment that covered all the contentious items was the key to success in the mediation.
During a full week of negotiations in Libreville, Bongo spent every day working
with the Congolese representatives to find solutions that would resolve the imme-
diate crisis and give long-lasting legitimacy to the agreements that were eventually
signed in the presence of the OAU, French, EU, and Gabonese representatives.

Bongo played down any possible French influence on his role in the negotia-
tions that led to the Libreville Accord. A French official stressed that a key to a
successful diplomatic intervention was to have a well-established basis of confi-
dence, not to pressure the African leaders, and to keep an open mind about the
roles of elders and preexisting relations between different leaders.
tional mediation in Congo was successful because no top-down solutions were presented in Libreville; and those found were elaborated by the international partners and the Congolese parties jointly. The French supported an old ally of both the president and the opposition and at the same time created more capacity for diplomatic interventions in the subregion.

None of these conditions were present in 1997. The two principals were rarely present in Libreville, and the Libreville exercise went on and on and on, making their presence more difficult. Even in the proximity talks in June, the parties were never together in one room, and they left at the end of the day to return to tend their militias. In these conditions, the perseverance of Bongo was all the more remarkable, and it accounts for the significant cease-fire in July and again the cease-fire and peace plan accepted—too late—at the end of September.

The OAU and Its Preventive Diplomacy Interventions

After the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in Africa was established in at the twenty-ninth OAU summit at Addis Ababa in June 1993, the political crisis in the Republic of Congo presented an immediate opportunity to go beyond the norm of noninterference in internal problems of its members countries and test the mechanism. On July 23, the OAU secretary-general appointed the former deputy secretary-general of the OAU and recently UN envoy to Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun, as the OAU envoy to Congo, the unanimous choice of both sides in the conflict. He was not of the region, yet was known to it, and his position was balanced by the local mediator, President Bongo. Congo thus presented a test case for the OAU that would set a precedent for any future mediation efforts in domestic conflicts.

Sahnoun was known as a professional diplomat with a taste for direct, personal engagement. His quick sense of the principal and surrounding situations was shown by his immediate call to Bongo and his broader concern for involving the EU and the French, and also by his balanced formula for equal African and European membership in the jurists’ panel (with an African chair). Beyond invention of the formula, the rest of his time was spent in persistent persuasion, focusing the grievances on the two electoral issues where they could be managed and then selling the solution.

The OAU’s political and moral importance in Africa lent legitimacy to the lengthy process and to its result. Moreover, as the chair of the international election committee and the international arbitration jury, it covered the difficult task of its members with credibility and a sense of neutrality.

It is therefore ironic that the best features of 1993–94 present in 1997 led to such bad results. Again Sahnoun was back at the job, now bearing two authorities as the special representative of the secretaries-general of both the OAU and the United Nations. He was as indefatigable in his job as was Bongo, and in addition he brought a fine sense of situational understanding and timing that led him to press so urgently for UN Security Council support at the crucial moments of July–August and late September.
The U.S. Role

The United States had a secondary role of collective importance in the crises. While the American embassy monitored the evolution of events from the CNS through the elections of 1992 and 1993, with the heightened violence after the second 1993 round in June, the Congolese asked the United States to provide good offices. Washington so authorized Ambassador Phillips, and although he was unable to bring about an agreement between the two camps, his action was an important part of the "nest of mediations" that formed the basis of the OAU’s ultimately successful action. Again in 1997, the American ambassador played a useful role alongside his French colleague in the internal mediation, but without success.

Such was the limit of U.S. power and interest. As the fifteenth largest foreign oil supplier of the United States, Congo did not weigh heavily in U.S. interests. The United States enjoys an important position and reputation in Africa that drags on it like an albatross. It is weighed down by several layers of misperceptions. Seen as the last remaining superpower, bigger than France, it is expected to be the great power of last resort by anyone unable to attract French support. In addition, when the party in question is standard-bearer for a cause that the United States has championed, that party automatically expects U.S. backing. Then, because of the United States’ important successes in mediation, especially in parts of Africa, Africans expect that they can turn to it to make peace in all conflicts. Finally, if either support or disinterested mediation should appear, it is immediately cast in the context of “Franco-Anglo-Saxon rivalry.”

Thus, Occidental’s assistance to Lissouba after Elf’s rejection was the source of opposition expectations of French support against “U.S.-backed Lissouba,” of government expectations of additional U.S. backing, and, incidentally, of Loik Flock-Prigent’s dismissal as president/director-general of Elf. On the other hand, Kolelas, seeing himself as the eternal opponent to the Marxist single-party regime and thus the “Mandela of the Congo,” expected U.S. support for his campaign. At the height of the crisis, Congolese leaders asked for U.S. mediation. In the end, the United States was able to deliver about $50,000 in technical assistance throughout the whole process plus private-sector supplies of semitransparent ballot boxes.

In the second crisis, the United States was preoccupied—to the extent that it was—by events next door in Zaire. But this made it only more important for France to secure its predominance in Congo (Brazzaville), even if it was not threatened by the United States. The Franco-American Cold War played the same role of conspiracy, suspicion, and motivation in Africa that the earlier Cold War had played on the global level.

The Congolese Role

French Cooperation Minister Michel Roussin’s deputy cabinet director Jean-Marc Simon attributes the eventual success of mediation in 1993–94 to the Congolese themselves: “They realized the risks, and took all possible political mea-
sures to bring about a peaceful solution. International intervention took place at the initiative and invitation of the Congolese parties.”

From the very beginning of the crisis, with the minor politicians’ initiative in December 1991, the Congolese tried to keep the political machine on the tracks of democratization. Lissouba’s dedication to the electoral process and the new political system, despite some tactical errors from time to time, also provided an anchor for the subsequent layers of mediation. Particularly impressive was the persistence of the Congolese leadership to find a political solution and not simply crack down on the violent opposition. For better or worse, Kolelas had access to state-run television to make his appeals, even at the height of the crisis. There was evidence of a real commitment to democracy by Lissouba and his entourage, even by the opposition—who after all used a very democratic tool, the no-confidence vote, to get rid of the government.

NGollo’s role was authoritative and dedicated; it was he who cleared the air before the presidential elections in August 1992 and he who produced the cease-fire in July 1993, a conflict management initiative that enabled the conflict resolution at Libreville. He benefited from a general respect by the army (or at least parts of it) and from an ability to combine proposals with veiled threats of an army intervention if the politicians did not settle down. Mokolo, a more partisan figure, nonetheless played an important role of mediator, animated by a professional sense of the military as a national institution; his testimony reflects a Congolese tradition of mediation by the military. More generally, the role of the army should be noted as a guardian of the new institutions. In mid-February 1992, a month before the constitutional referendum, the army held its own “estates general,” resolutely independent of the state and government, in which it adopted the new course of state building issued from the CNS as its own. From time to time thereafter, it threatened intervention, but always as a means of keeping the process of democratization on track.

In the second crisis, on the other hand, it was no more a question of learning to use the new system or of playing new institutional roles. It was simply a fight to the death, with only two sides—Lissouba’s and Sassou’s—and those not yet committed waiting for the opportune moment to jump on one bandwagon or the other. In addition, in 1997 as in 1994, the chiefs were no longer in charge of their troops. As a result, the well-intentioned efforts of the Internal Mediation Commission of Kolelas were beside the point, and even the International Mediation Committee’s cease-fires had only a tenuous relation to events in the city, the airport, or upcountry.

Lessons Learned

Congo in 1992–94 is clearly a case of state collapse forestalled and in 1997 a case of collapse consummated. The result of the three international and five domestic preventive diplomacy interventions in the first period was a successful navigation of the dangerous straits between autocracy and democracy, and some valuable lessons.
First, Congo was a case of multimediation. None of the efforts alone in 1993–94 was sufficient, and they all reinforced each other, in several ways. “Horizontally,” they were timely, cooperative, and respectful of the various mediators’ “territories.” There is no evidence of the usual mediator’s one-upmanship and instead rather unusual cooperation between the French sphere and the OAU sphere of African activity. That cooperation was spontaneous; the diplomatic community in Brazzaville was so small and informal that contacts were frequent and normal, but not planned or directed. The newness of the OAU Mechanism seems to have given it authority and respect, counterintuitively: people were interested in giving it a positive test.

“Vertically,” the mediations built on each other, “escalating” from internal government mediation through internal autonomous mediation to multiactor international mediation and back down again. As layers of mediation, they provided room for appeal to higher authority and backup for lower authority. The first rounds simply agreed to reduce hostility and cooperate; later levels put specific, accountable items beyond mere cease-fire into the agreements. Such layered mediation is often necessary to handle a complex conflict, and conflicts tend to be complex. To jump to the highest level would have been an inflation of means that would have left no backups and mediators of later resort (cf. among others the better-known mediation of the Addis Ababa Agreement in Sudan in 1972, when layered mediation was an important element in success). Since only the general context but not the specific grievances of 1993 were present in 1992, it would have been difficult for Bongo (or anyone else) to make the Libreville Accord any earlier.

The year 1997 entailed multimediation at its worst. Despite coordination between the two mediation committees in Brazzaville and Libreville, and the cooperation between Bongo and Sahnoun, the competition between the internal efforts of the mayor versus the parliament at home and between Kinshasa and Libreville abroad was fatal to any success. And this even though neither the parliamentary nor the Kinshasa alternatives ever produced anything. The fact that they were there, a potentiality, undermined the serious alternatives. Bad mediation drives out good.

Second, a key to the nature of the process as well as the solution, unfortunately, seems to go back to ripeness. Willingness to settle in 1993–94 did not appear until the parties had become convinced that they could not win and that therefore their conflicting efforts were only causing pain to self and others, for no gain. That is as good a characterization of a “mutually hurting stalemate” as one might find; the mediators, meanwhile were plentifully present with a way out, and the valid spokesmen for the sides were clearly indicated. Preventive diplomacy, of the combined internal and external varieties, was therefore a learning process, in which the conflict as much as the mediation worked to get across the message that winning of the single-party authoritarian style was now out of the question, and cooperation was the only path to shared governing. The only way to shorten that learning process is to produce more effective persuasion, a skill that has its human limitations.
Despite its tragic outcome, the second crisis also underscores the importance of ripeness. It was the existence of a mutually hurting stalemate in July, tested and unyielding, that made the moment so potentially promising and appropriate for a peacekeeping force, and it was the ability of the Cobras and Angolans to escalate their way out of another stalemate in October, just as a cease-fire and peace plan were being accepted, that shows the importance of the components of ripeness. But at the same time, the experience also shows that ripeness is a necessary but insufficient condition for effective negotiations or mediations to begin, not a guarantee of their success. For the process to go on, a peacekeeping force was needed.76

Third, both cases show the necessity for a neutral military force to lock a cease-fire and peace plan in place. That force was available internally in 1994, but there were no neutral internal forces left three years later. Therefore, an international force was necessary. It is utterly uncomprehending of the loose situation obtaining in a civil war to insist, as the UN Security Council did, on a firm and unblemished cease-fire as a precondition, and that insistence was in fact merely a cover for its own irresponsible inaction and lack of interest. Once a cease-fire is agreed to in principle, the presence of interposition forces is a precondition to its existence in reality, not the reverse. Once again, as in 1994 in Rwanda, the U.S. and other Security Council members have blood on their hands for their ineptitude and irresponsibility.77

Fourth, in its evolution, the conflict changed, so that it was not the same conflict being mediated in 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1997. Each of the mediations was upset by new events that the mediation had not covered, as new grievances arose that “confirmed” the bad conduct of the parties in each other’s eyes. The third round after the Libreville Accord of August 4, 1993, was of a different nature that escaped the principals’ control. There was a sorcerer’s apprentice quality about the militia and party members that eluded the authority of their creators. The complicating element in the Congolese crisis appears to have been the lack of control by the principals over their troops. The unrealistic political expectations of Kolelas and Sassou triggered the crisis, but the conflict and violence was carried out by ethnicity-identifying mobs and gangs out of control, working out their ethnic security dilemma. This is a typical “valid spokesman” problem, but one that is hard to forestall in the circumstances, short of long-term education programs and experience.

After 1994, however, there was enough time to implement the Libreville Accord and disband the militias, an action that was absolutely necessary (and maybe even sufficient) to prevent the reexplosion of civil war. Instead they were left to gather arms, attract reinforcements, and build up steam. When the presidential campaign passed through the North in June, the hair trigger was set to go off on its own and there were no national police forces to keep order. The aftermath of the 1993–94 crisis was a sadly wasted opportunity to rebuild order.

Finally, an element that contributed to the resolution of the overall conflict in 1994 and kept Congo from following Rwanda and Burundi was the absence of extremes. Kolelas was indeed a hothead, but he was still a politician with a
chance at a piece of the pie, not a warlord or militia leader. The Congo crisis always remained in the hands of politicians, who had wrong expectations, to be sure, and had to learn new ones for the new era, but who in the end could make and hold a deal. Room was provided for almost all of them in the political system, and after it was all over, more room was discussed in the revision of the French-type majority-rule constitution into a more pluralistic, power-sharing type. The politicians were never upstaged and unseated by the militants, and the sporadic mediations and agreements, even though broken, kept the play in the politicians’ hands. One man was left out of the postcrisis settlement in 1994, however, and that was sufficient to create a fully polarized situation from the start in 1997. Nonetheless, a different policy by France and by the UN Security Council members—notably the United States—could still have brought the civil war under control.
Notes

Notes for Chapter One (pages 3–20)


7. Others include the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action, the London-based International Alert, the International Crisis Group, and the Burundi Policy Forum.  

8. In a speech in Rwanda during his 1998 trip to Africa, President Clinton explicitly ac...
knowledged at least the semantical game played at the time: “The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy. . . . We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.” New York Times, March 26, 1998, p. A12.


17. Within this distinctions at times are made, as Lake and Rothchild do between the instrumentalist and constructivist versions; “Spreading Fear,” pp. 5–7. For our purposes here, the complementarities between these theories as stressing noninevitability in the sources of conflict and thus the collective differentiation of these and other variations from primordialism is the main point.


22. For other recent studies also working with the concept of missed opportunities, see, e.g., Deborah Welch Larson’s Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), and I. William Zartman (ed.), Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).


34. Raimo Väyrynen uses the term proximate, as distinguished from remote, sources of conflict; makes a similar distinction as between “remote” and “proximate” causes. See Väyrynen, “Toward Effective Conflict Prevention: Comparison of the Usability and Impact of Different Instruments,” paper presented at the 1996 International Studies Association annual conference, San Diego, Calif., p. 5.

35. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 11. One of the articles in Rotberg’s NGO preventive diplomacy study similarly tries to be embracing with the threefold “early/late/continuous preventive diplomacy,” but with a comparable problem of conceptual breadth detracting from conceptual clarity; Kalypso Nicolaidis, “International Preventive Action: Developing a Strategic Framework,” in Rotberg, Vigilance and Vengeance, p. 32.


38. Nicolaidis, “Preventive Action: Developing A Strategic Framework,” in Rotberg, Vigilance and Vengeance, p. 34.

40. Minear and Weiss, Mercy under Fire, p. 49.

41. Rotberg, Vigilance and Vengeance, p. 5; see also Erin Fraenkel, “International NGOs in Preventive Diplomacy and Early Warning: Macedonia,” and other articles in the Rotberg volume.

42. See, e.g., Bruce Jones and Janice Gross Stein, “NGOs and Early Warning: The Case of Rwanda,” in Schmeidl and Adelman, Synergy in Early Warning.


44. Stedman, “Alchemy for a New World Order,” p. 17.

45. This point was emphasized by Alexander George and Richard Smoke in their classic study, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), especially chap. 21.


51. For a similar argument in another context, see Bruce W. Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush and Saddam, 1982–1990 (New York: Norton, 1994).
1. The changing dimensions of information gathering and response are highlighted in two Foreign Affairs articles by Joseph Nye. Nye notes that as warning indicators become more diffuse and complex, "information about what is occurring becomes a central commodity of international relations, just as the threat and use of military force was seen as the central power resource in an international system overshadowed by the potential clash of superpowers." Nye suggests that international coalitions will, in the future, be based on "the ability quickly to reduce the ambiguity of violent situations, to respond flexibly, and to use force, where necessary, with precision and accuracy," Joseph Nye and William Owens, "America's Information Edge," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996): 20–36; and Joseph Nye, "Peering into the Future," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 4 (July/August 1994): 82–93. See also Gregory F. Treverton, "Estimating beyond the Cold War," Defense Intelligence Journal 3 (1994): 5–20.


A number of countries are struggling to improve their capacity to foresee, and respond to, humanitarian and political crises in the post–Cold War era. For an example of national efforts to understand and develop a response to longer-term changing international circumstances, see Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: Center for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1994).

For an incisive, documented analysis of the warning-response gap in dealing with humanitarian emergencies, see "Global Humanitarian Emergencies 1995," released by the United States Mission to the United Nations (January 1995). The so-called "Norwegian Model" offers an example of successful government-NGO cooperation to overcome this gap. The framework for Norwegian efforts is provided by the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) and Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), which provide flexible standby arrangements and foster close cooperation among government, voluntary, and academic agencies.

3. This need was succinctly recognized in the report of the Commission on Global Governance: "Although the need for collection, analysis, and dissemination of information cannot be overemphasized, an even more important task is to initiate action on the basis of information providing early warning of possible conflicts." Our Global Neighborhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 98, emphasis added.

4. This division is clearly demonstrated by the overwhelming—and often criticized—intelligence community emphasis on information gathering at the expense of analysis. According
to a recent report, 90 percent of the classified intelligence budget of U.S. agencies is used for the collection of data, while less than 10 percent goes toward the analysis of this information. See the report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence, In From the Cold (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996). Also, the report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 1996).

5. While this seems true of policy professionals, senior policymakers seem to be more divided on the optimal degree of separation between intelligence and policy. The 1995 debate over John Deutch's appointment as director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with Cabinet rank points up the ambivalence. While most observers applauded his appointment as DCI, many intelligence experts have been critical of the decision to award him Cabinet rank, arguing that its political nature could impede Deutch's ability to offer objective intelligence, especially in times of crisis. Political analysts appear to have a greater understanding of the president's motives. For a general discussion of the separation between collection and analysis on the one hand and the policymakers on the other, see Richard K. Betts, "Policy-Makers and Intelligence Analysts: Love, Hate or Indifference?" Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 1 (January 1988): 184–189.

6. A survey of recent newspaper articles and editorials bears this point out. From Chechnya to Yugoslavia to Rwanda, members of the press and public have argued that these conflicts were preventable and have lamented the lack of initiative taken by leading governments and international organizations to head off such disasters.


9. Although that is not to say that policymakers do not want to know that such events are imminent, only that when compared to direct national threats, these contingencies are simply deemed less important.

10. As will be discussed later in the chapter, there were a number of short-term and long-term signals that demonstrated the threat of military action by Iraq. Though many in mid-1990 may have been surprised by the timing and scope of Iraq's action, the mobilization of its army on the Kuwaiti border was no secret. For a detailed discussion of these warning signals, see Bruce Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982–1990 (New York: Norton, 1994), especially pp. 167–176.


12. A number of off-the-record discussions with analysts and policymakers familiar with the relationship between the intelligence and policy communities have noted the sometimes no-
torious competition among the various intelligence agencies for primacy in informing the policy process. Assessments of potential crisis situations find agencies at times in sharp disagreement with one another regarding the likely outcome. Such sustained disagreement often leads, over time, to the marginalization of the agency that is at odds with the intelligence agency offering the estimates that reinforce the policy inclinations of the key decision makers.


25. Likewise, it is not difficult to find excuses not to act. In Rwanda, e.g., even in the aftermath of genocide, the limited U.S. contribution of armored personnel carriers to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was delayed for two months while the State Department haggled with the United Nations over compensation for the vehicles.

26. Such reluctance may be a Western phenomenon. Former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev argues that the response tendency in many former bloc states, as well as other repressive regimes, tends to be exactly the opposite: knee-jerk crackdowns. Mikhail Gorbachev, "On Nonviolent Leadership," in Essays on Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998).


28. The "cry wolf" dilemma in warning and response is cogently summarized by William Zartman:

The biggest problem in the early warning debate is not whether an event is preceded by warning signals but whether warning signals are followed by an event. There are many more prior indications than there are ensuing events; many warning signals simply fizzle and seemingly impending events work themselves out. . . . What is needed is tornado warnings that announce tornados but also that do not announce non-tornados. The corridors of policy-makers reverberate with cries of "wolf!"


Other observers have noted that while greater vigilance in warning and response does result in an increase in "cry wolf" outcomes, errors of this type are preferable to extremely costly failures resulting from lack of attention to developing events.

29. Our Global Neighborhood, pp. 94–95.

30. A number of experienced intelligence and policy specialists have endorsed the need for developing a response "repertoire" that includes a wide array of responses, some small, possibly covert, and low-cost, others large, public, and more costly. The rationale that "the response must fit the warning" is a simple one, but not one easily realized. The response repertoire, of course, should include the many different responses that can be made by nongovernmental organizations. See, e.g., the remarks by John Brinkerhoff in Strategic Outreach Conference Report. See also the study by Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

31. A recent World Bank report provides a very interesting example of the possible utility of differentiating early warning signals with respect to identifying (a) different possible adverse consequences and (b) appropriate preventive actions for each such consequence. Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and I ngo Wiederhofer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996), see especially pp. 32–38.

32. These cues do not necessarily need to occur to be foreseeable; indeed, early preventive measures may mean that they never occur.

This is the objective of the case studies in this book. Some problems of obtaining and using warning by NGOs in humanitarian crises are discussed in Rotberg, Vigilance and Vengeance.

Notes for Chapter Three (pages 39–67)

1. The cases are those of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Trans-Dniester, South Ossetia, Tajikistan, and Chechnya. It is significant that all except Tajikistan involved conflicts over the demands for sovereignty or independence of former autonomous republics whose populations constitute ethnic minorities in now independent states.

2. The precise figures are uncertain and the subject of controversy. The figure of one hundred thousand deaths was cited by Grigory Yavlinsky in a speech in Washington, D.C., on September 19, 1996 (Symposium "Where Is Russia Headed?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and "nearly" that number is used by Sergei Kovalev, former chairman of Yeltsin's Human Rights Commission, in "Russia after Chechnya," New York Review of Books, July 17, 1997. In an interview on Moscow radio, Alexander Lebed used the figure of eighty thousand for military casualties, with an additional two hundred forty thousand wounded and maimed (September 3, 1996). A senior staff member of the Chechen Republic's mission to the Russian government, Aleksandr Dzyublo, commented that while no accurate figures for civilian casualties are available, the numbers are considerably higher (Izvestiya, September 5, 1996, p. 1). These figures are disputed by Minister of Internal Affairs Anatoly Kulikov, who claims that only 18,500 lives were lost and that inflated figures were being supplied by the Chechen separatists (cited in Kommersant-Daily, October 8, 1996, p. 3). The best-documented recent estimate, by Vladimir Mukomel, calculates the total number of deaths at 35,000, of which 6,500 are military and 28,500 civilian; "Vooruzhennye Mezhnatsional'nye i Regional'nye Konflikty: Liudskie Poteri, Ekonomicheskii Ushcherb, i Sotsial'nye Posledstviia [Armed Intercultural and Regional Conflicts: Human Losses, Economic Destruction and Social Consequences]," in Identichnost' i Konflikt v Postsovetskikh Gosudarstvakh [Identity and Conflict in Post-Soviet States] (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), pp. 298–324.

3. The civilian casualties in the war were largely the result of Russian bombardment and shelling of Grozny and other cities and villages; there were few reports of the kind of indiscriminate violence by Chechens against the Russian civilian population or large-scale ethnic cleansing, which were all too common in Bosnia, as well as in Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia. Indeed, a number of accounts by Russian and foreign journalists mention Chechen efforts to shelter Russian civilians trapped in Grozny during the early stages of the war.

4. While this view contradicts the official position of the Russian government at the time, it is shared by a number of knowledgeable Russian officials and analysts, including participants in the negotiations between Moscow and Grozny. While many aspects of the behind-the-scenes negotiations remain confidential, interviews carried out by the author confirm that a number of suggestions for third-party mediation or for the involvement of international organizations or actors were rejected by the Russian side as an unacceptable intrusion into its sovereignty. See also notes 33 and 34.


6. For a detailed account of this process, see Gail W. Lapidus, “Gorbachev and the ‘National Question’: Restructuring the Soviet Federation,” in Soviet Economy 5, no. 3 (July–September 1989); and “From Democratization to Disintegration: The Impact of Perestroika on

7. Many of these aspirations and grievances antedated perestroika; e.g., in 1954 the Writers' Union of Tatarstan sent a request to the Communist Party Central Committee asking that the status of the republic be upgraded. In the North Caucasus, the political movements that emerged in the late 1980s initially also focused on achieving Union Republic status and subsequently called for autonomy (samostoyatel'nost') and sovereignty; see Ann Sheehy, "Power Struggle in Checheno-Ingushetia," Radio Liberty Reports, November 8, 1991. The democrat- 
ically oriented deputies of the Inter-Regional Group were sympathetic to these demands; indeed, the proposed new constitution drafted by Andrei Sakharov and Galina Starovoiteva sought to eliminate the hierarchical ethnoterritorial structure of the Soviet system and to give equal recognition to demands for national self-determination by all groups.

8. The declaration adopted on November 27, 1990, proclaimed that the Chechen-Ingush Republic was part of neither the Soviet Union nor the Russian Federation; however, it also included provision for entering into contractual relations with other states and with a "union of states," in effect, the USSR.


11. See Gail W. Lapidus, "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case," World Politics (July 1984). Although a number of recent studies have emphasized the ways in which Soviet policy promoted national and cultural development and state formation among non-Russian minorities, the policy was highly differentiated over time and space and allowed little scope for political or economic autonomy.

12. This argument is further reinforced by the findings of a survey conducted by Western researchers in 1993 in the five Moslem republics of the Russian Federation; the highest levels of both religious belief and practice were reported by Chechens. See Susan G. Lehmann, "Islam and Ethnicity in the Republics of Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 13 (January–March 1997): 78–103.

13. Only Dagestan reported a higher figure, with 80 percent; and Tatarstan's, by comparison, was 48.5 percent.
14. According to official census data, only 0.2 percent of the titular nationality considered Russian to be its national language; Goskomstat SSSR, Vsesoyuznaya Perepis' Naseleniya, 1989 [All-Union Census of the Population, 1989] (Moscow: 1991).

15. The Russian Constitution adopted in December 1993 ignores the earlier Chechen Declaration of Sovereignty, explicitly identifies the Chechen Republic as a constituent part of the Russian Federation, and does not contain any provision for secession.

16. Notwithstanding important changes in the intervening years, there are striking parallels in this respect between the decisions to invade Afghanistan and Chechnya (Oleg Grinevsky, "Afghanistan and Chechnya: A Comparison of Soviet and Russian Decision Making," Seminar at the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., October 8, 1997). On the decision to invade Afghanistan, also see Oleg Grinevsky, "Posle Yada—Pulya [After Poison—a Bullet]," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 18, 1997, p. 4.

17. Whether Yeltsin's action constituted a violation of the constitution raised considerable controversy; Yeltsin declared neither martial law nor a state of emergency, nor did he officially notify the Federal Assembly or seek the approval of the Federation Council, as the use of regular troops would normally require. The decision was issued in the form of several executive decrees including one in the name of the Security Council, a body whose authority had not yet been defined, and was defended on the grounds that it was the president's responsibility "to restore constitutional order" in Chechnya. For a more detailed treatment, see Robert Sharlet, "Transitional Constitutionalism: Politics and Law in the Second Russian Republic," Wisconsin International Law Journal 14, no. 3 (1996): 495–521. In July 1995 a divided Constitutional Court upheld the president's action, with several dissents and "special opinions" (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, August 11, 1995, pp. 3–7).

18. According to surveys conducted by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, the public has been highly critical of Russian policy from the initiation of military action in December 1994 to the present. In polls conducted in 1996, 66 percent of respondents judged Yeltsin's actions to be unsatisfactory, and only 23 percent considered them satisfactory. Some 36 percent of respondents favored the departure of Russian troops from Chechnya and acquiescence to Chechnya's independence, while 23 percent favored decisive action to liquidate the Chechen fighters and retain Chechnya within the Russian Federation by any means. Asked who was primarily responsible for the bloodshed in Chechnya, 47 percent named Yeltsin and his circle, 7 percent the Russian military leadership, and 24 percent Dudayev and his field commanders. Over 54 percent considered Russian policy toward Chechnya totally mistaken, while 3 percent considered it totally correct. Asked what they considered to be an appropriate policy, roughly 50 percent of respondents advocated the swiftest possible withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya, and then the resolution of the relationship between Chechnya and Russia. These attitudes remained highly stable throughout the duration of the conflict. I should like to express my appreciation to Lev Gudkov of the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion for making the survey data available to me.

19. Nongovernmental organizations such as Memorial and the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers deserve mention as consistent critics of the war. The most comprehensive critique of Russian policymaking by a Russian analyst, along similar lines, is found in Pain and Popov, "Chechnya," in Azrael and Pain, U.S. and Russian Policymaking.


21. Internal Affairs Minister Anatoly Kulikov was a leading exponent of such views, and he remained unalterably opposed to any compromise with the Chechen "separatists" even af-
ter the debacle of August 1996 paved the way for Lebed’s negotiation of the Khasavyurt agreement. The tenor of his views is captured in a speech to the Duma on October 2 denouncing the agreement, where he argued that misguided Russian concessions were leading to ever more radical Chechen goals, including secret plans to unite a large part of the North Caucasus and expel Russia from the Caucasus and lock it off from the Caspian Sea. He predicted that the separatists would build a “militaristic, totalitarian, extremist-criminal state that is absolutely anti-Russian” and would unite all anti-Russian forces from Tajikistan to Ukraine and the Baltics. The Khasavyurt agreements, he stated, represented “a highly professional job that provides support for the process of the destruction of the Russian state as a whole” (Sovetskaya Rossiya, October 5, 1996, p. 2).

22. According to an account by Tatarstan President Shaimiyev, Yeltsin had spoken in March 1994 of his willingness to meet with Dudayev despite the opposition of some members of his Security Council until it was reported that Dudayev had spoken negatively of him, at which point he effectively dropped further consideration of the idea and became almost obsessively hostile to Dudayev. Sergei Stepashin, director of the Federal Security Service, later asserted in an interview that the question most frequently asked of him by the president was, “When will you catch Dudayev?” (Izvestiya, March 2, 1995).

23. This overview of the conflict draws from a large body of materials including a number of judicious and insightful accounts by Russian analysts as well as interviews by the author in Moscow. Special mention should be made of the series of articles by Emil Pain and Arkady Popov in Izvestiya, February 7, 8, and 10, 1995; Maria Eismont’s reportage in Segodnya, as well as her article in Prism, “The Chechen War: How It All Began,” March 8, 1996; and the somewhat more tendentious account by V. A. Tishkov, E. L. Belyaeva, and G. V. Marchenko, Chechenski Krizis [Chechen Crisis] (Moscow: Tsentr Kompleksnykh Sotsialnykh Issledovanii i Marketin- gka [Center for Sociological Research and Marketing], 1995). The report of the Duma’s Govorukhin Commission, created to conduct a thorough investigation of the events and assign appropriate responsibility, is a highly politicized and unreliable account. Svidetel’stva, Aakliucheniya i Dokumenty Sobranne Komissiey pod Predsedatel’stvom S.S. Govorukhina [Testimony, Resolutions and Documents Compiled by the Commission Headed by S. S. Govorukhin] (Moscow: Laventa, 1995). Two excellent English-language books on the subject that appeared after the completion of this study are Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal’s Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (New York: New York University Press, 1998), and Anatol Lieven’s Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).

24. A second abortive intervention occurred in November 1992 when Russian forces sought to use the conflict between Ingush and Ossetians in the Prigorodnyi district of North Ossetia to advance into Chechnya; see the account by North Ossetia’s Minister of Internal Affairs G. M. Kanterimov, in Govorit Elita Respublik Rossiiskoi Federatsii:110 Interviu Leokadii Drobizhevoi [The Elite of the Republics of the Russian Federation Speaks:110 Interviews with Leokadia Drobizheva] (Moscow: 1996), p. 188.

25. Sergei Shakrai, chairman of the Russian State Committee on Nationality Policy, was a leading advocate of a strategy of isolating Dudayev and undermining his legitimacy by insisting on the illegality and criminal nature of the Chechen regime. While the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Congress of People’s Deputies had declared the October 1991 elections illegal, neither the executive nor the judiciary ever undertook a formal review and assessment of them.

26. Assertions that the Chechen side was unreconciled to anything short of full independence are not clearly supported by the record. The Chechen constitution adopted in 1992 referred only to “state sovereignty”; the term independence was not used (Konstitutsiya Chechenskoi Respubliki [Constitution of the Chechen Republic], Groznoy, 1992). Moreover,
Russian officials repeatedly demonstrated a tendency to exaggerate the threat of dismemberment. E.g., although the 1994 power-sharing treaty with Tatarstan would later be held out as a model for compromise which the Chechens rejected, those negotiations were protracted and extremely tortuous, and even the more modest demands of the Tatarstan side were viewed with alarm by many in Moscow. Indeed, Tatarstan’s plans to hold a referendum on its status on March 20, 1992, provoked a serious crisis with Moscow and the real threat of Russian military intervention, as a number of officials in Moscow, including Yeltsin himself, alleged at the time that the Kazan leadership was aiming at full independence.

27. According to informed Russian sources, substantial quantities of Russian weapons and military technology were transferred to the Chechen side in 1992 with the knowledge and approval of Defense Minister Grachev. This was by no means an isolated incident; in the general disarray following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the chaotic withdrawal of Soviet military forces, large quantities of weapons were transferred or sold by military units in the Transcaucasus as elsewhere, allegedly with the acquiescence and often the participation of high-level military officials.

28. Emil Pain has denied that the President’s Analytical Center recommended or supported this approach, as some analysts have alleged; he argues that the strategy of covertly arming the anti-Dudayev opposition was already familiar to the Russian secret services, which had employed such tactics in overthrowing Presidents Gamsakhurdia in Georgia and Elchibey in Azerbaijan (Azrael and Pain, U.S. and Russian Policymaking).


30. The leading figures in the ascendant “party of war” included Nikolai Yegorov, who had replaced Shakhrai as minister for nationalities and regional affairs in mid-May and was given full control over policy toward Chechnya on November 30, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Minister of Security Sergei Stepashin, Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Yerin, and Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Security Council, as well as two key figures in the president’s apparatus: General Alexandr Korzhakov, a shadowy and hard-line figure who headed the president’s Security Service and was his key confidant at the time; and a close associate, General Mikhail Barsukov, Kremlin commandant. Korzhakov and Barsukov were closely allied with First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets, who was the major challenger to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and an opponent of his economic policies. Yegorov, according to several accounts, provided the major impetus for coercive action; of Cossack background and an agronomist with no training in ethnic issues, he had gained a reputation as a harsh administrator with little sympathy for ethnic minorities. As a thoughtful Russian parliamentarian and analyst, Viktor Sheinis, has noted, the replacement of Shakhrai by Yegorov was not so much a change from a “dove” to a “hawk” but rather from “an educated man with an inventive mind” to a “butcher— an ignorant uneducated man who prefers exclusively coercive decisions for those complicated problems which exist in Chechnya.” For a more extensive treatment, see John Dunlop, “The ‘Party of War’ and Russian Imperial Nationalism,” Problems of Post-Communism 43, no. 2 (March/April 1996); and Lilia Shevtsova, “Moscow’s Chechen War,” unpublished manuscript, Moscow Carnegie Center, 1998.

31. Ruslan Khasbulatov was a former Yeltsin ally of Chechen descent who backed Yeltsin in August 1991 but later opposed Yeltsin’s policy toward Chechnya and sought to use the situation to promote his own political ambitions.

32. The plan to set up a puppet government, which would then legitimize the introduction of Russian forces, was strikingly reminiscent of Soviet policy in Lithuania in January 1991.

34. The account of the conversation comes from human rights activist Sergei Kovalyov, as cited in Pain and Popov, “Chechnya,” in Azrael and Pain, U.S. and Russian Policymaking. Kozyrev would later assert that a successful military action required a “scalpel” rather than a hammer but that the military proved incapable of it (conversation with the author at Stanford University, May 13, 1996).

35. The phrase is that of Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov, as cited in Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict, p. 218.

36. A secret government document dated December 1 and later leaked by Russian sources, if authentic, offers a chilling glimpse of the contingency planning for the intervention. Apparently prepared for Prime Minister Chernomyrdin’s signature, it contains instructions for handling the mass evacuation of the population of Chechnya: Plan M operiyanai po Obespecheniyu Evakuatsii Naseleniya Chechenskoi Respubliki (Pravitelstvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Government of the Russian Federation]: Rasporyazheniye [Decree], December 1, 1994).

37. OMRI Daily Digest 86 (May 3, 1995).

38. Interfax sociological bulletin Viewpoint (no. 50), and Radio Ekho Moskvy, as reported in RFE/RL Research Institute, Bulletin no. 236, December 15, 1994.

39. The massacre of more than a hundred unarmed civilians in the village of Samashki by Interior Ministry troops, and the deliberate torching of over two hundred homes, came to symbolize the wanton brutality of the war and the blurring of all distinctions between Chechen combatants and civilians. Human rights organizations such as Memorial also documented the massive use of “filtration camps” by Russian forces, ostensibly to separate fighters from civilians, as an embryonic system of mass terror, in which large numbers of prisoners were subjected to beatings and torture in appalling conditions, and from which large numbers never returned.


41. In the spring of 1996, General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, commander of federal forces in Chechnya, repeatedly asserted that the only subject of negotiations should be how the Chechen militants would surrender their weapons, even as Yeltsin was announcing a broad peace plan and promising the withdrawal of federal forces.


43. See Alexander George and Jane Holl, The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy, chapter 2 in this volume. The difficulties in identifying the potential for violent conflict are discussed in Mikhail Alekseev, “Early Warning, Ethnopolitical Conflicts, and the United Nations: Assessing the Violence in Georgia/Abkhazia,” unpublished paper, the Kennan Institute, Washington, D.C.
45. Testimony in Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, U.S. Congress, May 1, 1995, p. 34.
46. Reported in Tishkov, Belyaeva, and Marchenko, Chechenskii Krizis.
47. Author's conversation with Yegor Gaidar, November 26, 1996.
48. Presidents Shaimiyev of Tatarstan and Aushev of Ingushetia, e.g., were skillful and influential figures who were in a position to play a constructive political role.
50. Statement by Movladi Udugov to joint session of the Chechen Presidential Council and the Parliament of the Confederation of Caucasian Peoples, TASS, August 23, 1994. The request for UN or other foreign observers was repeated the following month. According to a Segodnya correspondent in Grozny, following a rocket attack on the airport on September 30, 1994, the Chechen leadership called an emergency meeting at which it rejected opposition demands for a transfer of power, appealed to the governments of other North Caucasian republics to “forestall the use of their resources and territory” by Russian forces and called upon the United Nations and other foreign governments to send observers to Chechnya (Natalia Gorodetskaya, Segodnya, October 1, 1994, p. 1). Sergei Filatov, head of Yeltsin’s administration, responded with a statement that Russia’s leaders were not contemplating an invasion of Chechnya.
51. According to a high-level UN official interviewed by the author, no formal request from the Chechen leadership was ever received.
52. A similarly negative response to suggestions that OSCE mechanisms be invoked was reported in the Washington Post, January 13, 1995, p. A26.
53. However, it should also be noted that a project designed to monitor potential sources of ethnic conflict, by the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology in conjunction with Harvard’s Conflict-Management Group, failed as late as October 1994 to identify the potential for conflict over Chechnya; Alekseev, “Early Warning,” pp. 7–8.
54. From 1992 to the outbreak of war, the UNPO sent urgent warnings to individual governments, to the Political Affairs office of the UN secretary-general, to the Foreign Ministry of Russia, and to the U.S. State Department and Congress, and offered a base at their Hague offices to a representative of the Chechen government.
56. International Alert, Chechnia. The mission was described as a fact-finding visit, in the context of trips to several regions of potential ethnic conflict, in an effort to develop early-warning mechanisms; it explicitly disavowed any intention of contacting local NGOs involved in conflict resolution, of providing third-party involvement or of proposing solutions, although President Dudayev indicated his willingness to discuss third-party involvement in a letter of December 14, 1992, responding to the report (p. 52). The removal of Tishkov and his replacement by Sergei Shakhrai signaled a more hard-line approach by the Russian government to nationality policy and fewer possibilities for cooperation with international organizations, but there is no evidence that International Alert itself sought to pursue the issue.
57. The definitions are drawn from Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts, pp. 38–41.
58. The willingness of the Baltic governments to cooperate with such efforts stood in striking contrast to the Russian attitude at the time and reflected their strong desire for recognition as genuinely democratic, firmly European countries and for acceptance into European institutions. Such attitudes were significantly weaker and far more controversial.
among Russian elites, some of whom sought to define Russian identity and interests as “Eurasian.”


60. In a communiqué of December 13, 1994, the UNPO asserted that the organization had for months been warning the international community of the likelihood of a military invasion and appealing for international efforts to prevent it. The communiqué condemned the Russian invasion and called upon all governments, the United Nations, and the CSCE to use all possible influence over Russian government to prevent a “bloodbath.”

61. Such public assurances were proffered by Sergei Filatov, head of the presidential staff, on August 4 and 9, and by Yeltsin himself on August 11. Interviewed on TV before departing on a working tour of the Volga, Yeltsin stated, “Intervention by force is impermissible and must not be done. Were we to apply pressure by force against Chechnya, this would rouse the whole Caucasus, there would be such a commotion, there would be so much blood that nobody would ever forgive us. It is absolutely not possible.” Similar denials were issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense on August 10 and 11. As late as September 30 Filatov told journalists that Russia had ruled out armed involvement in the Chechen conflict. “We have only one position—no Russian troops must be there,” he asserted (Interfax News Agency, as reported by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 3, 1994).

62. One example of the tenor of such allegations was a December 1994 declaration of the Central Council of Russian National Unity, a right-wing political group: “The present Chechen administration has turned Chechnya into a parasitic, thieving conglomerate, and thereby lowered its people to the level of the early Middle Ages,” cited in Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict, p. 184. As Yeltsin himself described the situation, “On the territory of the Chechen republic as the result of an armed coup, there was established the most dictatorial kind of regime. The fusion of the criminal world and the regime—about which politicians and journalists spoke incessantly as the main danger for Russia—became a reality in Chechnya. This was the testing ground for the preparation and dissemination of criminal power to other Russian regions” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 17, 1995, p. 1).

63. A senior administration official described the Chechen leadership as “blackmailing, brutal and authoritarian,” according to a Washington Post account on December 25, 1994. Another official dealing with Russian affairs was quoted as asserting, “I don’t want to say that all Chechens are crooks, but the people running the country are” (Washington Post, December 25, 1994, p. A27).

64. The CSCE agreements obliged signatories to issue prior notice of military activities involving more than 9,000 troops or 250 tanks and to issue invitations to outside observers when more than 13,000 troops were deployed. The Code of Conduct pledged the signatories not to use their military forces for internal security except in accordance with constitutional procedures, and to avoid injury to civilians or their property.


67. McNeil-Lehrer Newshour, December 13, 1994. Pressed by the media to explain Christopher’s apparent endorsement of Russian actions, McCurry stated, “Secretary Christopher did not endorse the Russian effort to reestablish civil order in Chechnya; neither did he oppose it. In a sense, he took a neutral position on it by saying that Chechnya is an integral part of Russia. Therefore, the Russians have to handle this and address it as an internal Russ-
ian matter.” He went on to suggest that the Chechens seek redress of their grievances by working through the Russian parliament.


71. A high official reportedly stated, “I accept Yeltsin’s argument” that if Chechnya is able to break away from Moscow, other republics may be tempted to do the same. “It’s very important for our long-term security that Russia remain a unitary state that remains stable. We have an obvious interest in the stability of their armed forces [and] nuclear forces” (R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Interests Seen Allied with Russia in Chechnya; Effect of Independence on Nuclear Stability Feared,” Washington Post, December 25, 1994, p. A27). While the intelligence community assessments of the situation may well have been more nuanced, similar concerns had been voiced earlier in the year in a published article by an National Security Council official (Jessica Stern, “Moscow Meltdown: Can Russia Survive?” International Security 18 [Spring 1994]: 40–65).

72. See, e.g., the U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, January 3, 1995. Over a year later Clinton would explicitly draw this analogy before a Russian audience. During his visit to Moscow in April 1966, in response to a question whether the United States should be more critical of the war in Chechnya, the president responded, “I would remind you that we once had a civil war in our country in which we lost on a per capita basis far more people than we lost in any of the wars of the 20th century over the proposition that Abraham Lincoln gave his life for—that no state had a right to withdraw from our union” (Washington Post, April 22, 1996).

73. The Russian constitution, Kozyrev stated, “provides for the unity of the Russian Federation, and, yes, as President Lincoln, President Yeltsin will not tolerate defection, especially defection not by popular referendum or any free and fair elections in the area, but just a military camp. . . . It is just a criminal gang.”


77. The issue was apparently raised in diplomatic channels through the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in December 1994, and privately with Kozyrev at the OSCE Budapest meeting. But it was apparently not raised in conversations between Clinton and Yeltsin, at the meeting of Kozyrev and Christopher in Brussels, at the Grachev-Perry meeting, nor at the Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting in Moscow on December 14–16, 1995 (Collins, Testimony to U.S. Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, January 19 and 27, 1995).

78. Secretary of State Christopher had offered an explicit rationale for this view—a rationale heavily influenced by the “democratic peace” literature in international relations theory—in a speech to NATO on February 26, 1993:

Europe's long-term security—like America's—requires that we actively foster the spread of democracy and market economies. Democracies tend not to make war on each other. They are more likely to protect human rights and ensure equal rights for minorities. They are more likely to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords and environmental protection.


83. Brzezinski, “Moscow’s Accomplice.”


85. A Foreign Ministry statement on January 12 lashed out at “inappropriate and hasty” Western criticism of Russia’s actions and indicated that human rights observers from the OSCE would not be welcome until a “later phase” of operations in the region.

86. For a more complete account, see Heather Hurlburt, “Russia, the OSCE and European Security Architecture,” Helsinki Monitor 2 (1995). See also the report by Andrei Kortunov and Andrei Shoumikin, “Russian-European Interaction and the Chechen Crisis” (Moscow, unpublished manuscript, 1995).

87. Izvestiya, January 31, 1995. Gyarmati did, however, implicitly challenge the assertion by Kozyrev that the use of armed force against an “armed rebellion” was admissible from the standpoint of the OSCE code, stating that “the use of armed forces on such a scale and in such forms is at variance with OSCE principles.” Leonid Velekhov, “Mr. Gyarmati in Search of Compromise,” Segodnya, January 31, 1995, p. 1.

88. The term OSCE mission would have implied Russia was suspected of violating human rights in Chechnya. Russian acquiescence in the OSCE presence, however reluctant and constrained, nonetheless represented a major step forward, given the still-powerful tendency in elite circles to view with suspicion any “outside interference” in internal affairs, particularly one involving sensitive ethnopolitical issues.

89. These provisions were not stringently enforced, however, and Russia was ultimately admitted before the war was ended.


92. “Secretary-General Says Outlook in Somalia Remains Uncertain Despite Tremendous Progress,” in UN Press Release SG/SM/5153, November 9, 1993. The UN role in Somalia represented a special case, a “failed state” in which, arguably, there was no sovereign government to override. Other cases of intervention, such as Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique, followed peace agreements and occurred with the consent of the countries involved.

93. It is worth noting that in June 1998 Secretary-General Kofi Annan forcefully con-
demned the atrocities committed by Serbian military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo, a territory considered part of the Serbian republic; as cited in the New York Times, June 7, 1998, p. 4. This condemnation was made easier by the fact that Serbia was not a member of the Security Council and had already been sanctioned for its behavior in Bosnia. Moreover, the high potential for spillover of the Kosovo conflict into neighboring states appeared to directly threaten broader regional security.

94. The same political circles, however, were outspoken in defending the rights of Russian minorities in the newly independent states and in insisting that Moscow had the right, as well as the responsibility, to support them, including the right to use force.

95. For a more differentiated and nuanced treatment by several Russian scholars of the support for the “sovereignty” in other ethnic republics, including Tuva, Tatarstan, North Ossetia, and Yakutia, see Gail W. Lapidus and Renee de Nevers, eds., Nationalism, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict Management in Russia Today (Stanford, Calif.: Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 1995).


97. Despite urgent and repeated calls for the formulation and implementation of a broader strategy toward the region, Russian policy to this day suffers from confusion and paralysis. See, e.g., Akhsarbek Galazov, “Segodnya u Moskvy net Nikakoi Kavkazskoi Politiki [Today Moscow Has No Caucasus Policy],” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 8, 1997, p. 5.


99. Testimony before Congressional Commission, p. 5.

Notes for Chapter Four (pages 68–90)


2. The CSCE changed its name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994. Because much of the activity discussed in this chapter occurred before that date, the term CSCE is used throughout.

3. See also Thomas Goltz, “The Hidden Russian Hand,” Foreign Policy (Fall 1993).


11. See the CSCE mandate for the “Conference on Nagorno Karabakh,” issued at the CSCE Meeting in Helsinki, 1992.
15. Yeltsin speech at the Civic Union forum, as broadcast on Russian television and translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), March 1, 1993.

Notes for Chapter Five (pages 91–107)

1. The European Union had used human rights benchmarks in attempts to press for improvements in Spain, Portugal, and Greece when they were candidates for membership. See Andrew Moravcsik, “Explaining International Human Rights Regimes,” European Journal of International Affairs (June 1995): 166–168.
2. Then the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). For simplicity, OSCE will be used throughout.
5. On August 11, 1992, Carl Bildt wrote in the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet that Vladimir Zhirinovsky “wants to put pressure on Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and preferably reconquer them all. Who could assert that automatic neutrality should be Sweden’s line in such a situation?” Because of ongoing domestic debate about Sweden’s security policy, this was taken in the region as a strong statement of non-neutrality. See Tony Austin, Reuter Library Report, August 11, 1992.
6. See the Helsinki Commission’s 1992 Report on the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting for discussion of one instance where guarantees were requested— and refused, to the chagrin of the Baltic-American and NGO community.
8. E.g., Baltic-American representatives attended the OSCE’s Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension (1990) and the Geneva Meeting on National Minorities (1991) as members of the American delegation. U.S. delegates were mandated to stay in close touch with unofficial representatives of the Baltic states attending under the rubric of nongovernmental organizations and to intervene if they experienced difficulties with credentials or procedures.


11. E.g., Paul Goble, perhaps the best-known, worked for four government agencies over this period, then served as an informal adviser to the Baltic governments.

12. See particularly the reports of Senator Alfonse D'Amato's 1990 delegation, turned back at the Polish-Lithuanian border during the violence in Vilnius, and Senator Dennis DeConcini's 1991 trip just before the Balts were admitted to the OSCE, in the Congressional Record and available from the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.


17. Although certainly not without hesitations—references to Baltic politicians' unhappiness on this account can be found in the reports of OSCE missions. The point was also often raised when mandates for the OSCE's presence were negotiated.

18. Opening section of the Moscow Document of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, October 1991. (This and all other OSCE documentation is available from the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, Austria.)

19. See the 1993 communications of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities with regard to Latvia, available from the OSCE Secretariat.

20. Mission mandate available from OSCE Secretariat as Annex 1 to CSCE/19 CSO/Journal No. 2.

21. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Opinion No. 170(1993), On the application of the Republic of Estonia for Membership of the Council of Europe. Text adopted May 13, 1993; paragraph 5. The Protocol referred to contained the set of minority rights provisions binding on Council members at that time. It has since been expanded but, even in 1993, put its adherents at a level of obligation far above UN or other regional documents. Its overlap with OSCE commitments was extensive but not complete.


27. Van der Stoel letter to Latvian foreign minister Georgs Andrejevs, December 10, 1993, Reference No. 1463/93/L; available from the OSCE Secretariat.


35. See Matlock, Autopsy of an Empire, p. 735, for the concerns that held sway at the time.


37. There is no doubt that for some Estonian and Latvian officials this was a debating point rather than a personal conviction, but Estonian officials were calling for international investigations into the situation in Russia’s Caucasus region almost a year before the Russian invasion of Chechnya.

38. As it happened, destruction was carried out in 1995 (by a U.S. contractor), but Russian officials prevented the OSCE envoy from being present.


40. Information provided by the Joint Baltic-American National Council. It is worth noting that, although the quick appropriation of funds in 1993 and 1994 established the seriousness of U.S. intentions in a useful and timely way, spending the money has not been so easy. Difficulties and uncertainties regarding the complete availability of the money continue.


42. Perkin, “Russia Wants Sweden to Mediate Talks with Estonia.”

43. Clinton said, just before appealing for tolerance for ethnic minorities, “We will rejoice with you when the last of the foreign troops vanish from your homelands.” Remarks in Riga, Latvia, on July 6, 1994; reprinted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch 5, no. 31 (August 1, 1994): 513.

44. Walker, “Clinton’s Secret Successes.” n. 45.

45. Personal communications with High Commissioner’s staff, 1995.

Notes for Chapter Six (pages 108-129)

1. For the prediction of a neorealist, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 762, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 50–66: “It is unlikely that Ukraine will transfer its remaining nuclear weapons to Russia, the state it fears most.”

2. The author’s view is that an international nuclear restraint regime comprising princi-
amples, norms, and rules was created during the Cold War through a combination of formal and informal agreements and unilateral practices affecting command and control, use, and deployment of nuclear weapons. This was the foundation-building period of the preventive diplomacy of nuclear weaponry and has to be considered an integral part of the preventive diplomacy campaign described in this chapter. For a discussion of this concept relating mainly to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, see Roger K. Smith, “Explaining the Non-proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory,” International Organizations 41, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 253–79. The question posed by the events of 1991–94 in the former Soviet Union was whether a nuclear restraint regime could outlive the specific conditions that gave rise to it.


6. This summary is drawn from a Novosti report of President Gorbachev’s televised address of October 5, 1991, published in Survival 33, no. 6 (November/December 1991): 569–70.


10. However, it was not always smooth sailing for the HEU deal. Commercial considerations were an inevitable part of the picture and led to a certain amount of rancor between the U.S. and Russian entities concerned with the issue. The State Department frequently was called upon to intercede.

11. This was generally understood to be an affirmation of Ukraine’s intention to de-nuclearize, but some Ukrainians later suggested that it referred only to those weapons that had to be eliminated under the terms of START I.

12. As mentioned earlier, the two phases overlapped in the sense that the U.S. administrations were still carrying out their programs of action derived from their first perceptions of danger while early warning of another crisis in the making was being received. This was the situation roughly from May 1992 to May 1993.
13. The Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement, negotiated with each of the four recipient states, established the basic legal framework for Nunn-Lugar assistance to that state. Subsequent implementing agreements authorized and defined the various programs of assistance.

14. FBIS-SOV-93–064, pp. 21–22, April 6, 1993. No doubt the Russian government understood this statement and the U.S.-Russian Vancouver statement referred to earlier as fully consistent and no doubt the Ukrainians read the two statements the same way.

15. At the beginning of these negotiations, 46 SS-24 ICBMs, 130 SS-19s, 21 Bear H bombers, and 13 Blackjack bombers were deployed on Ukraine's territory.

16. Probably the Kravchuk government's perception that the United States had to be an active partner in the nuclear negotiations made it easier for the Russian-Ukrainian nuclear dialogue to proceed with little or no linkage to other issues in the Ukrainian-Russian relationship, including the division of the Black Sea fleet. Some ideas, such as techniques of compensation, did percolate from one negotiation to another, but there was no effort to make the various sets of talks interdependent.

17. See Appendix I for the text of the Rada's resolution.

18. See Appendix II for the text of the memorandum.


Notes for Chapter Seven (pages 133–172)


5. The best known of these warnings is the CIA national estimates report in November
1990, written by Martin van Heuven and leaked to David Binder of the New York Times. See also Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. 84.

6. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 104. I rely there on former U.S. ambassador Warren Zimmermann's account that he was the conveyer of this bad news when he arrived in Belgrade in March 1989. Subsequent interviews correct this claim; they were told first in 1987.

7. Given the later preoccupation with Slobodan Milosević, president of Serbia, it is worth noting that the surveys in Serbia favored Morković over Milosević, two-thirds to one-third.

8. Borisav Jović, Poslednji Dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz Dnevnika [The Last Days of the SFRY: Excerpts from a Journal] (Belgrade: Politika,1995), pp. 149–161, where Jović begins with his election to chair of the collective presidency on May 28, 1990, reporting Slovene opposition to his calling for an analysis on the state of the country, to June 28, 1990, where he and Milosević discuss the idea, and its constitutionality, of kicking Slovenia and Croatia out of the country, as long as they can create a coalition of the remaining four states.

9. Ambassador Zimmermann apparently cabled an assessment in December 1989 that “it’s becoming possible to think the unthinkable” (Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. 53).

10. Based on confidential interviews with Yugoslav diplomats involved in the visit. See Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, pp. 46–48, for his version of that visit. Zimmermann also writes that he “couldn’t fathom why Washington wouldn’t help Morković on his more modest requests, like debt rollover” (p. 51), but adds that the “main obstacle was the U.S. Treasury Department” and its “ideological view” of the area and “tinkering for political considerations.”


13. Gompert adds, “Because Washington did not view even a violent breakup of Yugoslavia as likely to lead to a Europe-wide war or to threaten the democratic revolutions elsewhere in eastern Europe, a major program to shore up Belgrade’s last federal government was no more seriously contemplated than was preemptive military action” (“The United States and Yugoslav Wars,” p. 124).

14. Gompert expresses this persuasively in his catalogue of what it meant at the time that “the United States was confronted with no less than a world political revolution” (see “The United States and Yugoslav Wars,” p. 123). European states were even more directly influenced in their Yugoslav policy by their focus on the Soviet Union; see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 154–57, 177–78.

15. In Origins of a Catastrophe, Zimmermann is equivocal, insisting—e.g., on p. 42—that his message to the Yugoslavs was support for both, that democracy and unity “had to go together,” but also making clear that his own view, and probably the message that got through, gave priority to democracy: “we could only support the country’s unity in the context of progress toward democracy” (p. 8). Evidence of confusion, suggesting the message was not clear to all Yugoslav parties, continues on pages 110, 137, and 138, where he even reverses the order of what was being said to the Slovenes, namely, that “if unity failed, democracy would fail with it.” Gompert, “The United States and Yugoslav Wars,” pp. 122–23.

16. The foreign minister of Slovenia after April 1990, Dimitrij Rupel, admitted at an Aspen Institute conference in Berlin in March 1992 that Slovene nationalists had “used Kosovo” to achieve their goal.

17. In protest several days later, on February 4, 1990, however, the Slovene government, followed by the Croatian, announced that it would withdraw its units from the federal police, including from Kosovo.

18. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 73. This fear that Milosević could translate three (and even
four, later) out of eight votes on the federal presidency into “unchecked influence” and dominate all of Yugoslavia reveals how far democracy had to go even in Slovenia, however; a democratic imagination would realize that the essence of democracy is shifting alliances, that three was not a majority, that if Slovenia continued to use its veto, then it had to grant that others had a right to do so as well, and that democratization would surely lead to institutional change of the executive branch and never permit one person autocratic control of Yugoslavia again.

19. Cited in Zimmermann, Origin of a Catastrophe, p. 62. Zimmermann calls this extraordinary statement, perhaps sufficient to explain everything that followed, “unexceptionable” although he also admits that it “set off shock waves in Slovenia.” They knew they could go, that “the United States and NATO would not use force to keep Yugoslavia together.”


21. The Communist Party network was particularly useful in Serbia against opponents to Slobodan Milošević, who in turn loaned it to far-right nationalist Vojislav Šešelj, giving him his first legitimation through parliamentary representation, and to Momir Bulatović in Montenegro. It is generally agreed that the $8 million flooding into Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), at a time when other Croatian parties had no campaign funds, was decisive in his victory (and on his Bosnia policy through his long-term dependence on the dominant émigré group, Herzegovinians).

22. Burg draws the same conclusion; see War or Peace? pp. 95, 126–27.

23. Bosnians in particular are fond of recounting this cultural trait of forceful stubbornness, called inat, which is a quality of amour-propre when self-referential but of irrational or even immoral behavior when discussing others.


25. See Slavko Curuvija and Ivan Torov, “The March to War (1980–1990),” in Udovički and Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia’s Ethnic Nightmare, pp. 195–209. One example is the Round Table of Authorities and Opposition in Yugoslavia, a gathering of representatives from the parliament of about thirty political parties and movements and from republican and federal officials and parties (both government and opposition) that began to meet in early 1991, in Sarajevo, with the aim of preventing and then stopping the violence by means of opening new lines of political communication.

26. Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Albanian supporters have adopted their spelling of Kosovo—Kosova—while Serbian nationalists have restored its pre-1967 geographic name, Kosovo and Metohija, when it was still a region with limited autonomy and not an extensively autonomous province. I choose the name commonly used at the time of this narrative, not a political position.

27. These charges were part of a larger analysis of Serbia’s place in the federation that became infamous for its extreme nationalism as an early draft of a memorandum written by a committee of the Serbian Academy of Science and the Arts and leaked to the press in September 1986.

28. See, e.g., Christopher Madison, “Not on Our Beat,” National Journal, August 17, 1991, p. 2034 [article, pp. 2032–34]. The Croatian and Albanian lobbies were effective enough to re-
sult in several fact-finding missions by members of Congress in mid-1990, the Nickles amendment of November 1990, and a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing February 21, 1991. The problem was not knowledge; see, e.g., the statement at that hearing by Richard Schifter, assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, published as “Human Rights in Yugoslavia,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 2, no. 9 (March 4, 1991): 152–53; although focused largely on Kosovo, Schifter turns to “conflict between Serbs and Croats” in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina; in Croatia, “a substantial Serbian population ... considers itself deprived of its cultural rights and of equal opportunity in an increasingly nationalist Republic of Croatia” and in both republics, “historic memory” is an obstacle because “Serbs suffered severely during World War II from the brutalities visited upon them by the Ustashi, the paramilitary force of the pro-Nazi Croatian wartime regime.” He does not, however, mention the relation between this conflict and Bosnian Muslims.

30. In addition to the instructions executed by Ambassador Zimmermann, see the telegram sent by Senator DeConcini and Congressman Hoyer, as chairs of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, in “Commission Urges Yugoslavs to Refrain from Violence,” CSCE News Release, January 24, 1991. According to Zimmermann (Origins of a Catastrophe, p. 96), he began these warnings on December 10, 1990. As a reflection of American attitudes, Zimmermann displays an extraordinary antagonism, misinformation, and lack of sympathy for the army; see especially pp. 85–91, 96–102.

31. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 107–17, provide the best narrative on the Croatian plot (called the Špegelj affair after the Croatian defense minister) and the army’s attempt to mobilize the presidency against it, although they too seem to deny that the federal government had legitimate authority in matters of force. From January to March 1991, Yugoslav minister of defense Kadijević reportedly went to Moscow several times to discuss arms deals. Although this was often cited later as equivalent to the Slovene and Croatian moves and is a main plank in the case against the army, the one verified trip, on March 13, according to Jović’s diary, was made only with the permission of Jović, then commander-in-chief as president of the presidency, to inquire from Soviet defense minister Dimitrii Yazov “whether the USSR would protect us from a possible Western intervention in case we decide to deploy the army to implement the presidency’s decisions” (cited by Filip Svarm, in “Kill, Then Tell: Ex-Yugoslav Generals Remember Their Wars,” Transitions [February 1998]: 26; for the original, see Jović, Poslednji Dani, p. 295; the reply, according to Jović, was that no Western variant featured any military intervention, thus avoiding an answer). The argument, in fact, reflects a confusion in levels of analysis taking place among outside interveners between the federal republic and the constituent republics, as if they were equal, which was to have such destructive consequences in the diplomatic mediation several months later.

32. Zimmermann admits as much, when he asserts that the message Secretary of State James Baker delivered to the parties June 25, 1991, was “right,” but that “the mistake” was that it came six months “too late” (Origins of a Catastrophe, p. 137); his staff persist in the view, several years later, that the problem was not the message but his failure to forge a coalition of European allies behind it.

33. There were some notable exceptions, such as the invitation from Margaret Thatcher, former British prime minister, to Croatian president Tudjman to visit London in May 1991; see Richard West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1995), pp. 373–75.

34. On the more general problem of Balkanism in the West, as a cultural bias reflecting more about the outside viewers than anything to do with the people of the area, thus a form of Orientalism, see Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

36. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, cited in Thomas L. Friedman, “Bosnia Re-


38. Clause 8 of the resolution declared “that the constituent republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia must have the right freely to determine their own future in a peace-
ful and democratic manner and on the basis of recognized international and internal bor-

39. By an amendment from Representative Dana Rohrbacher (Republican, California) to the Direct Aid to Democracies Act (the Dole Bill).

40. According to Zimmermann in Origins of a Catastrophe, this “first act of war” (p. 142) was nonetheless the “most brilliant public relations coup in the history of Yugoslavia” (p. 145) in favor of Slovenia.

41. Steven Burg provides a lucid survey of the development of these mechanisms and their application to the Yugoslav case, in War or Peace? pp. 43–55, 67–74.

42. The terms were a three-month moratorium on Slovene and Croatian moves toward independence, a cease-fire obliging the JNA to return to barracks and the Slovene govern-
ment to end its barricade of those barracks and JNA families, and an agreement by the Serbian faction in the federal presidency to remove its objection to the seating of the Croatian representative as Yugoslav president (chair of a nine-member collective body, rotating ex officio annually).


44. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, pp. 32–33.

45. On Croatian unreadiness in contrast to the Slovenes, see Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 149–50. Tudjman’s party received 1.2 million votes to the renamed Communist Party’s 994,000. He did form a grand coalition, but his right-wing movement was at odds over pol-
icy with its liberal, social democratic, agrarian, and former Communist Party members.

46. These talks are uniformly criticized to this day, but Paul Shoup offers a different per-
spective in “The Bosnian Crisis in 1992,” in Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Cul-
ture in a Shattered Community, ed. Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubisa S.Adamovich (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview, 1995), pp. 155–187, where he suggests that the Tudjman-Milošević talks
about partition were a “way of avoiding a civil war between Croatia and Serbia” (p. 164).

47. This public relations tactic was not wholly supported within the Croatian government because it required not acting forcefully to stop the violence, which they might have done, ei-
ther alone or in alliance with the federal army; this was most notable in regard to the internal
debate over the defense of Vukovar.

48. See his memoirs of this period, Stipe Mesić, Kako Smo Srušili Jugosloviju: Politički M emoari Posljednjeg Predsjednika Predsjedištva SFRJ [How We Destroyed Yugoslavia: Politi-
cal Memoires of the Last President of the Presidency of the SFRY] (Zagreb: Globus Interna-
tional, 1992). Burg writes, “No better example of the futility of American policies in this pe-
riod can be found than in the diplomatic effort invested” in seating Mesić “instead of ad-
ressing the underlying disagreements” (War or Peace? p. 68).

49. ECM M monitors recorded this, as did members of the negotiating team of UN envoy
Cyrus Vance in Croatia after October 8 to negotiate a cease-fire. (For one such discussion, see
the proceedings of the Humanitas Conference on Former Yugoslavia held at Leeds Castle,
Kent, February 25–27, 1994.)

51. The ethnic hatred interpretation of Yugoslav violence gained particular currency in the atrocities of the Bosnian war, but the vote for ethnic parties in 1990 says little about ethnic hatred or nationalism in Bosnia. Exploited by campaign rhetoric of all three parties, the “frightened and disoriented” population, explain Štitkovac and Udovički, “believed that unless they voted for the party representing their own nation, the other two would prevail—and that spelled danger in a way few could fully articulate at that point” (“Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Second War,” in Udovički and Ridgeway, eds., Yugoslavia’s Ethnic Nightmare, p. 168). Donald Horowitz shows how this dynamic occurs in any multiethnic society once one party forms along ethnic lines, in Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

52. For the debate in 1991, see Shoup, “The Bosnian Crisis in 1992.”


54. Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, sent to set up this headquarters, in a discussion at the Humanitas Conference, cited earlier, in February 1994. See also his memoir of the experience, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1993).

55. This is David Owen’s view:

In retrospect, the biggest mistake, and the one that made the continuation of war inevitable, was not premature recognition but the rejection by EC Foreign Ministers on 29 July 1991 of the suggestion made by the Dutch Presidency in a COREU telegram sent out on 13 July. If the EC had launched a political initiative in August 1991 to address the key problem facing the parties to the dispute, namely the republics’ borders, and had openly been ready to see an orderly and agreed secession of separate states in revised borders, then in conjunction with NATO a credible call could have been made for an immediate cease-fire... the Serb-Croat war would have been stopped in its tracks. It is in the first few days and weeks of a conflict developing that conflict resolution has its greatest chance of success. In July 1991 there was such an opportunity; once missed, it took until 1995 for war exhaustion to become the determining factor. (Balkan Odyssey, p. 342).

56. This was not true of the president, Adil Zulfikarpasíc, of the second largest Muslim party, the Muslim Bosniak party of secular liberals. His attempts to negotiate an agreement on Bosnian integrity with Bosnian and Serbian Serb leaders, Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, in the summer of 1991, if noticed and supported by European negotiators, might well have prevented war in Bosnia. The agreement failed, according to Zulfikarpasíc, because Izetbegović changed his mind and withdrew his initial go-ahead. Some explain this change by the fact that it was a state-to-state, not party-led, negotiation, while some journalists closely watching events at the time argue that Izetbegović held on, into late 1992, to the idea of Bosnia remaining a part of a rump Yugoslavia.

57. On the problem of credibility from the Croatian government alone, even if President Tudjman had been sincerely interested, see James D. Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” February 22, 1996, unpublished paper, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

58. Greece abandoned its continuing opposition to selective (and premature) recognition in exchange for a clause effectively preventing recognition of Macedonia.

59. For an analysis of this decision, the failure of the negotiating process, and its implications for multilateral cooperation on foreign policy, see Beverly Crawford, “Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral Recognition of Croatia,” World Politics 48 (July 1996): 482–521.

60. Opinion no. 4, the Badinter Commission.

61. No one in such a position has only one strategy or is fully consistent, so there will
forever be dispute about Izetbegović’s intentions and preferences. Many point to his sta-
tement in the formal request in December for recognition, that he would prefer Bosnia to re-
main within a rump Yugoslavia, and insist that he held this position until the end of 1992; oth-
ers involved in diplomatic negotiations argue that Izetbegović’s position throughout,
beginning in the early months of 1992 or earlier, was to gain recognition as a means of secur-
ing the right to self-defense in Art. 51 of the UN Charter, a lifting of the arms embargo, and
Western military intervention on behalf of Bosnian sovereignty.

62. See David Lake and Donald Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The In-
ternational Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict, Institute on Global Conflict and Co-
operation, University of California, San Diego, Policy Paper No. 20, January 1996.

63. Their reports in the summer and fall of 1991 on the peacekeeping efforts of the JNA,
the serious maltreatment of the army by Croatian authorities, and the nationalist inventive
broadcast daily on Croatian radio and TV, if taken seriously, might have enabled a more even-
handed diplomatic approach and perhaps even some distance from local propaganda that
might have led to formulation of a framework for political resolution.

64. On these two variants of the compensation principle in welfare economics— bribing
someone not to take an action (the Scitovsky version) or compensating someone for the con-
sequences of going ahead with that action (the Kaldor version)— see Maurice Dobb, Welfare
Economics and the Economics of Socialism: Towards a Commonsense Critique (London: Cam-

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68. Representative Lee H. Hamilton (Democrat, Indiana) in “Not on Our Beat,” National

69. According to Zimmermann (Origins of a Catastrophe, p. 158), General John Galvin,
then Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), drew up contingency plans to stop the
shelling of Dubrovnik, although “no Western government” called on NATO to do so, adding,
“The use of force was simply too big a step to consider in late 1991, and I don’t believe W ash-
ington did consider it. I didn’t recommend it myself.”

70. The Zimmermann view is that “the Serbs would have been taught a lesson about West-
ern resolve that might have deterred at least some of their aggression against Bosnia” (Origins
of a Catastrophe, p. 158).

71. There is dispute about how much of a debate actually took place at the WEU meeting,
but military officers present remain firm on their position that they did not have sufficient
force without the United States.
was completed in May 1998; it was updated in June 1999, a few weeks before the end of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

1. Because of the dispute with Greece discussed here, the new country was admitted to the United Nations under the provisional and cumbersome name "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM). For simplicity, "Macedonia" is used here.


4. The following sections thus examine whether key challenges that skeptics of international preventive action have posed (e.g., Stephen Stedman, “Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling Preventive Diplomacy” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 [1995]:14–20) were met in this case: (a) How likely and significant was the threat of violence? (b) Did third parties respond to possible imminent violence in a timely fashion? It is usually impossible to predict the precise moment when dangerous violence might break out, but policymakers can be judged as to whether they responded to plausible signs that significantly increased the risk of violent escalation. (c) Was sufficient political and bureaucratic support mustered for significant preventive responses that could actually reduce the sources and manifestations of the conflict, and without great costs or worsening the situation? (d) Can these preventive interventions exit the situation without risking new violence or simply freezing the status quo?

5. Probably the most crucial turning point for the breakup of the Yugoslav federation occurred in Kosovo in April 1987, when Milosjević, a committed socialist at the time, embraced the Serb backlash being expressed by a crowd of Serbs. In later speeches at huge nationalist rallies televised to the nation, he spoke against the privileges being gained by the Albanians and other rising ethnic groups. In the Croatian 1990 election campaign, the speeches of Franjo Tudjman referred proudly to the Ustashe in World War II, a Croatian puppet regime that had killed many Serbs. Serbia and Croatia discriminated especially severely against their respective Albanian and Serb minorities.

6. That independence had not emerged from a vigorous grassroots ethnonationalism was seen when the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) movement was revived to form a political party for the 1990 election that could represent ethnic Macedonians. It gained 37 of 120 parliamentary seats, more than any other party, but it could not form a government, so Macedonia’s first government was made up of nonparty experts.


Three states will come out of Yugoslavia— Greater Serbia, Small Croatia, and even smaller Slovenia. . . . And Macedonia has always been the Serb territory. . . . Shiptars [a term used for Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia but not Albania] now play into our hands by refusing to take part in the census [by the Macedonian government]. . . . We think that all those not recorded in the census should be banished from Serbia.

Interview in Revija-92, January 1, 1991, cited in Helsinki Committee, Hate Speech, p. 8f. And on July 10, 1991: “Macedonians, Moslems, and Montenegrins are fictitious nations.” Quoted in the periodical Svet cited by the Helsinki Committee, Hate Speech, p. 25, n. 14. Seselj sought to exploit the discontent of Macedonians, Serbs, and Serbian elements are believed to have assisted some Serbian nationalist cells in northern Macedonia during this time.

8. Milosjević may have begun to reach this conclusion as early as July 1991 (Warren Zimmerman, “The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” Foreign Affairs [March/April 1995]). When war broke out in Croatia that month, although the JNA and its allied Serb Croatian militias initially held the advantage, they were soon severely hampered by draft dodging and desertions, poor training and morale, and equipment shortages. By October, the smaller Croatian side had forced a stalemate. By December, the JNA was on the defensive and beginning to prepare for the growing hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cigar, “The Serbo-Croatian War,” pp. 313–26). Bosnia’s independence referendum in late February
1992 and its declaration of sovereignty in March were followed by heavy fighting that month. The withdrawal from Macedonia began a few weeks before that.

9. In deference to Serbia, a provisional administrative line was drawn short of the old republic line.

10. In a press conference with Greek foreign minister Michael Papaconstantinou in November 1993, Milošević referred to Macedonia in doubting terms and spoke of a Serbian confederation with Greece. The proregime Belgrade press and Serbian ultranationalists continued to see “South Serbia” as going through a trying transition on the way to eventual reunion. After the 1994 census, the Serbian press rejected the results by claiming Macedonia actually had ten times the number of Serbs recorded (Helsinki Committee, Hate Speech, pp. 31–35).

11. Early on, a UN official in Macedonia expressed the view that Serbia was unlikely to invade. The UN secretary-general stated in September 1994 that Serbian troops did not seem to want to provoke confrontation, and the UN liaison in Belgrade believed Yugoslav officials were largely indifferent to Macedonia (Leatherman, “Untying Macedonia’s Gordian Knot”; and interview).

12. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, p. 40. Compare Croatia, where most Croats are Catholic and Serbs, orthodox; and Bosnia, where many Bosnians are Muslim.


14. The Vergine symbol on the flag, a sun with sixteen rays, symbolized the Macedonian royal family whose empire had its ancient capital in Perin, which lies a few miles northwest of Thessaloniki.


16. In contrast, Bulgaria was the first country to recognize Macedonia, and although it denied the notion of a Macedonian nationality, Macedonia-Bulgaria relations have been much less troubled. Macedonia was also recognized by Russia and many other countries. Albania also was not belligerent.

17. Their leaders have claimed Albanians constitute 40 percent of the population. They boycotted the 1991 census because it did not count as citizens many Albanians who had fled to Macedonia from Serbian repression in Kosovo. The 1992 citizenship law required fifteen years’ residence, whereas all ethnic Macedonians from the former Yugoslav republics are granted citizenship automatically, regardless of how many years they have lived in the country. The 1994 census, sponsored by the Council of Europe in part because of this controversy, also did not count these émigrés, and its estimates put their number at 22.9 percent. The 1994 figure for Macedonians is 66.5 percent. The country also comprises an estimated 4 percent ethnic Turks, 3 percent Roma, 2 percent Serbs, 2 percent Macedonian Muslims, and 0.04 percent Vlachs.


19. A formal complaint concerning apportionment was brought before the Constitutional Court, and an election reform law allowing reapportionment and proportional representation was passed in 1998.

20. A year later, Macedonian suspicions were aroused when the ethnic Albanian deputy minister of defense and a leader of the ethnic Albanian political party, the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) were arrested for smuggling arms for a paramilitary organization connected to individuals in the Albanian government. The Albanian government has given verbal support to ethnic Albanian parties. Although Albania recognized Macedonia in April 1993, it engendered suspicion by not accepting a Macedonian nationality, and in June, it temporarily blocked
Macedonia's CSCE membership. There also have been reports of Macedonian paramilitary protection committees, and in 1992, a group was arrested while trying to destroy a mosque.

21. Interview. Some observers shared the government's view that the episode derived more from the desire to mobilize political support than educational concerns. Even though government officials are skeptical its graduates will meet educational standards, Tetovo University has continued in private buildings and is tolerated. But the problem remains that the qualifications of Tetovo graduates may not be recognized for jobs, such as in the civil services.

22. Over one thousand industries were closed or privatized. Major international financial donors began implementing economic reforms when Macedonia became a member of the IMF in December 1992 and the World Bank in February 1993, which opened an office in Skopje (World Bank, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: An Introductory Economic Report, Report No. 14576-MK, July 20, 1995; Human Rights Watch, Helsinki, Human Rights in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 6, no. 1 [January 1994]: 12, n.11). These policies reduced consumption, limited wages, laid off workers, and increased the burden on welfare and pension costs, just when government revenues were declining. From 1990 to 1994, real gross domestic product fell nearly 35 percent, trade flows by about 10 percent, and total investment by two-thirds, while known unemployment rose from 17 to 20 percent, possibly even to 30 percent, with many of working-age dropping out of the labor force. Gross social product per capita fell from U.S.$1,419 in 1987 to U.S.$720 in 1993, and per-capita income in 1994 was U.S.$790. The UN sanctions were estimated to have cost the country U.S.$3 billion by 1995, in relation to an annual government budget of $1.2 billion. The Greek embargo was estimated to have cost $330 million in lost exports in its first year. A further fiscal burden was added with UN membership in 1993, when Macedonia obligated to repay a certain portion of the former Yugoslavia's loans.


24. Troebst, "Macedonia."

25. The first parliament in early 1992 comprised a variety of parties, but the strongly anticommunist, anti-Serbian Macedonian nationalist party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNU) gained 37 seats of the 120, more than any other. Though the first government, made up of nonparty experts, fell in a nonconfidence vote in July 1992, the VMRO failed to assemble a new government. The Alliance of Macedonia thus formed a coalition among the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDUM, the successor to the communists), the Liberal Party, and one of the ethnic Albanian parties, the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP). The lack of a two-thirds majority hampered this government from enacting reforms, however, and boycotting Albanian and VMRO deputies often left it without a quorum. The Alliance strengthened its power in the second parliamentary elections in October 1994, gaining a clear two-thirds majority with 97 seats (SDS, fifty-eight; Liberals, twenty-nine; and PDP, ten). The PDP also has a number of vice ministerial jobs.

26. In September 1993, the Albanian PDP split into a moderate and more nationalist party. In February 1994, the IMRO split into the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party (VMRO-DP), with one seat, and a larger Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNU), which became the main extraparliamentary opposition party. Though generally deemed fair by election monitors, the 1994 election was criticized for several irregularities resulting from government manipulation. The VMRO-DPMNU disputed the results of its poor showing in the first round and boycotted the second round, thus being eliminated from representation in parliament and declaring its laws invalid.

27. Thus, Kosovo also fuels wariness between Albania and Serbia. The Kosovo Albanian
movement said it received only moral and political support from individual Albanians in Macedonia and Albania, which it reciprocated in the same way. Interview, 1996. The government of Albania at least gave moral support and supplied educational materials to Kosovo.

28. Serb nationalists hark back to the humiliating battle of Kosovo in 1389 in which their ancestral medieval kingdom was defeated by the Ottoman Turks. Since the late nineteenth century, Kosovo had become the center of a growing Albanian population and nationalist movement. But the population increase became more dramatic in the early 1960s. In 1961, they were 68 percent of the population, and by 1982, 78 percent. As tensions rose and Kosovo's economy fell further behind other regions of the country, more and more non-Albanians, including Serbs and Macedonians, emigrated. Many of Kosovo's leaders were educated at Prishtina University in Albanian, and Serbs identified Albanian political activists with Turk intruders. The Albanian attacks on Serbs are mentioned by Samuel P. Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996], p. 261) but have been grossly exaggerated in Serb tracts. On the several sources of the concentration of Albanian population since 1981, including a high Serb abortion rate, and the distorted Serb reaction to Albanians, see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 329–33, 336–39.

29. Albanian intellectuals and community leaders have shaped their people's educational and cultural institutions and political outlook, as have Serbs on their side.

30. The conflict reflects the classic feature of two sides viewing the same events with diametrically opposite renditions. What Albanians (and most historians) describe as wholesale ethnic cleansing of Albanians out of government, industrial, and other jobs, Serb officials say was necessary because Albanians left their jobs, and the mines and other facilities had to be kept operating. Interviews.

31. Bombs were first exploded nearby Croatian and Bosnian Serb refugee camps, the responsibility for which was claimed by the hitherto unknown "Kosovo Liberation Front." Other terrorist-like attacks left five Serbs killed, including three policemen, in apparent retaliation for the earlier killing. In January 1997, a car bomb injured the Serb rector of the University of Prishtina, and Serb police retaliated by killing three Albanians, arresting seventy, and interrogating more than a hundred students and political activists, including one who died in prison, possibly from torture. The shooting death of an Albanian student by a Serb then brought thousands into the streets without the usual LDK permission. Shkelzen Maligi, "Kosovo: Broken April," War Report (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, May 1996); Kosova InfoFax, nos. 168 through 177; Gjeraqina Tuhina, "Kosovo: Out of the Shadows," War Report (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, March 1997). Although an illegal National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo was known to exist, confused information about these incidents and the secretiveness of the Serbian investigating authorities at first generated theories that the incidents were engineered by radical Serbian elements or that Milosević perpetrated the bombings to bolster his declining support against the protests that began in Belgrade in late 1996. In 1997, FRY authorities jailed and put through highly criticized trials several suspected members of the alleged terrorist groups.

32. Chris Hedges, "Albanians in Serbia Fight for Their Independence," New York Times, May 11, 1997. More recent investigations claim that the KLA was started as a small group as early as 1991 by descendants of earlier Albanian radicals, but then recruited a larger membership from disenchanted members of the LDK. The LDK leadership apparently also maintained contact with the KLA. See Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs (May/June 1999), pp. 24–42.

33. At a time when major powers pay little attention to remote conflicts that brew below
the boiling point, endogenous local and regional suppressants are crucial for international prevention strategists to identify and track. They may indicate not “all clear” signals but at least signs of local coping that can be weighed against negative “early warning” signals, and thus help determine the precise extent and nature of the threat of particular incipient conflicts. Some may indicate favorable entry points where third-party preventive leverage might get especially good results.

34. In a whole chapter devoted to Macedonia, Kaplan describes it as the real source of World War I and other barbarisms—

a historical and geographical reactor furnace . . . [where] the ethnic hatreds released by the decline of the Ottoman Empire had first exploded, forming the radials of twentieth century European and Middle Eastern conflict. Macedonia was like the chaos at the beginning of time . . . the original seedground not only of modern warfare and political conflict, but of modern terrorism and clerical fanaticism as well.

See Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: Vintage, 1994), pp. 51–56. On the clash of civilizations reflected in the Yugoslavian and Macedonian “cleft” countries and how such legacies tend to prevail, see Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, p.138; and Samuel P. Huntington, “The West: Unique, Not Universal,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 6 (November 1, 1996):24–46. A usable historical variable that might predict violent conflicts is the extent to which the current parties have fought one another in the recent past (e.g., Miall, The Peacemakers). To the degree there are fresher memories of bloodshed perpetrated by another group against one’s kin or country, political activists might more easily conjure these up to instill distrust and hate and incite a following to take up arms. Comparing the histories of the four conflicts threatening Macedonia, all saw past animosities, but the Serb-Kosovar relationship saw the most hostility and lives lost in recent decades.

In Kosovo, Serbs clashed with the Albanians in violent demonstrations during and after both World Wars. Mutual atrocities and expulsions were common between local pro-Nazi Albanian groups and Serb Chetniks or communist partisans. The vehemence of the Greek-Macedonian conflict, especially on the Greek side, could stem from memories of 1946 until the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, when a Greek-Macedonian movement joined communists in fighting a civil war against the Greek government and tried to unite northern Greece into the SFRY. In Vardar Macedonia, though Albanians had dominated Macedonians during the Axis occupations, and ethnic Macedonians had mistreated Albanians just before independence, Albanians had not been oppressed by Macedonians. During the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, instances of Macedonians on the Bulgarian side being killed by Serbs, and vice-versa, occurred. More recently, however, during World War II, Macedonians fought with Serbs against fascism.

The impact of cultural differences is even less pronounced. If the cultural divide between the Orthodox Christians and Muslim Albanians were determinative, Serbs, Macedonians, and Greeks would be consistently aligned against Albanians, Bulgarians and Turks. But Macedonians shared interests with ethnic Muslim Albanians in Macedonia. To complicate matters, some Slavic ethnic Macedonians are Muslim, because they converted during the Ottoman Empire. And Macedonia is cooperating with Bulgaria and Turkey regarding East-West economic relations against Serbia and Greece. Similar state interests restrained Alija’s Berisha from inciting his ethnic brethren in Macedonia and Kosovo, and may explain Bulgaria’s restraint.

35. Research has found a strong association between peaceful dispute outcomes and whether the parties to the disputes are governments, rather than groups within states (e.g., Miall, The Peacemakers). Multiple, competing interests, such as security and maintaining eco-
conomic gains through trade and aid, may influence the leaders of states, especially of established ones or "satisfied powers," more than they do the leaders of particular groups who may aspire to state power. State leaders wish to preserve and improve their positions in the international system, such as becoming eligible for multilateral organizations and receiving the benefits of that membership for distribution among their own constituents. They must make practical calculations about how to keep power by balancing a variety of diplomatic, economic, legal, and political interests at any one time. The desire to continue to preside over stable, successful regimes by protecting or improving the material well-being of their present constituencies may be conservative when it comes to involving their states in wars. Regarding the ethnic "kin groups" within a neighboring state, such state interests may outweigh the gains from stirring up, beyond the minimum required level of rhetorical support, national chauvinist fervor or provoking intergroup animosities. Also, because the pursuit of interests abroad is enhanced to the extent they can preserve national unity at home, leaders would not always be well served by encouraging divisiveness in other countries, if these states could retaliate in kind by supporting counteragitation to undermine their own regime. This analysis fits many of the leaders of the established South Balkan states, who were restrained in part from sponsoring significant agitation among a "kin" ethnic group living in a nearby country.

36. Interview. See also Owen, Balkan Odyssey, pp. 11, 40f.
37. She is now its Washington ambassador.
38. Interview. The United States told Macedonia it was a valued entity, but it was not even granted an interest section.
39. Any U.S. reversal would not happen soon. A proposal by State Department staffers at the end of the year that Bush use his lame duck status to grant recognition was turned down.
40. To reiterate: intensified repression by Belgrade in Kosovo or a Kosovar uprising could incite further Serbian repression and counteragitation and cause massive outflow of refugees. This could force next-door Albania and Albanians in western Macedonia to come to the aid of their Kosovar brothers. A Serbian counterresponse would make western Macedonia into a battlefield. These developments would destabilize Macedonia's shaky interethnic coalition government and tenuous ethnic relations, which might themselves worsen the trouble in Kosovo and/or invite Macedonia's neighbors—Serbia, Greece, or Bulgaria—to take advantage. Incursions into Serbia or troubles in Macedonia might provoke Serbia's ally Greece to attack, especially now with its dispute with Macedonia. A direct Serbian attack on Macedonia was also thought possible, with the desire to reverse Macedonia's break from the Yugoslav federation and/or to assist Macedonia's Serb minority. External and internal threats to Macedonia in turn could provoke Bulgaria, either on behalf of Macedonia against Greece or to benefit from its dissolution by recovering parts for Bulgaria.
41. This prospect was not brought up in NATO meetings, however, for that would have put the problem too explicitly. Interview.
43. Though U.S. staff say the intensified U.S. concern also was aided by key, highly respected ambassadors in the region, such as Ambassador Warren Zimmermann in Belgrade. The visits to the Western powers by President Gligorov and communiqués from his Washington representative undoubtedly also helped keep relevant policymakers well informed about Macedonia's situation.
44. State Department staffers received their information from occasional news stories on the southern Balkan region and from other sources, but the standard reports from U.S.
embassies in the region were considered somewhat unreliable because the missions tended to view issues through partisan prisms of their host countries. Interview.

45. The Greeks' obstreperousness also helped to get the eventual U.S. action, for it rankled State Department staffers who were impatient with their country's inaction in Bosnia. They became convinced the United States had to do something about Macedonia to make up for a mistaken decision on recognition and for the increasing economic strain from the UN economic sanctions of spring 1992. Now that Greek pressure had kept the United States from protecting Macedonia through diplomatic recognition, they found it easier to argue that the United States should take compensatory actions. The nonrecognition policy apparently had similarly emboldening effects in EU governments such as the United Kingdom. Foreign Office staff redoubled their efforts to provide other kinds of help to Macedonia. One means was providing economic aid through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which could circumvent restrictions on the World Bank and other donors caused by Macedonia's lack of state status. It could soon receive aid from the EU despite the unresolved dispute with Greece. The EU itself entered the Greek-Macedonian dispute in another way. When Greece was unrelenting, it brought a suit to the European Court of Justice. Although the suit got nowhere and judicialized the controversy, the EU aid offered a carrot to Macedonia for settling the dispute, which the United States could not offer. EU ministerial meetings also increased the pressure on Greece by making the Greek representatives uncomfortable. Interview.

46. This section does not expound the decision processes of all the actors who became involved. U.S. perceptions and decision making are emphasized because of the greater ease of access to these sources and the fact that the United States was becoming the most influential single third party.

47. Leatherman, "Untying Macedonia's Gordian Knot"; Ackermann, "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." A CSCE observer mission was established in Kosovo in October 1992 in Prishtina and several other Kosovo towns, through the approval of Prime Minister Milan Panić. Because of the refusal of the CSCE to readmit the FRY, however, Milošević refused to renew their visas when the mission was up for renewal in July 1993, so they closed down.


49. Leatherman, "Untying Macedonia's Gordian Knot"; Ackermann, "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia."

50. Other multilateral forums also used informal dialogue to approach government and political leaders repeatedly to coax them to address certain ethnic issues and to provide advice on possible policy solutions, and they have promoted civic participation. In February 1993, the EC Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and its successor, the joint UN-EC International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), mediated discussions between the government and minority communities over the constitutional language referring to different statuses. The Council of Europe and the EU also promoted and helped support the 1994 census to try to resolve the ethnic numbers controversy. Also important was the work of the special representatives of the Human Rights Commission, who helped create an ombudsman position.


53. Izetbegović was told by UN officials that UN peacekeeping would be inappropriate in a location that was not yet a recognized state but that the European Community might be approached for help through the Western European Union (WEU).

54. This approach also helped obtain support for the UN force from ethnic Albanian
leaders who thought deployment along the Albanian border unnecessary. Along with the other parties in the parliament, the PDP accepted patrolling and monitoring of the Albanian as well as Serbian borders. The FRY objected, but Albania acquiesced.

55. The mission is the only multilateral preventive deployment in the strict sense of being placed where conflict has not occurred in recent decades but is perceived to be possible. Other multilateral peacekeeping, such as the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), since 1964 and 1974 has included preventive objectives but in terms of avoiding renewed hostilities in a recent war zone. The U.S. and NATO forces placed in Cold War Europe also sought to avoid new conflicts but as one side's defense strategy, not a neutral third party.

56. It was also supported by an Indonesian heavy engineering platoon, thirty-five UN military observers, and a twenty-six-person team of Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL). Military and civilian support staff totaled about two hundred, coming from about fifty countries.

57. The Nordic support for this mission arose out of a long tradition of participation in UN peacekeeping going back to the late 1940s, for which they had developed special expertise. As the Cold War waned, Scandinavian foreign policy analysts promoted the concept of cooperative security through the CSCE and other channels. Prior to the publication of An Agenda for Peace, they had proposed the idea of preventive deployment to the secretary-general. Although in the fall 1992, Sweden and other Nordic governments turned down NATO's request to provide ground troops for UNPROFOR, they responded to the secretary-general's request for Macedonia. A preventive assignment in Macedonia gave them the opportunity to respond to their own public opinion and signals from the United States, but without putting troops in the line of fire. See Clive Archer, "Conflict Prevention in Europe: The Case of the Nordic States and Macedonia," Cooperation and Conflict 29, no. 4 (1994):367–386. The U.S. decision is described later.

58. Secretary-general's letter to the Security Council (S/24923, December 9, 1992).

59. UNPROFOR Macedonia did not explicitly address for a while the prospect of thousands coming across from Kosovo because the issue was too controversial for the government to discuss. Subsequently, UNPREDEP, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other humanitarian bodies discussed the challenge of such an influx, including refugees seeking protection from pursuing forces. Leatherman, "Untying Macedonia's Gordian Knot"; Michael Weithmann, "Macedonia—Land Between Four Fires," Aussenpolitik 3 (1993): 261–270.

60. This internal focus was taken for granted by October 1996, when the government's minister of defense described external defense as the army's job and UNPREDEP's as signaling the need to preserve internal peace. Speech at UNPREDEP conference, Skopje, October 1996.


62. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Warren Christopher to Be Secretary of State, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, January 13 and 14, 1993, p. 21.

63. This proposal would have exempted the Bosnian Muslims from the arms embargo and offered NATO air strikes, but the Europeans felt it would put their peacekeeping forces on the ground at greater risk.


65. Two years later, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) would spell out specific criteria for U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping operations, after the debacle in Somalia when the body of an American soldier was shown on television being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993. But drafting of PDD-25 started during the Bush administration.
66. Personal communications.

67. Aware of past difficulties in maintaining cooperation with the United Nations and the EU over Bosnia, the United States obtained a UN authorizing resolution to give the negotiations added legitimacy. Clinton also kept in close touch with UN envoy to Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance and his deputy Herbert Okun to avoid any split position, and he briefed the EU in Brussels, key U.S. congressional leaders, and organizations such as those of Greek-Americans. Background briefing, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.

68. To the Greeks, the U.S. mediator pointed out the economic benefits of regaining the revenues from Macedonian trade through Thessaloniki and raised the specter of fifty-year contracts soon being signed to build alternative east-west ports and railroads that would reduce the north-south trade market. He pointed out the security advantages of an independent, democratic, and sovereign Macedonia on the northern border, compared to a Serb-dominated Macedonia. He reminded the Greeks of the dangers of keeping Macedonia out of the international community and the need to have good neighborly relations in a threatening Balkan environment where many issues remained unresolved with Albania, Serbia, and Bulgaria. But the United States had less leverage with its NATO ally Greece than with Macedonia. The embargo was hurting Macedonia economically by stopping trade flows and shopping trips for Macedonians into Greece. By compromising, Macedonia obviously stood to gain by being recognized without caveats. Recognition would accord them full diplomatic relations with the United States and eligibility for membership in several multilateral organizations—the EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace—as well as the resumption of international aid.

69. Increasingly, official bodies and nongovernmental organizations expressed concern about the situation after 1992 and issued many recommendations that generally advised dialogue over possible autonomy for the Albanians, while preserving Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. Several outside NGOs such as the Transnational Foundation from Sweden sought to encourage specific Track Two dialogue between elements of the increasingly polarized Albanian and Kosovo communities, but these usually broke down. Troebst, “Macedonia,” pp. 21–103.

70. E.g., to further improve relationships between Macedonia and its neighbors, Secretary of Defense Perry visited Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania in the summer of 1994 and announced plans for military cooperation and a program to educate Macedonian military officers in the United States and Europe. Washington Times, February 5, 1995, p. 1.

71. The sequence in international actions toward Macedonia reveals an interesting contrast with Croatia and Bosnia. Toward the latter, the international community recognized new states to try to stop a war, but only after violence was largely under way and without any military forces to back up de jure independence. In Macedonia, the international community recognized new states to try to stop a war, but only after violence was largely under way and without any military forces to back up the de jure independence. In Macedonia, the international community denied recognition, but even before many major governments recognized the government juridically, it protected the de facto independent entity by planting a military force before any violence arose and even assisted the new government to be a state.

Post-Cold War preventive action thus helped create a Macedonian state through a process similar to that of “juridical statehood” whereby many African states received the perquisites of statehood and standing in the international community largely by a series of actions by other more powerful entities. Earlier, most states in Europe earned that status by emerging out of local centralizing or nationalist forces that used force to wrest control over a given territory and build an integral state administration. Macedonia is not simply a newly independent state with some prior sovereign life such as Latvia; it is an unprecedented state whose legal being began in 1991. For reasons of their own, these powers fostered an entity on top of a local nationalism though it had not won control of the area through force or fought a war of liberation.
72. Increased tensions occurred in Bosnia in spring 1995 as a result of Croatia asking the United Nations to leave. Because this might have caused a major influx of refugees or prompted Serbia to move against Macedonia, the Clinton administration considered adding from as few as five hundred to as many as ten thousand more troops in Macedonia. To mollify congressional opposition, the administration reportedly was prepared to change the command structure to make the mission a U.S.-led coalition or NATO operation. *Baltimore Sun*, March 2, 1995.

73. The international recognition of Macedonia was more effective than the earlier “preventive recognition” of Croatia and Bosnia because Macedonia was not merely legally endowed with sovereign status by edicts from foreign capitals while hostilities were already in play. It was given a degree of prior military protection after legal sovereignty was accepted and before any external or internal perpetrators of instability had a chance to impose their will through cross-border encroachment or supporting local militias.

74. These methods included limiting the parties’ ability to grandstand by simultaneously keeping the talks secret while also keeping highly interested parties such as U.S. senators and the Greek-American lobby informed of their progress, assuring them that their interests were being taken into account. By focusing on future gains, the mediator avoided the process bogging down from the rehearsing of bygone historical grievances. The negotiator also “fractionated” the issues, by postponing the name issue for later consideration, so that progress could be made on the other questions.

75. Public opinion polls and surveys suggest majority support for UNPREDEP, so it was not seen, e.g., as necessarily pro-Albanian. Neither the Albanian nor Greek governments complained and both probably were content it was there, though this was not explicitly acknowledged. Some analysts even judged that UNPREDEP prevented escalation to a civil war by thwarting low-scale disruptive activity such as violent riots and insurgency within Macedonia. Though this would require a significant and controversial redefinition of mission and work for the UN force to be reinforced, because of their position in situ, the opportunity existed to beef up diplomatic efforts and military forces at the first signs that such turmoil was rising beyond a low level.

76. Compare the calm following the assassination attempt on President Gligorov on October 3, 1995, with the genocides that followed the killing of President Ndadaye in Burundi in October 1993 and President Habyarimana in Rwanda in April 1994.

77. NGOs are also dependent like the intergovernmental entities on doing projects that the host government will approve and on priorities that the third-party governments who are in part their funders see as worthwhile. The exception to many of these limitations, and perhaps the most crucial single foreign NGO, has been George Soros’s Open Society Fund, which provided the government bridging loans to help support its debt repayments when it lost revenues as a result of UN sanctions and the Greek embargo.

78. Cf. Lumsden, *Peacebuilding in Macedonia*.

79. The missions were quickly assembled because the OSCE already existed and one tool they used was already operating around Europe, the long-term mission. UNPROFOR’s command structure was already functioning in Croatia. In addition, the required peacekeeping contingents were not only readily offered but preassembled, having been organized for some years in a Nordic joint command. Archer, “Conflict Prevention in Europe, ” pp. 370, 376.

80. Conflict cases and theory refer to the importance of addressing several causes and facets of conflicts. When only one or two tools are used, key sources of conflicts may go unaddressed, thus leading to their worsening despite some measures being in place. Differing preventive actions thus will have different targets, expected impacts, and time frames—long-term, medium term, and short term (see Raimo Väyrynen, “Preventing Deadly Conflict:
Global and European Perspectives,” paper prepared for the Second Pan-European Conference in International Relations, Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, September 13–16, 1995, second draft, January 1996, p. 6). E.g., emissaries from governments and the United Nations and regional organizations are generally used to negotiating and bargaining over tangible assets and among state actors, but they are less familiar with issues of group identity and thus nongovernmental actors. Thus, power-based, official mediation, and military peacekeeping approaches may produce “quick fix,” temporary settlements among elites that maintain certain power relations but not address egregious problems that will surface in the medium term such as basic public security or grassroots participation. Measures for managing peaceful transition may need to be both broad—to bring hard-liners as potential “spoilers” along in reforms (Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalism,” 165–66)—and deep—to reach key publics (Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996], p. xi). But while NGOs may have some efficacy with the latter tasks, they are not usually brought into the picture in major roles (Miall, The Peacemakers, p. 185). By the same token, long-term structural approaches will not be effective in the medium term toward proximate security-threatening sources at work in emerging conflicts (e.g., Bloomfield and Leiss, Controlling Small Wars).

81. Communication and coordination between the governmental and nongovernmental programs could be improved, however.

82. A heightening effect was especially evident in the census of mid-October 1994 to resolve the disparity between government and Albanian estimates of the latter’s numbers. The second census largely confirmed the 1991 estimates, and it seems simply to have intensified resentment among many Albanians. According to one view, this stemmed in part from the way the Council of Europe misunderstood and mishandled certain issues of language arising in the census questions.

83. Macedonia has virtually no broad-based civil society that cuts across ethnic lines, such as an active middle class, independent nonethnic press, or civic associations, which could divert discontent away from the channels of ethnic mobilization and regulate other domestic interest conflicts. Except for a fledgling independent press that draws on small ad revenues and subscriptions, native NGOs have few sources of local financial support. The UN SRSG refers to these and the larger economic development needs of the country as the “third pillar” (beyond those of security and political dialogue) (Henryk J. Sokalski, “Preventive Diplomacy: The Need for a Multi-Dimensional Approach,” paper presented at the conference “An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theor y and Practice,” Skopje, Macedonia, October 16–19, 1996). UNPREDEP tried to begin to erect it, but the UN Development Program and other agencies would be necessary to provide the necessary resources.

84. Because the agreement languished, remission to the uneasy status quo reignited tensions because dashed expectations played into extremists’ hands. It seems less likely that reduced oppression, implementation of the agreement, and increasing FRY-LDK contacts would have created new obstacles through more extreme factions undermining Rugova by charging he compromised on the Albanians’ ultimate political goals.

Notes for Chapter Nine (pages 211-237)


9. This was a very popular view among UN officials in Somalia, who compared Somalia unfavorably with Mozambique (where a UN peace operation had enjoyed far greater success) and concluded that Somalis, like Mozambiquan society, needed perhaps a decade of warfare before becoming truly exhausted with fighting. For a more theoretically rigorous presentation, see Richard Betts, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (November–December 1994): 21–33.


11. Somalia’s unusually diverse range of donors provided economic assistance of over $5 billion and military aid estimated at $2.4 billion between 1960 and 1988, making it one of the highest per capita recipients of foreign aid in the world. Figures are derived from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (annual handbook) and cross-checked with the CIA’s World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995).


16. This disjoint between the country’s internal capacity to finance a government and the actual costs of an even-minimalist state structure was laid bare by UNOSOM efforts in 1993–95 to assist in the rebuilding of a “sustainable” government in Somalia. Reviewing the actual size of the prewar Somali GNP and the country’s likely tax revenues, UN officials concluded that even a bare-bones national police force would cost more than the entire annual budget of a future Somali state. All of the rest of the trappings of the contemporary state were well beyond the means of this impoverished country. Sustainability, as it turned out, was never an operative principle during the rise and expansion of the Somali state.

17. That is, clans that needed alliances with one another were capable of exaggerating, “rediscovering,” or fabricating lineage linkages with one another; and weak clans could also be “adopted” into lineages of stronger clans.


19. For outside mediators, clannism as a source of division and social identity in Somalia was a trap. On the one hand, by the early 1980s, it was clear that the political fault lines in Somalia were forming primarily along clan lines. Yet foreigners who attempted to acknowledge
clannism as a political reality in Somalia were castigated for “fomenting divisions” within the Somali nation. The taboo against direct discussion or acknowledgement of clannism complicated the international community’s ability to read early warning signs of conflict.


22. Christopher Clapham concludes that “one reason why such impoverished countries [are] able to keep fighting for so long [is] the ability of both governments and insurgents to extract resources from the international economy.” See his “The Political Economy of Conflict in the Horn of Africa,” Survival 32, no. 5 (September/October 1990): 414. See also J. F. Bayart, F. Ellis, and B. Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa (Oxford: James Currey Press; and Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).


25. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy, p. 142.

26. For two excellent narratives of this diplomatic history, see Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn, pp. 184–199, and Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy, pp. 142–52.

27. Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn, p. 198.

28. Some external assistance from U.S. allies—especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt—was given to Somalia before 1980. Those two governments had their own regional interests at stake in assisting Somalia against the Soviet-backed Ethiopians.


30. This thesis of “bureaucratic incrementalism” is most fully developed in Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy, pp. 152–59.

31. Structural adjustment reforms never succeeded in Somalia, however; the government employed a tactic of delays and renegotiations to postpone and evade austerity programs and fiscal policies insisted on by donors. See David Rawson, The Somali State and Foreign Aid (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, 1993).

32. The African Contemporary Record, for instance, subtitled its annual entries on Somalia as follows: “President Barre’s regime enters a twilight zone” (1981–82); “President Barre survives a difficult year” (1982–83); “Internal divisions deepen . . .” (1984–85); and “Speculation about the succession to the Presidency” (1986–87). Africa Confidential ran a 1983 story which declared that Barre’s regime “appears again [emphasis ours] to be in its last stages of viability;” entitled a lead article “Somalia: After Barre” in 1986; noted in 1987 that “there is a terminable air about the government of President Mohamed Siad Barre these days”; and entitled a 1989 article “Somalia: The End in Sight for Siad.” Eventually the law of averages worked in favor of these annual, erroneous prognostications, but the fact that they were repeated so regularly suggests that clear warning signs of impending crisis in Somalia were building throughout the decade.
34. Africa Watch, Somalia, pp. 43–113.
36. In the late 1980s, it was not uncommon to witness military trucks pull up in city streets and chase down fleeing young men for conscription, some of whom occasionally fought back with knives and guns. Often, forced conscription was a ruse by the military for extorting money from families in return for their conscripted men, a type of government-sanctioned kidnapping that foreshadowed endemic kidnapping of foreign aid workers in the 1990s.
40. Rawson, The Somali State and Foreign Aid, p. 45.
41. Rawson, The Somali State and Foreign Aid, pp. 115–18.
43. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy, pp. 155–56; and Rawson, The Somali State and Foreign Aid, pp. 115–18.
46. Crigler, quoted in Rawson, The Somali State and Foreign Aid, p. 82.
52. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy, p. 161.
55. Feldmann, “Critics Charge”
59. After years of unhappiness over the Somali government’s blatant abuse of refugee camps—they were used as recruitment and training bases by the military, and the food aid destined for refugees was systematically diverted by the government—the UN High Commissioner for Refugees finally suspended operations to the camps in 1989, prompting the
Barre regime to promise these changes. Relations between the UNHCR and the Barre government were poisonous throughout most of the 1980s, leading to mistreatment of UNHCR staff in 1988 and 1989.


64. Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities.

65. Some of the criticisms voiced against the Manifesto Group included that it overrepresented Mogadishu-based interests, alienating exile groups and rural leaders; that it was dominated by the Hawiye clan; that it represented a resurrection of discredited 1960s politicians; and that it constituted a clique of businessmen who were attempting to snatch the fruits of victory from the poor, predominantly nomadic militiamen. By 1992, some of the militia leaders—especially General Aideed—leveled such venomous attacks against the Manifesto Group that the label "Manifesto" came to be a derogatory and dismissive term in some quarters.

66. This conclusion is also reached by Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, pp. 25-26.

67. Refugee Policy Group, Humanitarian Aid in Somalia: The Role of the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 1990-1994 (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1994), p. 2. These two officials, John Fox (DoS) and Jan Westcott (OFDA), were able to travel for only short visits into Somalia, owing to DoS security restrictions.

68. Quoted in Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, p. 28.


72. See Menkhaus, "International Peacebuilding."

73. Quoted in Westcott, The Somalia Saga, p. 17.


78. Quoted in Refugee Policy Group, Hope Restored?

79. General Aideed was especially hostile to the United Nations as mediator throughout the conflict, in part because the new secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had been Egypt's foreign minister, and Egyptian foreign policy was supportive of Barre.


82. Several efforts toward the building of a diplomatic "toolbox" to deal with the rise of complex emergencies have been made; see, for instance, Michael Lund, Preventing Violent
Notes for Chapter Ten (pages 238-264)

1. This chapter draws on material presented in Early Warning and Conflict Management, Study 2 of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda by Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, with contributions by Bruce Jones (Copenhagen: 1996).

2. By now a commonly observed phenomenon, it is also known as “refugee warriors.” Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 275–78.


10. In Boutros B outros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992), preventive diplomacy includes in its purview efforts to contain conflicts that are under way and to prevent escalation within them.


14. Most of the power of the presidency would be transferred to a Council of Ministers. Habiyarimana— who was to occupy the presidency during the transition period prior to elections— was left with a ceremonial position. During the transition period, seats in the Council of Ministers of a BBTG would be divided between the government and the internal opposition parties as well as the RPF. The ruling party (the MRND) was left with only five out of nineteen portfolios, and most were politically insignificant.

15. The power-sharing formula in the Arusha Accords distributed the portfolios in the transitional Council of Ministers as follows:

- The ruling MRND retained defense and planning but otherwise received marginal ministries, including those for family planning and promotion of women, and “enseignement supérieur et culture.”
• The RPF got the Ministry of Interior, which gave it control over local administration; the Ministry of Youth, which meant power to organize and form the next generation (and thus possibilities for establishing structures competing with MRND’s educational portfolio); and the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, which entailed control over significant resources.

• The principal opposition party, Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR), got three choice portfolios in its batch of four: Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Primary and Secondary Education.

• The Liberal Party (PL), also in opposition, got the Ministries of Justice, Commerce and Labor—all three “heavy” portfolios.

• The opposition Social Democrats (PSD) got the Ministries of Finance, Public Works, and Agriculture.


16. This is based on the figures in the report of the UN Reconnaissance Mission to Rwanda in August 1993. If the higher figures sometimes cited of the Forces armées de Rwanda (FAR) having thirty thousand men and RPF fifteen thousand are more accurate, the difference in demobilization requirements becomes even greater—i.e., about twenty-four thousand on the government side and nine thousand for the RPF.


19. This refers to Museveni’s offer to the United Nations to inspect the border and cooperation with UNOMUR after the 1993 offensive (authors’ interview with Tanzanian diplomatic sources, September 1995).


21. The Arusha Accords called for a neutral international force to “guarantee overall security of the country” (B[1]), which in the UN resolution authorizing UNAMIR (Res. 846/1993) becomes “contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city” (3[a]). The accords have two strong provisions for confiscating illegal arms; the UN resolution has none.


24. UNAMIR was authorized at the time of a Washington review of peacekeeping, which had started out in mid-1993 on the premise that UN peacekeeping was a valuable instrument of U.S. foreign policy but soon took a critical course. Announced in May 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) held that the United States needed to apply stringent criteria of national interest before supporting UN peacekeeping operations, whether or not this involved U.S. troops (National Security Council, _The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations_ [Washington, D.C.: NSC 1994]). The increased activities of UN peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War had dramatically increased the assessed U.S. contributions, from a range of $29–47 million in 1985–89 to a sizable $460.4 million in 1993, the latter figure representing an increase of 370 percent from the previous year. Under a new procedure laid down by PDD-25, the costs of all Chapter VII operations plus those in which U.S. troops were involved would be charged against the Pentagon’s budget, which inclined the latter to oppose such operations. See Jeremy Rosner, _The New Tug-of-War: Con-

25. At the very high end was the UNTAC operation in Cambodia, which had an international staff of twenty-two thousand, including sixteen thousand blue helmets, whose cost was estimated at $60–70 million per month. United Nations Peace-keeping Operations (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995).

26. The Arusha Accords were signed on August 4, 1993. The UN Reconnaissance Mission (DPKO/DPA/DHA) traveled in Rwanda during the last two weeks of August. Upon its return, it prepared its report, had it translated, and submitted it to the Security Council on September 24. Authorization for deployment was received on October 5 (S/Res. 872). General Dallaire arrived in Kigali with an advance party on October 22.

27. No country came up with an armored unit with armored personnel carriers (APCs), as UNAMIR plans approved by the Security Council called for. As a result, the DPKO had to search for leftovers from other UN operations (and did scrounge eight APCs from Mozambique); the rest had to be obtained through civilian contracts. Since the commercial market for APCs was limited and UNAMIR's budget at any rate was not fully approved until April 4, 1994, the force never got its armored unit. The eight APCs assembled from the UN operation in Mozambique rapidly broke down, and UNAMIR had no repair facilities. A similar fate befell the small helicopter unit authorized by the Security Council. No country offered even half a helicopter squadron; a commercial contractor who eventually was found withdrew the equipment in April when violence broke out.

28. The mission had a temporary budget until the end of 1993. The first formal budget proposal was released by the Secretariat (DAM) on January 3, 1994 (A/48/837), translated into sixteen languages, passed to the Fifth Committee subcommittee dealing with budgets (the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions [ACABQ]), which began consideration of the budget and released it on March 17 (A/48/908). On April 2, it was formally approved by the General Assembly (A/48/828 Add. 1). Member states received requests for contributions on April 18, 1994. The process has since been speeded up. Previously the secretary-general could spend no more than $10 million per year without an approved budget from the General Assembly, and then only with approval of the ACABQ. Now, the Secretariat can go straight to the ACABQ for a temporary budget of $50 million once an operation is set up. Formal budgets are prepared for fiscal years rather than mandated periods (annual budgets for stable periods and six-month budgets for less stable periods), which harmonize better with regular national and UN budget processes. See A/49/375 and A/48/945, and William Durch, The Evolution of Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's, 1993).

29. An official who served in the Africa bureau of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the tenure of Ambassador George Martre could not recall any mention of human rights issues in the communications between Paris and Kigali (personal communication, March 1995). Considered a strong supporter of “the presidential tendency,” Martre served from September 1989 until March 1993. He was replaced by Jean-Michel Marlaud, who was more attuned to multipartism, but he did not raise human rights issues because he considered the evidence too flimsy or feared it would play into the hands of the RPF. Reflecting tacit principles of division of labor during the Cold War, the United States had for some time considered Rwanda as part of a French sphere of influence in Africa. To the extent that Rwanda figured at all, U.S. policy was to emphasize democratization and good governance as a means to deal with human rights. Both Ambassador Robert Flaten and his successor David Rawson observed this priority.

Further cuts did not occur because there was a significant shift from development to humanitarian aid.

31. The point was made unself-consciously by a French diplomat in interview with the authors (Paris, September 1995).

32. Agnes Ntamabyaliro. Considered both corrupt and of “Hutu power” persuasion, she appeared in the self-appointed “interim government” after April 6.


35. A high-level informant in Kigali who in early January 1994 gave UNAMIR detailed information about the militia’s plans to massacre Tutsi also claimed that the “principal aim of the interahamwe in the past was to protect Kigali from the RPF.” Cable from General Romeo Dallaire, UNAMIR/Kigali to Baril/DPKO/United Nations/New York, January 11, 1994.

36. Under the 1503 procedure, discussion is conducted by a small Committee of Five and is a means to approach the government in question to deal with the situation before it is brought onto a public agenda. The confidential discussions are seen as one step in a process that—in the most severe cases and as a final step—might lead to a special rapporteur with a country mandate. Only on May 24–25, 1994, did the commission call a special session and appoint a rapporteur to investigate the genocide in Rwanda.


38. Intelligence cables, UNAMIR to Brussels, doc. no. 6–16 (1994), Alexandre Goffin, Rwanda, 7 avril: Dix commandos vont mourir (Brussels: ASBL, 1995); De Morgen (Brussels: November 1995).


41. Canadian diplomat Lucie Edwards, who was accredited as ambassador to Rwanda in January 1994, recalls a meeting with human rights organizations exactly one year before in which the growing human rights violations in Kigali were discussed. “They agreed it was El Salvador–style death squads, supported by the youth wings of the MRND and CDR, tasked with killing the regime’s political opponents and disrupting opposition meetings. They were unanimous that the primary target was Hutu opposition figures, including human rights activists and journalists. No one mentioned systematic attacks on Tutsi. No one predicted genocide” (personal communication, October 27, 1995).

42. Interview, Kigali, August 1995.

43. Subsequent estimates put the figure between thirty-five thousand and fifty thousand. However, the higher figure was widely reported at the time.

44. Interview with authors, New York, April 1995.

45. The way the Secretariat handled the public information aspect of the January 11 cable reveals a belated recognition of its significance. Discussing the matter in March and April 1995 with a team of independent scholars who researched the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, DPKO officials first denied that they had received any information from the Kigali mission suggesting large-scale violence. Subsequently they affirmed the existence of the cable but said the credibility of the informant was in doubt. As for informing the Security Council, the office of the secretary-general told the evaluation team in January 1996 that the Council
had been informed, but when asked to elaborate, said that three members of the Council had been informed through their embassies in Kigali. Belgian press reports carried similar information in January 1966. The official UN history of its operation in Rwanda, released in September 1966, nevertheless claims that the secretary-general's special adviser on January 12 briefed the Security Council on the reports from UNAMIR's Force Commander, although it provides no further details (United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996, p. 32). Researching the issue, the evaluation team found no evidence that the Security Council as such had been briefed, and some strong evidence to the contrary. The ambassador of one European member of the Security Council even consulted his diary and dispatches covering the meetings in January. There was no entry for January 12 or a briefing on the Dallaire cables (authors' interviews, New York, March–April 1995, June 1996, and written communication from the UN Secretariat, January 1996).

46. Décorroix apparently was alarmed when finding that Rwanda was “awash with weapons” while UNAMIR stood by powerless. The Belgian UN commander of the Kigali sector, Luc Marchal, told Reuters news agency that since the Belgian battalion’s arrival three months earlier, it had confiscated only sixteen weapons and just over a hundred hand grenades. Marchal was unequivocal: “It is a problem with the mandate. Stopping and searching people for weapons is forbidden by New York,” he said (Reuters dispatch from Kigali, March 13, 1994).


50. Letter from the secretary-general to the President of the Security Council, April 13, 1994. The letter was not well received by the council, where some members saw it as an attempt by Boutros-Ghali to place the responsibility for UNAMIR withdrawal squarely on the shoulders of Belgium. In a letter to the Security Council the same day, the Belgians had publicly pointed to “the chaos in Rwanda.” The Belgian government concluded that it was “obvious that under these conditions the continuation of the UNAMIR operation has become pointless... and it is imperative to suspend the activities of UNAMIR forces without delay” (S/1994/430). DPKO reinforced this interpretation by telling the Security Council (April 13) that with the Belgians about to leave, the force commander could no longer guarantee the security of the airport or that of even his own men. DPKO did not relay to the council the more differentiated appreciation of the situation made by the force commander in Kigali.

51. Invoking NATO solidarity as well, the Belgian foreign minister phoned his counterparts in Washington, London, and Paris to plead for withdrawal. “Willy Claes panicked a bit,” a Belgian official later commented. Outcries from the public and the press over the brutal murders of the Belgian soldiers had placed enormous pressure on Belgian political leaders to withdraw, similar to that faced by the Americans in Somalia half a year earlier.

52. The United States had been traumatized by the Somalia crisis, which had been imprinted on American TV screens in the picture of a mob dragging the body of an American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu. Although no American soldiers were in UNAMIR, the experience had given peacekeeping a bad name in the United States. Washington apparently considered total withdrawal as soon as the Belgian peacekeepers were killed. When the Belgian decision was known, the U.S. position in the Security Council progressively favored withdrawal. In the informal consultations on April 12, the American am-
bassador expressed serious doubts about the viability of UNAMIR in the circumstances, noting that it could not carry out its original mandate and might even be a destabilizing factor. The next day, he suggested withdrawing, leaving only a skeletal force. On the April 14, the United States claimed the Security Council needed a resolution for orderly evacuation of the force; on the 15th there was no doubt: the U.S. delegation expressed firm opposition to keeping UNAMIR in place. See Adelman and Suhrke, Early Warning and Conflict Management, pp. 90–91.

53. Reports from the informal consultations in the Security Council make no mention of such canvassing. It should be noted, however, that even Nigeria, which circulated a draft resolution to strengthen UNAMIR, did not itself volunteer troops. Although a major military power in Africa and a contributor to other peacekeeping operations, Nigeria claimed it lacked logistics to send reinforcements. However, Nigeria had military observers in UNAMIR and made no move to withdraw them.


55. The Secretariat came back on April 14 with two options. Both were premised on a cease-fire, an assumption that the Security Council found unrealistic. The logic apparently was to threaten withdrawal of the entire force unless the RPF and FAR agreed to a cease-fire. That threat would hardly persuade any of the parties to stop either the wars or the killings.

56. During the first week of the crisis, the secretary-general was traveling at a brisk pace in the former Soviet Union and Europe. Even when returning to New York, Boutros-Ghali did not take a high-profile position on Rwanda until late in April, in particular on April 29, when he urged the Security Council to take “forceful action.”


Notes for Chapter Eleven (pages 265–292)

1. There is no consensus or precision on the number of deaths in 1993–94; a historical reference in Le Monde (October 28, 1997) cites three thousand. The official figure in 1997 was four thousand, but Congolese sources give ten thousand (Le Monde, October 17, 1997). Even the horrors enumerated in René Babu-Zalé, et al., Le Congo de Pascal Lissouba (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996) do not come with numbers. However, the brutality, savagery, and destruction were undeniable.


3. Ethnographic work in the late 1980s noted northern political control and ethnic stereotyping, but no serious conflicts; Kajsa Ekholm Friedman, Den magisksa världsbilden: On statens frigörelse från folket i Folkrepubliken Kongo (Stockholm: Carlssons, 1994).

4. Mokoko’s story is told in Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko, Congo: Le temps du devoir (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995); the December 1992 agreements (but not Bongo’s role) are found on pp. 57–64.

6. Soudan, "Brazza la haine."
8. On sovereign national conferences, see Boulaga, Les conférences nationales; van de Walle, “Economic Reform”; and Zartman Governance as Conflict Management.
10. Jeune Afrique 1725 (January 17, 1994):22. Sassou had had his own Presidential Guard during the single-party era, whose members then became the core of the Cobras.
14. It might be claimed that as early as this point, international preventive diplomacy had been practiced when an international group had advised on electoral procedures (Jeune Afrique 1631 [April 9, 1992]: 24).
15. The preamble of the CNS constitution “proclaims . . . the right and obligation of every citizen to resist, by civil disobedience if necessary,” any attempted coup d’état and tyrannical practices.
17. Babu-Zalé, Le Congo, pp. 154–55. This anti-Lissouba work claims that the cause of the whole conflict was Lissouba’s refusal to accept the new parliamentary majority, but does not acknowledge that the cause of the instability was the PCT’s political maneuvering in search of a return to dominance.
24. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) AFR93–110, 117.
25. FBIS AFR93–117.
27. FBIS AFR93–124.
28. On these, see Mokoko, Congo, pp. 66–68. Mokoko resigned as chief of the general staff on July 18, 1993.
29. FBIS AFR93–135, 136.
30. FBIS AFR93–128.
31. FBIS AFR93–137; see also interview with NGollo, FBIS AFR93–138.
32. FBIS AFR93–137, 138; interviews.
33. FBIS AFR93–141; interviews.
34. Reuters, July 26, 1993, August 4, 1993; FBIS AFR93–143.
35. Interviews.
36. FBIS AFR93–149.

39. Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 27–47. The security dilemma, in ethnic relations as in international relations, indicates that one party’s efforts to make itself more secure only make others less secure and induce them, in turn, to make themselves more secure, and so on. The result is a “kill or be killed” mentality.

40. FBIS AFR93–214.

41. Ethnic cleansing is used here, despite the smaller magnitude than in notable instances in Bosnia, e.g., because it refers to a specific dynamic in which formerly mixed neighborhoods were cleared by violence of all but one ethnic group; see, e.g., discussions in Friedman and Sundberg, Ethnic War and Ethnic Cleansing, and the Agence France-Presse report in FBIS AFR93–240. On the other hand, Babu-Zalé’s use of genocide is exaggerated.

42. FBIS AFR94–001.

43. FBIS AFR94–019.

44. FBIS AFR94–172.

45. FBIS AFR94–027.

46. FBIS AFR94–048 and 109.

47. FBIS AFR94–138.


52. An excellent analysis of Congolese ethnopolitics is found in the chapters by Elisabeth Dorier-Aprill and Patrice Yengo in Identités et démocratie, ed. Patrice Yengo (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997).

53. For an ambiguous explanation of his ambiguous position, see Kolelas and Soudan, “La démocratie n’est pas un champ de bataille,” pp. 22–26.


60. François Soudan, “Pourquoi Kabila s’en mêle-t-il?” Jeune Afrique 1915 (September 17, 1997): 14. Congo received the largest number of Rwandan refugees, and ex-FAR and interahamwe—fifteen thousand out of some forty thousand according to the UNHCR; Francis Kpatindé, “Refugiés,” Jeune Afrique 1919 (October 15, 1997): 19.


67. When Elf refused to give Lissouba an advance on its revenues so that he could pay the civil servants, the president negotiated a new contract with the American firm, Occidental, receiving $150 million in advance payment on the production of several streams at the rich Nkossa field, in what appeared to be an advantageous rate on a field not yet in production; this allowed him to pay back salaries just before the first round of the legislative elections, as noted above. Elf’s contract was later renewed, in December 1993, for ten years; in a complex set of trade-offs, Elf was given five million tons of crude from the Nkossa field, Congo insisted that Loik Le Floch-Prigent be replaced (Philippe Jaffé was appointed director), and Occidental was given a contract on the Nkitina field, not yet in operation (Africa Confidential 35, no. 4 [February 18, 1994]: 5–6). Le Floch-Prigent was later jailed for fraud in mid-1996 (Le Monde, September 21, 1996). On Elf, see Le Monde, June 8, 14; August 26; October 17, 18, 30, 1997; and Assou Massou, “Elf et eux,” Jeune Afrique 1921 (October 29, 1997): 70–72.


72. Interview, June 21, 1996.


74. Hizkias Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987).


category of diplomacy. At the other end of the spectrum, preventive diplomacy is also distinct from general diplomacy, although the line is not a hard and fast one. For the most part in other chapters of this volume, authors seem to consider preventive diplomacy to be statecraft pursued to avert imminent, mass violence, but this definition raises as many questions as it answers: How “imminent” must the violence appear? How widespread must the “mass” conflict threaten to be?


3. As Stephen John Stedman puts it, “Mediation should be timed to coincide with the moment when one or more of the combatants begins to fear the consequences of continuing the war.” Stedman, “Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict,” in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael Brown (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), p. 363. Stedman also stresses (pp. 344, 354) the fact that a perceived security dilemma can render the situation “unripe” for settlement, and that both (or all) sides’ “fear of settlement” must be eliminated before progress can occur.

4. Again, one finds the same lesson in the other case studies documented in this book. In Somalia, the various parties to the dispute certainly were not ready to end their conflict when the Americans intervened, and the results were obvious. Ukraine, on the other hand, had seen enough reminders of the costs of a confrontational policy toward Moscow that, by the early 1990s, it was ready for a deal involving its inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal.

5. This section draws on material in Michael J. Mazarr, “Going Just a Little Nuclear: Non-proliferation Lessons from North Korea,” International Security 20, no. 2 (Fall 1995).


8. See Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995), chap. 2.

9. This event is reported in numerous sources. See, e.g., Joseph Bermudez, “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1991, p. 409.

10. For details on this period see Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, chap. 3.

11. This four-part strategy is laid out in Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, chap. 4.

12. See Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, chap. 5.


18. As Stedman puts it based on the experience of another case, “Bosnia also proves a well-known dictum about mediation— that the interests of the mediators place limits on possible solutions and effective strategies.” Stedman, “Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict,” p. 362.

19. This mirrors the argument of George and Holl for a “warning-response framework” to guide actions once early warning occurs.


21. The specific elements of the package emerged in U.S. diplomacy, as recorded in the open press, from 1990 through 1992; information on its origins is drawn from interviews with former senior U.S. officials conducted by the author between 1992 and 1995. One interesting aspect of the strategy has to do with the global tactical nuclear initiative eventually announced in September 1991 that paved the way for the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Korea. Originally scheduled for August 1990, to be announced during President Bush’s Aspen Institute speech of August 2, the initiative was hastily postponed when Iraq invaded Kuwait that same day. U.S. officials did not want to offer Saddam Hussein any reassurance about immunity from nuclear retaliation. The Gulf War thus delayed one important element— in fact, the indispensable element— of the Korean package for over a year.

22. This approach reflects many of the attributes of the “fair but firm strategy” proposed by Jentleson in “Preventive Diplomacy and Ethnic Conflict,” pp. 15–16.


26. These paragraphs are based on interviews with several dozen current and former U.S. government officials conducted by the author in 1993 and 1994.

27. Of course, individuals can believe that the initial strategy was good but that the Clinton administration’s ultimate resolution of it represented weakness and obtained a bad deal. Yet to my knowledge, only one or two of the officials involved in formulating the initial Bush strategy hold this view; only those who thought they could have done better generally agree that the framework represents a reasonable accord.


33. Schroeder, "Rediscovering the New World Order."
35. Such an offer, e.g., comprised the heart of the Torricelli Bill on U.S.-Cuban relations, whose clever use of nongovernmental contacts to break down the Cuban government's authority has now been undermined by the absurd Helms-Burton legislation that bans such contacts in the name of bringing Fidel Castro down— and in the process, very probably props him up.

Notes for Chapter Thirteen (pages 319-348)

1. Other studies of Somalia concur on there being missed opportunities even though they may differ on the specifics of what they were. See, e.g., Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1994): "If the international community had intervened earlier and more effectively on Somalia, much of the catastrophe that has unfolded could have been avoided" (pp. xvii, 5–6).
2. See, e.g., the study convened by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and the United States Army, involving an international panel of senior military leaders, which, while stressing the requisites such a force would have had to meet, generally concurred; Scott R. Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998). See also reports on General Dallaire's testimony to the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, such as Stephen Buckley, "Mass Slaughter Was Avoidable, General Says," Washington Post, February 26, 1998, pp. A17, A22.
10. She also cites David Remnick that Yeltsin took away lessons that Clinton could acquiesce on specific issues of contention in the name of the overall relationship, raising questions as to whether this further reverberated into issues such as Iran and Iraq (n. 86). See also Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).


17. John Pomfret, “Aid Dilemma: Keeping It from the Oppressors,” Washington Post, September 23, 1997, pp. A1, A12–A13. “Just the other day,” AID director J. Brian Atwood mused fewer than two months after the Rwandan genocide, “we made a decision to contribute $35 million additional to handle this disaster [Rwanda]. One wonders if we had had $35 million in the previous two years we could have done something to avoid the killing.” Cited in Rupesinghe, “Toward a Policy Framework,” p. 8. See also Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), pp. 20–21.


20. For further discussion of this point see Vamik Volkan, Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1997).


23. E.g., Timothy Sisk concludes that power sharing is more likely to work if done early in the conflict cycle than if done late; Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

24. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,


39. Smock, Creative Approaches to Managing Conflict in Africa, pp. 1–4. This also was stressed at a late 1997 meeting/workshop of European and American mid-level officials from “preventive diplomacy shops” within their ministries, organized by the Carnegie Commission and the State Department Bureau of International Organizations.


43. For a similar argument, see Jentleson, With Friends Like These, especially chap. 5.

44. Stedman, "Spoilers."

45. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation.

46. Smock, Creative Approaches, p. 4.


52. Nor is there anything definitive in the literature on this; see Carment, "Effectiveness of Third Party Mediation," p. 12.


58. Stephen John Stedman, "Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling 'Preventive Diplomacy,' " Foreign Affairs 74 (May/June 1995). His other criticisms notwithstanding, Stedman leaves open the possibility that "if they [aggressors] had faced an early international willingness to use military force, then their calculations might have been different" (p. 18).

59. Schelling, Arms and Influence.


75. Annan, “Intervention.”


81. Kull and Destler, Misreading the Public, pp. 113–33.
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About the Contributors

Alexander L. George is Graham H. Stuart professor emeritus of international relations at Stanford University. A leading academic specialist on deterrence, crisis prevention and management, and coercive diplomacy, Dr. George came to Stanford in 1968 after twenty years at the RAND Corporation, where he had been head of the social science department. The most recent of his many scholarly publications are Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (1994) and Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy (1993). Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, which he coauthored with Richard Smoke, won the Bancroft Prize in 1975. In 1983 he was the recipient of a MacArthur Foundation Five-Year Prize Award. In 1998 he received the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science awarded by Uppsala University, Sweden.

James E. Goodby is distinguished service professor, Carnegie Mellon University, senior research fellow, MIT, and guest scholar, the Brookings Institution. He held the Payne lectureship at Stanford University during 1996–97 and is the author of Europe Undivided, published in 1998 by the U.S. Institute of Peace, in cooperation with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford. During his forty-year diplomatic career he was the special representative of President Clinton for the security and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, 1995–96; chief negotiator for cooperative threat reduction agreements, 1993–94; head of the U.S. delegation, Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in Europe, 1983–85; vice chair, U.S. delegation to START I, 1982–83; ambassador to Finland, 1980–81; and deputy assistant secretary in the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs and Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 1974–80. He also served with the U.S. Missions to the European Community and to the North Atlantic Council and was a member of the State Department's policy planning staff. He is the winner of the first Heinz Award in Public Policy, the Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit of Germany, and the Presidential Distinguished Service Award.
Jane E. Holl is currently the executive director of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Prior to joining Carnegie, Ms. Holl was the director for European affairs on the National Security Council staff at the White House. A career army officer, she served as a policy action officer on the CENTCOM staff in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm; an associate professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point; a commander of the U.S. Army Information Systems Command at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia; and brigade signal officer with Berlin Brigade. She retired from the army in 1994 and holds a Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University.

Heather F. Hurlburt is a speech writer and member of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State. She served on the U.S. delegation to the OSCE from 1990 to 1994, assisting in developing the organization’s institutions and its response to post–Cold War conflicts in Europe. She has also been a program director at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a staff member of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. She has published articles, book chapters, and reports on the development of the OSCE and conflict prevention and human rights in Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Bruce W. Jentleson is professor of political science at the University of California, Davis, director of the UC Davis Washington Center, and Washington research director of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC). His publications include the four-volume Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations (co-senior editor); With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush and Saddam, 1982–1990; and the forthcoming New Era, New Century: The Dynamics of Choice in Post–Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy. In 1993–94 he served in the Clinton administration as special assistant to the director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff. In 1999 he was on a research fellowship as a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He also has had fellowships from the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies. He holds a Ph.D. from Cornell University and a master’s from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Bruce Jones recently joined the Policy Development Unit of the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). During 1997–98, he was Hamburg Fellow for Preventing Deadly Conflict at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). Previously, he was an associate of the Conflict Analysis and Development Unit of the London School of Economics. He has been active in the conflict resolution and development community in the United Kingdom and Canada as an adviser on conflict resolution to the Department for International Development and a number of NGOs. He has published several articles, book chapters, and reports on the Great Lakes region of Africa and complex emergencies, including as coauthor of Study II of the
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance in Rwanda. His most recent publication (with Sue Lautze and Mark Duffield) is Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes Region: An Independent Study for the IASC, published by OCHA (1997). A coauthored study on the role of NGOs in complex emergencies was published by CARE in 1998.

Gail W. Lapidus is senior fellow at the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, and directs a project on ethnic conflict and regional security at its Center for International Security and Cooperation. A professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley from 1976 to 1994, she is the author of numerous books and articles on Soviet and post-Soviet politics and foreign policy.

Michael S. Lund is senior associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Creative Associates Inc., both in Washington, D.C. Since 1995, he has conducted research, written, and lectured about several cases and aspects of conflict prevention, and he has provided consultation on the subject for organizations such as USAID, the U.S. State Department, the OECD, and the European Union. Previously, Lund was senior scholar in charge of the Preventive Diplomacy Initiative at the U.S. Institute of Peace (1994–95), and he organized and was the first director of the institute’s Jennings Randolph Fellows Program (1987–93). He is the author of Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996). Lund received his Ph.D. in political science at the University of Chicago and has taught at Cornell, UCLA, and the University of Maryland.

John J. (Jack) Maresca is vice president for international relations of Unocal Corporation, one of the world’s largest independent energy resource development companies. Prior to taking up this position, Maresca led a number of nonprofit organizations focused on conflict resolution and research activities and was guest scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. During his diplomatic career, Ambassador Maresca served as the U.S. representative to the CSCE, as a special mediator for conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus, and as the negotiator for military Confidence and Security Building Measures. He negotiated the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 as well as the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the joint Declaration of Twenty-two States, the two documents that formally ended the Cold War and converted the CSCE to a post-Cold War role.

Michael J. Mazarr is senior director of policy and planning at the Electronic Industries Alliance in Arlington, Va. From 1995 until early 1999, he was editor of the Washington Quarterly, director of the New Millennium Project, and dean of the young professional program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. He holds A.B. and M.A. degrees from Georgetown University, in government and national security studies, and a
Ph.D. in public policy from the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs. He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, where he has taught graduate courses on conventional forces and political analysis. From 1993 to 1995, he was legislative assistant for foreign affairs and chief writer in the office of Representative Dave McCurdy (D-Okla.).


Louis Ortmayer is professor of political science at Davidson College. He specializes in American foreign policy, international political economy, and European politics with an emphasis on case teaching and writing. He was a fellow (1990) and faculty member (1993, 1994) for the Pew Faculty Fellowship in International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is the coauthor with Kenneth Menkhaus of “Key Decisions in the Somalia Intervention,” Case 464 of the Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1995. He has also written case studies on the U.S. intervention in Haiti, sanctions and South Africa, and the FSX Fighter Decision.

Astri Suhrke is senior fellow at the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen, Norway, and a resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She was professor of international relations at the American University from 1984 to 1991. She is a coauthor of the study by the Steering Committee on the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Dr. Suhrke holds a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Denver.

Katharina R. Vogeli is a graduate of the Africa program (with regional concentration on East, Central and the Horn of Africa) at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. Immediately after earning her M.A., she worked with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights field operation in Rwanda. She was a consultant in Central and East African politics, participating in the International Foundation for Electoral Systems’s pre-election assessment mission in Zaire, and was principal author of that organization’s 1996 report to USAID. In 1997, she managed
Search for Common Ground’s Burundi field office and its conflict management efforts through radio programming (Studio Ijambo), and a women’s peace center. She has worked on humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., and developed health projects in Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific with MAP International in Nairobi and Christian Services International in Stuttgart.

Susan L. Woodward is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, London. She has been a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program of the Brookings Institution; associate professor in Yale University’s Department of Political Science; assistant professor in the political science departments of Williams College, Mount Holyoke College, and Northwestern University; and a national fellow at the Hoover Institution. She has held fellowships in several programs at Harvard and Princeton Universities. During much of 1994, Woodward served as head of the Analysis and Assessment Unit in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to former Yugoslavia, in the headquarters of the United Nations Protection Force in Zagreb, Croatia.

I. William Zartman is the Jacob Blaustein professor of international organizations and conflict resolution and director of African studies and conflict management programs at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. His books on negotiation include Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Brookings Institution, 1995); Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Oxford University Press, 1989); Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars (Syracuse University Press, 1995); Positive Sum: Improving North-South Negotiations (Transaction, 1987); International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management of Complexity (Jossey-Bass, 1994); The Practical Negotiator (Yale University Press, 1982); and The 50% Solution (Yale University Press, 1987), among others. He is a member of the steering committee of the Process of Negotiation (PIN) Project at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and convenor of the Washington Interest in Negotiation (WIN) Group. He was visiting professor at American University of Cairo, Olin professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, Halevy professor at the Institute for Political Studies in Paris, and visiting distinguished fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Dr. Zartman received his Ph.D. in international relations from Yale, a diploma from the University of Copenhagen, and his M.A. from Johns Hopkins University.