

# Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives

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## A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Carnegie Corporation of New York

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Carnegie Corporation of New York established the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in May 1994 to address the looming threats to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. The Commission is examining the principal causes of deadly ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster or deter their outbreak. Taking a long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts that are likely to emerge, it is seeking to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented. The Commission is also looking at the strengths and weaknesses of various international entities in conflict prevention and considering ways in which international organizations might contribute toward developing an effective international system of nonviolent problem solving.

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### Foreword

In a world full of ethnocentrism, prejudice, and violent conflict, there is a vital need for core democratic values to resolve ethnic and religious conflicts and to prevent their escalation to violence. The absence of democratic mechanisms to sort out conflicts within a country often makes it easy for conflicts to spill over into violence. Although the history of each region has left a distinctive legacy of cultures, languages, and religions, fundamental democratic principles--applied in ways that fit indigenous circumstances--can be useful to all. In this highly informative essay, Larry Diamond makes a cogent case for the fostering of democracy, addressing the major problems in a constructive and thoughtful manner. The essay clearly shows the need for sustained efforts toward building democratic processes and institutions throughout the world.

The principles of democracy--such as the equality of human beings--cannot deny the immense variability of human experience and human attributes. But these principles address political equality in practical ways through equal access to elections in some kind of one-person, one-vote formula; equality before the law with authentic access in practice to judicial and other remedies, especially those that can redress grievances and resolve conflicts without violence; and equality of opportunity. Additional elements include equal access to the mass media as well as freedom to organize and express views without hindrance.

Any democracy needs a systematic, fair process for implementing consent of the governed. The development of election systems constitutes one crucial piece of this puzzle. Another component is the development of strong civic organizations in societies that have been harshly limited by authoritarian regimes. Civil society builds democracy, first, by allowing the evolution of democratic values through nonviolent conflict. Groups compete with each other and with the state for the power to carry out specific agendas. Civil society increases the effectiveness of coalitions of individuals for innovative activities, and, within the context of institutionalized competition, tolerance and acceptance of opposition can develop.

Ultimately, pluralism is at the heart of democracy. Pluralism fosters the dynamic interplay of ideas, enterprises, parties, and a great variety of nongovernmental groups on the basis of reasonably clear, agreed-upon rules that reflect an attitude of tolerance, mutual respect, and sensitivity to fundamental human rights.

All of this takes time, to be measured in decades and perhaps even in generations, like the development of democracy itself. Much work is required at the grassroots level, preferably in collaboration with elites and with similar entities in other countries that have more democratic experience. As this work progresses, the public of previously nondemocratic regimes comes to understand what is involved in democracy, what the rights, responsibilities, and opportunities of citizens are, how they can learn about the vital subjects and formulate constructive approaches, and how they can express their views.

The international democratic community can help to create an atmosphere in which ideals are meaningful and worth striving for even though they are hard to attain, where there is faith in successive approximations over time toward a better way of life. Such efforts call for communication from established democracies about crucial aspects of the democratic experience: the taking into account of different political arguments and the views of different sectors of society, so that choices are fair to all; awareness of mechanisms for nonviolent conflict resolution; a commitment to the inherent legitimacy of the society, with leadership that reflects its people and their continuing input; attitudes and mechanisms that protect basic human rights; enough of a personal stake for individuals in the future of the nation that they are willing to make sacrifices in the nation-building process; and, perhaps most important of all, tolerance for diversity, including religious and ethnic differences.

From an early stage in democracy building, a wide understanding of the possibilities for nonviolent conflict resolution and the practical value of mutual accommodation among different sectors and peoples within a state is important. At every step, from articulation of fundamental principles to implementation of operational details, there is a need to educate for democracy. Indeed, modern telecommunications may make it feasible to have a worldwide democratic network under highly respected auspices--perhaps a mix of governmental and nongovernmental supporters. Through such a network, in a short time it might be possible to enhance the level of understanding throughout the world of what is involved in democracy and its potential benefits for all, especially its capacity for nonviolent conflict resolution. People need to see that cooperation can often lead to greater benefits in the long run and to recognize superordinate goals of compelling value to all concerned that can be achieved only by cooperation.

Regrettably, the high ideals that characterize democracy are not readily translated into practice. Indeed, democracy is an evolving, changing, adapting, updating process--always less than ideal, yet always shaped by high aspirations, with norms of decency becoming stronger as the years go by. Nevertheless, new democracies can learn a great deal from the experience of old democracies and need not require centuries to make a reasonable first approximation of democratic ideals in practice. Even a very crude approximation would be a considerable improvement over the experience of many countries to date.

The building of democratic institutions would be one of the greatest conflict prevention measures that could be taken, especially if one thinks in terms of both political and economic democratic structures. The international community of established democracies must address the translation of this aspiration into the reality of emerging democracies. So fortunate a community, with so much relevant experience in coping with the problems of modern societies, is morally obligated to smooth the path to democratization around the world in a systematic, deliberate, long-term, high-priority way.

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict is concerned with building preventive capacities, so that people can live together peacefully over the long term. The building of democratic institutions is certainly one crucial, albeit complicated and frustratingly slow, component of this challenge. Historically, there is little precedent for well-organized international efforts to help substantially with this process of democratization--yet there is enough experience to know that it is not impossible.

If democracy is viewed as an optional preoccupation of self-righteous democratizers--or even as an intrusive activity of sugar-coated neo-imperialists--then all this is much ado about nothing (or worse). But if we view democracy as a powerful and constructive mechanism for resolving the ubiquitous ongoing conflicts of our highly contentious human species, then the challenge becomes vital, and the opportunity precious. That is why this essay is so important.

David A. Hamburg  
Co-chair

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## Preface

This essay was originally written for the 1994 Nobel Symposium on "Democracy's Victory and Crisis," organized by Professor Axel Hadenius and held in July of that year at Uppsala University, Sweden. It will be published in shorter form by Cambridge University Press in a volume under the conference title edited by Axel Hadenius, and I am grateful to him and to the publisher for permission to reproduce it in more extended form here.

This research project emanates from the intersection of two long-standing activities, one scholarly and the other oriented toward policy and action. It is informed in part by many years of study of comparative democratic development, particularly in Africa and other regions of what was once termed the "third world." It is also motivated and informed by more than a decade of

association with the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and with a number of other actors on both sides of the democratic assistance relationship: agencies and organizations offering political assistance for democracy, and recipients of that assistance (sometimes struggling against tremendous odds) in the civil societies of authoritarian and newly democratic countries.

Given my roles as co-director of the NED's new International Forum for Democratic Studies and co-editor of its *Journal of Democracy*, my objectivity in analyzing the work of the NED will have to be left for the reader to judge. I would only offer here this additional reflection: During the latter part of the 1980s, it was my growing admiration for the democratic development work being done by NED--and by similar organizations like the Asia Foundation and the German party foundations--and my deepening intellectual belief that democracy must be actively developed if it is to be secure, that led me gradually to a professional involvement with NED. I am indebted to the other officers and program staff of NED and its four affiliate institutes, who have shared generously of their time and insights over the years, to NED director of programs Barbara Haig, and especially to two people, NED president Carl Gershman and my coeditor of the *Journal of Democracy* and co-director of the International Forum, Marc F. Plattner.

Many more people have substantially assisted my research and understanding of this subject than can be mentioned here. I am grateful for the cooperation, comments, and assistance of a number of officials at the U.S. Agency for International Development, including Larry Garber, Jennifer Windsor, and Gary Hansen, as well as Joel Barkan and Harry Blair, two fine scholars who have worked extensively on AID democratic assistance programs in Africa and Asia, respectively. I have also benefited greatly from the cooperation and assistance over many years of Robert LaGamma, Director of the Office of African Affairs of the U.S. Information Agency, and of several officers of the Asia Foundation, particularly its president, William P. Fuller, and vice-president, Gordon Hein. I would like to thank as well the numerous international colleagues who offered generous insights and supporting documentation, including Diana Warwick, Chief Executive Officer of the Westminster Foundation; David Blackman, head of the division for Central and Eastern Europe of the Directorate General for Research of the European Parliament; Arturo Rodriguez, project manager for the European Union's Phare Democracy Programme; and Ambassador Bengt S've-S-derbergh, the founding secretary-general of the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Finally, I am indebted to Svetlana Tsalik for her enterprising and skillful research assistance on the revised draft of this paper, to several other U.S. government officials who prefer to remain unnamed, and to the Hoover Institution and its director, John Raisian, for their ongoing support of my work.

While these and many other individuals were exceedingly helpful, only some of them have seen even a portion of the manuscript, and obviously none bears any responsibility for my opinions and conclusions, or for any errors of fact or interpretation that may remain. Indeed, I expect that some may disagree sharply with some of the arguments and recommendations that follow, and probably none will endorse them all. I am grateful most of all to Carnegie Corporation and its Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict for providing me with the opportunity to publish this analysis in its full form, and, most of all, for his encouragement and support, to the president of Carnegie Corporation, Dr. David Hamburg, who has been for many years an inspiration to democrats in a great many countries and professions.

## 1. WHY PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?

- [Potential Threats to Global Order and National Security](#)
  - [Lessons of the Twentieth Century](#)
  - [The Need for Global Strategy and Vision](#)
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Five years after the collapse of global Communism, two decades since the start of the most sweeping wave of democratic transitions in world history, the new global "order" seems a bundle of contradictions. The Cold War is over, but many argue that a new one--even a "clash of civilizations"--has commenced between militant Islam and the democratic West. The threat of "mutually assured destruction" in nuclear war has ebbed. But rogue states, maniacal tyrants, criminal networks, and apocalyptic cults are all racing to get weapons of mass destruction, and some have already shown their willingness to use them in war or terrorism. In the formal sense of civilian, constitutional, multiparty regimes, there are more democracies in the world than ever before. Yet roughly half of those that have emerged since 1974 are not fully "free," and in a growing number, democracy is eroding and threatening to collapse under the weight of ethnic and religious conflict, secessionist violence, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, economic disarray, and state decay.

Perhaps the sharpest contradiction is that which grips the democratic West, and particularly the United States. Now, when the world is more fluid and volatile politically than at any time since World War II, when an old order has broken down and a new one has yet to be built--when global leadership and vision are most needed--U.S. foreign policy drifts from crisis to crisis, bereft of the clear doctrine and bipartisan consensus that underpinned the nation's global leadership in previous eras. Now, when new threats are rising and chaos looms on many fronts, the U.S. government is mired in debt, its foreign operations are being cut back sharply, and doubt grows both at home and abroad that the United States has "any purpose in the world beyond promoting its own interests."<sup>1</sup> Public support for "protecting and defending human rights in other countries" is down 24 percent since 1990. Already-modest support for "helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations" has fallen to its lowest level in twenty years. In principle, Americans continue to support international engagement as much as ever, but they increasingly fail to see a larger purpose beyond protecting narrow security and economic interests.<sup>2</sup>

With the value of the dollar diminishing and their economic future in doubt, it is not surprising that Americans are less inclined to support a foreign policy based on generous aims and grand ideals. Too often missing from the public debate, however, is an appreciation for how "hard" security and economic interests are inextricably, if often subtly, linked to the pursuit of liberal internationalist ideals. Throughout this century, and in some respects since its founding, American democracy has seen the promotion of democracy and freedom in other countries as part of its unique identity and purpose, but also as crucial to its national security and ultimately to the protection of its own liberty.<sup>3</sup> Now more than ever, as borders become more porous and people, technologies, ideas, and weapons cascade across them, the safety and well-being of

Americans--and Europeans, and Japanese, and Australians--is bound up with the nature of political order in less established polities.

In this period of drift and doubt, it is important for Americans, and their allies among the industrialized democracies, to ask hard questions. What are the threats to our national security and economic well-being in the coming years? What must we do--and spend--globally in the coming years to defend our interests? How do those interests relate to our values as a people and society?

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## **POTENTIAL THREATS TO GLOBAL ORDER AND NATIONAL SECURITY**

On any list of the most important potential threats to world order and national security in the coming decade, these six should figure prominently: a hostile, expansionist Russia; a hostile, expansionist China; the spread of fundamentalist Islamic, anti-Western regimes; the spread of political terrorism from all sources; sharply increased immigration pressures; and ethnic conflict that escalates into large-scale violence, civil war, refugee flows, state collapse, and general anarchy. Some of these potential threats interact in significant ways with one another, but they all share a common underlying connection. In each instance, the development of democracy is an important prophylactic, and in some cases the only long-term protection, against disaster.

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### **A HOSTILE, EXPANSIONIST RUSSIA**

Chief among the threats to the security of Europe, the United States, and Japan would be the reversion of Russia--with its still very substantial nuclear, scientific, and military prowess--to a hostile posture toward the West. Today, the Russian state (insofar as it continues to exist) appears perched on the precipice of capture by ultranationalist, anti-Semitic, neo-imperialist forces seeking a new era of pogroms, conquest, and "greatness." These forces feed on the weakness of democratic institutions, the divisions among democratic forces, and the generally dismal economic and political state of the country under civilian, constitutional rule. Numerous observers speak of "Weimar Russia." As in Germany in the 1920s, the only alternative to a triumph of fascism (or some related "ism" deeply hostile to freedom and to the West) is the development of an effective democratic order. Now, as then, this project must struggle against great historical and political odds, and it seems feasible only with international economic aid and support for democratic forces and institutions.

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### **A HOSTILE, EXPANSIONIST CHINA**

In China, the threat to the West emanates from success rather than failure and is less amenable to explicit international assistance and inducement. Still, a China moving *toward* democracy--gradually constructing a real constitutional order, with established ground rules for political

competition and succession and civilian control over the military--seems a much better prospect to be a responsible player on the regional and international stage. Unfair trade practices, naval power projection, territorial expansion, subversion of neighboring regimes, and bullying of democratic forces in Hong Kong and Taiwan are all more likely the more China resists political liberalization. So is a political succession crisis that could disrupt incremental patterns of reform and induce competing power players to take risks internationally to advance their power positions at home. A China that is building an effective rule of law seems a much better prospect to respect international trading rules that mandate protection for intellectual property and forbid the use of prison labor. And on these matters of legal, electoral, and institutional development, international actors can help.

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## **THE SPREAD OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM**

Increasingly, Europeans and Americans worry about the threat from fundamentalist Islam. But fundamentalist movements do not mobilize righteous anger and absolute commitment in a vacuum. They feed on the utter failure of decadent political systems to meet the most elementary expectations for material progress and social justice. Some say the West must choose between corrupt, repressive regimes that are at least secular and pro-Western and Islamic fundamentalist regimes that will be no less repressive, but anti-Western. That is a false choice in Egypt today, as it was in Iran or Algeria--at least until their societies became so polarized as to virtually obliterate the liberal center. It is precisely the corruption, arrogance, oppression, and gross inefficacy of ruling regimes like the current one in Egypt that stimulate the Islamic fundamentalist alternative. Though force may be needed--and legitimate--to meet an armed challenge, history teaches that decadent regimes cannot hang on forever through force alone. In the long run, the only reliable bulwark against revolution or anarchy is good governance--and that requires far-reaching political reform. In Egypt and some other Arab countries, such reform would entail a gradual program of political liberalization that counters corruption, reduces state interference in the economy, responds to social needs, and gives space for moderate forces in civil society to build public support and understanding for further liberalizing reforms. In Pakistan and Turkey, it would mean making democracy work: stamping out corruption, reforming the economy, mobilizing state resources efficiently to address social needs, devolving power, guaranteeing the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, and--not least-- reasserting civilian control over the military. In either case, the fundamentalist challenge can be met only by moving (at varying speeds) toward, not away from, democracy.

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## **POLITICAL TERRORISM**

Terrorism and immigration pressures also commonly have their origins in political exclusion, social injustice, and bad, abusive, or tyrannical governance. Overwhelmingly, the sponsors of international terrorism are among the world's most authoritarian regimes: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan. And locally within countries, the agents of terrorism tend to be either the fanatics of antidemocratic, ideological movements or aggrieved ethnic and regional minorities who have felt

themselves socially marginalized and politically excluded and insecure: Sri Lanka's Tamils, Turkey's Kurds, India's Sikhs and Kashmiris. To be sure, democracies must vigorously mobilize their legitimate instruments of law enforcement to counter this growing threat to their security. But a more fundamental and enduring assault on international terrorism requires political change to bring down zealous, paranoiac dictatorships and to allow aggrieved groups in all countries to pursue their interests through open, peaceful, and constitutional means.

As for immigration, it is true that people everywhere are drawn to prosperous, open, dynamic societies like those of the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. But the sources of large (and rapid) immigration flows to the West increasingly tend to be countries in the grip of civil war, political turmoil, economic disarray, and poor governance: Vietnam, Cuba, Haiti, Central America, Algeria. And in Mexico, authoritarianism, corruption, and social injustice have held back human development in ways that have spawned the largest sustained flow of immigrants to any Western country--a flow that threatens to become a floodtide if the Zedillo government cannot rebuild Mexico's economy and societal consensus around authentic democratic reform. In other cases--Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Afghanistan--immigration to the West has been modest only because of the greater logistical and political difficulties. However, in impoverished areas of Africa and Asia more remote from the West, disarray is felt in the flows of refugees across borders, hardly a benign development for world order. Of course, population growth also heavily drives these pressures. But a common factor underlying all of these crisis-ridden emigration points is the absence of democracy. And, strikingly, populations grow faster in authoritarian than democratic regimes.<sup>4</sup>

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## **ETHNIC CONFLICT**

Apologists for authoritarian rule--as in Kenya and Indonesia--are wont to argue that multiparty electoral competition breeds ethnic rivalry and polarization, while strong central control keeps the lid on conflict. But when multiple ethnic and national identities are forcibly suppressed, the lid may violently pop when the regime falls apart. The fate of Yugoslavia, or of Rwanda, dramatically refutes the canard that authoritarian rule is a better means for containing ethnic conflict. Indeed, so does the recent experience of Kenya, where ethnic hatred, land grabs, and violence have been deliberately fostered by the regime of President Daniel arap Moi in a desperate bid to divide the people and thereby cling to power.

Overwhelmingly, theory and evidence show that the path to peaceful management of ethnic pluralism lies not through suppressing ethnic identities and superimposing the hegemony of one group over others. Eventually, such a formula is bound to crumble or be challenged violently. Rather, sustained interethnic moderation and peace follow from the frank recognition of plural identities, legal protection for group and individual rights, devolution of power to various localities and regions, and political institutions that encourage bargaining and accommodation at the center. Such institutional provisions and protections are not only significantly more likely under democracy, they are *only* possible with some considerable degree of democracy.<sup>5</sup>

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## **OTHER THREATS**

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

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## **LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY**

The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

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## **THE NEED FOR GLOBAL STRATEGY AND VISION**

So what is to be done? As this essay makes clear, much already is being done. In fact, there is under way an extraordinarily diverse and constantly developing array of endeavors, both by public and private actors, to promote democracy (and interrelated goals, such as human rights, popular participation, accountability, and the rule of law) around the world. Established democracies and their civil societies can take pride in these efforts--though the last thing they should do is gloat. Developing democracies can draw hope from them. But if we are to make the most of this unprecedented "democratic moment" in world history, more must be done, with more resources, shared learning, better coordination, and in some cases sharper focus and a more refined approach. Those promoting democracy can and will learn from past experience. Gradually, they figure to improve their communication with one another as well. As I observe below, that is an important challenge, but it is not the central one. The overriding imperative

today is one of global strategy and vision, and returns us to the question: What is our purpose in the world, as Americans, and as democrats worldwide?

At a time when every domestic spending program in the United States is coming under searching scrutiny, it is only right that international spending should as well. But it is indefensible that so few voices in public life are explaining why promoting democracy is vital to our national security--not just to serve our values and ideals, but to defend against serious, possibly devastating, threats to our safety and well-being. That the defense democracy provides is preventive, and therefore subtle and at one remove, makes the case harder to establish but also more compelling. For prevention is far, far cheaper and safer than emergency response--whether in medicine or world politics. It is precisely when our resources are as scarce and precious as they are today that we can least afford to overlook the most intelligent and cost-efficient strategies.

As the review below will indicate, democracy promotion programs tend to be unusually cost-efficient in financial terms, because the grants are typically small and because they focus on transferring techniques, building capacities, and generating the institutions and policies for sustained good governance and development, rather than on providing an indefinite stream of resources for consumption. Diplomatic pressure and initiatives may also pull a country off the path to political and humanitarian disaster, at costs in political and financial capital that are much more bearable than those associated with peacekeeping and disaster relief.

Democracy promotion is cost-efficient, but it is not costless. Over many years, this country has evolved a diverse set of institutions to provide the assistance, organize the exchanges, and generate the knowledge underlying the effective promotion of democracy. As I argue below, that goal is best reached when its instruments are freed from excessive entanglement with the competing, more immediate constraints and pressures of conventional foreign policy. That is sometimes frustrating for a maker of foreign policy (executive or legislative). But the more autonomy democracy promotion (and related development) programs have, the more distance from partisan, interest-group, and bureaucratic politics in the donor country, the better able they will be to focus on their overriding purpose--a purpose vital to our long-term security. This is why so many of the proposals to reorganize and streamline our international spending--to merge the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Information Agency into the State Department, to consolidate all democracy promotion spending in a single agency, to eliminate the National Endowment for Democracy, the Asia Foundation, the U.S. Institute for Peace, the North-South Center, the East-West Center--actually undermine our national security, even though they appeal in the abstract when cuts must be made. Pluralism in outlooks, approaches, capacities, and foci has been a key factor in the success of democracy promotion efforts over the past decade and a half. Knowledge--gained and shared across cultures and borders--is indispensable to the effective design, practice, and improvement of democracy. It would be tragically short-sighted to terminate in an instant the hard gains we have made through so many years of engagement and innovation. And as with cutbacks in preventive medicine, it could be many years before we realize the full measure of what we have lost.

## **2. THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF DEMOCRACY**

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Since 1974, a "third wave" of global democratization has dramatically increased the number of democracies.<sup>6</sup> If we choose as our operational standard of democracy the presence of a civilian, constitutional, multiparty regime, with competitive elections, one could count as many as 114 "democracies" in the world at the end of 1994.<sup>7</sup> This is almost twice the number of formal democracies that existed in 1984.<sup>8</sup> If, however, we insist on looking beyond constitutional form and even electoral conduct, and consider as well real levels of political freedom and civil liberties, a different picture emerges. In its annual survey of freedom in the world for 1994, Freedom House counted 76 countries as "free."<sup>9</sup> This is a substantial increase from 42 in 1972 and 53 in 1985. According to Freedom House's criteria, however, a third of the formal democracies in the world (38) do not rate as "free" because the power of democratically elected leaders is seriously constrained by unaccountable groups, particularly the military (as in Pakistan, Turkey, and Guatemala); because political and ethnic violence limit individual freedom and undermine the integrity of political competition (as in India, Colombia, and El Salvador); or because the actual performance and accountability of formal democratic institutions pushes the quality of political competition, representation, organization, and/or expression below a critical threshold (as in Venezuela, the Philippines, and Zambia). Clearly, there is a large gap between democratic form and reality in the world, and this has serious implications for the challenge of consolidating democracy. Consolidation--the process by which democracy becomes so stable, so deeply institutionalized, and so broadly legitimate among all major political forces that it is highly unlikely to break down for any internal reason--must be the ultimate goal of international efforts to promote democracy.

I use the term "democracy" as roughly equivalent to Dahl's "polyarchy," or "liberal democracy." This encompasses not only a civilian, constitutional, multiparty regime, with regular, free, and fair elections and universal suffrage, but organizational and informational pluralism; extensive civil liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations); effective power for elected officials; and functional autonomy for legislative, executive, and judicial organs of government.<sup>10</sup>

Important normative and political issues are at stake in the way we define democracy. If we rest content to promote the mere constitutional form of democracy, pressure for democratization will cease once the structural form is put in place, and assistance may go mainly to strengthen formal institutions and assist economic reform and development. Those are necessary objectives for democratization, but they are not sufficient. In a great many "near-democracies" and partial, "poor," "low-quality," or struggling democracies, democratic capacities must also be strengthened outside the formal system, in civil society, and the international community must continue to pay attention to problems of military domination and impunity and of ongoing political violence and human rights violations. Such an analytical and strategic approach implies a different and more comprehensive mix of democracy promotion programs. It also directs attention to countries whose political systems might, with a more superficial conception of democracy, be considered too "advanced" or established to warrant international attention and assistance.

This essay proceeds in three principal sections. First, it surveys the wide range of national and multinational actors now engaged in democracy assistance and identifies some of their distinctive advantages and limitations. (This survey makes no pretense of comprehensiveness, as

there are now so many actors, private and public, bilateral and multilateral, that any kind of thorough coverage would require a team of researchers to assemble a very large book.) Second, it considers the principal policy instruments for democracy promotion, including diplomacy and aid conditionality, and analyzes some of the problems and opportunities that arise with their usage. In conclusion, I consider several issues and imperatives--communication, coordination, consistency, and coherence among actors--that will help to determine the effectiveness of democracy promotion efforts.

### 3. ACTORS

- [States and State Agencies<sup>11</sup>](#)
  - [Nongovernmental Organizations](#)
  - [Pluralism or Fragmentation, Public or Private?](#)
  - [International and Regional Organizations](#)
  - [A Universal Right to Democratic Governance?](#)
- 

Governments of the leading industrialized democracies remain the most important and resourceful promoters of democracy, but they increasingly share the arena with a wide variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Official democracy assistance comes from countries with long histories and lingering ties of colonialism (especially Britain and France) and of foreign intervention and occupation in the name of democracy (especially the United States), as well as from countries wishing to develop or deepen trading partnerships by promoting democracy among their neighbors (Japan). However, a number of smaller democratic countries have given the promotion of democracy and human rights a more and more prominent place in their foreign policy and foreign aid--Canada, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands. The Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), for example, has a carefully conceptualized program of support for democracy and human rights. Moreover, the first country to establish explicit institutions for democratic assistance, and still one of the largest donors for this purpose relative to its GNP, is a postwar democracy with a traumatic authoritarian history, Germany.

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#### STATES AND STATE AGENCIES<sup>11</sup>

Established democratic states are engaged in democracy promotion through diplomatic pressure and initiatives, through the mobilization and conditioning of multilateral policies and resources, and through their official overseas development or aid agencies. I will leave for later consideration the first two dimensions and consider here state actors in the aid relationship.

Almost certainly the largest official democratic assistance program today in terms of both scope and funding is that of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). By one estimate, AID spent some \$400 million in fiscal year 1994 on democracy assistance programs around the world, but any such estimates involve a good deal of judgment because a multipurpose

organization like AID has many programs that serve multiple goals.<sup>12</sup> U.S. government funding for democratic assistance programs (by AID and other agencies as well) is also quite unstable; while it rose dramatically in the early 1990s, it is now threatened with a steep decline as a result of congressional initiatives that would sharply reduce spending on foreign aid and international operations.

Since its creation in 1961, AID has been engaged in activities that serve democratization indirectly (such as strengthening independent educational and research institutions and enhancing political participation at the local level), but until 1990 its focus was mainly on social and economic development (including health, population, and environment). From modest beginnings with human rights projects in the late 1970s, AID programs expanded during the 1980s to assist the administration of justice, the conduct of democratic elections, and dialogue between civilians and the military (mainly in Latin America).<sup>13</sup> With the announcement of its "Democracy Initiative" in December 1990, AID launched a historic reorientation of its mission. The initiative established the promotion of democracy as one of the agency's central aims and involved it extensively in assistance programs for free and fair elections, constitutional drafting, legislatures, judicial systems, local government, anticorruption efforts, regulatory reform, civic education, and independent organizations and media in civil society (including human rights, legal aid, women's, professional, and church groups). AID's involvement in democracy promotion was deepened further with the inauguration of President Clinton, who had featured the promotion of democracy worldwide as one of the few foreign policy themes of his 1992 campaign<sup>14</sup>. For Africa alone, AID funding for democratic governance programs increased from \$5.3 million in 1990 to \$119 million in fiscal year 1994.<sup>15</sup>

The U.S. government has also been involved for some time in democracy promotion through the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). During the Cold War, USIA (and the associated anti-Communist Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe) did much to puncture the totalitarian lid of secrecy and advance pluralist, democratic ideas. Today USIA administers a wide range of activities to explain and advocate the concept of democracy; to provide information and counsel on institutional and policy options to those trying to consolidate democracy; and to facilitate links with American institutions toward those goals. In addition to its Fulbright scholarly exchanges, USIA brings hundreds of foreign professionals to the United States each year for month-long visits; places "professionals in residence" for limited periods (up to six months) to help establish democratic legislatures, media, and judicial systems; sponsors lecture tours and consultations by American experts (which often highlight relevant aspects of American experience); helps train Eastern European journalists; and provides educational and civic organizations in post-Communist and developing countries with books on the theory and practice of democracy. Thematic foci include elections administration, rule of law, constitutional reform, civil society, transparency and government ethics, conflict resolution, and economic reform. By 1992 USIA missions in 85 countries had undertaken 132 major projects under the agency's initiative for "Building Democratic Institutions," as well as another 215 projects addressed to related themes such as market-oriented economic reform and the free flow of information.<sup>16</sup> Almost all of USIA's Africa posts listed democracy programming as the number one theme in their FY95 country plans.<sup>17</sup>

The U.S. Defense Department has also devoted increasing attention to fostering democratic civil-military relations abroad. In 1993, with support from the U.S. Congress and the German Government, the U.S. Secretary of Defense established the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Bavaria as an element of the U.S. European Command. In addition to promoting defense cooperation and partnership with the emerging democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, the defense training programs of the center (for both military and civilian defense officials) include extensive curricula in "democratic defense management," such as the role of executive and legislative oversight, the professional role of the military in democracies, and reconciling intelligence systems with the need for openness in a democratic society.<sup>18</sup>

Among the European official aid agencies, SIDA, DANIDA (the Danish International Development Agency), and NAD (the Norwegian Agency for Development) have been particularly active in providing assistance to strengthen various types of civil society groups, including trade unions, human rights and legal assistance organizations, journalism associations and trusts, women's and civic education groups, and public policy and election monitoring organizations. In this sense, as well as in their lower profile, they resemble more some of the major nongovernmental democracy assistance organizations and foundations in the United States. They are less involved than AID in developing formal governmental institutions.<sup>19</sup>

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## NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Nongovernmental organizations (or NGOs, some of which are called "quasi-governmental" because they are primarily publicly funded but independently operated and directed) have long been engaged in the provision of financial and technical assistance for democratic development. Over the past two decades these efforts have achieved a breathtaking diversity.

The earliest explicit effort at nongovernmental (or quasigovernmental) assistance for democracy came in the 1950s with the creation of the German party foundations or *Stiftungen*: the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the Hans Seidel Foundation (each affiliated with a major German political party). Like USIA and AID, these organizations have a number of purposes (including fostering educational exchanges, providing scholarships, and promoting international understanding). But democracy promotion abroad has long figured prominently (if not always explicitly) in their work. In fact, until the early 1990s the combined annual spending of the four foundations on assisting democratic associations, trade unions, media, and political institutions abroad equaled or exceeded that of all U.S. publicly funded institutions.<sup>20</sup> For example, in 1991 the Friedrich Ebert Foundation alone disbursed DM88.5 million (about \$55 million) in 67 countries in the developing world, with the assistance of 97 German experts abroad and more than 500 local personnel.<sup>21</sup> Many of these projects were devoted to supporting autonomous civil society organizations, decentralized and democratic local government structures, enhanced citizen participation, more effective trade unions, market-oriented economic development, and other activities that were more or less related to democracy promotion. The other *Stiftungen* have similar training, education, and institutional assistance programs.<sup>22</sup>

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## THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

Influenced to some extent by the model of the German *Stiftungen*, the Reagan administration in 1983 established the National Endowment for Democracy (NED); NED receives congressional funding but has an independent, bipartisan board of directors.<sup>23</sup> NED's explicit mandate is to promote and assist democracy abroad. It received \$35 million in appropriations for this purpose in FY94, when it made more than 300 grants in some 80 countries. NED makes grants directly (through its "discretionary" program) and through four "core" grantees that receive about two-thirds of its annual program funding and have their own independent boards and staffs. These four core grantees are the two party institutes--the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI)--the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), and the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).<sup>24</sup> FTUI is affiliated with the main U.S. labor federation, the AFL-CIO; and CIPE is affiliated with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. While labor already had several active regional institutes before the creation of NED, the other three core grantees were established in 1984 after the creation of NED.<sup>25</sup>

Despite its relatively small size and small budget,<sup>26</sup> NED has been on the cutting edge of democratic change in many countries over the past decade. Its extensive efforts in Poland, Chile, and Nicaragua provided critical support to the democratic movements that brought down dictatorships in these countries. Throughout Eastern Europe NED helped to build the independent civic infrastructure that undermined Communism in the late 1980s (most notably, through sizable assistance to Poland's anti-Communist trade union, Solidarity). NED also played an important role in facilitating the transitions to democracy in Namibia, Haiti, Zambia, and South Africa, in part through [international election-observing efforts](#). While most governmental and publicly funded democracy promotion organizations now focus mainly or exclusively on assisting the consolidation of new or partial democracies, NED continues to devote substantial funds (mainly through its discretionary grants) to supporting beleaguered democratic movements in (and in exile from) authoritarian and closed societies. It has become a major (sometimes the primary) source of funding for human rights and prodemocracy groups and for the independent flow of information in numerous countries, including China, Tibet, Burma, Vietnam, Serbia, Bosnia, Cuba, Iraq, Egypt, Zaire, Sudan, Nigeria, Liberia, and Kenya.

The NED family also funds a wide variety of grants that aim to consolidate democratic political institutions and civil societies in the post-Communist and developing worlds. In several dozen new or partial democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, it provides training, capacity building, infrastructure, and (in some instances) operational resources for democratic political parties, legislatures, election monitoring and administration, and local governments; it also supports independent social movements, civic education and human rights organizations, policy publications and research institutes, conflict resolution efforts, anticorruption and accountability initiatives, mass media, and democratic trade unions. Among the NED's civil society grantees in 1994 were the Moscow Human Rights Research Center, a network of 15 human rights groups in Moscow and ten other Russian cities that offers citizens legal counseling, advises the government on legislation and policy, and monitors implementation of the law; GERDDDES, a

Benin-based citizens' organization, with contacts in more than 30 African countries, that promotes civic education, election monitoring, and democratic development across the continent<sup>27</sup>; and Mexico's Civic Alliance, whose unprecedented election-monitoring efforts--compelling more balanced media treatment, fielding some 12,000 Mexican observers, and organizing an independent "quick count" of the vote--resulted in the least fraudulent presidential election Mexico has had in decades.<sup>28</sup>

Through CIPE, NED supports innovative efforts in many countries to demonstrate the need for economic reform, advise legislatures on economic issues, train economic and business journalists, enhance the skills of business associations, improve corporate governance and accountability, strengthen the codes and enforcement of business and commercial law, and promote the teaching of private entrepreneurship and modern business management. In its first decade, CIPE has sponsored more than 100 projects in some 48 countries. By broadening the base of understanding of and participation in the economic reform process (and the market economy more generally), such training and capacity-building programs lessen the presumed tensions between democratization and market reform, thereby exploding the myth that it takes a Pinochet or a Chinese-style dictatorship to accomplish such reform.<sup>29</sup>

In its work in the post-Communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, FTUI seeks to increase the capacity of democratic trade unions, which were born with enormous structural disadvantages vis-a-vis the power of the old Communist trade unions and the managerial *nomenklatura* (which are often closely allied with one another). Early on after the fall of Communism, it rushed in "liberation technology" (computers, local-language software programs, printers, fax machines) and then printing equipment. It has also supported democratic newspapers and radio and TV shows; offered courses on the role and responsibilities of free trade unions, the techniques of labor organizing and collective bargaining, and the mechanics of financing and democratically governing a trade union; encouraged (on a nonpartisan basis) voter participation; provided advanced training for union organizers; and facilitated cross-country interaction among free trade union leaders from throughout the region. In Russia, FTUI's rule-of-law project is helping to build the legal infrastructure of democratic trade unionism by supporting the work of Russian lawyers on labor legislation and by assisting unions with registration, local disputes, and illegal dismissals or privatization schemes. In Poland, FTUI has given technical and financial support for the Solidarity trade union's network of Consulting and Negotiating Bureaus, which seeks to safeguard worker rights during the economic reform process by exposing corruption, assisting management in enterprise restructuring, and assisting local unions in negotiating equitable contracts.<sup>30</sup> Similar programs by FTUI's regional affiliates seek to strengthen the democratic capacities (for advocacy, organization, and coalition building) of independent trade unions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The two NED party institutes are heavily involved in institutional development in new and emerging democracies. By 1994, NDI had sponsored political party training in 27 countries, legislative strengthening in 13 countries, local government programs in 5 countries, civil-military dialogues in four Latin American countries, and civic and voter education efforts in 29 countries.<sup>31</sup> Its efforts draw on 20 field offices throughout the developing and post-Communist worlds, a staff of regional and functional experts in Washington, and democratic politicians, civic organizers, election monitors and other practitioners from more than 70 countries who are



recruited to volunteer their time to share their experiences. (In this important respect, nongovernmental organizations like NDI, IRI, NED, and the Asia Foundation have the flexibility, which USIA does not, of using non-American teachers and trainers to promote diffusion of democratic knowledge and enable developing democracies to learn from one another. The international democratic networks they thereby generate constitute one of the most important results of their work.)

Supporting free and fair elections, through monitoring and voter education, and strengthening political parties and institutions have also figured prominently in the mission of IRI, which has 11 field offices (mainly in the former Communist countries, including Cambodia) and projects in some 50 countries around the world. From 1990 to 1993, IRI organized 18 international election-observing missions during the first rounds of post-Communist elections, and it has also observed in Africa and other regions. With NDI and others, it sponsored the highly successful South African Election Support Project that assisted parties and civic organizations with voter education, registration, communication, and poll watching for the historic April 1994 elections. Unlike NDI, IRI will occasionally assist democratic institution building in nondemocratic systems--for example, it has programs in China to assist the National People's Congress with economic reform legislation and to aid the process of instituting competitive, secret-ballot elections for local village and township officials.<sup>32</sup>

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## **OTHER U.S. NGOS**

A number of other private, nonprofit U.S. organizations also have independent identities and structures of governance, though they rely heavily or almost entirely on public funds in performing a variety of democracy promotion functions. For example, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), established in 1987, monitors, supports, and strengthens the mechanics of the election process in emerging democracies. It offers technical assessments of the electoral process in particular countries, on-site technical assistance (for example, in voter registry and design of electoral laws and administration), training of poll workers, voter and civic education, and assistance with monitoring and administration on election day. During its first five years, IFES sent more than twenty teams to survey pre-electoral conditions on five continents, and it aided the electoral administration commissions of nine (mainly newly emerging) democracies.

The Asia Foundation, founded in 1954 and based in San Francisco, now devotes more than half of all its grant spending (about \$8 to 10 million per year during fiscal years 1993 to 1995) to democracy promotion in one form or another. These activities, which serve about 16 countries throughout East, Southeast, and South Asia (plus others in the Pacific Islands), cluster in five areas: building the institutional capacities of legislatures and promoting more effective citizen participation in and monitoring of legislative processes; developing an effective justice system, through training and technical support for governmental institutions and through aid to human rights organizations, bar associations, and legal assistance programs; supporting journalism training programs, journalists' associations, and liberalizing reforms of media laws; aiding the development of nongovernmental organizations through start-up support, staff training, research

and publication projects, and encouragement of indigenous philanthropy; and strengthening democratic governance in several dimensions, such as electoral administration, local government, civil-military relations, and public accountability and probity at all levels. With a total cash budget of \$41.7 million in FY94, the foundation is considerably larger than the NED discretionary grant program and has the advantage of some 14 field offices in Asia, which give it intimate knowledge of each country, sensitivity to its culture, and a long-term presence that allows for an emphasis on incremental change.<sup>33</sup>

Similarly straddling the boundary between public and private is the Eurasia Foundation, established in 1993 with funding from AID to support economic reform and democratic institution building in the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. Based in Washington, with field offices in Moscow, Kiev, Saratov, Tashkent, and Vladivostok, the Eurasia Foundation makes grants in four areas: economic reform, governmental reform, the nonprofit (civil society) sector, and mass media and communications. In its first year of operation, it awarded about \$7.5 million in grants (some of them quite small, but with an average grant size of \$52,000). Among the projects supported were the conversion of military plants to peacetime production, business and management training, public opinion polling, new education for public administration, strengthening NGOs, book distribution, and electronic publishing.<sup>34</sup> One of the foundation's current priorities is to expand access to computer communications (electronic mail, on-line services, and electronic databases) and to support new E-mail networks throughout the former Soviet Union.<sup>35</sup>

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## NED COUNTERPARTS

Outside the United States, the NED example has inspired the creation of at least two counterpart organizations, both of which also are funded almost entirely by annual parliamentary appropriations. The International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development was established by the Canadian Parliament in 1988 and operates on an annual federal grant of \$5 million (Canadian, or about \$3.6 million U.S.). The centre's mission is both narrower than NED's, in that it focuses on promoting human rights and democratic societies, and broader, in that it gives "equal emphasis" to social, economic, and cultural rights and to civil and political rights. It provides financial, political and technical support primarily to nongovernmental organizations, such as human rights and women's organizations and independent trade unions, that are struggling for such goals as due process, press freedom, and elimination of child slavery and violence against women. Unlike NED, it is also an advocacy organization, lobbying governments, multilateral institutions, and regional organizations on human rights and democracy issues (such as the promotion of women's rights). It works with more than 300 partners and projects primarily in 13 countries in the Americas, Africa, and Asia.<sup>36</sup>

Established in 1992 by Royal Prerogative of the British Government, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) follows more closely the American NED model of sponsorship by the principal political parties (in this case three), which (as with NED) are represented on the foundation's governing board along with nonparty figures from business, the trade unions, academia, and civil society.<sup>37</sup> About half the foundation's annual budget (£2 million

in 1993-94, twice the initial grant) is directed through British political parties, and the other half is allocated to all-party or nonpartisan projects. Even more than NED, Westminster seeks to leverage its limited resources with many small grants (some only a few thousand pounds). Thus it was able to fund 230 new projects in 1993-94 (April 1-March 31). Westminster also focuses its grants regionally: in 1993-94 fully three-quarters were in Central and Eastern Europe (58 percent) and the former Soviet Union (17 percent), and another 16 percent were in (Anglophone) Africa. Most of its projects, which are channeled through the British parties, support development, campaign training, and media assistance for like-minded political parties; other grants support civic education, civil society organizations (including free trade unions), mass media development, rule of law, and other programs similar to NED's.<sup>38</sup> As with other European democracy assistance programs, funding for the Westminster Foundation has been slowly growing, to £2.2 million in 1994-95 and £2.5 million in 1995-96, and it gains further leverage through collaboration and cost-sharing with other donors, such as the European Union.

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## **NGOS AND U.S. ASSISTANCE**

A large amount of U.S. financial and technical assistance that originates with governmental organizations like AID is channeled through nongovernmental organizations (including NED affiliates). Some of these, like Freedom House (which publishes the annual survey of "freedom in the world"), the African-American Institute, and the Asia Foundation, have been involved in political assistance and institution building for decades, and are now engaged in a wide range of democratic assistance projects (some funded by NED; see Table 1). Some have more narrowly focused democracy promotion aims, such as the defense of human rights or press freedom.

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## **THE PRIVATE SECTOR**

### *The Law*

A number of organizations of varying size are working, typically in close partnership with institutions in the recipient countries, to defend human rights, develop legal systems, and build the institutional and cultural foundations of a rule of law. The American Bar Association provides pro bono legal assistance to emerging democracies throughout the world. Its Central and East European Law Initiative linked each law school in the region with at least three American schools, conducted numerous legal assistance workshops, assessed more than 172 draft laws, and provided over \$20 million worth of legal expertise by volunteer lawyers, judges, academicians, and interns.<sup>39</sup> With a tiny staff based in Boulder, Colorado, the Center for Human Rights Advocacy has launched several endeavors to protect minority rights in the former Soviet Union and to promote reform of Russia's criminal justice system. These include human rights professional education for Russian judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and law professors and students; investigation of barbaric prison conditions and campaigning for their reform; and legal advocacy for oppressed minorities seeking emigration and political asylum. The Institute of European Law in the United Kingdom provides human rights law training to lawyers and judges

in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, monitoring organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have not only had some success in pressuring for release of individual detainees but have also helped to generate political and diplomatic pressure on offending regimes.

### *The Press*

The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and the Vienna-based International Press Institute (IPI) both monitor the state of press freedom in the world, exposing and protesting abuses of press freedom and pressuring for openness and change.<sup>40</sup> Established in 1984 and funded mainly from the private sector, the Center for Foreign Journalists (CFJ), based in Virginia, offers foreign journalists and news executives advanced training and consultation in the United States and in their own countries, donates textbooks, and operates related support services. In 1993, CFJ initiated a fellowship program for U.S. news media professionals to locate abroad (for up to nine months) to provide practical journalistic, management, business, and technical assistance to the developing independent press in the former East Bloc countries. Press training programs are also conducted by IPI; by numerous press fellowship programs, such as the U.S.-based Alfred Friendly Press Fellowships and the Paris-based Journalists in Europe (which offers eight-month programs for young Russian journalists); and by the Independent Journalism Foundation (IJF), which operates Centers for Independent Journalism in Prague, Bratislava, and Bucharest and publishes KMIT, a journalism quarterly for the region.<sup>41</sup>

### *Strengthening Democratic Values and Institutions*

A similar panoply of private assistance efforts focuses on democratic civic education and strengthening civil society. The Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE) makes grants and facilitates communication to support NGO activity in the former Soviet bloc. In cooperation with its sister organization (IDEE Warsaw) it coordinates the flow of information and ideas among eleven "Centers for Pluralism" in ten countries. The American Federation of Teachers (a U.S. trade union) conducts "education for democracy" workshops and numerous other civic education programs; it is now preparing a database of some 300 groups worldwide that are engaged in civic education for democracy. The Washington-based National Institute for Citizen Education in the Law educates students in more than a dozen countries (including the United States) about laws, the legal system, and civic rights and responsibilities by showing young people the connection between their daily lives and the law, and by promoting "cooperative learning, critical thinking, and positive interaction between young people and adults." The London-based Charity Know-How helps voluntary organizations in the former East Bloc countries to develop the legal, financial, and regulatory frameworks, coordinating bodies, and other skills they need to operate effectively. The Network of East-West Women (linking more than 700 women activists in more than 20 countries in Eastern and Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the West) supports the formation of independent women's movements to advance women's participation in public life and their human and political rights. Building upon its efforts to strengthen civil society organizations in Poland, the American Committee for Aid to Poland is now working to draw NGOs from throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics into a cooperative, information-sharing network.<sup>42</sup>

One of the most energetic private-sector endeavors in democracy promotion has been undertaken by the Carter Center of Emory University. Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter has been instrumental in organizing a council of former elected heads of state in the Americas. In collaboration with them, and with a wide variety of other prominent individuals and organizations, he has observed elections in more than a dozen countries around the world, and in several countries--including Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and Liberia--the center has played a pivotal role in mediating between conflicting or warring parties.

Private foundations have also been devoting an increasing share of their resources to building democratic institutions and civil societies (although these goals often overlap with other developmental objectives). Carnegie Corporation of New York lists several sizable grants it has made under the rubric of "strengthening democratic institutions." Among its recent recipients are the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights to monitor, analyze, and assist legal reform in Russia; Helsinki Watch, for human rights monitoring and training in the former Soviet Union; the Kennedy School of Government, for programs on democratizing civil-military relations and advising on economic reform and political decision making at all levels of government in the former Soviet Union and for scholarly exchanges between the United States and the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.<sup>43</sup> In addition to its support for individual scholars, the MacArthur Foundation made grants in 1992 to support democratic legal and institutional reform, including increased accountability of police and military, in Central America, and to advance human rights and democracy in Latin America.<sup>44</sup> The Ford Foundation has long had an extensive program of grants in this field. In 1992 it made 15 grants for human rights work to U.S. and European organizations (totaling almost \$3 million) and another 19 grants in developing countries (totaling about \$2.25 million). A large number of other Ford grants go to support independent research institutes and foundations in civil society, such as the Democracy after Communism Foundation in Hungary. In all, the total of Ford Foundation grants to support human rights and democratic development probably equals the discretionary grant program of NED.

Founded in 1972 with a gift from the German people to support more traditional types of exchanges between the United States and Europe, the German Marshall Fund of the United States in 1989 initiated a Political Development Program to support democratization in seven Central and Eastern European countries. From an initial focus on building independent judiciaries, representative legislatures, and democratic political parties, the program shifted emphasis in 1992 to civil society. Its grants (many with AID funding) now support the independent press, NGOs, citizenship training, and efforts to counter discrimination against ethnic minorities. Among other things, these grants seek to alter entrenched cultural patterns of distrust, cynicism, passivity, and deference to authority; to encourage active citizen and NGO engagement with local government; to help NGOs to become effective public advocates for human rights (including minority rights), governmental transparency, and public access to information; and to foster accurate, readable, fact-based reporting.<sup>45</sup>

The boldest and most far-reaching private effort has been the network of Soros Foundations established by Hungarian émigré financier George Soros, who contributed more than \$15 million in 1990 alone to democratic dissidents and organizations throughout Eastern Europe.<sup>46</sup> Begun in Hungary in 1984 and now operating in some 22 countries, from Poland and Russia to

South Africa and Burma, the Soros Foundations seek to promote an "open society" based not only on democracy and the market economy but on tolerance, the rule of law, historical truth, and respect for minorities. Democracy-building projects support human rights (especially the rights of ethnic and national minorities), legal reform, expanded access to electronic mail and the Internet, revision of Communist-era school curricula, and mass media training and development. The intellectual centerpiece of the foundations network, the Central European University in Budapest and Prague, has, since its founding in 1990, rapidly become perhaps the most influential institution of higher learning in the post-Communist world. Soros's Open Society Institute, based in New York, also administers numerous projects to research public policy issues, encourage pluralism and debate, and assist other institutions of higher learning in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>47</sup>

Beyond these grant-making institutions, an increasingly wide range of civic organizations is becoming involved in democracy promotion efforts, as suggested by the list in Table 1 of selected U.S. organizations that were administering NED grants for democratic groups abroad in 1992 and 1993. The presence on the list of nongovernmental organizations historically concerned with economic development, peace, and international exchange issues is noteworthy. So is the involvement of civic and lobbying organizations, like the League of Women Voters and the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, whose traditional focus has been on American politics. This not only broadens the base of political support for democracy promotion in the established democracies,<sup>48</sup> it also multiplies the points of independent interchange between developed and developing democracies.

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## PLURALISM OR FRAGMENTATION, PUBLIC OR PRIVATE?

It is sadly ironic that at a moment of unprecedented democratic ferment and uncertainty in the world, and after a decade in which international democracy assistance organizations have often demonstrated remarkable cost-effectiveness, U.S. organizations that blazed the trail in democracy promotion in the 1980s and early 90s are in danger. As pressure intensifies to cut spending to eliminate chronic budget deficits, and as support for liberal internationalist engagement declines, AID and USIA are being targeted by some Congressional budget cutters. There is also growing sentiment for cutting or eliminating funding for NED, the Asia Foundation, and similar publicly funded NGOs. Some critics maintain that democracy promotion is not a vital interest of the United States. Others seek to scale back international assistance in general. Still others contend that the NED network duplicates what AID does and is therefore superfluous.

There are several reasons why nongovernmental organizations like NED and the Asia Foundation must remain vigorously engaged in democracy promotion, with public funding directly appropriated by Congress and not tied to specific projects. Each type of effort has its own strengths and weaknesses. AID can be effective at long-term institution building, particularly with respect to the governmental structures of democracy and large-scale assistance projects.<sup>49</sup> With its years of experience in economic and social development, AID also is well positioned to offer assistance at the nexus between those sectors and the political, for example to

universities, and to NGOs and research institutes concerned with development, the environment, economic reform, and the status of women. However, as with any large government bureaucracy, AID's elaborate decision mechanisms and reviewing, reporting, and auditing procedures make it unable to respond quickly to crises and new opportunities, less prone to take risks, and less effective in dealing with smaller and less formal organizations.<sup>50</sup> Because it lacks extensive political development expertise, much of AID's work in this area must be contracted out, and when large amounts of money must be disbursed quickly, some contract recipients are bound to be less experienced, less cost-effective, and less committed to the substance of democracy promotion than others. NGO donors can be more cost-effective in providing small grants for a wide range of projects, not only because their administration is more compact but because they are able to mobilize volunteer and *pro bono* expert participation.<sup>51</sup> In addition, it is much more difficult for AID to provide assistance, even to NGOs, in countries where governments have come to power through coups, are in arrears in repaying debts to the United States, or lack diplomatic relations with Washington, and it also no longer operates in many of the more economically developed newly emerging democracies, such as South Korea and Taiwan.

These problems of increased administrative burdens and reduced flexibility and cost-effectiveness apply as well when NGOs receive AID grants to promote democracy abroad, as do most of the major U.S. nongovernmental democracy promotion organizations.<sup>52</sup> Heavy dependence on project-specific AID funding also makes it more difficult for NGOs to maintain their own methods and institutional identity, and to engage in long-term financial and program planning and staff development, since they cannot know what their budgets will be from year to year.<sup>53</sup> In terms of both cost efficiency and effectiveness in democracy promotion, it would make more sense to increase--rather than eliminate--direct congressional funding for these NGOs, by converting into general public grants most of the project-specific funds they are now receiving from AID. This would still leave the bulk of U.S. public funding for democracy promotion under AID control but would generate greater pluralism of strategy and approaches. The case against shifting more democracy promotion funding into direct NGO appropriations appears mainly political, in that it would reduce centralized control over U.S. democracy promotion projects by the executive branch agencies and the Congress.

Other considerations also underscore the need to limit the direct role of U.S. governmental agencies in democracy promotion. "In countries where one of the issues being addressed is the paucity of autonomous civic and political institutions, the fundamental idea that government ought not control all aspects of society is undermined by a too-visible U.S. government hand in the development and implementation of these programs."<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, as agents of the U.S. foreign policy establishment that must serve overall U.S. government interests, both AID and USIA have less scope to assist political opposition forces and groups in civil society that might expose corruption or press for reform of a government with which the U.S. seeks warm bilateral relations. For a big power in the world, this is a big problem: It must have nongovernmental instruments that can react quickly and engage civil society actors who might be suspicious of official big-power aid agencies, or who might become the object of diplomatic friction between the big power and a hostile host government. Particularly in authoritarian situations, prodemocracy groups are exposed and vulnerable, at greater risk of being discredited (or punished) as tools of foreign interests when they accept government money from a superpower like the United States, or a regional power like Japan, or a former colonial ruler like Britain or

France. There is less risk and suspicion when funding comes from a nongovernmental agency, which is not bound by the political direction or constraints that may be imposed by the local American embassy, or from the official aid agencies of a smaller country, like Canada or Sweden, which are less likely to have (or to be seen to have) geostrategic interests at stake (and which have more of the flexible, cutting-edge, challenging character of the publicly funded democracy promotion NGOs in the U.S.). In authoritarian countries, NED has particular freedom of action because (unlike the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation in some countries) it does not have to worry about preserving an in-country presence, with a local office and expatriate staff.

As a general rule, assistance to civil society groups that are challenging in some way the established social or political order should therefore be left to nongovernmental foundations and organizations and to the aid agencies of smaller countries. The big official development organizations, especially AID, should concentrate on helping to develop formal institutions and civil society sectors that are less controversial or explicitly political. Some of the funds that AID is now expending to assist democratic NGOs abroad should probably be directly allocated by the U.S. Congress to groups like the Asia Foundation and NED.

In an endeavor such as democracy promotion, where the challenges are diverse in character, scale, countries, and cultures, there is value in pluralism of approaches and donor organizations. For countries whose overcentralization of government and public life retards democratic development, centralizing the provision of U.S. (not to mention international) democratic assistance through a single agency would hardly provide a useful model or message. Vigorous pluralism of U.S. democracy promotion actors exposes democratic forces abroad to the diversity (and tolerance of diversity) intrinsic to democracy and creates a richer repertoire of donors and methods that are able to relate effectively to a wider range of potential recipients.<sup>55</sup>

Globally as well, having donors from a wide range of countries and approaches increases the legitimacy of democracy promotion as a political task, provides a broader array of funding sources from which the potential aid recipients can choose, and gives civil society organizations the opportunity to shield themselves from political retaliation and reduce future funding uncertainty by broadening their bases of support. As we have seen, some organizations, like NED, still work to foster democratic transitions, while some focus only on consolidation. Some work on a larger scale, some on a small scale. Some focus mainly on democratic governance, some on human rights more broadly, some on multiple dimensions of development (including conventional economic ones that make them appear less threatening to authoritarian regimes). Some have the deep country expertise that comes with regional focus, others have the comparative breadth that comes with a global network and reach. Some have an in-country presence that enhances understanding of local conditions, actors, possibilities and risks, and facilitates closer monitoring and evaluation of grants. Others have the added freedom of not having to protect an in-country presence when they award grants. Official aid bureaucracies move slowly and may need to respond to multiple and conflicting policy goals, but they can commit large amounts to institution building and sustain them over long periods of time. Nongovernmental organizations like NED, Canada's Centre, and the Soros Foundations can respond rapidly to urgent needs and surprise opportunities; emergency help from NED, for example, kept the Sarajevo daily *Oslobodjenje* publishing, as a source of truth and hope, through



the brutal winter of 1994. Certainly, it makes sense to have donors like NED and Westminster that are able to offer relatively small grants for limited or short-term projects, or for seed purposes, or for informal organizations; often these smaller grants are the most cost-effective, though unfortunately they are also the most difficult to audit cost-effectively.<sup>56</sup>

The enormous variety of organizations involved in democracy promotion has permitted the development (both deliberately and coincidentally) of widely different strengths and areas of expertise-- functionally, thematically, and regionally. At first glance, this may appear a welter of confusion and duplication. In fact, it increasingly represents the same overlapping, reinforcing, integrating pluralism that marks a healthy democratic civil society within a country. In the spirit of democracy, such pluralism should remain--full of eclecticism and experimentation, and free of central direction. What would be useful, however, to keep such pluralism from running wild, and to keep assistance working to maximum benefit, is regular communication and closer coordination among the various donors. Today, such communication and coordination works much better (but still not always well) within countries than across them.

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## INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to states and NGOs, international and regional organizations have also become involved in democracy promotion in recent years.

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### THE UNITED NATIONS

Periodically over the years, and quite rapidly since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been developing a concern with and capacity to assist the administration of free and fair elections--which Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates as the means for determining "the will of the people," which "shall be the basis of the authority of government." The UN's supervision of the 1989 Namibian elections marked a turning point: its last major observing role as a territorial trustee and its first engagement in a new, broader type of democratic intervention that included not only extensive election monitoring but peacekeeping forces, civilian police, civic education, and postelection assistance in institutional development. In February 1990, the UN mounted its first electoral observation mission in a member state, Nicaragua, a comprehensive effort that began six months before the voting and continued after it. A comparable mission to Haiti followed later in the same year. In Haiti, the UN's willingness for the first time to justify its intervention on the basis of a country's internal needs (rather than maintenance of international peace and security) marked a sharp departure from the past. UN engagement was soon institutionalized with the creation of an Electoral Assistance Unit and was then tested with major new missions in El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola, and the Western Sahara.<sup>57</sup>

The first UN mission in Angola failed (with the resumption of civil war after the September 1992 elections), largely because of the lack of adequate human and financial resources.<sup>58</sup> However, its

mission in El Salvador (Onusal)--which included monitoring of human rights and a ceasefire, as well as peacekeeping and civil policing assistance--did provide a crucial mediating framework for the termination of the civil war and incorporation of the rebels into the constitutional process. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was successful in bringing about a peaceful transition to a multiparty, formally democratic system (although it failed to demobilize the Khmer Rouge, control corruption, and prevent campaign violence and malpractices). After a year and a half of what can only be described as UN "occupation," almost 90 percent of voters turned out to the polls, in a surprisingly peaceful and free election that defied enormous logistical obstacles and a daunting legacy of fear and horror. A new coalition government resulted. The most ambitious such undertaking in UN history-- representing an investment of \$2 billion, 16,000 troops, more than 3,000 police officers, and some 3,000 civilian officials who assumed control of key ministries--UNTAC became the epitome of the UN in the "New World Order." It illustrated the inseparable connections between traditional UN functions--such as peacekeeping, disarmament, and repatriation of refugees--and the new democracy-building functions of electoral administration and monitoring, political mediation, and institutional reconstruction.<sup>59</sup>

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## REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

### *The European Community*

Of the regional organizations, the European Community (now the European Union, or EU) was the first to take democracy seriously by imposing as a condition for membership that states manifest "truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms." This conditionality provided "an important incentive for the consolidation of democratic processes in the Iberian peninsula," Greece, and (more recently and less successfully) Turkey.<sup>60</sup> It is today a powerful incentive against backsliding into authoritarianism in Eastern Europe, particularly in those more economically advanced countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia) whose admission in the near future is most plausible. Indeed, the possibility of their admission was specifically included--with very explicit democratic conditionality--in the Europe Agreements of 1990.<sup>61</sup> Similar conditions--democratic pluralism, the rule of law, and protection of human rights--are placed on membership in the Council of Europe, which several East European democracies have recently obtained, and which the former Communist countries view not only "as desirable in its own right" but "as an important step toward the grand prize of membership in the European Community."<sup>62</sup>

The general EC/EU approach to encouraging democratization has been through support for market reform, on the principle that if Eastern Europe's markets become developed, like those in the West, its governments will become more democratic, like those in the West. Since 1990, the EU and the G-24, together with the IMF, have thus given the Central European countries, plus Bulgaria and Romania, \$1 billion each in aid; Poland also received a \$16 billion debt write-off.<sup>63</sup> The EU and G-24 have also provided humanitarian aid of food and medicines to ease the shock of economic adjustment, and, through the Phare program, technical and administrative advice,

training, and support on building market institutions amounting to some \$3 billion per year for the region.<sup>64</sup>

Phare is one dimension of an ambitious set of European Union initiatives to help consolidate the economic and political transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to humanitarian aid and balance-of-payments support, the EU provides investment capital to advance market transitions through the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Most importantly, perhaps, Phare assistance is now explicitly identified as a means to help prepare the eleven partner countries for eventual membership in the European Union. Six of these countries-- Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia--have signed association agreements (known as "Europe Agreements") with the EU expressly to prepare them for membership. The other five countries--Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia--have been given more general Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements, but the latter four are expected to be offered association agreements soon.<sup>65</sup> As with Spain, Portugal, and Greece, it is likely that the process of integration into a democratic Europe will be one of the most powerful factors locking the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe into democratic forms of governance and making blatant authoritarian reversals unthinkable.

In 1992 Phare and its counterpart for the former Soviet Union, Tacis, initiated democratic assistance programs, which have been managed since 1994 by the European Human Rights Foundation. Each has ECU10 million (ECU1 = \$1.33 as of July 1995) in funding in the current fiscal year, which (unlike the American programs) is likely to increase next year. In contrast to the bulk of Phare/Tacis assistance, which goes to governments, these programs target "non-state, non-profit making bodies" in civil society, offering grants that are smaller in scale and that result as much as possible from the initiative of indigenous actors in the post-Communist countries. A new "micro-projects" facility for Central and Eastern Europe makes available very small grants (of about \$3,000 to \$10,000) with a minimum of bureaucracy (unlike larger projects, an EU partner is not required); the goal is to stimulate activity more deeply at the grass roots and to enhance the development of a wider range of NGOs.

Recently approved Phare/Tacis projects are helping to establish a legal information and assistance program in Hungary, a network of trade union education centers in Russia, organizations to promote consumers' rights in Romania and Slovenia, NGOs to monitor and improve prison conditions in Ukraine, Estonia, and Lithuania, a system to monitor violent racist acts and speech in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, and a new Russian radio series to show the importance of local government and NGOs. Phare/Tacis democracy projects also provide support for a variety of NGOs working for human rights, civic education, conflict resolution, interethnic tolerance, and the rights of gays, lesbians, minorities, and the disabled. Other projects support a vast array of training programs for lawyers, journalists, public opinion analysts, trade union educators, women's rights activists, local administrators, employer association managers, civilian specialists in defense and security issues, and many other sectors of civil society.<sup>66</sup> An additional value of these programs is that they link (as a requirement for funding) the participating NGOs in the post-Communist countries with a vast array of partners from across the European Union. These proliferating ties across the former Cold War divide help to diffuse not only hard skills

and resources but a culture of democracy, while gradually building at the nongovernmental level some of the organizational basis for a pan-European society.

The European Parliament of the EU also has a modest program of its own to train the elected members and professional staffs of parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It focuses on such functions as budgetary management, press relations, and research and library support. (The U.S. Congressional Research Service has also been actively involved in parliamentary assistance programs in this region.)<sup>67</sup>

### *The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe*

The twenty-year-old Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE; formerly CSCE) is more directly engaged than the EU in democracy promotion activities in the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Building upon its historic (but limited) concern for human rights in that broad region, the CSCE (in its June 1990 Copenhagen meeting) declared "democracy and the rule of law" to be "essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms"; defined those various concepts in unprecedentedly explicit and comprehensive detail (incorporated later that year into the Charter of Paris for a New Europe); and imposed sanctions against states responsible for flagrant human rights abuses.<sup>68</sup> The EU has also imposed sanctions: a trade agreement with Bulgaria was suspended after the regime's abuse of its Turkish minority in 1989; Phare assistance to Romania was suspended following the violent repression in 1990; and the aid program for the Soviet Union was suspended following its action against the Baltic states in 1991.<sup>69</sup>

Since the downfall of Communism and the transformation of its role in 1990, the CSCE has also established a number of new permanent institutions, including an Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw with a mandate to aid the development of democracy in more than 20 post-Communist CSCE countries. Though lean in staff and funding (with a 1993 budget of \$2.4 million), the ODIHR has been active, organizing electoral advice and assistance for new democracies, missions to assess minority rights and interethnic relations in Moldova and Estonia, and seminars on such issues as developing tolerance and drafting constitutions.

### *The Council of Europe*

Since its founding in 1949, the Council of Europe has been explicitly concerned with the advancement of pluralist democracy and human rights as key foundations for building European unity. Toward that end, it has established a human rights regime among its membership (which now includes several Central and East European countries) that encompasses a European human rights convention, commission, and court independent of other international structures. Following the institutionalization of the CSCE in 1990, the council became the official coordinator of human rights issues for that body.

In 1990 the council established its own set of democracy promotion activities in Central and Eastern Europe, with a view toward facilitating the eventual integration of these countries into the council. With a budget of 54 million francs (about \$10 million) in 1994, plus voluntary

contributions from member states, the council's Demosthenes project provides practical assistance in many areas, such as the drafting of legislation on human rights, the mass media, and local government; the prosecution of human rights violations and protection of ethnic minorities; the technical aspects of broadcasting; local finance procedures; and seminars on the role of NGOs in a democratic civil society.

### *Organization of American States*

Since its founding in 1948, democracy has also been an explicit concern of the Organization of American States (OAS). This rhetorical commitment has been periodically strengthened over time, yet always with equivocation about national sovereignty. Not until the historic June 1991 Santiago meeting was this ambivalence pierced to some extent with the adoption of Resolution 1080, which mandated an immediate meeting of the Organization's Permanent Council following the overthrow of democratic rule anywhere in the region, and the adoption of "efficacious, timely, and expeditious procedures to ensure the promotion and defense of representative democracy."<sup>70</sup>

Until the 1990s, OAS action to enforce the democratic commitment implicit in its charter had been modest and episodic at best, showing the difficulty that any regional organization would face in effectively promoting democracy when most of its member states are not democratic. Only when the region had become overwhelmingly democratic and had passed the Santiago resolution did the OAS begin to take more concerted action, effectively monitoring elections in Haiti, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Suriname; imposing sanctions after the coups against democracy in Haiti (in September 1991) and Peru (in April 1992) and helping to reverse the attempted executive coup against democracy in Guatemala in May 1993. In the case of Haiti, the member states of the OAS cut off all nonhumanitarian aid and imposed a general trade embargo, but this had little impact on the ruthless ruling elite, and OAS mediation (in conjunction with the UN) produced an agreement that would have restored President Aristide without dismantling the thoroughly corrupt military (and associated elite structures) that had overthrown him and that had repeatedly terrorized the nation (the military leaders subsequently refused to honor the agreement). In the end, only the prospect of an imminent U.S. invasion induced the generals to accept a negotiated exit at the final hour. The milder OAS diplomatic pressure on Peru may have helped persuade President Fujimori to abandon plans for a plebiscite to legitimize his *autogolpe* (executive coup, or, literally, "self coup") and instead to hold OAS-monitored elections for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. But human rights abuses continued.<sup>71</sup>

As Peter Hakim has argued, a principal reason (beyond deep-seated distrust of the United States) why the OAS is so notoriously weak and immobile--even more than the UN--is its structure, which provides for no independent institutional authority, other than the 34 member governments sitting collectively, to manage its affairs. There is no equivalent to the UN Security Council (which Hakim believes is badly needed), and the OAS Secretary-General has far less authority and autonomy than his UN counterpart. On the other hand, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS, with a self-activating enforcement mechanism and an independent governing board and mandate, has achieved "a distinguished record of investigating and disclosing abuses and recommending remedial action in many countries of the hemisphere."<sup>72</sup> A few years ago the OAS established a Democracy Unit "to provide program

support for democratic development," but it needs more staff resources and broader analytical capabilities. As with the UN, funding constraints are severe (the OAS today spends less than half of what it did twenty years ago).<sup>73</sup>

### *Organization of African Unity*

Much less effective still at democracy promotion has been the Organization of African Unity. Its history shows even more graphically the constraints imposed on a regional organization when most of its member states are authoritarian. Anticolonialism, defense of sovereignty, and regional cooperation were its founding purposes--not democracy or human rights. In 1981, a meeting of OAU heads of state unanimously adopted an African Charter on Human and People's Rights, which came into force in October 1986 with 48 countries as signatories. The charter was riddled with contradictions and qualifications, however, and lacked any serious enforcement mechanisms. Most member states ignored even its most mild procedural provisions, and the commission it established to research, investigate and receive charges of violations has proved timid and ineffectual, with no real power.<sup>74</sup> This contrasts sharply with its OAS counterpart, which has greater structural independence and is backed by the more forceful, prodemocratic charter of the parent organization.

Recently, beginning with the historic 1991 Zambian election, the OAU has begun to undertake small electoral observation missions (including ambassadors from member countries and OAU staff). However, these have been initiated only by invitation from the country, and they have been hampered by the small size of the team, their narrow mandate, excessive reliance on host governments, the briefness of their stay in country, and the fact that their findings are reported privately to the Secretary-General and not made public.<sup>75</sup>

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## **A UNIVERSAL RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE?**

Clearly, there is a growing international architecture of collective institutions and formal agreements enshrining both the principles of democracy and human rights and the legitimacy of international action to promote them. The world community is increasingly embracing a shared normative expectation that all states seeking international legitimacy should manifestly "govern with the consent of the governed"--in essence, a "right to democratic governance" is seen as a legal entitlement.<sup>76</sup> Already effectively implied by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, this right to democratic governance has been articulated more and more explicitly in the documents of regional organizations like the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the OAS and affirmed by the growing number of interventions by those organizations and by the UN. For some, this suggests the world is moving (and *should* move) toward establishing a global guarantee of constitutional democracy to every nation (similar to the clause in the U.S. Constitution that requires the federal government to "guarantee to every State a Republican form of government").<sup>77</sup> Such a universal guarantee (in anything more than principle) is no doubt years away, at least. But significant erosion of the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a country is already discernible (even in Africa). At a minimum, this evolution has done two things. First, it has lowered the political

threshold to intervention, not only for the multilateral actors but for states and NGOs as well; and second, it has emboldened domestic advocates of democracy and human rights. If the world has not yet recognized a universal *legal* entitlement to democracy, it has at least advanced cultural norms and expectations of its *moral* worth.

#### 4. INSTRUMENTS

- [Political Assistance](#)
- [Economic Assistance](#)
- [Diplomacy, Aid Conditionality, and Sanctions](#)

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A variety of instruments are available for international actors seeking to promote, foster, or support democracy. Most of the above review has focused on the various donors offering political assistance of various kinds. Such assistance may be of a financial or technical nature, but its goal is political: to develop democratic institutions, practices, and capacities. Economic assistance can also make a difference, if one presumes that (market-oriented) economic development ultimately encourages democratization, and that economic improvement is at some point necessary to legitimate and sustain a new democracy. A major aid instrument that states have at their disposal and are increasingly inclined to use is conditionality--tying desired forms of aid to democracy or political liberalization. States may also threaten or cajole other regimes through diplomatic pressure (usually behind the scenes), and may employ sanctions if diplomatic threats and appeals fail. If those measures fail as well, as a last resort a few powerful nations, or the international system collectively, may resort to military force. And where armed conflict has become an obstacle to democracy, peacekeeping and mediation may also help to establish more favorable conditions for democratization. Space does not permit review here of the latter two instruments, although I do believe that peacekeeping and military intervention may have legitimate roles to play in two cases: where warring parties are ready to cease violent hostilities and transfer their conflict into the political arena (for example, in El Salvador), and where an overwhelming popular preference for democracy exists and is blocked by a narrow repressive elite (as in Haiti). (For a fuller treatment of the role of multinational military forces, see the forthcoming Commission report by Andrew J. Goodpaster, *When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: The Use of Multinational Military Forces*.)

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#### POLITICAL ASSISTANCE

Assistance explicitly aimed at developing the political practices of democracy is a relatively recent phenomenon, but over the past decade or two it has manifested dramatic growth in the scope of efforts and the number of donor countries and agencies involved. While it may be categorized in different ways, this political assistance is basically of three types: helping to develop the formal political institutions of democracy; assisting the preparation, conduct, and monitoring of elections; and strengthening independent organizations in civil society.

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## DEVELOPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Political institution building is the most urgent and important challenge of democratic consolidation. It may also begin to have a positive effect during a protracted period of phased democratic transition (as occurred in Brazil or Nigeria) or even during the early stages of liberalization of an authoritarian regime (as in Taiwan in the 1970s, or, arguably, China and Vietnam today). When outsiders offer assistance to develop the nascent representative institutions of an authoritarian regime that appears to be liberalizing its rule, they must, however, satisfy themselves that that assistance will do more to advance democracy than to legitimize and sustain authoritarian rule.

Most new democracies are very weak institutionally. Presidents, prime ministers, their cabinets and bureaucracies dominate governance, as legislatures have little autonomous power, resources, or experience. Local governments, even if they are elected, have scant financial resources or administrative capacity, and judiciaries have little real authority to enforce a rule of law. Elections typically begin with a highly fragmented landscape of political parties, few if any of which have significant and stable bases of support, especially outside the major cities. Most parties are heavily dependent on a few notable personalities, or on a shared ethnic identity, or both. By Huntington's classic criteria of institutionalization, they lack coherence, complexity, autonomy from other social groups, and, of course, adaptability (since, being new, they have had little chance to evolve with a changing environment).<sup>78</sup>

For several reasons, political institutionalization in general, and the party system in particular, is strongly related to the persistence and stability of democracy.<sup>79</sup>

First, because institutions structure behavior into stable, predictable, and recurrent patterns, institutionalized systems are less volatile and more enduring, and so are institutionalized democracies. Acting within well-established and normatively shared institutional settings, individuals and groups confine themselves to legal and constitutional methods that eschew the use or threat of force. The outcomes of electoral and other conflicts remain uncertain, but that uncertainty is bounded by rules that protect basic interests, and it is also eased by the knowledge that these institutionalized interactions will continue indefinitely, generating a long-term view that induces moderation, bargaining, accommodation, and trust among competing actors.<sup>80</sup> Political parties in particular are crucial, because they remain "the most important mediating institutions between the citizenry and the state," indispensable not only for forming government but also for constituting effective opposition.<sup>81</sup>

Second, regardless of how they perform economically, democracies with more coherent and effective political institutions will be more likely to perform well politically in maintaining not only political order but a rule of law, in ensuring civil liberties, in checking the abuse of power, and in providing meaningful representation, competition, choice, and accountability. Third, well-institutionalized democracies are also more likely to produce, over the long run, workable, sustainable, and effective economic and social policies, because they have more effective and stable structures for representing interests and because they are more likely to produce working



legislative majorities or coalitions that can adopt and sustain policies. Moreover, a strong party system facilitates governability and effective macroeconomic management even in the face of prolonged economic crisis.<sup>82</sup> Finally, and largely because of all these factors, democracies with capable, coherent democratic institutions are better able to limit military involvement in politics and assert civilian control over the military.

Traditional development assistance programs sought to strengthen the bureaucracy and executive branch. While state strengthening and civil service reform are important targets of World Bank and other economic assistance and are crucial to the institutionalization of market-oriented reforms, democratic assistance targets the input and response mechanisms of the political system--legislatures, local governments, and political parties--as well as the judicial system and the electoral process.

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### *Legislative Assistance*

Legislative assistance programs not only improve the legal and technical ability of legislators and staffs to write legislation (which in many countries has historically been the virtual monopoly of the executive branch); they also aim to strengthen a number of other key functions: committee systems; library, information, and research support services; oversight of executive branch agencies (including ultimately the military and intelligence apparatus); communicating with and serving constituencies; drafting and analyzing budgets; computerizing legislative operations; and opening the legislative process to greater citizen access, participation, and scrutiny. The last goal involves a distinctly important dimension of the democratic state's engagement with civil society (which the Asia Foundation, among others, has heavily supported), including public hearings, public dissemination of legislative proceedings, training for parliamentary reporters, public opinion polling on issues before the legislature, and independent watchdog groups. Like so much of institution building, legislative development relies heavily on training (particularly of permanent staff), but it is also advanced through the transfer of financial resources, resident advice, organizational forms, and books and equipment, particularly computers. With decades of experience and several specialized organizations, this is one of the best developed forms of institutional assistance.

### *Local Governments*

Local government assistance nurtures the ability of municipalities and rural districts to govern their own affairs, enhancing the skills both of elected officials and of staffs. Improving communication between officials and local constituents is again an important theme. So are crafting and managing budgets, working with higher levels of government authority, dividing responsibility between mayors and elected councils, and other features of democratic law-making and governance at the local level.

### *Developing Political Parties*

Political party building is a crucial and too often neglected element of democratic development. Despite the advent of television, computer networks, and public opinion polling, as well as the proliferation of NGOs of all types, political parties remain the indispensable instruments for fashioning diverse identities, interests, and preferences into laws, appropriations, and governments. Without effective parties, democracies cannot have effective governance. Party building entails more than training party practitioners in campaign organization, use of the mass media, candidate recruitment, and the like. It requires training in techniques of membership recruitment, volunteer organization, local branch development, fundraising, public opinion polling, interest group liaison, policy research, message development, constituency contact, and coordination between parliamentary and extraparliamentary wings. It may involve education about alternative electoral laws and the different incentives and party systems they generate. Often it requires assistance to overhaul and democratize established parties that have become brittle, corrupt, and unresponsive. Among the reforms that can help to invigorate and democratize parties are competitive primaries to select candidates, transparent procedures, greater scope for participation of grassroots volunteers, and more effective two-way communication between national party headquarters and local branches.

### *Legal and Judicial Assistance*

Building a legal and judicial system is a much more extensive undertaking than merely training judges, magistrates, clerks, prosecutors, public defenders, police, and investigators--though all of that is centrally involved. Often, a very substantial presence of expert legal advisors from abroad may be useful in helping to redraft and codify criminal laws and procedures. Computers and other equipment may help to modernize and speed up judicial proceedings. Frequently the courts (and even the national legislatures) need the most basic type of infrastructural assistance, such as money for adequate working facilities, to operate effectively. However, democratic rule of law involves more than the official administration of justice. It requires a supporting culture and institutional framework in society. Even in an institution- building sense, development of a democratic judicial system must involve parallel assistance to train judicial reporters, fund legal aid programs, improve law schools, strengthen bar associations, and institute basic human rights and legal education at all levels of society.

Strong advocacy groups in civil society and aggressive, resourceful investigative reporting are especially crucial to the challenge of controlling corruption--an indispensable dimension of a democratic rule of law. This is the aspect of democratic legality that vested political, bureaucratic, and socioeconomic interests most resist. Foreign donors can invest huge sums of money, expertise, and time in helping to develop effective auditing staffs and procedures, but to no avail if their investigations are sidelined and their reports are buried and if an auditor-general lacks the autonomy and legal standing to expose and bring to punishment venal officials. The same is true for the judicial system more broadly, which often requires broad structural (and even constitutional) reform to establish more autonomy for the judiciary in budgeting, administration, and review of executive and legislative actions, as well as higher professional standards for appointments.

### *The Importance of the Political Context*

AID experience with rule-of-law programs suggests the importance of the political context for any effective democratic institution building. Professional training and modern technology may produce little improvement in judicial (and for that matter, other democratic) performance "in the absence of a political commitment" at high levels.<sup>83</sup> Similarly, much knowledge has accumulated about how to improve auditing and management information systems, alter incentive structures, circumscribe the discretion of government officials, and narrow the scope for rent-seeking in order to control corruption. But only committed political leadership can make these work.<sup>84</sup> Foreign donors must look for, or find ways of using leverage to generate this political commitment, or assistance may be consumed eagerly, but with little impact. This is precisely why a balanced approach is needed, which simultaneously develops societal as well as governmental institutions. Independent NGOs and media are vital in mobilizing the public support for reform and accountability that make possible effective institution building in the state sector.

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## **ELECTION ASSISTANCE**

Election assistance involves preparing, conducting, monitoring, and observing a free and fair election.<sup>85</sup> The great fund of technical knowledge accumulated has enabled organizations like NDI and IFES to provide expert, independent recommendations for reforming electoral codes and reorganizing electoral procedures in order to break deadlock and win the confidence of both government and opposition. With sufficient numbers of trained domestic monitors and international observers, it is not difficult to detect organized efforts at fraud. The premier instrument for doing so is the parallel vote tabulation, by which independent monitors report the results from individual polling stations (either all of them or, if a "quick count" is sought, a statistical random sample) directly to a nonpartisan watch group (usually aided by international observers), which then collates and announces its own count.<sup>86</sup> However, observers can render adequate judgments about the overall freedom and fairness of the election only if they begin work sufficiently well in advance of the voting (as much as six months) not only to assess administrative preparations, train monitors, and prepare for election day, but also to observe the election campaign for signs of official intimidation, lack of access to the media, and misuse of government resources by the incumbent party.

Few instruments of democracy promotion have had as immediately and clearly visible an impact as international election observing. Free and fair elections are only one dimension of democracy, albeit an indispensable one, but they are too often equated with democracy itself. There are often forbidding obstacles to the conduct of free and fair elections at the dawn of a new regime or in a period of political crisis. At a minimum, a well-organized team of international observers can help to verify the election results so as to enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the declared victor in a polarized contest, as in South Korea in 1987 and Bulgaria in 1990. In some countries, their presence has deterred an authoritarian or incumbent government from rigging the election or forging or canceling the result, as with the 1988 plebiscite that ended Pinochet's rule in Chile; the December 1991 elections in Zambia that defeated President Kenneth Kaunda after 27 years of rule; and the recent founding elections in South Africa and Malawi, where long-ruling parties went down to peaceful defeat.<sup>87</sup> Where fraud does occur, as in Panama under Noriega (1989) and

the Philippines under Marcos (1986), observers can demonstrate the fraud and deny the result domestic and international acceptance. At times, observers can also go much further, helping bitterly opposed sides to negotiate mutually acceptable terms of the electoral game, and even mediating the implementation of "a collectively guaranteed process of national reconciliation and democratization," as in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Cambodia. Many times, the international role is truly indispensable, since mediation and observing of elections requires impartial arbiters whom all sides can trust.<sup>88</sup>

As with other forms of political assistance, election observing requires political will to succeed--in this case, will on the part of the international community to hold a particular regime to the same democratic standards as others and to impose sanctions if it fails to meet them. Election observing failed to advance democratization in some recent instances--notably the 1992 presidential elections in Cameroon and Kenya--because of divisions among international actors. While NDI's observer mission found widespread irregularities in Cameroon's elections and the United States imposed sanctions, France ignored the ample evidence of fraud and embraced the regime. In Kenya, NDI was excluded from the international observing process altogether, and its efforts to aid Kenyan civic organizations to develop a nonpartisan election-monitoring program were hindered.<sup>89</sup> This left the international responsibility to 160 observers from IRI and the Commonwealth who were perhaps less aggressive; they declared the voting largely "free and fair," in contrast to independent domestic observers who pointed to numerous irregularities in ten key "swing" constituencies. The lack of unity in assessments, the underemphasis given to malpractices in advance of the election, and the severe divisions in opposition political ranks undermined the formation of any clear judgement that Moi had stolen the election, and thus enabled the regime to squeak through to reelection with some remnant of political legitimacy and international tolerance.<sup>90</sup>

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## **AIDING CIVIL SOCIETY**

Aiding civil society is the third dimension of political assistance, and it goes hand in hand with the other two. Election monitoring often stimulates independent civic efforts, because of the large numbers of domestic monitors who must be trained and deployed (3,500 for a small country like Zambia). Founding elections are often the genesis for civic education organizations, like the Latin American network *Conciencia*, that go on over a period of years to heighten civic awareness, encourage tolerance and compromise, and mobilize women and other excluded groups. Rule-of-law assistance programs increasingly seek to strengthen independent media, research, training, and advocacy organizations in civil society both to deepen democratic legal capacities and culture and to generate informed political pressure on the state to undertake democratic reforms. Such examples point to the significant complementarity between state and civil society in the construction of democracy.<sup>91</sup>

Civil society development takes work, and, especially in the former Communist countries, must struggle against debilitating legacies of distrust, both in public institutions and in fellow citizens. It is precisely this pervasive distrust that makes the construction of a vibrant civil society (interacting, in particular, with autonomous local government) essential, for "the construction of

trustworthy institutions is more likely to happen from the bottom up than from the top down."<sup>92</sup> The purposes of international assistance for civil society development are well expressed in the goals of the Polish community outreach program, DIALOG, which is supported by the German Marshall Fund: "to encourage citizens to respond actively to problems that concern them; and, through such responses, to build--or rebuild--a civil society. A society in which ordinary citizens trust each other, organize voluntarily to achieve common ends, expect local government to respond to their needs, and participate generally in the public life of the community."<sup>93</sup> As Robert Putnam has shown in his work on Italy, social trust and cooperation, norms of reciprocity, and networks of civic engagement reinforce one another and undergird the vitality of democracy.<sup>94</sup>

As with political party development, assistance to civil society groups heavily involves education and training (including the training of trainers and of leaders of independent organizations) in forming, building, and running an organization democratically: drafting a constitution or by-laws, facilitating meetings, recruiting volunteers, eliciting active participation, expanding membership, holding elections, tolerating differences, resolving conflict, raising funds, managing projects, advocating policies, building networks of associations, and relating to the press, public, and government. Training in more specialized skills--grant proposal writing, financial accounting, curriculum development, civic education, program evaluation, computer networking, public opinion polling, and statistical analysis--is often also needed, along with equipment, infrastructure, project funding, and general operational support. In very poor countries, and in those with massive inequalities and scant civic traditions, it is often unrealistic to expect that groups seeking to reform the political process, empower marginalized groups, and challenge established interests can maintain ambitious agendas while being (or becoming) self-supporting. International donors should provide their grantees in civil society with incentives and skills to develop indigenous funding sources (even in very small amounts from mass memberships), while recognizing the limits of the possible in countries without broad middle classes or enlightened elites.

Aiding civil society also complements and overlaps with more traditional development assistance goals and programs. When a women's group receives assistance to develop a network of cooperatives, or an environmental group to lobby for pollution controls, or a research institute to study market reforms, or a university to initiate a new school of public administration, or a trade union to enhance its bargaining ability, the grants may be for economic and social development, but they also have political consequences. By strengthening the capacity of independent actors in civil society, they broaden participation and enhance the prospects for democratic accountability and responsiveness.

Aid to challenging groups in civil society (including groups in exile) is often the most effective way of pressuring for democratic change in a country with an entrenched authoritarian regime. In a great many developing and post-Communist countries, organizations and, especially, broad coalitions in civil society have been at the forefront of pressure for democratic transitions. However, while aid to civil society can empower democratic groups, it usually cannot do so sufficiently to tip the balance toward a democratic transition without additional international pressures, fortuitous fractures in the regime, or other changes in society and politics (for

example, changes induced by economic development) that take place only gradually, over a long period of time.

International assistance to civil society can also contribute significantly to democratic consolidation, in which civil institutions may perform a number of crucial functions: scrutinizing and containing the power of the state; educating people about public affairs, political issues, and their civic rights and duties; increasing citizen participation, efficacy, and skill; developing a democratic culture of tolerance, moderation, and willingness to compromise; providing additional channels for interest representation; recruiting and training new political leaders; monitoring elections and government performance; and generating democratic constituencies for market reforms. Again, these functions do not merely involve watching and challenging the state; in the end they strengthen it by enhancing its accountability and responsiveness.<sup>95</sup> Many of the political assistance grants described earlier and listed in Table 1 serve these long-term goals of building a pluralistic, informed, participatory, and tolerant civil society.

However, democracy assistance organizations must be sensitive to the tensions they may generate by aiding civil society actors. In strengthening challenging and oppositional groups and neglecting state institutions, they may undermine governability. In aiding numerous interest groups with particularistic demands, they may diminish political parties and risk generating a floodtide of spending appeals and interest conflicts that may overwhelm state capacities. Related to this is the potential to stimulate religious and cultural conflict by advancing Western notions of development, democracy, and the "good society" in societies with strong alternative notions of these values.<sup>96</sup> None of these caveats provide reason not to act in support of civil society development abroad, but they do suggest that international donors should proceed with caution, weighing the long-term consequences of their assistance and the need for institutional balance and synergy between the state and civil society.

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## ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

New (as well as established) democracies around the world have shown much greater capacity to launch bold economic reforms than many critics could have imagined.<sup>97</sup> Nevertheless, such reforms typically are accompanied by increased unemployment and hardship for many middle- and lower-class groups. Moreover, fear of these consequences often leads politicians to avoid instituting urgently needed reforms, aggravating macroeconomic imbalances and throwing the economy deeper into crisis. History and logic suggest that economic crisis and hardship cannot continue indefinitely without undermining the legitimacy of democracy and gravely damaging its quality. Already, significant erosion of democracy is apparent in Latin America, due in part to the strains of the prolonged economic crisis in countries like Peru, Venezuela, and Brazil.<sup>98</sup>

New democracies, and international actors who wish them well, together confront a major dilemma. Democracy cannot be consolidated unless the regime lays the basis for (eventual) sustainable economic growth. Such economic dynamism, it is increasingly apparent, cannot be achieved without reforms (of a very radical nature in post-Communist and formerly very statist economies) to stabilize and liberalize the economy. Yet such policies are extremely painful in the

short term and therefore risk generating intense political opposition that may deter, dilute, or reverse their implementation. How can the tensions between democracy and economic reform be mitigated? There are many answers to this question, involving shrewd political strategies, the education and mobilization of key, potentially supportive domestic constituencies, and the construction of social safety nets to ease the pain of adjustment.<sup>99</sup> But the success of these strategies depends in part, perhaps crucially, on the availability of international support, conditioned on the pursuit of economic reform policies.<sup>100</sup>

At the center of the new political economy of international aid has been an implicit bargain between the creditors and donors on the one hand and the (usually deeply indebted) reforming governments on the other: that if these Third World and post-Communist countries "successfully reform their economies in a neoclassical manner with the direction and help of the <sup>IMF and the World Bank</sup>, then new voluntary bank loans and foreign investment will be available to underpin and sustain the reform efforts. This implicit bargain has failed in most places.<sup>101</sup> While capital flows did increase to Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s (mainly attracted by reform), foreign investment has been slow to enter much of the post-Communist world and especially Africa. The massive levels of Africa's external debt (relative to GDP) present a particularly difficult problem, both because debt servicing eats up resources badly needed for investment in human and physical capital and because the debt is held by the very international financial institutions that are pressing for reform. "To insist that African countries meet their debt repayments weakens reform, but not to enforce arrangements weakens the <sup>international financial institutions</sup> as creditor agencies."<sup>102</sup>

Prospects for reform and democratic consolidation would clearly be advanced around the world by making the bargain real. A number of new democracies have received, as a reward for democratizing, at least a temporary aid bonus from the United States and other donors. That is helpful but inadequate. In the poorest countries, particularly in Africa, debt relief must feature prominently, because the debt will never be repaid. A concrete bargain that could do much to facilitate renewed development and to strengthen domestic constituencies for reform would freeze debt service payments in these countries and then retire the debt at some fixed rate (for example, 10 percent per year) for every year that a country remains committed to democracy and economic reform policies. Specific levels of new aid might also be incorporated into this ten-year commitment.<sup>103</sup> Long-term commitments of this nature offer hope of overcoming the two most serious problems with aid conditionality at present: the lack of adequate resource flows to assist adjustment and the temporary, episodic nature of assistance from international donors. "A temporary reward is a recipe for temporary liberalisation."<sup>104</sup> By contrast, if an explicit longer-term agreement could help lock a country into economic reform policies and democratic institutions for a decade or so, these policies and institutions would have the time to begin to yield concrete results, developing new constituencies of support and self-sustaining political momentum.

Among the most urgent needs for international assistance is the need to help fund safety net programs, which temporarily provide food, income, jobs, schools, health care, and infrastructure to the poor, ideally in response to decentralized initiatives from grassroots community organizations and local governments.<sup>105</sup> This is not mere charity to aid the poor abroad, but an investment in the economic reform of particular countries, and therefore in their democracies and

in their long-term political stability and responsibility on the international stage. The case for aiding countries (most of all Russia, but also Ukraine and the Eastern European nations) where an undesirable outcome could affect the national security of the United States, Europe, and Japan is especially compelling.

Yet curiously, for the country where the West has the biggest self-interest in the success of reform--Russia--international aid was notoriously slow to be delivered, despite lofty promises of, first, a \$24 billion commitment from the G-7 in 1992, which was raised to \$44 billion the following year.<sup>106</sup> In January 1993 Jeffrey Sachs proposed that the West boldly assist Russian reform with "real stabilization support" for the ruble and a deep debt rescheduling, a support fund for small businesses, several billion dollars in funds to assist long-term industrial restructuring, and support for social programs, "mainly unemployment compensation and job retraining-- both to serve as a political signal and to provide budgetary support, which is crucial to stabilization."<sup>107</sup> This might have made a real difference. However, the failure of the West to support Russian economic reform with the tangible assistance that had been pledged seriously undermined the agents of reform, led by Yegor Gaidar.<sup>108</sup> Compare this with the \$1 billion stabilization fund Poland received in 1990 to help launch the Balcerowicz plan. As Sachs argues, the IMF's insistence on seeing demonstrated progress before aid is forthcoming may be poorly suited to the crisis pressures of "life in the economic emergency room." In fact, the IMF and World Bank do not seem to be the appropriate institutions for delivering assistance whose urgent imperatives rely more on political than technical economic calculations.<sup>109</sup>

At the same time, however, international advocates of reform must not lose sight of the important connections between economic and political reform. "It is naive to pour millions of dollars into promoting privatization when the legal framework and political support for protecting private property do not exist. Political reform in Russia has helped, not impeded, economic reform."<sup>110</sup> Yet most of the U.S. and international assistance that has been delivered to Russia has been for economic reform; of \$2.1 billion allocated for Russian assistance through AID in 1994, only \$30 million was designated for "democratic pluralism initiatives."<sup>111</sup>

International support for reform also needs to maintain a low profile and some sense of humility and sensitivity to individual country circumstances and national pride. We have seen already, in the neofascist Zhirinovsky's strong showing in the December 1993 elections, how tough times and personal hardships can generate acute resentment of foreign models and influences, resentment that is readily exploitable by zealots, demagogues, and xenophobes. In assisting reform, international actors have to tread a careful path between firm conditionality and arrogant (and often ill-informed) imposition of detailed policy prescriptions.<sup>112</sup>

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## DIPLOMACY, AID CONDITIONALITY, AND SANCTIONS

Diplomatic persuasion and pressure, and such tangible instruments of pressure as sanctions and aid conditionality, may induce a regime to do politically what it would not otherwise do: become more democratic. They do so by offering rewards and/or imposing costs greater than the costs the regime perceives from the conditions demanded: improving human rights, relaxing political



restrictions, backing down from a military coup or an election annulment, implementing democracy. Thus, conditionality works best with a regime that is sufficiently divided or ambivalent over the issue of political reform that external pressure can help to tip the balance.<sup>113</sup>

Democratic aid conditionality may be imposed *ad hoc* on certain countries at pivotal moments of political stress and change, or it may be institutionalized in universal standing conditions that are considered to apply to all potential members or aid recipients. The latter is more effective, because it is more credible and can have a prophylactic effect in preventing democratic erosion or reversals. The growing institutional architecture of Europe, beginning with the EU, has been the most effective in using explicit, standing conditionality both to encourage countries to become democratic (in Eastern Europe) and to discourage member states from abandoning democracy. Increasingly, would-be autocrats have to ponder the heavy price their country would pay in loss of aid, capital, trade, investment, and symbolic status if they were to roll back democracy.

However, aid conditionality has its costs and risks as well. It may generate conflicting logics if it encompasses both economic and political dimensions, as some regimes will satisfy one dimension and not the other. Its democratic aims may conflict with other (strategic and commercial) foreign policy goals, "pitting credibility against realistic flexibility."<sup>114</sup> It may provoke further repression by a regime that resents the violation of its sovereignty and feels strong enough to resist the pressure. International sanctions may be welcomed by democratic forces within a country, but they may also enable the regime to marginalize a democratic movement, discredit them as unpatriotic, and rally national anger and frustration, particularly if the general population suffers from the imposition of sanctions. Alternatively, some have argued, democratic (and also economic) conditionality may work but only superficially, inducing ruling elites to make tactical concessions they will later hollow out, or "externalizing responsibility" for a country's political fate and thereby preempting "longer-run processes of learning and organization" crucial to enduring democratization.<sup>115</sup>

The experience of recent decades offers several lessons about the potential utility of conditions and sanctions. The more they focus on specific, monitorable goals (such as human rights conditions, free and fair elections, a return to civilian constitutional rule), the more likely they will have a discernible effect. The more they can be targeted to hurt an offending regime without damaging the population--as with cut-offs of military and security assistance--the less the chance of a popular nationalist reaction. The more the regime's international allies, donors, and partners can be rallied to support the sanctions or conditions, the less feasible it will be for the regime to resist them. And at best, aid conditionality can only be "a useful complement to other approaches encouraging political reforms--not a strategy in its own right."<sup>116</sup>

Beyond friendly dialogue to persuade a regime of "its own best interests"--what the Reagan Administration termed "constructive engagement" with respect to its South Africa policy--diplomatic pressure or aid conditionality requires real leverage to be successful. Even where that exists, as with the huge volume of U.S. imports of Chinese goods, the target regime may judge the political cost of the conditions too great and the levers at its own disposal not insignificant. Thus did the Clinton Administration correctly judge in 1994 that China would not yield to U.S. human rights conditions for "Most Favored Nation" trading status, which it had imposed

unilaterally. One wonders whether the United States and European democracies would not have more success in inducing Turkey to improve its deteriorating human rights record, and to give full citizenship rights to the Kurds, if they did not depend so much on Turkey as a strategic counterweight to the radical Islamic states and a conduit for assistance and outreach to the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, and if the EU were willing to commit itself to Turkey's admission in exchange for fundamental improvements in human rights.<sup>117</sup> This raises another problem with democratic conditionality--that the United States historically has tended to satisfy itself with the civilian, electoral form of democracy rather than the substance, and has too little concerned itself with actual behavior of the regime after the transition. This is a problem the Western European democracies may increasingly confront as pressure grows for integration with Central and Eastern Europe.

During the "third wave," U.S. and international diplomatic pressures have contributed to democratization and political liberalization, but only when they followed the above lessons and reinforced significant domestic pressures. One way diplomatic pressures have worked has been to narrow the domestic support of authoritarian regimes and to aggravate internal divisions. Carter administration human rights pressure on Uruguay and especially Argentina, including cut-offs of military and economic aid and other sanctions, had this kind of effect, while bringing significant improvement in human rights.<sup>118</sup> Carter administration human rights policies, along with specific diplomatic initiatives, also supported democratic transition in Peru, "prevented an authoritarian relapse" in Ecuador in 1978, and in that same year deterred vote fraud in the Dominican Republic's presidential election.<sup>119</sup> Although the Carter administration marked a new departure in emphasizing and operationalizing human rights concerns in U.S. policy, it was also torn by the same pull of conflicting interests, and thus the inconsistency, that has characterized every liberal internationalist presidency from Wilson to Clinton.<sup>120</sup>

Pressure from the Reagan administration, the U.S. Congress, and international public opinion, interacting with rising domestic mobilization and a loss of business confidence, led Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos to call the 1986 presidential "snap election" that independent election observers judged he lost to Corazon Aquino. In the tense days following the February 7 vote, a deliberate U.S. policy to "accelerate the succession" (led by Secretary of State Shultz, who repeatedly had to press a reluctant President Reagan) helped to frustrate Marcos's effort to retain power through massive electoral fraud. The United States warned Marcos against suppressing the independent poll-watching group NAMFREL, vigorously challenged the election's credibility, threatened to cut off military aid if Marcos used military force against a prodemocratic army rebellion, and finally (with the prospect of mass bloodshed hanging in the balance) told Marcos it was time to go.<sup>121</sup> American pressure (both coercive and diplomatic) figured prominently, too, in the decision of the Sandinistas to hold early and free elections, as did a mix of other domestic and international factors (including the promise of new Western aid after free elections).<sup>122</sup> During the Reagan years, U.S. diplomatic and economic pressure, and its symbolic support for human rights and peaceful democratic change, ultimately contributed to democratic transitions in Chile and South Korea as well (in part by deterring the Chun Doo Hwan government from forcibly suppressing prodemocracy demonstrations in 1987), while preventing planned military coups in El Salvador, Honduras, and Bolivia in the early 1980s and in Peru in January 1989.<sup>123</sup> "In each case, however, international support for democracy worked only because it *reinforced* domestic groups and sectors of the military opposed to military

intervention."<sup>124</sup> Moreover, throughout these years, the goals of democracy promotion and of fighting Communism struggled for policy dominance (and for Reagan's soul), and although the former increasingly prevailed in Reagan's second term, the massive military assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras appear to have undermined the ability of embattled civilian, democratic forces to gain control over abusive and powerful militaries.<sup>125</sup>

U.S. diplomatic pressure (backed by the threat of severe sanctions) also played an important role in dissuading the Guatemalan military from throwing its weight behind the *autogolpe* of President Jorge Serrano in May 1993, thus leading to its unraveling. More important, however, "was the unanimity of purpose shown by the OAS member states and the unequivocal and immediate message conveyed to the Serrano administration and other forces that Guatemala would face political isolation and economic sanctions if constitutional rule remained disrupted."<sup>126</sup> Again, however, both OAS and international pressure worked as rapidly as they did only because of the massive mobilization of Guatemalan civil society.<sup>127</sup> Overall, Huntington concluded that (between 1974 and 1991) "U.S. support was critical to democratization in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, Panama, and the Philippines and that it was a contributing factor to democratization in Portugal, Chile, Poland, Korea, Bolivia and Taiwan."<sup>128</sup> More difficult to assess but probably quite significant during the third wave--not only in encouraging democratic transitions but in discouraging reversals--has been the cumulative effect of the U.S. and European policies in generating a global normative climate inhospitable to authoritarian rule.

Both governments and societies respond to international sanctions, and also to anticipated rewards. In Taiwan, "the political reform movement was initially triggered" in the early 1970s by the "forced severance of its formal ties with many Western countries and its loss of membership in the United Nations," which catalyzed a wave of new intellectual concern with domestic politics.<sup>129</sup> Sophisticated Taiwanese began to realize that democratization was the only way their country could become politically reintegrated into the world and ultimately accepted as a full partner among advanced, industrial nations. This factor also played an important, if intangible, role in the transition to democracy in South Korea (which feared losing the prestige of hosting the 1988 Olympics) and in Chile. In these contexts of economic dynamism, broad international criticism of authoritarian rule bred a sense of isolation and a desire to be regarded with respect by the industrialized democracies.<sup>130</sup>

Nowhere was the sense of isolation sharper and more dispiriting than in South Africa. Years of stiffening international sanctions and opprobrium, along with other dramatic changes in the international environment, were instrumental in inducing key elites in South Africa's business establishment and ruling National Party to abandon apartheid and to opt for a negotiated transition to democracy. Economic sanctions and disinvestment by the Western powers--"as much a psychological as a financial blow"--merged with the decline in global gold prices and domestically generated debt and inflation to produce "protracted recession, capital flight, and a profound sense of isolation. . . . Whites began to realize that unless they came to terms with the political demands of the black population, the economic noose would not loosen."<sup>131</sup> The South African experience shows that country-specific sanctions can work when major powers cooperate and domestic pressures converge.

International diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions have played an important role in facilitating Africa's "second liberation," which began with the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990 and the assumption of effective power by the national conference in Benin in that same month. These two seminal developments coincided with a sharp turnabout in the aid and diplomatic policies of the principal Western powers, the United States, Britain, and France. Each of them announced that year new initiatives to tie economic aid to political and economic liberalization. Other bilateral aid donors as well--the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Canada, and to some extent Germany and Japan--were also moving toward some degree of conditionality or consideration for human rights and democracy conditions in the allocation of aid.<sup>132</sup> [France's implementation of democratic conditionality](#) was the most dramatic (albeit short-lived), as it was a radical departure from its past cynical, neocolonial embrace of African dictators. The new French policy quickly contributed to the downfall of the Kerekou regime in Benin (which, without French subsidies could not pay its civil servants), the initiation of democratic transitions (since successfully completed) in Mali, Niger, and Madagascar, and more limited and equivocal political openings in Chad, the Congo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Gabon.<sup>133</sup>

The most decisive evidence of the new conditionality in Anglophone Africa came in Kenya, where U.S. Ambassador Smith Hempstone had already become a thorn in the side of the Moi regime with his open appeals for democratic reform and gestures of support for human rights causes. At the November 1991 meeting in Paris of the Consultative Group for Kenya, the country's international aid donors "established explicit political conditions for assistance, making Kenya a precedent for the rest of Africa."<sup>134</sup> New aid was suspended for six months, pending "the early implementation of political reform."<sup>135</sup> These international pressures forced the regime to repeal the ban on opposition parties one week after the Paris meeting (a fact which President Moi bitterly conceded two months later)<sup>136</sup> and to hold multiparty elections a year later that could have led to a democratic transition if the political opposition (with Machiavellian help from the regime, to be sure) had not fractured along ethnic lines. A similar decision by international donors in May 1992 to freeze \$74 million in aid to Malawi (following the first mass protest demonstrations in 28 years) compelled the iron-fisted regime of Hastings Banda in Malawi to liberalize: a national referendum on multiparty competition produced a severe defeat for the regime in June 1993 and led to multiparty elections in which it was similarly crushed the following year.

It would seem that the power of the democratic donors was nowhere greater than in Africa, and particularly during the 1990s, when one country after another experienced vigorous domestic mobilization for democratic change. Yet since 1990, only about a dozen of some four dozen nondemocratic regimes in Africa had adopted multiparty, constitutional systems. A number of transitions, as in Nigeria and Zaire, have effectively been aborted or (as in Cameroon, Kenya, Gabon, and the Ivory Coast) have been hijacked by ruling elites through fraudulent elections. If international actors have so much power in Africa, and the moment is so propitious, why has there not been more democratic progress?

As the above examples demonstrate, the power of international donors to induce democratic change (or otherwise shape behavior) through aid conditionality is directly proportional to the dependence of the aid recipients (or debtors) upon them and to the unity of the donor community

in imposing conditions on individual authoritarian regimes.<sup>137</sup> Disastrous divisions and miscalculations on the part of regime opponents (some of whom have questionable commitments to democracy themselves) contributed heavily to setbacks in most of these instances. But so did equivocation and division on the part of the international community. Although the United States imposed sanctions on the Nigerian military regime after its annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election (including suspension of a very modest aid program, and, most seriously, a ban on individual travel to the United States by regime members), other key actors such as France, Germany, and Japan held back, and Britain later backed away from its initial tough stance. Two years later, the most repressive Nigerian military regime ever was still operating in the international economy, and its top officers were still depositing and investing abroad staggering fortunes in corrupt personal wealth, largely free of penalty or pressure from the international community. In Kenya, British and World Bank pressure to resume aid, and the arrival of a new American ambassador with a more economy-centered perspective, led to a limited resumption of assistance and a consequent weakening (at least for the time being) of democratizing pressure on the Moi regime. Only now, with the continued erosion of economic and political order in Kenya, are the donors showing signs of reasserting full conditionality.

Most damaging has been the rapid French retreat from its November 1990 embrace of democratic conditionality. At the Francophone conference a year later, President Mitterand considerably diluted the message he had given at La Baule; six days after the announcement of that more lax stance, troops loyal to Togolese dictator Eyadema launched a coup in Lome to derail the democratic transition.<sup>138</sup> And, as mentioned above, despite ample evidence of fraud in Cameroon's 1992 elections, France endorsed the results and proceeded two months later to grant Cameroon roughly \$110 million in new loans (while the United States suspended \$14 million in aid following the election).<sup>139</sup> This barely enabled Cameroon to reschedule its debts to the IMF and World Bank (failing which all international aid would have been halted).<sup>140</sup> The following May, "Mr. Biya was welcomed in Paris by both Mr. Mitterand and the new French prime Minister Edouard Balladur."<sup>141</sup>

Before international actors can even have the possibility of promoting democracy, they must first have the collective will. In an increasingly multipolar world (with U.S. dominance declining), divergent, mercantilist and narrowly self-interested policies on the part of the principal established democracies considerably diminish the prospects for democratic change in the short term. Aid conditionality can work only if the major donors coordinate their conditions, both in their treatment of specific countries and also on general principles, and if they sustain those conditions over time.

The need for coherence is no less compelling *within* the U.S. government. One of the greatest handicaps to the effective exercise of U.S. diplomacy and aid for democracy promotion has been inconsistency across different policy centers and in the treatment of different regimes. Increasingly, traditional policy rivalry between the White House and the Congress, and among the State and Defense departments, the National Security Council, and the intelligence agencies, is compounded by the disparate policy interests and demands of the Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture and Justice departments, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Office of the Trade Representative, and so on.<sup>142</sup> Two types of cleavage drive these increasingly complex conflicts. There are sharply differing perspectives and priorities, deriving from different conceptions of the

national interest in the post-Cold War world; these not only pit "new" emphases on trade and economics against the "old" emphases on military security and political alliances, they also pit conventional conceptions of national security against new, more global and preventive orientations of the kind emphasized here. A second, related source of cleavage stems from concern to protect bureaucratic *raison d'Être* and overseas client relationships. Reports that the CIA covered up information about political assassinations and human rights violations by one of its own paid agents in the Guatemalan military, even in these post-Cold War years, suggest how profound and contemporary are these clashing bureaucratic interests and conceptions of the national security.

The Clinton administration's creation of the Interagency Working Group on Democracy, under the leadership of the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor, is a welcome step at improved coordination, but it is only a facilitating mechanism. If the political will (and skill) at the top to back a unified, prodemocracy foreign policy is lacking, no amount of coordination can produce it. The United States needs to craft a prodemocracy policy (indeed a foreign policy) that has the coherent backing of all foreign policy branches of the government and bipartisan support that can be sustained across administrations. This requires strong presidential leadership and clear preeminence for a forceful secretary of state as the president's chief foreign policy advisor and spokesperson. Such leadership must then take care to provide "unambiguous and consistent signals" about the high priority it attaches to the maintenance of democracy and human rights.<sup>143</sup> The concern for human rights (codified in aid conditionality) must be pressed with formally democratic regimes as well as with obviously undemocratic ones, and with friendly countries as well as unfriendly ones.<sup>144</sup>

Yet this raises one of the most troubling issues confronting democracy promotion policy, especially for a great power like the United States: the conflict between promoting democracy and securing other, "harder" national interests. Globally, the expansion of democracy serves the national interests of the United States and other established democracies by advancing peace, stability, legality, human dignity, property rights, and environmental protection in the international system. But it does not always do so immediately and everywhere. Democratic powers thus cannot avoid facing the "Algeria problem": what to do when a free and fair election, or a process of democratic opening, risks bringing to power an authoritarian and actively hostile government, which might ally itself with similar regimes. There is no easy answer to this painful dilemma, which is not usefully wished away by dismissing that particular experience as an "experiment." Democracies are under no moral obligation to support the coming to power of antidemocratic forces through elections (which were, after all, the vehicle that the Nazis rode to power). A demand by the established democracies for clear and unequivocal commitment to democratic standards and values by oppositional forces in exchange for active support for their political rights is not to engage in hypocrisy or double standards, so long as the test is evenly applied.

The only real resolution to the Algeria problem lies in earlier and more proactive engagement on behalf of democracy and human rights. Regime legitimacy deteriorates and extremist opposition develops in the face of sustained decadence, corruption, repression, and ineptitude on the part of ruling elites. If the democratic powers do not want to be faced with a choice between an existing and a future authoritarianism (as in Algeria) or between autocracy and anarchy (as may now be

the case in Zaire), they must press friendly authoritarian regimes (like Egypt's) to reform, renew, liberalize, and open up before it is too late.

## 5. ISSUES AND IMPERATIVES

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If recent trends are any guide, the period of rapid and easy gains for democracy in the world is now over. At best, we have probably entered a long period of halting institutionalization, uneven marketization, and considerable regime instability, in which most new democracies that progress toward consolidation will do so incrementally, others will continue to deteriorate institutionally or perform very poorly, and some will break down altogether.

Skeptics question whether external assistance can do much to foster democracy in the face of historical traditions, value systems, class structures, and embedded power distributions that are profoundly hostile to democracy.<sup>145</sup> To be sure, socioeconomic development (especially at higher levels) does alter political culture, class structure, civil society, and patterns of participation in ways that make stable democracy more likely.<sup>146</sup> Yet there are numerous grounds to resist an emphasis on societal preconditions. Democratization is triggered mainly by political factors. And many of the countries with longstanding democracies today--such as Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan, and Spain--were dismissed as unready for democracy only shortly before they achieved it. Given the precarious balance of political and social forces in many newly democratic and transitional countries, international actors would appear to have real scope to influence the course of political development. Their ability to do so, however, will depend on the extent to which they can rally their will, improve their effectiveness, and extend their time horizons. Whether and how they can do so raises a few additional issues worth mentioning in conclusion.

As the number of donor organizations, programs, and potential recipients proliferates, improved communication and coordination among political assistance efforts looms as an ever more important challenge. Agreement among international actors, both public and private, on more explicit norms and guidelines would help to focus their various aid and diplomatic efforts to promote democracy on a common set of clear, tangible, general, but realizable goals. With such stronger normative coordination, various democracy promotion efforts would have more potent reinforcing impacts, both practically and symbolically. At the operational level, greater networking and coordination may help to avoid duplication and waste, pool resources for major projects and urgent priorities, and diffuse knowledge about what works. Within individual countries, coordination of donors in the field can improve the efficiency and political leverage of their efforts.<sup>147</sup> Indeed, the need to systematize and share learning, develop common norms and rules, and coordinate more closely among the donors was the overarching conclusion of the conference organized by the Swedish government in May 1994 to consider improved donor cooperation in electoral assistance.<sup>148</sup>

In recent years, the official aid donors have made progress in coordinating their policies and programs for promoting democracy and good governance. Since 1990, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD has become increasingly active in promoting common policy orientations and shared learning with respect to what it has termed "Participatory

Development and Good Governance" (PDGG), a catchall term encompassing political democratization, human rights, the rule of law, public sector management, controlling corruption, reducing excessive military expenditures, strengthening civil society, and mobilizing broad-based participation in development (including participation of women and minorities, and especially at the local level). At its December 1993 High Level Meeting, the DAC adopted a remarkably comprehensive statement of common principles, approaches, and objectives for rendering assistance in these various areas, and established an *ad hoc* working group on PDGG.<sup>149</sup>

At the level of general principles and priorities, the donor countries appear increasingly united around the above PDGG aims. In practice, however, some powerful countries continue to chart divergent courses in the spirit of traditional, amoral "realism" in foreign affairs. French policy in Africa has heavily reverted to this pattern, and Japan has been the slowest of the major powers to break from it. This is perhaps not surprising, since Japan has also had the least democratic input into its foreign policy, and within the established democracies the concern for promoting democracy, human rights, and good governance abroad has been heavily driven by pressure from the media, civil society, legislators, and the informed public in their own societies.<sup>150</sup>

Effective coordination must go beyond principles, to specific countries and programs. For more than two decades, that has been the province of the "consultative groups" of aid donors for various specific countries, which are convened in Paris by the World Bank. During the 1990s, the consultative groups have become much more assertive in considering political issues of governance, democratization, and human rights, and even in conditioning aid on democratic progress, as was done for Kenya and Malawi. However, with a charter and an organizational culture that constrains it from venturing beyond economic considerations, the World Bank has not been comfortable dealing with democracy and human rights issues. This underscores the importance of tapping a different (bilateral donor) member, perhaps on a rotating basis, to take leadership responsibility for democracy issues within each consultative group, not only in preparing and facilitating the meeting but in following up and monitoring compliance. It may also be helpful to hold preparatory meetings within the recipient country to elicit broad commentary and open debate about the official aid relationship from civil society, opposition politicians, policy analysts, and the press in advance of the closed consultative group meetings in Paris.<sup>151</sup> Had such in-country meetings taken place in Kenya, and had there been rigorous monitoring of the regime's post-election assaults on democracy, it would have been much more difficult to justify the resumption of official economic assistance. PDGG principles and goals now appear firmly established on the agendas of the individual country consultative groups. But the consideration of PDGG goals must become more institutionalized, with standard procedures for broad consultation, more active participation of civil society in the policy dialogue, and sustained monitoring and enforcement.

Greater sharing of information and approaches is also needed among nongovernmental democracy assistance organizations. NED sought to initiate enhanced cooperation with a "democracy summit" in February 1993 that brought together representatives of NED and its four core institutes, the German *Stiftungen*, the Westminster Foundation, Canada's International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, as well as observers from the Japan Institute for International Affairs. A follow-up meeting, focusing more narrowly on programs in



Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, was convened later in the year by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. These were important first steps, but such exchanges and dialogues need to be institutionalized through more than occasional meetings. A useful instrument in this regard may be the new NED International Forum for Democratic Studies, which is constructing an electronic database of democracy promotion grants, a directory of democracy promotion organizations, and a global electronic information network connecting democracy promotion organizations and study centers, as well as conducting research, hosting conferences, and publishing on problems of democracy.

The International Institute for Democracy, set up on the initiative of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, serves as a clearinghouse for information on democracy and human rights by publishing the bimonthly *Clearing House Review*, a list of conferences and seminars as well as recent publications. It also publishes *Democracy*, the quarterly newsletter of the Strasbourg Conference on Parliamentary Democracy (which groups the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the national parliaments of Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and the United States). The institute also organizes training seminars on parliamentary procedure and law drafting for parliamentary staff and publishes its own studies.

Another valuable point of coordination will be the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), which was established in February 1995 at a founding conference of fourteen country sponsors, led by Sweden, whose government has contributed substantial resources to the effort, including a prominent building near the Swedish Parliament in Stockholm. The result of a two-year planning effort, International IDEA aims to facilitate interaction among organizations, agencies, and individuals active in the field of democratic development and electoral assistance; to establish and promote common guidelines for the development of democratic elections, parties, media, and other institutions; to create a user-friendly databank and inventory of existing research on elections and democracy; to produce and disseminate new research on the development and promotion of democracy; to link donors and recipients, and researchers and practitioners; and to offer advisory and capacity-building services for improving elections and other aspects of democratic functioning.<sup>152</sup>

Other private efforts are also under way, some regional and some sectoral, to facilitate the regular (even instantaneous) exchange of information among democracy assistance organizations (and research and studies programs) through E-mail and other networks. Comprehensive coordination of the incredible profusion of efforts is beyond the capacity of any organization, and such tight coordination might even threaten pluralism. But overlapping networks for information exchange and collaboration are gradually emerging and will be broadly beneficial.

As we have seen, nowhere is coordination more needed, and nowhere could it make a quicker and more decisive difference, than in the area of diplomacy (including sanctions and conditionality). Sanctions and diplomatic pressure succeed only where they are backed cohesively by the countries with influence over the target regime. In most countries where democratic possibilities have been squandered, stalled, or diminished, the trail of big-power divisions is easy to locate. Beyond Africa, one could point to Cambodia, where France and Japan supported antidemocratic demands of the incumbent Cambodian People's Party (while Thailand

treated with the Khmer Rouge in an exceptionally greedy pursuit of logging and gemstone profits); or Burma, where Thailand and Japan have backed a brutally repressive regime (to which Europe is also now resigning itself); or Vietnam, where the Western democracies abandoned the leverage they might have exercised for fundamental political liberalization in a headlong race to open Asia's next booming market; or Pakistan and Turkey, where, for strategic reasons, the United States has reacted rather passively to human rights violations and covert military domination.

Major and middle-level powers are not going to surrender their freedom to act to secure their own interests, but stronger democratic conditionality for aid, more closely coordinated among the major donors, would force ruling or military elites to think twice before desecrating democracy, "even if they know that the principle is not entirely consistently enforced."<sup>153</sup> More vigorous and creative diplomacy might mobilize pressure on dissenting donors, resulting in a more coherent stance by the democratic powers in a number of critical cases. That requires U.S. leadership, however, which in turn requires vision, vigor, and coherence in U.S. foreign policy. In the absence of these, the Western democratic alliance has weakened, drifted, and divided.

Failure to hone and coordinate the big-power and multilateral diplomatic instruments of democracy promotion could exact a heavy price. Not only does it risk big, visible setbacks for democracy with potentially significant regional effects--as in Nigeria, Pakistan, and, most of all, Russia--but it also threatens to erase enormous investments of money and human resources in specific democracy promotion projects that come to naught. One of the most serious problems in democracy promotion today is the disarticulation between the hundreds of democracy assistance donors, seeking incremental gains in civic and institutional capacity at the micro level, and the foreign policy strategies and actions--or inactions--of the major powers. Early action at crucial moments might prevent the macro-level blow-ups that level the democratic terrain. What democratic assistance impacts have survived the holocaust in Rwanda? Or the ruthless dictatorship in Sudan? What will survive in Nigeria if it descends into civil war? Or in Russia if an ultranationalist dictator takes power?

Both for individual organizations and governments and for the international community of democracy-promoting organizations and states, sharper strategic thinking is needed. The leading democracies, through their foreign policies and official aid commitments, must set priorities. Several criteria suggest themselves: the strategic importance of the country to their own security and to regional and global security more broadly; the degree to which democratic assistance is needed; the capacity of indigenous institutions and actors to absorb aid effectively; and the potential of a country to serve as a model, a point of diffusion, a "beachhead" for democratic development (and even a stabilizing anchor) within a region. Small countries like Costa Rica and Botswana have been able to play that role of regional model, and this argues for a global strategy that seeks to advance and consolidate democracies in every region, while recognizing that some countries are more plausible and serious democratic prospects than others. Partly because of its own ethnic complexity, the United States most of all--but increasingly Europe, Canada, and Australia as well--cannot afford to write off any portion of the less-developed world. It is increasingly apparent that intergroup conflict and humanitarian disasters have their roots in abusive and incompetent governance. The established democracies, and the multilateral institutions in which they exercise leadership, must seek to get at these roots, and that means a

global strategy of democracy promotion, with intelligent priorities in each region. This does not rule out the type of decision the Western democracies have made to give priority to democratic development in the former Soviet bloc. But it should raise concern about the decline of aid to and engagement with Africa, where AID closed eight of its thirty-five missions last year, with more to follow.<sup>154</sup>

Among individual donor organizations, there is often a tendency to support democracy and human rights wherever worthy causes present themselves (globally or within regions). Too little thought is given to weighing resource constraints against desirable--and achievable--end goals, especially strategic objectives. NED, for one, has been criticized for the "scattershot nature" of its programming, for trying to fund too many types of programs in too many countries with a limited budget.<sup>155</sup> Yet, for democracy promotion, strategic objectives must be large in scale and time horizon, involving prolonged (and often subtle) engagement. Such sustained engagement must aim for enduring improvements in institutional capacities, in the quality and stability of democracy in a country, and in structural variables, such as market development and civil society, whose democratic impact will be felt most over the long run. Even if the international community collectively can help to bring about changes of this magnitude, individual organizations, even those with annual budgets of \$35 million, most certainly cannot.<sup>156</sup> Only if the principal governmental and nongovernmental donors strategize with one another from time to time can they maximize their chances to tip truly uncertain but plausible democratizers--from Russia and Ukraine to South Africa and Benin-- firmly into the democratic column. For the biggest, most sensitive and important cases in particular, like Russia and Ukraine, this requires coordination among the major powers at the highest levels of government, which argues for institutionalizing discussion of democracy promotion issues on the annual agenda of the G-7 nations. Similar far-reaching coordination is needed to develop the democracy-building and conflict-regulating capacities of regional organizations, most urgently the OAU, at a time when the UN, its specialized agencies, and its powerful member states are increasingly exhausted by the burdens of direct intervention, and new patterns of dependency on international emergency aid and protection need to be broken.

The major democratic powers of the world need to think boldly and creatively about the kind of world order that can best nurture and sustain democracy and human rights. This involves many of the most controversial collective security issues of our time--when and how to intervene against genocide, civil war, human rights atrocities, and forcible overthrows of democracy; how to bring to *international* justice the perpetrators of these crimes; how to reconfigure and revitalize alliance structures and multinational organizations toward these ends. It may demand hard choices--for example, between the desire of arms industries, defense ministries, and trade bureaucrats for ever-expanding weapons exports and the urgent need--for democracy, development, and peace--to reduce military expenditures in less developed countries. And it raises issues of world order that have not even entered serious international discussion, such as the construction of a truly global rule of law to confront the increasingly global threats of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, financial fraud, political bribery, money laundering, weapons smuggling, and other organized crimes.

Particularly needed is an international mechanism for imposing biting and specifically targeted sanctions (as the United States did belatedly in Haiti) on the ruling elites directly responsible for

violating international laws and accords and suppressing popular aspirations for democracy, so that pain and pressure can be pinpointed on them and not inflicted on innocent and long-suffering people.<sup>157</sup> The international community, ideally acting through the UN, must have the ability to freeze the personal assets of these elites worldwide and to deny them and all their family members visas to enter any law-abiding country. This will require intensive new efforts to gather international financial and political intelligence, radical changes in international banking practice, and probably a new international covenant. Without these kinds of radical legal and institutional steps toward a new world order, the corruption and greed of small and potentially very vulnerable elites--like the ruling military clique in Nigeria--are likely to continue to ravage democratic aspirations in much of the world.

Finally, and no less importantly, the established democracies--and not least the United States--must "heal themselves." The post-Cold War ideological hegemony of democracy in the world has been brief indeed--if it ever really existed. Today, new ideological challengers scorn democracy and scoff at the social decay, economic stagnation, political corruption, and general sclerosis of the most powerful practitioners and promoters of democracy in Europe and North America. The most sophisticated challenge in this regard comes not from the Islamic fundamentalists or Eastern European and post-Soviet ultranationalists, though they are vigorous and passionate enough. Rather, it emanates from the more economically dynamic East Asian countries (such as Singapore, Malaysia, China, and Indonesia), whose governments (and progovernment intellectuals) claim they have found--in the convergence (in varying degrees) of economic liberalism, limited societal pluralism, and centralized political hegemony--a truly superior political system. It is doubtful that even the most successful of these political systems, Singapore's quite regimented and illiberal electoral regime, will smoothly resist the growing pressure of the socioeconomic, generational, and attitudinal changes its society will be experiencing over the next decade or two. Nevertheless, such stresses in the nondemocratic world offer in themselves no comfort for the established democracies. With some striking commonalities across continents, the wealthy, industrialized democracies in North America, Europe, and Japan find themselves mired in serious problems of political corruption, stagnation, decay of political parties, voter disillusionment and apathy, fiscal imbalance, racial, ethnic, and nationality conflict, and so on. These problems do not yet threaten the stability of democracy, but they do diminish its quality, as well as its capacity to inspire and provide models for democratic development elsewhere in the world.

Ultimately, the established democracies cannot be successful promoting democracy abroad unless they find ways to reform, repair, and revitalize their own democracies at home. A vast array of political challenges await committed democrats within these countries: for example, reforming systems of campaign finance; reinvigorating school curricula and civil society to educate for democracy and interethnic tolerance; and finding new, technologically innovative ways to connect citizens with parties, legislators, and government officials. Reforming from within need not and should not compete with the imperative to assist the development of democracy around the world. Indeed, the two tasks are complementary, and democratic reformers in countries like the United States will find they have lessons to learn from civic activists and constitutional reformers in newly emerging democracies.

Taking this challenge of democratic renewal seriously will not only generate a new surge of democratic energy and commitment in the industrialized world, it may also provide a healthy antidote to the tendency toward hubris and paternalism of too many democracy assistance programs that are conducted in the post-Communist and less developed countries. Particularly in circumstances of sharp economic decline and loss of international power and prestige, as in Russia today, arrogance in international assistance programs reinforces perceptions of victimization and threat, strengthening the appeal of antidemocratic, ultranationalist forces.

If democracy is to expand and triumph in the twenty-first century, democrats everywhere must view the challenge of democratic development and improvement as universal and ongoing. And democratic systems--new and old--must demonstrate anew that democracy is, in the long run, the best, most just, effective, and humane form of governance for all peoples.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1. William Schneider, "Waiting for a New Clinton Doctrine," *National Journal*, March 25, 1995, p. 778.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
4. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Democracy and Development," paper presented to the Nobel Symposium on Democracy's Victory and Crisis, Uppsala University, Sweden, August 27-30, 1994, pp. 9, 10, and 18 (Table 5). For their entire sample of regimes across several decades, the average population growth rate in democracies was 1.48 percent; in dictatorships, the rate was 2.51 percent. This is not a mere artifact of the association between democracy and higher levels of development. Dictatorships had higher (often substantially higher) average rates of population growth at *every one* of ten levels of per capita GNP.
5. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), and "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990). (See also the other essays in the Montville volume. Also Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Ted R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993); Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994); and Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
6. For a conceptualization of the third wave, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

7. Adrian Karatnycky, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom 1994: Democracies on the Rise, Democracies at Risk," *Freedom Review* 26(1), 1995, p. 5.

8. Although there are 191 independent countries in the world today (24 more than in 1984), the increase in democracies is due mainly to a dramatic rise in the percentage of countries with the formal institutional arrangements of democracy: from 38 percent in 1984 to 60 percent in 1994, according to Freedom House.

9. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1994-1995* (New York, 1995), p. 3.

10. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 1-9; Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction: What Makes for Democracy," in Diamond *et al.*, *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 6-8.

11. The limitation of this discussion to U.S. agencies is not intended to disparage the growing and creative engagement of other official development agencies, such as the Swedish International Development Authority, which developed in 1993 an extensive and sophisticated strategy for wide-ranging assistance, to both governmental and nongovernmental recipients, in support of democracy and human rights.

12. Thomas Carothers, "The NED at 10," *Foreign Policy* no. 95 (Summer 1994), p. 124. Something around \$400 million appears to be the most reasonable estimate. Under the Peace, Prosperity and Democracy Act of 1994 (PPDA), AID political assistance for democracy is budgeted principally through two titles. Title I establishes "Support for Democratic Participation" as one of the four objectives of "Sustainable Development" assistance to "less developed" countries. Title II, "Building Democracy," authorizes a wide range of support (including economic and humanitarian) to countries that are not eligible for sustainable development support, either because they are too advanced economically or because the government's overall performance record rules them out of a conventional development assistance relationship with the United States. (A third title authorizes political institution building in countries emerging from civil war or humanitarian crisis.) Title II includes the entire country programs for the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and selected other "Countries in Transition" (including those emerging from civil strife and those where democracy is threatened, such as Colombia and Venezuela). In its FY96 International Affairs ("Function 150") budget request, the Clinton Administration requested \$179 million (the same as FY95) for its "Support for Democratic Participation Programs," including \$11 million for multilateral programs of the Organization of American States (OAS) and \$1.527 billion for the Building Democracy programs. Some of these Building Democracy funds are for political assistance for democracy (free and fair elections, judicial systems, legislatures, local government, civil society, political culture, accountability, and so on): \$148 million of the \$788 million requested for the NIS, \$73 million of the \$480 million requested for Central and Eastern Europe, about \$60 million for various Latin American, Caribbean, East Asian, and African countries, and some of the \$140 million in special assistance

for Haiti, Cambodia, and Angola. Thus, something over \$300 million of the Building Democracy budget is for political assistance programs for democracy; adding the \$179 million in Support for Democratic Participation yields a budget request for FY96 of around \$500 million in AID spending for democracy promotion, more narrowly construed. This is slightly less than 10 percent of the total requested for bilateral, nonmilitary foreign aid.

Clearly, however, other development assistance spending has potential democratic impacts. The PPDA not only lists four objectives of sustainable development--broad-based growth, environmental protection, democracy promotion, and population stabilization--but emphasizes their interrelated character and points to other goals that cut across these, such as enhancing popular participation in development and improving the participation and status of women. Assistance to civil society organizations, for example, may simultaneously advance the role of women in the economy or improve environmental protection, at the same time that it strengthens the ability of citizens' organizations to lobby the government and hold it accountable. Some portion of development assistance for economic growth, population stabilization, and environmental protection (totaling over \$2.3 billion in FY95) might be considered as assisting indirectly the civil society and social structural foundations of democracy. If one were to estimate that even 10 percent of this other development funding builds democratic civil societies; then count the entire Building Democracy account, and add in the \$179 million in support for democratic participation, the total democracy promotion budget would be roughly \$1.7 billion in FY95 and close to \$2 billion in FY96. So how one estimates democracy expenditures by such an aid organization depends on how narrowly one construes the function. What is striking is how small in comparison are the sums appropriated annually to the nongovernmental democracy assistance organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy (see note 26).

13. For a detailed critical assessment of these AID democracy assistance programs in Latin America during the 1980s, see Thomas Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 206-226. The earliest AID involvement in explicitly political assistance began in the early 1960s, when AID and the Ford Foundation supported the development of law faculties in a number of Latin American, Asian, and African countries. Premised in modernization theory, the "Law and Development" program naively expected that cadres of lawyers schooled in Western law "would spearhead the process of political and economic modernization." This program gave way in the mid-1970s to a focus on making legal services available to the poor, as part of AID's new emphasis on poverty alleviation and basic needs. Women's rights and human rights assumed a larger role in the late 1970s, but it was not until the Reagan Administration that a third-generation "Administration of Justice" program began, focused initially on Central America. The current "Rule of Law" program, much broader geographically and conceptually, represents a fourth generation of AID programs in this area. However, the comprehensive democracy promotion endeavor of which it is a part is without precedent in the agency.

14. See Joel Barkan, "Can Established Democracies Nurture Democracy Abroad? Lessons from Africa," in Axel Hadenius, ed., *Democracy's Victory and Crisis: Nobel Symposium 1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press); and the U.S. Agency for International Development, "Building Democracy: USAID's Strategy," in *Strategies for Sustainable Development* (Washington, DC: USAID, March 1994).

15. Personal communication from USAID Africa Bureau Information Center, August 8, 1994.
16. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," *Foreign Policy* 87 (Summer 1992), p. 35.
17. Africa Bureau of USIA, "Summary of AF Democracy Programming in FY95 AF Country Plans" (no date).
18. "Forging Democracy through Understanding and Trust: The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies," Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, July 29, 1994.
19. Barkan (note 14, above).
20. For example, according to Michael Pinto-Duschinsky ("Foreign Political Aid: The German Political Foundations and their U.S. Counterparts," *International Affairs* 67(1), 1991, pp. 33-63) in 1988 about half of their total of \$170 million in income from the German government was spent on these democracy-promoting activities (\$85 million), exceeding by a factor of more than five the NED budget and nearly equaling the estimated total U.S. democracy-promotion spending in 1989 of \$100 million. My estimate of \$85 million is derived from applying the percentages on the first four types of foreign activities Pinto-Duschinsky lists in Table 4 to the total funding amounts he lists in Table 1. The U.S. figure is drawn from his essay but is consistent with what U.S. administration figures estimated to me in 1989. Pinto-Duschinsky judged at the time "that overall U.S. government spending on political aid (excluding CIA activities) is about half West German spending on the party foundation's foreign operations" (p. 47).
21. These totals were obtained by adding the figures for Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and do not include a number of projects the Ebert Foundation was then initiating in Russia and several East European countries (information from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, February 1992).
22. The Friedrich Naumann Foundation, for example, works with more than 500 partner organizations in more than 80 countries on programs to train journalists and political leaders, promote civic education, strengthen civil society organizations, and foster the regular exchange of information and ideas about democracy.
23. On the origins of NED, see Carothers (note 13, above), *In the Name of Democracy*, pp. 202-205.
24. In addition to the annual reports of NED and its core grantees, see Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," *Foreign Policy* 87 (Summer 1992), pp. 25-46, and Thomas Carothers, "The NED at 10" (note 11, above). In recent years, the parent organization has spent about 20 percent of the total funding on its own discretionary programs, while roughly 31.5 percent has been allocated to FTUI, 14 percent to CIPE, and 12.25 percent each to the two party institutes (with 10 percent going to administrative expenses).



25. The other regional labor institutes, which have been functioning for several decades and which were important instruments of political and ideological competition with Communist forces during the Cold War, are the African-American Labor Center, the Asian-American Free Labor Institute, and (for Latin America) the American Institute for Free Labor Development. FTUI, established in 1977, is both a regional institute (for Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) and an administrative center through which NED funding for the other three AFL-CIO institutes flows.

26. Annual congressional funding ranged from \$15 million to \$18 million from 1984 to 1990, and from \$25 million to \$30 million from 1991 to 1993. The Clinton administration's request to raise its funding for FY1994 to \$50 million sparked intense congressional debate that almost killed the endowment altogether. Total funding of the endowment family of organizations is larger because of grants from AID, which now exceed for the two party institutes what they receive from the NED appropriation, and because of occasional grants of up to \$10 million earmarked by Congress for programs in particular countries (e.g., Poland, Nicaragua, and Haiti). See Carothers (note 12, above), "The NED at 10," p. 126.

27. See Honoré Koffi Guie, "Organizing Africa's Democrats," *Journal of Democracy* 4(2) (April 1993): 119-129.

28. See the 1993 and 1994 Annual Reports of the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington DC, covering the relevant fiscal years (October 1-September 30). On the Mexican Civic Alliance, see Sergio Aguayo, "A Mexican Milestone," *Journal of Democracy* 6(2) (April 1995), pp. 157-167.

29. John D. Sullivan, "Democratization and Business Interests," *Journal of Democracy* 5(4) (October 1994): 146-160. For a summary of CIPE programs, see Center for International Private Enterprise, *1983 to 1993: A Decade in Review* (Washington, DC: CIPE, 1993).

30. Paul Somogyi, "Assisting Independent Trade Unions in Post-Communist Countries," *Problems of Post-Communism*, March-April 1995.

31. National Democratic Institute, "1993: A Year in Review," Washington, DC, January 1994, pp. 4-5. IRI has similar (though less extensive) programs, but is more inclined to focus party assistance on one or more conservative parties. Carothers, "The NED at 10," p. 127.

32. International Republican Institute, "IRI: A Decade of Democracy, 1984-1994," Washington, DC, June 1994.

33. About 40 percent of this budget (\$16 million in FY94) derives from its annual congressional appropriation through the State Department, but its total government funding is much larger because, like the two party institutes, it receives substantial annual, project-specific grants from AID (\$23.1 million in FY94). The two party institutes and FTUI also operate field offices abroad, but many of these serve regions rather than individual countries.

34. Summary of Grants Awarded during May 1994, communication from the Eurasia Foundation, June 1994.
35. Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, *Newsletter*, no. 7 (Winter 1995): 34.
36. International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Brochure (1994) and Annual Report, 1993-94. The 13 countries in which the Centre now works are El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo, Burma, Pakistan, and Thailand.
37. By contrast, the Canadian centre has three representatives from developing countries on its thirteen-member international board of directors, including former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias.
38. Westminster Foundation for Democracy, *Annual Report 1993-94* (London: Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 1994). WFD's Corporate Plan 1995-1998 projects somewhat increased funding for the former Soviet Union (especially Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) and, in its other two target regions, priority on these six countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland; Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia.
39. Rozann M. Stayden, "Democratization: Legal Transformation--The Necessity of Strong Legal Systems and Institutions in Emerging African Democracies," Discussion Papers from a Seminar on Democratization in Africa, the Carter Center of Emory University, May 13-14, 1994, pp. 201-209.
40. With membership of some 2000 leading editors, publishers, broadcasting executives, and journalists in more than 80 countries, IPI holds conferences and seminars on a wide range of topics relating to press freedom and the journalistic profession. It also runs regular training programs in developing and post-Communist countries and publishes a monthly magazine and an annual report that monitor country developments with respect to press freedom. See Adam Feinstein, "Fighting for Press Freedom," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (January 1995): 159-168. The annual survey of the CPI, *Attacks on the Press*, is a particularly detailed account of violations of press freedom, and the organization also publishes a monthly *Update*.
41. IDEE, *Newsletter* no. 7 (Winter 1995):30, 37; *TransAtlantic Perspectives* (published by the German Marshall Fund of the United States), no. 30 (Autumn 1994): 36-37.
42. IDEE, *Newsletter* no. 7 (Winter 1995): 2-3, 5, 22, 30-36.
43. Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1992 *Annual Report*.
44. John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 1992 *Annual Report*, Chicago.
45. *TransAtlantic Perspectives*, no. 30 (Autumn 1994), special issue on Political Development in Central and Eastern Europe.

46. *New York Times*, 15 October 1990.

47. George Soros, *The Soros Foundations Network*, The Soros Foundations, New York, February 1994.

48. When the U.S. House of Representatives voted in mid-1993 to eliminate funding for NED (a vote that was soon reversed), more than 100 U.S. NGOs and study centers joined in a statement of support for the endowment.

49. Carothers concludes that AID "does not like to do political development work and is not good at it," in part because its officers lack expertise (*In the Name of Democracy*, p. 221). This longstanding and widely shared criticism was more or less true in the 1980s but appears increasingly invalid, however, as AID experience with democracy assistance projects cumulates over time and as commitment to the goal becomes entrenched at the top, as it has during the Bush and Clinton administrations. Moreover, AID has utilized a growing array of consultants and specialists (many on leave from academia) with real expertise in democracy, and it is now developing a multiyear program to train specialized career officers in democracy promotion.

50. Carothers in particular points to its cumbersome and risk-averse nature. See *In the Name of Democracy*, pp. 221-222.

51. NDI, which has a network of some 500 *pro bono* consultants, estimates that from February 1993 to January 1994 it saved more than \$2 million in consulting fees for more about 7600 days of expert assistance rendered *pro bono*. See NDI, "Submission to the Congressionally Authorized Study on U.S. Government-Funded Democracy Programs," July 1994, p. 12.

52. In FY94, the Asia Foundation received about 55 percent (\$23 million), of its entire budget in project-specific funding from AID; NDI received four-fifths (\$14 million), and IRI also received most (\$11 million) of its budget from AID. The Eurasia Foundation obtains virtually all its funding from AID.

53. Leading NGOs like NED, NDI, and the Asia Foundation have all raised these concerns in recent years. See also Carothers (note 12, above), "The NED at 10," p. 134.

54. NDI, "Submission to the Congressionally Authorized Study on U.S. Government-Funded Democracy Programs," July 1994, p. 11.

55. NDI, "Submission to the Congressionally Authorized Study on U.S. Government-Funded Democracy Programs," July 1994, pp. 11-12.

56. Problems of auditing and accountability are among the most frequently cited objections by critics of NED and its core institutes. In response to these criticisms and to a critical evaluation by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), NED implemented in FY94 a new audit strategy with more formal, comprehensive procedures, more frequent audits (twice as many during fiscal years 1993 and 1994 as during the previous two years), and more on-site visits to evaluate and improve grantee accounting systems (NED, 1994 *Annual Report*, p. 8). It must be remembered,

however, that as audit procedures become more rigorous and comprehensive, cost-effectiveness may in fact diminish, partly because auditing involves certain minimum fixed costs that are difficult to justify for small grants. Congressionally funded donor organizations like NED are publicly accountable in that they are subject to congressional oversight and are periodically audited by the GAO, AID, and the USIA Inspector General.

57. Carl Gershman, "The United Nations and the New World Order," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 9-11.

58. Inge Tvedten, "The Angolan Debacle," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 2 (April 1993), p. 118.

59. Julio Jeldres, "The UN and the Cambodian Transition," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (October 1993), pp. 104-116.

60. Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 21-23; see also Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 87-89.

61. John Pinder, "The European Community and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe," in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford, eds., *Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) pp. 124-125.

62. Neil J. Kritz, "The CSCE in the New Era," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 3 (July 1993), p. 25. Membership in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), established in 1990, has similar democracy and market conditionality.

63. The Group of 24 industrialized countries came together in mid-1989 to coordinate aid to Poland and Hungary and then later agreed to extend aid to other Eastern European countries that pursued democracy and free markets.

64. Pinder, "The European Community and Democracy," pp. 128-129, 133 (note 61, above). PHARE stands for "Poland/Hungary Aid for Restructuring of Economies," which was launched for those two countries in July 1989 but soon expanded to other Central and Eastern European countries.

65. "What is Phare?" European Commission, Phare Information Office, Brussels, Belgium, 1995, p. 3.

66. Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme--Projects Summary, 2 February 1995. See also *The European Union's Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme: Projects in Operation in 1995* (Brussels: European Commission, Directorate General for External Economic Relations, April 1995).

67. IDEE *Newsletter* no. 7 (Winter 1995): 39-40.

68. Quoted in Kritz, "The CSCE in the New Era," p. 19 (note 62, above).
69. Pinder, "The European Community and Democracy," p. 132 (note 61, above).
70. Heraldo Muñoz, "The OAS and Democratic Governance," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 29-38; Peter Hakim, "The OAS: Putting Principles into Practice," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 3 (July 1993), p. 40. A reform of the OAS Charter adopted in December 1992 (the Washington protocol) provides for the suspension of a member state whose democratic government has been overthrown by force.
71. Hakim, "The OAS: Putting Principles into Practice," pp. 40-42.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 44. See also Tom J. Farer, "A Multilateral Arrangement to Secure Democracy," in Robert A. Pastor, ed., *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), pp. 115-166.
73. Hakim, "The OAS: Putting Principles into Practice," pp. 43-45.
74. Clement Nwankwo, "The OAU and Human Rights," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 50-54.
75. Larry Garber, "The OAU and Elections," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 55-59.
76. Thomas Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," *The American Journal of International Law* 86, no. 46 (1992), p. 50.
77. Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, "Toward a Global 'Guarantee Clause,'" *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 3, July 1993, pp. 60-69; and Morton H. Halperin, "Guaranteeing Democracy," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1993, pp. 105-122.
78. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
79. Jonathan Hartlyn and Arturo Valenzuela, "Democracy in Latin America since 1930," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. VI: Latin America Since 1930: Economy, Society, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); see also Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation," in Tom Farer, ed., *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, in press).
80. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 57-59; see also Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 56-61.

81. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association, *American Sociological Review* 59, no. 1 (February 1994), p. 14.
82. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, "The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in Middle Income Countries," in Haggard and Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) pp. 270-313, and "Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy," pp. 342-345; and Michael Coppedge, "Institutions and Democratic Governance in Latin America," revised version (August 1993) of paper prepared for the conference "Rethinking Development Theories in Latin America," Institute of Latin American Studies, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, March 11-13, 1993, p. 16.
83. These insights derive from Harry Blair and Gary Hansen, "Weighing in on the Scales of Justice: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Rule of Law Programs." Washington, DC: USAID, Feb. 1994.
84. Robert Klitgaard, "Political Corruption: Strategies for Reform," and Larry Diamond, "Political Corruption: Nigeria's Perennial Struggle," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 4 (Fall 1991), pp. 86-101 and 73-85.
85. *Election observing* is the term used to describe the work of international visitors who watch and assess the electoral process, typically for periods of no more than a few weeks in country (though this may be spread out over a few periodic visits during preparation for the election and then the campaign). *Election monitoring* denotes the work of a much larger number of indigenous observers, organized and deployed by nonpartisan NGOs as well as the various political parties. A comprehensive monitoring effort will place at least one nonpartisan observer (usually from a broad umbrella organization in civil society) at every polling site in the country.
86. Larry Garber and Glenn Cowan, "The Virtues of Parallel Vote Tabulations," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 2 (April 1993), pp. 95-107.
87. The South African case was unique in the scale of international involvement, which included over 1,000 UN-organized international observers (augmenting thousands of domestic monitors) and millions of dollars in assistance in public and private assistance for voter education and electoral administration.
88. Jennifer L. McCoy, Larry Garber, and Robert A. Pastor, "Making Peace by Observing and Mediating Elections," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 4 (Fall 1991), 102-114. *See also* Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1991), pp. 208-210; Larry Garber and Eric Bjornlund, "Election Monitoring in Africa," in Festus Eribo, Oyeleye Oyediran, Mulatu Wubneh, and Leo Zonn, eds., *Window on Africa: Democratization and Media Exposure* (Greenville, NC: East Carolina University Center for International Programs, March 1993), pp. 28-50; Eric Bjornlund, Michael Bratton, and Clark Gibson, "Observing Multiparty Elections in Africa: Lessons from Zambia," *African Affairs* 91 (1992), pp. 405-431.

89. NDI's unmatched experience in election observing, and its early warning of serious flaws in preparations for the December 1992 voting, made it too great a risk to the Kenyan government. See National Democratic Institute of International Affairs, "1992: A Year in Review," Washington, DC, 1993, p. 8.
90. Joel D. Barkan, "Kenya: Lessons from a Flawed Election," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 85-99.
91. Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 3 (July 1994): 4-17.
92. Richard Rose, "Rethinking Civil Society: Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 2 (July 1994): 29.
93. Peter Szanton, "DIALOG," *TransAtlantic Perspectives*, no. 30 (Autumn 1994): 6.
94. Robert D. Putnam, with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
95. Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," pp. 7-11.
96. Harry Blair, "Civil Society, Democratic Development, and International Donors: A Case Study from Bangladesh," paper presented to the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New York, September 1-4, 1994, p. 24.
97. Karen L. Remmer, "Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience," *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 315-335; and "The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s," *American Political Science Review* 85, no. 3 (September 1991): 777-800; and Barbara Geddes, "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 4 (October 1994 special issue on Economic Reform and Democracy): 104-118.
98. Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation" (note 79, above).
99. See Larry Diamond, "Democracy and Economic Reform: Tensions, Compatibilities, and Strategies of Reconciliation," in Edward Lazear, ed., *Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), pp. 107-158.
100. An eleven-country study shows that many of the most prominent success stories of economic reform in the developing and post-Communist worlds (Korea in the 1960s, Indonesia from the late 1960s, Chile, Mexico, Turkey, and Poland) received very generous financial aid and debt rescheduling, whereas the successful cases of reform without substantial aid were the already rich countries of Australia and New Zealand, as well as Spain and Portugal with the implicit aid of imminent entry into the European Union. John Williamson and Stephan Haggard, "The Political Conditions for Economic Reform," in John Williamson, ed., *The Political*

*Economy of Policy Reform* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994), pp. 566-567.

101. Thomas R. Callaghy, "Vision and Politics in the Transformation of the Global Economy," in Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schutz, and Steven R. Dorr, eds., *Global Transformation and the Third World* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 173-174.

102. Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, "How Hemmed In? Lessons and Prospects of Africa's Responses to Decline," in Callaghy and Ravenhill, eds., *Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 526.

103. Larry Diamond, "Democracy: The New Wind," *Africa Report* 39, no. 5 (September-October 1994), pp. 50-54.

104. Paul Collier, "Africa's External Economic Relations, 1960-1990," in Douglas Rimmer, ed., *Africa Years On: The Record and Outlook after Thirty Years of Independence* (London: James Curry Ltd, 1991), p. 161.

105. Carol Graham, *Safety Nets, Politics and the Poor: Transitions to Market Economies* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994).

106. As of early 1994, Sachs estimates, the West had transferred only about 1/7 of the resources pledged. Jeffrey Sachs, "Betrayal," *The New Republic*, January 31, 1994, p. 14.

107. Jeffrey Sachs, "Life in the Economic Emergency Room," in Williamson, ed., *The Political Economy of Policy Reform* (note 100, above), p. 521. This paper was delivered at a January 1993 conference. For a similar and more recent perspective, emphasizing the funding of social safety net programs based in major regional cities throughout Russia (with parallel transfers of Russian subsidies for state enterprises into the safety net programs), see Michael McFaul, "Causes and Consequences of the 'End of Market Romanticism' in Russia," paper presented to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, March 31, 1994, p. 34-35.

108. McFaul, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

110. Michael McFaul, "Why Russia's Politics Matter," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1 (January-February 1995): 98-99.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

112. See Williamson and Haggard, "The Political Conditions for Economic Reform," p. 566.

113. Joan M. Nelson with Stephanie J. Eglington, *Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid?* (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1992), pp. 48-49. As they note, when reform elements are too weak, external pressure fails; when reformers predominate,



pressure is not needed. Yet, some states, particularly in Africa, are so weak that even a militantly authoritarian regime may have little choice but to capitulate to coherent external pressure, or face collapse. Still, Nelson and Eglington provide a thoughtful and balanced treatment of the issues that has heavily influenced the discussion that follows.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

115. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

116. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

117. Although Turkey remains a constitutional democracy in form, the deterioration of its empirical democratic standards is reflected in its declining freedom rating from Freedom House and in the harsh assessments of international human rights groups. See, for example, Freedom House, *Freedom in the World, 1993-1994*, pp. 551-554, and *Human Rights Watch Annual Report 1994* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1993), pp. 243-246.

118. Kathryn Sikkink, "The Effectiveness of U.S. Human Rights Policy: Argentina, Guatemala, and Uruguay," paper presented to the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Buenos Aires, July 21-25, 1991. Uruguay's first post-transition democratic president, Julio Sanguinetti, declared shortly after taking office in 1984, "The vigorous policies of the Carter Administration were the most important outside influence on Uruguay's democratization process." Quoted in Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 96.

119. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 96-97.

120. Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton University Press, 1994).

121. George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), pp. 608-642.

122. Robert A. Pastor, "Nicaragua's Choice: The Making of a Free Election," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 15.

123. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 95. On the U.S. efforts to induce and support democratic transition in Chile, see Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, pp. 150-163. As far back as 1983, and repeatedly thereafter, President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz had emphasized to Chun Doo Hwan the importance of his commitment to transfer power to an elected successor at the end of his presidential term in 1988. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 976-980.

124. J. Samuel Fitch, "Democracy, Human Rights and the Armed Forces in Latin America," in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas, eds., *The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1993) p. 203 (emphasis in the original).

125. Reagan struggled throughout his presidency between his passionate commitment to freedom and democracy and his strong emotional attachment to Cold War authoritarian allies like Marcos, Chilean General Augusto Pinochet, and the Angolan insurgent Jonas Savimbi. Moreover, the first year and a half of Reagan's presidency, with Alexander Haig as secretary of state, charted a very different course, seeking to reverse Carter's human rights emphasis and refurbish relations with anti-Communist authoritarian regimes in the Third World. See Smith, *America's Mission*, pp. 286-290, and Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, pp. 118-127. Carothers provides a largely critical perspective on what the Reagan administration ultimately accomplished for democracy in Latin America; Smith, taking a global view, offers a more sympathetic assessment (pp. 297-307).

126. Francisco Villagr n de Le n, "Thwarting the Guatemalan Coup," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (October 1993), p. 124.

127. However, Sikkink concludes that U.S. human rights pressure over the years has not been particularly effective in Guatemala and cautions that even superpower pressure for democratization may be ineffective unless it is applied in a comprehensive and forceful manner, clearly conveyed through multiple channels and utilizing a wide range of policy instruments; and unless there is a moderate faction within the authoritarian regime prepared to be receptive to such pressure. Sikkink, "U.S. Human Rights Policy," pp. 32-38 (note 118, above).

128. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 98.

129. Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," *World Politics* 41, no. 4 (July 1989), p. 484.

130. On this effect in Chile late in Pinochet's rule, see Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 972 and 974.

131. All quotes are from Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Future: A Turbulent Transition," *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 4 (Fall 1990), pp. 8-9.

132. Nelson and Eglington, *Encouraging Democracy*, pp. 16-17, 32 (note 113, above).

133. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in Africa," in John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics*, 2nd. ed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

134. Barkan, "Kenya: Lessons from a Flawed Election," p. 91 (note 90, above).

135. Quoted by Barkan, from the World Bank's press release of the meeting of the Consultative Group for Kenya (Paris, 26 November 1991).

136. Githu Muigai, "Kenya's Opposition and the Crisis of Governance," *Issue* ("A Journal of Opinion" of the U.S. African Studies Association), 21, no 1/2 (1993), p. 29.

137. Larry Diamond, "Power-Dependence Relationships in the World System," in Louis Kriesberg, ed., *Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change*, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1979). These principles are also emphasized by Nelson and Eglington, in *Encouraging Democracy*, who also stress the importance of a reform element within the regime (pp. 48-49). However, if aid dependence is extreme enough, as it is in much of Africa, and the donor community is sufficiently united (as in Kenya initially and Malawi), even a regime in which hardliners predominate may have little choice but to give in to the pressure (or face financial collapse).
138. John R. Heilbrunn, "The Social Origins of National Conferences: A Comparison of Benin and Togo," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no. 2 (June 1993).
139. *Africa Report*, March/April 1993, p. 62. Worse still, reports the defeated opposition candidate Fru Ndi, "The French government's ministry to Cameroon openly accused the U.S. government" of supporting his party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), in charges that were repeated by the government-controlled press.
140. *West Africa*, 5-11 July 1993, p. 1146.
141. *The Economist*, May 29, 1993, p. 46.
142. Divergent bureaucratic goals and agendas have also been evident in other countries, such as France and Germany (though probably not to the same degree). Nelson and Eglington, *Encouraging Democracy*, p. 23.
143. Abraham Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from History," in Lowenthal, ed., *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America: Themes and Issues*, p. 263.
144. Fitch ("Democracy, Human Rights, and the Armed Forces," p. 205; note 124, above) proposes that military aid be conditional not only on decent human rights performance (as evaluated by independent organizations like Amnesty International and the OAS) but also on "certified progress toward greater democratic control" over the military.
145. Carothers, a cautious supporter of democracy promotion, nevertheless takes this view. *In the Name of Democracy*, particularly pp. 224, 257.
146. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Economic Development and Democracy," in Lipset, *Political Man*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds., *Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992).
147. Barkan, "Can Established Democracies Nurture Democracy Abroad?" pp. 21-22 (note 14, above).

148. "Free and Fair Elections and Beyond. Summary and Conclusions from the Conference on the International Electoral Institute Commission," Stockholm, Sweden, May 18-19, 1994.

149. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "DAC Orientations on Participatory Development and Good Governance," Paris, 1993. The first meeting of the Working Group was held in May 1994. A subsequent meeting, in November 1994, was preceded by a seminar on the role of the Consultative Group process in addressing these issues at the level of individual countries. A seminar on aid to civil society is planned for 1995.

150. David Arase, "Japanese Policy toward Democracy and Human Rights in Asia," *Asian Survey* 33, no. 10 (October 1993), pp. 935-952.

151. These procedural directions appeared to enjoy general consensus at the November 1994 meeting, but the DAC PDGG Working Group is not a policy-making body, and it remains to be seen if the DAC itself will formally adopt them.

152. International IDEA, Newsletter 1, March 8, 1995; Declaration of the Founding Conference for the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, 27-28 February 1995; *Conclusions and Suggestions for the Mandate and Tasks of the Proposed Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance* (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, October 1994); *Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Government on the Working Group for an International Electoral Institute (IEI)*, Stockholm, October 1993. The fourteen sponsoring countries are Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, India, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden.

153. Nelson and Eglington, *Encouraging Democracy*, p. 42 (note 113, above).

154. "African Democracies Worry Aid Will Dry Up," *New York Times*, March 19, 1995, pp. A1 and A8.

155. Carothers, "The NED at 10," p. 135 (note 12, above).

156. Moreover, an argument can be made for *some* organizations taking a global approach, rather than ruling out certain countries, so that (with modest investments in a small country like Sierra Leone) democratic aspirations and ideals can at least be kept alive everywhere, even against great odds.

157. By this principle, the United States should also rethink its current broad requirement to cut off all aid to gross human violators or military regimes. It is fine to punish those regimes, but why not leave open the possibility of assisting nongovernmental organizations (with both economic development and political aid) where possible?

## Appendix

### List of Acronyms

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**AID** -- (or USAID) United States Agency for International Development

**CFJ** -- Center for Foreign Journalists (U.S.)

**CIPE** -- Center for International Enterprise (affiliated with NED)

**CPJ** -- Committee to Protect Journalists (New York)

**DAC** -- Development Assistance Committee (OECD)

**DANIDA** -- Danish International Development Agency

**EU** -- European Union

**FTUI** -- Free Trade Union Institute (affiliated with NED)

**GERDDES-Afrique** -- Groupe d'Etudes et des RÈcherches sur la DÈmocratie et DÈveloppement Economique et Sociale (based in Benin)

**IDEE** -- Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (Washington and Warsaw)

**IFES** -- International Foundation for Electoral Systems (U.S.)

**IPI** -- International Press Institute (Vienna)

**IRI** -- International Republican Institute (affiliated with NED)

**NAD** -- Norwegian Agency for Development

**NED** -- National Endowment for Democracy (U.S.)

**NDI** -- National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (affiliated with NED)

**NGO** -- Nongovernmental organization

**OAS** -- Organization of American States

**OAU** -- Organization of African Unity

**OECD** -- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

**PDGG** -- Participatory Development and Good Governance

**SIDA** -- Swedish International Development Authority

**UNTAC** -- United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

**USIA** -- United States Information Agency

**WFD** -- Westminster Foundation for Democracy (Britain)

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Larry Diamond is a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; he is also co-editor of the *Journal of Democracy* and co-director of the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies. He has written widely on problems and conditions of democratic development, both globally and in Africa. Among his recent edited works are *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (1993), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (1993), and *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy* (1994) (the latter two with Marc F. Plattner); and a forthcoming second edition of *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, edited with Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset.