

A House No Longer Divided Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa

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**A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
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Foreword

South Africa's decisive democratic transformation has inspired hope for civility around the world, as history's most violent century draws to a close. Few predicted such dramatic progress, given the long and bloody history of struggle over apartheid. Indeed, South Africa was widely expected to succumb to the ethnic violence that afflicts so many nations when repression begins to yield to revolution. Today, no less than thirty-five civil wars are raging, reflecting an absence of tolerance and trust between governments and their people. These conflicts, and the mass violence that all too often accompanies them, are a threat to national, regional, and even global security. It is vital to find ways of preventing such conflicts and resolving differences by democratic means. South Africa's experiences on the road to democracy may offer some valuable insights.

What factors have contributed to the peaceful transition to majority rule, to true democracy, in South Africa? What lessons can other nations learn from the South African experience? Preliminary answers to these questions may be found in this report, the result of a June 1996 conference in Cape Town sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, in cooperation with the University of Cape Town and the University of the Western Cape.

During my tenure as secretary of state in the Carter administration, we were committed to moving South Africa toward majority rule. We made it clear that friendly relations between the United States and South Africa depended on signs that such a transformation was beginning. At the time, guerrilla wars were raging in Rhodesia and Namibia, and we were intimately involved in the tortuous negotiations to resolve these conflicts and establish majority rule. We felt that it was essential for the United States and other concerned countries to offer the parties to these conflicts a credible alternative to armed struggle and to encourage the building of democratic institutions. We assumed, however, that establishing "one man, one vote" in South Africa would be a long and painful process.

The opportunity to end apartheid suddenly and decisively was one of those rare hinge points in history, and Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk seized the opportunity. Together they turned South Africa away from conflict and toward democracy, and the result of their joint commitment to a peaceful transition to majority rule was the epoch-making election of April 1994, when South Africans of all colors went to the polls for the first time. The election, and the constitution that followed, reflect enlightened, consistent support for rights-based government, coalition politics, and civil society by Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress. But only the foundations of a peaceful democratic society have been laid. Building and maintaining a strong and enduring democracy on those foundations will depend on a continuing commitment by all segments of South Africa's diverse population to reconciliation and far-reaching economic and social transformation. It will depend on a healthy economy, confidence in the equitable administration of justice, and the willingness of those who were wronged under the old regime to put the good of the nation above their desire for vengeance. Other nations, the international business community, and nongovernmental organizations also have a role to play in nurturing the new and transformed elements of South Africa's civil society.

Just as the effort to end apartheid had effects far beyond South Africa's borders, so too will the effort to build a lasting democracy. I believe that the struggle to achieve multicultural democracy

will be as important to world politics in the twenty-first century as the overthrow of apartheid has been at the end of the twentieth century. The Commission hopes that this report may shed fresh light on the process of transformation so that other nations can better understand and address the obstacles that lie ahead.

On behalf of the Commission I should like to acknowledge our gratitude to the University of Cape Town for providing the facilities and other assistance for the conference. We are especially grateful to Vice-Chancellor Dr. Mamphela Ramphele and to Ms. Helen Zille, director of Development and Public Affairs, for their administrative support and for their substantive contributions to our deliberations. We were also pleased to have the cosponsorship of the University of the Western Cape and the help of Vice-Rector Dr. Colin Bundy. Finally, I would like to thank my fellow commissioners, the Hon. Flora MacDonald and Sir Shridath Ramphal, for their participation in the meeting.

Cyrus R. Vance
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Introduction: Opportunities Opened and Dangers Foreclosed

Celebrations of South Africa's liberation from apartheid have given way to a more somber mood. Huge political, economic, and social challenges now confront the citizens of this new democratic nation in what promises to be a long and difficult struggle to build and sustain true self-government. And it is a quest of great international significance that is not likely to be won without substantial international support.

When South Africans went to the polls in April 1994 they ended a state of oppression that had become a global rallying point for all who wished an end to one of humanity's longest-running dramas; the struggle against slavery, colonialism, segregation, and other forms of institutionalized racism. For apartheid to end so suddenly and relatively peacefully seems especially remarkable against the backdrop of history's most violent century. But international euphoria has dissipated as the costs and uncertainties of consolidating democracy have become more evident.

Yet South Africa's recent political achievements could prove to be even more important for the opportunities they opened than for the dangers they foreclosed. Future historians may someday conclude that the current efforts to build democracy in a nation as culturally diverse, economically divided, and internationally renowned as South Africa have had a greater political impact on the global spread of democratic values in the twenty-first century than the fight against apartheid had for the spread of human rights in the twentieth century.

In the course of a journey as long and arduous as the struggle for majority rule in South Africa, it is tempting to think only of the difficulties ahead, rather than obstacles overcome. Pausing occasionally to take stock of what has been achieved can inspire renewed determination to press

ahead. So in June 1996, midway through President Mandela's term of office, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, in cooperation with the Universities of Cape Town and the Western Cape, convened a two-day seminar in Cape Town. The meeting, "Miracles That Matter," brought together a group of South Africans who had been involved in South Africa's transition to democracy in various ways and gave them the opportunity to reflect on past progress and consider future prospects.*

For the South Africans, the conference was an opportunity to weigh differing perspectives in an attempt to see a balanced picture, and so avoid falling into the twin traps of premature triumphalism and forecasts of failure. For the Carnegie Commission it was an opportunity to learn lessons about preventing deadly conflict from the South African experience. This summary of the seminar proceedings is intended to inform an international audience about the current progress and prospects for democratic peace in South Africa, a nation that for decades appeared headed toward political and humanitarian catastrophe.

Three Challenges

The seminar was organized around three broad challenges that face any country that is struggling to build a sustainable democracy: achieving accountable competent governance, broad-based economic prosperity, and social stability. How each challenge is addressed and in what sequence will depend upon a country's history, culture, resources, and other factors. In the case of South Africa, the seminar began with the country's foremost preoccupation: the political transformation from apartheid to inclusive constitutional democracy. Three elements were highlighted: the role of leadership in opening the way for national reconciliation and democracy; the importance of power sharing and the constitution that was adopted on May 8, 1996; and the process of redefining the national identity of South Africa's citizens, including coming to terms with the country's troubled history with the help of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Next on the agenda were key economic dimensions of South Africa's transformation, including unemployment and the June 1996 macro-economic strategy. Both are central to achieving economic growth, greater equity, and viable self-government.

Finally, the meeting addressed three elements germane to South Africa's social transformation and the emergence of a vibrant civil society: education, crime prevention, and the media. All three affect, and are affected by, progress on the political and economic fronts. South Africa's long-term political prospects will depend, as in any other democracy, not only on the government's capacity and willingness to meet the needs of the people, but also on the capacity and willingness of citizens to assume their civic responsibilities and obligations.

South Africa'S International Significance

Although the focus of the meeting was primarily on South Africa's internal political, economic, and social dynamics, there were frequent references to the international community's stake in South Africa's domestic transformation. In retrospect, these can be summarized under three broad headings that were not on the conference agenda.

South Africa's Special Standing in World Politics

South Africa represents one of the world's most prominent and promising attempts to find a democratic answer to the most urgent question in post-Cold War international affairs: How can people with profound intergroup cultural, racial, and religious differences, compounded by a history of race-based political oppression and economic deprivation, govern themselves without fighting? Armed conflicts brought havoc to over thirty countries in 1995, nearly all of them multi-ethnic states that appear far less deeply divided than did South Africa only a few years ago. If South Africa succeeds, there are bound to be positive demonstration effects as other governments decide whether and how to empower the more than 900 million people in some 233 groups that political scientist Ted Gurr has identified as "*minorities at risk*."¹ The international community is already turning to the new South Africa for leadership and advice in efforts to promote power sharing and democratic peace in Burundi, Nigeria, Burma, the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere.

Under international law, problems of national integration fall within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states. But South Africa's domestic affairs under apartheid eventually were deemed a legitimate concern of the international community. In one of the major diplomatic developments of the twentieth century the United Nations Security Council branded the human rights abuse of apartheid a threat to international peace and in 1979 imposed mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. How significant these actions were in weakening the resolve of the apartheid government, compared to the decisions by private banks to deny access to new capital and other measures, continues to be debated. But the efforts by the the majority of UN members to promote more vigorous intervention in South Africa's internal affairs acquired special political significance, as many of these states are vulnerable to foreign intervention and ordinarily oppose any infringement on a UN member's sovereign rights. Against this background and in light of its recent success, South African leaders speak with moral authority and political credibility when advocating restraint and respect for human rights in resolving ethnic conflicts elsewhere.

Among the many countries now in transition, South Africa also enjoys special status in the West. As the anti-apartheid movement gained momentum, especially in communities throughout the United States, it produced a degree of public concern with and understanding of South Africa's internal affairs that probably still exceeds that which Americans have for any other foreign country except Israel. No two societies share a deeper and more persuasive and convergent interest in race relations than South Africa and the United States. This shared interest gives their relationship special importance in the domestic and foreign affairs of both nations.

No Longer an Outlaw, Not Yet a Big Emerging Market

International economic sanctions became the principal policy instrument of governments opposed to apartheid and were accompanied by powerful grassroots campaigns in Europe and North America that forced corporate disinvestment in South Africa. There is consensus in South Africa and abroad that sanctions and the denial of access to foreign capital played a major role in promoting peaceful change. Now that majority rule prevails, South African leaders are campaigning strenuously for increased foreign investment and trade expansion in order to

generate the economic surpluses necessary for building democracy and reducing economic and social inequities.

The major industrial powers all officially back these efforts. South Africa, whose 1995 GDP accounts for 45 percent of all sub-Saharan Africa's gdp, and which has the potential to become a major economic engine in the region, is regarded by Washington to be one of the world's ten most important "Big Emerging Markets."² Yet the flow of private capital from other nations, including the United States, has been much slower than South Africans had hoped. South Africans of all races are dismayed by the hesitancy shown by international business in light of what they see as historic opportunities to develop long-term and highly profitable economic partnerships while also helping to build the foundation for sustainable democracy in South Africa.

International Support For South Africa's Civil Society Remains Vital

Complementing the international economic sanctions campaign to end apartheid was a more positive commitment by foreign governments, private foundations, and citizen groups to build capacity for grassroots civil empowerment and the development of black leadership in South Africa. During the 1980s, hundreds of millions of dollars were provided to local civic associations, trade unions, professional groups, community-based education organizations, and a host of other organizations that have played a crucial role in South Africa's "bargaining culture," the key to democratic peace. With the end of apartheid, foreign donors have begun to reduce their programs or shift support from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to assist the new government more directly. Many key government agencies are now headed and staffed by former NGO leaders.

Seminar participants urged continued international support for strengthening South Africa's civil society. The South African state has neither the resources nor the administrative capacity to bring about the social equity and citizen involvement that will be required to sustain democratic peace. Democracy, after all, depends on the diffusion of power, resources, and social responsibility to local communities, and a robust civil society will be crucial to long-term political stability and the peaceful preservation of cultural diversity. Continuing transnational cooperation with, and support for, the full range of NGOs that are vital to further strengthening pluralism in South Africa will be as important to consolidating democracy as the earlier efforts to achieve the peaceful overthrow of apartheid.

Under each of the conference's substantive topics South African participants also testified to the benefits they gained from surveying the experiences of other nations. Support from private and public donor agencies has been critical in helping future and current officials gain exposure to these alternatives. In the case of the constitution, teams visited other democracies and compiled vast amounts of historical and current information that led to the reformulation of South Africa's political system. Similar processes of fact-finding have been under way in education, where the policies of between 80 and 90 countries were studied before the 1996 White Paper on reform of South Africa's education system was issued. Information gleaned in this way has also proven very useful politically: seminar participants recalled how reference to what has or has not worked in other countries helped to break deadlocks in policy debates.

Finally, international donors, both public and private, should weigh the advantages of investing in South Africa in light of the potential impact these commitments might have on South Africa and the potential that South Africa holds as an example to others and as a source of practical advice and technical assistance to advance the cause of democratic peace elsewhere. Should the great South African transition to a pluralistic democracy fail, however, this will cast a dark shadow throughout Africa and on friends of democracy everywhere. In short, South Africa should be seen as a major building block for a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic order across Southern Africa and around the world. The extensive and diverse network of cooperation between the civil societies of South Africa and Western Europe, North America, and elsewhere also point to new opportunities for a deepening North-South cooperation in the post-Cold War era that could reinforce global order and help to revitalize civil societies in the mature democracies. Yet barely five years ago such cooperation did not seem even remotely possible.

South Africa is often described as such a "special case" that comparisons to other countries in transition are unlikely to be meaningful. Yet the deliberations about South Africa's "Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace" at the June 1996 conference in Cape Town reconfirmed the salience of several attributes common to democracies everywhere. First, true self-government can grow only from the grassroots upward. Second, democracy must be supported by three main pillars--democratic institutions, market economics, and civil society. The construction of these pillars, as the South African case has shown, can proceed at different rates at different times, but without sufficient strength in all three, democracy will collapse. South Africa's experience also points to a third universal truth: democratic development is a nonlinear process. And finally, policies of inclusion and fairness help build the resilience that will be necessary to withstand setbacks and unforeseen domestic and foreign obstacles to democratic development. All of this means, of course, that democracy can be built only gradually, over many generations, and in the face of changing circumstances it will never be perfect, only perfectible.

* See the [Appendix](#) for the conference agenda and a list of participants. Proceedings were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis, so quotations and opinions in this summary report derive from either written statements that participants submitted for the record or publications that help to clarify or update the topics that were discussed during the June 20-21, 1996, conference.

Political Empowerment and Restraint

In 1991, Bruce Scott, a Harvard economist and a leading specialist on comparative economic performance of nations, made the following statement as a member of a team analyzing future scenarios for South Africa:

No country in modern times has made a successful transition starting from a position like South Africa, [having endured] ten years of economic decline [and] significant and rising violence. . . . The time for economic and social transformation is before the transition to democracy, not after.³

The value of Scott's analysis was its emphasis on the three essential elements of transition: the political, economic, and social. But Scott identified economic growth as a precondition for

peaceful political transformation, a course that was not open to South Africa. By the 1980s, the political conflict and division resulting from three and a half centuries of colonialism and four and a half decades of apartheid made it necessary to reverse Scott's order. Political domination by the white minority would have to be abolished by a settlement that included the liberation movements representing the black majority before significant progress could be made on the economic and social fronts.

It is much too soon to cry victory, even politically. South Africa has safely traversed two of the three precarious passages that, according to transition theory, are required in a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. The first, the beginning of the transition phase, occurred under P. W. Botha, who tried to modernize apartheid, which only fueled opposition and a new United Democratic Front. Botha's successor, F. W. de Klerk, presided over the second stage during the 1980s and early 1990s, which culminated in the first universal franchise election on April 27, 1994. This "founding election" generally marks the second stage of progress towards democracy. The longer, less dramatic, but still essential third step of consolidating South Africa's new democratic institutions will probably last for another decade. The struggle to sustain and improve democracy in South Africa--as in any other nation--is a never-ending one.

The imperative of keeping the political process on track will determine what is possible, and necessary, on the economic and social fronts. Without sufficient political stability in South Africa, economic growth and social cohesion will remain elusive. Likewise, economic decline and social disintegration could derail the political process. In the political domain, three elements--leadership, the new constitution, and the role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission--shed light on how South Africa contained the threat of mass violence and is creating the foundations for sustainable democracy.

Opening The Way To Reconciliation: Leaders Matter

It is a cliché but true that South Africa was blessed with outstanding leaders, most notably Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk. Together, they turned South Africans away from conflict and toward democracy, actions that won them a joint Nobel Peace Prize. The decision by de Klerk and others in the National Party to accept a negotiated resolution of their conflict with the ANC over access to political rights was not inevitable. Other ruling groups in far more threatening circumstances have chosen to maintain political monopolies rather than seek a political compromise. At the same time, Nelson Mandela and his ANC colleagues, with history clearly moving in their direction, could have decided to fight their way to power, as other liberation movements have done elsewhere, and from a much weaker base. Remarkably, the two leaders were able to sustain this compromise in the face of strong rejectional forces in both camps.

Each leader's decision to opt for negotiations rather than the use of force reflected both practical and moral imperatives. Several factors helped to put South Africa on the pathway to democratic peace²:

- Although de Klerk presided over a military that could prevail in the short run, and Mandela (or his successors) could reasonably expect to be able to overcome their military disadvantage in the long run, war at any time would surely wreck the South African economy, the most advanced in sub-Saharan Africa, leaving the victor with few spoils and no means to consolidate victory and to govern.
- Economically, South Africa was a much more integrated society than many other countries now beset by civil conflict. The economy was sufficiently developed to offer ambitious South Africans of all races a means other than the state to acquire wealth and respect. Despite huge economic disparities and the different economic experiences of black leaders returning from exile and the black majority forced to live under apartheid, a cross-racial consumer culture had begun to emerge by the late 1980s. Today this common consumer culture, which prizes pragmatism and deal making in order to reap economic benefits, helps hold the society together.
- Even though black South Africans lacked the military capability to overthrow the South African state, their political behavior made it obvious that they could be governed only through increasingly costly repression.
- The moral hazards of war were also very high for both sides. Defense of the status quo by force would be decried as genocide, while the use of force by blacks against a white minority that had vowed to reform risked alienating white majorities in the powerful Western nations.
- Common religious and moral beliefs have helped overcome racial and cultural distinctions between black and white South Africans: 78 percent of South Africans are Christian. The elaborate ideological theology of the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church had been used by whites to give apartheid a religious justification, but in the 1970s black leadership began to emerge in the Anglican, Catholic, and other sects with worldwide ties. These churches became, in the term of the day, a "site of struggle." Rather than fighting the government, progressive church leaders first sought an ecumenical religious accord to challenge the moral basis of apartheid. This culminated with the 1987 joint declaration by all the major denominations that condemned the apartheid regime as morally illegitimate. Although late in the apartheid era, the declaration was important because it was issued at a critical moment in the debate within the white community about the future of minority rule.
- With the passage of the 1979 labor legislation, which opened the way for collective bargaining, particularly in the vital mining sector, South Africans finally began substantive negotiations across the racial divide. This and other reforms did little to enhance the legitimacy of the South African state--internationally or for the country's alienated majority--but did give blacks real power and negotiation experience that contributed to the "bargaining culture" after 1990.
- During the 1970s and 1980s, the effectiveness of the state also had been eroding: demographic pressures rendered influx control unworkable; deteriorating fiscal health was evident in the government's increasing dependence on deficit financing; revelations of spreading corruption among public officials of the National Party began to weaken the government's standing among whites; and, most important, there was rising domestic and international support for the hundreds of independent groups that had come together in the anti-apartheid United Democratic Front.

- The white community also was becoming increasingly averse to making material sacrifices to preserve its political privileges and increasingly resigned to what was coming to be seen as an inevitable shift of political power to the black majority. Evasions of military conscription rose, emigration rates and capital flight increased, and polling data showed a growing alienation from hard-line pro-apartheid politicians.
- The South African government was confronted with the prospect of an economy that, without outside resources, would never be revitalized and that had no prospect of gaining the resources it needed--credit, investment, technology, or markets--unless it undertook major political reforms.

Several international factors also affected leadership calculations about what was possible and necessary:

- Foremost among these factors was the end of the Cold War. The 1984 summit between Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, began a new era of U.S.-Soviet relations that had a major impact on the politics of Southern Africa, notably their joint efforts to facilitate the independence of Namibia. As the threat of international Communism faded, the National Party was robbed of a demon that it had long used to mobilize support at home and temper hostility abroad, especially among the Western powers. At the same time, the failure of Communism deprived the liberation forces of a traditional source of support and, ironically, allowed Nelson Mandela greater leeway to restrain the more radical elements within his own movement. By the early 1990s there was no ideological rallying point other than freedom and democracy to rally international support and mobilize internal forces.
- International efforts to resolve long-standing conflicts in Angola and Mozambique further isolated the South African government, which for years had helped fuel these conflicts, and encouraged more concerted diplomatic efforts to promote a negotiated end to apartheid. These wars had also greatly strained the South African security forces, which were deeply involved in supporting rebel movements in these countries while trying to quell unrest at home. Countering the Cubans in Angola had become especially costly in the 1980s.
- At the same time, the damage that civil war brought in Angola, Mozambique, and elsewhere in Africa--whatever the causes--is today cited by both black and white South Africans as justification for seeking a peaceful end to apartheid.
- Finally, a large number of foreign ngos, private foundations, trade unions, universities, and other educational and professional organizations were either active in South Africa or were helping to train and advise a wide diversity of South Africans abroad. Although they were not directly part of the political bargaining process, they helped to create an environment conducive to compromise, as well as building the human and institutional capacity to bargain effectively and to implement agreements.

Against this backdrop, Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk have shown both "strategic" and "operational" leadership at critical stages in the transition process. These two sides of effective leadership are described by Mikhail Gorbachev in "Nonviolent Leadership," an essay prepared for the Carnegie Commission.⁵ Strategic leadership, according to Gorbachev, "paves society's path to the future . . . when the sources feeding the old system are exhausted and new activities,

reforms or even revolutions are needed." Operational leadership, "the solution of daily and ongoing managerial tasks," requires a "timely *response* to the problems of domestic and international life . . . [including] the settlement of conflicts and interest collisions. The main objective of strategic leadership, however, is to *prevent* such problems from occurring in the first place. . . . Keeping a balance between the two is probably the highest art of policymakers. . . ."

In South Africa's political transition Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk initially shared strategic leadership. But once Mandela left prison, de Klerk's role became largely operational until he relinquished power in 1994. De Klerk and Mandela were both trained in the law, and, although Mandela was unjustly held in prison for twenty-seven years, a sentence sanctioned by a legal system that was regarded by the vast majority of Mandela's followers as fundamentally illegitimate, the two leaders brokered a compromise that would reform, rather than abolish, the nation's basic legal and government structures and principles of due process. Since the April 1994 elections, the overwhelming burden of leadership--strategic and operational--has rested with President Mandela.

Mandela's first challenge at the start of the negotiating process was, in effect, to function as a national leader while still a prisoner of the state. The process by which he secured the trust and respect of his adversaries and renewed the faith of his followers has been described at length elsewhere.⁶ Mandela's approach to nation building deftly balanced the hopes and fears of those who stood to lose and those who would gain political power. He gave carefully considered and strong support for rights-based government, coalition politics, and civil society--a formula similar to the "Republican model of government" advocated by America's first president, George Washington.⁷

From the onset of negotiations in March 1989, the genius of Mandela's leadership has been to hold forth a vision of South African democracy that effectively has reassured the white minority that the deprivations they had so long imposed upon the black majority would not one day be imposed upon them, while reassuring the nonwhite majority that the abuse of power they had had to endure for so long would never happen again. "The individual rights and national self-determination of the South African people," he declared at the May 8, 1996, adoption of the new South African constitution, "shall not be inhibited, but reinforced by the collective rights of communities."⁸

A successful balancing of individual and group rights will, however, depend on such factors as a healthy economy, which are largely beyond the control of political leaders and which will be especially problematic for South Africa. President Mandela has sought to temper the economic expectations of whites, who hope to retain the material fruits of entrenched economic privilege, and of the black majority that remains overwhelmingly poor and so eager for new opportunities for advancement. President Mandela has deftly sought to link economic opportunity and responsible self-government in ways that do not deny hard realities but that avoid a forced redistribution of wealth. As he noted in his address celebrating South Africa's new constitution:

The new constitution obliges us to strive to improve the quality of life of the people. In this sense, our national consensus recognizes that there is nothing else that can justify the existence of government but to redress the centuries of unspeakable privations, by striving to eliminate

poverty, illiteracy, homelessness and disease. It obliges us too, to promote the development of independent civil society structures.

The reference to civil society is a reminder of a key element of Mandela's leadership, the belief that neither government nor a particular leader can guarantee the development and well-being of the nation. He returned to this theme and the responsibility of citizens in thanking

. . . the representatives of almost every organized sector of civil society which made their inputs into the process: the legal fraternity, women, local communities, traditional structures, and leaders of sectors of business, labor, land issues, the media, arts and culture, the disabled, children's rights and many more.

President Mandela's claim and approach to leadership were shaped during his twenty-seven years as a political prisoner. When he finally assumed power late in life, his ideas and moral authority, rather than the bargaining and coalition-building skills of a more conventional politician, have marked his brief but historic time as head of state. He has effectively established a founding myth for the post-apartheid nation, with the help of F. W. de Klerk, particularly during the critical period of March 1992. How his successors will choose to build on this legacy is difficult to predict, especially with all the uncertainties about the challenges of further consolidating democracy and dealing with South Africa's huge economic and social inequities. A few of the elements of good leadership are indisputable. First, leaders must avoid any hint of corruption or displays of arrogance that would undermine citizen trust and patience during the period of economic transformation. Second, no leader can act, or appear to act, in ways that are above the law or extraconstitutional. In a multiethnic state with wide disparities of wealth, such behavior can quickly polarize ethnic or racial groups and lead to government failure and mass violence. Mandela's strategic goal of building a secure democracy in which constitutional structures, processes, and principles ensure that any future conflict in South Africa will be settled through due process and the rule of law, rather than through the force of arms or in ways that favor one race or ethnic group above another, must remain paramount. Henceforth, South African politics must revolve around the policies of the state and not the color of those who run it.

Constitutional Framework for Democratic Peace

South Africa's apartheid state officially ended with the April 1994 general elections that led to Nelson Mandela becoming president under the terms of an interim constitution. But it took two years of long and often contentious deliberations by a multiparty Constitutional Assembly to define the new nation's permanent political structures. This was a crucial period of confidence building. On May 8, 1996, a new constitution was proposed that sought to balance the rights of individuals and groups and define the collective goals and purposes of the nation. After a careful review and the acceptance of amendments prescribed by the country's highest constitutional court, the constitution was adopted in February 1997.

South African constitutional experts, jurists, and politicians studied and debated the successes and failures of other constitutional democracies, drawing most heavily on the experience of the Federal Republic of Germany. But the 137-page document they produced to guide their nation's development is uniquely South African. It does not fit into any classic constitutional mold.

According to the leader of the Democratic Party and one of the constitution's many architects, Colin Eglin, "It is neither classically federal nor unitary, presidential nor parliamentary, liberal nor conservative. It does not embody a complete separation of powers, yet it avoids an excessive concentration of powers."²

The goal of the Constitutional Assembly was to produce a new order in South Africa that is truly democratic, not just representative but also transparent, responsive, and accountable. Complicating the construction of this new order was the need to accommodate South Africa's deep and sometimes dizzying diversity of language, culture, religion, and political persuasions. For a nation that was governed for over three centuries by authoritarian white minorities that practiced divide-and-rule policies, the great challenge was to find a formula that would guarantee rights for all *and* foster a greater sense of collective responsibility for the nation and its future.

In order to limit the excessive concentration of power and accommodate diversity within and among regions, the constitution provides for government to be structured at three levels: local government, known as municipalities; nine provinces, each with its own elected legislature and an executive; and a three-branch national structure. In addition, there is a lengthy bill of rights which covers a vast range of topics, from the most fundamental political rights (for instance, privacy and freedom of expression, religion, and association), to social and economic rights (access to education, employment, housing, food, and water, for example), to more specific rights of the person (for example, the right of a child to have a name or a woman to have an abortion).

The constitution accommodates cultural diversity but avoids granting formal standing or special rights to particular "cultural groups." It allows cultural diversity to be expressed in a voluntary, organic manner by securing the rights of citizens, either individually or collectively as communities, to "enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language" and to form "associations and other organs of civil society." The state is also prohibited from discriminating against its citizens on the grounds of such characteristics as ethnic or social origin, language, or religion.

The national parliament has two chambers, a National Assembly whose members are elected on proportional representation through a national common voters' roll, and a National Council of Provinces, composed of delegates elected by each of the nine provincial legislatures. The National Executive consists of the president, who is elected by the National Assembly, plus a cabinet, which he appoints. The president and his cabinet are directly accountable to the National Assembly and its committees. A majority vote of no confidence by the National Assembly requires a president to resign. An independent judiciary, including a Constitutional Court that is appointed by a Judicial Service Commission, upholds the constitution as the supreme law of the land.

At the provincial level there is also an elected legislature and an executive accountable to that legislature. Provincial governments have extensive legislative powers that are specified in the constitution. The constitution makes provision for the "equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the national, provincial and local spheres of government," although provincial governments (and local governments) have only limited powers of taxation.

At the local level, the constitution provides for the establishment of municipalities covering the entire territory of the Republic. The elected legislature (council) of a municipality and its executive "has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the constitution. National and provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality's ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions."

Three issues, which may be harbingers of tests of constitutionality in the years ahead, nearly derailed the constitution's adoption just hours before the Constitutional Assembly's deadline to adjourn. The first had to do with education and was brought to a head by Afrikaners, who succeeded at the last minute in including provisions requiring respect for differences of language and culture in the formulation of education policy. A second sticking point was property rights. Businesses feared the government might attempt to seize mineral rights, but this was resolved by dropping the word "mineral" from the property clause. And third, trade unions wanted to exclude a provision that would sustain the right of business to lock out striking employees; the Assembly agreed to this demand, but then reassured business by allowing existing legislation to stand. Despite these difficulties, constitution making in South Africa served the cause of national reconciliation in at least two important ways: it provided a nonviolent forum for conflict resolution; and the lengthy and far-reaching negotiations helped to educate the public about the rights and responsibilities inherent in a democracy.

When the constitution was finally adopted, the chair of the National Assembly, Cyril Ramaphosa, proudly declared it to be the "Mecca" of constitutions: "People would travel far to see how democracy has been enshrined in South Africa." He may be right, although the true strength and durability of any constitution can be determined only in practice, across many generations and changing national circumstances. In the case of South Africa, the constitution adopted in May and celebrated by Ramaphosa had to be approved by an eleven-member Constitutional Court before it could even take effect. And after three months of study, the Court ruled in September 1996 that the constitution must be amended to toughen the bill of rights, ensure the independence of "watchdog" agencies, and enhance the powers of provincial governments. The immediate reaction of President Mandela and other political leaders was acceptance of the Court's authority. The content of the Court's action was widely viewed as less important than the fact that by overruling proposals by the governing party it demonstrated its independence and marked another milestone in the development of constitutional democracy in South Africa. The new constitution was formally signed by President Mandela on December 6, 1996.

Looking farther ahead, the constitution could evolve into a document with provisions that no one currently envisions. The constitution can be amended by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly, although the Constitutional Court has ruled that a stricter standard should apply for the bill of rights. However it evolves, it seems safe to conclude that the constitution provides a solid basis for representative, transparent, and accountable governance, with meaningful protection and promotion of fundamental rights. As such, it does hold promise as an inspiration for other countries in transition, particularly those that are attempting to build viable coalitions under conditions of diverse cultures, deep economic disparities, and limited political authority and financial resources.

At the heart of the South African constitution lie the same political ideals that motivated the drafters of the U.S. Constitution, despite the contradiction of slavery. The first concern in both cases was to ensure permanent liberation from any further oppression: The struggle for liberty, ultimately, is not about freedom from government but about building capacity for self-government, which alone makes the practice of freedom possible. The South African constitution, like the one drafted for America some 200 years ago, recognizes--if for somewhat different reasons--that sovereignty need not reside in a single place. The dispersal of sovereignty to provinces and local communities allows for multiple sites of civic engagement that is a necessary, if insufficient, condition for successful pluralistic democracy. It encourages citizen responsibility, on the one hand, and discourages coercion, on the other.

At this stage, South Africans understandably are still preoccupied with breaking free from the legacy of apartheid. But the government also recognizes that the new nation must become more than an escape from the past if it is to build a solid political foundation for the future. ANC leaders are therefore encouraging all citizens to think afresh--at a very personal level--about what it means to be South African. They are also encouraging the nation to come to terms collectively with the realities of South African history, primarily through the mechanism of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Redefining and Reconciling National Identities

South Africa's leaders know that, for the new constitution to work, a common national identity must emerge that transcends but does not threaten cultural diversity. To give impetus to this search for a collective national soul, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki used the occasion of the adoption of the new constitution on May 8, 1996, to issue a highly personal, emotional, and eloquent statement on what it means to be a South African.¹⁰ In essence, he declared that all South Africans are Africans, and that the term "African" must be as blind to a person's race, religion, or cultural background as the term "American" is for a citizen of the United States. It was a direct assault on the contradictions inherent in the ideology of apartheid, and, ironically, the statement received the greatest attention and positive reaction from the Afrikaans media.

Mbeki's conception of being an African begins with the common ties all South Africans have to the nation's land and natural environment. He notes that at times he has wondered whether "I should concede equal citizenship of our country to the leopard and the lion, the elephant and the springbok, the hyena, the black mamba and the pestilential mosquito." But the heart of his statement deals with transforming cultural diversity from the basis of oppression to the basis of democracy that now defines -- South Africans as Africans. The following excerpts suggest the scope of his appeal to all citizens:

I owe my being to the Khoi and the San whose desolate souls haunt the great expanses of the beautiful Cape--they who fell victim to the most merciless genocide our native land has ever seen, they who were the first to lose their lives in the struggle to defend our freedom and [in]dependence and they who, as a people, perished in the result. . . . I am formed of the migrants who left Europe to find a new home on our native land. Whatever their own actions, they remain still, part of me.

In my veins course the blood of the Malay slaves who came from the East. Their proud dignity informs my bearing, their culture a part of my essence. The stripes they bore on their bodies from the lash of the slave master are a reminder embossed on my consciousness of what should not be done.

I am the grandchild of the warrior men and women that Hintsa and Sekhukhune led, the patriots that Cetshwayo and Mphephu took to battle, the soldiers Moshoeshe and Ngungunyane taught never to dishonour the cause of freedom. . . .

I am the grandchild who lays fresh flowers on the Boer graves at St. Helena and the Bahamas, who sees in the mind's eye and suffers the suffering of a simple peasant folk, death, concentration camps, destroyed homesteads, a dream in ruins.

I am the child of Nonquause. I am he who made it possible to trade in the world markets in diamonds, in gold, in the same food for which my stomach yearns.

I come of those who were transported from India and China, whose being resided in the fact, solely, that they were able to provide physical labor, who taught me that we could both be at home and be foreign, who taught me that human existence itself demanded that freedom was a necessary condition for that human existence. . . .

I have seen what happens when one person has superiority of force over another, when the stronger appropriate to themselves the prerogative even to annul the injunction that God created all men and women in his image. . . .

The great masses who are our mother and father will not permit that the behavior of the few results in the description of our country and people as barbaric.

We are assembled here today to mark their victory in acquiring and exercising their right to formulate their own definition of what it means to be African. The constitution whose adoption we celebrate constitutes an unequivocal statement that we refuse to accept that our Africanness shall be defined by our race, colour, gender or historical origins. . . . It gives concrete expression to the sentiment we share as Africans . . . that the people shall govern.

This statement provides the rationale for a common South African national identity that would support and be supported by the new constitution. Barriers to implementing such a robust national allegiance remain, despite the success of the Constitutional Assembly and the broad support for President Mandela's leadership. To overcome the deeper concerns that could impede the development of democratic pluralism, the government is encouraging all South Africans to confront more openly the legacy of apartheid. The principal instrument for doing so has been the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (trc), a seventeen-member panel chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu; the commission was established by the government in December 1995 with a two-year life.

The purpose of the TRC is to heal old wounds, not reopen them. It is about forgiving, not forgetting, the deeds and misdeeds of the apartheid era. The TRC's main tasks are to apportion

reparations to victims, to grant amnesty to perpetrators, and to compile an official history of the nation's transition from raw repression to majority rule. This has been a difficult and delicate balance to strike.

During the tense political negotiations to end apartheid, the ANC had to walk a tightrope, assuaging the fears of those who were giving up power while at the same time avoiding a perception among its own rank and file that elites were selling out. To gain agreement the ANC went a long way to contain the fears of the white minority. It offered as part of a general amnesty guarantees of nonretribution against those who had implemented or defended apartheid and pledged that state officials could keep their jobs and their pensions. The vast majority of ANC members who accepted the many concessions to the white minority risked a popular backlash among the new voting majority should they conclude that the perpetrators of crimes under apartheid were deemed more worthy of consideration than their victims. It was essential for the ANC to address these concerns.

The political process that led to the formation of the TRC provides another illustration of the new nation's commitment to democracy. Ironically, some suggest the precursor of the TRC was an internal ANC commission of inquiry that was established not to expose the crimes of apartheid but in response to accusations before the 1994 general election that the ANC itself had perpetrated human rights abuses in some of its exile camps. When the first report was criticized as biased, a second, more independent commission was named to look into the ANC's record, and a more general debate over how to come to grips with the nation's troubled past began to develop. Two major conferences were organized by nongovernmental organizations, with the participation of human rights experts from other countries in Eastern and Central Europe and Latin America that were in transition; the reports that they produced were widely discussed at workshops and meetings around the country. In addition, South Africans studied the experiences of the nineteen truth commissions that have operated since the 1970s, or are currently being formed, in sixteen other countries. Much of this research and deliberation informed the work and public hearings of the parliamentary standing committee on justice that was charged with preparing a bill for what became the TRC.

In July 1995 President Mandela assented to the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act that the Parliament had approved by an overwhelming majority. The Act was not, however, without its critics. Before the actual formation of the commission, F. W. de Klerk warned that it could become a one-sided witch hunt that could bring reconciliation to a standstill. The chief executive of the South African Institute for Race Relations rejected nomination to be a commissioner for similar reasons. More conservative whites expressed fears that the TRC might spark renewed racial conflict. On the other side, more radical elements in the ANC protested that the TRC would equate the relatively minor human rights violations by the ANC in its struggle against apartheid with the actions of those defending a system that the UN had declared to be a "crime against humanity." Some in the ANC also were unhappy that TRC terms of reference covered only the period 1960 to 1993, arguing that the period under review should go back at least to 1948, when the National Party came to power, if not all the way back to the arrival of the first white settlers in 1652.

The ANC minister for safety and security, Sydney Mufamadi, tried to assure the critics that the TRC's role was to facilitate reconciliation, that no one would be prosecuted as a result of coming forward, and that all the government wanted was to let people know what really happened. To imbue the TRC with further legitimacy, President Mandela appointed a multiracial and political diverse representative committee to solicit names from the public, hold hearings, vet the candidates, and then send him a list of twenty-five nominations from which he would pick seventeen commissioners. Nearly three hundred citizens applied and were considered.

The democratic approach to the formation of the TRC continues to characterize its operations; this distinguishes the South African experiment from the truth commissions of other countries.¹¹ Hearings before the commission--testimony from the victims as well as those seeking amnesty--are conducted at locations throughout the country, and they are open to the media and to the general public. Managing this process has posed major logistical and legal problems, but the transparency has provided an important opportunity for public education, healing, and reconciliation that continues to gain support and national respect. Other factors that have contributed to its apparent success, and that differ from most other truth commissions, include powers of subpoena and of search and seizure, which gives the exercise teeth, and a strict focus on the role of individuals. There is no blanket amnesty, which has caused such disaffection in other countries, as the formerly oppressed conclude that general amnesty amounts to impunity.

To qualify for amnesty, applicants must first complete a prescribed form that requires details of human rights abuse that will be published in the *Government Gazette*; second, make a full disclosure of all human rights violations; and, third, in most cases appear in open session before the TRC. Before amnesty can be granted, the TRC has to be satisfied that the criteria established by Parliament have been met. These have to do with motive, circumstances, chain of command, and other matters. Amnesty is allowed only for acts clearly associated with political objectives, not those motivated by personal gain or personal malice.

By ruling only on individual misdeeds, the TRC risks criticism that only token exposures will be possible. To accommodate these concerns, the life of the commission has been extended to allow more amnesty applications to be made. The TRC has also sought to win public support in three ways. First, commissioners frequently remind the public that the TRC is not a substitute for criminal justice. And as the government has continued to prosecute former military generals and police officials for specific crimes, such as murder, this claim has both insulated the TRC from criticism and encouraged more and more individuals who may fear prosecution to appeal for amnesty. Second, television and other media coverage of the testimony by hitherto unknown victims of apartheid appears to be serving a surrogate function for the millions of other victims who have not had the opportunity to come forward. And finally, more and more prominent individuals have come forward seeking amnesty. After several months of hearing only from a handful of low-ranking officers seeking amnesty, the commission was approached by a group of twenty-two senior police officers and seven generals, including a former law and order minister and a former police commissioner, who sought amnesty. F. W. de Klerk and Deputy President Mbeki also have made separate appearances before the TRC to apologize for past wrongdoings by the National Party and the ANC.

Naturally, not all the TRC's critics have been silenced. The fundamental tension remains between those committed to the politics of compromise and those with a strict notion of justice. In the latter camp are the thousands who suffered grievous personal, familial, and material harm under apartheid and who believe there ought to be no amnesty. Even among the less seriously affected a recurring question is whether the political compromise that produced the TRC can be morally justified. The commission's vice-chair, Alex Boraine, has a simple reply:

It is morally defensible to argue that amnesty is the price we had to pay for peace and stability. Whether in fact a military coup was a reality or not, one thing is certain. If negotiation politics had not succeeded the bitter conflict would have continued and many more human rights violations would have occurred and hundreds, and possibly thousands would have been killed.¹²

In addition to helping prevent deadly conflict, Boraine summarizes well the TRC's constructive contribution to building democratic peace:

Essentially the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is committed to the development of a human rights culture and a respect for the rule of law in South Africa. In attempting to do this, I believe that there is an irreducible minimum and that is a commitment to truth. As Roberto Canas of El Salvador puts it, "Unless a society exposes itself to the truth it can harbour no possibility of reconciliation, reunification and trust. For a peace settlement to be solid and durable it must be based on truth."¹²

Creating a new political and moral order in South Africa cannot be achieved and sustained, however, without an equally determined effort to transform the economic and social life of the majority of South Africa's recently liberated citizens. Pursuit of Growth and Equity

No democratic government can survive in South Africa if it fails to address the huge economic and social inequities left by apartheid. But the leaders of the new majority also know that a significant and sustainable program to redress inequity will require rapid economic growth. To meet this dual challenge, the government is attempting to strike a balance by implementing programs that will gain it the continued support of the voting poor without bankrupting the country or precipitating the flight of the white minority, who retain the bulk of South Africa's technical skills and capital. When the government assumed power, it acquired a vast array of economic assets, compared to the rest of Africa, but these assets were clearly insufficient to overcome the legacy of apartheid quickly.

The South African Economy¹³

South Africa's economy, with a gross domestic product in 1995 of approximately \$120 billion, ranks twenty-seventh in the world and is by far the best developed and largest in Africa. South Africa is also twenty-seventh in population, at around 42 million, about the size of Poland or Spain. The U.S. Department of Commerce has designated South Africa as one of the world's ten "Big Emerging Markets" because of the pent-up consumer demand among the majority of the

population, which under apartheid was largely excluded from the formal economy, and because of the country's potential as the primary economic engine for an underdeveloped Southern Africa region with a population of more than 120 million.

The country has an increasingly diversified economy. It has a modern transportation and communications infrastructure, financial institutions, and a strong core of well-trained and internationally engaged professionals in law, finance, engineering, higher education, and the media. South Africa can still rely on a treasure trove of minerals that includes major proportions of the world's total reserves (for example, South Africa accounts for 40 percent of the world's gold, 66 percent of platinum group metals, 24 percent of diamonds, 54 percent of chrome, 83 percent of manganese, and 33 percent of vanadium); together, minerals contribute \$12 billion annually to the balance of payments. As a proportion of South Africa's gdp, however, the minerals sector contributes less than 9 percent. Of far greater importance has been the growth of manufacturing since 1950. It now accounts for nearly 24 percent of gdp and is the largest source of employment after the government. Three other sectors, finance, wholesale and retail trade, and government each account for between 15 percent and 17 percent of the country's economic activity. Agriculture, until 1920 the economy's largest sector, today contributes less than 5 percent to the gdp, but it remains a large export earner. Despite South Africa's obvious economic advantages, an overhang of apartheid economic structures and policies will make the new government's goal of rapid growth with greater equity very difficult to achieve.

The Legacy of Apartheid

Ironically, the apartheid government pursued for decades many of the same misguided policies that they so often criticized in other African countries, building huge bureaucracies and parastatals, spending heavily on capital projects and national defense, and practicing protectionism and import substitution. The reasons, of course, were to promote and protect the well-being of the tiny white minority, barely 13 percent of the population. This extravagance could be sustained for so long because the privileged group was small, the natural resources were large, and the minority monopolized the military. But as South Africa became increasingly isolated, domestic savings and investment plummeted, so that when the ANC finally came to power the country's per capita income of \$2,700 represented, in real terms, what it had been thirty years earlier. Investments had been largely wasted on inefficient public and capital-intensive private enterprises. Productivity in South Africa's modern sector was among the lowest in the world.

Overcoming apartheid's entrenched inequities remains a much greater challenge than altering macroeconomic policies to stimulate growth. Throughout most of this century, a combination of land dispossession and influx control laws forced blacks into the labor market but channeled them primarily to low-wage mine and farm work. Those not able to work were sent into the impoverished "homelands" that occupied the least productive 13 percent of the country's territory. During the 1970s the system began to crack as more and more workers were needed to help run white enterprises. But whites continue to enjoy a per capita income almost twelve times higher than that of blacks, and they own over 80 percent of the land. Forty percent of the nation's households--94 percent of them black--are living below the poverty line of less than \$200 a month for a family of five. The earnings of this 40 percent of South African households, 64

percent of which are in poor rural areas, account for only 6 percent of the national income. The richest 10 percent of households, most of them white, claim over half of the national income. Reinforcing these income gaps are huge disparities in access to education, housing, health care, and employment opportunities.

Redressing the Balance--The Realities of Power

For decades the ANC had promised to redress these imbalances one day. And the list of sectors where they hoped to achieve major gains for the deprived majority has not changed:

- Housing and related services
- Steady improvement in the quality of education and access to it
- Universal access to primary health care
- Land and agricultural support to rural workers who sought to become independent farmers
- Electrification of all urban areas and an increasing number of rural communities
- Reliable water supplies and appropriate sanitation infrastructure
- Improved postal and telecommunications services
- A broad social security net, including social grants and targeted welfare services

As the ANC assumed political power, however, its policies on how best to achieve these objectives have changed. Until four years ago, ANC leaders advocated a broad socialist approach, as outlined in its Freedom Charter, including nationalization of the private oligopolies that control 80 percent of the companies that trade on the Johannesburg stock exchange. Shortly after taking office, the Mandela administration issued a Reconstruction and Development Plan. While there was no longer any suggestion of nationalization, the plan did not indicate how the government would pay for its long list of social objectives, including such ambitious targets as the construction of one million low-income houses by 2000.

A New Economic Strategy

In mid-June 1996 the government announced a new economic strategy that many consider to be the Mandela administration's most important piece of work since it took office. The 500-page program, entitled *Macro-Economic Strategy for Growth, Employment and Redistribution*, reflects many months of internal debate about the role of government in the economy; extensive assessments of the economic policies and performances of countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas; and intensive consultations with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. As the title suggests, the government's first priority is to accelerate economic growth to generate and sustain expanded employment opportunities and so to reduce South Africa's huge inequities. Conflicts over the redistribution of resources might be prevented if this could be engineered within the context of a growing economy, rather than forcing a simple transfer of wealth from rich to poor.

Reducing unemployment is the strategy's lynch-pin, and making significant progress on this issue looms as one of the government's biggest political, economic and social challenges. In 1994

unemployment was estimated by the Central Statistical Service to be 32.6 percent. The rate among blacks, the country's newly enfranchised majority, was over 40 percent, compared to 6.4 percent for whites. Since the end of apartheid and the lifting of economic sanctions, the economy has begun to grow at a consistent annual rate of about 3.5 percent, slightly more than the increase in population. Government analysts have concluded that at this rate only about 100,000 new jobs will be generated annually. By 2000 the unemployment rate would rise another 5 percent to around 37 percent, a figure that would not bode well for the next national elections, in 1999.

The rate of growth also has to accelerate if the government wishes to increase public spending on improved social services for the poor, including employment-intensive programs to build low-cost housing, improve community water and municipal infrastructure, and pay for land reform. South Africa's budget deficit had already reached 9 percent of gdp by 1992-93, and higher fiscal deficits would lead to higher inflation and higher interest rates, risking renewed recession and a capital outflow that could cause a balance-of-payments crisis. Therefore, the government has sought to reduce the budget deficit which is expected to be only 5.1 percent of gdp in 1996-97.

Despite these fiscal realities, the government has adopted ambitious targets. It aims to raise the rate of economic growth from 3.1 percent in 1996 to 6 percent by the end of the decade while simultaneously creating 833,000 jobs; its goal is to create at least 400,000 jobs annually after 2000. Whereas the ANC had previously held that rapid increases in government spending would provide both the stimulus for economic growth and means to reduce inequities, their new strategy is strikingly similar to those now widely prescribed by the World Bank for other countries in transition from authoritarianism, central planning, and underdevelopment. South Africa's comprehensive plan to transform the economy includes

- A competitive platform for exports
- A stable environment for a surge in private investment
- Restructured public services and government capital expenditure
- New emphases in industrial and infrastructural development
- Greater labor-market flexibility
- Enhanced development of human resources

Economically, success of the strategy will hinge on greater engagement in the global economy: ". . . the central thrust of trade and industrial policy has to be the pursuit of employment-creating international competitiveness." This will entail a fundamental shift away from demand-side interventions, such as tariffs and subsidies to help producers, to supply-side measures aimed at lowering unit costs and spurring economic expansion all along the value chain. By focusing on creating a macroeconomic environment in which private fixed investment can flourish, the government hopes to set off a virtuous circle of employment-generating growth.

Politically, voters demand improvements in basic services. While the government cannot afford the huge home-building program once envisioned, large investments in roads, sewerage, and electrification are being made. By the end of 1997, the government estimates that 640,000 households will have gained access to clean drinking water--its most popular program. Major advances also include rural electrification, free primary health care for children and pregnant women, and the redistribution of nearly two million hectares of land. The government hopes that

providing such help will lead local communities to commit their own labor and resources to building new housing.

On more contentious aspects of the plan, such as the need for wage and price restraints, the macroeconomic plan proposes that a broad national agreement be negotiated among the interested parties in order to prevent renewed social conflict.

The immediate objective of the agreement would be to ensure that the recent depreciation of the currency does not translate into a vicious circle of wage and price increases leading to instability in the financial markets and decline in competitive advantage. For this reason it is important that wage and salary increases do not rise more than productivity growth. It is equally important that price restraint should be maintained, facilitated through an effective competition policy and continued trade liberalization.¹⁴

The macroeconomic strategy, which was developed by a team of fifteen economists, bankers and other financial experts drawn from government, universities, and development banks at the direction of the Ministry of Finance, was backed by a special multipartisan council of political leaders appointed by President Mandela. This is just one more example of Mandela's strategic leadership in helping to forge a national consensus to support the tough choices inherent in the strategy and to avoid debilitating conflicts over the plan's feasibility and fairness.

The plan's proponents hope to emulate the rapid economic growth and greater social equity of the newly industrializing countries (nics) of Asia, or the more recent economic advances of several Latin American countries, notably Chile. The Asian "tigers," however, have benefited from much higher levels of investment in capital equipment and education than exist in South Africa. Currently, East Asia's savings and investment rates are roughly seven times those of South Africa; these nations have huge pools of low-cost skilled labor that will not be duplicated in South Africa for at least another generation. Furthermore, South Africa's modern sector remains saddled by senior managers who have never known real competition. While trade unions remain powerful and are often cited by economists as another source of inefficiency, they played such a crucial role in undermining apartheid and facilitating its peaceful overthrow that it will be very difficult for any freely elected government to challenge or ignore them, as has occurred in other rapidly industrializing countries.

There is also a fundamental political difference between the economic transformations in East Asia, or in Chile, and that of South Africa. In moving decisively to democracy before restructuring the economy, South Africans are challenging the political judgment of Asian leaders such as former Singapore prime minister Lee Kwan Yu, who condemned Gorbachev for failing to put "perestroika" ahead of "glasnost." But in South Africa there was much less political leeway for overcoming unpopular economic policies than in the more authoritarian Big Emerging Markets, because the overwhelming problem of apartheid had to be resolved before any significant economic reform was possible.

When the macroeconomic strategy was finally introduced to parliament and the nation, all of the ANC's political leadership, including current and former members of the South African Communist Party, lined up to endorse the plan publicly. This unity is yet another tribute to

Mandela's leadership, because there had been strong differences within the party over all the key provisions, and these were heatedly debated right up to the plan's release. To help sell the plan at home, the government secured immediate and strong endorsements from the World Bank and the IMF, and a large ministerial delegation was sent on a much-publicized trip to Cannes, where the plan was enthusiastically received at a meeting of European Union bankers and finance ministers.

Economic pundits in the South African media have offered more qualified endorsements, pointing to the obvious political and social difficulties in meeting strategic targets. Cutting the budget deficit to 5.1 percent in 1997 and to 4 percent in 1998, as called for in the plan, will mean less money for improving life in the black townships, for police and educational reform, and for a host of other needs.

Cutting tariffs to spark foreign direct investment will cause a further drop in revenues, adding to pressure on the deficit. But no one knows whether foreign capital will flow in fast enough to offset these losses, help bring down interest rates, and begin generating sufficient growth to finance the social programs that cannot be financed internally without incurring huge new deficits, inflation, and sharply higher interest rates.

Selling off parastatals and publicly owned assets is, of course, one major way to raise money to meet social and other needs. And the privatization potential in South Africa is enormous, perhaps amounting to half of the country's capital stock. But privatization is also a political minefield, as it would introduce market forces that could lead to protests among more affluent consumers who are accustomed to paying subsidized prices for services, and among poor households in overcrowded black townships where during the apartheid era the government was either unable or unwilling to collect fees for basic services such as electricity and water. Privatization could also arouse new fears over job and wage security among organized labor. Tensions between the government and South Africa's trade union movement over the macroeconomic strategy has been growing and could become a major obstacle to consensus-building on a range of issues.

Trade Unions

Unions represent only 17 percent of the economically active population, but they wield enormous power over the South African economy. The largest of the trade union federations, the predominantly black Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), along with the United Democratic Front, was at the forefront of the anti-apartheid movement within South Africa. While COSATU's ties to those ANC leaders who returned from exile was weaker than with those who had been part of the internal struggle, it remained an important ally of the ANC during the political transformation. But in the constitutional debates COSATU failed to gain the ANC's backing for a provision outlawing company lockouts of workers during strikes. And more recently, COSATU has become increasingly critical of government efforts to restrain wage demands to keep inflation in check, as well as of its proposals for labor market reform.

COSATU leaders naturally are most concerned with protecting the security and benefits of their members. They do not reject the macroeconomic strategy, but they want to slow it down. No one disputes the need for massive job creation, but COSATU would like to start with immediate and

major government programs, not deficit reduction. They note that South Africa's deficit as a proportion of gdp is 25 percent below the OECD average, and they claim that the government can afford to spend much more on labor-intensive projects, including major public works programs, especially in poor rural areas. Organized labor also supports major new investments in education and training. But on trade liberalization, privatization, and other elements in the strategy, labor's position is best described as favoring a "go slow policy." Government programs to train and employ the poor would, in their view, help to narrow the wage distribution and gradually increase competition within labor markets and thereby help productivity.

While a COSATU-like approach worked during the postwar boom in Europe to facilitate structural adjustment and overcome certain economic inequities, the circumstances in South Africa and the global economy today are quite different. South Africa cannot afford to fund the job creation programs or the social safety net that was politically necessary in Europe to accommodate the eventual restructuring of labor markets. Furthermore, South Africa's decision to seek rapid economic growth by expanding international trade and by attracting foreign direct investment means the South African labor markets will no longer be isolated from changes in labor markets globally. Nicoli Nattrass, a professor of economics at the University of Cape Town, points out that as South Africa proceeds with trade liberalization and experiences growing competition (particularly from lower-wage economies), there will be pressure on unskilled wages. At the same time, there will be a rising demand for highly skilled workers (particularly if their skills are internationally transferable), and employers will have to pay much higher wages to keep them in South Africa.

Narrowing the Income Gap: Macroeconomics and the Labor Market

Labor market reforms since the late apartheid era have primarily benefited organized labor, which has become an enclave of regulated and protected employment. Unless the employment base can be broadened, the major political fault lines among South African workers will no longer be between COSATU and the small and still largely white elite that sits on the top rungs of the economic ladder. Rising inequalities between organized labor and the huge pool of workers who are either beginning to gain access to the unregulated, informal, subcontracted, or "out-sourced" labor markets, or are still among the unemployed, could present new political problems for the government. While racial income inequality had begun to narrow in South Africa, class inequality appears to be growing. Between 1975 and 1991 the poorest 40 percent of blacks became 40 percent poorer, while the top 20 percent became 40 percent richer. Inequality among blacks was 90 percent as wide as overall inequality among all the population groups.

Under the macroeconomic strategy, economic growth will contribute only about a third of the 833,000 new jobs to be created by the year 2000. Thirty percent will come from reforms of the labor market, introducing greater flexibility in the hiring and retaining of workers and providing new opportunities for the unemployed. Much of the remaining job creation is expected to come from government programs, mainly accelerated labor-based infrastructural development and maintenance of public works in urban and rural areas. Given the tight budgets and likely

resistance from trade unionists, it is doubtful these targets will be met by the end of the decade, but the government appears determined to try.

There are no easy answers for dealing with a widening income gap between the employed and unemployed in South Africa. Creating millions of low-wage jobs to draw unemployed workers into the formal economy through reform of the labor market and new government public works programs will be an essential first step in promoting greater equity and political stability; so, too, is economic expansion through enhanced international competitiveness if South Africa is to generate the economic surpluses to pay for public spending. Many more high-skill, high-wage workers and low-wage, low-skill jobs will be needed. Widening rather than diminishing inequities may result during the lengthy transition to a more balanced and fully developed economy. Resolving conflicts among labor, business, and government during this process will be one of South Africa's biggest political challenges.

To begin to deal with these issues, the government established a special Labor Market Commission that ran parallel to the work of the macroeconomic team; it released its report a few days after the new macroeconomic strategy was released. The commission has sought a consensus formula for reconciling South Africa's extreme income inequalities and high unemployment with low levels of output and productivity while trying to hold wages and prices in check. The thrust of the Commission's report was to recommend yet another consultative process to broaden traditional labor-management bargaining by including government representatives. The aim would be to reach a new social accord on the terms for promoting employment and growth within the framework of the macroeconomic strategy. A key element in this process would be the reform and strengthening of the National Economic Development and Labor Council (nedlac), a trilateral negotiating forum established under Labor Relations Act 66 of 1995. The government would present its plans for public works programs, tax policies, industrial and trade policies, and macroeconomic policy interventions. Business's contribution would be commitments to negotiating profit-sharing arrangements, to corporate governance mechanisms to include labor, to moderation in setting managerial salaries, and to expanded training programs at lower levels of the workforce. Labor would contribute commitments on wage restraints and greater flexibility in allowing companies to employ unorganized workers at lower wage scales.

It is too early to know whether it is possible to coordinate macroeconomic policy and labor market policy to produce more rapid expansion of employment. But in South Africa's difficult and potentially contentious economic transition, at least the forum would permit labor, business, and the government to understand each other's concerns better, and to explore options for reducing the risk of debilitating conflict. Traditionally, unions and employers could not negotiate real wages because of the volatility of prices and the severe economic distortions caused by the government's apartheid policies. But today, with prices and politics more stable, the government faces a new challenge to reassure unionized workers about the likely impact on real wages of programs to promote employment among the poor, international economic policies, and other dimensions of the macroeconomic strategy.

Economic policy, after all, must do more than promote growth and employment; it must also promote equity so that the poor will have the means and opportunity to participate actively in

civil society and the rich will not become so powerful and insular that they feel no need or obligation to do so. For example, one key factor in long-term employment generation and in undoing the inequities of apartheid will be the government's investment in improving education for the poor, especially at the primary and secondary levels. This is a need that must be addressed by business and labor as well as government.

The Social Demands of Democratic Peace

Three elements are vital to South Africa's successful transformation and to the growth of a vibrant civil society: education, crime prevention, and the media.

Financial and Fairness Realities In Education¹⁵

Access to education, the gateway to employment, will not come cheaply or quickly to South Africa's huge illiterate, or barely literate, population. Measurable progress in creating new educational opportunities for the disadvantaged, however, is certain to be regarded politically as another vital measure of the government's performance in the run-up to the 1999 elections. If substantial gains can be made on the educational front, the public may be more willing to accept official explanations should the broader economic targets not be met. So far, the government has been as open and forthright about the magnitude of the education challenge and its limited capacity to find instant solutions as it has been in presenting the economic strategy or explaining the operations of the new political structures. It is still too early to see any major gains in the national educational profile, however.

Under apartheid, undereducation of the black population denied most an opportunity for anything beyond menial labor. The Central Statistical Service reported that in 1994 ten million people had no education, 86 percent of whom were black. In the same year per capita spending on white children not attending private school was 147 percent higher than the amount spent on blacks. Whites, who comprise only 13 percent of the population, received twice as many university degrees, certificates, and diplomas as blacks.

According to the macroeconomic strategy,

Progress in education shows up consistently in comparative studies as a key determinant of long run economic performance and income redistributions. Sustained improvements in the quality of public schooling available to the poor and greater equity in the flow of students through secondary and tertiary education are central to the Government's approach.

The ANC had given high priority to this task well before coming to power, and in 1990 it set up a special team that assessed educational reform and multicultural systems in some eighty countries around the world. Australia's efforts to integrate large numbers of Asian immigrants and indigenous people, for example, offered important lessons.

In March 1995 the Department of Education published a *White Paper on Education and Training*; the White Paper became the basis for a comprehensive National Education Bill that

was passed six months later. The bill carefully balances power between the national and local educational authorities. Nineteen separate education departments that had served different racial groups and so-called independent tribal homelands were transformed into one integrated system of nine provincial departments. The national department is responsible for tertiary education, while the provinces handle primary and secondary education, with funding from the central government. Teacher training is a joint responsibility. The minister of education has been given new far-reaching powers to set national policy on a wide range of politically sensitive issues, including coordination, finance, governance, monitoring, staffing, student-teacher ratios, the curriculum framework, and the language of instruction. But the bill guarantees every person the right to basic education, to choose to be instructed in one of the eleven constitutionally designated official languages ("to the extent practicable"), to enjoy freedom of conscience, belief, and association, and to establish education institutions based on a common language, culture, or religion.

The government spent approximately \$7.67 billion on education in fiscal year 1996. This sum amounts to nearly 7 percent of the gdp and represents a 9.6 percent increase from the previous fiscal year. Eighty-five percent of the national education budget goes for salaries to teachers and other personnel. As a result of the post-apartheid consolidation of parallel educational structures, there are at least 100,000 redundant personnel in the system, most of them white. In keeping with the spirit of reconciliation, President Mandela gave assurances that the jobs of teachers and other public servants hired during the apartheid era would be protected at least until they retire or leave voluntarily. Thus far few have done so. Most of the funds for new initiatives--building schools in poor areas, school fees of poor children, and special programs in youth education, adult education, and teacher training--to redress the inequities in education in 1996 were therefore financed out of the 9.6 percent budgetary increment. Although the National Education Bill includes a plan for free and compulsory education for all children, this will be introduced incrementally; the costs in the first year were only for first-year primary school pupils. In general, reform will have to be financed through the redeployment of money under the current budget ceiling in order to satisfy the aims of the new macroeconomic strategy, along with other pressing social needs in the new democratic South Africa.

Rather than dwelling on the need for more money, the education department is emphasizing qualitative changes through a two-pronged strategy under the banner "equitable learning opportunities for all." One element builds on grassroots interest in education. John Samuel, deputy director of education, estimates that 60 percent of the schools in South Africa owe their existence to local community efforts. The government is attempting to expand and reinforce such involvement by setting new national standards for the governance of schools. These standards make clear that parents are the main stakeholders in education and that they should be represented, together with teachers, students, and community leaders, on school governing bodies. By encouraging much greater local responsibility for developing and maintaining high-quality education at the primary and secondary levels, the government also seeks to mobilize local funding and in-kind contributions to improve buildings, equipment, and teaching. Evidence of success in this campaign is already accumulating.

The second element in the strategy is the implementation of greater equity in the distribution of funds and personnel among South Africa's provinces and within them. For example, per pupil

expenditures in the more affluent Western Cape province were \$800 in 1996, while in the neighboring province of the Eastern Cape the per pupil expenditure was only \$450. Within each province, of course, public schools in traditional white enclaves have long enjoyed far larger government support than those in black townships. Related to the financial disparities are variations in student-to-faculty ratios: to create greater equity, the Mandela government announced a new national standard of a 35:1 student-to-faculty ratio for all primary and secondary schools. Each school is encouraged to work out its own plan of adjustment; the provincial departments of education oversee the redeployment of faculty. Such processes of local problem solving can become highly contentious, but they are essential to confidence building, conflict resolution, and national integration across South Africa.

Police Protection of Public Safety and Private Liberty¹⁶

Among the many problems facing post-apartheid South Africa, violent crime is seen as the nation's biggest challenge. If the public perceives that the government is not dealing decisively with criminal violence, its ability to sustain political support for other reforms--and its re-election efforts in 1999--will be seriously undermined. In a recent national opinion survey conducted by social scientists at the University of the Witwatersrand, 46 percent of the people name crime as the most serious problem facing the country, compared to 18 percent who cited unemployment and 2 percent who said the country's biggest problem is poor education.

Within the black urban townships, violent crime has been endemic for decades, and local community leaders complain that it has only been with the spread of violent crime to affluent white suburbs and downtown business districts that the predominantly white-run press has given publicity to this problem. No one disputes that underreporting of crime against blacks has been a problem, but today all groups in South Africa feel increasingly at risk and so are calling for action.

It is not the rate of criminal activity that makes South Africa so exceptional; it is the levels of violence accompanying crime. Overall, South Africa's recorded crime rate is 5,651 per 100,000 people, more than double the international average of 2,662 but roughly the same as in the United States, France, or Norway. The murder rate of 61 per 100,000, however, is more than eleven times the international average of 5.5, making South Africa possibly the most murderous society on earth. Between 1987 and 1994, the country's reported murder rate increased nearly 87 percent, although the figure for 1996, the latest available, showed a 5.4 percent drop from 1995. Carjacking, another highly visible crime that is often accompanied by violence, jumped 80 percent between 1992 and 1994. Nearly 75 percent of these crimes occurred in and around the country's media capital of Johannesburg, where an average of twenty-one cars were stolen each day.

Crime prevention is, of course, the classic task of the police in any normal democracy. But under apartheid the primary function of the South African Police Service (saps) was the suppression of political dissent. Stopping criminal activity, beyond that which directly threatened the white minority, was a much lower priority, and there is almost no tradition or expertise in criminal

investigation in South Africa. Between 80 and 90 percent of criminal convictions were gained on the basis of confessions, obtained by what senior officials today disparage as the "choke and talk" technique of police intimidation. Today the saps must reform fundamentally while at the same time striving to show the public that it can and will reduce crime. As a senior saps officer has noted, police reform is like rebuilding a ship while it is in full sail during a hurricane.

Reform of the police is a top priority of the new government. With the passage of the South African Police Service Act in September 1995, eleven apartheid-era policing agencies were consolidated into a single police service organized at the national and provincial levels. Crash programs in training and evaluation have produced a police officer corps that is now 30 percent black, up from only 10 percent in 1994, while the total force remains about two-thirds black. The government also announced the country's first National Crime Prevention Strategy, a four-part attempt to strengthen the criminal justice system, design crime-resistant government systems (for instance, personal identity documents and a new vehicle registration system), institute educational crime prevention programs aimed at youth, and strengthen cooperation with South Africa's neighbors to reduce transborder criminal activity.

Over the past two years the minister of safety and security and the commissioner of police have repeatedly emphasized that the changes in the saps were aimed at meeting the requirements of a democratic government and creating a police service accountable to the community. Advice and assistance in transforming South Africa's police has been sought from other countries, notably the multicultural democracies of Australia, Canada, India, and the United States. Publication of the *Police Plan for 1996/97*--a plan that was formulated in a participatory and consultative manner and that was open for public debate--marked the first time the Department of Safety and Security informed the public about specific policing priorities and objectives. As noted in the plan's preamble: "We have learnt that an illegitimate police force that is not focused on crime, but on maintaining a particular political system, and which is disassociated from the community it serves, cannot effectively promote and maintain the safety and security of all the people."

Across the country the department has sponsored familiarization meetings between civic leaders and the police. This has been part of a broad effort to devolve power and accountability downward to the local communities. All members of the 140,000-member police force have begun to pass through a special course on human rights and community relations. In contrast to the highly centralized apartheid era, the national police expect to become engaged only rarely and only when requested by the local authorities. Two exceptions have been designated national priority areas: the mass violence in KwaZulu/Natal, where ethnic conflict, party rivalries, and crime threaten not only to destabilize that province but to undermine the new era of democratic peace nationally; and, the richest province, Gauteng (which includes Johannesburg), where organized crime, the rash of carjacking, and the tensions endemic to huge impoverished black townships are producing much socioeconomic turmoil.

Anecdotal evidence suggests police attitudes about their own responsibility and accountability are changing. Deputy President Mbeki told a Washington meeting of the US-South African Business Council how a car thief was recently apprehended as he tried to take a stolen vehicle into a neighboring country. In his possession was a notebook with the names and telephone numbers of many prominent South Africans, including the deputy president's. The thief tried to

intimidate the senior arresting officer by claiming influence over the officer's superiors. To "avoid any complications" the officer-in-charge turned the case over to a junior colleague, but the younger man did not flinch, and the thief was eventually convicted. The deputy president used the incident to make the point that under apartheid the police worried more about not crossing their superiors than about catching criminals. Today democratic empowerment is helping to transform the way even the lowest police recruit views his or her assignment; this new commitment to serve community interests, Mbeki argues, will be the key to the government's success in fighting crime.

To secure and sustain the public's trust in the long struggle to reduce crime, the police and the politicians must be seen as honest and free of corruption. In 1995-96 the national commissioner of police increased the number of anticorruption units around the country from two to eleven. The police are also proceeding with hearings and trials on a wide range of misconduct, including the use of force to repress dissent under apartheid or to abet political violence. These efforts also serve the cause of reconciliation by encouraging those responsible for many of the worst actions under apartheid to seek amnesty by admitting to the wrong-doing before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Thus far, corruption among politicians has not been alleged or uncovered. Were this to happen, of course, the public's patience with government explanations regarding the slowness of change or the need for sacrifice to make the country more economically competitive could dissipate quickly. There is probably no greater threat to the democratic, economic, and social transformation of South Africa than the corruption of government officials.

In the private sector, white-collar crime and fraud has been rising sharply, but the government is rapidly expanding its investigation efforts. On other fronts, concerted police work has produced results: by mid-1995, significant drops in crime were being reported from several of the worst areas. In downtown Johannesburg, for example, there was a 43 percent drop in carjacking, while in the suburbs housebreaking fell 30 percent.

In the townships, where organized crime has been deeply entrenched, police and citizens groups have successfully forged cooperative efforts not only to prevent crime but to press for stiff penalties for those convicted as a way to deter others--especially Soweto's unemployed and undereducated youth--from criminal activity.

Media and Government: Partners or Antagonists?

South Africa's media had very little impact on the ANC's successful campaign to end apartheid or its victory in the 1994 election. But the media could become crucial to the new government's ability to gain citizen understanding, patience, and support for its efforts to consolidate democracy, reform the economy, and deal with education, crime prevention, and other social needs. It is too soon to know if the media can or will assume such a role, for the media has only begun to adapt to the post-apartheid era in its relations to the government and the public.

Moegslen Williams, editor of the *Cape Times*, notes that during South Africa's 175-year history there have been two main threads representing the mainstream press: one white-owned and -

controlled and, until the end of the 1980s, concerned primarily with the political, economic, and social life of the white population; the second and much thinner thread was the resistance press, dating back to the nineteenth century.¹⁷ There continues to be much debate about what constituted the resistance press. Was it only the underground, banned, and exiled voices of black liberation, or did it also include the mainstream English press, which claims a proud tradition of investigative and opposition journalism? Many ANC critics of the mainstream press consider the English-language press to have been, at best, opposed to the Afrikaner-dominated National Party, while it continued to brand the ANC a terrorist organization and practiced self-censorship in response to the government's efforts to censor the media. Most of the Afrikaner press and the state-owned national radio and television outlets continued to be staunch defenders of apartheid to the very end.

President Mandela, who has vigorously defended freedom of the press as one of the mainstays of democracy, also noted in a February 1994 speech that the newsrooms and board rooms of South Africa's media still lacked racial, gender, or ethnic diversity and suggested that this might limit the media's ability to cover the multicultural complexity and dynamics of the new South Africa. Eighteen months after Mandela's speech, Moegslen Williams was appointed editor of the *Cape Times*, the country's oldest daily newspaper. He was the first person of color ever named to edit a major metropolitan mainstream newspaper (other than the black township paper, the *Sowetan*). Currently there are five other people of color on the *Cape Times* editorial staff of sixty, producing a paper for a readership that is 62 percent nonwhite.

Another factor affecting the media's relations with the new government is more directly political. All parties in South Africa, except the ruling anc, have long had their own newspapers to carry their messages to the public. Most of the established papers still reflect partisan interests. Ties between the Afrikaans press and the National Party and even more conservative fringe groups remain close, while several of the English-language editors continue to support the small, white, liberal Democratic Party. Other English papers, most notably the *Weekly Mail*, *Argus*, and *Cape Times* continue to see their role as watch dog and critic of any government.

The anc, of course, commands a large majority in parliament and among the voting public. It also now controls the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), which functioned during the apartheid era as little more than a propaganda instrument of the ruling National Party. The head of the SABC, Zwelakhe Sisulu, faces many of the same challenges of personnel and procedural holdovers from apartheid as do those who are attempting to make the police, education department, and other institutions more transparent, democratic, and responsive to the interests and needs of all races. At the same time, government leaders know they need the media in order to win public support for their policies, many of which will require more patience and sacrifice from the black majority. Mounting frustration prompted Deputy President Mbeki in remarks before the first session of the 1996 Parliament to declare the South African media, including the broadcast services, so woefully inadequate that it invites government intervention, perhaps to request a "propaganda hour."

Deputy President Mbeki's remark sparked an outburst of generally negative reaction from the country's editorial writers. Yet current market trends seem to suggest that the only papers that are making money are those with strong, if narrow, links to the conservative political opposition.

Except for the *Argus*, liberal papers are steadily losing readers, who are either tuning into radio and television or are turned off by the lack of news and opinion relevant to their interests and needs. Faced with declining revenues, those in the press who might otherwise be receptive to expanding their coverage and to diversifying their staff in order to attract a wider black audience now say they lack the money to do so as this would risk further erosion of their white subscriber base.

The contribution of the media to South Africa's long-term social transformation will likely depend on the extent to which new and more open partnerships can be forged among government, the private sector, and civil society, similar to the processes noted earlier with regard to the macroeconomic strategy. In the case of the media, this need not imply a loss of independence and the freedom to criticize those in authority. But it would require that the media become more responsive to the economic, social, and political concerns of its audience, and that it take a consciously constructive approach to nation building.

In the United States, where there is also a growing debate about the appropriate role of the press and the media, the terms "public," "civic," and "community" journalism are gaining currency. Simply put, civic journalism initiatives make a deliberate attempt to reach out to citizens, to listen to them, and to have citizens listen and talk to each other and to use that information in ways that enable them to participate more fully in their communities and in the democratic process. Citizens become more than consumers of a news "product," and the press builds a wider and more loyal audience by becoming a much more integral part of community life. Media committed to public journalism, whether print, audio, or video, do not deal exclusively with public affairs. Any mass medium, to succeed in the market place and to be effective, has to handle a wide variety of informational and entertainment needs. Public journalism, however, is committed to making public affairs a central and vital concern.

Public journalism has many critics--reporters, editors, and management--within the U.S. media. Some see a threat to journalistic independence and integrity, while others see huge financial risks in focusing deeply and narrowly on grassroots community interests. Yet a trend toward greater community engagement by urban and regional newspapers across America does appear to be emerging. South Africa would seem to be an especially promising arena in which to practice and develop techniques of public journalism. Citizens today are confronted by issues fundamental to civic and community rights and responsibilities: the separation and concentration of power at the national, regional, and local levels and the role of the state in the economic and social life of the country. And despite the enormous gaps in income, resources, and access to opportunity, there appears to be widespread public interest in these issues, from the poorest townships to the wealthiest suburbs. The careful and enlightened deliberative political process culminating in 1996's constitutional agreement has established a vital base for further civic engagement and consensus building. The economic and social challenges, however, are much more complex, though often less immediately compelling, and meeting them will be more difficult than the final leap from apartheid to democracy. It is on the difficult and contentious economic and social issues that the government needs to build public support and understanding.

If the South African media are to play a more vital role in helping to inform and to empower citizens, the information and opinion conveyed by the media will have to do more than raise the

public's consciousness. Public journalism goes beyond agenda setting by providing information relevant to the clarification of core values and helping to organize the political debate with that goal in mind. This does not mean advocating particular priorities but, rather, assuming the new and now more important role of acquiring a better understanding and then communicating clearly the competing beliefs and priorities that underlie each public problem.

As all sides discovered in negotiating the peaceful transfer of power and framing a new constitution, within each of South Africa's cultural groups certain core beliefs were beyond compromise. Yet the extremes of these positions were also impossible for others to accept, for this would have undermined the viability of the democratic process. Sustaining this process in reaching a new accord between business, labor, and the government over key elements of the new macroeconomic strategy, or in redistributing education and anticrime resources, depends on the same process of compromise. The special challenge facing South Africa's media is to assist in reconciling conflicting interests by ensuring that they do not coalesce around racial, ethnic, or other grounds that defy compromise.

Deputy President Mbeki's concerns about the media's treatment of the government must be seen in the special context of post-apartheid South Africa and deserve a constructive response. Promoting public journalism may be a partial answer. Proponents of public journalism offer not a formula but a general approach that would allow the media to play a fuller role that is implicit in the democratic process, conveying information in ways that can lead to public discussion and then turn into action. For example, public journalism might deal with crime prevention, in the following way:

- Use traditional techniques of reporting the who, what, when, where, why, and how of specific criminal activity, but refer to how particular incidents--however sensational and violent--fall within broader trends of criminal activity in order to convey a better understanding of the scope, frequency, and costs of the crime problem.
- Embellish the story with related reporting and analysis of the basic dilemmas and choices that the saps and provincial and local authorities face in dealing with the crime problem, including trade-offs in the allocation of resources and actual potential changes in priorities.
- Devise mechanisms to enable citizens to engage in the debate about public safety, beyond just complaining about the problem. This might involve providing a special page or segment for venting opposing views and working with community leaders to sponsor forums on the topic.
- Offer repeated opportunities for government officials responsible for crime prevention policies to interact with the public and increase understanding of why greater progress has not or has been made.
- Finally, report when progress has been achieved, in order to convey to people that their interest and role in the process matter.

Raising the necessary revenue for the increased reporting that public journalism demands will require difficult adjustments within newspapers and other media. External funding from private and foreign donor agencies may also be necessary, at least during the initial stages. But the long-

term returns could be substantial in helping South Africa consolidate democracy and in ensuring that the media plays an expanded and constructive role in that historic process.

Conclusion: A Matter of Trust

President Mandela and his colleagues have demonstrated extraordinary skill in leading the nation down the road of political transition; because of this, South Africans enjoy a strong wind at their backs as they embark on economic and social reform. The most important reason for this favorable wind has been the ANC's astute and enlightened approach to elections, political reconciliation, and the drafting of a new constitution. These actions have greatly enhanced the new government's standing at home and abroad. But the new nation has also benefited from the absence of several obstacles that in another time or place might have aborted the journey.

Politically, the aftertaste of apartheid is so bitter that no one of significance in South Africa would dare advocate openly a return to the old order. Racism will continue to infect South African society as it does other liberal democracies, and there are radical elements who are armed and capable of terrorism. But, fortunately, no opposition comparable to the challenge that resurgent Communism posed to Russian president Boris Yeltsin exists in South Africa. And despite the demise of the apartheid state, the framework and key elements of government and public administration of that era--including the judiciary--have proven to be remarkably adaptable. They have played a crucial role in opening the way to sustainable democratic peace, in contrast to what has occurred in Russia and other countries in transition.

Economically, there has also been an initial gust of support with South Africa's re-entry into the global economy and the reversal of negative rates of growth that has opened the way to economic reforms. These efforts have been helped by the absence of any credible competing economic model to challenge the government's commitment to capitalism. The fortuitous collapse of Communism undercut those elements in the ANC who support nationalization of the private economy. South Africa's new leaders have also been realistic about the size of the economic disparities that must be overcome and have sought to keep the expectations of the poor in check, knowing that the resources simply are not available to radically alter the distribution of wealth and that to attempt such a futile move would probably destroy the nation's modern sector, the foundation for long-term sustainable growth. What is most striking, however, is the speed of accommodation between old and new elites who are prepared to rely on pragmatic deal making to accomplish as much market-based economic progress as possible while holding the country together.

Finally, there is an absence of any general ideological division in the country over the ANC's approach to nation building. Significant political conflict over the role of the state in South African society will continue, as it does in any democracy. There may even be, at some stage, the risk of a military coup or other tendencies toward authoritarianism. But no one is likely to come forward with a credible alternative to democratic ideals, ideals that appear to be sinking ever-deeper roots in South African society. This commitment to liberal democracy is reinforced by the

widespread belief in Christianity that transcends racial and ethnic differences, another positive force inherited from the apartheid era. South Africa's civil society, which until the 1970s had been almost exclusively in white hands, grew rapidly in major black townships during the final years of the liberation struggle, and this should reinforce the popular base of support for democratic ideals.

But in the practical world of politics, this report has attempted to show that the road to economic and social transformation is certain to be long and treacherous. As the political momentum from successfully achieving majority rule dissipates, South Africa's leaders are bound to encounter many unexpected obstacles as they pursue macroeconomic and social objectives. New conflicts over the numbers and costs of illegal immigration, how to deal with the AIDS epidemic, and demands for greater cultural self-determination will surely arise. To keep moving forward, the government cannot rely on its own energy and sense of direction; it will need the sustained support of many others at home and abroad. Citizens and the media must also remain vigilant to ensure that the government does not burden itself with debilitating corruption, arrogance, or sectarian biases in the allocation of state employment and resources.

Ultimately, a successful journey through the next stages of economic and social transformation will depend as much on psychological factors as on quantitative indicators of economic growth, educational improvement, or a falling crime rate. Two hundred years of practical political experience, and innumerable national and cross-cultural studies, confirm that market democracy cannot be easily built from the top down, through social engineering. It must be built with social capital, especially trust. For democracy to flourish, citizens must believe that government policies are moving the country in the right direction and at a tolerable rate. Likewise, the government must trust in the people to do their part in assuming civic and other responsibilities of self-government and not to pursue extraconstitutional means of protest and resistance to policies they do not agree with. It is impossible to gauge the depth of current public trust in the ANC or how easily or quickly this could fracture if targets for economic growth and social improvements are not met. No democracy has discovered a reliable road map for distributing rights and obligations between the government and citizens as the political, economic, and social transformations proceed.

The most hopeful aspect of South Africa's approach to democratic transformation is the acceptance by the government that it must encourage the development of social capital at the grassroots level of national life so that the supply of civic involvement, mutual trust, and reciprocity increases throughout the nation. This is evident in the government's efforts to encourage local community involvement in housing, education, health care, crime prevention, and other social programs, and in the promotion of private enterprise. Much of this results from the need to stretch scarce government resources, but it is also encouraged by the new constitution and bill of rights, which provide the legal framework and space to allow civic organizations to thrive.

For trust to develop between the government and people in democratic South Africa, further development of a robust and diverse civil society is essential. President Mandela and other ANC leaders speak often and publicly about the vital role that the business community, civic organizations, trade unions, professional associations, and other religious, educational, youth,

and cultural organizations must play in building a new South Africa. Although the majority of these groups were at the forefront of the internal anti-apartheid movement and continue to have strong ANC loyalties, Mandela's embrace of the civil society is nonpartisan.

Realism dictates that the burdens of developing South Africa must be broadly shared, particularly if the government adheres to its present policy of allowing white privilege to persist for the sake of domestic peace and in order to achieve more rapid economic growth. Idealism also justifies this approach because reciprocity is the fulcrum of self-government; those who receive public assistance should give something back. But adopting such policies in a country where so many are so very poor and so few are so very rich takes enormous courage, and those policies will be difficult to sustain.

The Development Facilitation Act, which Parliament approved in October 1995, aims to promote civic involvement by encouraging local communities to design their own comprehensive approach to infrastructure, social services, and job creation. A Transitional National Development Trust was enacted at the same time to support such actions. Public funds, however, remain tight. When the trust finally opened its doors in mid-1996, it had slightly more than \$30 million available, with two-thirds of the money coming from the European Union, to satisfy requests in excess of \$160 million. Despite these constraints, initial reports of government partnerships with local community groups have been encouraging. Successful demonstration programs in which the government provides limited financial support and technical assistance to communities that are prepared to contribute their own money and labor to build schools, health clinics, and improve water, sanitation, and police, suggest that the pace of economic and social transformation is proceeding at a politically tolerable rate.

The development of civil society must accelerate across South Africa. Neither the government nor local communities nor private industry have the financial, technical, and management resources to keep up with the huge and growing demand for basic services. International assistance will, therefore, continue to be critical for the success of democratic peace in South Africa. During the final decade of apartheid hundreds of millions of dollars from Western governments and private foundations poured into the nongovernmental organizations. Since 1994 much of this support has been diverted to assist the new government. In the case of the European Union, this sudden shift amounted to over \$300 million annually. Many of the big national nongovernmental organizations that have played a major role in strengthening civil society at the grassroots level have suffered major losses of revenue and personnel as many key staff joined the new government.

Appeals to foreign governments to restore preliberation funding levels for NGOs are clearly unrealistic. Not only are they understandably eager to cultivate closer relations with the new government, but, as global levels of official development assistance are declining, the pressures to reallocate assistance to other more desperate countries is certain to increase. The United States, for example, has announced that its current annual grant level of \$120 million will be reduced to zero by 2003.¹⁸

Many South African community activists and sympathetic government officials are hoping that private foundations in the United States, Canada, Europe, and elsewhere will be able expand

their presence in South Africa, at least for another decade.¹⁹ Their funding has allowed many of South Africa's most important NGOs to survive and to spread their programs into poor rural and urban communities throughout the country. With the return of more and more foreign corporations, some of whom are bidding on huge contracts to improve communications and other facilities, the government and civic leaders are beginning to press for greater corporate commitments to assist community development. If private and corporate foundations can be persuaded to partner more substantially and extensively with NGOs in South Africa's emerging civil society, the cumulative effects could not only help ensure democratic peace locally but could also contribute to the growing number of transnational NGO networks that are helping to advance this goal globally.

For those who help South Africa along the road to fuller democracy also help themselves. As aid agencies in the mature democracies of North America and Western Europe have begun to discover, one way to re-energize their own civil societies is to promote greater citizen involvement in the democratic transitions in South Africa and other nations. The effects of such engagement are difficult to quantify, but there is much anecdotal evidence that international NGOs not only play a generally positive role in helping other nations to develop economically and politically, they also generate a greater awareness of and support for such engagement among their grassroots supporters at home.²⁰ In the 1980s international grassroots support for the successful campaign to end apartheid also served the interest of improving race relations in the United States and other pluralistic democracies with widespread popular interest in South Africa. Conversely, had South Africa erupted in race war, or should its democratic transition falter badly in the future, this could have a negative impact on the domestic well-being of these same donor nations.

South Africa is often described as such a "special case" that comparisons to other countries in transition are unlikely to be meaningful. Yet the deliberations about South Africa's "Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace" at the June 1996 conference in Cape Town reconfirmed the salience of several attributes common to democracies everywhere. First, although elites initiate political reform, true self-government can grow only from the grassroots upward. Second, democracy must be supported by three main pillars--democratic institutions, market economics, and civil society. The construction of these pillars, as the South African case has shown, can proceed at different rates at different times, but without sufficient strength in all three, democracy will collapse. South Africa's experience also points to a third universal truth: democratic development is a nonlinear process. And finally, policies of inclusion and fairness help build the resilience that will be necessary to withstand setbacks and unforeseen domestic and foreign obstacles to democratic development. All of this means, of course, that democracy can be built only gradually, over many generations, and in the face of changing circumstances it will never be perfect, only perfectible.

These hard realities recall a remark that Robert Kennedy made during his historic visit to the University of Cape Town at the height of apartheid. His words ring as true for the struggle to secure democracy as they did when the goal was to abolish apartheid:

Few will have the greatness to bend history itself; but each of us can work to change a small portion of events. And in the total of these acts will be written the history of this generation.

The role that Nelson Mandela and a handful of other remarkable leaders played in changing the course of South African history does not contradict the wisdom in Kennedy's remark. The opportunity to end apartheid suddenly and decisively was one of those rare hinge points in human events, and one that Mandela and F. W. de Klerk seized. The time for such dramatic actions has passed, although there will always be a need for good leadership. In consolidating democracy and overcoming chronic economic and social ills, however, leaders have no instant cures. Rather, as Kennedy's observation suggests, the progress of current and future generations will again be measured in much smaller steps. Fortunately, there is a reassuring depth of political talent in the generation of leaders who will succeed Mandela and who share his commitment to human rights and democracy. South Africa is no longer a house divided, but maintaining and remodeling its structures to accommodate one of the most diverse nations on earth will be an endless challenge for all of its citizens and for those abroad who care enough to help.

Appendix

"Miracles That Matter": Agenda and Participants

University of Cape Town
University of the Western Cape
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

"Miracles That Matter"

*An International Forum on
Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa*

June 19-21, 1996

Cape Town, South Africa

AGENDA

WEDNESDAY, June 19, 1996

6:00pm-9:00pm **Opening Reception and Dinner**

"Why the Three Miracles Matter"

Remarks by: Cyrus Vance

Cochair

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

Mamphela Ramphele

Vice-Chancellor Elect

University of Cape Town

Colin Bundy
Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Academic
University of the Western Cape

THURSDAY, June 20, 1996

8:30am-9:00am **Introduction: "The Importance of the South African Experience to the International Community"**

Presenter: Jane Holl
Executive Director
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

9:00am-10:00am **"Opening the Way to Reconciliation: Why Leaders Matter"**

Presenter: Tom Lodge
Witwatersrand University

Part I Consolidating the Political Miracle of Majority Rule

10:00am-12:00pm **Session One: "Balancing Reconciliation with Justice: The Role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission"**

Presenter: Desmond Tutu
Archbishop of Cape Town
Anglican Church
Discussants: Kader Asmal
Minister of Water Affairs
Beyers Naude
Co-director
Ecumenical Advice Bureau

12:00pm-1:30pm **Session Two: "Constitutional Checks and Balances in South Africa's Democracy"**

Presenter: Pravin Gordhan, mp
Discussants: Colin Eglin, mp
Harold Pakendorf
Political Advisor

Part II "Pursuit of an Economic Miracle: Growth and Equity"

2:30pm-4:00pm Session Three: "Creating a Viable Employment Market"

Presenter: Ebrahim Patel
Assistant General Secretary
South African Conference of Trade & Workers Unions
Discussant: David Bridgman
Chief Executive Officer
Wesgro

4:00pm-5:30pm Session Four: "The International Dimension of South Africa's Economic Transformation"

Presenter: Chris Saunders

Director

Tongaat-Hulett Group Limited

Discussants: Nicoli Natrass

Department of Economics

University of Cape Town

Robert Davies, MP

FRIDAY, June 21, 1996

Part III "The Still Distant Social Miracle"

9:00am-10:00am Session Five: "Identities in Transition: The Search for a New South Africa"

Presenter: Mvume Dandala

Superintendent Minister

Johannesburg Central Methodist Mission

10:00am-11:30am Session Six: "Police Protection of Public Safety and Private Liberty"

Presenter: C. P. Steenkamp

Divisional Commander, Human

Resources and Management

South African Police Service

Discussant: Azhar Cachalia

Superintendent General

Secretariat of Safety and Security

11:30am-1:00pm Session Seven: "Financial and Fairness Realities in Education"

Presenters: Jairam Reddy

Chair

National Commission on Higher Education

John Samuel

Deputy Director General

Department of Education

Discussant: Brian O'Connell

Director of Education

Western Cape Province

2:30pm-4:00pm Session Eight: "Media and Government: Partners or Antagonists?"

Presenters: Moegslen Williams

Editor

Cape Times

Anton Harber

Editor

Weekly Mail and Guardian

4:00pm-4:15pm **Conference Summary, Conclusions, and Challenges Ahead**

Presenter: Jane Holl

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