

Preventing Deadly Conflict Strategies and Institutions Proceedings of a Conference in Moscow, Russian Federation

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**A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
Carnegie Corporation of New York**

Carnegie Corporation of New York established the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in May 1994 to address the looming threats to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. The Commission is examining the principal causes of deadly ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster or deter their outbreak. Taking a long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts that are likely to emerge, the Commission seeks to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented. The Commission is also looking at the strengths and weaknesses of various international entities in conflict prevention and considering ways in which international organizations might contribute toward developing an effective international system of nonviolent problem solving.

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Preface

In recent years the problem of conflict has been the focus of attention of many scholars, politicians, diplomats, public figures, and journalists. It is the subject of numerous conferences and roundtables, books, and analytical articles.

The sharpness of these acute discussions is explained by the fact that the post-Cold War world, in spite of expectations and hopes, has not become peaceful and conflict-free. Conflicts, and often bloody ones, are still going on in many countries of Africa and Asia. The Arab-Israeli conflict is still shaking the Middle East, to the anxiety of the world community. The tragedy in Yugoslavia showed how unstable and fragile our world is, especially as it broke out in the center of Europe, which had not witnessed armed combat since World War II.

If previously the basic types of conflicts were interstate conflicts, the center of gravity has now clearly shifted toward interethnic and interdenominational conflicts.

The situation in the post-Soviet space is a matter of special concern for the world. The Transcaucasus, Tajikistan, and Chechnya have, as it were, tensions in a concentrated form.

As has happened before, alongside the peacekeeping efforts by politicians and diplomats and the activities of nongovernmental international organizations, members of the academic community also are meeting to discuss these problems. This conference, organized in Moscow by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control, was such a gathering.

Carnegie Corporation has gained a high reputation and authority by, among other things, encouraging scientific discussions of important contemporary problems and especially of international and internal conflicts. The conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union were the focus of the Moscow conference. Stanford University professors David Holloway and Gail Lapidus and other prominent scholars were among the organizers from the American side.

The "particular post-Soviet case," however, stimulated the discussion of broader problems relating to conflict theory. World "conflictology" (as the course of the conference revealed) had already worked out its theoretical and methodological approaches to the analysis of various types of conflicts.

First of all, there is the problem of the nature and origin of conflict. Scholars discuss the dynamics of their genesis, the interaction of various factors (national, religious, etc.). The problem of "smoldering coals" is of considerable interest-historical legacies and traditions to which conflicts often are closely connected. As a rule, conflict situations are not a contemporary phenomenon; they have been "contained" for many years, and the authorities have tried either to ignore the growing tension or to localize it temporarily. That was the case with many national problems in the former Soviet Union.

As soon as the Soviet system collapsed, old disputes and conflicts resurfaced. Sharp controversies, difficulties, and disputes were still there, as it turned out, behind the slogans of eternal and unbreakable friendship between nations.

Thus, it is very important for scholars to analyze the old and new "trouble spots," to trace the factors and periods that generated conflicts. This large and complex problem includes the "image of the others" aspect-the question of outlooks and stereotypes that one nation or state has toward others. This is a very popular problem now in world historiography, and its application to conflict theory would be expedient and useful, especially as psychological and cognitive aspects are of special significance among its various components.

The analysis of the actual development of conflicts, especially of the ways and means of their resolution, also is a large and complicated problem. While world history, it seemed, had already accumulated a vast experience of the containment and cessation of diverse conflicts, in recent years we have often seen that this experience is not applicable to contemporary situations, which demand a deep understanding both of the history of a particular conflict and of its contemporary component parts.

Quantitative methods are among the modern instruments of conflict analysis, i.e., the use of mathematical methods and computer technology to create a general theory of conflicts and to generate patterns of conflict resolution for particular cases.

These and many other problems were discussed at the Moscow conference in August 1996. Russian and foreign scholars of various specialties took part, demonstrating the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to conflict studies. It is the joint efforts of historians and political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and ethnologists, economists, and legal experts that will make possible an in-depth analysis of the history and dynamics of contemporary conflicts and to sketch the possible approaches to resolution.

It was especially important that, along with scholars and public figures, influential Russian officials (for instance, Mintimer Shaimiev, the president of Tatarstan; and Andrei Kokoshin, the Russian first deputy minister of defense) took part in the conference and expressed their opinions from the perspective of present-day political realities.

The conference was very useful for the Institute of Universal History. Apart from its scientific significance and the opportunity to use its results in future research, we established fruitful contacts with an important American organization. On our part we are certainly ready to continue our cooperation with Carnegie Corporation of New York.

The conference was a success owing to a large extent to the personal participation of Dr. David Hamburg, the president of Carnegie Corporation, and the work of the Carnegie Commission's executive director, Jane Holl, and other American colleagues.

Aleksandr Chubarian
Director, Institute of Universal History

Acknowledgments

The Conference "Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions," held in Moscow on August 14-16, 1996, was a joint undertaking of three partners—the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. Its purpose was, in essence, to share the work of the Commission with a broader audience of practitioners and analysts, and in turn to learn from Russian perspectives and experiences. The Commission generously provided the needed support.

If, as we believe, the conference was a success, this was due in large measure to the dedicated and selfless work of key staff members of all three sponsoring institutions. We are particularly eager to acknowledge the contribution of Thomas Leney, Nancy Ward, and Sharon Poulson at the Commission in planning the conference and skillfully managing its organization. We are

most grateful to the Institute's director, Academician Aleksandr Chubarian, for hosting the meeting in Moscow, and to Maxim Korobochkin and Anya Volod'ko, of his staff, for their conscientious professionalism in handling local arrangements and the translation of the papers. At Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control, Svetlana Tsalik made an important contribution to both the conference and this volume, serving ably as conference rapporteur and as coauthor of the summary of the proceedings. Flavia Pellegriniably managed the enormous flow of correspondence and papers between Washington, Moscow, and Stanford; Arthur Khachikian facilitated the smooth operation of the conference and the elegant translation of conversations as well as final texts. Megan Hendershott, as well as Vadim Rubin, did yeoman's work in preparing the final manuscript for publication.

To all of them, and to all the other unsung heroes of this complex undertaking, our profound thanks!

Gail W. Lapidus
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Welcoming Remarks

Russian accomplishments over the past decade have major significance. The interrelated set of transitions undertaken here have few parallels in history. These accomplishments are deeply respected throughout the world and especially in the United States. Indeed, the changes that Russia has undergone can be compared in scope to the French Revolution. Yet the tasks have been addressed with ingenuity, courage, and decency. Revolutions require courage, vision, and luck. However, revolutionary situations do not ensure revolutionary outcomes. Individuals create such outcomes.

Mikhail Gorbachev is such an individual. The change Gorbachev initiated is one of the most dramatic in modern history. He broke ranks with his predecessors and elected not to send in troops to maintain the old order. Gorbachev had no path to follow, but much to overcome. The peaceful nature of the transition means that old economic institutions still have an impact-hence consolidation will be long and difficult. But we should not lose sight of progress made. After all, market mechanisms elsewhere developed over generations. There is strong reason to expect major economic growth and democratic development. Russians have clearly demonstrated their commitment to democracy and resoundingly refuted assumptions that they are apathetic politically and favorable to authoritarianism.

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict's main intention is to stimulate a preventive outlook throughout the world. We want your observations about preventing deadly conflict. The intellectual framework of the Commission has three parts. First, assessing the problem of deadly conflict in the post-Cold War world. We ask, Where does violence break out? How does it happen? Why does it happen? We offer a rationale for prevention-why it is better

than efforts to cure violence after it has occurred-and why outside help is so often necessary. We try to understand the critical threshold between ongoing normal conflict and extreme hatred and mass violence.

The second part of the framework asks what the international community can do to prevent deadly conflict. More specifically, what tools does the international community have to prevent conflict? How can those tools be sharpened and made more effective? We speak of operational tools that are effective for rapid action, i.e., early warning and response, sanctions, inducements, including economic incentives, and military force in limited and selected ways. We also address structural tools, long-term processes that can diminish the likelihood of conflict in the first place: education for conflict prevention, building democratic institutions, engineering democratic transitions, including the role of power sharing, and fostering sustainable development.

This brings us to the third part of the framework, the large question of who the actors are: Who can do what? Different actors must work together because preventive tasks require a sharing of burdens and pooling of strengths. No nation is strong enough to do it alone. The Commission takes a long-term view-about 30 years-looking into the next century when the capacity for enormous destruction will be widely distributed over the entire world.

International organizations are essential actors in conflict resolution. The United Nations is the only truly universal forum we have. How can its preventive efficiency be strengthened? Answers include improving the UN's capacity to undertake preventive diplomacy, manage preventive military functions, develop a stronger system of special representatives and personal envoys, and enhance its educational role, as well as the possible creation of regional centers for conflict prevention.

We address regional arrangements such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization of African Unity, consider the various regions, and ask how these organizations may be strengthened. Our work also looks at how international financial institutions, mainly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, can contribute to preventing deadly conflict.

We give attention to nongovernmental organizations, many of which focus explicitly on conflict prevention. The Commission considers the role of the scientific community. We also address religious institutions, which preach brotherhood but often have made conflicts worse. We ask what the potential is for religious institutions to contribute beyond rhetoric. Given the power of the media, we look at them as well. We look at the business community, which has an extended worldwide reach, at international legal institutions, and at the role of leadership.

Rethinking the power arrangements after the demise of a centralized authoritarian regime requires reevaluating the relationship between the center and the regions, and reconsidering when the use of force is appropriate. This forum's power-sharing panel draws our attention to power arrangements in deeply divided societies. This is important because the world is a great mosaic of people who have to learn to live together. It is impossible to separate each group into its own nation-state. There are several thousand ethnic groups in the world mostly mixed up together within nation-states. These groups need to think about paths to mutual accommodation,

which are many. They include agreed-upon secession, peaceful border revision, federation, confederation, functional autonomy within a state, and cultural pluralism. Democratic institutions support all these options because they provide ways of dealing with ongoing disputes without violence.

Many factors are conducive to the flare-up of mass violence: for example, an intense degree of competition, a history of domination by one group over another, strong loyalty of one ethnic group to an outside entity, or demographic changes that convince one group that it will be swallowed up by another. The greatest danger is from ethnic entrepreneurs who stir ethnic hatreds, often for their own political gain. They find fertile soil under conditions of drastic and frightening economic deterioration, rapid erosion of social norms, and historical intergroup tension.

How is it possible to prevent such violence? Political institutions of fairness and participation are crucial. Some places have tried proportional representation to avoid majoritarian domination; others have set aside fixed seats for minority groups. While it is valuable to have multiparty systems and free elections to build stable peace, it is not sufficient. These situations need bridge builders to unite groups that have been suspicious of each other. Solutions usually require continual participation of the international community to formulate standards and monitor implementation. Local branches of international organizations may help. The development of market economies may also help if there is attention to fairness in the distribution of opportunities.

Democratic engineering can be helpful, and power sharing is a prime example. This is structural prevention that can help build confidence across different communities by offering institutional arrangements that protect against discrimination. There are many ways to get the consent of the governed other than oppressive control. That is why Tim Sisk's path-breaking study of power sharing is important. His work looks at multiethnic societies and the world's experience in trying out different methods of mutual accommodation, including a role for international mediation. Some efforts succeeded and some failed. Positive experiences in South Africa are encouraging. We need to pool the world's experiences to learn the conditions under which power sharing helps prevent violence. Thus, we believe this meeting will clarify opportunities that can be useful throughout the international community.

David A. Hamburg
Cochair
Carnegie Commission
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Summary of Conference Proceedings

The end of the Cold War, rather than ushering in an era of peace, has promoted an intensification of conflict. Primarily, it is conflict that occurs within states rather than between them, and more often than not pits one ethnic group against another. Once such conflicts erupt, they are difficult to resolve because the fighting sides do not trust one another and international intervention is viewed as a breach of sovereignty. Fighting of this kind is costly. It incurs high civilian

casualties, weakens a state's infrastructure, undermines confidence in the regime, disturbs relations with other states, and leaves deep scars of hostility and distrust between the parties involved. The goal of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict is to avoid such costs by fostering a preventive outlook throughout the world. The Commission was established to address the looming threats to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Taking a long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts that are likely to emerge, it seeks to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented.

The Commission's Moscow forum on August 14-16, 1996, "Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions," was held in an apt location. Russia's successful prevention of violent conflict with republics such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan stands in sharp contrast to its policy in Chechnya. The dramatically different outcomes within one country provide the setting in which to compare strategies for preventing the outbreak of deadly violence. While considering Russia's experiences with internal situations of conflict, the forum participants also devoted attention to the more general questions of conflict prevention: How does violence break out? What tools does the international community have to prevent deadly conflict, and how can those tools be sharpened? What role can international institutions play in preventing conflict? What is the role of the military in preventing the outbreak of violent conflict or limiting its impact?

Special attention was devoted to the possible contribution of power-sharing arrangements in deeply divided societies. Recognizing that there are more ethnic groups in the world than there can be states to accommodate them, the critical question is, how can these groups be encouraged to live together peacefully? What political institutions can multiethnic societies adopt to give minorities guarantees that they will not be trampled by majorities?

POWER SHARING: ISSUES, STRATEGIES, INSTITUTIONS

Power Sharing in Multiethnic Societies

Timothy Sisk

Panelist Timothy Sisk of the United States Institute of Peace discussed the various power-sharing tools available to prevent conflict. Power sharing is a critical issue for states undergoing democratization because they are prone to violent conflict. Power sharing is a potential solution because it can give meaning to the concept of self-determination in the context of democratization without leading to the violence that too often erupts in multiethnic democratizing states.

Power sharing is defined as a system that fosters governing coalitions inclusive of most if not all major ethnic groups in society, in contrast to the traditional notion of majoritarian democracy, which is based on single member districts with plurality electoral rules. Majoritarian democracy is problematic in multiethnic societies because it can permanently exclude minority groups. Unable to influence policy through the ballot box, such minorities may feel that their very survival is threatened.

Power sharing offers an alternative to majoritarian democracy. Its underlying assumption is that deft political engineering can mitigate the problems raised by majoritarianism. The rules of the political game can be structured to provide a concrete incentive for political leaders to mobilize on moderate themes that cut across ethnic, religious, or national identities.

Because power sharing is more an outlook than a single concrete model, there is disagreement among its proponents about what form it should take. Arend Lijphart is the strongest advocate of the *consociational* approach, which argues that arrangements to protect and preserve groups are superior to ones that try to transcend group cleavages. In contrast, supporters of an *integrative* approach, most notably Donald Horowitz, argue that ethnic identities can and should be overcome by designing institutions that encourage multiethnic parties and electoral appeals. Thus, the central question of the power-sharing debate is: Which broad approach best manages conflict, one that sees ethnic groups essentially as building blocks of national politics in multiethnic states, or one that purposefully encourages the formation of political blocs across group lines?

Sisk argued that the two approaches do not exclude one another and can be integrated. Power sharing provides us with a menu of options which can be innovatively applied at different stages of a conflict and to different levels of government. Even at the level of local government, two power-sharing arrangements can play a useful role, as in the administration of Mostar, in the Bosnian-Croat Federation, and in Durban, in the province of Kwazulu Natal, South Africa, which is one of the most multiethnic cities in the world and which had been racked by violence for the past ten years.

While power sharing leaves policymakers with much leeway for creativity, Sisk argued against partition as a solution to the problem of democracy in multiethnic societies. As the experience of Eritrea shows, separation does not solve the problem of multi ethnicity. It only rearranges the configuration of minorities and majorities.

Finally, the role of international actors in promoting power sharing is fraught with dilemmas because it requires them to choose sides. The recent Dayton Peace Accords are the best example. Yet the failure to require the opposing parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to share power would have renewed attempts to create an ethnically pure state.

Discussion

The discussant, Claus Offe, argued that there is a more fundamental problem to choosing the best power-sharing instruments. The items in the power-sharing "toolbox" are of little value unless the sides to a conflict have all committed to reconciling their disagreements and are determined to adhere to institutional solutions. But generating that kind of commitment is itself a challenge. Under conditions of deep ethnic division, there is no recognized authority that can be charged with the tasks of diagnosis, policy advice, and implementation. The institutional devices, or "medicines," must be self-administered. Doctor and patient are identical and the patient must be sufficiently capable of self-control and rational action to swallow the often bitter pill. The irony is that commitment to adopt power-sharing practices is easiest to generate where they are least

needed. In contrast, the most fragmented societies with a long history of conflict have the greatest difficulty in developing the necessary commitment.

The primary question then is not which institutional tools are best, but how to generate commitment to adopting such solutions in the first place. Offe identified three factors which influence groups' likelihood of committing to power sharing: the type of conflict, its duration and intensity, and international involvement.

Interest-driven conflicts concerning control over and distribution of resources (more traditionally known as class conflict) are the easiest to resolve because groups recognize their interdependence with those with whom they are in conflict. Interest-based conflicts are not zero sum; the sides have to cooperate in order to prosper and prosperity makes all better off. In modernizing societies where class interests are not well structured, however, there may be a weaker commitment to power sharing. Where the prospects for economic growth are not well understood and class identity is amorphous, interest-based struggle may be disguised as conflicts of identity as the opposing sides compete for control of land and resources. A more difficult type of conflict to resolve is ideological conflict because the opposing sides are striving to eliminate the "wrong" ideas of the other. Identity conflict is most difficult to end because in it, groups visualize their well-being only in the absence of the other.

A second determinant of groups' willingness to adopt the "medicine" is the historical depth of division and the memory the conflict has left behind. The longer a conflict lasts, the weaker the commitment to the remedy. Memory of conflict feeds anticipation of further conflict. Each side suspects the other and knows that the other side is conscious of its distrust. Everything is assumed to be strategically designed to give the opposing side the upper hand. Such mutual cognitive confrontation is almost a guarantee of weak commitment to power sharing. Because the sides to a conflict cannot force themselves to forget the past, the longer a conflict has endured, the more difficult it is for them to extend enough trust to the other to attempt peace. Truth commissions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the media, and the artistic and scholarly community all can help to transform divided societies into "cognitively unified" ones.

Finally, the involvement of the international community can influence commitment to power sharing in a number of ways. For one, transnational agencies can issue credible promises of economic premiums as well as equally credible promises of military sanctions, creating an environment of incentives that can facilitate the preparedness for reconciliation. An international organization or NGO that can credibly claim to be neutral and fair and is ready to assume effective responsibility for enforcement of a settlement can also do much to help generate commitment. Another type of influence can be exerted by patron states-states whose peoples are a minority in another state. Groups that have a patron state are easier to commit to settlements because negotiations can be carried out in the form of international negotiations between the titular nation and the patron state of the minority, such as between Bulgaria and Turkey.

Two exceptions are worth noting. Settlement of a conflict becomes more difficult when both sides to an identity conflict have foreign patron states, as in Cyprus, Israel, and Northern Ireland, all of whose conflicts have proven intractable. The most difficult conflicts to resolve are those

which involve groups that do not have a patron state and that are dispersed in their country of residence, as for example the Romany or the Jews up to the end of World War II.

Frans Timmermans, of the OSCE's Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, focused his comments on the role played by kin states in the affairs of other states, claiming that the issue requires greater attention and analysis because of its growing importance throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states. To what extent should a state play the role of advocate or guarantor of rights of citizens of another state who happen to be co ethnics of the kin state? For example, to what extent should Croatia have the right to act on behalf of Croatians in Bosnia? The Croatian government gave Croatians living in Bosnia Croatian citizenship and the right to vote in Croatian elections: what should the international community's position be on these kinds of actions?

John Maresca focused on the fundamental paradox of applying power-sharing solutions to resolve internal conflicts: States are attached to their sovereignty and give bits of it away only reluctantly. Groups which seek greater autonomy from a state, on the other hand, have very few avenues available to pursue their objectives other than the use of force. The historical record confirms for them that almost all groups that have achieved their objectives have done so through the successful use of violence. The dilemma is, how do you get groups to pursue their objectives through peaceful means and how do you get states to be more flexible in dealing with groups so as not to push them to violence?

In addressing this dilemma, Maresca made three suggestions. First, the international community should not so easily submit to group demands because this is a step backward in history. Every modern society is measured by how well people can live together regardless of ethnic background, and this should remain our ideal. Second, we should recognize that the changing nature of sovereignty puts new constraints on states. Sovereignty is no longer absolute. The modern concept of sovereignty derives from the people, and not from above. This implies that a state must be more flexible and softer in its uses of and adherence to sovereignty. Third, we need to consider what will satisfy group demands within the limitations of the way the world is organized. Russia faces the problem of what it can offer the Chechens that will satisfy their ambitions without compromising the Russian state. It requires creating a status that is greater than autonomy but less than independence.

POWER SHARING AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Power Sharing in the Russian Federation

Leokadia Drobizheva

Six wars, close to 20 armed clashes, and more than 100 nonviolent confrontations have occurred on the territory of the former Soviet Union in the past five years. Moreover, strained ethnic relations exist in Kazakstan, Ukraine, and the Baltic states, which may yet erupt into violence. In Russia, while armed conflict has broken out only in Chechnya, tensions remain widespread in the Caucasus-in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia-where more than three dozen ethnic groups reside. This record demonstrates the

importance of utilizing power-sharing methods in the Soviet successor states, and particularly in the Russian Federation, argued Leokadia Drobizheva of the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology in her presentation.

One obstacle to introducing power-sharing practices in the Russian Federation, Drobizheva asserted, is the different understanding of the sources of ethnic conflict circulating in the center and in the regions. Officials in the center view conflict as motivated by regional elites striving to increase their power. In contrast, leaders at the republic level stress the lack of constitutional protections for ethnic rights and their consequent inability to make progress in decolonization. Survey research conducted in the regions fails to support the view that only the leaders of ethnic republics seek greater sovereignty; both Russians and the titular nationalities of these republics support it. In Tatarstan, more than 70 percent of the population supported the idea of greater economic sovereignty. Over 60 percent of respondents in Tatarstan, Sakha-Yakutia, Tuva, and North Ossetia affirmed that their republic should control security forces on its territory. Between 40 and 60 percent of respondents in all republics that were studied believed that their republics should retain the right of secession. An interesting difference, however, is what respondents in the different republics believed they needed sovereignty *for*. Ossetians wanted sovereignty to defend themselves from the Ingush, who are being resettled after their deportation by Stalin. Respondents in Yakutia and Tatarstan primarily wanted sovereignty to realize their economic interests and have greater control of resources on their territory. Understanding why ethnic groups want sovereignty is critical to deciding what tools should be applied to conflicts.

Conflict in the Soviet successor states has a number of causes and is the product of more than one historical epoch. Some conflicts are a result of Stalin's policy of deporting "untrustworthy" peoples. As they return to their homelands, tension with new settlers is typical (e.g., the Balkar in Kabardino-Balkaria or the Crimean Tatars in Crimea). Other conflicts result from the arbitrary redrawing of borders by the Soviet regime. The uneven transition to a market economy also encourages a search for scapegoats-often a different ethnic group. Above all, Drobizheva emphasized changes in the social structure of ethnic groups that began long before perestroika. Soviet affirmative action policies, which fixed quotas for titular groups in the republics for public office and for professional positions, created a much higher rate of social mobility for titular groups than for Russians. Competition over employment and anxiety about the future accumulated over the years has made many of the ethnic republics places of latent conflict.

Tension within republics, or between republics and the center, reached its peak in 1992-1993 against the backdrop of the sharp struggle for power between the president and the parliament. The most intractable of the standoffs between center and regions involved Tatarstan. The republic demanded recognition as a "sovereign state, a subject of international law" voluntarily associated with the Russian Federation. To press its demands, Tatarstan boycotted the 1991 Russian presidential elections, refused to sign the 1992 Federation Treaty, and did not participate in the 1993 parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum. Tatarstan's example set a dangerous precedent, threatening to destabilize the Russian state. To counter the threat, Yeltsin developed a "policy of consensus" from which he departed only in the case of Chechnya. Rather than choosing the path of ultimatums and confrontation, Yeltsin agreed to sign a bilateral treaty between executive organs of the Russian Federation and Tatarstan, which became the basis for treaties with other subjects (republics and regions) of the Russian Federation as well.

The Tatarstan treaty proved beneficial to both sides. Tatarstan received funds for infrastructural development and military conversion, and its debt to the federal treasury was forgiven. In return, Tatarstan accepted that it was a member of the Russian Federation and resumed payment of taxes. The primary gain, however, was political. While Yeltsin could claim credit for bringing Tatarstan back into Russia's fold, the president of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, could take credit for freely negotiating the terms of Tatarstan's relationship with Russia. Moreover, the treaty helped disarm extreme nationalists in Tatarstan and forge unity between Russian and Tatar citizens of the republic, who all benefited. The Institute's surveys in Tatarstan reveal that nearly 60 percent of Tatars and more than 70 percent of Russians approve of the treaty.

While this policy of consensus has been extremely successful in avoiding a repetition of the events in Chechnya elsewhere, the treaty-signing process is in danger. There is a sharp disjuncture in the way center and regions view the treaty process. For the regions, it is not a temporary procedure but the foundation of their political and economic development. At the center, however, a movement in the State Duma advocates a revision of treaty-signing procedures and a possible revocation of existing treaties. State Duma deputies insist that treaties should only be signed with regions facing unusual circumstances and needing special arrangements to overcome their problems. Moreover, they claim that federal and regional legislatures should be allowed to ratify power-sharing treaties.

What would happen if the legislature were given the authority to ratify treaties? The State Duma, consisting predominantly of ethnic Russians and of representatives of the nonethnic subjects of the Federation, would not have approved the treaties for ethnic republics. Republic legislatures, which tend to be more nationalistic because they are dominated by members of the titular group, would probably also have rejected the treaties. Moreover, if there were a revision or nullification of treaties that have already been signed, a new wave of conflicts could break out. It is crucial to uphold and abide by those principles that have already been agreed to in these treaties, Drobizheva argued.

A longer term concern in Russia is how to design representative organs that can defend the interests of the numerous ethnic groups residing in the country. This is critically important, because the more these groups feel they cannot influence federal policymaking, the more they try to consolidate power on the regional and local level, thus inciting conflict with Russians and other ethnic groups living in the territory. The problem is that the share of minority groups in the population is too small to effectively influence federal policymaking. While the consociational model was developed for societies experiencing violent conflict, it nevertheless could be usefully applied to Russia to guarantee representation for these minority groups, Drobizheva argued. Moreover, consociationalism should be applied at the regional level as well as at the center. Drobizheva's survey research in the regions reveals that Russians living in ethnic republics feel alienated from the sources of power, and their low number in republic legislatures and administrations indicates their concerns have a real basis.

Distribution of Power

Vladimir Lysenko

Vladimir Lysenko, State Duma deputy and chair of the Duma subcommittee on federal relations, agreed with Drobizheva that democracy in Russia without federalism is impossible. However, he claimed that the treaty-signing process threatened to turn Russia into a contractually based confederal state with sharp inequality between regions and a weakened central government. While the treaties with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan were important in quelling extreme nationalist movements in those republics, and a treaty with Chechnya might have averted the war, subsequent treaties with republics, oblasts, and kraiss* strengthen the importance of patron-client relations with Moscow elites and sharpen regional inequalities.

The treaty-signing "rush" is largely a product of ambiguity over provisions of the federal Constitution, Lysenko claimed. The Constitution identifies 35 joint competences (shared jurisdictions) between federal and regional authorities, but virtually no legislation has been passed specifying how the joint competences are to be implemented. In most cases, the federal government acts alone in these domains, neglecting the role of regional authorities. To compensate for the lack of clarity about executing joint competences, regional and federal authorities have been signing bilateral treaties delineating mutual delegation of powers. The problem, however, is that these treaties do not conform to any particular framework and hence lack uniformity. As a result, each subject of the Federation has a different relationship with the federal government, and enjoys different powers and responsibilities. Moreover, some regions have not yet been able to sign treaties with the center, and they bear a heavier fiscal burden, paying 15 to 20 percent more in taxes to the federal budget as a result.

Instead of signing treaties on an ad hoc basis to clarify issues of joint competency, Lysenko urged that uniform legislation be adopted which could act as the fundamental basis for exercising all joint jurisdictions. With such fundamentals in place, there would no longer be a need to enter into bilateral relations with individual subjects of the Federation unless they faced exceptional circumstances. Moreover, the existence of uniform practices would alleviate tension between regions due to the fear that some have received a better deal from the center than others.

In Lysenko's view, the treaty-signing process, initiated by the treaty with Tatarstan, created three dangers. First, the treaties arbitrarily redistribute authority without regard for consistency with the Constitution. Second, the treaties exacerbate regional inequality by delegating certain concessions and benefits to signatories which are denied to other regions. Three of the richest republics in the country-Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Sakha-Yakutia-have signed treaties allowing them to retain the lion's share of their revenues. Redistribution of wealth in this way may threaten the livelihood of structurally disadvantaged regions. Third, they provide fodder for Russian nationalist sentiments which oppose giving any concessions to ethnic republics that "Russian" territories do not enjoy.

The first treaties were justifiable because Russia stood at the threshold of disintegration. They were necessary to keep the autonomous republics from seceding during a critical period in Russia's transition. But more recent treaties with non ethnic territories are concluded strictly for pecuniary reasons. Not all power-sharing treaties should be ruled out, Lysenko argued. Some regions face unusual circumstances which require more particular delineations of authority: for example, Kaliningrad, because of its exclave position, and Buriatia, by virtue of its location on Lake Baikal.

The treaty-signing process in Russia is a temporary phenomenon, Lysenko predicted. When Russia develops a more integrated system of federal and regional laws and the economy stabilizes, there will no longer be a need for treaties. As in other federal states, matters relating to the demarcation of competences will be regulated by uniform legislation. But to reach this stage, Russia must work out inconsistencies in its constitution. For example, the status of autonomous okrugs* must be clarified. These territories are both subjects of the Federation and subjects of the oblasts or krais in which they are embedded. Moreover, the federal and regional constitutions should be brought into conformity with one another.

In the meantime, since the signing of treaties is gaining speed, some regulation of the process is warranted, Lysenko said. Currently, treaties are signed only by executive organs of the respective sides. Lysenko advocated legislative ratification of treaties, since the power of the federal parliament is also being demarcated by the treaty provisions. Recognizing that it would be difficult to have treaties approved in a body the size of the State Duma, Lysenko suggested that the Federation Council approve treaties, since it is composed of leaders from each region. Drobizheva objected, however, arguing that the Federation Council's voting record does not bespeak a commitment to protecting group rights. For example, the Federation Council refuses to approve a law passed by the State Duma which would protect small ethnic groups in danger of extinction. There is little reason to think it would support treaties for individual regions, especially since two-thirds of the subjects of the Federation have no treaties yet, and the treaties that have been signed differ from one another.

The current arrangement will be resistant to change, conceded Lysenko, because not only regional elites but federal authorities as well benefit from the treaties. Federal politicians can buy the loyalty of regional elites at strategic moments, and use this help to get reelected. Despite these precautions, Lysenko emphasized that Russia cannot become a democracy without federalism. Power sharing was a crucial factor in the successful prevention of conflict between Russia and Tatarstan, Moldova and Gagauzia, and Georgia and Adjara. Commitment to federalism must remain strong, but it must be a more regulated and evenly distributed federalism than exists today.

Discussion

Valery Tishkov, the director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, questioned the appropriateness altogether of applying power-sharing techniques to Russia. Much of the literature about power sharing was developed to address conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, where the markers of identity are more visible and deeply felt than in Russia, he argued. Though Soviet nationalities' policy did encourage ethnic affiliation among elites as an avenue through which to advance politically and professionally, among the masses ethnic identity is weak. There is a high rate of intermarriage, and civic, family, professional, or religious identification predominates over ethnic affiliation.

Tishkov also questioned whether the principle of proportionality at all levels of decision making, advocated by consociationalists, would ensure ethnic groups the representation of their interests. There is no guarantee that once incorporated into the bureaucracy, these individuals would continue to represent the interests of their ethnic group. The bureaucracy has its own culture,

Tishkov argued. Moreover, bureaucrats can be even more nationalist than ordinary Russians in order to prove their loyalty to the state.

The question of whether ethnic identities should be reinforced through power-sharing practices cannot be considered separately from the important objective of nation building in the newly independent states, Tishkov claimed. An important goal for these states in the post-Soviet context is the construction of general Russian, Moldovan, Ukrainian, or Kazak identities. A balance must be struck between protecting group rights and preserving state integrity.

Ethnic federalism in Russia is also fraught with dilemmas, Tishkov asserted. In most ethnic federations, titular groups are a majority of the population in their given territory. In Russia, however, the titular nationality is a minority in most of the ethnic republics, and in some cases an autonomous territory is shared by two titular ethnic groups. Moreover, less than half of the population of Russia's ethnic groups lives in a territorial autonomy. The challenge is identifying a new democratic form that can reconcile individual and group rights in such a complicated setting. Under conditions of a market economy, when ethnicity cannot serve as the basis for discrimination or privilege, how is it possible to preserve the ethnic profile of the autonomous republics, especially when the titular group is a minority within them?

Tishkov proposed that each republic have two "preferential cultural systems" (*predpodchitelnykh referentnykh kulturnykh sistem*): the Russian, and that of the titular nationality. To govern in an ethnic republic, leaders would be selected not on the basis of ethnicity, but of participation in the local culture. The president of Tatarstan, for example, need not be Tatar so long as he speaks the Tatar language and has the confidence of the majority of voters.

Putting aside seats for ethnic groups in the legislature, however, is both impractical and unwise; it pressures individuals to identify according to their ethnicity, argued Tishkov. The prospects for organizing separate elections all over the country for Jews, Tatars, and Russians is uncomfortable for the many citizens whose needs are satisfactorily met by the existing legal framework. If Jews or Armenians or Ukrainians are assimilated into the Russian sociocultural space, why should the state pressure them into ethnic coalitions by encouraging them to vote for a candidate simply because of similar nationality? When the Soviet state constructed strict ethnic borders and enforced them through favoritism and repression, does it make sense, Tishkov questioned, for Russia to continue a policy of ethnic particularism, fixing group blocs at the expense of constructing a general civic loyalty? Rather than protecting ethnic groups by adopting institutions which reinforce ethnic identity, Tishkov emphasized the role that informal alliances between elites can play. The real reason that Russia was able to find a peaceful solution in Tatarstan but not in Chechnya, Tishkov claimed, is because President Yeltsin and the president of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, were willing to negotiate with one another, whereas Yeltsin and Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev were not.

Emil Pain, discussant on the panel, rejected three assumptions made by the previous panelists. First, it is inaccurate to depict regions as trying to gain more power from the center and the center resisting, he said. The division is not between center and regions but between conflicting visions of elites at the center, some of whom advocate a devolution of power while others guard

the interests of a unitary state. Second, allusions to a growing Russian nationalism driven by resentment of rights given to ethnic republics is greatly overstated. Survey research shows that xenophobia in Russia is at a highly abstract level and ethnophobia remains at the level of 4 to 6 percent, the lowest level in all the former Soviet states. Electoral history reveals that parties and candidates who exploit nationalist ideas lose support, both in federal and local elections. Third, claims that Yeltsin ignored opportunities to resolve the tension in Chechnya peacefully are wrong. In 1993, before hostilities began, the president announced that he was willing to enter into special agreements with Tatarstan and Chechnya. While Shaimiev was receptive to this offer, Dudayev was not.

The decision to use force in Chechnya was closely tied to political considerations, Pain argued. The strong support given to ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and to Communists in the 1993 Parliamentary election was interpreted by Yeltsin's administration as a sign of growing nationalism among the people and a desire for a strong hand. Moreover, the administration needed to divert people's attention from the hardships engendered by the economic reform program. In addition, the fundamental concept of Yeltsin's nationality policy—anything but war—was put aside in response to critiques that the president was being weak and indecisive.

A real chance for peace was missed following the 1996 presidential elections, however. In early March, a peace plan produced by the Presidential Council, of which Pain was a member, was approved by Yeltsin. The plan culminated in the Nazran agreements, the furthest step toward peace, in which both sides were able to agree even to joint patrols to oversee the cease-fire. The plan was never implemented, however, because several generals considered the agreements merely an electoral ploy. In the first days of July, General Tikhomirov issued an unfulfillable ultimatum to the Chechens, branded them bandits, and began an onslaught on villages in which there was no sign of rebel presence. Pain argued that although the war was driven by a variety of economic interests, the dominant factor was the persistence in power of people whose formative experience was developed in Afghanistan and who continued to hold racial stereotypes.

Other workshop participants differed in their evaluations of the treaty process in Russia and in explanations for conflict between center and regions. Venali Amelin, a participant from Orenburg Oblast, which recently concluded a power-sharing treaty with the federal government, challenged the idea that treaties no longer have political objectives but rather are pursued by regions to obtain fiscal concessions. Amelin claimed that the Orenburg treaty failed to meet the economic objectives of the region, which had sought to retain a greater share of the VAT collected on its territory, which would have brought in an additional 400-570 billion rubles to its budget annually. Rather, the treaty served political purposes, allowing the governor to claim credit for having signed a treaty in the first place. The biggest contention Orenburg has with the center, he claimed, concerns the unevenness of revenue collection from subjects of the Federation. One example of this is the fact that both Orenburg and its neighbor, the Bashkortostan Republic, pay the same amount in taxes to the federal budget, even though Bashkortostan's revenue is three times the size of Orenburg's.

The tensions over fiscal distribution between regions have not hampered interregional cooperation on other issues, however. Orenburg has concluded agreements with the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan on issues of economic, technological, and cultural cooperation.

Moreover, agreements between local governments of different regions are proceeding as well, Amelin said. Local governments in Orenburg, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan have signed cooperation agreements to counter the shortage of fuel and harvesting equipment needed for the fall harvest. Sergei Popov of Stavropol Krai concurred that interregional cooperation is under way in his region as well. The regions of the North Caucasus are entering into security agreements with one another to protect themselves against impulsive actions by the federal government. This kind of "people's diplomacy" has created a regional security regime in the area. The republics of Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kalmykia, Chechnya, and Stavropol Krai have all exchanged representatives.

Popov confirmed, however, the uneven treatment of republics and regions as a lingering source of tension. After the Chechen hostage-taking incident at Budyennovsk, the governor, his deputy, and the police chief of Stavropol were removed from office. However, after the Chechen incursion into Dagestan, the republic was rewarded financially.

The issue of power sharing with subjects of the Federation led Vitaly Zhurkin, the director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Europe, to focus on the boundary between federalism and confederalism. By giving up rights to regions in order to prevent conflict, might Russia not be moving toward becoming a confederation with such a weak center that even worse conflicts are likely? Zhurkin argued that Russia has not reached that critical threshold, however, and that the signing of treaties is both correct and not unique to Russia. In the United States, the federal government still helps states adopt new constitutions, Zhurkin claimed, only these are not called "treaties."

Sergei Arutiunov of the Russian Academy of Sciences deplored the repudiation of treaty-based relations and disagreed with the argument made by Lysenko that regional constitutions need to be brought into consistency with the federal constitution. The federal constitution was approved by a bare 51 percent of the vote, and was rejected in numerous ethnic republics, he argued. In contrast, many regional constitutions were passed with a higher share of support and therefore have greater legitimacy. Rather than demanding that regional constitutions be brought into line with the federal one, the federal Constitution should be made more consistent with regional constitutions. Lysenko responded by saying that the Constitution cannot be amended to be consistent with 89 different regional constitutions. To demand this would be to reject the rule of law.

General Mahmut Gareev emphasized Russia's long tradition of asymmetric federalism to undermine arguments made by nationalists such as Aleksander Solzhenitsyn calling for a return to a unitary state. Gareev argued that in czarist Russia, Finland had its own constitution with privileges that even Tatarstan today does not enjoy. The Polish kingdom had special privileges, and in Central Asia local rulers were allowed to remain in power. Had the czar's policies not been reversed, the Baltics and Poland might not have wanted independence, Gareev suggested. Hence, it is wrong to emphasize Russia's unitary traditions only.

Participants' explanations for ethnic conflict in the Soviet successor states differed. General Gareev argued that such conflicts are a reaction to the economic hardships facing the population. The 30 million votes given to Gennadii Zyuganov register this discontent. If ethnic conflict is to

be avoided, the quality of life for the average citizen must be improved. Yuri Krasin attributed ethnic conflict to the weakness of interest identity in the post-Communist states. The integrative approach described by Sisk fosters a civil society where people have multiple overlapping cleavages. Civil society is beginning to form in Russia, he argued. More than 2,000 nongovernmental organizations are registered federally and tens of thousands exist on the regional and local level. Nevertheless, interests are weakly defined because Russian society has not yet developed class stratification. Where class interests have not crystallized, a crisis of personal identification results, and ethnicity becomes people's primary cleavage.

Debate also centered on Russia's role in resolving conflicts in other states. Mikhail Guboglo argued that Russia should intervene to protect the Turkic peoples living in Moldova, Ukraine, Albania, and Bulgaria against assimilation by their host states. Since Russia invited them to settle in these regions more than 200 years ago, it cannot abandon them now, he argued. Emil Pain responded that such intervention would violate international law. Russia can supply textbooks and other humanitarian aid to these Turkic minorities, but it cannot violate the sovereignty of other states; such actions would invite havoc in many states throughout the world.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT

The end of the Cold War has failed to bring the era of peace and tranquility that many observers expected. Regional border disputes, the breakup of multinational states, growing demands for self-determination, population increases, urbanization, mass migration, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction make the world rife with sources of conflict. Today, violent conflict afflicts more than one-quarter of the world's states and touches every region of the globe. With sources of conflict so prevalent, what role can the military play in preventing the outbreak or limiting the escalation of deadly conflicts?

The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly Conflict

Colonel Daniel Kaufman

Colonel Daniel Kaufman made three broad points: First, peace will not keep itself. Preventing deadly conflicts will require extensive involvement by multilateral and regional organizations, as well as by individual states. Second, force and threats of force should not be regarded exclusively as a last resort, but should be seen as part of an integrated strategy of conflict prevention to be used in conjunction with political and economic instruments. Third, the major powers must accept the implications of their leadership roles. For preventive action to succeed, potential aggressors must believe that the international community or the major powers have the will and capability to punish aggression.

Why should states or organizations outside the zone of conflict become active in preventing the outbreak or escalation of these violent, predominantly internal conflicts? Kaufman offered three reasons: national interest, moral humanitarian imperative, and the responsibilities of leadership.

Traditional concepts of national interest need to be widened in the post-Cold War environment. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, the sale of fissionable material, genocide, terrorism, and the spread of ideological or religious extremism make it impossible to ignore events in countries

once considered peripheral. Humanitarian concerns are also likely to create increasing pressure for action by individual states or multilateral organizations. The lethal potential of modern conflict and the instantaneous and global access to information will convey moving images of human suffering that demand action.

Since peace will not keep itself in this unpredictable and turbulent period, the use of military force or threat of force, far from being rendered irrelevant or obsolete, has become a potentially more important instrument of statecraft in the prevention of deadly conflict and should not be considered exclusively as a measure of last resort. The strategic use of force combined with diplomacy in the early stages of a conflict can defuse or control it before it reaches crisis proportions. Just as a glass of water can extinguish a spark before it becomes a raging inferno, so timely use of military force can contain a conflict before it becomes unmanageable.

The call to combine force with diplomacy requires closer communication and planning between military and political leaders to avoid the potential for misunderstanding and ensure the efficacy of the intervention. However straightforward this conclusion seems, claimed Kaufman, it contradicts the conventional wisdom about leaving the conduct of military operations to military professionals.

The early use of the military can prevent the outbreak of violence and establish the conditions for the development of long-term political and economic solutions, Kaufman concluded. Not every conflict can be prevented, but the timely use of military force can reduce the incidence and destructiveness of deadly conflict.

The Role of Military Factors in Preventing and Resolving Armed Conflicts

General Mahmut Gareev

In his presentation, General Mahmut Gareev also emphasized the increased dangers of the post-Cold War world and the important role the military can play in this changing environment. Meeting new challenges will require a reform of international organizations, a rethinking of traditional military doctrines, and an increased emphasis and responsibility accorded to diplomats to find peaceful solutions. With the decentralization of potential points of conflict, prevention will require cooperation and coordination between states. The most promising way to do this is for Russia and other CIS states to establish a cooperative relationship with NATO under the auspices of the OSCE. But NATO must be remodeled into a global security system which does not violate the security of any state. If, however, the bipolar world is replaced by a single superpower which attempts to weaken its Cold War rival, then new conflicts will replace old ones and the chance for peace will be lost.

Reform of UN procedures is also required. Currently the UN Charter contradicts the organization's practices. While the Charter prohibits the use of force in international affairs, the organization is itself more frequently employing force, sometimes even before diplomatic solutions have been exhausted. Effectiveness of the UN is also undermined when it fails to ensure that all sides to an agreement uphold their obligations, or when UN peacekeeping forces favor one side in a conflict while trying to suppress the other. Gareev argued that the UN should also develop criteria for when to recognize the legitimacy of a sovereign movement. Why, for

example, is Georgia entitled to sovereignty but not Abkhazia? Why did Germany recognize Slovenia and Croatia, but not the Kurdish state? If there were less ambiguity about when groups can and cannot gain independence, this might give secessionists pause before launching independence drives. UN military command structures should also be enhanced. Experience shows that the conduct of peacekeeping operations should be under UN command rather than directed by NATO or other regional organizations.

The responsibility of civilian leaders in preventing deadly conflicts must also be increased. Politicians turn to the army as to a fire crew when they need to extinguish a conflict that has become intractable. When the military fails to solve the problem, it is blamed, and officers are severely reprimanded. Yet one hardly hears of the Ministry of the Interior or the State Department being questioned about its failure to settle a conflict by diplomatic means.

Meeting the threats of the post-Cold War world will require greater coordination between civilian and military leaders. This violates traditional thinking, which sees diplomacy as exclusively the domain of politicians and fighting as exclusively the sphere of the military. The notion that these are entirely separate spheres is a fiction, Gareev claimed. Politicians must understand military capabilities to be able to make strategic decisions, and military leaders must understand and inform political objectives. One way to develop this cooperation between military and policymaking spheres is to design training games, by the UN for example, which require military and civilian leaders to react to scripted crisis situations.

The diversity of conflicts in the post-Cold War world requires a rethinking of the tasks that armed forces can perform. Force can be used as a diplomatic tool in a wide variety of nontraditional ways short of massive warfare and frontal attacks. The military can play a greater role in psychological intimidation, application of sanctions, enforcement of sea and land blockades, displays of force, and warning strikes. There is a whole spectrum of stages that a state can pass through before initiating the unrestricted use of force. Indirect military actions will play an increasing role in the post-Cold War world.

The growth in local conflicts presents new challenges to the military. Experience shows that even local conflicts require the commitment of large numbers of forces, as in the Persian Gulf War. Fighting local conflicts is complicated by the fact that there is no "front." Armed units are mixed with civilians and may strike from various, often unexpected, directions. Supply and logistics are often obstructed by broken communication lines and guerrilla attacks. Responding to these challenges requires adjusting military training. Manuals and training exercises need to be developed for the specifics of local conflicts. Moreover, potential problem spots need to be identified and permanent troops stationed there to defuse a conflict before it escalates. Finally, soldiers involved in local conflicts must be given moral support to prevent them from taking desperate measures. Frustration and lack of preparation for fighting local wars has increased the level of civilian deaths during warfare exponentially. While attempts must be made to avoid civilian casualties, such precautions should not turn into cruelty to one's own army, Gareev said. Sparing civilians by not shelling Grozny also means sparing rebel fighters, who can then attack Russian soldiers. Moreover, monitoring of human rights violations must be more even-handed. Both sides to a local conflict should be held responsible for maintaining human rights norms.

Discussion

Discussant John Galvin echoed the two speakers' call for a reassessment of the dictums of Clausewitz. First, military and political power cannot be separated. Military force should be a continuous part of the effort to prevent conflict and restore peace either by being in the background or the foreground, but the military element cannot be divorced from the political element. Second, Galvin challenged Clausewitz's injunction against changing one's objectives after force has been employed. Galvin argued that the use of force may itself change the situation, and policymakers need to be attuned to and responsive to these changes.

Finally, Galvin highlighted an argument made by Gareev which he considered the most important point of the conference: "In order to substantially reduce the likelihood of war, every state, including the U.S., must change its policy rather than just talking about such changes. All efforts should be directed to the creation of a global security system which wouldn't infringe on any country's security." Traditional concepts need to be reexamined and abandoned if necessary, including the idea of an anarchic international system. It is true that historically the world has been anarchic, but the future does not have to continue to be so. Other problems we have to overcome are our own conflicting needs, our insistence on freedom of action and flexibility as nations rather than as coalitions, indifference to or fear of things foreign, and hegemonic tendencies. This approach takes these to be practical problems that we can deal with, one by one, and is not Wilsonian idealism, claimed Galvin. Unless we are willing to give the idea of collective security the importance it deserves, the twenty-first century may surpass the twentieth, which has been the bloodiest century in all human history.

Discussant Alexei Arbatov analyzed the conduct of the war in Chechnya to draw a number of conclusions about fighting civil wars in general, and the one in Chechnya in particular. The war lacks legitimacy, Arbatov argued, because there are no provisions in federal law allowing the state to engage the army against Russian citizens. The Constitution states that the armed forces can only be used to defend against outside threats, and that additional uses for the military must be specified by federal law. But no such laws have been passed. The Constitutional Court considered the case, and interpreted the president's responsibility for the territorial integrity of Russia as justifying the use of the army in Chechnya. This decision raised serious doubts in the country about the independence of the court.

The army's ineffectiveness and brutality in Chechnya are a direct result of the vague mission with which it was charged. The army is trained to either seize a territory or defend it. In Chechnya it does neither: it cannot seize the territory because it already belongs to Russia, and it cannot defend it because no one is attacking it. An army cannot be sent to achieve some abstract goal like preserving territorial integrity and constitutionality because these goals mean nothing to it. From the start, soldiers did not know what they were supposed to do in Chechnya other than remain there while surrounded by a hostile population and guerrilla fighters.

Inevitably, when the army fails to fulfill the vague objectives which it was given, it becomes a scapegoat for political mistakes that had been made. To protect itself from blame, the army starts taking policy into its own hands, doing what it thinks is needed to ensure military victory. This often leads to brutal violations of human rights and the loss of civilian control of the military,

altering and further complicating the situation. When goals are vaguely defined, employing armed forces will only complicate the situation.

Even if goals were better defined, however, this is not sufficient to guarantee victory. Guerrilla wars are inherently difficult to combat, as Henry Kissinger once argued: guerrillas win if they do not suffer a major defeat. In contrast, a regular army always loses unless it scores a major victory. When guerrillas have the support of the majority of the local population, they cannot be defeated by the regular army without massive civilian casualties. No contemporary democracy can put up with such losses. While guerrilla fighters may be disadvantaged in number, technical capacity, and arms, their advantage is that they choose the time and place of their attacks. Attempts to find someone to blame for an army's ineffectiveness are misguided because an army can never be fully prepared for this kind of war.

Arbatov then pointed to particular lessons that had not been heeded in Chechnya. First, it is imperative that all troops be united under one command structure. In Chechnya, there is a great deal of confusion and disagreement between army, interior, and special forces, and others.

Second, negotiators should be carefully chosen. Negotiations should proceed under one person's command, and this person should have sufficient authority to commit the armed forces and other involved departments to the agreements. Otherwise, there will be lack of consistency between agreements, or agreements will be violated by armed units not coordinating their actions with the talks. Assigning Aleksandr Lebed this task is problematic because he does not have the authority to command those ministries which are engaged in fighting the war.

Third, it is imperative for government leaders to have access to objective information. Information provided by the army, interior ministry, or intelligence services is unreliable because those groups are too deeply involved in the problem to be objective. When talks begin, it is imperative to replace those officials who initiated the conflict, because their goal will be victory and they will do everything in their power to frustrate the peace process. Any compromise is to them a sign of defeat. They should be replaced with people for whom success is not military victory, but withdrawal of forces and attainment of peace.

When negotiations do begin, it is important not to denigrate the opposition. This is particularly difficult in civil wars because the opposition is portrayed as criminal, and negotiating with criminals is a sign of capitulation. Hence, if peace is to be achieved, the Chechen opposition must be recognized as a legitimate bargaining partner and not a group of bandits.

As anyone involved in conflict knows, the withdrawal of forces is a much more complicated and dangerous task than their introduction. The creation of puppet regimes in the disputed regions makes withdrawal and attainment of peace even harder.

Unfortunately, even in democratic states we have to continue to use force for the resolution of not only external, but internal conflicts as well. But it is very important that the use of force be based on a legal foundation and have the support of the majority of the population, Arbatov said. Otherwise, use of the armed forces is extremely destructive for the army and for democracy itself, as we see in Chechnya.

Vitaly Zhurkin responded that while politicians are primarily responsible for the war in Chechnya, soldiers are not free from blame for military crimes. Soldiers have to take responsibility for war crimes since they, unlike policymakers, carry weapons which can do a lot of damage. Russian generals in Chechnya operate with impunity. Moreover, the Russian armed forces lack experience as peacekeepers. The war in Afghanistan did not give them the opportunity, and their role in Bosnia does not provide sufficient training. Ending the war in Chechnya will require nontraditional methods, argued Zhurkin, because normal political practices will not work to end the kind of warfare described by Arbatov.

John Maresca expressed the deep disappointment and concern in the United States over the prospects for U.S.-Russian military cooperation after the events in Chechnya. The end of the Cold War generated much hope in the United States for partnership with the Russian military based on the belief that the two countries face many similar challenges and that their societies are rooted in many of the same values. Chechnya became the watershed for these expectations, claimed Maresca, raising grave concerns about who controls the military in Russia and about the underlying values of a society that bombards its own cities. The war in Chechnya has profoundly undercut Western hopes regarding cooperation with Russia on many issues. The sooner that Russia can manage to get itself out of Chechnya in an honorable way, the sooner that kind of cooperation can resume, claimed Maresca.

Georgi Shakhnazarov argued that the war in Chechnya could have been avoided if Yeltsin had invited Dudayev for talks; instead, it was primarily driven by wounded pride. He also noted the danger of suspicions, growing among leftist forces in Russia, that the Chechens are supported by the United States as part of an effort to weaken Russia. If these are without any basis, it is critical that Americans deny them lest these suspicions feed anti-United States sentiment. Tension with the United States is also exacerbated by plans for NATO expansion. Shakhnazarov challenged the idea that a global security system could be built while expanding NATO; either all the world would have to join, or it would be an organization of select nations, providing security to some while threatening others. Shakhnazarov concluded by arguing that the study of conflict prevention requires greater exchange of ideas between Russia and the United States. He pointed out that both Sisk's and Kaufman's conclusions do not draw on the work of any Russian analysts. Such one-sidedness undermines the ability of these analysts to understand the particularity of Russia and limits the applicability of their models to Russian reality. Inadequate exchange of ideas is largely a reflection of the limited number of translated works, and this is why the Carnegie Commission's work is so valuable.

Kim Tsagolov, deputy minister for nationalities and regional policy of the Russian Federation, concluded by claiming that no universal model exists for resolving local and regional conflicts. Moreover, it is wrong to call them ethnic conflicts. All "ethnic conflicts" have material roots and if these can be identified, the conflict can be defused. Fighting the Chechen opposition will do little to win the loyalty of the Chechen people; the more we fight them, the more we undermine their faith in being citizens of Russia. Finally, Tsagolov affirmed Shakhnazarov's call for more attention to Russian analyses of conflict. Russian institutes produce many insightful works; when foreigners present advice as mentors without having read available Russian works, the advice they give is not useful.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEKEEPING

International Peacekeeping on the Territory of the Former USSR

Andrei Kortunov

International organizations seeking to intervene in conflicts in the republics of the former Soviet Union face a number of difficulties, said panelist Andrei Kortunov. Views of the efficacy of international organizations have changed dramatically in the region over the five years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The early 1990s were a period of naive idealism in which the newly independent states appealed to the UN and OSCE with every minor complaint, much as they had turned to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in earlier days. The second stage was a period of romantic maximalism in which leaders of the post-Soviet states believed that international organizations had unlimited economic and military resources which would be used to address all major challenges of daily life in their states. The third stage was one of cynicism toward international organizations, most sharply felt in Russia. The view that international organizations lack either the interest or the capacity to become involved in Eurasia led to the conclusion that membership in these organizations has little value. Participation could even be counterproductive because it raises hopes that will inevitably be disappointed.

A second difficulty concerns the relationship of great powers to international organizations. Regional powers prefer to act through organizations in which they have particular influence; for example, England through the British Commonwealth, the United States through the Organization of American States, France through the Organization for African Unity, and Russia through the CIS. Where the great power is unwelcome, intervention through an international organization may be more palatable. Great powers also use intervention via international organizations to cloak their actions in a legal framework.

Given these difficulties, international organizations face two dilemmas. The first is how to coordinate activities with a superpower while remaining independent of it. For example, the OSCE cannot be effective in Chechnya without coordinating its efforts with the Russian authorities, but such coordination can make the OSCE vulnerable to manipulation by Russian leaders. The OSCE faces the dilemma of how to strike a balance between achieving its goals and maintaining its principles. A second dilemma is finding a balance between short- and long-term goals. Meeting short-term goals requires bargaining with whoever holds power in the conflict zone, while long-term goals require integrating a wider circle of elites into the negotiation process.

Discussion

Panelist Vladimir Lukin, while noting the weakness of many international organizations, warned against a return to realpolitik, in which each state acts unilaterally to maximize its power and balances of power are necessary to preserve international peace. While international law has legitimacy, it has no one to enforce it. Individual states, on the other hand, have the power to do as they wish, but lack legitimacy for their actions.

The central problem that international organizations will have to address is the tension between groups pressing for their rights to sovereignty and states trying to preserve their integrity. International organizations must determine under what circumstances one or the other goal should prevail. This is a vital question for Russia, which has more than 100 ethnic groups and 21 ethnic republics. If each of these groups is given independence, Russia will fall apart and civil war will result.

International organizations must also prioritize their goals when mediating conflicts. The first goal should be a cease-fire because that stops the killing. For example, in the talks between the Minsk group and Russia concerning settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Russia pushed for a cease-fire, even in the absence of a political settlement. While there is still no permanent settlement in the area, the war is no longer being fought. The same approach was taken in the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict.

Sometimes, great powers have to take the lead when multilateral cooperation in mediation cannot be marshaled, Lukin asserted. For years, Russia has tried to coordinate a CIS force to resolve the war in Tajikistan, but to no avail. No other newly independent state but Russia has taken on the responsibility of peacekeeping in Tajikistan.

Russia's openness to international intervention is also unusual, argued Lukin. No other great power has allowed an international organization to intervene in resolving a conflict on its territory. Permitting the OSCE to mediate the conflict in Chechnya would be like allowing the UN to monitor the U.S. police after the riots in Los Angeles. We should appreciate how far Russia has gone in signing numerous international agreements, no matter how much domestic opposition there is to such commitments from nationalist forces.

Reform of the UN is also a necessity, claimed Lukin, but reform is impossible unless members meet their financial obligations to the organization. U.S. arrears to the UN are inexcusable, given that the United Nations was formed on the initiative of the United States. In sum, reforming the UN, strengthening regional organizations, and encouraging individual states to take the initiative to intervene when others do not will provide the tools necessary to at least partially control crisis situations.

Discussant Frans Timmermans offered suggestions on how an international organization could play an effective role in conflict settlement, especially in a very large country. Timmermans concurred with Lukin that the first priority is a cease-fire. Once a cease-fire exists, the key goal is to get the conflicting sides to agree to the role of the international organization. Winning this kind of agreement depends on establishing a reputation for impartiality and confidentiality. Confidentiality is sometimes difficult to achieve because organizations may try to enhance their role and win outside support by turning to the media.

The organization must also be very restrained in promoting its position, which requires modesty. The dilemma, however, is that an organization that is too modest will not be regarded as useful or powerful enough by the parties to the conflict to be allowed to arbitrate, unless the organization has the full support of its member states. With such support it does not have to go to

the media and violate confidentiality to communicate the message that the organization is powerful.

With regard to the tension between sovereignty movements and preserving the integrity of states, the basic principle of the OSCE is to seek solutions within the framework of the state. The international organization cannot violate the principle of territorial integrity unless both sides to the conflict agree, as in Czechoslovakia.

Every OSCE member state has signed numerous agreements reflecting common values of the member states. It is the right and the obligation of the participating OSCE states to hold one another to the commitments they made by signing these agreements: this is not meddling in others' internal affairs. As John Maresca said earlier, the concept of sovereignty has changed.

Timothy Sisk challenged the argument made by Lukin and Timmermans about the importance of having a cease-fire before mediation can begin. Some parties will not agree to a cease-fire unless they have assurances about the outcome of the conflict, Sisk asserted. Mediators should bring with them a clear idea of what the settlement should be and they should get agreement, at least in principle, at the time of the cease-fire about the parameters of the settlement. Otherwise, one may end up with outcomes like the one in Cyprus, where a cease-fire has lasted for many years, but sporadic violence and tension continue.

Sisk also questioned whether international organizations are necessarily the best actors for conflict resolution. Successful mediation requires clout in order to have power over the opposing sides in a dispute. As consensus-building bodies, international organizations inherently lack such clout. Powerful states may thus be more effective arbitrators than international organizations, Sisk suggested. However, different stages in a conflict may be more conducive to involvement by different actors.

Sergei Arutiunov pointed to the massive corruption which undermines the effectiveness of peacekeeping in the territory of the former Soviet Union. He cited Shamil Basayev, the Chechen field commander who led the raid against Budyennovsk, as saying that he had originally intended to get much closer to Moscow but did not have enough money to bribe all the guards he would have to pass through to get to his planned destination. The bridge over the Samur River between Russia and Azerbaijan is commonly known as the "Golden Bridge" because of the wealth that the guards patrolling this bridge have collected in bribes. Graft by Russian peacekeepers guarding bridges over the Inguri and Psou rivers in Abkhazia is also well known. How can Russian peacekeeping be effective when guards can so easily be bought off by either side to a conflict in which they are supposed to be neutral?

The neutrality of international organizations was questioned by Valery Tishkov. Rather than being instruments of their member states, Tishkov argued that organizations are concerned with survival and hence have their own interests and logic. Organizations formed to address a particular conflict face a crisis once the conflict is gone. For example, NATO enlargement is driven more by the fact that the organization was left without a mission by the end of the Cold War than by the desire of East Europeans to join, claimed Tishkov. The Organization for Unrepresented Nations and Peoples (UNPO), based in The Hague, for example, significantly

aggravated the conflict in Chechnya by recognizing Chechen independence, a recognition which was perceived in Chechnya as originating from the United Nations. Moreover, international organizations must be careful to communicate neutrality in the language they use. When activities that are elsewhere called "terrorism" are referred to by international organizations as "hostage-taking" when they are committed by Chechens, the neutrality of the organization is called into question. Finally, Tishkov disagreed with Lukin that intervention in Russia by foreign states is an attempt to weaken the country. Russia lacks experience in dealing with domestic conflicts and should welcome world experience. Moreover, Russian leaders should overcome the suspicion that everyone in the world wants the worst for Russia and recognize that many have an interest in preserving Russia in its present political configuration. However, comments from the West about the Russian threat or about differences in U.S. and Russian values reinforce the claims of the new isolationists in Russia who argue that Russia is encircled. When this view is overcome, international organizations can be more effective.

Mikhail Narinsky of the Institute for Universal History argued that reform of international organizations should not stop with the UN. The end of the Cold War has shown that no international organization is adequately equipped to react to the new kinds of conflicts that have emerged. The expansion of NATO and the development of the CIS should also be depoliticized, argued Narinsky. If NATO were to be dramatically reorganized and reformed, then its eastward expansion would be perceived with less alarm in Russia. Similarly, Western fear of CIS integration is misplaced. Just as Soviet propagandists of the 1950s could only see a united Europe as a tool of American imperialism, so many Western analysts can only see the CIS as the imperialistic creation of Moscow. These suspicions fail to recognize that the CIS could be developed into an effective regional security organization.

General Gareev expressed strong opposition to NATO expansion. If NATO expands to include Eastern Europe, that is because it considers Russia a threat, Gareev claimed. If everyone is a member of NATO, what purpose is the organization serving? General Gareev also underscored the importance of neutrality when international forces mediate conflict. If peacekeeping forces take sides in a conflict, they will not be able to forge an agreement and peace will be elusive.

Rafael Khakimov, advisor to the president of Tatarstan, pointed to an often underappreciated role that international organizations can play: as forums in which opposing sides to a conflict can meet and discuss their positions in confidentiality. Khakimov described several such meetings that took place at The Hague with representatives from Georgia, Abkhazia, Moldova, Gagauzia, Ukraine, Crimea, Russia, and Chechnya. The informal atmosphere created by the absence of the press made sincere dialogue possible and permitted attendees to share their experiences about conflict resolution, to exchange documents, and to erase stereotypes.

Timmermans urged that study of the causes of conflict not be neglected. Ethnicity is rarely the source of conflict, he argued. Often when people are unemployed and have little prospect of improving their standard of living, or when a society is undergoing cataclysmic changes, politicians may use nationalism to amass support, and escalation of tension becomes inevitable. In hindsight, the conflict is labeled "ethnic." Hence, a large part of preventing such conflicts consists of understanding how and why they start.

Effective prevention and resolution of conflict also requires less selectiveness by the international community in recognizing conflict, argued Kortunov. Some conflicts, like the one in Chechnya, are spotlighted, while others, as in Sudan, are obscured. Attention to conflicts is a product of Great Power interests, degree of risk to peacekeepers, prospects for success, and costs. NGOs must work to bring attention to the forgotten conflicts. Moreover, the rules of engagement for UN peacekeeping forces need to be revised to accommodate the specificity of intrastate conflicts and to be sensitive to issues of sovereignty. It is very difficult for a state to allow international mediators to resolve a domestic conflict because this is tantamount to admitting that a government cannot solve the problem itself.

David Holloway, of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University, concluded the conference by highlighting the dramatic changes in the agenda for international security that the end of the Cold War has wrought. In the old security paradigm, deterrence was the primary goal. Today the problem of deadly conflict, its causes, regulation, and resolution has come to be the key issue of international security. The Carnegie Commission's emphasis on prevention is a key contribution to understanding the new era of international security because it is a broader concept allowing analysts to draw on many more disciplines in their thinking about conflict. Finally, Holloway reiterated the warning of Kim Tsagolov that no country should present itself as a mentor to another in the area of conflict prevention. Both Russian and U.S. analysts have rich research traditions in the study of conflict prevention and management, and understanding can be enriched only by drawing from both.

*** Oblasts (regions) and krais (areas) are administrative divisions of the Russian Federation. ([Back](#))**

*** Okrugs are ethnically defined administrative units located within krais and oblasts. ([Back](#))**

Part One Power Sharing: Issues, Strategies, Institutions

1. Power Sharing in Multiethnic Societies: Principal Approaches and Practices

Timothy D. Sisk

In what ways can systems of democratic government be structured to help harmonize relations among groups in multiethnic societies? Many policymakers and scholars alike believe that broadly inclusive government, or power sharing, is essential to successful conflict management in societies beset by severe ethnic conflicts. Broadly interpreted, *power-sharing political systems are those that foster governing coalitions inclusive of most, if not all, major mobilized ethnic groups in society*. Decision making is based on a broad consensus that transcends groups through coalitions that are widely inclusive. Consensus or near-consensus decision making is

differentiated from simple majoritarian forms of democracy, in which decisions are taken for the entire society based on the preferences of a minimum winning majority (Rae 1969).

THE TWO BASIC APPROACHES TO POWER SHARING

The term "power sharing" has been defined by scholars such as Arend Lijphart as a set of principles that, when operationalized through practices and institutions, provide every significant identity group in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group. Lijphart's principles of power sharing-known as "consociational democracy" (derived from the Latin term *consociatio*, meaning to associate in an alliance)-differentiate coalescent democracy from majoritarian democracy (Lijphart, 1977a: 25).

Scholars differ over whether the *consociational* power-sharing approach-in which groups are represented as groups (usually through ethnically exclusive political parties), in essence as building blocks of a common society-leads to better relations among ethnic groups in multiethnic societies than practices that seek to foster political organizations that transcend ethnic group differences, or an *integrative* (or pluralist) approach. The integrative approach sees as ideal the creation of pre-election coalitions among ethnic parties or (less commonly) the creation of broad multiethnic parties based on interests that transcend ethnic identities, such as region or common economic interests. Traditionally, pluralism also relies on the forces of economic interaction to help create social cleavages that crosscut ascriptive identity. The preeminent example of this crosscutting pattern of democracy is the multiethnic United States, best described in Seymour Martin Lipset's 1960 book, *Political Man*; India is another oft-cited example (Brass 1990).

In addition, prominent scholars of the politics of multiethnic societies differ over the scope of the term "power sharing." Some, such as Lijphart, argue that the consociational approach to power sharing encompasses a wide variety of practices and instances. Others, such as Donald Horowitz, argue that the consociational approach is more narrow in meaning and that many cases of consociational democracy cited by consociationalists (such as Malaysia or Lebanon) are not in fact consociational but integrative. Lijphart contends that the integrative approach is essentially majoritarian in nature, and that integrative mechanisms encourage majority representatives to behave moderately and with sensitivity toward minorities, which are still excluded from real political power.

Thus, the power-sharing debate revolves around the following central question: Which broad approach best manages conflict, one that essentially sees ethnic groups as building blocks of national politics in multiethnic states, or one that purposefully encourages the formation of political blocs across group lines? Consociationalists suggest that conflict management is best promoted by accommodation among ethnic group leaders representative of their communities through cooperative problem-solving in post-election coalitions. Critics of the consociational approach-such as Horowitz (1985)-argue that institutions and practices that create incentives for the formation of pre-election coalitions and that encourage intragroup competition, rather than intergroup competition, better reduce the likelihood of violent conflict. Ideally, integrative mechanisms would lead to multiethnic parties or organizations that transcend narrow communal interests.

A central theme of this paper is that the concept of "power sharing" encompasses both consociational power sharing and integrative power sharing. Both the consociational and integrative approaches to ethnic conflict management seek to promote governing coalitions that are broadly inclusive of all ethnic groups in a deeply divided multiethnic society-the hallmark of power sharing-but advocates of these approaches sharply disagree over when and how such coalitions are formed, and which specific institutions and practices better manage ethnic conflict. For this reason, power sharing should be interpreted as encompassing both distinct approaches, keeping in mind that there are different types of institutions and practices to promote democratic ethnic conflict management which can be assembled and arranged in many different ways.

PROBLEMS OF MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY

Scholars of comparative politics tend to agree that simple forms of majoritarian government contain special problems for multiethnic societies. Minorities in particular in such societies do not equate democracy with freedom or participation, but with the structured dominance of adversarial majority groups. Permanent minorities such as Tamils in Sri Lanka, Catholics in Northern Ireland, and whites in South Africa have feared the consequences of electoral competition, especially when the expected consequence of majority victory is discrimination against them. For minority groups, losing an election is not simply a matter of losing office, but of losing the means for protecting the survival of the group.¹

Majoritarian democracy is typified by the Westminster system of small single-member districts with first-past-the-post (plurality) electoral rules; the party (or parties in coalition governments) with a majority of the seats forms the government while other parties remain in loyal opposition. Analytically, there are three problems with simple majoritarian democracy in multiethnic societies: the possibility of permanent exclusion of minority group-based political parties, the lack of "floating" voters whose preferences are formed on other-than-ascriptive criteria such as class,² and the pervasiveness of radical outbidding on divisive ethnic issues. Although simple majority rule may be "fairest" from a theoretical point of view (Rae 1969), the scholarly consensus recognizes the principle's limitations in multiethnic societies.³ (Horowitz [1993: 30] also demonstrates how a procedurally free and fair election can lead to equally exclusive minority rule.)

Advocates of power sharing in divided societies agree on the dangers of majoritarianism, citing the potential distortions in vote-to-seat outcomes, the inability of geographically dispersed minority parties to achieve representation, and-in the context of an ethnic party system-the likelihood that a single ethnic group or coalition of ethnic groups will govern exclusively and to the detriment of others.⁴ Lijphart, the most indefatigable critic of majoritarian and plurality electoral rules for divided societies (and indeed in other democracies), identifies the core problem when he refers to the potential for "majority dictatorship" (1985: 102). Horowitz concurs, arguing in his seminal work, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, that under conditions of simple majority rule:

Ethnic parties developed, majorities took power, and minorities took shelter. It was a fearful situation, in which the prospect of minority exclusion from government, underpinned by ethnic voting, was potentially permanent . . . Civil violence, military

coups, and the advent of single party regimes can all be traced to this problem of inclusion-exclusion (1985: 629).

Simply put, simple majority rule results in minimum winning coalitions that tend to exclude a significant minority; when minority preferences are intense, and when there is little chance of their becoming a majority, a recipe for conflict exists. Simple majoritarianism in a deeply divided society leads to zero-sum politics (Welsh 1993). Without an assurance that the electoral system will not lead to permanent exclusion, why should a minority group that perceives a threatening environment be willing to accept the inherent risks of electoral competition?

POLITICAL ENGINEERING

Rejection of majoritarian democracy does not mean a rejection of democratic values. What distinguishes advocates of majoritarianism from advocates of coalescent democracy, or power sharing, is belief in the prospects for "political engineering" (Sartori 1968) to mitigate conflicts in divided societies. *That is, the rules of the political game can be structured to institutionalize moderation on divisive ethnic themes, to contain the destructive tendencies, and to preempt the centrifugal thrust created by ethnic politics.* There is no assertion that deft political engineering can prevent or eradicate deep enmities, but appropriate institutions can nudge the political system in the direction of reduced conflict and greater governmental accountability. The common assumption is that choices about the basic rules of the game affect its outcomes. Horowitz writes: "Where there is some determination to play by the rules, the rules can restructure the system so the game itself changes" (1985: 601).

The central question of political engineering is: In multiethnic societies, which kinds of institutions and practices create an incentive structure for ethnic groups to mediate their differences through the legitimate institutions of a common democratic state? Alternatively, how can the incentive system be structured to reward and reinforce political leaders who are moderate with respect to divisive ethnic themes and to persuade citizens to support moderation, bargaining, and reciprocity among ethnic groups?

As highlighted above, there are two distinct approaches to constructing conflict-ameliorating democratic institutions in deeply divided societies: the consociational model most associated with Lijphart (1968, 1969, 1977a, 1977b, 1985) and what I term the integrative approach associated with Horowitz (1985, 1990, 1991, 1993). These approaches are summarized in Table 1. Although dichotomizing these approaches may be a too-simplistic description of their advocates' views, I do so here in order to highlight the differences. The former approach places greater faith in assurances for minority group protection, whereas the latter places greater emphasis on the role of incentives in encouraging interethnic cooperation. What unites them is the belief in coalescent democracy as an alternative to the adverse effects of majoritarianism and the assumptions that support a rejection of majoritarian practices. "Coalescent" decision making is argued to be a better prescription for the ills that plague deeply divided societies than the adversarial pattern associated with majoritarian democracy.⁵

THE "CONSOCIATIONAL" OR GROUP BUILDING-BLOCK APPROACH

Consociationalism, above all, relies on elite (political leaders) cooperation as the principal mechanism of successful conflict management in deeply divided societies.⁶ Consociationalists suggest that even if there are deep communal differences, overarching elite cooperation is a necessary and sufficient condition to assuage conflict.⁷ In the consociational approach, elites directly represent various societal segments and act to forge political ties at the center. This is the case in many of the consociational democracies-Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Malaysia (1955-69), and Lebanon (1943-1975)-that have been considered successful experiences by these theorists.⁸

Table 1. Approaches to Power Sharing

| | Consociational | Integrative |
|----------------------------------|--|---|
| Characteristics | Elites cooperate after elections to form multiethnic coalitions and manage conflict; groups are autonomous; minorities are protected. | Parties encouraged to create coalitions before elections, creating broadly inclusive but majoritarian governments. |
| Principles | Broad-based or "grand" coalitions, minority veto, proportionality in allocation of civil services positions and public funds, group autonomy. Dispersion and devolution of power, promotion of intraethnic competition, inducements for interethnic cooperation, policies to encourage alternative social alignments, managed distribution of resources. | Institutions and practices to promote these principles Parliamentary government, proportional reservation of seats, PR electoral system. Federalism, vote pooling, electoral systems, president elected by "super-majority." |
| Strengths of the approach | Provides groups firm guarantees for the protection of their interests. | Provides politicians with incentives for moderation -- "coalitions of commitment." |
| Weaknesses | "Coalitions of convenience." Elites may pursue conflict rather than try to reduce it; communal groups may not defer to their leaders; system relies on constraints against immoderate politics. | Lack of whole-country empirical examples of working systems; assumption that politicians respond to incentives and citizens will vote for parties not based on their own group. |

According to Lijphart, consociationalism relies on four principles: broad-based or "grand" coalition executives; minority veto; proportionality in the allocation of civil service positions and

public funds; and group autonomy. Lijphart argues persistently that the institutions that give life to these principles must be specially adapted to the society they are to serve, and they cannot be implemented and expected to work singularly. Lijphart also identifies a number of conditions that are favorable to the successful operation of consociational democracy: popular deference to elites, "a multiple balance of power, small size of the country involved, overarching loyalties, segmental isolation, prior traditions of elite accommodation, and-although much more weakly and ambiguously-the presence of cross-cutting cleavages" (1977a: 54).

Broad-Based Parliamentary Coalitions

Power sharing in the executive in a grand coalition, or a variant thereof, ensures that the minority is not permanently excluded from political power.² Parliamentary systems are argued to be more conducive to the creation of inclusive governing coalitions. In grand coalitions, political elites-representing the various segments of society-thrash out their differences in an effort to reach consensus, but *public* contestation among them is limited. The common denominator, and most important feature, is that decision making takes place consensually at the top among elites representing underlying social segments (Lijphart 1977a: 31-6).

Minority or Mutual Veto

The second feature of consociationalism is the mutual or minority veto, through which each segment is given "a guarantee that it will not be outvoted by the majority when its vital interests are at stake" (Lijphart 1977b: 118). Through the mutual veto, the majority's ability to rule is qualified by "negative minority rule" (Lijphart 1977a: 36). The minority veto is at the heart of the concrete assurances of consociationalism. The veto provides an ironclad guarantee of political protection to each segment on issues related to its vital interests. While the minority veto gives minorities the right to prevent action by others on the most sensitive issues, such as language, cultural, or education rights, it also serves a more important overriding goal. Like the Calhounian "concurrent majority," it invests each segment with the power of protecting itself (Lijphart 1977a: 37).

Proportionality

In every sphere of political life, the principle of proportionality lies behind consociational practices. Proportionality is introduced at every level of government decision making (central, regional, and local) to give minority groups power, participation, and influence commensurate with their overall size in society. The principle is manifested in two ways. First, through the electoral system proportional representation (PR) is used to faithfully translate the demographic strength of the segments into commensurate representation in parliament; parties are awarded seats in parliament in direct proportion to votes garnered in an election. Second, the allocation of resources by the state-including the appointment of civil servants and public spending-should be doled out according to the proportionality principle.

Segmental Group Autonomy

Either through territorial federalism or "corporate federalism" (nonterritorial autonomy), consociationalism provides internal autonomy for all groups who want it by devolving decision-making authority to the segments. Lijphart draws distinctions between those issues that concern the common interest and those that primarily concern the segments; on the former, decisions are made by consensus, otherwise decision-making power is delegated to the segments. The basic principle underlying communal autonomy is "rule by the minority over itself in the area of the minority's exclusive concern" (Lijphart 1977a: 41). An important feature of the call for entrenched group rights on certain issues is the principle of "voluntary affiliation." Group identification should not be predefined or determined; instead, the segments of society would be able to define themselves through the proportional electoral system (Lijphart 1995).

Lijphart consistently asserts that consociationalism is the only viable option for democracy in divided societies: "For many plural societies of the non-Western world, therefore, the realistic choice is not between the British [majoritarian] model of democracy and the consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all" (1977a: 238).

Consociationalism is not without its critics, of course. Below I will address criticisms of some of the specific practices (as opposed to principles) that are raised in response to the policy recommendations that flow from consociationalism, but here I would like to raise three broad criticisms of the consociational approach in order to better highlight the differences between it and the integrative approach. They are the reliance on elite accommodation and the problem of elite-initiated conflict; the reification of ethnic identity; and the tendency toward antidemocratic and inefficient decision making. (A fourth broad criticism raised by Horowitz, that consociationalism relies on constraints, not incentives, is outlined below in the discussion of the integrative approach.)

Consociationalists have been criticized for the assertion that elites can effectively regulate conflict in divided societies. As the Anglo-Irish Accord of 1985 demonstrates—as does the 1990 failure of the Meech Lake Accord agreed to by Canada's provincial leaders in 1987—even though political elites may agree on a formula for accommodation, peace cannot endure without grassroots backing. In Northern Ireland, the 1985 Anglo-Irish power-sharing agreement was reached without the inclusion of local Ulster, unionist, Protestant involvement; this constituency perceived the agreement, negotiated by the United Kingdom on its behalf, as a step toward a unified Ireland. As Rose (1990: 148) has suggested, "exclusion from the deliberations was regarded as part of a deliberate British plan to 'sell out' the Protestant majority." Moreover, George Tsebelis (1990 b) suggests that consociational institutions may provide incentives for politicians to foment conflict along group lines in order to bolster their own bargaining position vis-à-vis other groups at the political center—what he terms "elite-initiated conflict."

In a similar vein, Steven Burg is critical of consociationalism as the "ultimate form of elite manipulation and control," reducing the accountability of political leaders to their communities. He writes:

There is mounting evidence that consociational arrangements (power sharing and mutual veto) encourage elites to rule in opposition to mass beliefs. Why did Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia fall apart? It was not because of . . . interethnic hatreds at the mass level. It was because of elite mobilization of latent nationalisms, and because the structural characteristics of each system included power sharing and mutual veto, enabling [for example] the Slovene regional leadership and the Slovak regional leadership to paralyze their respective federal governments. . . . The mass electorates did not want their respective countries to break up until elites had pushed these conflicts beyond the point of no return.¹⁰

Critics also assert that consociationalism serves to maintain, legitimize, and strengthen segmental claims against the state, reinforcing and entrenching ethnicity in the political system. By "freezing" group boundaries in the political system, for example through statutory reservation of offices for specific group representatives, a consociational power-sharing system is said to be an undynamic model for conflict management (Barry 1975). Providing structural guarantees for communities, for example through a minority veto, can provide systemic incentives for maintaining the rigidity of the segments. Finally, consociational institutions are arguably antidemocratic because they can stifle vigorous opposition politics. For example, the absence of an opposition party in a grand coalition may detract from the accountability of the government. For example, Marc Chernick (1991) suggests that the exclusive nature of Colombia's "National Front" government between 1958 and 1974 led to the emergence of insurgent groups in subsequent years.

In response to these criticisms, Lijphart refers to the consociational arrangement not as an institutional blueprint, but as a set of principles to which certain institutions—such as a proportional representation electoral system—are naturally suited. For example, he replies to the charge that consociationalism can "freeze" or rigidify segments by arguing that the PR electoral system allows the segments to "define themselves." While the institutions of consociational decision making vary, its advocates argue, the principles are rediscovered time and time again as societies seek solutions to the existence of intense ethnic politics and methods to harness ethnicity for constructive purposes.¹¹

THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH

In contrast with the consociational model, Horowitz (1985: 597-600) proposes a typology of five mechanisms aimed at reducing ethnic conflict: dispersions of power, often territorial, which "proliferate points of power so as to take the heat off of a single focal point"; devolution of power and reservation of offices on an ethnic basis in an effort to foster intraethnic competition at the local level; inducements for interethnic cooperation, such as electoral laws that effectively promote pre-election electoral coalitions through vote pooling; policies to encourage alternative social alignments, such as social class or territory, by placing political emphasis on crosscutting cleavages; and reducing disparities between groups through managed distribution of resources.

Horowitz's prescriptions for conflict-regulating institutions for divided societies overlap those of Lijphart in certain respects: both advocate federalism, for example, and assert the importance of proportionality and ethnic balance. Yet Horowitz is an indefatigable critic of the consociational

model for two important reasons (1985: 568-76; 1991: 137-45). First, he argues, is the problem of "elite-initiated conflict" that Tsebelis and Burg also identify. "There is no reason to think automatically," Horowitz writes, "that elites will use their leadership position to reduce rather than pursue conflict" (1991: 141). Consociationalism overestimates deference by communal groups to their leaders and underestimates the power and role of popular dissatisfaction with intergroup compromise.

Second, consociational institutions rely on constraints against immoderate politics, such as the mutual or minority veto, as opposed to incentives for moderation (1991: 154-60). Horowitz argues that political institutions should encourage or induce integration across communal divides. For effective democratic governance in a divided society, moderates must be rewarded, extremists sanctioned. The aim is to engineer a centripetal spin to the political system by providing electoral incentives for broad-based moderation by political leaders and disincentives for extremist outbidding (1985: 601-52). This differentiates Horowitz's prescriptions from those of consociationalism in two important respects.

First, the key to any successful democratic political system in divided societies is to provide demonstrable incentives for politicians to appeal beyond their own communal segments for support. The only assumption is this: politicians will do whatever they need to do to get elected; they are rational electoral actors (Horowitz 1991: 261). When politicians are rewarded electorally for moderation, they will temper their rhetoric and actions. Given this premise, the political system can be engineered essentially to encourage intergroup cooperation as a prerequisite for electoral success. Horowitz contends that incentives are better than consociational constraints (like the mutual veto) because they offer reasons for politicians and divided groups to behave moderately, rather than obstacles aimed at preventing them from pursuing hegemonic, defeat-the-other aims.

The second difference is a concern with constituency-based moderation rather than reliance on political leaders as the engines of moderation. The solution is to design the electoral system so that leaders must appeal to underlying moderate sentiments in the electorate and shun the forces of extremism in order to win elections. Office-seekers, by appealing to the most moderate sentiments of the electorate, maximize moderation at both the elite and popular levels. Looking for the basis of consent at the constituency level allows politicians to make the kinds of compromises they must make at the center if the divided society is to be truly democratic and stable. The key to constituency-based moderation is the electoral system. To safeguard minority interests, according to Horowitz, the system should make the votes of minority members count. Minorities should have more than representation, they should have influence. What institutions and practices are argued to have these effects?

Federalism

Dramatic devolution of power can serve four important purposes in divided societies, according to Horowitz (1985: 601). First, it can combine with the electoral system to encourage the party proliferation that is conducive to intersegmental compromise and coalition building. Second, politics at the regional and local levels can serve as training grounds for politics at the center: political leaders can form intergroup ties at the constituency level before they contest higher-

stakes issues at the level of central government. Third, federalism disperses conflict at the center by resolving some issues at subtler levels, and may in communally homogeneous federal states promote cleavages within groups. Finally, it creates difficulties for any parties hoping to get a hegemonic grip on the entire country; capturing all of the provincial states would be a difficult task. For example, the adoption of federalism at the time of democratization in Spain is an instructive example of successful ethnic conflict management through devolution (Horowitz 1985: 623; Share 1986). "Federalism can either exacerbate or mitigate ethnic conflict," he writes, ". . . much depends on the number of components, the number of states, boundaries, and the ethnic composition" (Horowitz 1985: 603).

Vote Pooling

To Horowitz, divided societies need electoral systems that fragment support of one or more ethnic groups, especially ethnic majorities; induce interethnic bargaining; encourage the formation of multiethnic coalitions; produce fluidity and a multipolar balance; and produce proportional outcomes. Three types of electoral systems can achieve these aims: a subsequent preference voting system (preferably among such systems, alternative voting or AV); mixed lists with a common voters roll; and single-member districts in multiethnic constituencies. In each instance, the purpose is to promote vote pooling by candidates or parties across ethnic lines. Although electoral systems and conflict management will be more thoroughly discussed below, a brief introduction here will highlight the differences between the consociational and integrative approaches.

Why are electoral systems that provide for vote pooling superior for divided societies, in Horowitz's view? The logic is this: in order to win, politicians must seek to obtain the second- or third-preference votes of those who would not ordinarily vote for them (presumably because they do not represent the voter's community). In order to gain second- or third-preference votes, leaders must behave moderately toward other communal groups. Outbidding on ethnic themes will inevitably occur, Horowitz agrees, but so too will moderation. In response to the incentive structure of the electoral system, most politicians will vie to appear the most moderate—they will compete with one another to define and occupy the political center. Centripetal forces will override centrifugal ones. The critical difference between the consociational approach to electoral systems and Horowitz's is thus the formation of electoral coalitions by constituents as they specify their second or third preferences beyond their own narrow group interests. Horowitz cites the system established by the Sri Lankan constitution of 1978, and the electoral politics of the Indian state of Kerala, where four major ethnic blocs share power in a fluid system of changing coalitions and alliances, as examples of successful interethnic vote pooling (1993).

A Presidential System

A presidency, argues Horowitz, if elected directly on the basis of a super-majority distributional formula or a subsequent preference voting method, is a less exclusive institution than parliamentarism. Presidentialism is argued to have two important advantages in divided societies. First, if a president is elected with an electoral system that requires broadly distributed support, an executive who has the broadest possible national appeal can be elected. A strong, statesmanlike, moderate president—forced to appeal to the least common denominator of electoral

sentiments-can serve a unifying, nation-building role (Horowitz, 1990b). Second, a strong executive would be able to push legislation through a divided parliament. If strong but benevolent leadership is required, to make tough economic decisions or redress historical injustices, for example, a strong president is desirable. An example of such a presidential system, according to Horowitz, is Nigeria's (1985: 636).

Horowitz's broad approach to ethnic conflict management-"the political incentive structure is one package," he writes (1985: 651)-has also encountered criticism, considered here, as have the specific conflict-regulating practices (considered below). There are four interrelated concerns: a paucity of empirical examples of the system at work; the questionable assumptions that politicians will respond to the incentive system for moderation if it exists, and that voters will be willing to vote for parties not based in their own group; and the contention that the electoral systems Horowitz advocates are essentially majoritarian in nature. Like criticisms of consociationalism, these concerns go beyond simple conflict-regulating mechanisms and are rooted in basic beliefs about the fluidity and malleability of ethnic identity and representation.

At the heart of the difference between consociational and integrative approaches to power sharing are the nature and formation of multiethnic coalitions. In the consociational approach, coalitions are formed after an election by elites who realize that exclusive decision making will make the society ungovernable or who are compelled to do so by prior constitutional arrangements that are based on the same reasoning. In an integrative power-sharing system, coalitions are formed prior to an election-either as a coalition of parties in pre-election pacts (vote pooling) or by a party with a broad multiethnic candidate slate. Consociational arrangements formed after elections, Horowitz contends, are fragile and tenuous "coalitions of convenience" as opposed to firm and enduring "coalitions of commitment" (1985: 365-95).

POWER-SHARING PRACTICES

A central argument of this paper is that in the above-outlined debate, neither approach can be said to be the best in all circumstances. Rather, the two approaches should be seen in contingent terms, and in terms of a spectrum of options from the most consociational to the most integrative. The appropriate question is: Under what conditions is the consociational approach likely to mitigate conflict, and under what conditions is an integrative approach likely to produce success? The challenge is not to develop a singular model of conflict-regulating practices, but rather a menu of conflict-regulating practices from which policymakers can choose and adapt to the intricacies and challenges of successfully regulating any given ethnic conflict.

Eric Nordlinger's seminal 1972 study, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, identified six political methods and practices, the presence of which account for successful conflict regulation in societies with deep ethnic fissures: stable governing coalitions, the principle of proportionality, mutual veto, purposive depoliticization, compromises on key issues, and concessions by conflict groups. These practices generally reflect the consociational vein of thinking about democracy in divided societies, relying principally on elite accommodation, popular deference to elites, group solidarity, and legitimate group representation. Given recent experiences with power sharing, both successful and unsuccessful, and criticisms lodged against consociational and integrative approaches, it is possible to refine, build upon, and expand

Nordlinger's typology to encompass an amended and enlarged typology of conflict-regulating practices, including integrative practices. It is useful to consider power-sharing practices in terms of three sets of variables that apply to both approaches: territorial divisions of power, decision rules, and defining state/ethnic relations. The first two deal with constitutional structure, whereas the third relates to public policies.

Territorial Divisions of Power

When the territorial dimensions of ethnicity are strong, practices that configure the territorial division of power are exceptionally important. The range of options within these types of practices is between partition (separation) and a centralized unitary state (the ultimate form of sharing), with a variety of options such as con-federal, federal, and semi-confederal systems in between. It is widely agreed that the territorial division of power can serve a variety of purposes beyond simple devolution, including providing economic mechanisms for affecting the distribution of resources and political mechanisms for reducing the stakes of conflict at the center.

Among the variety of methods for dividing territory, federalism is the most extensively analyzed for its potential conflict-regulating effects. Federalism, it should be noted, can be structured for either con-sociational or integrative purposes. Indeed, the opportunities for innovation are so extensive that federalism can be structured to serve both ends within a given state. In multiethnic societies, the test of federalism is the degree to which territorial units coincide with or are parallel with communal boundaries.¹² By promoting intra-ethnic conflict within each sub-national territorial unit, federalism can potentially create incentives for interethnic cooperation, encourage alignments along non-ethnic interests, and be fiscally structured to level socioeconomic disparities. Devolution of power can give minorities some degree of power when it is unlikely that they would ever achieve majority status at the center.¹³

Federalism implies a division of power based on mutual consent. The national or central government is bestowed with a defined area of authority and the territorial units are provided degrees of autonomy, with both tiers of government enjoying some limited coordinated powers—what the Europeans call "competences."¹⁴ The hallmark of federalism is that neither the center nor the regions can amend the arrangement without mutual consent (Wheare 1964: xviii). It is through federal structures that the principle of unity through diversity, an essential norm of democracy in divided societies, can best be realized; this is especially true with respect to the protection of minorities through a panoply of options such as grants of autonomy, indigenous rights and semi-sovereign ancestral lands, and recognition of limited territorial self-determination (Hannum 1990).

Like other power-sharing practices, federalism is highly flexible. As new territorial units are created, so too are opportunities for innovative practice. Six of India's states, for example, have adopted the use of ombudsmen; many have complex language policies to meet local ethnic demands. It is for this reason that federalism offers innumerable opportunities for addressing the absolute complexity of ethnic demands in deeply divided societies within a democratic framework. For complex multiethnic states in the developing world, as Richard Sklar (1987: 698) writes, "federalist futures are democratic images."

Decision-Making Rules

The crux of decision making within a democracy is the threshold of consensus required for some members of the society to take decisions that apply to all members of society (Rae 1969). Thus, practices that establish decision-making rules for executive and legislative decisions by elites, and decision-making rules for the selection of representatives (the electoral system) by the electorate, are critical. Options range from minimum winning decision-rules (for example, a plurality) to complete consensus.

There is a long-standing debate between advocates of parliamentary government and advocates of presidential executives as to which system is more inherently stable and inclusive.¹⁵ In a typical parliamentary system, the executive is drawn from the ranks of parliament and ultimately dependent on its members for its continued governance. The leader of the largest party in the parliament serves as prime minister and the cabinet is drawn from the majority party or parties in the case of coalition governments. In grand coalitions, sometimes known as governments of national unity or a "national front," all significant political parties are represented in a ruling coalition and participate in executive decision making. Cabinet posts are doled out carefully and with an eye toward a balance of power commensurate with each party's electoral strength, creating a plural executive. Decisions are made by consensus, with each segment exercising a mutual veto.

Parliamentary structures are attractive options for divided societies because they may be structured to facilitate the inclusion of many groups, including minorities, at the highest levels of government, for instance in a broadly representative cabinet. Juan Linz (1990: 52) argues that parliamentary systems "are more conducive to stable democracy" than presidential systems and that this "applies especially to nations with deep political cleavages and numerous political parties." Parliamentarism, he contends, allows for many shades of possible political outcomes. When parliamentarism is combined with a variable term (the government can be forced to resign when majority parliamentary support is withdrawn), it is, in sum, a highly flexible arrangement. Presidential systems-with executive branch authority highly centralized in one individual, usually but not always directly elected-are by definition more exclusive than parliamentary systems, particularly if the president is unambiguously identifiable as a member of any one community or interest.

The problem with a parliamentary-chosen executive, according to Horowitz (1990b: 73-9), is that in typical parliamentary systems whichever party or coalition of parties has a bare majority in the legislature can choose an executive without regard to the preferences of the minority; parliamentary-chosen executives can fall in the winner-take-all, government-versus-opposition pattern of politics which serves to further divide an already divided society. A minimum winning coalition usually forms the government. Instead, Horowitz believes that, combined with a strict separation of powers with the legislature, a separately elected presidency can proliferate points of power at the center, allowing some parties to win sometimes, and others to win at other times. Dispersing power in a political system through a system of checks, balances, and divided responsibility serves to lower the stakes of control for any particular institution or office (the separation of powers doctrine). If the stakes are very high for any particular office or number of seats, conflict between winners and losers will rise commensurately.

For Horowitz, given conditions in divided societies, a nationally elected president with exceptionally broad support is more likely to have conflict-reducing effects than its parliamentary counterpart.¹⁶ A presidential system can be constructed so as to ensure that, in order to be elected, candidates present themselves as conciliatory broad-based leaders.¹⁷

A broad-minded individual fairly pursuing aims of national integration can serve a symbolically important conflict-reducing role. South Africa's Nelson Mandela, with broad public support and an ethos of national reconciliation and moderation, is Horowitz's ideal president-in essence, standing above the ethnic fray. Although South Africa technically has a parliamentary system (the president is indirectly elected and the system essentially allows for the majority party in parliament to elect its candidate president), Mandela's behavior as a president is exemplary of the type of role a president can play.

Broad-based executives are more easily created if the principle of proportionality is operational. Perhaps the best-known example of proportional appointments in the executive was the Lebanese National Pact of 1943, which mandated top posts for representatives of the Christian (Maronite), Druze, Shi'a, Sunni, and other communities. Seats may also be reserved in legislatures. In Indonesia, Chinese, Europeans, and Arabs are awarded nine, six, and three seats in parliament, respectively, if as many are not duly elected.¹⁸ For the first ten years of post independence Zimbabwe, 20 of the 100 seats in parliament were reserved for whites, even though they constituted 3 percent of the country's population. Nigeria's 1989 constitution stipulates that if the president comes from the North, the majority party leader must come from the South; Tanzania has similar arrangements. Like many of the conflict-regulating practices, proportional appointments can be handled informally.

Problems with proportional communal representation arise when the structure is inflexible to demographic changes in the underlying population. At least one factor in the collapse in 1975 of the Lebanese National Pact of 1943 was the demographic shift as the Christian majority population became a minority. The deterioration of Lebanon into one of the world's intractable civil wars between 1976 and 1990 attests to the dangers of such rigidity.¹⁹ Whether the National Pact can be labeled a success (for mediating conflict for more than 30 years), or a failure (because it degenerated into civil war) is an open question. In many ways it was both.²⁰

Electoral Systems

An appropriate electoral system in a multiethnic society is possibly the most important mechanism through which parties in conflict can adopt a democratic conflict-regulating practice. This is true because, as Giovanni Sartori has written, electoral systems are "the most specific manipulative element of politics" (1968: 273).²¹ The debate over which electoral system is best is complicated by the fact that electoral system design can be a very technical matter, and the outcomes that flow from a specific choice are highly dependent on unknowns such as the spatial distribution of votes, shifting party alignments and interparty pacts, voting behavior, ballot design, and myriad other variables.²² Finally, electoral system choices inevitably involve trade-offs among values such as legitimacy, simplicity, accountability, and proportionality.

For multiethnic societies, the central issue is whether a majoritarian system (or the less demanding plurality systems) are best or some type of proportional representation (PR) system is best. Underlying the debate is the clear understanding that electoral system choice, over time, has a strong effect on the type of party system that emerges (Lijphart 1994a); plurality and majoritarian systems tend to produce two-party systems, whereas PR usually leads to a fragmented multiparty system (Duverger 1964). It is in this regard that the policy-relevant differences between the consociational and integrative approaches to power sharing are most acute.

Advocates of consociationalism are strong believers in simple systems of PR that allow all parties, presumably but not necessarily ethnically based, representation in government commensurate with their share of the electorate. PR is not a single system but instead a broad set of electoral systems that seek to minimize differences between votes and seats in parliamentary elections (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 24-5).²³ By directly translating the number of votes won to the proportion of seats, PR systems may be more suited to providing incentives for inclusion of minority parties (Dahl 1989: 156-62).²⁴

Opting for PR incurs the risk that the system may in fact provide incentives for social fragmentation. While PR may produce proportionality and allow for the politics of ethnic inclusion, the prospect of at least some presence in parliament (and of a parliamentary salary) can make it attractive for politicians to factionalize into narrowly based, exclusive parties, a phenomenon that Sartori has termed "polarized pluralism."²⁵ The proliferation of parties during the continually troubled Weimar Republic led postwar constitutional designers in Germany to adopt a threshold for representation (5%), a now-common practice in PR systems. In circumstances of fragile minimum winning coalitions, such as in Israel, small parties can force onto the agenda narrow interests or highly volatile ethnic issues by threatening to withdraw from majority coalitions.

Horowitz, on the other hand, sees advantages to PR under certain specific conditions (1985: 628-653), but the purposes of electoral system design are different from those proposed by Lijphart. In addition to achieving proportionality and reducing disproportionate vote-to-seat ratios, Horowitz suggests that the effects of the electoral system should also be to fragment support for ethnic parties; induce an ethnic group, particularly a majority group, to behave moderately; preserve fluidity and multipolar balance to prevent exclusion; and, most importantly, encourage pre-election coalitions of parties across ethnic cleavages or, if possible, the creation of broad multiethnic parties (1985: 632).

Although Horowitz agrees that list PR can be structured to meet these goals, he identifies problems with simple list system PR, namely the strong role played by "party bosses" and lack of a constituency link by representatives; a lack of accountability; the potential incentives contained in the system for the proliferation of ethnic parties and ethnic outbidding; and the lack of incentives for cross-group integration. He and other integrationists (e.g., Lardeyret 1991) argue that the electoral system should root accommodation across group lines at both elite and popular levels in society and should seek to integrate groups into large multiethnic parties. On the other hand, large multiethnic parties are criticized for being a mask for ethnic dominance, in which the

votes of some minorities are taken for granted given the electorate's choices (for example, black votes for the Democratic Party in the United States).

To meet the integrative aims he sets out, Horowitz favors vote pooling as a mechanism for inducing moderation; vote-pooling systems provide opportunity for voters to cast not only their first preference votes, but subsequent preference votes as well. In providing examples of vote pooling, Horowitz favorably cites (1985; 1991) the alternative vote (AV, where parties can agree to pool votes) or the single transferable vote (STV, where candidates can make vote-pooling agreements); second- and third-preference votes can be transferred among candidates or parties in a complex computation that produces overall winners.²⁶ The major precondition for a successful vote-pooling framework is sufficient party proliferation, large heterogeneous constituencies, and conditions that make vote pooling profitable: that is, when moderation by political leaders causes them to gain more second- and third-preference votes than the first-preference votes, they lose by appearing "soft" on communal interests.²⁷

Neither Nigeria nor Sri Lanka, the principal cases that Horowitz relies on to make the argument for the salutary effects of vote pooling, have had their electoral systems fully tested, and other examples such as Kerala (in India) are of limited comparative value given the idiosyncratic context of regional politics within overall national politics in India. Nevertheless, these examples do show that innovative solutions are conceivable to create an electoral system that provides incentives for intergroup moderation. Crawford Young writes that "In Malaysia, the semi-consociational management of racial divisions has probably been facilitated by the operation of the plurality system which in this setting provided incentives for cooperation within the Malay-dominated ruling alliances, whose electoral majority is magnified by the Westminster model" (1994: 12).²⁸

The problem, of course, is the difficulty of winning support across group boundaries in situations of deep intergroup conflict. Nordlinger anticipates the problem when he writes that "even if party leaders were to mitigate their positions on the less salient issues, members of the opposing conflict group are not likely to change their party attachments on the basis of a secondary issue" (1972: 102). Horowitz notes that the only assumption to the successful operation of a vote-pooling framework "is that voters will vote for candidates other than those of their own group if advised to do so by leaders of the ethnic party they support (and usually only for second preferences). There is abundant evidence from Malaysia that they do this regularly, and it does not depend on the malleability of ethnic identity or even a softening of conflict."²⁹ In situations where the population is highly illiterate or innumerate, however, these systems may simply be too complicated, especially when severe conflict places a premium on clearly legitimate and simply understood election results.

Electoral systems are highly flexible and can be pieced together in many ways to be appropriate for specific conditions. For example, given large heterogeneous electoral districts, it may be possible to create a simple PR list system that gives parties incentives to put up multiethnic slates—an integrative practice—to maximize support. When large multimember constituencies are ethnically diverse and no single group dominates, a party seeking to maximize its vote share would want to appeal as broadly as possible and to moderate on ethnic themes during an election campaign. In this manner, list PR can achieve integrative aims by providing incentives for

coalitions of different variations within a single party, as was the case with the choice for PR in South Africa's first all-race elections (Sisk 1995a). In a subsequent analysis of the April 1994 vote in South Africa, I suggest that parties did in fact respond to the incentives embedded in the electoral system to moderate their campaign rhetoric. Moreover, the top two vote-getters (the ANC and the National Party) deliberately structured their candidate lists to appear racially inclusive (Sisk 1995b).

Thus, PR was a seemingly appropriate choice for this transitional or "founding" election, and may be a good choice for other elections that culminate a negotiated transition from deep conflict. Yet the South African system will likely be changed because large multimember district PR systems arguably lack accountability. For that reason, it is likely that South Africa will adopt a hybrid system, similar to Germany's combination of national PR plus majoritarian single-member districts, a system which has contributed to stable electoral outcomes in the postwar era in that country (Kaase 1986). In the current deliberations over a more permanent electoral system for South Africa, there is a keen awareness that the system should try to maximize the values of proportionality, incentives for moderation, and representivity and accountability.

Public Policies

Practices that define relationships between ethnic groups and the state are an essential dimension of power-sharing practices. At one end of a spectrum are practices that do not identify or name specific groups or specify group rights or preferences in ethnic terms; on the other are those that enumerate, recognize, and confer special rights or preferences to distinct ethnic groups. Economic policies, the allocation of public funds, education and language policy, the delineation of rights and duties (especially whether group rights are entrenched and, if so, their formulations), citizenship, and procedures to administer justice all are critical components of successful ethnic conflict management.

Crawford Young, in summarizing the findings of a United Nations Research Institute for Social Development study of public policies in ethnically diverse societies, writes:

Few if any state policies will be absolutely neutral in their distributive effects among ethnic groups. What matters, then, is whether the ethnic distributive effect is widely perceived as a product of deliberate bias towards those groups with favored access to the state, and whether offsetting or compensating policies are undertaken to redress imbalance created by a given policy (Young 1992: 21).

Thus, conflict-regulating practices in divided societies have a significant "political economy" component.³⁰ If a source of ethnic conflict is the mal distribution of resources, what sorts of practices can lead to the appropriate redistribution of wealth or income? Kenneth McRae (1974) refers to a host of options as "fiscal equalization devices"; that is, measures that promote the equitable distribution of society's resources. Such practices might include directed public policies, labor market policies, and differential access to certain resources. But, as Esman (1994: 239) notes, "excursion into economic variables demonstrates how difficult it is to explain or predict the effects of economic trends on ethnic-based conflict."

When ethnic groups have been historically disadvantaged or discriminated against, provisions have often been included—for example, in the United States, Sri Lanka, South Africa, India, or Pakistan—to acknowledge problems of discriminatory inequality. Often constitutional provisions do not spell out with specificity the public policy strategies to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination or comparative inequality, but make the important symbolic statement professing it the aim of the polity to seek redistribution as a goal. Enshrining the objective of encouraging the uplifting of those who may be disadvantaged can help chart the subsequent course of politics toward that end.

Often the answer to such vexing problems is not to specify their solution in constitutional terms, but to set up new institutions and procedures to which all groups can subscribe that address equalization measures in collaborative, problem-solving forums. South Africa's new land restitution commission and court, whose establishment has served to defuse and constructively channel tensions, is an example worth considering for replication in other conflicts in which land disputes are a central cause of continued hostilities.

One important practice often ignored by power-sharing theorists, or at least downplayed, is the role of human rights (particularly the careful balancing of individual and group rights) and the role of judicial institutions in ethnic conflict mitigation. This is understandable because courts are weak in most developing states. Group rights, providing for multiple official languages, own-language education, special statutory protection for named groups, access to broadcast and media, and special religious practices and customs are legal protections that may give groups comfort that their cultural identity is secure within a multiethnic framework. The self-management of community institutions and associations, or non-territorial self-determination (sometimes known as "corporate," as opposed to territorial, federalism), may be a sufficiently reassuring practice that groups will not seek other types of privileges or special representation.

A critical issue in divided societies is the careful balancing of individual and group rights and their adjudication. The protection of individual rights—and increasingly the protection of minority group rights—has traditionally been perceived as the telos of modern constitutionalism: the principle of *garantisme* (Sartori 1962: 85ff) against arbitrary rule. In multiethnic societies the issue has been whether there should be fully articulated rights to address minority group concerns. Such claims often take the form of demands for linguistic freedoms, particularly the right to education in one's mother tongue, rights to establish cultural and religious institutions or associations, protection against discrimination, and in some cases a right to self-determination. Some international law scholars assert strongly the case for further codification of minority rights; Hannum (1989: 19) writes: "The essential philosophical underpinnings of human rights include the right to be and to live in community with other members of one's own group."

TEN POWER-SHARING PRACTICES

From the discussion above, it is clear that any menu of power-sharing practices will be quite broad. Practices need to fit together into a grand puzzle that carefully meets a divided society's particular needs. With this in mind, however, it is possible to discern ten distinct practices that embody either a consociational or an integrative approach to power sharing. As mentioned

above, some practices can serve either consociational or integrative aims depending on how they are conceived and structured. Table 2 provides a summary.

Consociational Practices: Territorial Divisions of Power

1. Granting Autonomy and Creating Confederal Arrangements. Territorially concentrated ethnic groups, particularly minority groups, can be accommodated through grants of autonomy or joint decision-making via agreements reached between the rump government and the autonomous units over issues such as economic and foreign relations and regional commerce. A critical variable is the degree of economic interdependence, the structure of fiscal relations, and the balance of dependency.

2. Creating a Polycommunal Federation. Territorially concentrated ethnic groups can also be accommodated in a polycommunal federation, that is, through "ethnic federalism." Ethnic federations require more extensive interaction than confederations between central and regional governments, and the allocation of powers between them is invariably a difficult, and ongoing, balancing act. Management of the economy and the distribution of commonly held resources (e.g., water, mineral rights) are critically important. Other thorny issues in constructing ethnic federations are boundary delimitation; the structure of security; the containment of secessionist tendencies; relations between subunits and foreign governments and international organizations; disparities across region or state in the adjudication of law, language, and education policy; and perhaps most important-the status of minorities and majorities within any given region.

Table 2. Conflict-Regulating Practices

| | Consociational Approach | Integrative Approach |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| Territorial divisions of power | Granting autonomy and creating confederal arrangements. | Creating a polycommunal federation. Creating a mixed or noncommunal federal structure. Establishing a single inclusive unitary state. |
| Decision-making rules | Adopting proportional representation and consensus rules in executive, legislative, and administrative decision making. Adopting a highly proportional electoral system. | Adopting majoritarian but integrated executive, legislative, and administrative decision making. Adopting a semimajoritarian or semiproportional electoral system. |
| State/ethnic relations | Acknowledging group rights or corporate federalism. | Adopting "ethnicity-blind" public policies. |

Consociational Practices: Decision Rules

3. Adopting Proportional Representation and Consensus Rules in Executive, Legislative, and Administrative Decision Making. When all groups demand an influential role in decision making at various levels, proportional representation in the executive (through grand coalitions), legislative (through the minority veto), and administrative (through appointments) can serve conflict-mitigating aims. The principle underlying such practices is that of consensus decision making. Such practices work best when there are few clearly identifiable groups and where there has been a history of exclusion of disadvantaged groups. Problems may arise when consensus is impossible or difficult to achieve and any one group's leaders perceive it as advantageous to act as a "spoiler" (withdrawing from participation and violently opposing accommodating groups). The most critical question is whether positions are reserved on a predetermined group basis or whether positions are reserved on the basis of electoral outcomes.

4. Adopting a Highly Proportional Electoral System. PR electoral systems are useful for defining group boundaries where they are ambiguous or where an ethnic party competes against multiethnic parties. Moreover, these electoral systems (particularly list PR) can serve as the basis for determining the relative weight of various groups in terms of proportional representation in executive, legislative, and administrative arenas, especially when census data is inaccurate, suspicious, or absent. A critical issue is whether a simple PR system is expected to fragment the party system over time and what the implications of such fragmentation may be. A second issue is the appreciation that PR systems may not mitigate the effects of majority domination when the majority bloc is sufficiently cohesive.

Consociational Practices: State/Ethnic Relations

5. Acknowledging Group Rights or Corporate Federalism. By giving groups autonomy over issues that concern them most, such as language rights, state-financed own-language education, protection for cultural or religious activities, and access to customary law, ethnic groups can feel sufficiently protected to participate in a common polity without fear that their identity will be subsumed in the overarching national ethos. Group rights may also amount to group preferences, particularly for historically disadvantaged groups. When an ethnic group is not territorially concentrated, non territorial or corporate federalism can be introduced through the structure of group rights. However, group rights (and especially preferences) can be difficult to adjudicate and can precipitate demands by other groups which may be more difficult to accommodate and which may provoke a backlash by non preference groups. Group rights and principles of equality are in constant tension.

Integrative Practices: Territorial Divisions of Power

6. Creating a Mixed or Noncommunal Federal Structure. When groups are not territorially concentrated, or when the aim of federalism is to promote intra-group cleavages and foster alignments across groups, a mixed or polycommunal federal approach may serve conflict-mitigating aims. Mixed federations are appropriate when one or two ethnic groups are mobilized, aggrieved, and territorially concentrated, but where other groups are more integrated; those territorially concentrated groups can be given special status or recognition while preserving a

non ethnic hue for the remainder of the polity. Noncommunal federalism can be especially appropriate when groups are not territorially concentrated or where significant minority communities will reside in all of the subunits. Dangers occur in mixed federations when special status is conferred on one territory but not others, and in noncommunal federations when some groups strive for greater territorial autonomy and such autonomy is not forthcoming.

7. Establishing a Single Inclusive Unitary State. Under some situations, it may be best to avoid the territorial division of power and work at the central and local government level to develop conflict-regulating practices. In small states, states where economic integration is especially high, and where grants of autonomy will lead to violent secessionist attempts, it may be best to centralize power but equitably exercise it. Unitary states are useful when a well-integrated elite exists and when efficient decision making is a premium, for example to implement difficult structural adjustment economic policies.

Integrative Practices: Decision-Making Rules

8. Adopting Majoritarian but Integrated Executive, Legislative, and Administrative Decision Making. When political elites are integrated and when cleavages crosscut ethnic divisions, majoritarian decision making in the executive, legislative, and administrative fields is more efficient than reliance on consensus. Moreover, there are a host of integrative options that are more demanding than simple majority rule but less demanding than consensus. The use of special majorities on key issues in both cabinet and legislative institutions (for example, through innovative parliamentary rules) can serve this aim without reliance on grand coalitions or minority vetoes for named groups. Inclusive, legitimate, and authoritative arbiters of conflict such as broadly accepted commissions and judicial bodies are good examples of integrated administrative decision-making practices.

9. Adopting a Semimajoritarian or Semiproportional Electoral System. As a conflict-regulating practice, semimajoritarian electoral systems have traditionally been difficult to implement, but they nevertheless hold great promise. Electoral systems that are essentially majoritarian but that may, under certain conditions, have proportional effects (such as AV) or that are proportional but still have a majoritarian element (such as STV) advance conflict regulation by providing concrete incentives for candidate moderation across group lines. The principal problem with such systems is their complexity (either for voters or for understanding vote-to-seat formulae). However, sophisticated and complex electoral systems like AV or STV may be effectively used in elite decision making, such as parliamentary elections for prime ministers or presidents.

If semimajoritarian or semiproportional systems can facilitate vote pooling, their conflict-regulating effects can be realized. In some instances, when group mutual security is of less particular concern, plurality or simple majoritarian systems are expected to be the most integrative electoral system. It should also be kept in mind that majoritarian and proportional systems can be combined, such as Germany's double ballot system. Like PR, a critical issue is how the electoral system relates to the territorial division of power.

Integrative Practices: State/Ethnic Relations

10. Adopting "Ethnicity-Blind" Public Policies. When there is no particular pattern of historical inequality or no clear economic base to group mobilization, an "ethnicity-blind" public policy approach may serve integrative aims. By protecting the rights of a group through essentially individual rights (of association and nondiscrimination), group preferences can be avoided and the principle of equality can emerge as paramount. Practices such as adopting a lingua franca and eliminating ethnic traits in the overarching national identity are examples of such conflict-regulating practices.

ISSUES FOR POLICY

Policymakers considering power sharing as a potential solution to the problems of multiethnic societies deservedly ask straightforward questions about experiences with various forms of democratic practice in multiethnic societies. Under what conditions does power sharing work and under what conditions does it fail? Is elite power sharing antidemocratic? Under what conditions do power-sharing systems entrench group identities and collapse into violent conflict, and when do they lead over time to more integrative and majoritarian patterns of democracy?

Naturally, there are no simple answers to these questions, but some conclusions can be drawn. A necessary condition for the mitigation of conflict in multiethnic societies is the existence, or creation, of a centrist core of moderates—both elites and more broadly in civil society—that adheres to rules and norms of pragmatic coexistence with other groups. The commitment to pragmatic coexistence must be broad (accepted by most disputants) and deep (accepted by political elites, their organizations, and constituencies in civil society).

When a sufficiently cohesive core of moderates does exist, power sharing is a viable means of democratic governance. Power sharing describes a wide variety of conflict-regulating practices, and each power-sharing system has its own peculiar characteristics. There is no single, transportable model of power sharing, but rather a broad menu of conflict-regulating practices, institutions, and mechanisms. Whether a consociational or integrative power-sharing approach is "best" is highly conditional on the structure and dynamics of a given society and is ultimately a matter for the society itself to decide.

However, conditional generalizations can be made about successful and unsuccessful power-sharing practices. Power sharing is successful in managing ethnic group tensions when:

- A core of moderate, integrated elites has a deeply imbued sense of interdependence and shared or common destiny, and when elites are genuinely representative of the groups and elements of civil society for whom they claim to speak.
- The practices adopted are flexible over time, sensitive to shifting demographics and to changing external and internal environments.
- The practices foster equitable resource distribution and manage change in a manner that does not create more new grievances than those attempting to be addressed.
- The practices are indigenously arrived at, and are not based on overwhelming external pressures or short-term, zero-sum expectations of the parties.

- Over time parties can eschew the extraordinary measures that power-sharing practices entail and move toward a more integrative and liberal form of democracy in which the predominant divisions in society, over which control of the state is contested, are not based on the politics of identity but instead on perhaps equally divisive, but inherently more manageable, differences such as ideology or class (Przeworski 1991 ; Diamond 1990).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. In other types of voting, governments do not countenance plebiscites or referenda on secessionist claims because of fear of the consequences of determining the popular will by simple majority rule. The government of India has not allowed the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions of 1947 promising a plebiscite on the territorial dispensation of Kashmir because of the likelihood that a majority of Muslims would opt for accession to Pakistan, or, more recently, for independence. The trigger of the onset of the war in Bosnia was the move in February 1992 by the predominantly Muslim and Croat government to hold a referendum on independence from former Yugoslavia, the outcome of which would have been determined by simple majority rule; the referendum was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs.

2. The absence of floating voters is a critical assumption for antimajoritarians, one that I will return to below in the section on integrative electoral systems. In defense of the assumption, Nordlinger writes:

Orthodox democratic theory, which presupposes alternating or shifting majorities, is certainly not applicable to divided societies. Given the conflict's intensity, individuals belonging to a particular segment or conflict group will be adamantly and emotionally attached to "their" political party or parties. And in this kind of electoral arena party leaders rarely seek to broaden their appeals in order to win the support of intractable individuals belonging to the opposing segment (1972: 34-5).

3. Vernon Bogdanor, writing in the *Basil Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions*, summarizes the scholarly consensus: "Where . . . the basic cleavage is ethnic, religious, territorial, or tribal, the plurality method will emphasize concentrations of support, and it will tend to emphasize territorial cleavages at the expense of socio-economic ones. Plurality and majority methods will work less successfully in deeply divided or plural societies than in homogenous ones" (1987: 195). This consensus is by no means unanimous, however, a point that I will return to below.

4. See Lijphart (1977: 25-8, 114-18) and Horowitz (1985: 629-30) for critiques of majoritarianism in deeply divided societies. Horowitz (1985: 333-64) provides a lengthy analysis of the acute problems of ethnic party systems.

5. The coalescent/adversarial distinction is Lijphart's (1977a: 25).

6. The literature on consociational democracy is well developed. While the groundbreaking work is Lijphart's, particularly his book *Democracy in Plural Societies* (1977a), many other scholars have contributed to the approach. First, consociationalism has its antecedents in the earlier work of Lijphart (1968), which termed the approach "the politics of accommodation." Landmark

works in the school include Daalder (1971), McRae (1974), and Pappalardo (1981). Several scholars, led by Jürg Steiner, have sought to extend the consociational approach to a broader framework of decision making in coalitions. See Steiner's articles (1981a; 1981b). Other scholars, such as Lembruch and Schmitter, have related consociational theory to the corporatist model, arguing that these approaches are complementary; their views are best stated in Lembruch and Schmitter (1979). Lijphart (1985) catalogs and responds to critics of the consociational approach.

7. Eric Nordlinger (1972: 73) goes so far as to argue that elites "alone can initiate, work out and implement conflict-regulating practices, therefore they alone can make direct and positive contributions to conflict-regulating outcomes."

8. Horowitz does not consider the Malaysian and Lebanese experiences to have been consociational, arguing that "neither was a grand coalition, neither had a proportional electoral system, and neither had a minority veto. In neither case did the ruling coalition ever represent the segments as such, only parts of the segments. In fact, none of the (only) four cases cited by Lijphart in his 1977 book as a consociational regime in a severely divided society was one." Personal communication with the author, 25 August 1995. For more on Horowitz's views on this issue, see his book, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985: 575-6).

9. Grand coalitions can occur either in the cabinet or parliamentary systems, in "grand councils," or as a grand coalition of a president and senior executives in presidential systems (Lijphart 1977b: 118).

10. Personal communication with the author, 30 August 1995.

11. For instance, despite the failure of power sharing in Cyprus in the early 1960s, power sharing appears to be the only solution to that conflict as evidenced by the substance of the UN secretary-general's 1992 "Set of Ideas" for Cyprus.

12. Boundary demarcation is inevitably a critical and sensitive issue in creating or amending federal systems. On criteria for determining "just" boundaries, see Walker and Stern (1993: 4).

13. An example is the conflict-mitigating effects that South Africa's choice for regionalism has had. In the 1994 election, the primarily white National Party, supported by a majority of the so-called "Colored" community (mulattoes), won a province, as did the primarily Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party.

14. For ten "yardsticks" to measure federal-subfederal relations, see Duchacek (1987: 188-276).

15. Lijphart does argue (1977a: 33) that types of presidentialism and consociationalism are compatible, although the type of decision-making structure he advocates (grand coalition, as above) is clearly different from the broad-based presidential model advocated by Horowitz.

16. Federal Republic of Nigeria, *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Promulgation Decree* (1989), Article 131 (1) (a).

17. The provisions of the 1979 and 1989 constitutions of Nigeria illustrate. In Nigeria's Second Republic (1979 constitution), election to the office of the presidency required the candidate to take due notice of the "federal character" of the state; in order to win, the candidate was required to garner a plurality of votes nationwide and at least 25 percent of the votes in 13 of Nigeria's then 19 states. In the Third Republic's constitution, promulgated by the Babangida military government (following a constitutional constituent assembly) in 1989, an even more stringent requirement was built into the constitution to require a "super majority" for election to the presidency: "He has to have not less than one-third of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the states in the Federation." In the event a single candidate does not meet this test in the first round of balloting, a runoff election is required. It was however, a dispute over the 1983 presidential election that contributed in part (another cause was corruption in the civil service) to the downfall of the Second Republic (1979-83).

18. For a thorough discussion of the communal proportional representation principle, see Duchacek (1987: 108ff).

19. See Samia (forthcoming) and Maila (1992) for a review of the terms of the Taif Agreement, the power-sharing arrangements agreed in the context of the experiences with earlier Lebanese efforts to manage confessional differences, and the implications for conflict resolution. Samia concludes that the agreement should not be considered a final statement of inter-group relations in Lebanon, but that "amending, reviewing, reconsidering, and rewriting some [of its key terms] to recreate balance and equity is a virtue."

20. It is significant that in the 1990 Lebanese constitution the formulas for representation were changed (seats in the National Assembly are allocated on a half-Moslem, half-Christian basis with future subgroup sectarian and regional representation) and that the 1989 Taif Accords that led to the new constitution stipulate that an electoral law is eventually to be designed which wholly removes inflexible guarantees for sectarian representation. Joseph Maila notes that the Taif Accord "recognizes that confessionalism is a regulating principle of political society by claiming that power cannot be legal if it contravenes the 'Pact of Co-existence' or the 'desire to live together' (*al aysh al-mushtarik*)" (1992: 17).

21. See Lijphart (1994: 139- 52) for the effects of political engineering on the degree of proportionality, the party system, and the nature of majority victory.

22. Moreover, formal theorists have shown that no single system is arguably the "fairest" because of the "paradox of voting"-with the same set of voter preferences, different systems yield different winners (Arrow 1963).

23. See the essays in Lijphart and Grofman (1986: especially parts 1 and 2) for a discussion of the varieties of PR and PR list systems.

24. The benefits of simple PR (and especially list-system PR in which parties offer candidate slates) include a more precise vote-to-seat ratio; the lack of "wasted votes"; the ability of ethnic groups to "define themselves" and to achieve representation by their own leaders in legislative and executive institutions (Lijphart 1990: 10); an immunity to gerrymandering (given

sufficiently high district magnitude); and the likelihood that over time fragmentation of the party system will result in coalition governments.

25. Examples of polarized pluralism include Italy (before recent changes in its electoral system) and Israel.

26. See Taagepera and Shugart (1989) for a thorough discussion of alternative preference voting systems. Lijphart (1991) counters that systems such as AV, particularly, are no better and sometimes worse than simple majoritarian electoral systems and that vote pooling can be achieved in many variants of list PR, primarily through the system of *apparentement* (in which parties can link their candidate lists).

27. The last condition is critical. If the constituencies are too divided-if there exists no sentiment for accommodation in the electorate-vote pooling cannot establish it.

28. Lijphart notes that "Malaysia has managed as a power-sharing system in spite of, not because of, the plurality system. Some form of PR would have been more straightforward." Personal communication with the author, 25 August 1995.

29. Personal communication with the author, 21 August 1995.

30. See Samarasinghe and Coughlan, *Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict* (1991).

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2 Conflict Prevention and Management: The Significance of Tatarstan's Experience

Mintimer Shaimiev

This is not the first time that we are cooperating with Carnegie Corporation, and I can say with confidence that the research and materials presented at these forums have a positive influence on those policymakers studying conflict resolution not only in Russia and the other CIS states, but throughout the world. We are grateful for this to Carnegie's leaders. They are diligently committed to their task and we hope to keep working with them in the future. Within the framework of the program "Hague Initiative," we have participated in two forums at The Hague and are willing to host a third one in Tatarstan, providing all the appropriate conditions.

Coming to the topic of today's forum, many different causes are invoked to explain the conflicts that broke out on the territory of the former Soviet Union: ethnicity, lack of rights, the legacy of totalitarianism, etc. All of these factors played some role in initiating conflict. But in my opinion,

as someone who has directly participated in all these political processes, especially the breakup of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Russian Federation, the main reason for conflict was the incompleteness and imperfection of the Union itself and of the state structure of the USSR.

In such a huge empire, for such a disciplined state, to put it mildly, where everything was centralized, not one Union republic or autonomous republic, let alone the oblasts and kraia, had any real rights. Everything was strictly done according to orders from the center and through strict central planning, down to the production of needles and thread.

When perestroika began in 1985, everyone, and first of all republics, began speaking about their rights. This should have been expected. Why? The international community had always spoken of human rights and of the rights of peoples to self-determination. These ideas fell on ripe soil. When the opportunity for realizing these rights opened up, all the ideas that had received lip service but not been realized in the Soviet Union came to the surface. Therefore, when Union Republics and autonomous republics adopted declarations of state sovereignty, I believe it was a natural process. This process was waiting for its historical moment, a time when democratic conditions would give nations a chance to express their wills. At that time the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) also was without rights, as one of the Union Republics within the USSR. It is not accidental that in the course of work on a new Union Treaty there was a tug-of-war between Boris Yeltsin and Ruslan Khasbulatov, then chair of the Supreme Soviet, about the rights of Russia within a renewed USSR.

Inevitably, when Russia made its demands with the hope that a renewed union would give it the rights it would enjoy in a federation, all the other Union Republics made their demands as well. Thereafter the autonomous republics also declared their rights because they were all equally without rights and could not avoid proclaiming them. That is why the declaration of sovereignty of the Russian Federation is absolutely lawful, as is the declaration of sovereignty of Tatarstan. Both the Union Republics and the autonomies appeared as states under the Soviet Constitution, though only decoratively, since they lacked real rights. And so these states said, since they are states, they need the rights to exercise their state functions. This was a lawful but very painful and complicated process.

For this reason I consider the primary cause of conflicts in the USSR to be neither ethnic nor national problems, but the lack of rights of Union and autonomous republics when they were subsumed under a tightly centralized system. The other factors-ethnic and nationalistic-of course were supporting conditions. Undoubtedly, parties, movements, and leaders appeared and searched for ideas with which to advance their cause, and extreme nationalist ideas were put forth. As a result, those that had made declarations of sovereignty were mistakenly accused of separatism. This is the way the active process of state-building began-in the successor states as well as in Russia.

Why was Tatarstan more vocal than the other autonomous republics during this process? Because the problem of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as huge republics was always there. The question arose after the Revolution of 1917 when the first constitution of the RSFSR was being adopted, and when subsequent constitutions were being considered it came up again. Because of their economic power and their history, they always aspired to become Union Republics. These

questions were always there. Many have now forgotten, but Tatarstan was even given a special status in the USSR state structure. The chairs of the Supreme Soviets of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan were always members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, along with those of the Union Republics; they were the only two autonomies so represented.

The history of the nation is another important factor. Tatarstan had a long history as a strong state, and had treaty-based equal relations with Russia starting from the tenth century until the battles between the Kazan khanate and Russia in the mid-sixteenth century. In the course of perestroika all of these issues came up in the national movements and among the population as a whole, and were advanced as political demands. In terms of industrial potential Tatarstan was equal to the three Baltic republics put together. It is impossible to ignore these considerations. When the population rose up, it demanded autonomy. Those who are in power, if they are real politicians, cannot fail to take into account popular demands in a republic or a region. The main thing is to know how to evaluate the processes occurring throughout the Soviet space and which processes began in Russia itself.

Unquestionably, the confrontation with Russian state authorities after the collapse of the USSR was based on a total misunderstanding. We never asserted in any official decision that Tatarstan wanted full independence: I always emphasized that Tatarstan demanded more rights and independent development, but without compromising the integrity of the Russian Federation. But at the time, it came off like a bomb. Voices were heard in Russia demanding that no additional rights be given to the autonomous republics, forgetting that just recently Russia had demanded the same rights from the USSR and played a major role in the breakup of the USSR. Perestroika processes could not just occur inside the Garden Ring in Moscow; they consumed the whole country.

When this misunderstanding occurred, we decided to hold a referendum, which is widely considered the highest expression of the democratic process. The world community has high respect for the will of the people. We held a referendum about the status of Tatarstan in accord with the declaration of Tatarstan's sovereignty that had been announced earlier.

But there we were even more misunderstood. We were accused of everything possible, to the point where on the eve of the referendum a brigade of procurators* headed by the general procurator of the Russian Federation was dispatched to every district in the republic to stop preparations for the referendum and keep the polls from opening. And on the eve of the referendum, Yeltsin was persuaded to appear on television to try to convince the people of Tatarstan not to take part in the referendum. After Yeltsin's performance I also appeared on the republic's television programs to say that only a referendum-the most democratic form-could communicate the wishes of the people. Yeltsin warned that if the referendum were held, interethnic conflict would break out in Tatarstan and war would result. I responded that only with a referendum could we find out the people's attitude toward creating a Tatar state, and only a referendum could create peace in the republic.

Despite the procurator's* prohibition, all 2,611 polls were open and the referendum proceeded peacefully. Sixty-two percent voted "yes" for the status of Tatarstan on the referendum.

The question was not about the secession of Tatarstan, but about building a federation on a treaty basis. The results of the referendum were the basis for preparing the new constitution of Tatarstan. We invited foreign experts-leading academics and lawyers-to take close part in the drafting of our constitution. And though the composition of our parliament was very difficult (there were two extreme opposition groups, federalists and nationalists), after long discussions and several nights, we passed the constitution of Tatarstan.

The main thing is that the basis of our constitution incorporated observance of human rights, and for this reason our fundamental law cannot be subjected to open criticism. One could not say that it contradicted the norms of international law. The constitution also established two official languages-Tatar and Russian-and provided for dual citizenship with Russia. The inclusion of these two points was decisive in stabilizing the political situation. You know why the conflict began in Moldova and other states, where those issues were not resolved earlier. We considered these problems ahead of time.

Boris Yeltsin and I were elected president on the same day, June 12, 1991. It is hard to describe what a strong influence the failure to resolve the situation in the republics had on the national election. We had two ballots-one for the president of Russia and one for the president of Tatarstan. Everything took place in the same polling stations and with the same people. Yet no candidate was chosen for president of the Russian Federation. The reason: failure to resolve the problem of national groups in Russia.

When the elections to the State Duma were scheduled, even though we followed all the right procedures, the election was not sustained in our republic. We had a turnout of only 13 percent, while the minimum turnout required for the election to be valid in a region is 25 percent. The people demanded that the status of Tatarstan be resolved before they went to vote. All of these events took place under absolutely peaceful circumstances. We followed a civilized democratic path and did not seek armed confrontation. We sought only to meet the demands of the people.

The same happened with the vote on the constitution of the Russian Federation. We made our own proposals for the drafting of the constitution, considering not only Tatarstan but also all republics in the Federation, and in consideration of what is needed for the development of democracy. Unfortunately, our suggestions were not included. After that, our delegation left the drafting process. We announced that this constitution was creating a unitary government. I can say even today that our republic did not accept the constitution, and we were not the only ones. Thirty subjects did not accept it, not because they did not want to, but because the demands of the subjects, and especially the republics, were not incorporated.

Today I believe that the constitution is more decoratively federal than real. If you carefully study it and start to live under it, it appears more like the constitution of a unitary state. I believe that if this constitution is not peacefully changed, it will always be internally strained.

I recently met with Yeltsin regarding the bilateral treaty with Tatarstan and have to admit that he was among the first to understand that if Tatarstan's demands for creating a democratic federation were not met, an open confrontation could result. For more than two years we worked on a bilateral treaty between the state bodies of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. We would

not sign the Federation Treaty back then, and neither did Chechnya, not because we did not want to sign but because the Federation Treaty was constructed from the top down. It did not meet the norms of a democratic federation. We said this up front: if we are going to create a federation under conditions of a civilized society, we have to do it from the bottom up. We stuck by this position and proposed a treaty for mutual delegation of powers. Today many trivialize this treaty. But the treaty is not only an agreement about division of powers, but also a mutual delegation of authority. It was very important to be able to satisfy all sides at the time. Ours was the first such treaty concluded, in 1994. This was the first agreement with a republic that did not sign the Federation Treaty in the form in which it was proposed to the subjects.

August 30, called "Republic Day," is the anniversary of Tatarstan's sovereignty declaration, which we celebrate every year. The whole population takes part, and it is the biggest holiday we have. On people's faces I can see how important it was to begin building federal relations this way. This is in the people's souls. In the end, we do everything to help people live well.

The treaty we signed is good not only for Tatarstan, we believe, but also for the Russian Federation. If there were no such treaty, it would be hard to say how Russia would be developing today, especially when we know about the imperial thinking so embedded in the consciousness of many. It could have either fallen apart like the mother empire, or become a unitary state.

A unitary state and democracy in Russia cannot coexist, because Russia is a multinational state. Hence Russia cannot have the same state structures as exist in other countries. It is a federal system, and today it is an asymmetrical federalism.

In my last meeting with Yeltsin, he diplomatically asked me when Tatarstan would make its constitution consistent with that of the Russian Federation. I did not deny the inconsistencies. I acknowledged that we have this problem because our constitutions really don't coincide, though we live together peacefully. In the treaty we recognized both constitutions, knowing they were not consistent. But we won time and this was very important in putting off critics from both sides. I responded that the Russian Federation's constitution is not perfect and suggested he take the initiative by changing the federal constitution, to bring it closer to a real federal constitution. There is no other option. Russia has already signed agreements with many subjects of the Federation. It is already a contractual federalism in practice, like it or not. If you make these changes, we will too, because this has to be a two-way street to gradually bring all the constitutions into line. This is a very long and complicated path, but if we understand one another, with time, the constitutions will come closer to one another. This is work for the future.

What worries me? This is a transitional period, and the center can live with an asymmetrical federalism and treaty-based relations. I do not consider myself a naive person, and I think that when the political and economic situation stabilizes, this question will arise in full force and we will move toward a symmetrical federation. Voices will arise calling for a democratic but uniform federalism. We have to be ready for this; it is a reality of life. Only politics that takes reality into consideration is real politics. But for this we need a well thought-out nationalities policy. Like it or not, we need a nationalities policy for Russia. A conception of a nationalities policy has been confirmed by the President but it is mostly to quiet the society and republics for the next year and a half or two. It cannot satisfy a multinational Russia.

We lived under a totalitarian regime in the USSR. Though everything was centralized and we had no rights, the Supreme Soviet was bicameral and there was a chamber for national groups. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation until recently was also bicameral with a nationalities chamber. Today neither the constitution, nor the representative organs in the Duma, nor the Federation Council can guarantee the rights of the nations of Russia.

In Russia there are many Russians. Tatars are the second most numerous group, and their interests also have to be taken into account. But there are only 5 million, not 100 million, Tatars. With their numbers, they cannot influence a single policy in the State Duma or the Federation Council. Even if every titular ethnic group were to vote together, that is still only 25 percent of the vote. Consequently, these peoples are deprived of the possibility of deciding issues that affect them. Those politicians who think this will pass are deeply mistaken. I will be among the first to raise this question, but the time is not yet appropriate. While the war in Chechnya continues, we must not abuse our influence. We have to do what is best for all nations. We have to help when Russia is having a difficult time. We must peacefully resolve these problems with respect for each nation.

We all now understand that building a democratic society is extremely difficult. It is easy to call for it, but building and leading it is a lot harder. But the choice has been made, and it is a historic one. This choice draws us toward civilization. We politicians have to be responsible, and understand from history what Russia consists of, and with this sense of reality peacefully strive to defend the rights of each nation. Only in this way can we build a democratic Russian Federation. The experience of Tatarstan can serve as an example in this process.

When we met at The Hague for the first time, there were representatives from Georgia and Abkhazia, Trans-Dniester and Moldova, and Crimea and Ukraine present. We discussed regulation of their relations. Even discussing this topic was difficult. War separates the opposing sides even further, making adoption of a peaceful solution even more difficult. That is why, no matter how difficult, all conflicts should be addressed through negotiations.

From the very beginning, I said that Chechnya cannot be solved by force. You can, of course, try to forcefully subjugate a nation, impose a totalitarian regime on it, especially since our people are used to this already. But we do not have the right to do this. That is why those involved in this conflict today must be ready to negotiate with anyone to find a peaceful solution. The memory of war in this nation will be passed on from one generation to the next. That is why I believe that we have to learn to find the peaceful path and negotiate with everyone involved in the conflict today, even though the war continues. If there is no suitable federal policy for all nations, it will not be a real democratic federation. We are learning this from bitter experience, but we are gaining experience and it shows us we have to extinguish this fire in Chechnya.

The main thing, in my view, for regulating and preventing conflicts in such a complex country as Russia in the long term is not to allow tension to accumulate, especially when economic reforms are proceeding with difficulty. Accomplishing political stability under conditions of an unstable economy is very hard. I believe we do not need to add additional difficulties.

DISCUSSION

Valery Tishkov: Efforts by myself and Pain and Mikhailov to create a legislative chamber to represent nationalities were not implemented. A few nights ago Mikhailov and I got together to discuss the remarkable proposals from Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. At first the project began from the top, but in the end it was with the agreement of the republics. That was the advantage of this version over the one in 1992 when I was chair of the nationalities ministry. Though I agree with you that it was not a permanent document, the general result is good.

Shaimiev: Were it not for Tishkov and Mikhailov, there would be no concept at all of a nationalities policy, or it would not be accepted by anybody. I also very highly value the contributions of Emil Pain and Vyacheslav Mikhailov on the Chechen conflict. Unfortunately, their efforts were never supported by those of other ministries. I say this as a member of the state commission for resolving the Chechen conflict. We always talked about this and stated our position clearly because there should not be "double politics" on such a complicated question, especially when we are involved with a nation that not for the first time is experiencing the consequences of central force. . . . But with regard to a nationalities policy, I said a year and a half or two years ago that without a change in the constitution, without the constitutionalization of rights of a multinational Russia, no nationalities conception will work. That is what we insisted on with you and Mikhailov, that for the time being we should proclaim in writing that we need at least a special chamber that would include representatives of the state apparatus and the public (*obshchestvennaya gosudarstvennaya palata*) on national questions. This is the first step. Then it has to be constitutionalized, but it cannot remain a public-governmental organization in that form only.

Georgi Shakhnazarov: You justly noted that there is no existing government institution that allows minorities to influence decisions affecting them. This is felt when treaties are being signed with all oblasts, and I support this move toward real federalism. But how do you view this? Should another organ be created or do we have to reform the whole institutional structure?

Shaimiev: I began to talk about this, about a conception of nationalities policy. We came to an agreement, and it was approved to create an *obshchestvennaya gosudarstvennaya palata*. If it will come into being, I think the President will use his decree power to give this chamber powers of legislative initiative when problems arise. But the mechanism for realizing the rights of nations in Russia must be developed. The constitution now says only one thing-it forbids secession. But the realization of rights of nations is not limited to this. Take one example: I get letters all the time asking how can we listen to music sung in the Tatar language? This is the demand of any nation. People cannot hear the language they were raised in. I propose that a powerful radio station be set up in Tatarstan so Tatars all over can listen to their language. But this issue is not being addressed. There are many such problems. There is a problem with schoolbooks: we need to supply schools with textbooks in the Tatar language. This is a problem not only for Tatarstan. Every person has a right to listen to music in the language he was brought up in, this is also part of human rights.

Unidentified questioner: Several times you spoke of the rights of nations, but treating a nation as a holder of rights is very difficult. Do you believe this, and will you continue so emphatically to work in that direction?

Shaimiev: The Tatar declaration of sovereignty was written in the name of the people (*naroda*) of Tatarstan, and we do not divide this people into ethnic groups. That is why there is such a thing as the rights of peoples. For example, take the processes under way now in Chechnya. Everyone forgot about the right to self-determination. They fear it like fire. But there was a time when that right widened and no one ever revoked it. Now the right to self-determination is counterpoised to individual rights. There is a real and theoretical opposition there. Yet, international organizations for the defense of rights of nations are silent. I think this is under the pressure of domestic concerns because each state has its own troubles and considers it best to be quiet. I can tell you that even when the USSR collapsed, those who declared full independence should have considered the international situation at the time; that the world community would not uphold this idea.

Unidentified questioner: What is your attitude toward the signing of bilateral treaties with kraia and oblasts?

Shaimiev: I have not discussed this until now, but I believe it was largely done to lessen the importance of the treaties signed with Tatarstan and other republics. This is a well thought-out policy. But at the same time, I am pleased that Russia is putting itself on the path to a real federalism. It is leaving behind the possible path of imperial development. On a political level, these have no analog to the treaty with Tatarstan, if you read the latter carefully. In the economic sphere, I always express support for equal rights for all subjects of the Federation. The rights are there, but they have to be realized. When someone does not know how to realize his rights, he starts to complain that others have more rights. However, to be realistic, all the regions will never be equal.

* The *prokuratura* (procurator) is a Russian legal office somewhat resembling that of attorney-general in the United States. ([Back](#))

Part Two

Power Sharing and the Experience of the Russian Federation

3. Power Sharing in the Russian Federation: The View from the Center and from the Republics

Leokadia Drobizheva

In the past ten years, the states of the former Soviet Union have produced a diverse array of ethno-political conflicts. After examining the conflicts that arose in the Russian Federation, this report will seek to compare Russian academics' explanations of ethnic conflict with models developed in other countries; to examine methods of conflict management in other countries with the view of applying this experience to the Soviet successor states (including considering whether there is anything peculiar to the requirements of conflict management in Russia); to consider the views of ethnic groups, the central administration, and the public on power sharing; to discuss what models of power sharing can ensure a balance of interests between the center and the republics while maintaining interethnic cooperation; to examine what lessons Russia could offer to conflict management elsewhere; and to consider the role that international organizations can play in mediating conflicts.

ZONES OF CONFLICT AND INTERETHNIC TENSION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Six wars already have occurred on the territory of the former Soviet Union: in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Trans-Dniester, South Ossetia, Tajikistan, and Chechnya. Close to 20 short-term armed clashes have taken place; the conflicts in Fergana (Uzbekistan) and Osh (Kyrgyzstan), the pogroms in Baku and Sumgait in Azerbaijan, and the Ossetian-Ingush conflicts are among the better known. In addition, there have been more than 100 nonviolent interstate, interethnic, interreligious, or interclan confrontations, most occurring in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus, and the North Caucasus.¹

Currently, war is being fought or unstable cease-fires are in place in Tajikistan, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the adjoining territories of western Azerbaijan which were captured by Karabakh troops. Sharp ethno-political strife continues in areas where military appeasement was achieved yet the initial causes of conflict were not resolved, as for example in Trans-Dniester, South Ossetia, the Prigorod region of North Ossetia, and Ingushetia. Strained ethnic relations which may yet turn violent exist in Kazakstan, Ukraine, South Siberia, and the Baltic states. In Russia, the most conflict-prone area is the North Caucasus, where more than three dozen ethnic groups reside. Military action has been under way in Chechnya since 1994, and tension remains in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia (the first region in Russia to burst into warfare, in 1992). Indeed, the possibility of ethnic conflict exists in all the Soviet successor states as they struggle over the redistribution of power in this new political space. Conflicts over power sharing have broken out throughout Russia, though only Chechnya has demanded outright secession.

CAUSES OF CONFLICT: INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CENTER AND OF THE PERIPHERY

Soviet explanations for ethnic conflict differed from contemporary Russian interpretations of these events. Communists considered ethnic conflict a result of "distortions of Lenin's nationality policy" and of deprivation caused by the "period of stagnation." The last Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was devoted to resolving the country's nationality problems, viewed them from this perspective. Opposition politicians and academics of democratic orientation viewed these conflicts as a product of the Soviet regime's discriminatory, totalitarian policies, and of deficiencies in its nationality policy and state structures.²

Explanations of ethnic conflict shifted once Russia became an independent state. Sergei Shakhrai, then minister of nationalities and regional policy, stressed that neither ethnicity nor the "tragic errors of the past" were the causes of conflict. The real driving force behind conflicts, according to Shakhrai, is the struggle over "redistribution of property," "redistribution of power," and organized crime.³ Valery Tishkov, an academic specialist in the study of conflicts and in 1992 the head of the State Committee on Nationalities, concluded that ethnic nationalism and conflict in Russia "is an issue of power-of the hedonistic desire of elite elements in society to possess it, of its relation to material gratification in terms of access to resources and privileges." Tishkov did not consider other sources of conflict, such as competition for work, as important explanations. The next best explanation, Tishkov claimed, comes from theories of collective action, which relate the behavior of large groups to psychological factors such as the loss of dignity.⁴

Meanwhile, politicians and analysts in the ethnic republics of the Russian Federation placed the causes of conflict elsewhere. They stressed the real "lack of rights of subjects of the Federation," and the "neglect of elementary political, legal, and moral norms."⁵ As Rafael Khakimov, advisor to Tatarstan president Mintimer Shaimiev, put it, "the center cannot understand that democracy for the people is meaningless without the guarantee of ethnic rights, which allows them to pursue progress in decolonization. Democracy cannot be based on force as the source of law, in which case democracy loses its legitimacy."⁶ Elites of Russia's ethnic republics, like the elites of the USSR's Union Republics, recall their repression under the totalitarian regime as a "colonial past."

Ethnic conflict in Russia and in the other republics of the former Soviet Union had several causes, and is the product of more than one historical epoch. Some conflicts are a result of Stalin's policy of deporting "untrustworthy" peoples. When these peoples return to their homelands (Ingush in the North Caucasus, Balkar in Kabardino-Balkaria, Crimean Tatars in Crimea), tension with new settlers is typical. Other conflicts resulted from the arbitrary redrawing of borders by the Soviet regime. Some ethnic territories were split apart, while others were arbitrarily joined together. A third cause of conflict is the uneven transition to a market economy. The growing economic inequality which has resulted from increased competition has launched searches for scapegoats-often a different ethnic group. Such was the case in Tuva in 1990 or Sakha-Yakutia.

Ethno-sociologists, including this author, instead attribute conflict to changes in the social structure of ethnic groups that began long before perestroika.⁷ By the end of the 1970s, more than half the professional cadre in half of the Union Republics and 11 of the 21 autonomous republics in Russia was composed of the titular ethnic group. The social mobility of ethnic groups was higher than for Russians. Two-thirds of the population of titular ethnic groups experienced social advancement in their own lifetime. Among the population of titular ethnic groups, value orientations were changing and expectations of social mobility were mounting. Meanwhile, Russians and Ukrainians began to fear the loss of their dominant position. The situation resembled that of the Québécois in Canada, or of the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium in the 1970s. Tension lay not just in competition for employment, but in a growing divergence of expectations and mutual evaluations. As soon as the hegemony of the Soviet state was broken,

ethno-national claims were openly declared in the political sphere and masses mobilized around them. This explanation was subsequently accepted by Tishkov.⁸

Any explanation of ethnic conflict that looks only at ruling elites, without taking into consideration the mood of their constituents, oversimplifies the situation and produces misleading prognoses for conflict resolution. This is not to deny the responsibility of leaders. We have seen numerous instances of leaders in the Soviet successor states attempting to inflame ethnic feelings when they were unable to cope with their region's economic degradation and felt their authority slipping under the criticism from opposition movements. In North Ossetia, for example, A. Galazov's once shaky authority was restored after he incited an armed struggle against the Ingush.

While leaders aim primarily at a redistribution of power, the conflicts that result differ in their scale, character, and primarily in their aims and content. In the Russian Federation, three types of conflict can be identified:

- Ethno-political conflict: The struggle of ethnic republics for sovereignty, statehood, and greater power.
- Territorial conflict: Reaction to the arbitrary drawing of borders under Soviet rule, which dismembered some ethnic territories while throwing together others. For example, Stalin's deportation of the Ingush was followed by their recent expulsion from the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia, which resulted in armed conflict between Ingush and Ossetians.
- Intergroup ethnic conflict: Conflict produced by competition in the labor and housing markets or in perceived obstacles in access to power for certain groups. In this category fall the clashes between Yakuts and Russians in 1986 in Sakha-Yakutia and Tuvinians and Russians in Tuva in 1990.

It is primarily in situations of ethnic conflict that power sharing becomes an important issue.

MAIN CONFLICT ZONES

The most acute ethno-political conflicts in Russia broke out between 1991 and 1993, when the republics of Chechnya and Tatarstan declared their independence. In 1990, Tatarstan became the trailblazer among Russia's ethnic republics that were striving for sovereignty. Tatarstan's quest to upgrade its administrative status began even before perestroika. In 1954 Tatarstan first petitioned the Central Committee of the CPSU to elevate its status to that of a Union Republic. The Committee eventually was to concede to Tatarstan's demands as part of the new Union Treaty, scheduled to be signed on August 19, 1991. The putsch on that date, however, meant that the treaty was never signed, and once Russia itself became independent following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the issue of Tatarstan's status lost its urgency.

Tatarstan continued to demand special status, however. This prompted similar claims by other republics, and throughout 1991 - 1994 this chain reaction threatened Russia with disintegration. Tatarstan boycotted the 1991 Russian presidential elections, the signing of the Federation Treaty in 1992, and the parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum of 1993 in order to demonstrate its independence from the Russian Federation. Tatarstan's constitution identifies the

republic as a "sovereign state, a subject of international law in voluntary association with the Russian Federation."

The conflicts over the status of members of the Federation occurred against the backdrop of a severe struggle at the national level between the president and the parliament. When in May 1993 meetings of republic heads resulted in ultimatums to President Yeltsin, his parliamentary opponents used these to accuse Yeltsin of impotence in preventing the disintegration of the state. In response, Yeltsin announced to republic heads that in accordance with the Federation Treaty, relations between republics and the federal government could be governed by bilateral agreements. At the time, it was most urgent to reach such agreements with those republics that had not signed the Federation Treaty: Chechnya, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan (which had signed the Treaty but with reservations). The subsequent constitution permitted the signing of such bilateral agreements, thus granting the process official legitimacy.

Aside from the above republics, constitutional conflicts also broke out in Sakha-Yakutia and in Tuva. Both republics have external borders. While Sakha is rich in natural resources, Tuva is poor and dependent on subsidies from the federal budget. Nevertheless, Tuva has geostrategic importance. Until 1944 Tuva was an independent state. It is the only republic within the Russian Federation that contains the right to secession in its constitution, in sharp contradiction of the federal constitution.

Chechnya is an acute zone of conflict. Its constitution states that the republic is a sovereign independent state, an equal member of the world community of nations, and not a subject of the Russian Federation. Military action has been under way in Chechnya since December 1994; hence the republic constitutes not only a case of institutional conflict over power sharing, but also an armed struggle. The Russian government is trying to turn it back into an institutional conflict through a return to peaceful negotiations.

Only in Chechnya is secession the main point of contention. Elsewhere, the issue is redistribution of power. The constitutions of Tatarstan, Sakha-Yakutia, and Tuva proclaim the dominance of republic laws over the laws of the Russian Federation, the right of these republics to ownership of the natural resources on their territory, and their right to design and implement their own internal and foreign policy. Ingushetia's constitution also grants it the right to design its own foreign policy (Article 54). Bashkortostan's constitution states that its relations with the Russian federal government are governed solely by bilateral agreements (Article 70), which contradicts the federal constitution, and that self-governance for the republic includes legal proceedings, the office of the public prosecutor, and the judicial power in its entirety. The constitutions of Sakha and Bashkortostan vest their legislative assemblies with determining the share of taxes they will turn over to the federal budget. The federal constitution, however, stipulates that the federal budget and taxation are the jurisdiction of the Federation as a whole.

President Yeltsin and his administration faced the challenge of finding institutional means of solving internal conflicts, of creating rules and norms of behavior that would be acceptable to all sides. Yeltsin's achievement was the creation of a "conception of consensus," proclaimed in 1993 and manifested since then in the form of bilateral treaties with subjects of the Federation. Yeltsin's failure, however, was his deviation from this principle in the case of Chechnya.

BILATERAL TREATIES AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT REGULATION

Bilateral treaties between the federal government and the republics were possible because they benefited both sides. Neither was interested in conflict escalation. Yeltsin wanted to normalize relations with the republics, and to demonstrate his ability to put down the threat of secession.

Tatarstan was the pioneer in concluding such a treaty. The republic is situated in the heart of the country. Hence, possible sanctions against it included a withdrawal of export quotas on oil and isolation from the transport, pipeline, engineering, and financial systems of the country. As Tatarstan's presidential adviser Rafael Khakimov wrote, "Moscow has become a financial empire. It can swallow Tatarstan's entire banking system within 24 hours."⁹ Or, as the former prime minister of Tatarstan, Mukhamad Sabirov, said, "We could demonstrate our pride and proclaim ourselves independent, but in two to three days, events might take an unpredictable path, and people would never pardon us for that."¹⁰

In agreeing to the bilateral treaty (signed in February 1994), President, Shaimiev, made a responsible and prudent decision. Many interpret this step within the framework of a patron-client relationship. Kazan received low-interest loans to restore its industrial giant, KAMAZ; a considerable amount of money for agricultural needs; stable financing for its military-industrial complex; construction of a bridge over its Kama River; and funds for reconstruction of the Kazan Kremlin. In addition, Tatarstan was forgiven its debt to the federal treasury. In return, Tatarstan declared itself a member of the Russian Federation and began paying its taxes to the federal budget. The primary gain for both sides, however, was a political one. Tatarstan's leadership could save face by claiming it was freely entering into negotiations with the federal authorities. As Shaimiev wrote on the first anniversary of the treaty, "Sovereignty for us means the possibility of defining for ourselves which authority we leave for ourselves, and which we delegate to the Russian Federation."¹¹

Shaimiev's decision to enter into treaty relations with Russia disarmed the extremist nationalist movement in Tatarstan, which was among the most radical and influential in the country. In the republic parliamentary elections, F. Bairamova, the leader of the nationalist movement, lost in the first round. Boris Yeltsin also emerged from this conflict a victor. Not only did he demonstrate his willingness to solve conflict peacefully, but he also erased the image of the federal government as an "imperial enemy."

Tatarstan's treaty was followed by similar treaties with eight other republics, and later with a number of oblasts (regions). We can delineate several stages in the development of Russia's treaty-based federal relations. The process began with the division of powers in the Federation Treaty of 1992. The Treaty confirmed the status of republics as sovereign states (in accord with the 1977 Soviet constitution). However, in contrast to the Soviet federal constitution, which recognized republics only as full members of the Federation, the Federation Treaty was signed by all of its members: republics, oblasts, krais, okrugs, and federal cities. This difference created the basis for believing that what was being created was not Soviet-style federalism.

The second stage began with the adoption of the new constitution in 1993, which guaranteed equal rights (but not equality) for all subjects of the Federation, and permitted the signing of

bilateral treaties and agreements (Article 78). This article was intended for those ethnic republics that had not yet concluded such a treaty.

The signing of the initial treaties with Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Sakha-Yakutia was a means of using power sharing to resolve tension with the most confrontational republics of the Federation. The final stage-signing treaties with oblasts such as Sverdlovsk, Orenburg, Kaliningrad, and with Krasnodar krai—extended the possibility of treaty-based relations to all subjects of the Federation, hence confirming their equal rights.

The treaties have different motivations and nuances. Tatarstan's was pursued primarily for political aims. Hence, it contains some points absent from other treaties. For instance, it grants Tatarstan the right to decide issues of republic citizenship (Article 2, part 8), to develop alternative forms of civil service for those who prefer it to military service (Article 2, part 9), to independently engage in foreign affairs in accordance with a separate agreement (Article 2, part 13), and to set up a national bank (Article 2, part 12). There is no provision in Tatarstan's treaty requiring the republic's laws and other normative acts to be in accordance with the Russian constitution and federal laws. The fact that this treaty had elements of an intrastate treaty in combination with elements of an international one, as well as a combination of federal and confederal arrangements, played a significant role in the political stabilization of Russia.

The treaty signed with Sakha-Yakutia and, to a certain extent, the treaty with Bashkortostan were primarily economic. These treaties declare the republics constituent parts of the Russian Federation. Sakha was granted the right to establish republic and local taxes and duties (as well as exemptions from such) (Article 1, part 1), and to create and use a fund for precious metals and stones (Article 1, part 1). Like Tatarstan, Sakha has the right to engage in external economic activity. The Sakha treaty is unique in that it establishes joint federal and republic jurisdiction in developing budgetary federalism, creating special (budget and off-budget) programs and funds (Article 2, part 2), coordinating the creation of federal state reserves, agreeing on export quotas of precious metals and other strategic raw materials, and developing and jointly using the resources of the continental shelf.

The conclusion of other treaties was motivated by the center's desire to support certain regional authorities who were facing strong internal opposition. In this category we can place the treaty with Kabardino-Balkaria, and, to a certain extent, that with North Ossetia-Alania. The emphasis in the North Ossetian treaty was on defense and geostrategic interests. Protection of the territorial integrity of the republic, responsibility for guarding the border with Georgia, and management of migration flows were put under the joint jurisdiction of federal and republic authorities. The treaties signed with oblasts and krajs have been largely concerned with equalizing their rights and opportunities.

BALANCING POWER: NEW CONSIDERATIONS

The first treaty, signed between Tatarstan and the federal government, received an ambivalent reception both in the republic and in Moscow. Radical Tatar nationalists condemned the republic leadership for surrendering and turning Tatarstan into a "semi-state."¹² Nevertheless, a majority of Tatarstan's population approved the treaty.

As part of a project on post-Communist nationalism, ethnic identity, and conflict management in the Russian Federation, we conducted a survey in Tatarstan shortly after the conclusion of the treaty.¹³ We found that almost 60 percent of Tatars and nearly 70 percent of Russians approved of the treaty. About 30 percent of Russians and slightly over 30 percent of Tatars could not answer, and only 10 percent of Tatars and 2 percent of Russians disapproved.

In the center, the main criticism of bilateral treaties came from the Duma Subcommittee on the Development of Federal Relations, which demanded the right to ratify any such treaties. Many deputies predicted that the signing of bilateral treaties would lead to a chain reaction that would "end with the disintegration of Russia." In assessing the Tatarstan treaty, the subcommittee's chairman, Vladimir Lysenko, called it "a considerable step forward in comparison with the situation a few years back," but one which, on the other hand, constituted a "transfer by the federal center of considerably wider competencies and rights to Tatarstan than to other subjects of the Federation."¹⁴

What would have been the consequences of giving legislative organs the right to ratify such treaties? The State Duma, consisting predominantly of ethnic Russians and representatives of oblasts and krais, would most likely not have approved the treaties for ethnic republics. The republic legislatures, which tend to be more radically nationalistic because they are dominated by members of the titular group, would most likely also refuse to ratify the treaty.

The governments of the center and republics evaded these obstacles by making the treaties specifically between the executive organs of each side. This was a bigger win for the center because, in the absence of legislative approval, the treaties could only be considered internal agreements, and not treaties between two independent states. Within the republics, however, officials prefer to describe the treaties as agreements between independent states.

Experts from the president's team and deputies of the State Duma see the treaties as a "form of regulation of relations between the federal center and its subjects, and a useful tool for peaceful settlement of constitutional disputes."¹⁵

In 1996, believing that the constitutional crisis was over in Russia, the State Duma Subcommittee on the Development of Federal Relations proposed the creation of a legal framework for the signing of power-sharing treaties with subjects of the Federation. In April 1996, Duma hearings were held to discuss this issue. At the hearings it became evident that the majority of deputies did not perceive the treaties as a step toward creating a vertical division of power, but rather as an attempt by subjects of the Federation to upgrade their status, and win subsidies and other privileges. Most deputies evaluated the treaties very negatively. The authors of the proposed legislation argued that the treaty process should be aimed at realization of concrete projects undertaken between the center and the individual subject of the Federation, and that legislation should be adopted on each sphere of authority. The deputies representing republics which had signed such treaties, one of the most vehement of which was Tatarstan's M. Sabirov, forcefully opposed such legislation, arguing that it would slow or even stop the fulfillment of already signed agreements.

In contrast, the opinion of the federal center, personified by the chairman of the Subcommittee on the Development of Federal Relations, Vladimir Lysenko, criticized the regional elites of a wide range of Federation subjects for "taking an economic offensive out of fear of openly fighting for an improvement in their political status and using the treaty process to resolve the problems which they could not solve earlier." Pointing to inconsistencies in the distribution of federal funds, he noted that republics "spend the bulk of sums on themselves, thus providing a higher standard of living for their population, and consequently greater loyalty to the regional leaders."¹⁶ Deputies hoped to create a legal basis for the development of federal relations, which would prevent "treaty fever" from becoming a ubiquitous phenomenon and transforming Russia from a constitutional to a treaty-based state.

In the fall and winter of 1996, the State Duma continued preparing the law on the principles and framework for delimitation of the spheres of authority between the federal organs of state power and those of the subjects of the Federation. In the draft law the main role in supervising fulfillment of the agreements is assigned to the Federation Council, rather than the Duma, which is too politicized. The principal significance of the legislation is the requirement that all the legal acts of subjects of the Federation correspond to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the observance of equal rights.

However, the law will come into complete effect only after the adoption of laws concerning the delimitation of property and of the ownership of natural resources between the central government and the subjects of the Federation, laws which have not yet been adopted. It is assumed that each agreement will pass through several levels of discussion, including in the Special Commission of the President of the RF, and the subjects of the Federation whose interests are affected by the law. One may assume that this will be a complicated process.

We will not discuss in detail the problem of designing a state system, which is the subject of heated discussions in Russia over how to build a modern civic state. The founding feature of such a state is a territorial and civic community rather than ethno-territorial formations such as "national republics." Debate over the principles of the state system continues in the press and in various meetings. Some, including a recent candidate for the presidency of the Russian Federation, M. Shakkum, suggest a transition from the Russia of the "krais, oblasts and republics" to the model of "Russia of the regions."¹⁷ Others consider such actions untimely.¹⁸ However, with regard to the issue of power sharing, it is worth noting that in several republics, ideologues have adopted Valery Tishkov's ideas. In Tatarstan, for example, the formation of a Tatarstan nation, as a civic rather than an ethnic community, is under discussion.¹⁹ The majority of politicians and academics dislike the idea of creating a civic state because they associate it with the "gubernization" proposals: to transform all ethnic republics into *guberniya*, the administrative unit of prerevolutionary Russia. They believe that gubernization would deprive titular nationalities of the opportunity to use their position of power to preserve their ethnic group.

Moreover, the view that access to power is an essential tool for the development of ethnic culture is widespread. As a scholar conducting field research in the republics, I believe that the threat of gubernization emanating from leaders of the center, who claim to represent the democratization process, coupled with the use of force in Chechnya to settle conflict, had a very negative effect on Boris Yeltsin's reelection campaign. In contrast, the treaty-signing process raised the level of mutual trust between republics and the center. Now, while negotiations with the Chechen leadership are under way and the conclusion of a treaty with the republic is possible, we can only guess how the Chechens will react to even the nonbinding suggestions made by the center about its relations with other republics.

In my judgment, the treaty-signing process plays a positive role by allowing centrists in the republics and the center to come to a peaceful agreement, while marginalizing extremists at both ends. What a number of the State Duma deputies are proposing—controlling the treaty-signing process by requiring it to be directed at concrete programs—represents one very specific goal-oriented approach. But a structural approach involving partnership on a wider range of issues would have a more profound effect.

POWER SHARING: THE AMBITIONS OF LEADERS AND THE WISHES OF THE MASSES

Since 1993, nationalist separatist movements throughout Russia have been dying out. In my view, this is not only a result of Yeltsin's "policy of consensus," but also because centrist-oriented leaders have come to power on the republic level. However, the disproportionate representation of titular groups in the administrations of the ethnic republics may become a source of tension with the local Russian populations. In Tatarstan, for example, while Tatars constitute 51 percent of the population, they account for 92 percent of ministry heads and up to 76 percent of regional administrators.²⁰ In Sakha, where members of the titular nationality constitute 37 percent of the population, they held 69 percent of ministry positions in 1996. This movement into power-holding positions by the titular ethnic group occurred on the wave of the national movements and the rise in ethnic identification.

In the course of our survey research in four ethnic republics, we presented the following question: "What conditions are most needed now for the revival of your people?" Together with the most frequent response-"revival and development of our national culture"-more than 40 percent of urban-dwelling Tatars and 57 percent of urban Yakuts claimed they needed "more independence, greater sovereignty for the republic, and control over the exploitation of natural resources." (This response was less frequently given by rural respondents, with the exception of Tuvinians, where rural respondents were more in favor of greater independence.)

In response to the question "Who should control the right over use of natural resources?" more than 60 percent of Tatars, 70 percent of Yakuts and Tuvinians, and 60 percent of Ossetians replied that "the republics should possess the exclusive right to use their natural resources." More than 60 percent of respondents said that security forces on the republic's territory should be subjugated to the republic leadership. Over 40 percent of Tatar and Yakut and over 60 percent of Ossetian respondents said that republics should be sovereign states within the Russian Federation and should retain the right of secession.

These results suggest that republic leaders were not acting solely on the basis of their own preferences when they pushed for greater sovereignty. These demands were supported by large shares of the regional population. By entering into negotiations, the republic leaders were able to convince their population of the necessity for compromise.

It is interesting to note that Russians, in response to the question of which problems currently demand the most attention, most often replied, "ensuring the interests of my people in the power structures of the republic." This shows that at issue is not only the division of power between center and republic, but within the republic as well.

On many occasions we have pointed to the wide diversity of ethno-political, historical, ethno-social, and ethno-demographic conditions in the republics of the USSR and now in Russia. Events which might provoke only slight tension in one area instigate mass national movements and conflict in another. Hence, it is crucial to continually seek examples of compromise and even transitional decisions. After all, even in such established democracies as the United States, Canada, or Germany, there are variations in how power is distributed between regions and the center.

THE SEARCH FOR A NEW MODEL OF COOPERATION IN POWER SHARING

The democratization process in Russia has convinced the population that through elections it is able to influence the composition of the legislative organs of power. The competition for seats in federal and local legislatures is becoming more intense. However, the issue of fair representation of ethnic groups in governing institutions and in the media remains a vital issue in Russia's multiethnic society.

Even if the Parliament accurately reflected the country's population, which is 82 percent Russian, representatives of ethnic groups would be in a clear minority and hence unable to influence decision making. The upper chamber of Parliament, the Federation Council, represents the members of the Federation. But even if every delegate from the ethnic republics were a member of the titular nationality, they would still control only one fifth of the chamber's vote. Russian nationalists often talk about the existence of a "non-Russian government," while the non-Russian population

denies its domination by Russians. The more that representatives of the republics feel marginalized from power at the federal level, the more they insist on dominating the power positions in their regions.

Ethnic discrimination leads to many conflicts. The Kumyk, Lezgin, and Nogai, feeling underrepresented in the government of Dagestan, raised the issue of creating their own state structures, as did the Balkars in Kabardino-Balkaria. The Ingush broke off from Chechnya-Ingushetia to form their own republic, which to this day is a republic without clear borders because its borders with North Ossetia-Alania and with Chechnya are conflict zones.

Another complicated question is how to represent the eight million non-Russian members of ethnic groups either living outside their titular republic or lacking a designated homeland. How, without violating the idea that ethnicity is a private matter, is it possible to represent these people in the organs of power so as to defend their interests?

Another issue concerns the alienation from power that Russians living in ethnic republics feel. We have already cited data above showing the low representation of Russians in the administration of ethnic republics. The relief of Russians when V. Likhachev was elected speaker of the Tatarstan Parliament when the number of Russian deputies in the legislature was falling is well known. But few similar cases exist.

The "one person, one vote" electoral system, often considered the most democratic, does not ensure the representation of ethnic minorities in legislatures. For several years, there has been discussion of the possibility of convening a congress of the peoples of Russia and the establishment of a new body (*obshchestvennaya palata*) that would serve as an advisory board to the Federal Assembly. (This has been mentioned by Abdulatipov, Lebed, Mikhailov, and Tishkov.) On the initiative level, specifically in Tatarstan, there has been discussion of how to organize fair elections in such a case. Back in 1993, speaking at a session of the presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Valery Tishkov proposed the idea of consociational democracy.²² As is well known, this is a system of government advocated by Arend Lijphart for multiethnic states. It guarantees minority groups' participation in government, and even gives them a veto on matters of cultural autonomy as well as on other issues of direct concern to them.

Another electoral system is described by Timothy Sisk. The integrative system requires not simply a majority of votes to be elected president, but a majority of votes in a majority of territories (in Russia, in the republics). Such a system would give greater weight to republics, if the majority were counted differently in oblasts and republics.

It would be important to represent members of the larger ethnic groups, and in turn of smaller groups, in the higher echelons of the administration on the level of prime minister, ministers, the diplomatic corps, and high-ranking officers. Academic specialists in ethnic relations have frequently called also for better representation of non-Russian ethnic groups on television and radio, as well as programming in languages other than Russian. The barrier to such changes is not only the lack of informed interest among parliamentarians and state officials about interethnic relations, but also a resentment among Russians of ethnic issues following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the sovereignty drives of the republics. Suffice it to say that the law on "small indigenous peoples," which was stalled for five years and finally approved by the Duma in June 1996, was rejected by the Federation Council. It was only in June 1996 that the law on national-cultural autonomy, which had also been discussed for five years, was finally passed. This law may encourage ethnic groups that it is worthwhile to participate in the system of majoritarianrepresentative democracy. Given the current mood and composition of the State Duma, it is unrealistic to expect that the Federation Council might support the idea of a consociational or integrative democracy.

There is greater hope, however, that Russian politicians will reflect more sensitivity in promoting non-Russian representatives to the highest organs of power. U.S. President Bill Clinton offers a good example in his intention to have his administration reflect the ethnic composition of the country. This example is instructive not only for the leadership of the Russian Federation, but for the leadership of its republics as well. It is more likely that the president and prime minister, rather than the legislative organs, will move toward a policy of cooperation and accord. The president has demonstrated his willingness by initiating discussions with the Chechen opposition leader Yandarbiyev, by repeatedly soliciting the input of presidents of republics on major decisions, and by guaranteeing the treaty process with republic administrations. Moreover, shortly before the

first round of the presidential elections, Yeltsin issued a decree titled "A Conception of State Nationality Policy in the Russian Federation." It confirmed the commitment to federal relations and explicitly stated that their development would not require the "gubernization" of republics, nor, in turn, the "republicanization" of oblasts and kraia.

This conception to a great extent fulfills the principles to which Russia committed itself in joining the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Membership in these organizations may encourage Russia to make other positive steps, such as forming permanent commissions with representatives of state power and of minority groups to guarantee their interests. Examples of such commissions exist in other countries.

In addition, the support of international organizations, the adoption of laws on property rights, the development of market relations, and the strengthening of a free press will create the basis for common interests among people and cooperation on nonethnic grounds. Associations which transcend ethnic borders already operate in Russia. These interregional associations are composed of oblasts and republics (for example, Siberian Agreement, Volga-Urals Association²³). Our interviews with leaders of republics suggest that they regard these associations as tools with which to realize their common interests.

Russia's membership in the Council of Europe opened the possibility for international mediators to have greater influence on the negotiation process with the Chechen opposition. In the resolution of this conflict and other tensions in the Russian Federation, it is essential that the world community understands the particular features of our history and supports a variety of forms of power sharing in Russia.

The development of democracy and consensus in Russia requires that the legitimacy of power-sharing agreements that have already been concluded not be undermined; that republic leaders be given incentives in accordance with their internal political situations to clarify constitutional contradictions; that more power be devolved to local institutions that can be more flexible and responsive to the cultural needs of diverse groups; and that public opinion be gradually acclimatized to the possibility of improving the electoral system to give minority groups more access to the institutions of power.

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4. Distribution of Power: The Experience of the Russian Federation

Vladimir N. Lysenko

Today, together with the "horizontal" division of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Russia is undergoing a no less difficult "vertical" division of power; that is, a division of power involving, first, the federal authorities; second, authorities of the subjects of the Federation; and, third, bodies of local self-government. In developing a "vertical" division of power Russia is proceeding along its own unique path. Russian federalism, different from that in any other country, is characterized by the following traits.

First, it combines the principles of ethnic (autonomous republics and autonomous okrugs) as well as territorial (oblasts and krais) federalism. Such a combination has not been possible elsewhere in the world. Second, the Russian Constitution establishes the principle of equality for all 89 (no other has as many!) subjects of the Federation, although such equality is in practice not attainable in the foreseeable future. In Russia, the Federation is de facto asymmetrical, and the most ample evidence of that is the "special status" of Tatarstan and the continuing war in Chechnya. Third, the foundations of Russian federalism include, in addition to the Constitution and federal laws (as in other federations of the world), the Federation Treaty and bilateral treaties demarcating jurisdictions between the federal government and the governments of the subjects of the Federation. Such treaties do not exist in other federations, where the respective spheres of authority and jurisdiction are determined by a constitution and legislation.

Finally, Russian federalism quite often is used as a tool or even a bargaining chip in the political struggles of various forces and power ministries. Therefore, as far as the budget and other spheres are concerned, federalism is often a hollow declaration. In a country that for centuries has been a unitary state, federal relations and a federal mentality are difficult to establish. Attempts to substitute decentralization for federalism often occur. Nevertheless, we must take into account the simultaneous trend toward Russia's confederalization, as regional elites still cherish hopes of being isolated in their "independent principalities."

In this situation, a most acute question arises: is Russia moving toward becoming a constitutional or a treaty-based federation? Is it possible that the treaty-signing process and the division of competences between federal and regional powers will spin out of the federal government's control, leading to confederalization, and ultimately, disintegration of Russia? This paper analyzes the ongoing "vertical division of power" and evaluates the prospects for further development of federal relations in Russia.

LEGISLATIVE DEMARCATION OF COMPETENCES AND JURISDICTION

Between May 1990 and early April 1996, more than 700 laws were adopted in the Russian Federation. Among those, about 150 are related to joint competences of the Russian Federation (RF) and its subjects. In view of the fact that the federal constitution (article 72) identifies 35 joint competences, each is governed by five laws on average.

However, joint competence is often more nominal than real, because it is rarely accompanied by legislation specifying how it is to be implemented. For example, joint competence over maintaining consistency between the RF Constitution and regional constitutions, charters, and

laws is not regulated by any law whatsoever. The same is true with regard to demarcation of state properties and coordination of international and foreign-economic relations of the RF subjects. The following joint competences lack clear legal guidelines

- Establishment of general principles of taxation and tax collection in the Russian Federation (a Tax Code has not yet been adopted)
- Selection of personnel for judicial and law-enforcement bodies; institutes of lawyers (barristers) and notaries (there is no Law of the Bar, etc.)
- Protection of indigenous homelands and the traditional way of life of small ethnic communities
- Establishment of general principles for organizing a system of governing bodies
- Resolution of issues pertaining to possession, use, and disposal of land and its contents as well as water and other natural resources
- Protection of rights of national minorities
- Enforcement of law, order, and public safety (the Law on Struggle Against Organized Crime has not yet been adopted)
- Creation of a regime for patrolling borders

While a better legal basis has been adopted for implementing other joint competences such as general matters of education, science, culture, and health care, these spheres also contain serious omissions in legislation. Often the adopted federal laws on issues of joint competence tend to neglect regional authorities, and more closely resemble the laws of a unitary state.

The legislative plan for 1996, as adopted by the sixth session of the State Duma, intends to pass about 100 laws on issues of joint jurisdiction. However, the plan was not coordinated with existing bills, and hence, there are many parallel laws under preparation in various committees. For example, two very similar laws have been prepared: one called *On the Circulation of Narcotic Means and Psychotropic Substances* and another titled *On Countering the Illegal Circulation of Narcotic Means, Psychotropic Substances, and Precursors*. At the same time, however, no plan exists for adopting laws that would provide for consistency between the RF Constitution and constitutions and charters of the Federation subjects; demarcate objects of state property; and coordinate international and economic ties of the RF subjects.

While numerous partial draft laws exist, there are very few that can act as frameworks for regulating the entire set of joint competences. That is to say, for the sixth session of the State Duma, as for earlier sessions, federalism-related legislation has not yet become a priority. It is imperative to adopt the fundamentals of legislation for implementing each joint competency (with respective amendments to be introduced in the RF Constitution). On the basis of such fundamentals, the RF subjects can pass their own laws as the Union Republics had under the Soviet. These fundamentals of legislation must demarcate the authority of federal and regional organs in implementing their share of the joint jurisdiction.

There would no longer be a need to conclude power-sharing treaties if such legislation were adopted because the powers of all the subjects of the Federation would be legally demarcated in the Constitution and in the respective legislation. The signing of treaties could then be reserved for regulating the sphere of activity assigned to a region by the Constitution, temporarily delegating the federal government's authority to a region, or a region voluntarily sharing a matter of its jurisdiction with the federal government. Such delegation would be determined by

geographic, economic, national, and other specifics of the given region rather than by subjective factors. The treaty-signing process would then, as in other federal states, be concerned with concrete projects and programs requiring the joint efforts of center and region.

TREATY-BASED DIVISION OF POWER

Phases of the treaty-Signing Process

The first stage in the treaty-signing process began with the conclusion of the Federation Treaty on March 31, 1992. (The Federation Treaty was composed of three separate treaties: one signed with autonomous republics, one with autonomous okrugs, and one with oblasts, krais, and cities of federal jurisdiction.) The next stage was the adoption of the new Russian Constitution on December 12, 1993, which equalized the provisions of the three Federation Treaties so that the status of krais, oblasts, and cities of federal jurisdiction was raised to the level of republics within the Russian Federation. The Constitution left open the possibility of concluding additional treaties between federal and regional governments (Article 11, Part 3 and Article 78, Part 3 of the RF Constitution).

The third stage occurred two months after the passage of the Constitution when the first treaty, *On the Demarcation of Competences Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan*, was signed (February 15, 1994). The significance of this treaty lay in the fact that Tatarstan had never signed the Federation Treaty, and in March 1993 it had not allowed the referendum on the new Russian Constitution to be held on its territory. Tatarstan's resistance created the impression that federal authorities had little choice but to enter into agreements with the republic.

Only after similar treaties were signed with Kabardino-Balkaria in June 1994, and with Bashkortostan in August 1994, was there reason to conclude that power sharing had moved to the fourth stage in its development.

In early 1996, the fifth stage, similar treaties were signed with Sverdlovsk, Kaliningrad, and Orenburg oblasts as well as with Krasnodar krai. This extended the treaty-making process to nonrepublic subjects of the Federation.

Since 1994 more than 15 treaties and 150 agreements on demarcation of powers in specific spheres have been signed. The signatories include republics (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Sakha-Yakutia, North Ossetia-Alania, Buriatia, Udmurtia, and Komi); oblasts (Kaliningrad, Orenburg, Sverdlovsk, Rostov, and Leningrad); krais (Krasnodar and Khabarovsk); a city of federal jurisdiction (St. Petersburg), as well as territories composed of okrugs (Irkutsk oblast and Ust'-Ordynsk Buryat okrug; Perm oblast and Komi-Permyatsk okrug).

TYPES OF TREATIES

The treaties contain both common and unique features. They were concluded in order to realize different objectives. In order to explain the treaty process in more detail, I offer the following categorization of motives for the different treaties.

(1) Treaties concluded primarily for political reasons. First in this category is the treaty with Tatarstan signed in February 1994. This document cannot be considered in isolation from the tense relations that existed between the federal authorities and those of the republic throughout 1990-1993. The treaty resulted from two years of negotiations and discussions which revealed the need to reach a compromise. The only alternative would have been the use of force, which would have destabilized the political situation and moved Russia to the brink of disintegration. Today it is evident that the treaty eased the growing tensions and brought Tatarstan back within the political and legal space of the Russian Federation. We believe that it is possible to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Chechen Republic as well, which would define the specifics of Chechnya's status within the Russian Federation.

Nevertheless, the treaty with Tatarstan did not remove serious contradictions between the federal and republic constitution. The treaty contains neither a provision stating that Tatarstan is a constituent republic of the Russian Federation (Article 65 of the RF Constitution) nor recognition of the federal constitution's and federal laws' superiority over republic laws (article 4 of the Constitution). The treaty has elements of both an international and an intrastate treaty, and hence is a combination of confederal and federal relations. It deviated from the principle of equality of all subjects of the Federation (as required in the Constitution, article 5), and initiated a return to the asymmetrical federalism that had existed in Russia under Soviet rule.

Through this treaty and 11 supplementary agreements, the federal center has delegated a much larger number of powers and benefits to Tatarstan than to other subjects of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Tatarstan has received a number of the federal government's exclusive authorities. A number of agreements included in the Tatarstan treaty have no relation to power sharing. This refers to such agreements as *On Issues of Ownership, On Realization and Transportation of Oil and Oil-Refinery Products, On Budget Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, and In the Military Sphere.*

The above has created a dangerous precedent of exceeding the region's authority above the limits set by the federal constitution, arbitrarily redistributing authority and jurisdiction without regard for consistency with the federal constitution, and delegating certain concessions and benefits to a region which are denied to others.

Tatarstan's example set a precedent for other republics as well. Soon after, similar treaties and agreements were signed with the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), whose relations with the federal government were also strained. In terms of political concessions to the region, these two treaties were less extreme than that with Tatarstan. They did contain provisions stating that the republics are constituent parts of the Russian Federation, and an assertion of the superiority of the Federal Constitution. At the same time they also contained numerous political concessions and "unconstitutional" redistribution of authority, as well as economic and budget benefits.

The three republics, being among the richest in natural resources, succeeded in gaining from the federal authorities the right to retain the lion's share of their revenues and spend them on their own populations. While natural resources are both a guarantee against an unforeseen crisis and a source from which many regions can draw to solve their local problems, they belong to the

whole country and to each Russian citizen. Redistribution of the country's national wealth through such methods may lead to the destruction of economic ties within the country.

Despite the above-cited problems, the development of treaty-based relations between the federal center and the three republics brought positive results as well. The separatist and nationalist trends in these republics lost much of their momentum following the conclusion of the treaties. All three republics now recognize and abide by federal legislation. In exchange for being offered certain tax benefits, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have abandoned their single-channel tax system (by which they could unilaterally halt the flow of taxes collected on their territory to the federal budget) in favor of a multichannel system of taxation. The republics' legislatures have made progress in demarcating joint competences, as well as accumulating positive experience in the development of treaty-based relations in various spheres. In the course of a working visit last February to Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia by the deputies of the State Duma Committees for Federal Affairs and Regional Policy, we could see that the timely demarcation of authority (even if imperfect) provided broad possibilities for the development of new economic relations.

A large number of treaties with oblasts, krais, and autonomous okrugs signed by Boris Yeltsin in the course of his election campaign in spring and summer of 1996 can also be categorized as "politically motivated." Those treaties were used by the president to win the regional elites' and population's loyalty in the pre-election rush. The president viewed these treaties as a panacea; a universal remedy against all troubles. While in the economically troubled Tver' oblast, Yeltsin, responding to complaints by local leaders and citizens, said bluntly that all their troubles owed to the fact that they had not signed a treaty with Moscow, and ordered that such a treaty be urgently prepared and signed prior to the elections.

(2) Treaties signed to confirm close ties between the regional and federal authorities, as well as to support the leaders of these regions in difficult political situations (the treaties with Kabardino-Balkaria and with North Ossetia-Alania, for example).

(3) Comprehensive treaties with oblasts and krais seeking to acquire the same rights as the republics enjoy. This refers to the treaties with Krasnodar and Khabarovsk krais as well as with the oblasts of Orenburg, Leningrad, Irkutsk, Perm', and especially Sverdlovsk.

For a long time, federal authorities signed treaties only with republics. This approach angered the leaders of many oblasts and krais. Almost two years after the signing of the first treaty, the federal authorities, seeking "to balance the treaty-making process," agreed to sign treaties and agreements with a number of oblasts and krais high up in the so-called "table of ranks" and with strong support in the federal echelons of power.

These treaties initiated a new phase in the treaty-making process. The difference is exemplified in the treaty signed with Edward Rossel', the new head of the Sverdlovsk oblast, who had been dismissed in 1994 for his notorious attempt to build "the Urals Republic," but returned to power after winning the region's gubernatorial election in 1995.

The treaty and its 17 supplementary agreements are comprehensive, encompassing most joint competences and regulating relations between the federal center and the Sverdlovsk oblast's bodies of power in all major spheres of life. Analysis of the provisions of the Sverdlovsk treaty reveals the following:

First, the treaty contains an inventory of joint competences of the Russian Federation and Sverdlovsk oblast (article 2 of the treaty). The list elaborates in fuller detail the joint competences mentioned in article 72 of the federal constitution, such as

- Developing conditions for structural reorganization of the economy
- Operating the defense industries
- Developing the agro-industrial complex, including creation of a granary-fund for Sverdlovsk oblast
- Certifying and licensing certain types of activities operating in Sverdlovsk
- Developing a coordinated personnel policy

These concrete joint competences are needed by all other subjects of the RF. The Sverdlovsk treaty contains a number of joint competences not listed in the federal constitution, such as the "regulation of matters related to processing and use of precious metals, gems and their products in enterprises located in Sverdlovsk oblast" (Sverdlovsk is the Urals' richest region in minerals), or the article *On organization of alternative forms of civil service* (similar to the relevant provisions in the treaties with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan).

The Sverdlovsk treaty delegates to the federal government authority over elaborating, funding, and implementing federal programs for structural reorganization of the regional economy; restoring mineral and raw-material bases, converting defense industries, and developing the agro-industrial complex; securing the economic conditions necessary to maintain defense mobilization readiness in Sverdlovsk oblast; and coordinating with Sverdlovsk authorities on the appointment of high-level personnel to federal agencies operating in the oblast.

All these prerogatives are equally necessary for other subjects of the Russian Federation. The powers delegated to Sverdlovsk authorities by the treaty include participation in the implementation of federal programs and participation in decision-making with regard to appointment of administrators (see above).

A unique provision of this treaty is the requirement that the oblast's laws be brought into conformity with the treaty. Also unique is the right "to define, in conformity with federal laws, conditions for licensing and use of nature on the territory of Sverdlovsk." It seems that none of the subjects of the Russian Federation would decline such commitments.

In addition, there are a number of provisions which moderately resemble clauses in the constitution of the failed "Urals Republic," such as the oblast's right to introduce legislation concerning issues of joint jurisdiction prior to the passage of federal law on the given issue; extension to Sverdlovsk of benefits, rights and other advantages provided by the federal government after the signing of the treaty; directors of regional divisions of federal agencies shall be appointed to and relieved from their respective positions by the Governor of Sverdlovsk oblast in coordination with the respective federal body of power (but not vice versa); and

regional executive bodies can be assigned the functions (prerogatives, rights) of territorial branches of federal agencies by agreement.

The most demanding provision is article 8 of the treaty, which says: "In case the RF Government does not abrogate the legal acts of the RF ministries and agencies, mentioned in Part 1 of the present Article, such legal acts shall not be subject to implementation by the government of Sverdlovsk oblast until the respective court shall have passed its verdict." Whereas the constitution of the Urals Republic entitled the local authorities to stop federal laws, the treaty allows it only to stop the acts of Russia's ministries and agencies. This means that all federal agencies have to take into consideration the laws of one oblast, Sverdlovsk, in doing their work.

All the above provisions are disputable and are not unique to Sverdlovsk oblast. They should be coordinated with other subjects of the RF, and then reflected in federal laws, and especially in a law on demarcation of competences.

The agreements signed with the Sverdlovsk regional administration have produced the following results:

First, many of the agreements provide for power sharing in specific spheres of activity such as forestry, health care, the agro-industrial complex, and international political and economic ties. This is a useful innovation, and after coordination with other subjects of the RF, it should be introduced by specific federal laws (founding legislation) to regulate specific spheres of public affairs.

Second, the agreement *In the Sphere of State Property Management* concretely divides state property between federal and oblast authorities, and joint ownership (municipal property is missing entirely). Unclear, however, is what criteria they used for dividing property, since no federal law on property has been adopted yet. This division of property must have resulted from a bargain between the sectoral ministries and the regional administration. With several ready precedents (Bashkortostan and others), it would be advisable to generalize their experience and regulate this important issue by means of legislation.

Third, almost all of the Sverdlovsk agreements contain a clause stating that in case of untimely or insufficient funding of federal programs operating in the oblast, the Sverdlovsk administration may fund the programs at the federal budget's expense by drawing on the funds of a mutual account (see for example the *Agreement on the Sphere of the Agriculture-Industrial Complex*, Article I; *Agreement on Health-Care*). This provision, extremely kind to Sverdlovsk oblast, was one of the main goals in signing the treaty because it enables Sverdlovsk oblast to reduce its allocations to the federal budget. At the same time this provision hurts other subjects of the RF that are in grave economic need. Such a budget benefit would be desired by all subjects of the RF, and not only by the donor-region Sverdlovsk. However, if during the current high deficit and nonpayment crisis such a privilege were extended to all subjects of the RF, the federal budget would collapse and no money would be available to fund the army, militia, communications, and other federal structures and programs of vital importance for all subjects of the RF.

In addition to the above-mentioned advantages, Sverdlovsk oblast has gained several others:

- In accordance with the consent of the Ministry of Finance, the oblast may grant amnesty to enterprises behind in the payment of federal taxes (*Agreement on Demarcation of Prerogatives in the Sphere of Budget Relations*, Article 5).
- The right to create free economic zones (*Agreement on Demarcation of Prerogatives in the Sphere of International and Foreign-Economic Relations*, Article 1).
- The right to establish a regional reserve fund of precious metals and gems to guarantee the liquidity of foreign investments in the region (*Agreement on Demarcation of Prerogatives in Investment Activities and Structural Policy*, Article 4).
- Ten percent of the federal tax collected on emission of pollutants and disposal of wastes will be transferred to the region to support environmental programs (*Agreement on Demarcation of Prerogatives in the Sphere of Possession, Use and Disposal of Natural Resources and Protection of Natural Environment*, Article 9).
- Before responsibility for social services previously provided by military establishments in the region transfers to municipal jurisdiction, the federal government will provide subsidies to these enterprises to reimburse them for their expenditures on these social programs (*Agreement on Demarcation of Prerogatives in the Sphere of Defense Industry*, Article 5).
- The allocation of dividends from bonds held on the fuel and energy complex to development of the infrastructure of this complex in the oblast (*Agreement on Demarcation of Competences and Prerogatives in the Sphere of the Fuel-and Energy Complex*, Article 9).
- While any surplus funds from the oblast's pension service will be transferred to the federal pension fund, any deficits in the regional fund will be covered by transfers from the corresponding federal fund (*Agreement on Demarcation of Prerogatives in the Sphere of Pension Provision*, Article 6).

There are other advantages received by Sverdlovsk oblast (as well as by many other treaty signatories). For example, the agreement with the Republic of Komi contains a very generalizable preamble: "On the basis of annual agreements between the RF Ministry of Finance and the Government of the Komi Republic, in order to accelerate mutual accounts between the budgets and to reduce counter-flowing financial streams, expenditures to fund territorial divisions of federal executive bodies, federal institutions and federal programs in operation on the territory of the Komi Republic, can be relayed to the budget of the Komi Republic, with due account of the respective prerogatives, delegated by the federal executive bodies to the state power bodies of the Komi Republic."

The reason for such detailed discussion of the treaty and agreements with Sverdlovsk oblast is that they represent a qualitatively new phase in the treaty-making process. While the earlier treaties and agreements with republics were seen by their backers as compensation for the return of those republics to the constitutional and legal space of the Russian Federation, the treaties of the Sverdlovsk type actually legitimize law-making via treaty. The "parties" to the treaty often consider it superior to federal laws and sometimes even to the constitution. This view openly legitimizes benefits and advantages received by the signatories, and leads to an extraconstitutional change in the status of the Federation subjects. This trend may move Russia from being a constitutional federation to a treaty-based federation.

(4) Treaties necessitated by the specific conditions of the Federation subject—for example, treaties with Buriatia and Kaliningrad oblasts.

The treaty with the Republic of Buriatia begins by saying: "Considering the fact that the Republic of Buriatia is a water-collection zone of Lake Baikal; recognizing the unique ecology of that lake and treating the lake as a national treasure of the Russian Federation . . ." It then proceeds with joint competences, strictly federal jurisdictions, and those of Buriatia, all aiming to preserve, restore, and improve the Baikal region's ecological system. The treaty concludes by elaborating the mechanisms for implementing it and the arbitration procedures in case of dispute. The treaty is in full conformity with the federal constitution. For example, the *Agreement on Demarcation of Prerogatives in Creation of Conditions for Economic Activities in the Water-Collection Zone of Lake Baikal* points out: "Considering the difficult financial and economic condition of the Republic of Buriatia, the parties agree that the additional expenditures necessary for providing essential services in the republic will be reimbursed from the federal and republic budget in an agreed-upon proportion. The list of essential services and the volume of additional expenditures shall be determined and agreed upon at the planning stage of the federal budget and the Republic of Buriatia budget for the respective years." Another agreement, which demarcates prerogatives with regard to exploitation of minerals and other raw materials, offers a different mode of funding: "In compliance with the RF Constitution and the federal *Law On Natural Resources*, the RF Government shall provide funding for work on geology-exploration, effective in the territory of the Republic of Buriatia within the framework of the federal program for development of the mineral and raw-material base of the Russian Federation, which shall be funded by revenues received from the Republic." The treaty with Kaliningrad oblast appears quite reasonable in light of the region's exclave position and its importance for Russia's national interests.

In sum, we already have treaties and agreements that are grounded in the specific conditions of individual subjects of the RF and that stipulate a real demarcation of competences and prerogatives in compliance with the constitution and federal law.

THE TREATIES' COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF RUSSIA

Let us now address the problem of the treaties' consistency with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The following three cases indicate the lack of such consistency:

First, the authorities that are referred to in the RF Constitution as within the jurisdiction of the federal government are often included in the list of joint competences of the Russian Federation and its subjects, for example:

- Maintaining border patrol regimes (treaty with North Ossetia-Article 4, para 2)
- Protecting state and territorial integrity (treaties with North Ossetia-Article 4, para 3; Kabardino-Balkaria-Article 4, para 4; Bashkortostan-Article 4, para 2; Tatarstan-Article 3, para 2)
- Coordinating budgetary-financial, monetary-credit, and pricing policies (North Ossetia-Article 4, para 19; Tatarstan-Article 3, para 6 and 8; Bashkortostan-Article 4, para 7)
- Defense conversion issues (North Ossetia-Article 4, para 22; Bashkortostan-Article 4, para 5; Tatarstan-Article 3, para 3; Udmurtia-Part 7, para 2; Sverdlovsk Region-Article 4, para 4; Orenburg-Article 1, para 1 and Article 2, para 1)
- Decommissioning military properties (Kaliningrad Region-Article 1, para 6; Udmurtia-Part 6, para 2; Sverdlovsk Region-Article 2, para 4)
- Functioning of defense industries (Sverdlovsk Region-Article 4; Udmurtia-Article 2, Part 7)

- Coordination (management) of R&D and production of weapons and military equipment in the territory of the given republic (Bashkortostan-Article 4, para 5; Tatarstan-Article 3, para 3)
- Deployment of military units and military installations in the territory of the republic (Bashkortostan-Article 4, para 5)
- Sale of weapons, ammunition, military equipment, and other arms (Tatarstan-Article 3, para 3)
- Issues of citizenship (Tatarstan-Article 3, para 4; Bashkortostan-Article 4, para 4)
- Banking (Kabardino-Balkaria-Article 4, para 5)
- Elaboration and approval of federal programs (Buriatia-Article 1, para 2 and 3; Udmurtia-Article 2, Part 3; the Krasnodar Territory-Article 2, para 2 and Article 3, para 2; Orenburg-Article 2, para 2 and Article 3, para 2)
- Coordination of activities in the spheres of geodesy, meteorology, and time calculation (Tatarstan-Article 3, para 10)
- Coordination of management with regard to general systems of energy; highway, railway, pipeline, airplane, and water transportation; as well as information networks (Tatarstan-Article 3, para 12)/P>
- Maintenance of a regime for dutyfree traffic of transport vehicles, cargo, and products by air, sea, river, railway, and highways, as well as through pipelines (Tatarstan-Article 3, para 13; Bashkortostan-Article 4, para 9)
- Issues of customs policy (customs sphere) (Kaliningrad-Article 1, para 4; Udmurtia-Article 2, Part 9)
- Assistance to the RF subjects in their foreign economic activities (Kaliningrad-Article 1, para 9)

Second, in a number of treaties, exclusive jurisdictions of the Russian Federation are extended to the subject of the Federation:

- Pardon of those convicted by the courts of the given republic (Tatarstan-Article 2, para 2; Bashkortostan-Article 3, para 11)
- Participation in international affairs, establishment of relations and signing of agreements with foreign states (Tatarstan-Article 2, para 11)
- Establishment of national banks (Tatarstan-Article 2, para 12; Bashkortostan-Article 3, para 15)
- Defense conversion issues (Tatarstan-Article 2, para 14)
- Issues of republic citizenship (Tatarstan-Article 2, para 8; Kabardino-Balkaria-Article 3, para 11; Bashkortostan-Article 3, para 1)
- Enactment of emergency rule (Kabardino-Balkaria-Article 3, para 5).

Third, what a number of treaties categorize as joint jurisdictions belong according to the RF constitution to the jurisdiction of regional governments:

- Protection of human and civil rights and freedoms (Tatarstan-Article 2, para 1; Kabardino-Balkaria-Article 3, para 7; Bashkortostan-Article 3, para 1)
- Bar and notary matters (Tatarstan-Article 2, para 3)
- Legal regulation of administrative, family, and housing relations in the sphere of environmental protection and use of the environment (Tatarstan-Article 2, para 4)
- Matters pertaining to possession, use, and disposal of land and its resources, water, forestry and other natural resources, as well as state enterprises, organizations, and other movable and real-estate properties (Tatarstan-Article 2, para 6; Bashkortostan-Article 3, para 5)
- The system of state bodies, the order of their organization and activities (Tatarstan-Article 2, para 7; Kabardino-Balkaria-Article 3, para 4; Bashkortostan-Article 3, para 2)
- Maintenance of law and order, providing for public security (North Ossetia-Article 3, para 6; Kabardino-Balkaria-Article 3, para 8; Bashkortostan-Article 3, para 8)

- Protection of natural, historical, and cultural monuments (North Ossetia-Article 3, para 13)
- Foreign-economic activities (Kabardino-Balkaria-Article 3, para 14)
- Health care, education, culture, and sports (Kabardino-Balkaria-Article 3, para 16)
- Formation and use of the republic's fund of precious metals and gems (Yakutia-Article 1, para 7).

Therefore, one can conclude that the treaties signed by the federal and regional governments to some extent run counter to the RF Constitution. At present, the situation is such that some provisions of the RF Constitution are not effective in parts of Russia. For example, Articles 71 and 72 do not hold for those subjects that have signed treaties with federal authorities. In addition, the treaties have transferred some costly responsibilities, such as shipment of foods and commodities to the northern areas and natural disaster relief, to the federal government.

The above analysis of the signed treaties leads us to the following conclusions. Treaty signing with subjects of the Russian Federation should be motivated by:

- Particulars of geography characterizing the subject of the RF
- Particulars in the given relationship between the Federation and any of its subjects
- Structural inequality of some subjects of the Federation vis-à-vis others
- Difficulties incurred when some subjects of the Federation try to solve their problems at the expense of others

Apart from the first reason, all others are problems inherent in the transition from a unitary to a federal state. Hence, in our view, the signing of treaties is a temporary phenomenon. When Russia builds an integrated system of federal and regional laws and creates stable economic and political conditions for the development of subjects of the Federation, there will no longer be a need for such treaties. Matters relating to the demarcation of competences will be regulated by legislation as in other federal states. Such regulation would include passing laws for regions with unusual circumstances; for example, the existing law on the free economic zone in Kaliningrad.

Today the treaties put subjects of the RF in unequal positions and thus run counter to the principle of equality as stipulated in the Russian Constitution. In precise terms, Article 5, Part 1 of the RF Constitution means the following: if some subject of the RF expands its rights by whatever means (treaty, agreement, presidential edict, federal law), the same is automatically provided for all the other subjects of the RF. Hence, we can offer the shortest sample draft treaty between the subjects of the Federation and the center. It would contain just one provision, stating that "All rights, benefits, and advantages stipulated in the earlier or later signed treaties of division of authority between federal and regional governments shall be extended to every subject of the Federation (oblast, krai, republic, autonomous okrug, city of federal jurisdiction)."

In the absence of such a law, Russia will be saddled with the coexistence of both legislative and treaty-based demarcation of authority. Hence, our task is to try to develop-within the shortest possible time-a legal process for dividing authority and jurisdiction. Such a system should build on the experience of treaty-based relations. Furthermore, it is necessary to "civilize" treaty-based relations, i.e., to put them in the framework of the constitution and federal law and thus put a stop to separatist trends, further economic differentiation of subjects of the RF, and the burgeoning of shadow mechanisms for redistribution of national income among various regions of the country.

At the same time, we stand in favor of an evolutionary adjustment of treaty-based relations, as we understand that radical changes would only aggravate the situation in many subjects of the RF.

Finally, we draw attention to one more problem-the authority of the individual officials who sign such treaties. All treaty titles mention the "bodies of state power of the Russian Federation and bodies of state power of the RF subjects." However, the treaties are signed by officials representing only some bodies of state power, usually the executive.

On the Russian Federation's side, the treaties in all cases were signed by the RF president and-with the exception of the treaties with Buriatia, Krasnodar krai, and Sverdlovsk oblast-the prime minister as well.

Among the subjects of the RF, there exists a broader variety of signatories. On the part of republics, the treaties were signed by their presidents and heads of government. The treaty with Udmurtia is the only exception, as it was signed by the chairman of the State Council (the parliament of the republic) and the head of the government.

On the part of territories and regions, in three out of four cases the treaties were signed only by the heads of administration or by the head of the government (the treaty with Sverdlovsk). In only one case, Kaliningrad, was the treaty signed by the head of administration and the chairman of the regional дума.

The federal parliament, despite being a state organ of the Russian Federation, is excluded from the treaty-making process, even though its jurisdictions-as well as those of the president and prime minister-are demarcated by the given treaties. Almost all the treaties have similarly excluded the legislative bodies of the subjects of the RF. However, requiring the approval of the дума speaker would be difficult because representative bodies are collegial, and none of their deputies (not even the speaker) is entitled to sign a treaty without authorization from the assembly.

Unfortunately, the RF Constitution does not offer specifics about the process for ratifying power-sharing treaties. Therefore, we suggest that the Federation Council be endowed with the authority to approve treaties signed between the federal government and its subjects.

TREATY-BASED RELATIONS IN PRACTICE

Leaders of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and other regions complain that the treaties are not being properly implemented by federal authorities. However, such noncompliance is directly related to the lack of real demarcation of authority in these treaties, as well as with the political nature of many of them.

As we were told by the government and the National Bank of Bashkortostan, in 1995 the republic had transferred about 28 percent of taxes collected on its territory to the federal budget. Though this is much more than it had transferred in the years of confrontation (1992-1993), it is half the amount paid by other regions. The republic's Council of Ministers explains the disparity

by claiming that in absolute terms, Bashkortostan's allocations to the federal budget exceed those from Perm and many other regions. But in terms of its area, population, and natural and material resources, Bashkortostan is not comparable to many other regions.

At the same time, we do not support egalitarianism and equal poverty. On the contrary, we suggest that the state should support the advanced regions in order that they might, like locomotives, drive our economic growth. Such support, however, must not take place through reduction of their payments to the federal budget. In this regard, the proposal to create a fund for economic encouragement incentives for well-developed regions seems worthy of promotion. Such a fund could be formed with off-budget monies and special allocations from the RF subjects.

As revealed by the actual federal budgets of 1994 and 1995, the volume of transfers from the federal budget to the regions is rather insignificant, amounting to only about 10 percent. The major portion of budgetary funds is received by the regions through various kinds of short-term budget loans and mutual accounts-in other words, through their respective access to "the Kremlin corridors of power." Such a personalized approach to budget relations creates a "shadow" government and paralyzes the federal budget-and-monetary relations fixed in the federal Budget Law.

The current situation is beneficial not only for regional elites, but for the federal power structures as well. Standing at the uncontrolled helm of distribution, state bureaucrats act by the "divide and conquer" principle. At the "right" moments (elections, aggravation of the political situation, etc.) they can buy the loyalty or help of subjects of the Federation, and thus ensure their own continuation in power. The situation can be improved only by a democratic and open procedure of budgetary relations set by law.

CONCLUSION

As shown in the above analysis, the ongoing construction of the new Russian state involves, on the one hand, the trends and rules that have been well tested by world experience in the development of federalism, and, on the other hand, the very specific and unique features of the Russian and other peoples of our country.

Accelerating in breadth and depth, the treaty-making process demonstrates an attempt to take into account the historical, geographic, ethnic, and other particularities of the subjects of the Federation. This process has also demonstrated, however, our insufficient legal culture, legal nihilism, subjectivity, and "belief in a good czar," and the willingness to solve important issues of the state and its subjects at the level of "common law" rather than at the level of the Constitution and legislation.

In the prevailing circumstances, the most important task is to formulate standard rules of the game that will be accepted by all subjects of the Federation and the federal center. As long as there are no such rules, or they are not recognized, or the game is run by the rules set between Moscow and individual subjects, there will be no truly democratic federation in Russia.

Today, only two alternatives are available: (a) either the federal parliament together with the legislative bodies of the RF subjects can build a modern legislative basis for development of federal relations, while the judicial power would oversee strict implementation of laws, and the executive branch would implement the law; or (b) the "treaty-making rush" will become a permanent rather than a temporary process and the Russian Federation will be transformed from a constitutional into a treaty-based state. Which of the trends prevails will be clear in the near future.

Meanwhile, it is absolutely evident that for Russia today it is impossible to separate the federal structure of the state from democracy. It is federalism-"the fourth branch of government"-that today serves as a major constraint, a counterbalance, and a guarantee for the preservation and development of democratic institutions in the center and in the periphery. Attempts by various forces seeking to revert to the USSR (the Communists) or to the Russian Empire (Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party), i.e., to the "initial Soviet, Russian" forms of state organization, would inescapably be accompanied by establishment of an authoritarian regime in Russia. Today, such a gigantic and diversified country as Russia cannot be governed democratically without a federal form of state organization. Sustaining and developing federal relations is a major component of the reform process in Russia.

5. The Settlement of Interethnic Conflicts and the Experience of Russia

Mikhail Gorbachev

Only a few years ago many considered the question that we are discussing here to be rather serious, but nevertheless of secondary importance. While recognizing the full danger of ethnic conflicts, we reasoned that they do not come anywhere close to such threats as nuclear war, ecological catastrophe, or the overpopulation of the planet. As soon as an approach to solving global problems was found, it would be possible to settle the local ones without much difficulty.

Frankly, I shared this point of view. And it did somewhat confirm itself. The removal of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, and of the division of the world into political-military blocs, allowed for fairly fast settlements in Cambodia, Nicaragua, and Angola, and helped to move the conflict in the Middle East from a stalemate.

But the grounds for optimism diminished to some extent when an alarming countertendency appeared. Territorial disputes, dissatisfaction with political status, ethnic inequality-all this explosive matter that had been artificially frozen during the years of the Cold War started to fuel local conflicts, one after another.

Each year brings additional proof that this is not a local phenomenon but a global problem that mankind will have to deal with, perhaps throughout the entire upcoming century. Three circumstances add to its severity.

First, multiplying ethnic conflicts become a constant generator of international tension, which is increasingly difficult to release. The struggle for the interests of ethnic communities, their legitimate rights or excessive claims, has already become one of the main incentives for arms production and trade. The same source also feeds terrorism, whose wave is virtually flooding the world. Interethnic disputes revive religious conflicts, threatening to return the world to the long-forgotten jihads and crusades. The "resolution" of these conflicts, by touching on the political interests of the great powers in one way or another, may provoke tensions between them and make the formation of a new and more stable and fair world order questionable.

Second, it is important to bear in mind that the process of attaining ethnic self-determination is not yet complete, and therefore the problem has not yet fully unraveled itself. The world numbers several hundred relatively large nations that, for various reasons, have not yet had the time, or been able, to achieve their own governance. There exist, according to different counts, from three and a half to seven thousand ethnic groups. Many of them are satisfied with their current status and do not raise the question of changing it. However, if even a tenth of them will make such a demand, we will have to be talking about the restructuring of institutions on a world scale.

It is necessary to add here regional tendencies toward autonomy. As access to essential resources like land, water, air, and raw materials becomes more complicated, so grows the striving of regional communities for securing control over them and for avoiding reallocation in favor of backward regions. Everywhere in the world, prospering provinces, states, lands, and even large cities strive for an extension of their independence. The example of Lombardy in Italy demonstrates that this aspiration may grow into regional separatism. The same kind of danger exists here in Russia as well.

Finally, thirdly, we still do not have a clear conception which to resolve the tension between the right of nations to self-determination and the sovereignty of existing states. The latter are in a way the building blocks of the modern international world, and there is every indication that they will remain in this role in the near future. One might say that it is their unshakable right to protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, the right of nations to self-determination is similarly accepted now by many and is incorporated in UN documents.

Even Hegel used to say that the collision between two equal rights is decided by force. This is precisely what we are currently observing. This situation is going to increase in severity unless the world community can work out a clear and well-defined approach to the resolution of this baffling problem.

I dare say that a search for some general formula will not get us anywhere. The greatest difficulty of this problem resides in the fact that each ethnic conflict is unique and requires a specific solution that takes into consideration the sum of concrete factors—from the historic conditions of its origination to the national character of the participating sides. Nagorno-Karabakh, Bosnia, Chechnya—each conflict is unique and requires a unique settlement. However, the framework within which the search should be conducted and the guiding principles can, of course, be common to all. And although conflictology is a young science, it has already found, in my opinion, useful approaches.

I am not a specialist and do not presume to generalize. I will just allow myself to point to the conclusions that I consider to be the most important.

First of all, we must recognize the fact that force cannot serve as a means of conflict resolution. Of course, sometimes we have to resort even to this means to stop belligerent sides. But in this case the problem does not get resolved, but is pushed deeper and is postponed. Furthermore, we must recognize that under current conditions the single reasonable method of settlement and prevention of conflicts is the search for compromise between the disputing sides. In necessary cases this would be done by arbitration and with the help of the world community. If it is a question of well-grounded demands of ethnic communities, such a compromise would include granting them different levels of autonomy or involvement in the central government. Most often the combination of both is effective.

Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge that the general key to preventing conflicts that arise on the grounds of national and regional separatism is federalism. Only in this way is it possible to overcome the danger of the formation of countless "sovereignties" incapable of self-support, which would completely finish off the international system and draw it into chaos.

I have to admit that ten years ago these conclusions were not as obvious. But when I became the head of the Soviet Union and had to face the need to solve analogous problems, we tried to follow these principles.

Having developed during the several hundred years of being a part of the Russian empire, and then the Soviet Union, many nations, especially those that had self-governance in the past, have fully prepared themselves for independent political existence. Perestroika, democratization, and political freedom opened up such an opportunity for them.

Striving for independence, these peoples, with the exception of the Baltic nations, were not planning to secede from Russia. The results of the referendum of March 17, 1991, serve as evidence for this. The optimal solution under those conditions was the reorganization of the overly centralized state into a real federation.

Intense collective work allowed for the drafting of a new union agreement that was based on the principle of "strong union-strong republics." Unfortunately, the August 1991 putsch interfered with its ratification, and the new version, which provided for the creation of a confederate union, was thwarted by the Belovezh agreement.

Even now I remain convinced that it was possible to save the union by transforming it into the federation. But we lingered over this process and underestimated the dangers, on the one hand, of the forces of national separatism, and on another, of the Russian radicals, and, from the third side, of the communist conservatives.

Now about ethnic conflicts. Anyone who has followed the events of that time knows that in the disputes between Georgia and Abkhazia, North Ossetia and Ingushetia, Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and in all the other cases, the central government tried to look into the essence of the claims raised by both sides with full objectivity, to bring them together to the

negotiating table, and finally, to utilize all of our economic and political capabilities in the search for mutually acceptable compromise.

Unfortunately, we were not able to avoid the use of force to restore public order in places where pogroms were starting and the danger of mass bloodshed had emerged. Almost no peacemaking mission would be able to avoid this. Nevertheless, there are still attempts to declare, for example, that the events in Baku, where the troops prevented a mass pogrom of the Armenians and people of other nationalities, were all but a massacre. In reality, any use of the army on a somewhat larger scale to suppress national movements was strictly out of the question.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the Russian leadership initially followed this approach. It had to face the same burden of nationalistic problems, augmented by even more difficult conditions resulting from "shock therapy," political instability, a mass inflow of refugees, the sharp rise in crime, and other consequences of the liquidation of the union.

The call to the republics to assert as much sovereignty as they could handle, a populist appeal, played a crucial role. One might say that it significantly raised the stakes for national elites, whose interests did not always correspond to the interests and aspirations of the people. We had to pay a high price for this, especially in Chechnya.

The saddest thing in the history of this conflict is that it never needed to occur. The problem could have been solved in the same way it was solved in the case of Tatarstan. However, such an opportunity was thwarted by a chain of mistakes. The Kremlin helped Dudaev come to power, harming itself in the process. Then they let him manage huge resources received from the oil trade, and armed him to the teeth. During three years Yeltsin did not find it possible to meet once with Dudaev, and did not make any attempt to restore constitutional order. And in the end he decided to suppress Chechnya through armed intervention.

I persistently cautioned the Russian leadership against the utilization of this extreme measure and was even willing to take on the function of mediator in the talks. However, I received no reply.

The meaningless bloodshed has already lasted for more than a year and a half. The latest episodes with the invasion of Grozny and Gudermes serve as evidence that despite the huge human losses and destruction, the situation is at the same point it was a year and a half ago. This is the most convincing, truly classic example of the fruitlessness of forcible decisions.

The Chechen conflict has disturbed all of Russia. To some extent it has turned out to be a lesson to its government as well. Having hurt itself in this and other cases, it has realized the necessity of searching for a reasonable compromise when dealing with national movements and well-grounded demands of the regions.

From this originated the practice of concluding treaties differentiating between the Federation and its subjects' authority. In essence, it is the same methodology of distributing or "sharing" power that is recommended by specialists in conflictology. In particular, as I understand, this point of view is shared by the Carnegie Commission.

At the same time, these agreements have their downside. To some extent they create a legitimate basis, if not for separatism, then for the weakening of the vertical discipline that is necessary for each federal state, especially in Russia with its huge territory and the remoteness of many regions from the center.

There already exist some indications that some republics and oblasts have been able to negotiate more advantageous conditions of "coexistence" with the center. This will lead to the intensification of the differentiation, and will reduce to a minimum the capacity of helping the backward regions lacking natural resources and industry. In other words, another time bomb is being planted.

It is also impossible not to see that the conclusion of treaties with each of the 89 subjects of Russia will make the federal agreement meaningless and will undermine the constitution of the Russian Federation in many ways. In response to the corresponding apprehensions, one of the president's aides declared recently that these agreements are not between Russia and separate republics and oblasts, but only between their governments.

It goes without saying that the problem will not get solved with such casuistry. We have to look straight at the facts and search for that precise measure which will allow us to combine real self-government of the oblasts and political independence of the republics with the full consolidating functions of the center.

In spite of the great importance of judicial formulations, the matter does not end there. If the socially oriented market economy will really work here, then it will become the best bond and guarantee of the integrity of the Russian state.

I will briefly speak about international involvement in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. In our times it inevitably grows increasingly large. It is impossible to stop the wave of local armed conflicts by any other means. The world community simply is obligated to render assistance in the settlement of conflicts, using first and foremost political, diplomatic, and economic means or taking on the role of arbitrator. And in extreme cases, when nobody else can stop the mass death of people, it could even utilize strictly measured armed force.

Such actions should not become a continuation of the geopolitical games of the great powers. Unfortunately, such an element is discernible in the history of the settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Old biases and selfish interests contributed significantly to the fact that a conflict that could have been settled on a civilized basis grew into a full-scale war. Evidently, the Balkans have not yet been saved from the fate of being the "gunpowder magazine of Europe." The good news is that the manslaughter in Bosnia has stopped. But this fragile peace is contingent on the presence of the NATO troops. Only after their withdrawal will it be possible to judge the fairness of the settlement reached.

I would like to share with you my view of our peacekeeping role. As one of the great powers, Russia in principle cannot avoid involvement in such actions. But they entail significant spending that is extremely burdensome under the conditions of the current economic and financial crisis. Thus it would not be advisable for us to participate in such operations for any

length of time, even more so because Russia cannot escape from its peacemaking mission within the borders of the CIS, where nobody else can fulfill it.

Our diplomats are currently helping to search for a compromise in Nagorno-Karabakh, and an armed force is preventing the renewal of military operations in Abkhazia as a result of the decision of the CIS. Without Russia's help the civil war in Tajikistan would have been much more destructive and the fire could have spread to the neighboring countries of Central Asia. Acting in agreement with the other countries of the Commonwealth, Russia could continue to fulfill a stabilizing role on the post-Soviet territory. This would be its important contribution to the troubles of the world community.

When participating in peacekeeping actions outside our borders, we in turn need aid from outside. This is currently manifested through the useful role that the OSCE mission plays in Chechnya by assisting the negotiating process between the federal powers and the separatists. The world community could provide even more effective help in settling the conflict, however. It is well known that Dudaev received money and arms from foreign Muslim fundamentalists; otherwise a war lasting for so many months against the Russian army would have been impossible. There is much evidence of the participation of mercenary soldiers from a number of Eastern countries in the battles. These are not simply individual volunteers, but methodically recruited, and, naturally, well-paid mercenaries.

I am convinced that the United States and other Western powers could use their influence to terminate such involvement. It is perfectly clear that fomenting the conflict and making it international will be harmful to Russia and the rest of the world.

I would like to touch on the plans for NATO expansion to the east. I have expressed my negative attitude toward such a prospect before. If it becomes reality, two scenarios are possible.

The threat of international isolation will provoke mass xenophobia and will bring to power not only nationalist but also chauvinist forces. This could be followed by the militarization of the states, the revival of the arms race, and consequently another cold war under considerably worse circumstances.

Another scenario is the weakening and collapse of Russia, the emergence of a chain of local conflicts on its territory, and finally the formation of a mighty patriotic movement that will unite the country. Then, alas, back to the first scenario.

Thus it is better for everyone to rethink and abstain from this fateful step. The right path to a stable world order would be not to isolate Russia but to develop mutually advantageous collaboration with Russia, and to aim at widening the sphere of partnership over time.

Not only that, the preservation and development of the foundations of democracy and political freedom that were begun by perestroika are seriously dependent on the policy the West will pursue in relation to our country.

And democracy and political freedom are most important for the future of Russia. They concern the fate of humanity as a whole.

Part Three

The Role of the Military

6. The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly Conflict

Colonel Daniel J. Kaufman

Today, the widespread occurrence of violence, persistent threats that more conflicts will break out, and the capacity of established states to help prevent such violence lead to three important conclusions regarding the use of force or threats of force in the post-Cold War period.¹ The first conclusion is that the post-Cold War environment has proven that peace will not keep itself.² Responsible members of the international community must understand the implications of this conclusion for their role in international affairs. Preventing deadly conflicts will require sustained and, at times, extensive involvement by multilateral and regional organizations as well as by individual nations. Second, force and threats of force cannot be regarded exclusively as a last resort. They must be part of an integrated strategy of conflict prevention and used in conjunction with political and economic instruments. The use of force and threats of force are not only viable options, they are intricately linked to the success of efforts to prevent deadly conflict. The third major conclusion is that states-particularly the United States-must accept the military implications of their leadership roles. Rather than becoming less relevant to international relations, the use of force retains its central importance as states adjust to the dynamics of the post-Cold War era. These three conclusions have important implications for informing national and international leaders' considerations of how to deal with the problem of preventing deadly conflicts.

PEACE WILL NOT KEEP ITSELF

The Sources of Conflict

The end of the Cold War has had important consequences for the incidence and nature of deadly conflict. To be sure, the Cold War period was not the era of peace and tranquillity that some observers now seem to remember. Interstate and intrastate conflicts were a common feature of the supposedly "stable" bipolar world. There were, by some estimates, 125 wars leading to 40 million deaths in the years following World War II and before Operation Desert Storm. Most of these wars were in the developing world. They were not the result of ideological differences between East and West. They were the result of the age-old causes of war-boundary disputes, economic conflicts, and ethnic tensions. Any listing of the ethnic conflicts that took place during the Cold War will quickly belie the notion that such conflicts erupted only in the post-Cold War era.

While deadly conflicts certainly were a prominent feature of the Cold War world, the end of the superpower competition and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have had a significant impact on

the possibilities for both interstate and intrastate wars. Despite the reality of conflict and the potential for nuclear confrontation, the Cold War was not without its stabilizing aspects. For example, it is unlikely that during the Cold War Iraq would have been left free by the Soviet Union, its patron and principal source of arms, to invade Kuwait, an oil-producing country in a region known to be a vital interest of the United States and the West. The diffusion of political authority increases rather than decreases the potential for international challenge and conflict.³

In regional competition, the superpowers did not want to see any of their client states collapse, since such collapse could lead to regional political losses. Thus, regimes in states such as Somalia, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, which otherwise would have had difficulty maintaining social order and legitimacy, were propped up by financial aid, arms transfers, and diplomatic support. The cessation of much of this support has left some states incapable of maintaining a functioning domestic order. Their inability to ensure the safety of the citizenry and to provide economic subsistence can produce anarchy, lawlessness, and warlordism, factors that often result in massive violations of human rights, armed conflict between rival factions, and large flows of refugees into neighboring countries.

The end of the Cold War also has facilitated the breakup of multinational political units such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It has raised the potential for the emergence of violent centrifugal forces in places such as India, Iraq, Pakistan, and Ukraine. Two of the immediate consequences of the centrifugal forces in multinational states are the increasing incidence of mass communal violence (such as in Bosnia) and conflict over minority ethnic enclaves left behind in the territory of another ethnic group (such as in Nagorno-Karabakh). The erosion of empires and multinational states has moved ethnic concerns to the forefront of political discourse. "Nationalist" movements are defined more by ethnicity or religion, rather than by political ideology or territory. Afghanistan, it appears, is not inhabited by Afghans, but by Pathans, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Baluchis, and Turkomans, none of whom wishes to be ruled by the other.⁴

Indeed, the process of "political fission" may well be the most striking tendency in world politics in the years ahead. The principle that no people should be ruled by another can, if taken to extremes, create antagonisms that will make ethnic or religious violence an all-too-common feature of international life. There are, according to more conservative estimates, at least 3,500 distinct and identifiable groups around the world that could be called "nationalities." The Republic of Kazakhstan alone is inhabited by 102 nationalities. Can it become 102 countries? Who shall determine which group is deserving of its own territory and which is not? The central question in the politics of the twenty-first century everywhere in the world likely will be the tension between holding together and pulling apart: between the centripetal pull of a modern global economy that requires regional and worldwide organization, and the centrifugal push of atavistic tribalisms.⁵

Exacerbating the problem of sustaining multinational political associations are two major demographic trends: population increases and urbanization. Dramatic population increases are taking place in the developing world. From 1985 to 1990, the world added 88 million people per year to its population; the overwhelming majority of this increase occurred in the developing world. For example, from 1985 to 1990, Europe's population grew at the rate of 0.2 percent per year while Africa's grew at 3.0 percent per year.⁶

Population forecasts reinforce the notion that population growth will continue to be concentrated in the developing world. Egypt's population grows by one million every nine months, and is forecast to reach about 94 million people by 2025. Roughly one-third of the population lives in poverty, up from 20*-25 percent in 1990.⁷ Indonesia adds three million people to its population every year, and the country is projected to have 260 million inhabitants by 2025. Brazil's already large population of 155 million today will approach 245 million by the middle of the next

century.⁸ Pakistan, with 123 million people in 1990, will have 276 million by 2025, and India's population, 853 million in 1990, is projected to grow to 1.45 billion by 2025.⁹ These burgeoning populations will, of course, put enormous pressure on political, economic, and ecological systems.

The populations of most states in the developing world are relatively young. In Kenya, for example, about half the population is under 15, while less than 3 percent is over 65.¹⁰ In Pakistan, 46 percent of the population is under 15; in India, the figure is 35 percent.¹¹ Therefore, tens of millions of young people enter the job market every year. Inadequate economic opportunities for them will further strain the fabric of societies already under siege from a host of forces that contribute to political fragmentation.

A related concern is the rapid trend toward urbanization, particularly in the developing world. At the turn of the century, roughly 5 percent of the world's people lived in cities with populations over 100,000. Today, an estimated 45 percent live in urban centers. In recent years the most explosive growth has been in the developing world. Between 1950 and 1995 the number of cities in the developed world with populations greater than one million more than doubled, from 49 to 112. In the same period, million-plus cities in the developing world increased sixfold, from 34 to 213.¹² In 1985, 32 percent of the people in the developing world lived in cities; by 2000 this number will have risen to 40 percent, and by 2025 estimates are that nearly 60 percent of the people in the developing world will reside in urban areas.¹³

Of course, dense concentrations of predominantly young, relatively unskilled workers put enormous pressures on social and political structures. Poverty, unemployment, disease, crime, and pollution have plagued urban centers for centuries. The explosive growth of urban populations in the developing world increases the likelihood of social upheavals that could threaten governments, cause widespread disorder, and ultimately result in more failed states with which the international community will have to contend.

Finally, some argue that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons, as well as the ballistic missiles with which to deliver them—also increases the likelihood of deadly conflicts. Nations or groups that possess such weapons may be tempted to use them. Those who do not have them may well perceive a need to acquire them, particularly if they feel vulnerable to attack by those who do possess them. Alternatively, nations without weapons of mass destruction may be tempted to launch preventive or preemptive attacks against a potential adversary's unconventional weapons capabilities before they can be fully deployed or employed. Certainly the widespread availability of such weapons threatens to raise the cost of any conflict that does erupt. On the other hand, it is important to remember that modern weaponry is not necessary for the wholesale slaughter of huge numbers of people. More than half a million people perished in Rwanda in the 1994 tribal war, where the most common instrument of death was nothing more sophisticated than a machete.

The Incidence of Conflict

Today, violent conflict afflicts more than one-quarter of the world's states and touches every region of the globe. The specter in 1996 of more than 40 conflicts of every type simultaneously under way connotes a problem of global proportions. The post-Cold War period is replete with examples of conflicts caused by aggression, ethnic and religious violence, the collapse or absence of functioning governments, territorial disputes, and mass migrations. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 demonstrated that aggression can still produce a "traditional" interstate war. However, the extensive list of armed conflicts that have taken place since the end of the Gulf War reflects the pervasiveness of intrastate conflict. By one count, there are 32 significant ethnic conflicts ongoing today.¹⁴ While many argue correctly that these conflicts have deep historical roots, it is important to recognize that modern events have molded them into something other than solely "primordial hatreds."

Today's intrastate violence is a product of complex historical processes shaped by contemporary events. Violence touches every continent. The former Soviet states, Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Central and South America all are home to intrastate conflicts. In Africa and elsewhere, boundaries imposed by colonial rulers cut across tribal and ethnic lines. Corrupt leaders manipulate ethnic tensions and the volatile dissatisfactions that result from slow or uneven economic development. In some cases, such as Liberia and Somalia, warlords vie for power and wealth, with little or no attention devoted to the development of a functioning and recognizable civil society. In 1992 more than 20 million refugees were fleeing communal violence worldwide. Included in that figure was 3 percent of the entire population of sub-Saharan

Africa.¹⁵ By 1995, at least 71 countries were creating or hosting large numbers of displaced persons. In Liberia alone, the civil war that began in 1989 has left 150,000 Liberians dead and 1.2 million displaced-out of a total population of only 2.5 million.¹⁶

A simple review of the events of the past five years leads to one inescapable conclusion: In the aftermath of the great power competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, deadly conflicts of every description are an all-too-common feature of international life. Death tolls are staggering: 500,000-1,000,000 in Rwanda, 100,000 in Burundi, 250,000 in Bosnia; 50,000-150,000 in Iraq, 100,000-300,000 in Angola, just to mention a few.¹⁷

The Case for Involvement

Why should states outside the region of conflict or multinational organizations become involved in preventing the outbreak or escalation of these violent, predominantly internal, conflicts? After all, persistent or massively violent conflicts often trace their origins to deeply rooted antagonisms that are obscure to outsiders. Although every conflict is unique, several alarming characteristics warrant our concern. The Rwandas, Burundis, Somalias, and Bosnias all are characterized by massive loss of life and brutal violence. The number of people killed, left homeless, or forced to migrate threatens local as well as regional stability. Surely conflicts with such enormous consequences invite action, perhaps even forceful action, to preclude them if possible or contain them if not.

It is important to recognize that prevention is not synonymous with simply maintaining or restoring the status quo. There may well be occasions where the use of force or threats of force are required to facilitate necessary or desirable changes in highly unstable situations. For example, force might be appropriate where mass violence is a distinct possibility and where new power-sharing arrangements could reduce the tensions that contribute to such a possibility.

Intervention will not take place in a vacuum. Many of the countries where violence is occurring or might occur have experienced repression at the hands of outside powers and may well resent any form of imposed settlement. Discounting or ignoring the history, values, and culture of the local population will be a recipe for disaster. The internal will to create or maintain peace is essential. It is for the people in conflict to commit ultimately to peaceful solutions to their disagreements.

Why should states outside the region of conflict become engaged in these internal, potentially violent, situations? As President Clinton indicated in his speech to the American public explaining the commitment of U.S. troops to the enforcement of the Bosnian peace accords, there are three distinct reasons for a nation such as the United States to become involved in efforts to prevent the outbreak or resumption of deadly conflict. These are threats to an important national interest; the moral or humanitarian imperative; and the responsibilities of leadership.

(1) National Interest

Traditional conceptions of the national interest would seem to preclude involvement in conflicts in strategically remote parts of the planet. Violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, pose little or no threat to important American or European economic or political interests. Certainly the safety, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the developed countries are not threatened by such conflicts.

This narrow view of the concept of national interest seems not only anachronistic, but strategically myopic. The changing nature of the threats posed by these conflicts makes it impossible to ignore occurrences in countries once considered peripheral. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, the sale of fissionable material, the spread of modern and increasingly destructive military weapons, genocide, terrorism, and exportable activities such as ideological or religious extremism can endanger regions as well as individual countries. The proliferation of modern, relatively inexpensive military weapons means that potential adversaries do not need a substantial industrial base in order to acquire or support forces capable of inflicting much more destruction than the level of domestic economic development would suggest.

The varied and complex causes of conflict also may make them more likely to spread. Neatly drawn depictions of regions or countries of national interest can be overwhelmed by the spread of conflict from the "periphery." If the United States had no important national interests in Bosnia per se, it certainly had an abiding interest in stability in Europe. The goal of keeping the war from spreading to surrounding areas was a primary concern for U.S. policymakers, and even led to the deployment of U.S. soldiers to Macedonia to demonstrate U.S. resolve to contain the conflict, at least geographically. The Bosnian conflict is but one example of the threat a war can pose for surrounding countries. Violence in Rwanda inevitably hauled Zaire into the conflict. Likewise, Liberia's civil war has become a real challenge for Sierra Leone.

Taken together, the destructive military potential of even minor powers and the likelihood that many forms of conflict will overwhelm established or disputed political boundaries make the traditional conception of the national interest unusable as a means of substantively assessing the dangers posed by conflicts in seemingly remote corners of the earth. Of course, acceptance of a broader view of what constitutes the national interest does not lead automatically to military involvement in every conflict. Other instruments of statecraft are available to support efforts to prevent the outbreak or escalation of deadly conflict. Diplomatic and economic leverage can convey intent and influence the course of events. Embargoes and boycotts can have a significant effect on the economic and political health of the target nation or group. Regional and multinational organizations can contribute to efforts to preclude conflict.

The key, however, is not simply to declare the issue, however unfortunate from a humanitarian perspective, one of little or no national interest because the security of the republic is not endangered. Intense regional, ethnic, or civil wars now have an immense potential for destruction. The United States and the other peaceful great powers must adopt an approach to the definition of national interests that acknowledges these conditions and accepts their role in the world as it is, not as they might wish it to be.

A broadened sense of the national interest should be framed in terms of widely held notions of justice. How would one give operational effect to such a conception of the national interest? Early efforts to preclude deadly conflict could involve exposing gross injustices or substantial violations of human rights. National intelligence resources could be helpful in shedding light on atrocities in some cases. Specific international mechanisms could be designated to deal with such exposed injustices. The War Crimes Tribunal for actions in the former Yugoslavia provides such an example.

(2) Moral Imperative

The lethal potential of modern conflict and the instantaneous and global access to information have heightened the impact of the moral dimension of international affairs. Moving images of human suffering lead invariably to calls for action to end the cause of the destruction. The end of the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union has enabled analysts, scholars, and policymakers to focus more on issues of human rights, to the extent that the entire concept of sovereignty as previously understood has come under increasing scrutiny. Of particular concern is the treatment of minorities or ethnic groups within a state. "Inalienable rights" adhere to every human being simply by virtue of that person's existence; these rights are not dependent on locale or system of government. Thus, when traditional notions of sovereignty cloak oppression and massive violations of human rights, increasingly the legitimacy of outside involvement outweighs the principle of internal primacy.

Advocates for human rights call for a new humanitarian order in which governments are held-by force, if necessary-to higher standards of respect for human life. Many contend that the protection of ethnic, religious, and other minorities endangered by conflict and alienated from a hostile government is now increasingly a recognized obligation of the international community. In the words of former UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, "We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."¹⁸ Thus, along with the broadening definition of national interest, the concept of sovereignty also requires reassessment. Sovereignty would no longer reside with states, but with the people within them.

The difficulty here, of course, is consistency. Taken to its logical limits, the guiding principle of morality and the primacy of human rights-that is, the international community's obligation to intervene wherever a state or group within a state fails to meet the humanitarian needs of its people-

will be impossible to enforce consistently. To do so would dictate intervention in every civil war. Obviously, potential cases for intervention far outstrip available resources. Intervention will have to be selective, and a moral principle applied unevenly will leave even well-intended international actors open to charges of hypocrisy, cowardice, neglect, or racism. Indeed, those who want to increase substantially the UN peacekeeping effort in Liberia already have compared the level of effort there with that in Bosnia and concluded that the peacekeeping operation is unlikely to be enhanced "because we are Africans, not Europeans. People say 'They are Africans. Let them kill each other.'" ¹⁹

Despite the pitfalls attending the application of moral principles to international situations, humanitarian concerns are likely to become an ever stronger rationale for action by individual states as well as regional and multinational organizations. The crux of the issue is whether this rationale will be accepted and acted upon by governments and publics. While every instance of significant violations of human rights will not result in the deployment of military forces from outside the country or region in conflict, the accumulation of cases in which force is applied may well give future violators pause. At the very least, the moral imperative makes shielding such violations from international view and censure essentially impossible.

International legal norms provide a framework of support for this moral imperative. There are treaties and conventions that codify legal norms related to human rights and violations thereof—it is not just a moral imperative, it is the *law*. Morality aside, the international community has some strong prudential reasons to strengthen and enforce the rule of law in the international system. Domestically, states prefer predictable, effective legal regimes because they promote political stability and economic growth and prosperity. Similarly, at the international level enforcement of the rule of law fosters an environment in which political stability and economic growth can flourish. Stability and the rule of law promote the general welfare.

(3) Responsibilities of Leadership

If the root causes of conflict are to be addressed in substantive and extended fashion, it will be essential to create and maintain an environment that protects, or at least strongly encourages respect for, fundamental human rights and provides the circumstances whereby people can pursue their livelihood in a society that provides opportunities for development and growth. Therefore, as increasingly violent conflicts threaten both regional stability and the effective functioning of the global economic system, international actors, particularly the major powers, cannot retreat from the responsibilities of leadership.

To be sure, national political leaders and, indeed, UN and regional organizations as well, will be reluctant to become engaged in risky, seemingly open-ended interventions unless some important national interest is at stake. Effective prevention regimes undoubtedly will have to be based on multinational action legitimated by declarations of support from the United Nations, a relevant regional organization, or an ad hoc coalition of involved and willing partners. Unilateral action remains a possibility, but will be limited, in all likelihood, to instances in which a nation's important interests are threatened or when a special relationship exists between the source of conflict and the intervening power. Over time, the accumulation of instances of successful prevention or intervention may well increase the confidence of national leaders in the ability of multinational forces to conduct such operations at acceptable levels of cost and risk. If practice does not exactly make perfect, experience certainly should facilitate the planning and execution of preventive interventions, particularly by regional organizations and the United Nations.

Participation by an increasing number of nations also will help spread the costs and risks of prevention. "Burden-sharing" all too often means that developed countries provide transportation and logistical capabilities, while others provide the soldiers that are in harm's way on a sustained basis. One of the responsibilities of leadership is sharing the personal risks, not just the financial costs of prevention.

The Road Ahead

The conclusion that peace will not keep itself is buttressed by all too much horrific evidence. The implications of this conclusion are much more contentious. A "business-as-usual" response to the forces at work in the post-Cold War world will produce heartfelt expressions of concern and remorse at the human and societal costs exacted by conflicts of extraordinary ferocity and seemingly unending duration, but little in the way of

concerted action until after the fact or unless the interests of a major power are threatened. A more engaged response suggests the need for nations, particularly the major powers, to broaden their concept of the national interest, to reconsider the traditional notion of sovereignty, and to endeavor to prevent the outbreak or escalation of instances of mass violence.

Critics of this more engaged approach argue that preventive intervention produces at best only short-term palliatives, while failing to alleviate the deeper causes of the conflict. To be sure, such may well be the case in some instances, and the desire to avoid open-ended commitments to "nation-building" likely will remain a fundamental imperative for national leaders contemplating the potential costs and benefits of intervention. On the other hand, a short-term intervention may well provide the basis for the development and initial implementation of long-term structural solutions. To paraphrase Lenin (who once observed that quantity has a quality all its own), preventing the outbreak or escalation of deadly conflict has a quality all its own.

The boundaries between peace, crisis, and war may be blurred, particularly in an ethnic conflict. Such a conflict may experience numerous periods of escalation, de-escalation, and apparent dormancy.²⁰ Inaction resulting from the view that short-term solutions do not redress the historical, cultural, religious, or territorial sources of conflict will be an alluring temptation, but cannot be the accepted norm if the incidence of deadly conflict is to be reduced. Certainly it is all too easy to accept the view that deadly conflict, particularly ethnic or religious conflict in the developing world, is a problem too difficult for the mechanisms of international adjudication to redress.

Dealing directly and effectively with the problem will take effort and leadership. What is quite clear is that military force and, even more so, threats of force that are credible and potent enough to support effectively a diplomatic-political strategy, have a distinctive role to play in the prevention of deadly conflict, whether it be through unilateral action or under the auspices of a multinational coalition or regional organization. What is also clear is that while diplomacy remains the preferred solution in conflict resolution, the use of force must not be considered only as a last resort.

FORCE CANNOT BE EXCLUSIVELY A LAST RESORT

The Lessons of History:

"All-or-Nothing" versus "Limited Objectives"

The premature declarations announcing the dawn of a more peaceful era following the fall of the Berlin Wall have not been borne out by experience. Rather than the end of history, the world is witnessing a return of history in the diversity of the sources of conflict. Since peace will not keep itself in this unpredictable and turbulent period, the use of military force or the threat of force, far from being rendered irrelevant or obsolete, has become a potentially more important instrument of statecraft in the prevention of deadly conflict. Indeed, the second major conclusion that emerges from this substantive consideration of the role of military force in the prevention of deadly conflict is that force is not, should not, and cannot be considered exclusively as a last resort.

As the preceding discussion argues in detail, the causes and incidence of conflict in the post-Cold War world dictate that states reassess their conception of the national interest, for it is this conception that provides the basis for state action (or inaction). Humanitarian issues or conflicts in regions deemed peripheral, once subordinated to the bipolar competition of the Cold War, can constitute legitimate security risks. Certainly a national security strategy based on the principle of expanding the community of market-based democracies requires recognition of the importance of preventing massive violations of human rights, wherever they occur.

Prevention does not require the indiscriminate broadening of a state's view of its important interests or a commitment to use force in every circumstance. What effective prevention does require is recognition of both the changed nature of national interests and the extent to which military force can be used in a variety of ways to support efforts to prevent deadly conflict. In traditional terms, what is needed now is a more potent linkage between interests, more broadly defined, and the use of military force to protect those interests.

The threat and actual use of force long have been accepted as necessary instruments of influence. However, the perceived lessons learned from actual force employments in the last three decades produce a contemporary view that recognizes both the necessity as well as the risks of resorting to force. Consequently, decision makers are left to determine under what conditions military force can be used effectively to attain different types of national objectives at an acceptable level of cost and risk.

In the United States, the loss of the Vietnam War and the 1983 bombing of the military compound in Beirut led to the discrediting of the doctrine of flexible response and the resurgence of what will be styled here the "all-or-nothing" approach to the use of military force. In 1984 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed perhaps the most well-known articulation of this view. Weinberger listed what he called six major tests that should be made in judging whether to employ U.S. military forces. Briefly stated, Weinberger's criteria are (1) commit forces only in the defense of vital national interests; (2) commit forces only with the clear intention of winning; (3) commit forces only if there are clearly defined political and military objectives; (4) continually reassess the relationship between objectives and forces, and adjust as necessary; (5) commit forces only with the support of the American people and their representatives in Congress; and (6) *commit forces only as a last resort* (emphasis added).²¹

Other influential policymakers supported Weinberger's lead. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell listed his own six questions that he argued had to be addressed before any decision to intervene was made: Is the political objective important, clearly defined, and understood? *Have all other nonviolent policy means failed?* (emphasis added) Will military force achieve the objective? What will the cost be? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? Once military force alters the situation, how will it develop further and what will the consequences be?²² General Powell felt strongly that if military force was to be used, it had to be used in overwhelming strength in order to accomplish the mission.

In May 1994 the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 25, its own policy statement on the use of U.S. military forces in multilateral peace operations.²³ In PDD-25, the number of criteria that had to be met or considered had grown to eight in the case of United Nations operations for which the United States would be asked to vote, 14 if the United States was expected to participate in peacekeeping operations, and 17 if the United States was to be asked to participate in combat operations.

In March 1996 Anthony Lake, President Clinton's assistant for national security affairs, described a somewhat different approach to considerations of the use of force. He cited seven justifications for the use of force: To defend against direct attacks on the United States; to counter aggression; to defend key economic interests; to preserve democracy; to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, or drug trafficking; to maintain U.S. reliability as an international partner; and for humanitarian purposes. While the list reflects the more varied missions that military forces could be called upon to accomplish in the post-Cold War environment, Lake's formulation concluded with the observation that force would only be used "once all peaceful means have been tried and failed. . ."²⁴

While the specifics of each set of criteria vary, the strategic approach they all share is that force should be used only as a last resort, after all the diplomatic and economic instruments of influence have failed. Of course, not everyone shared this view. Secretary of State George Shultz argued that diplomacy and force could not be separated completely. Responding to Secretary Weinberger in 1984, Shultz insisted that power and diplomacy always went together. In Shultz's view, the hard reality was that diplomacy not backed by strength (and the willingness to use it) was ineffectual.²⁵ Furthermore, Shultz felt strongly that force could not be used only as a last resort. As he noted in a speech to the Corps of Cadets at West Point, "If force is the last resort, it is the only resort."²⁶

Others as well argued against the "force as a last resort" and "all-or-nothing" views. In one of his last major speeches as president, George Bush noted that military force can be a useful backdrop to diplomacy, a complement to it, or even a temporary alternative. He also decried the search for a definitive set of rules for decision makers to apply when they are considering the use of force. In Bush's words, "there can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using force. Inevitably, the question of military intervention requires judgment. Each and every case is unique." He also challenged the view that force should only be considered in the event of threats to vital national interests. Indeed, he made the critical point

that the relative importance of an interest is not a guide for the appropriateness of the use of force: military force may not be the best way to safeguard a vital interest, while the use of force might be the best way to protect an important, but not vital, interest.²⁷

Events seemingly conspired to give the impression that the all-or-nothing approach indeed was the most appropriate response to the conflicts of the post-Cold War world. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact removed the direct threat to the survival of the United States and its allies. All other threats, almost by definition, did not imperil vital national interests. The overwhelming battlefield success of the coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm seemed to validate the Weinberger-Powell doctrine. The small but politically significant number of American military casualties in Somalia led to the rapid withdrawal of the remaining U.S. forces, with attendant criticisms of "mission creep" all but abolishing acknowledgment of the successes of the humanitarian operation that had, by all accounts, saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Somalis.

The conventional wisdom has been to overlearn the lessons of Somalia at the expense of strategic wisdom and real world experience. Military force has been effective throughout the world in the prevention of deadly conflict. The deployment of UN forces to Macedonia may well have played a critical role in preventing the conflict in Bosnia from spreading, thereby avoiding the attendant instabilities the widening of that conflict would have inflicted on neighboring countries. The imminent arrival of U.S. paratroopers focused the minds of the junta leaders in Haiti, leading to the reinstatement of the popularly elected president and subsequently to the first peaceful transfer of power between elected leaders there in 200 years. Military forces in the Sinai and in Cyprus have been deployed for so long that stability in these potentially volatile regions has become the rule rather than the exception. While no one can know for sure, the early application of force by NATO in the initial stages of the Bosnian conflict might have prevented or reduced the carnage of that war. Certainly it would be hard to argue that the results could have been any worse for the citizens of Bosnia.

The point here is not that the evaluative criteria described by Secretary Weinberger, General Powell, President Clinton, and others are inappropriate or inapplicable. Indeed, as the incidence of conflict in recent years has made abundantly clear, states and international organizations must have some reasonable procedures for deciding which of these seemingly endless conflicts warrant the commitment of military forces. Ideally, clearly defined political objectives provide the context for the development of clear military objectives. These circumstances enhance significantly the probability of the successful use of force, either to prevent deadly conflict or to bring it to a rapid conclusion. What is to be avoided is the rote application of a list of prerequisites in those instances where the perceived threat to national interests seems less acute or urgent.

To be sure, military force cannot succeed in preventing every conflict. No nation or international organization has the resources or the will to pursue such a standard. Furthermore, just as the use of force should not be regarded as the last resort in conflict prevention, neither should it become the first resort, a sort of international default setting that obscures the need for sustained diplomatic and economic efforts to deal with the structural causes of conflict. What must be avoided is a general state of paralysis, a condition where major powers and multinational organizations decry the incidence and level of violence while simultaneously assuaging their consciences with declarations about strategic interests and limited resources.

The consequences of inaction have become all too clear in the post-Cold War world: horrific levels of casualties, devastated communities, vast numbers of refugees, disrupted commerce and truncated economic development, discredited international norms of behavior, and national and regional instability.²⁸ Modern weapons give even minor powers enormous destructive capability. Intrastate, ethnic, and religious conflicts portend sustained levels of violence against those once considered "noncombatants." Women and children become symbols of heritage and culture, thereby making them "legitimate" targets for death and destruction. Lengthy conflicts reconfirm old hatreds or justify new ones, making the construction of any sort of civil society all the more difficult, if not impossible. Leaders exploit and inflame ethnic or other differences to serve their own interests and ambitions.

Military force cannot eliminate these conditions, but the prudent use of the military in preventing the outbreak or escalation of conflict can help to avoid or reduce the costs and consequences of deadly conflict. The pursuit of such "limited objectives" should be regarded not as naive idealism on the part of the United States and other major powers, but as an integral aspect of a strategy of enlightened self-interest.

Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy

The use of, or threat to use, military force to prevent the outbreak or escalation of deadly conflict necessarily involves the ability to deter or coerce; that is, to persuade an adversary not to follow an unacceptable course of action. (Deterrence represents an effort to dissuade an opponent from undertaking an action that has not been initiated; coercive diplomacy, or compellence, attempts to reverse actions that already have been undertaken by an adversary.) The requirements for the successful employment of a strategy of deterrence or coercive diplomacy are well known. Three are particularly applicable, since in their absence even a major power can fail to intimidate a weak opponent and find itself engaged in a protracted, costly conflict. First, the deterring or coercing power must create in the opponent's mind a sense of urgency for compliance with its demand. Second, the target nation or group must believe that the coercing power is more determined to achieve its stated demand than the target is to oppose it. Finally, there must be a threat of a military response that is credible enough and potent enough to persuade the adversary not to challenge the deterrer, or to accept the demands made by the side employing coercive diplomacy.²⁹

Elements of Successful Prevention

Credibility, capability, and communication become the sine qua non for successful prevention. A major challenge for deterring powers will be to determine what will dissuade an aggressive state or faction from initiating deadly violence. In order for deterrence or compellence to work, one must understand the aggressor's cost-benefit calculation. If an aggressor perceives that the benefits of a course of action will outweigh the costs, deterrence or coercion will fail. Therefore, the intervening powers will have to identify pivotal assets or interests that will influence the target's cost-benefit calculation and raise the perceived price of aggression to unacceptable levels.

Such calculations are extremely idiosyncratic; they should not be presumed to reflect simple "rational actor" assessments. Threats that effectively influence one target may be entirely irrelevant to the cost-benefit analysis of another. Therefore, deterrent and compellent strategies must be tailored in specific ways to fit the peculiar circumstances and actors in each situation. Preventive actions must take into account the cultural, political, historical, and even psychological variables that will affect the likelihood of success.³⁰ For example, a leader's perception of an impending humiliating retreat could engender a psychological reaction that makes such an action all but impossible to accept. Coercive actions by former colonial masters may engender strong resistance, while the same action by another, historically unattached, power could prove successful.

The degree to which these variables operate will be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain with any degree of precision. However, intervening powers must be aware of their importance and try to account for them during the development of a preventive strategy. At the very least, leaders must understand that there are few "standard operating procedures" that are likely to be valid regardless of the specifics of the individual case.

Credibility is perhaps the most critical aspect of a successful strategy of prevention. No one doubts that the major powers have the military ability to inflict significant levels of damage on the target state or group. Much less certain are views about the willingness of the major powers to use those abilities in a protracted way if deterrence or compellence fails. In order to establish and maintain credibility, intervening powers must be willing to carry out threats or promises, since force and the willingness to use it are the bases of deterrence and compellence. Perceptions of lack of will can dominate an aggressor's risk calculus, even in the face of overwhelming military force. In the case of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi ruler might have been deterred from invading his neighbor or compelled to withdraw from its territory had he been convinced that the United States was not only concerned about the effects of his invasion, but concerned enough to engage in a war in which it might sustain heavy casualties.³¹

It is the target's perception of the intervening power's impotence or lack of resolve that emboldens warlords, dictators, and aggressors. In this regard, the domestic constraints on U.S. leaders seem particularly salient. Despite being acknowledged as the world's foremost military power, the

fragmented decision-making apparatus of the U.S. government and the lack of consensus about the role of the United States in the post-Cold War era combine to cast significant doubts about the credibility of U.S. threats to use force in a sustained and potentially costly way. The failure of American will in Vietnam gives substance to such doubts. The vote in the Senate to support Operation Desert Storm prior to the Gulf War was hardly overwhelming, and the extreme ambivalence about the deployment of U.S. troops to Haiti and Bosnia indicates that public support for such endeavors is fragile and uncertain at best. The lessons of the October 3, 1993, fight in Mogadishu in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed have not been lost on those who would test U.S. resolve in the future.

Effective communication of intent and resolve is not so easy as one might surmise in this era of instantaneous global communications. Two problems complicate the matter. First, in almost any preventive situation, there will be multiple audiences involved. The (perhaps idealized) view of two unitary, rational actors involved in a bargaining process is no longer valid, if it ever was. The compelling power must deal with the target nation or group, factions that may exist within the target nation or group, as well as interested allies or adversaries of both sides, regional organizations that may be involved, and the United Nations or other international organizations.

As the number of actors involved has grown, the ability to communicate with them separately has essentially disappeared. Messages tailored for one particular participant cannot be kept privileged for long. Diplomatic positioning is much more difficult when the process is largely transparent. Interested parties can exert influence on the internal decision-making processes of both sides. The composition of different actors and the relationships among all of them make it much more difficult to influence the actions of the "opponent."

Messages intended to communicate resolve to an opponent can affect the willingness of other actors to compromise. In Bosnia, for example, actions that were designed to signal NATO resolve to the Serbs seemed to have encouraged the Bosnian Muslims to adopt a harder line, anticipating that they could hold out for a better deal in any subsequent agreement that might be reached. The inherent characteristics of intrastate conflicts ensure that the difficulties engendered by multiple audiences and simultaneous communications will affect the development of a credible deterrent or compellent strategy.

The magnitude of the demands made on the target nation or group obviously will influence the probability of success of a deterrent or compellent action. The more one asks of an adversary, the less likely a favorable outcome. Opposition engenders even more potent threats, as leaders harden their positions in the face of external demands. For the intervening power, credibility becomes an end in itself. Leaders of the target nation or group perceive the legitimacy of their rule to be at stake.

Intrastate conflicts are particularly susceptible to this action-reaction cycle. In ethnic or civil wars, the strongly preferred outcome for both sides is the elimination of the opposition. Coercive or deterrent action to prevent deadly conflict will be difficult to develop and implement. However, responsible leaders should not throw up their hands in despair, unwilling or unable to make threats of force that are sufficiently credible and potent. While preventive action may not be able to preclude conflict entirely, military force can be used to establish clear limits on intolerable behavior.

The Bosnian example again seems relevant here. No deterrent or compellent action short of occupation may have been sufficient to prevent civil war in the former Yugoslavia. However, during the course of the conflict, when the United Nations or NATO made specific, limited demands on the Serbs and demonstrated their willingness to enforce those demands with military action, the Serbs generally adhered to the limits that were drawn. Examples of these limited objectives include the opening of the Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the establishment of no-fly zones.³² Similar restrictions have been imposed elsewhere, such as the no-fly zones in Iraq.

The major point here is not that the international community should be satisfied with the establishment of limits that prevent the most egregious of excesses. Rather, it is to describe the dynamics at work in any situation involving threats to use force and to demonstrate the strong connection between the nature of demands and the probability of success of preventive action. The experiences of the post-Cold War era demonstrate vividly the need for the international community to improve its ability to engage in timely preventive action. Toward that fundamental end, the use of force cannot be exclusively a last resort.

Successful prevention will require the implementation of what some call the "glass of water" strategy.³³ The analogy is that of using a glass of water to extinguish a spark before it becomes a raging inferno requiring much more substantial effort to put out. The timely use of force or threat to use force may preclude the need for much costlier efforts later.

However conceptually appealing this approach may be, in reality nations will continue to be reluctant to intervene if the commitment seems ill-defined or open-ended, which most incipient conflicts are likely to be. An implication of the all-or-nothing approach to the use of force is the requirement for clearly defined military objectives. Certainly such clarity of purpose shapes the size and nature of the employment. Yet there are few situations involving deadly conflict in which one can with confidence clearly delineate what will happen during the course of events. Things change; the introduction of military force into a situation changes the very nature of that situation. How can decision makers square this circle of the need for timely and credible action while at the same time having some specific idea of what the action is intended to accomplish?

A Rolling Assessment

The notion of a "rolling assessment" provides one such solution. A decision to intervene will be made based on an assessment of the situation at the time. A level of force appropriate to the task at the outset may become less credible as conditions change. Therefore, leaders need to make continual assessments of the operation and of its political environment and make strategic and operational adjustments as required. If the situation on the ground changes, then both political and military leaders must reexamine their objectives and the prospective costs of the operation. The course of a conflict can be erratic and unpredictable; the situation may reach a point where intervention is no longer warranted or where it requires a level of commitment in order to be credible that the intervening power(s) neither wants nor can fulfill.

This rolling assessment performs two critical functions. First, it projects to the public the fact that leaders have clear political objectives and that the intervention has a focused purpose and role. If the path to the achievement of those objectives becomes too costly or ambiguous, leaders will recognize the need to extricate the nation from the commitment. Second, the rolling assessment enables leaders to use the most effective combination of military, diplomatic, and economic tools for the particular situation. A change in the nature of the conflict, therefore, may warrant a modification in the nature and extent of the response.

To be sure, leaders certainly monitor the progress of any intervention involving their forces. One advantage of codifying the notion of rolling assessment is that it facilitates the use of military force early in a crisis, thereby enhancing the probability of preventing a deadly conflict, while at the same time assuaging public concerns about the costs and risks of intervening. A second advantage is that a rolling assessment commits political and military leaders to continuous evaluations of the situation, accepts a priori the possibility that changes or unforeseen consequences could result in significant changes in policy, and, it is hoped, reduces the trauma of terminating an intervention in the face of unacceptable costs.

What would be the effect on domestic and international credibility if such a rolling assessment were to lead to withdrawal from a particular conflict? Surely there would be domestic political costs: casualties incurred, resources expended, expectations dashed, political capital consumed. Would credibility suffer, making future interventions more difficult? An environment in which force is accepted as a useful instrument in preventing deadly conflict but in which unacceptable costs are not borne in the name of credibility would seem to foster, over time, the view that prevention is an important goal of the international community and that *timely* intervention is the key to successful prevention. Not every attempt at prevention will succeed, but rolling assessment will enhance both public support and credibility by helping to avoid the catastrophic intervention that makes subsequent attempts politically impossible.

Toward a System of Prevention

Building the political will to broaden the concept of the national interest and to consider the use of force as something other than the last resort is a mammoth political challenge, but one that is necessary for the successful prevention of deadly conflict. Both civilian and military leaders must be cognizant of the costs associated with the use of force and with the potential constraints on its employment. Military officials must accept the fact

that crisis management remains the responsibility of political leaders. Political leadership provides legitimacy and credibility to ongoing missions while setting the stage for potential future actions.

The requirement for an ever-closer relationship between force and diplomacy engenders a parallel requirement for ever-closer communications between political and military leaders, with mutual appreciation for the pressures on both groups that inevitably arise. Without close communication and such mutual appreciation between political and military leaders, the potential for misunderstanding will be great, with subsequently deleterious effects on the efficacy of the intervention.

However straightforward this conclusion may seem, in practice it contradicts the conventional wisdom about leaving the conduct of military operations to the military professionals. Military leaders will have to accommodate the involvement of political leaders in what have been presumed in the past to be operational issues. Political leaders will have to avoid the temptation to micromanage ongoing operations. More important, national leaders will have to avoid overreacting to tactical setbacks, thereby possibly conferring strategic consequences to essentially tactical events. The U.S. response to the battle in Mogadishu, Somalia, in which 18 American soldiers were killed illustrates the effect that individual events can have on national policy.

The argument here is that prevention is not simply deterrence or compellence incognito. To be sure, both are subsumed in the concept of prevention, but prevention must entail the construction of a broader *system*, one which develops both the short- and long-term policies needed to prevent violence and to assist states in the development of more effective instruments of governance. Blandishments as well as inducements will need to be part of a successful system of prevention. Links between responsible nonviolent behavior and the promise of reward through fuller integration into the international economic and political systems provide the "carrot." The timely use of military force to prevent the outbreak or escalation of violence and punish those whose behavior violates accepted norms of behavior supplies the "stick."

The use of force and threats of force, then, must be an integral aspect of the system of prevention. More specifically, their use should not be held in abeyance until all other options have been exhausted. Force and threats of force should be considered with, not after, diplomatic and economic measures. Equally important, sanctions and other instruments of influence should not be considered in a vacuum; force or the threat of force should be considered as a viable supplement to other instruments. The belief that force exists only as the last rung on a ladder of potential responses deprives nations and multilateral organizations of flexibility and influence. Reinforcing diplomatic and economic instruments with "teeth" will lend credibility to deterrent proclamations and weight to the implementation of coercive measures.

The Menu of Military Options

The term "use of military force" conjures up images of legions of tanks, fighting vehicles, helicopters, and high-performance aircraft engaged in massive struggles that produce significant damage and numbers of casualties. In fact, military forces can be used in numerous ways and combinations to help prevent, contain, or resolve a conflict. Indeed, many of the imaginative ways in which military forces can be used require only relatively few forces engaging in essentially nonviolent activities. The following discussion is only suggestive, not definitive, in its description of the roles that military forces can play in a system of prevention. The following are some examples of how military forces can be used:

- Military assets can be used to provide independent and reliable intelligence and other information about an incipient or ongoing crisis through technical surveillance means of various kinds, military observers, or military advisors assigned to one or both sides. Such means could be used to acquire data on levels and sophistication of armaments, state of training of military units, unusual or massive movements of troops and equipment, etc.
- Military-to-military contacts have become a major post-Cold War mission for the armies of developed countries. Such contacts are intended not only to assess and improve the state of training of the host-country forces, but to demonstrate the proper role of a military establishment in a democracy and the appropriate relationship between political and military leaders. The professional education of military elites and future leaders may reduce the propensity of military establishments in developing countries to seize and maintain control of the government.
- The preventive deployment of small "tripwire forces" can contain a conflict or prevent its escalation or spread. Such deployments can be at borders around a conflict area, internally between conflicting groups, at critical communications or economic centers, etc. The United Nations deployment to

Macedonia is a good example of a preventive deployment. Such demonstrations of commitment must be accompanied by strong political signals. Preventive deployments must be accompanied by political and diplomatic efforts to solve the potential threat to peace that inspired the deployment. A combination of strong political signals, the demonstration of resolve through deployments on the ground, and continuous efforts to resolve the underlying problems are key to the success of preventive deployments.

- The commitment of deployed forces to demonstrate resolve was a common feature of the Cold War era. The Berlin Garrison demonstrated both allied resolve and the grave consequences that aggression would entail. NATO armies defended the inner-German border for four decades. The UN forces in Korea continue to separate hostile armies 43 years after the armistice. There is no reason to believe that in the post-Cold War era substantial numbers of forces could not be deployed for considerable periods of time to prevent the outbreak of war between hostile neighbors, particularly if those neighbors were armed with weapons of mass destruction.
- Military forces have been used extensively in traditional peacekeeping roles as "intervening" forces to ensure the effective implementation of a cease-fire agreement or peace treaty. U.S. forces have been stationed in the Sinai since the Camp David Accords of 1979. Peacekeeping forces in Cyprus have been on duty even longer. The dramatic increase in the number of UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations in the last five years indicates both the need for and the legitimacy of the use of military forces for such missions in the post-Cold War era. Developing nations can make significant contributions to peacekeeping operations.
- Humanitarian interventions can prevent or arrest mass starvation, relieve the suffering following natural disasters, or aid refugees fleeing from deadly conflict. The ultimate fate of the UN mission to Somalia notwithstanding, the humanitarian aspect of the operation must be judged a legitimate and effective use of military force. Relief efforts in Rwanda did not prevent the tragedy there, but they did bring some level of relief to the survivors.
- Military force can be used to impose, control, and enforce economic embargoes. The sanctions imposed on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait are still largely in place, enforced by military forces, five years after the end of the war. Sanctions imposed on Serbia during the fighting in Bosnia were enforced by both ground and naval units.
- Military forces can be employed to stop-or at least reduce-atrocities during a conflict. Techniques can range from observation and reliable reporting- thereby identifying the culprit-to the use of military forces to stop such acts through the demonstration and use of force. Punitive air strikes or extensive blockades can raise significantly the cost of aggression or the massive violation of human rights.
- Military forces can be deployed to protect key installations such as communications sites, population or refugee centers, dams and hydroelectric stations, etc. Military forces also can assist in keeping communications and logistics supply lines open in order to provide food and other supplies to the civilian population living in the conflict area. Such missions could include using military forces to protect convoys, restore or rebuild bridges, telecommunications centers, energy and water supply systems, and other critical infrastructure assets.
- At the higher end of the scale, military forces can be used for what are styled peace enforcement operations. In the absence of a peace agreement between the warring parties, intervening forces can be used to enforce a cease-fire or separate the belligerents. Military forces also can be used to remove illegitimate governments that have seized power from duly constituted authority, as the United States did in Haiti.
- Finally, military forces can be used to stop or overturn the results of aggression. Timely intervention may prevent the outbreak of full-scale war or deter aggression. The rapid return of U.S. forces to Kuwait in December 1994 demonstrated both resolve and capability. Of course, the coalition of forces that defeated Iraq in the Persian Gulf War is a textbook example of the use of force to reverse the results of aggression.

This menu of the potential uses of military force should not obscure the fact that although military force is often a necessary component of an effective system of prevention, it is seldom a sufficient one. The role of military force is to provide political leaders with as many options as possible in their efforts to prevent deadly conflict. Effective prevention will always be a complex and challenging task, one requiring strong and resourceful leaders who can build the necessary political support at home and, if need be, also create the requisite international agreement and support for the use of military force.

The Capabilities-Interest Gap

If one accepts the proposition that force and threats of force are not a last resort, then the challenge becomes one of recognizing when and how to use them. All conflicts are not "created equal." Each should be examined individually to determine its significance, its level of threat to national or international interests, and the likelihood of success if force were used. Since the paths that these conflicts can follow are in many cases impossible to predict with precision as to specific detail or with confidence as to final outcome, they can develop into overwhelming, seemingly intractable problems. Therefore, the sooner the response to the violence, the greater the likelihood that its emergence or escalation can be curbed. In Rwanda, intervention may well have prevented enormous loss of life, just as the intervention in Somalia, for all its ultimate problems, saved thousands of innocent people from starvation.

In cases such as Mozambique, Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia, UN forces prevented the escalation of violence by monitoring elections, troop withdrawals, and cease-fire lines. The fact that "force" was on the ground during periods of significant tension and transition indicates that it is a critical element in the successful prevention of violence. The conclusion here is as simple as it is compelling: *Force and threats of force work*. Not always completely, and not without cost. But the available evidence suggests strongly that the early use of force or threats of force by individual nations or multilateral organizations can prevent the emergence or escalation of deadly conflict.

Whatever the potential benefits of the early application of force, the fact remains that for the foreseeable future nations will be reluctant to commit their forces in preventive situations unless important national interests are threatened. In some cases, such as the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, that traditional approach is satisfactory. In others, such as the tribal violence in Rwanda, it clearly is not. The capabilities for successful prevention exist, but the absence of a compelling interest reduces the likelihood of timely engagement.

One solution proposed for the resolution of this "capabilities-interest gap" is the creation of a standing military force under the auspices of the United Nations. (My purpose here is not to evaluate the operational advantages and difficulties associated with the various proposals, but only to describe the alternative approaches.) In light of the reluctance of nations to commit their forces to intrastate conflicts in regions of less than vital interest, assembling an effective military response to a crisis usually requires a significant amount of time, if it can be done at all. A standing UN rapid-reaction force could alleviate this problem and be employed in concert with, not in place of, other instruments of influence. The glass-of-water strategy is relevant here: a trained force arriving at the scene of potential violence as soon as the enabling resolution has been passed by the Security Council likely will be more effective than a larger national or multinational force arriving later. An immediate response force would be unimpeded by national political considerations, would enhance the credibility of the United Nations, and would, hopefully, lower the ultimate cost of the intervention. Since the Security Council would have to authorize the deployment of the rapid-reaction force, member states would retain a say in its use. The rapid-reaction force would not replace traditional peacekeepers; it would be trained to carry out normal military functions and operations as well as to handle unanticipated events.³⁴

An alternative to the creation of a standing UN force is the development of a standing force composed of national elements that remain in their respective countries but are "dedicated" to UN-sanctioned rapid-reaction missions. The division of labor would be worked out in advance. For example, nations such as the United States could commit strategic airlift and sealift capabilities, while others contributed troops, supplies, communications equipment, engineers, and so on. Just such an arrangement has been implemented for potential action in Burundi. For such an arrangement to be effective over time, nations would "dedicate" their contributions for specific periods of time, rather than waiting for an incipient crisis before responding.

A variation of the "dedicated forces" concept entails the creation of a standing operational-level headquarters in the United Nations that would be responsible for the planning and advance preparations that are critical for a rapid-reaction force to work. The headquarters could establish, maintain, and operate an early-warning system designed to identify areas of likely or imminent conflict. The headquarters also would conduct contingency planning as well as maintain liaison with regional organizations and agencies. It would develop the training objectives for the component forces dedicated to the United Nations, and deploy with those forces when they are authorized to do so by the Security Council.

Whatever one's view on the desirability of a UN standing rapid-reaction force or one composed of dedicated national elements, it is increasingly clear that the international community needs to reappraise the Cold War mindset regarding when to use force. For preventive action to succeed, potential aggressors must believe that the international community has the capabilities and the will to punish aggression. Force is relevant in prevention to deter or coerce aggressors, to lend credibility to threats, and to complement other diplomatic and economic instruments. This closer connection between force and diplomacy warrants a more intimate relationship between political and military leaders to lessen the potential for misperception, miscommunication, and misunderstanding. Military force is available in a variety of forms to accomplish a variety of tasks. The early use of the military may prevent the outbreak of violence and establish the conditions for the development of long-term political and economic solutions. To be sure, not every conflict can be prevented. But many, particularly intrastate conflicts, can be prevented or limited in duration and scope. Peace will not keep itself in the post-Cold War world, but the timely use of military force can reduce the incidence and destructiveness of deadly conflict.

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF LEADERSHIP

The experiences of the post-Cold War period provide the basis for some useful judgments on the use of the military for prevention and some unavoidable implications for both nations and international organizations. The incidence and cost of deadly conflict in the very few years since the end of the Cold War have contributed to the increasingly firm conviction that the international community is better served by using force or threats of force early to prevent the outbreak or escalation of conflict. The economic imperatives of the glass-of-water strategy have become more and more appreciated: Clearly it is the developed nations of the West that have paid or will pay to restore areas devastated by deadly conflict. Prevention is clearly less expensive than restoration. As a direct consequence of this conviction on the early use of force, the role of the United Nations in conflict prevention has increased significantly.

The data on the expanded number and scope of UN operations are well known. From 1948 to 1988 the United Nations conducted 13 peacekeeping operations, which typically consisted of deploying observers or peacekeeping troops to enforce an already agreed-upon cease-fire. Since 1988, the United Nations has conducted 22 peace operations that have pursued a wide range of new and challenging missions, including preventive diplomacy, the establishment of safe havens, protection of refugees, re-establishment of governments, and supervision of elections. The United Nations has deployed more than 70,000 military personnel to locations throughout the world, with 16 operations ongoing presently. What the UN involvement in nearly every military operation in the last six years reflects is the extent to which the United Nations provides legitimacy, as well as institutional oversight in some cases, for the use of military force in the post-Cold War world.

Employing Military Force

The post-Cold War era has seen an evolution in the political framework within which force is employed. This new perspective is reflected particularly in changing views toward UN authorization for use-of-force operations under both Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN charter. The number and diversity of UN operations, as well as the complexity of the tasks they have been employed to accomplish, have focused renewed attention on the legal and practical bases, distinctions, and limitations of these endeavors. During the past six years, the international community has conducted or sanctioned three rather different types of missions: Traditional peacekeeping operations conducted under the provisions of Chapter VI; peace enforcement operations in accordance with Chapter VII; and missions that fall outside the definitions of either Chapter VI or VII, dubbed Chapter VI 1/2.

Conceptually, Chapter VI missions are relatively straightforward. They require consent by the warring parties to the presence of peacekeeping forces to maintain a cease-fire or other agreement. The presence of peacekeeping forces allows political negotiations to proceed in a more stable atmosphere. Peacekeeping forces are lightly armed and are neither required nor prepared to impose solutions on the combatants. During the Cold War, the majority of peacekeeping missions were postconflict operations intended to separate the belligerents and prevent the reignition of conflict. Donor state reluctance to introduce forces to hostile circumstances, and recognition by states in crisis of the need for outside help, suggest that classical Chapter VI peacekeeping might be more effective as a preconflict measure-while there is still peace to keep-rather than a postconflict response.

Nonetheless, the evidence of the past eight years clearly indicates that the United Nations is competent to execute Chapter VI missions where there is consent by the warring parties for UN involvement. The presence of UN troops or observers before a crisis escalates can help prevent tensions from escalating into conflict or from spilling over from neighboring states. Traditional peacekeeping operations should remain multilateral efforts that are impartial and provide a suitable atmosphere for substantive political negotiations or for the implementation of the provisions of a peace treaty or cease-fire agreement. Although it is not a UN operation, the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai is an example of a mission that helped to maintain the peace in the aftermath of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel. UN forces in Macedonia undoubtedly helped keep the conflict in Bosnia from spreading.

Of course, the conceptual and legal clarity of Chapter VI operations do not guarantee their success. The difficulties and dangers encountered by peacekeeping forces in Somalia and Bosnia resulted in more than 200 deaths among the peacekeepers. The "consent" of the belligerents

dissipated in both instances, putting the peacekeepers in untenable positions. Repeated instances of such occurrences may well lead countries that have traditionally supplied troops for peacekeeping missions to reassess their policies and adopt a more guarded approach to contributing their forces, particularly where the peace is perceived to be fragile.

For all of the operational effectiveness of UN-sanctioned peacekeeping missions, the dramatic increase in their number has engendered enormous financial costs that the United Nations is ill-equipped to bear. In the early 1980s, the budget for peace operations was just over \$400 million. By the late 1980s, costs had doubled to about \$820 million. By 1994 the costs had grown to \$3.6 billion. Concern about overstaffing and inefficient use of resources in nonmilitary aspects of UN operations has led some nations, notably the United States, to question their annual assessment from the United Nations and, in some instances, to refuse to pay the entire³⁵ assessment. U.S. arrears to the UN total about \$700 million. Some accommodation between major donor nations and the United Nations will have to be made if the UN is to be able to fund the level of peace operations that has become "normal" in the post-Cold War period.

Chapter VII missions are also conceptually and operationally straightforward, although they are more difficult to execute than traditional peacekeeping missions. Resolutions authorizing the use of force under the provisions of Chapter VII are, in essence, declarations of war. Chapter VII operations are undertaken to reverse the results of aggression, to enforce peace between warring parties without their approval, or to respond when an important national security interest has been threatened.

During the Cold War, states justified their use of force on the basis of perceived threats to national security. The imprimatur of the United Nations was not, with some notable exceptions, used to legitimize the use of force. In the post-Cold War world, a UN resolution "authorizing" the use of force clearly has become more important. Furthermore, the UN provides the multilateral framework within which regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions can pursue their interests, by force if necessary. The Persian Gulf War is the most dramatic example of this approach. More recently, the United Nations authorized the United States to organize a multinational task force to intervene in Haiti.

The end of the East-West rivalry and the increased incidence of intrastate conflicts that produce very high levels of violence have led to a reevaluation of the traditional concept of state sovereignty. As noted above, the international community increasingly has come to accept the notion that international law does indeed permit intervention in a state to save citizens from their own rulers. In his 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali suggested that the United Nations might be compelled to intervene in the domestic affairs of nations in certain circumstances, such as a breakdown of civil authority, gross violations of human rights, or when internal events threaten international peace or stability.³⁶

As a result of the intensification of intrastate conflicts and the reassessment of what falls within a state's "domestic jurisdiction," the United Nations has become involved in more complex operations that do not fall neatly into the categories of Chapter VI or Chapter VII missions. These "gray zone" or Chapter VI 1/2 operations refer to those where consent by all warring parties is ambiguous or absent and where more robust peace enforcement may be required. For example, Saddam Hussein's repression of the Kurd and Shiite citizens of Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War led to the establishment and enforcement of secure zones in northern and southern Iraq where Iraqi troops and aircraft are forbidden to enter.

In light of the nationalist and ethnic tensions most likely to lead to the eruption of deadly conflict in the years ahead, the need for these conceptually messy and operationally difficult Chapter VI 1/2 operations almost certainly will be more prevalent in the future. There are differing views on the nature and extent of the challenges posed by Chapter VI 1/2 operations. To be sure, difficulties will arise when consent is not forthcoming from all parties involved. Intervening troops could be forced into a position of "peacekeeping with no peace to keep." Correctly assessing the nature of the challenge will be crucial if any mission is to have a reasonable chance of success. Since the size, armament, rules of engagement, and behavior of peacekeeping forces are very different from those intended to enforce peace, those operations that fall between the two clearly delineated functions will be the most vexing. Nonetheless, they will be an important aspect of any preventive system, and there may well be less ambiguity than is popularly believed when crafting these political-military strategies.

Three distinct approaches have been proposed for how to narrow the "gray zone" associated with these operations. One approach espouses the view that the United Nations can simply muddle through the "undefined" aspects of Chapter VI 1/2 operations. The "stick with it" approach is predicated on the assumption that the presence of peacekeeping forces is more helpful than harmful in conflict prevention situations. Peacekeepers can constantly reassess the situation on the ground and make adjustments as necessary, adjustments that may include a change in the UN mandate or a significant shift in operational outlook. The "rolling assessment" technique described earlier is particularly applicable to these types of situations. In the view of this approach to dealing with ambiguous or complex operations, the United Nations is actively learning from each new experience how to deal with these missions and has been reducing the level of uncertainty associated with Chapter VI 1/2 operations.

A second perspective holds that there really is no "gray zone" between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations, but that there is actually a "zone of paralysis" that makes progress all but unobtainable. Since under the UN mandate peacekeepers must remain neutral, they will be unable to perform their duties and could well be held hostage or even assaulted by one or more of the warring parties. Proponents of this view argue that the situation that confronted the peacekeepers in Bosnia prior to the Dayton agreement is a case in point. The credibility and effectiveness of the peacekeeping force continued to plummet as peacekeepers' actions were constrained by their mandate and by the increasingly aggressive action on the part of the belligerents. In the end, the peacekeepers were hostages, literally taken captive in some cases, or were subjected to hostile fire.

In this view, "peacekeepers with no peace to keep" cannot alternate between being neutral keepers of an agreed-upon set of conditions and enforcers that by definition will engage in coercive behavior, possibly even combat. In such circumstances, it is impossible then to revert to the previous status of neutral observers. Therefore, peacekeeping forces should not be deployed in the absence of a peace to keep. If the conditions under which peacekeeping forces were deployed change, they should be withdrawn and, if properly sanctioned, replaced by a more appropriately equipped and instructed peace enforcement mission.

The third approach to dealing with the ambiguities of such operations seeks to remedy the possibility of paralysis by adjusting the traditional concept that UN peacekeeping forces must remain neutral. Maintaining neutrality is challenging when there is a clear transgressor and cooperation under the terms of the deployment is not forthcoming. Consequently, there may be circumstances when the maintenance of neutrality is not only difficult, but actually detrimental to the likelihood of a successful mission. Knowledge that the UN force is equipped and authorized to respond to violations of treaty terms or to acts of violence directed against it or its protected population could well have a deterrent effect on potential aggressors. The "meanest dog on the block" approach adopted by NATO forces deployed to Bosnia to enforce the Dayton accords seems to have reduced the temptation, at least initially, to test the resolve of the newly arriving forces.

This approach would, of course, entail changes to traditional notions of how peacekeeping forces are organized, equipped, and instructed. The deterrent effect on potential aggressors might also spill over onto those who were contemplating contributing troops to the mission. On the other hand, the chance to prevent a deadly conflict that could easily produce hundreds of thousands of casualties, such as was the case in Rwanda, makes the "suspension of neutrality" approach perhaps a necessary aspect of an effective prevention regime.

Managing Military Forces

An issue closely related to the types of missions military forces will be called upon to accomplish is the concept for managing multinational operations. An in-depth discussion of the practical issues associated with the management of military operations is beyond the scope of this analysis. The purpose here is simply to identify the different management schemes available in the post-Cold War era and to make some preliminary observations about their utility in light of the experiences of the past six years.

Three organizing schemes are available for the management of multinational military operations. (Unilateral action is always possible, but does not involve managing international forces.) These three options are (1) the United Nations; (2) regional organizations; and (3) ad hoc coalitions.³⁷ What lessons, if any, can we draw from recent experience about the efficacy of each approach?

Today, the United Nations does not have the capability to manage deployed multinational forces. It lacks the command, control, and communications capabilities needed to provide real-time supervision of operational forces. UN communications and monitoring capabilities have improved significantly in recent years, but remain inadequate to serve as an operational headquarters. The United Nations can supervise peacekeeping forces on essentially stable missions where both sides accept their presence and the probability of substantial conflict is low.

Of course, the development of a UN rapid-reaction force would put the organization directly in the command and control business. Consequently, the creation of such a force would have to be accompanied by the acquisition of the sophisticated infrastructure and trained personnel required to operate and maintain such capabilities. If the "dedicated forces" concept were put into practice, it likewise would entail the requirement for modern command and control facilities if the efforts of the contributing nations were to be coordinated effectively. The need for rapid deployment often necessary for effective preventive action only exacerbates the requirement for worldwide command and control capabilities.

Regional organizations would, at first glance, seem likely candidates to provide management oversight for military forces deployed in their regions. However, these organizations generally suffer from the same lack of resources and infrastructure as does the United Nations. The clear exception, of course, is NATO. But NATO took a long time to develop, and its capabilities reflect decades of political discourse, the development of alliance-wide operating procedures, and the sustained commitment of substantial financial resources. No other regional organization can match its political, organizational, and financial capabilities.

Despite these shortcomings, there are opportunities for regional organizations to contribute to prevention activities. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have potential that could be developed. Indeed, the multinational (but largely Nigerian) peacekeeping force in Liberia was deployed under the auspices of ECOWAS. Other regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity, have established histories of diplomatic involvement in regional crises. However, if regional organizations other than NATO are to become effective mechanisms for the management of crises and the command and control of deployed military forces, they will need to devote considerable political effort and financial resources to the task. Preventive action would seem an appropriate place to start for the development of integrated planning and coordinating capabilities.

In the absence of robust UN or regional capabilities for the management of military forces, ad hoc coalitions become, almost by default, the most promising mechanism for instituting preventive action or peace operations. A "coalition of the willing" could be employed for deterrence of potential aggression, humanitarian aid operations, peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, or conventional war against a common foe. The obvious advantage of this arrangement is that the participants are all volunteers. The difficulties are those associated with any military operation, but exacerbated by the multinational aspect of the endeavor: command and control, logistics, strategic and tactical lift, effective sharing of intelligence information, and differing employment doctrines and levels of operational sophistication.

The coalition that conducted the Persian Gulf War is the most obvious example of this arrangement. But even this successful endeavor revealed the pressures to which any coalition is subject, particularly differing views of acceptable goals. Therefore, any ad hoc coalition will have to be based on some fundamental level of agreement about the desirability of the mission, its likely duration and cost, and the goals it is intended to accomplish.

On the other hand, ad hoc coalitions can be formed quickly, and they are not subject to the (potentially lengthy) deliberative procedures common in more established organizations. Consequently, coalitions may be the most responsive mechanisms for prevention, enabling interested parties to act in concert quickly. A preventive system that can identify likely hotspots will enhance the probability of successful preventive action by ad hoc coalitions, presumably with the approval of the United Nations or relevant regional organizations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

This assessment of the post-Cold War world has produced three significant conclusions: Peace will not keep itself; force should not be used exclusively as a last resort in the prevention of deadly conflict; and there are important lessons about the use and management of military force that have been learned from recent experience. What do these conclusions imply for national and international leaders?

First, it is clear that prevention matters. Preventing deadly conflicts not only saves lives, it will also facilitate the establishment of structural mechanisms for the management of the still-emerging post-Cold War system. Whatever the ultimate shape of that system, preventing the outbreak or escalation of deadly conflicts is an essential aspect of regional and even global stability. Early forceful action can preclude conflict and prevent the need for more complex and more costly operations in its wake.

Traditional peacekeeping operations will continue to be a routine aspect of international life. But they will be used only when both sides of a conflict agree to arbitration and to the interposition of peacekeeping forces. The majority of peace operations in the future likely will fall into the more nebulous and dangerous category of peacemaking. Therefore, force that is credible enough to deter or coerce, deployed prior to the outbreak of conflict, will preclude the subsequent requirement for conducting difficult and potentially costly Chapter VI 1/2 operations.

Although Chapter VII operations can be successful when a forceful leader guides international action, most states will continue to be hesitant to participate in such operations unless clear and important interests are at stake. Undeniably, preventive action must become an increasingly familiar aspect of the international system if we are to reduce the incidence of violence that has become more prevalent, more destructive, and more difficult to contain.

Prevention can work. In 1992, the United Nations authorized the deployment of troops to Macedonia to prevent conflict from erupting within its borders or from spreading into Macedonia from the other Balkan states, where conflict is ongoing. What can we learn from this successful instance of prevention? What were the conditions that attended the deployment of UN troops for this preventive action? Are there other countries or regions where the deployment of force can be used to prevent the spread of conflict from neighboring areas?

What we do know is that no serious intervention will occur without strong international leadership to provide a base of support for the action. Political will is directly related to public perceptions of the desirability and feasibility of the endeavor. Leaders must convince their publics that the benefits associated with preventing deadly conflicts outweigh the costs.

Since the decision to act multilaterally is derived unilaterally, countries need to be given the incentive to act in concert with others. Structuring such incentives is no easy task. The accumulation of successful "preventions" may well reduce the reluctance to participate, but acquiring such a record will require the commitment of the military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities of the major powers for the foreseeable future. In the end, leadership and acceptance of the responsibilities attendant to membership in the international community will provide the basis for multilateral action.

No system of conflict prevention will be perfect. The use of force remains an integral aspect of international relations. The traditional causes of conflict have, if anything, reemerged with suddenness and ferocity in the post-Cold War world. The end of the superpower competition and the enormous attendant changes in the dynamics of the international system affirm the need for significant adjustments in traditional conceptions of the national interest and the use of force. Those who contemplate the use of violence to achieve their aims must confront an international community that will, when necessary, respond forcefully to prevent the outbreak or escalation of deadly conflict. Those who immediately discount any attempt to use the military to prevent deadly conflict as too costly or not in the nation's important interests do not respond to the needs of the contemporary world.

What is inescapable is the need for states to accept the military implications of their leadership, and this fact applies particularly to the United States. The United States has both obligations and interests in promoting a stable international environment favorable to democratizing and

market-reforming states. Articulating objectives and mobilizing itself and others to support this agenda demands American leadership, a role the United States must accept if it is to retain its influence in global affairs. As President Clinton acknowledged in his most recent national security strategy document, "freedom, democracy, security and prosperity are now threatened by regional aggressors and the spread of weapons of mass destruction; ethnic, religious and national rivalries. . . . Today, addressing these threats demands American leadership."³⁸

In the end, in some instances, there will be no substitute for the use of force-American force. When power and responsibility come together in this way, as they inevitably do for a Great Power, the willingness to use force is the unavoidable burden of leadership. In the post-Cold War world, the use of the military to help prevent deadly conflict reflects the imperatives of both power and principle.

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7. The Role of Military Factors in Preventing and Resolving Armed Conflicts

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With the end of the Cold War and of global confrontation, the threat of a world nuclear war has diminished substantially, although it cannot totally be ruled out. Today the greatest and most immediate danger for the United States, Russia, and the world community is posed by local wars and conflicts, which under certain situations can erupt into massive warfare. The main task for the United Nations, for individual states, and for the world community is to prevent wars and conflicts by neutralizing their sources; that is, to apply political, economic, and diplomatic means to prevent local wars and conflicts. When political and diplomatic measures have been exhausted, military force must be considered.

POLITICS AND THE MILITARY FACTOR

The essence of wars and local armed conflicts is the same. War has always been a continuation of politics by other, forceful means. Just as in a war, the sides to a local conflict use violent instruments in pursuit of certain policies. I define local conflict as a form of hostilities involving the use of regular or irregular armed forces which stops short of developing into war. The American military defines local conflict as a military conflict of medium intensity that is limited to a comparatively small region and engages only a small part of the adversary's armed forces.

Since Clausewitz's time, it has become standard to consider war a continuation of policy by other, violent means. The emergence of nuclear weapons, and later the "new thinking" introduced by Gorbachev, suggested that war could no longer be a continuation of policy. Two questions are involved. The first concerns the acceptability of warfare in the modern world. The second asks whether the emergence of a new type of weapon can change the sociopolitical calculus of war.

The answer to the first issue is unequivocal: all wars should be ended, and especially nuclear wars, which have catastrophic consequences both for participants and for other countries. However, despite the justifiability of this argument, despite our good intentions, and despite the existence of nuclear weapons, not all conflicts in today's world can be solved through diplomatic means, and thus the use of armed force continues. Hence, in response to the second issue, we have to conclude that war and politics are inseparable. It would be more accurate to say that nowadays, both nuclear and conventional war *should not* be a continuation of policy by other means. But if a war has begun despite our wishes, it is always connected to politics.

The qualitative changes in both politics and the instruments of combat are complicating the connection between war and policy. On one hand, the responsibility of politicians is increasing. On the other hand, weapons of mass destruction and changes in the international system

influence politicians and fundamentally alter the character of war. Political scientists emphasize justly that new weaponry is increasingly intertwined with politics, to the extent of becoming a policy itself. To avoid war, all states have to change their policies in accordance with the above realities. Otherwise, the scenario Clausewitz warned of 160 years ago may come true: sooner or later war will slip out of the hands of politicians and become an instrument of collective suicide. Unfounded declarations that war and politics are no longer related can only mislead the attempts of people struggling to prevent wars and local conflicts.

A survey of history finds no shortage of wars. More than 14,000 wars have been recorded in history, and the pattern continues to this day. In 1994 there were 31 large-scale military conflicts in 21 countries, including eight members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The number increased in 1995. The highest death toll was in Rwanda (one million casualties), but high casualties also occurred in Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, Greece, Iran, and Turkey. With the end of the Cold War, the world has become more rather than less dangerous.

What was the principal cause of all these wars? If we leave aside their immediate causes, all wars involve the desire to seize foreign territories, material resources, wealth, or human labor (slavery); conquest of new territories as colonies; attempts to establish spheres of influence; or striving for world domination. Nations and states which fall victim to these aggressive actions are forced to fight for their sovereignty, independence, and existence. To this day, this is how wars and local conflicts begin.

It would seem that with the end of the Cold War we have for the first time in history the chance to prevent the outbreak of wars. Post-Cold War thinking proclaimed the superiority of the interests of mankind over national interests, and claimed that all controversies between states should be solved diplomatically. A substantial strengthening of the United Nation's role in international affairs was also envisaged. The security of every state would be guaranteed by the establishment of a global security system, rather than confined within the limits of national security. With an eye toward fulfilling this vision, the Warsaw Pact was dismantled, and with the collapse of the USSR a regional security system of states also disappeared. Nevertheless, most other states, while taking certain measures to reduce arms buildup and to maintain a partnership with former socialist states, still regard their national interests as a foreign policy priority and focus on strengthening their military security. Hence, the Soviet successor states are also forced to look out for their national interests. It appears that the world community is nowhere near ready to implement this "new thinking."

Does this mean that war will be casting its shadow over human history forever, or is it possible to put new and effective barriers in its way? On one hand, the aforementioned traditional causes of war are now supplemented by the emergence of new sociopolitical, economic, territorial, and ethnic disputes between and within states. On the other hand, there are new factors that can reduce the likelihood of war being waged or at least limit the scale of hostilities. The struggle for natural resources will be the source of the sharpest sociopolitical and economic controversies in the foreseeable future. This struggle will escalate to the limits of political confrontation, and military responses cannot be excluded.

The character of future military threats will also depend on the future political world order—on the kind of international system that will replace the bipolar world, which was based on superpower confrontation. Some observers think the international system will inevitably be a monopolar one under U.S. leadership, but this perspective seems unrealistic now. A different group of scholars and politicians predict a return to a bipolar world, with a number of Southeast Asian, Eurasian, and Central Asian states allying with China to confront the United States' political and economic expansion. This outcome is possible but unlikely. The most likely development—and the one in the best interests of the international community—is the strengthening of a multipolar system with various regional centers of power, such as the United States, Western Europe, Russia and other CIS states, China, Japan, India, and others.

The increasing variety of national interests in a multipolar world will make it a more complex system than a hegemonic or bipolar one. A multipolar system can only be stable by balancing states' interests. This stability can only be attained by dramatically restructuring the entire system of international relations, which is unrealistic in the near future.

The rise in national consciousness, which should not be equated with the narrow concept of nationalism, may become an important factor among those determining the direction of international affairs and the eruption of conflicts. Movements for national self-determination are appearing everywhere—in Europe (not only in the former Yugoslavia and Russia, but also in islands of political stability like Belgium or Spain), in the Middle East and Asia (Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Kurdish regions)—and may become sources of interethnic conflict. Sharpening controversies between developed and developing countries can transform the former East-West axis into a North-South one.

Attempts to revise post-World War II borders can be most dangerous to international stability. These include Japan's claims to the Kuril Islands and Chancellor Helmut Kohl's comments that he had reunited East and West Germany but that it would be the task of future chancellors to regain the other German lands. Such claims can launch a chain reaction of territorial demands, increasing both political and military tensions.

The United States, which has close economic links to most countries and is highly dependent on imported oil and other raw materials, has an interest in maintaining stability in important regions of the world. Increasing tensions or military conflicts in these regions would threaten U.S. interests, and considering the large number of American troops and military bases abroad, could result in U.S. involvement in military conflicts or local wars. It is not too difficult to send American troops to Bosnia, for instance, but they may encounter resistance and have to be reinforced, with more and more forces being dragged into conflict, and the conflict zone expanding, as happened in Vietnam. Moreover, if the number and scale of conflicts increase, the United States would be unable to control them alone and would have to cooperate with other centers of power, including Russia.

Besides these global challenges, Russia faces a number of military threats closer to home. Armed conflicts are blazing in the Caucasus and Central Asia (especially on the Tajik-Afghan frontier), close to Russia's borders. Along these borders, territorial claims are being made on Russia and its national interests threatened by the attempts of third countries to increase their sphere of

influence in the Baltics, the Balkans, and the south. Nationalist groups in some countries of the near abroad proclaim Russia their enemy. NATO expansion poses a direct threat to Russia, especially if NATO forces and nuclear weapons were deployed in Eastern Europe and in the Baltics.

In the past, Third World countries sought the support of one of the superpowers or its allies to help defend their national interests. Now, with the possibility of such support gone, many are arming feverishly and creating threats to one another in the process. There are many complex disputes between the former Soviet republics and in some war rages (Armenia-Azerbaijan, for example). Fighting continues in Chechnya and the situation in Tajikistan is very tense. It is extremely important, and for the West as well, to preserve the integrity of Russia so that it can continue to be a great power. Otherwise, the world will not be able to handle all the conflicts that may erupt in Eurasia, a land strewn with nuclear weapons.

In sum, in addition to traditional sources of conflict, new challenges exist which cannot always be solved by peaceful diplomatic means. The increase in potential sources of conflict in the post-Cold War world means that, in certain situations, the use of armed forces cannot be excluded.

PREVENTING ARMED CONFLICT

The first step in preventing armed conflicts entails neutralizing their origins by political and economic means. This demands the coordinated efforts of many states. The most promising way to do this is for Russia and other CIS states to establish a cooperative relationship with NATO under the auspices of the OSCE. But to substantially reduce the likelihood of war, every state, including the United States and other NATO countries, must substantially change its policies, rather than only talk about such changes. All efforts should be directed to the creation of a general global security system which would not infringe on any country's interests and security. If, on the other hand, the Cold War bipolar system will be replaced by a single superpower or a group of leading powers who attempt to further weaken former Cold War participants (the general attitude toward the vanquished is well known), then new conflicts will replace old ones and the chance for preventing armed conflicts will be lost.

The time is ripe not only for a reconsideration of the activities of national governments, but of international organizations as well, especially the United Nations. An important contradiction in the UN's action has become more evident in recent years: while the UN charter prohibits the use of force or threats of force in international affairs, the UN is itself employing force more frequently to enforce its resolutions. Sometimes the UN uses force before all political means have been exhausted. The absence of a prior political solution puts the deployed peacekeeping forces into a difficult position because, as Talleyrand said, you can do a lot of things with bayonets, but you cannot sit on them. Appropriate amendments to the UN charter are necessary.

My principal conclusion is the following: no matter how many speeches one makes declaring that conflicts are immoral and intolerable, they will be mere words with little effect. It is high time that the United Nations and individual states address the basic sources of conflict and war. The cases of Tatarstan and Chechnya show that a conflict can be either artificially aggravated or defused. One should never forget that politics is the art of the possible. One should move toward

an objective step by step, amassing one's achievements gradually. Maximalist aims and adventurist policies can lead to disaster.

It is also necessary to enhance the authority of the Security Council, and of individual states and especially their foreign ministries to enable them to settle conflicts diplomatically. There is usually a lot of high rhetoric about the importance of solving conflicts peacefully, but often little diplomacy is attempted and ultimately military force is used. When the army fails to accomplish a particular objective, however, officers are severely reprimanded. Yet one rarely hears of the Ministry of the Interior or the State Department being questioned for its failure to settle a conflict by diplomatic means. Conventional thinking is that if diplomacy works, fine, but if it does not, then the armed forces can always be employed.

The effectiveness of the UN is also undermined by its failure to ensure that international agreements are upheld. For instance, the 1988 Geneva Agreements on Afghanistan were completely implemented by the governments of Afghanistan, the USSR, and Russia. But the United States, Pakistan, and other states failed to cooperate and there was no UN reaction to this. Especially dangerous is when international organizations and peace-keeping forces, instead of separating and reconciling the conflicting parties, favor one side to the conflict while trying to suppress the other with force. This was Russia's mistake in Afghanistan, when it turned its back on the Najibullah government and practically sided with the *Mujahideen*. Rather than mitigating the Afghan problem, this resulted in a further expansion of the civil war. Now, some hotheads suggest abandoning the Tajik government and siding with the opposition. That would require doing the same in Uzbekistan. It is not difficult to fathom the threat to Russia from the south. Who would pay the tremendous costs of such a foreign policy? In similar ways, the UN and some individual states are fanning the flames of conflict while declaring their allegiance to peace and stability. Such an approach cannot be tolerated further.

UN military forces also need to be reformed, especially since they have come to be employed more frequently in recent years. Experience shows that command of peacekeeping forces should not be given to NATO or other regional organizations. Peacekeeping forces should be under UN command. The role of the UN military staff committee, which until now has had nothing to do with peacekeeping affairs, should be enhanced, staffed more fully, and given the necessary facilities.

Numerous exercises are conducted for peacekeeping troops in which, for instance, they undergo detailed training in how to treat refugees. From the logistical point of view, these exercises are far from perfect and resemble dress rehearsals. Still, contact between soldiers of different armies is useful. NATO is particularly concerned with making peoples of other countries accustomed to the presence of NATO soldiers on their territories.

Soldiers need training, but a more useful training exercise would be a UN-sponsored exercise involving both politicians and soldiers in the prevention or resolution of some of the aforementioned problems which are the frequent sources of deadly conflict. Not only soldiers can learn from such a simulation, but also those who make the decisions to initiate armed conflict. The main task for the UN should be analysis of the fundamental sources of conflict and the development of practical suggestions about how to maintain peace. It is also important to

strengthen the UN's monitoring and implementation functions so that it can ensure its decisions are executed.

Equally necessary is the genuine aspiration of all countries and peoples to balance their interests, to cooperate with one another without double standards, and to stop dividing people into "us" and "them." These are the most important factors for the success of the UN. The main responsibility of the military is to ensure that all its actions are within the parameters of political decisions in order not to aggravate or prolong conflicts.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

The military, and especially the general staff, should play an increased role in a number of stages of a potential conflict: in assessing the military-political situation, in the decision-making process on crisis prevention or resolution, and in the planning and implementation of political, economic, or diplomatic decisions. The idea that politicians should be concerned with policies and the military with military affairs is a widespread misconception. Historical experience shows that "pure" policy does not exist. Policy is only practical when it takes into consideration the whole complex of sociopolitical, economic, ideological, and military-strategic factors. For example, in 1941 Stalin's highest priority was to avoid war with Nazi Germany. He delayed mobilization and refused to put the armed forces on alert. His preoccupation with political and diplomatic concerns to the exclusion of military considerations led to disaster.

This bitter experience demonstrated that the military should not be excluded from political decision making but should rather take active part when military aspects of policy are involved. Military-political decisions should be made in close collaboration with politicians, economists, diplomats, and the military.

The military must make a sober assessment of the tasks assigned to it, and present political leaders with realistic information about the feasibility of these tasks. A responsible political decision cannot be made if Russia's defense minister reports, for instance, that an enemy capital can be captured by a regiment in two hours, when in fact it would take years and heavy casualties to accomplish this objective. Such inaccurate information can lead policy to a dead end.

The modern approach to military engagement is changing in two ways: first, it is becoming evident that no massive use of nuclear weapons is possible and the theory of global nuclear war must be abandoned. Nuclear weapons will mainly play a deterrent role. Second, the relationship between direct and indirect strategic action is changing.

As the conditions for starting and waging wars change, it is imperative to develop more flexible military-political planning and to develop a greater variety of both direct and indirect actions. Indirect military action will play an increasingly prominent role because nuclear weapons will be reserved for deterrence purposes because the great powers are increasingly reluctant to support only one side in a conflict, and because they are more reluctant to engage their professional armies. During the Cold War, the adversaries in military conflicts (for example, in Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Afghanistan) were usually each supported by the superpowers,

and hence the conflicts lasted for many years. In the post-Cold War world the great powers are more likely to act in concert, and measures to localize conflicts will be more effective.

Indirect action may be used to create political conditions that may prevent wars. Prevention should be a primary goal because the most likely scenario for a large-scale war is one in which states gradually become absorbed into conflicts which then grow and involve other states. If political measures fail to prevent conflicts, the military can also be used in a preventive role by enforcing sanctions; blocking communication from the sea, air, or ground; demonstrating its force capabilities; or dispatching peacekeeping forces to separate adversaries. The demonstration of force in Haiti in 1994, for example, facilitated the diplomatic activity that resulted in the resignation of the junta. If these preventive measures are not successful and hostilities are unavoidable, a surprise attack may minimize the scale of fighting. Active combat operations by ground forces can precede massive air and naval strikes to break the adversary's will to resist. During or after these strikes, an ultimatum can be presented to the adversary, demanding surrender or proposing a compromise. Ground forces, which usually suffer the heaviest casualties, should only be thrown into a bloody Clausewitz-style battle after destroying the adversary's firepower and principal military installations. Since it is nearly impossible to destroy all of an enemy's means of defense, those enemy weapons in the path of the friendly forces' offensive should be targeted.

Even the most skillful application of indirect strategies cannot always guarantee the adversary's defeat. In such instances, either political and strategic objectives must be amended or direct action must be taken. Such direct actions in the future will, one hopes, be based on well thought-out exercises and will employ a wide array of tools of warfare. Untraditional methods will play a greater role in the planning of indirect actions-ranging from psychological warfare to subversive actions to special forces operations. In the United States and elsewhere a series of manuals and instructions on the conduct of special operations already has been prepared; for example, U.S. Army Combat Manual M 31-22, "Management, Control, and Support of Special Forces Operations" (1981), U.S. Army Field Manual M 31-21, "Methods of Special Operations" (1983), and others.

As early as 1954 George Kennan came to the conclusion that the Soviet problem could not be resolved exclusively by military means and advocated a search for a more flexible strategy to meet the United States' international objectives.¹ In the end, these alternative forms of pressure on the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries proved to be the most effective. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stressed the need to develop cunning new methods to deter both old and new enemies. Some specialists even argue that the world is facing a new generation of wars in which the aim is not the physical destruction of the enemy through direct confrontation, but subversion of the enemy's military power from within through political and economic pressure. American expert E.E. Keel articulates this strategy in more subtle terms: "We must elaborate an effective strategy not to contain our adversaries, but to influence them and form their foreign and domestic policies in accordance with our interests."²

Since local conflicts are the most common present-day threat, the role of mobile forces will accordingly increase. However, we must not copy the American system in this respect. The U.S. army's main challenges and tasks occur far from its territory. In Russia, local conflicts occur

either inside the country or very near its borders. Hence, mobile forces are insufficient for Russia. Mobile forces (paratroopers, for example) can operate independently only for a short time and need subsequent reinforcement. Moreover, deployment of mobile forces in Russia is delayed by the country's vast size, weak communications, and shortage of air, sea, and surface transport. Yet many cities, important economic and military installations, and railroads are situated close to these troubled borders and need defense. These vulnerable sites need permanently stationed forces: ground, air, and other defense units.

Experience shows that even local conflicts require the commitment of large numbers of forces, as in the Persian Gulf War. Attempts to resolve conflicts with small numbers of forces, as in the Soviet-Finnish War or the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, led to heavy casualties and protracted hostilities. Leaving political considerations aside, a purely military conclusion from the experience of Afghanistan and other regional wars is that peacekeeping forces operating under the aegis of the UN or independently must act resolutely, concentrating sufficient forces to fulfill their given task in as short a time as possible.

Local conflicts are complicated by the fact that there is no distinct front line. Rival armed units are mixed in with the civilian population and may strike from various, often unexpected directions. Supply and logistics are often hindered by broken communication lines. Management and coordination between stationed and arriving mobile units, and between army, navy, air force, and anti-aircraft defense units should be organized thoroughly.

Failure to abide by these principles led to the Soviet Army's ineffectiveness in Afghanistan. Despite lessons provided by the Vietnam War, standard motorized rifle regiments and divisions with their cumbersome structure and heavy material were dispatched to Afghanistan. These soldiers were unfit for guerrilla warfare in the mountains against the Mujahadeen. Moreover, Soviet units sent to Afghanistan were not regular forces but peacetime divisions supplemented by reservists. The lack of training and coordination resulted in unnecessary losses and bad performance. As losses accumulated, strategies were revised. Troop commanders developed new tactics suitable for the concrete operational task at hand. Line divisions were reinforced by a large number of paratrooper assault battalions, special force detachments, and helicopter units. Gradually and improvisationally, learning from bitter experience, we came to the conclusion that mobile forces must be created and trained for wide varieties of specific actions in local conflicts.

Paradoxically, despite the ten years of experience garnered from Afghanistan and other local conflicts, Russian military doctrine until recently has been exclusively oriented toward global war. Local wars were considered an accidental and passing phenomenon, uncharacteristic of modern warfare and unworthy of serious attention. This view must be reassessed and lost time made up for. We must study the experiences of other countries that have reformed their militaries to respond to the specific circumstances of local conflicts and wars. Adjustment of military doctrine to the realities of local conflicts requires the following three steps:

First, potential conflicts must be identified. In Russia, there are many research centers, but their work is largely uncoordinated. Moreover, rather than attempting to predict future events, they are more frequently engaged in analyzing the past, and limit their activities to publishing articles or

appearing on radio or television programs. Serious analysis of potential conflict zones is needed which can produce concrete proposals for how to prevent those conflicts from erupting.

The media and politicians also have a role to play. Currently, certain political figures and the press fan the flames of conflict instead of trying to tame it. Certain federal legislative acts are sharpening rather than resolving conflict, as in North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Chechnya. Interference in the internal affairs of other republics is counterproductive, especially when military support is given to one of the conflicting sides. It is high time to understand that no one gains from fighting and bloodshed. Balance and consensus are imperative.

Prevention planning in Russia would also be facilitated by the creation of an analytic research center under the auspices of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. This center could coordinate research on the political situation in certain explosive regions and could prepare practical proposals with concrete suggestions. The center should coordinate its work with the Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the General Staff and the analytical structures of the Foreign Ministry, the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of the Interior, the Intelligence Service, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Academy of Military Sciences.

The primary goal should be avoiding conflicts like that between Ossetians and Ingush or that in Chechnya. These regions became increasingly tense over a number of years and little was done to resolve the tensions peacefully. Such carelessness and irresponsibility can allow local conflicts to turn into civil wars.

Second, commanders of the armed forces must study past local wars in order to draw conclusions from those experiences. Documents on the wars in Korea, Afghanistan, and elsewhere must be declassified for this purpose. A deeper and more objective study is required of the combat operations in the Gulf War. There is still a great deal that is unknown about the conduct of the Gulf War, and descriptions of it sound more like publicity than analysis.

Third, changes in the nature of military threats demand a broadening of strategic options available to the armed forces. The following actions deserve more careful consideration:

- Partial strategic deployment (remobilization, theater deployment, and regrouping of reserve forces) for local conflicts and full deployment for preventing large-scale wars
- Deployment of armed forces for local conflicts corresponding with the scale of hostilities. This requires coordination between stationed and mobile units and between the air force, army, and navy. This may also involve operations to deter an enemy attack, air force operations, and naval actions.
- Employment of armed forces in large-scale warfare

Army manuals need to be written for each of the different kinds of conflicts. These documents should elaborate approaches to the conduct of different types of combat operations more thoroughly than they have in the past. Separate manuals should be developed for mobile forces. Combat training should more closely apply the principles developed in these manuals.

The foreign press reports that NATO forces are reorienting their plans for combat training away from traditional programs focusing on large-scale operations to the new challenges of crisis

management. The Russian armed forces must also adjust their training programs in similar ways. Exercises for the conduct of operations in local conflicts should be developed. Commanders, staff, and troops should be trained for operating under states of emergency. Some units should also be trained in the particularities of peacekeeping.

This does not mean, however, that preparation for a "classic" war against large-scale aggression should be abandoned. It does mean that more attention needs to be devoted to the theoretical elaboration and practical planning of how to prevent or limit local conflicts.

A troubling trend in the conduct of warfare has been the steadily rising share of civilian casualties. In World War I, civilian casualties constituted 5 percent of all casualties. In World War II they were 48 percent, in the Korean War, 84 percent, in Vietnam, 98 percent, and in Afghanistan, 85 percent. This increase is a product of the increasingly destructive power of modern weapons, of violations of international rules by the armed forces, and of guerrilla tactics in which rebel forces mix with the local population and use it as a shield. How can one, for instance, destroy a rebel missile launcher yet spare the lives of civilians when the launcher is situated in the courtyard of a residential house?

But is total brutality then unavoidable in war? One should strive to abide by international rules even in the most cruel war. It is impossible, for instance, to justify the massive bombings of Dresden by Allied air forces and the use of atomic weapons against Japan in 1945 when the war was coming to an end, or the American bombing of Vietnamese and Iraqi residential areas, or Soviet bombing of Afghani residential areas. A more rational approach can avoid heavy casualties. In 1944, for instance, Soviet troops prevented the Nazi command from detonating explosions it had planned for Krakow, thus preventing high civilian casualties. That same year, skillful diplomatic and military actions taken by the Soviet leadership combined with the sensitivity of local leaders made it possible to avert combat in Romania and Bulgaria. By refraining from the complete encirclement of the Nazis in Silesia, the Soviet Army saved this industrial area and its population from destruction. Civilian losses were also minimal during the Soviet offensive in Manchuria in 1945. Despite its political imprudence, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was very thoroughly planned from the military point of view, and heavy civilian casualties were avoided.

Under any circumstances the military command must do its best to spare civilian lives. Still, one should understand this problem in all its complexity. First, both sides to the conflict should be held responsible for violation of international human rights laws. The media, however, often adopts a one-sided view toward this issue. Second, humaneness should not be turned into cruelty against one's own troops. The decision to stop air and artillery strikes against Grozny for humanitarian reasons also meant prolonging the conflict, with new victims with each passing day. While civilians in Grozny should be spared from bombings, we must understand that Dudaev's gunmen also are being spared, and Russian soldiers will have to pay for this decision with their lives. Where can the line be drawn to balance these considerations? Everyone has a measure of his own, but the Russian soldier pays for these decisions.

The capabilities of precision weapons should not be overestimated either. In 1991 the world witnessed the "pinpoint" strikes of coalition forces hitting Iraqi hospitals, mosques, and residential quarters, killing thousands of civilians.

The problem of high civilian casualties is endemic to local conflicts. There is no panacea. Experience shows, however, that when troops are supported by their society, they are less embittered. The higher the level of civil consciousness and professionalism of the military command, the better the chances that military objectives will be reached with minimal casualties among civilians.

In conclusion, the role of the military in preventing and resolving armed conflicts is a very complex and important one. There are many new challenges which need to be thoroughly studied and then incorporated into planning and training procedures. This is especially true for peacekeeping operations, in which Russia and NATO have already cooperated fruitfully. Experience from these operations should be developed and skillfully used for common interests.

NOTES

1. George Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), 81.
2. Earl E. Keel, Jr., "Toward a New National Defense Strategy," in *Essays on Strategy 10*, ed. Mary A. Sommerville (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), 45*-73.

8. The Role of the Military in Post-Cold War Russia

Andrei Kokoshin

Opinion on the role of the armed forces in Russia after the Cold War enjoys no national consensus. Not only military, but also wider considerations regarding economic security and national goals drive the debate. As Russia strives to develop its economy, culture, society, political institutions, and technology, military doctrine and the armed forces must be attuned to these goals.

The pressures under which military reform must proceed are great. Russia's new borders, which last existed more than 300 years ago, will have a great impact on Russia's foreign policy and its place in the international system. Moreover, though the Cold War and the standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States have ended, the two sides emerged in different positions; while we are in a much weaker position, the United States emerged with gains and is trying to increase those gains. Many in our country, for rational and irrational reasons, cannot help but worry about this situation. Another source of pressure is Russia's inability to keep up with the dynamic economic growth of its Eastern neighbors. Equally disappointing, we have been unable to establish with our former Warsaw Pact allies the kind of division of labor that has emerged among the Pacific Rim states. All of these pressures set the context within which we determine the future role of the armed forces.

In many ways, Russia's armed forces are unprepared for the challenges they face in the post-Cold War world. The reigning military doctrine since World War II was developed in anticipation of a third world war, rather than of the kind of local conflicts that are more prevalent now. Tactics and psychological training were oriented toward the final decisive encounter between capitalism and communism, in which the latter would undoubtedly triumph. Though for the last 15 to 20 years most, including commanding officers, doubted this scenario, the military machine continued to work according to the same guidelines established shortly after World War II. While there exist numerous scenarios for group front operations, for grand theaters using weapons of mass destruction, I cannot recall a single scenario developed in the 1970s to resolve local conflicts. There was no theoretical or practical focus on this among the military academy general staff, and hence we were not ready for the kinds of conflict we are encountering now. Consequently, we have to reorient virtually the entire military establishment to the new environment we face.

Since the 1980s we have been thinking about fundamental reform of the military, but this has to be a gradual process. After 1992, many wanted to conduct radical reform in the course of six months to one year. But this spawned the risk of losing control and destroying the army entirely. We have a huge economy tied to the production of weapons of mass destruction and their infrastructure. Moreover, these dangerous weapons demand careful attention if they are not to fall into the wrong hands. The task of guarding these weapons and maintaining their military readiness is very complicated. In the four years following Russia's independence, the army's highest achievement has been the preservation of the system of command and a top level of readiness for high-intensity wars. But the time for radical change has come—not only of the army, but of other armed units that have been created. I am deeply convinced that reform will take several years and will be painful, but it is unavoidable. We are closely examining the experiences of other states, such as China and France, that are implementing radical military reform. But to apply outside experience to our own case, we need to examine the case of a country that undertakes military reform while facing tight economic constraints, as we do.

While many things have changed, one thing remains the same: we are still a nuclear superpower and this will play a large role in determining our place in the international system. But being a nuclear superpower is also a great economic burden in the costs of maintaining the weapons and their infrastructure. Both these costs and the change in the kinds of conflicts that have emerged in the post-Cold War world make it evident that we cannot rely exclusively on our nuclear weapons. We must develop all aspects of our potential for military operations, ranging from peacekeeping to deterring mass aggression. Our economic limitations prevent us from being able to make all these changes at once, however. Therefore, in the near future, we will be even more limited in general purpose forces. Nuclear forces will be palpably reduced not only to conform to START II agreements, which I think will be ratified, but also to conform to our own plans for changing the structure of our armed forces.

We also need to think about the development of a nuclear doctrine. In the French White Book on Defense, it plainly states that French military doctrine does not exclude preventive nuclear strikes. U.S. nuclear strategy, in a less direct statement, also conveys this idea. Though we don't plan to wave our nuclear weapons about, we must take the existence of these strategies into consideration.

The most important priority for us is developing a strategy for local conflicts, especially one which can be applied in the earliest stages of any tension to prevent it from escalating. But this is a very difficult challenge-probably even harder than conducting total war or large-scale operations-because in contemporary armed conflicts, policy cannot be divorced from military conduct.

Clausewitz's scenario-in which politicians establish goals for the military, the army does its work, and then diplomats sit down to negotiate agreements based on the army's accomplishments-probably never existed. For more than 150 years, debate has continued about Clausewitz's formula. Many of these debates have been academic, but some have taken on a very practical dimension. Moltke (senior) interpreted Clausewitz this way: yes, war is a continuation of politics by other means, but as soon as military operations begin, politics should not interfere; the army should have full freedom of command. He had endless conflicts with Bismarck over this issue because Bismarck significantly interfered with military operations when he considered it expedient. This is a classic conflict between military men and politicians. It is so well-known because Moltke was not a typical military man but an intellectual-he spoke six languages and traveled extensively-while Bismarck was not a typical politician; he loved military affairs, spent much time in the barracks, and liked to wear military uniforms. We also remember well how Ludendorff in his memoirs sharply criticized the German leadership for interfering in the military campaign and not letting him win World War I.

These days, it is evident that the conduct of military operations cannot be isolated from politics. With the omnipresence of the mass media, even a local conflict immediately becomes globalized in the social consciousness. The reactions of public opinion, legislatures, and outside actors immediately have an impact and cannot but affect policymakers' priorities. Separating policy from propaganda in these situations is extremely difficult. For example, it is said that during Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf, General Schwarzkopf spent more time in the press center than at the command post, and that this is what helped him win the war. I think there is much to be learned from that example. If we are to improve our effectiveness in local conflicts and prevent them from turning into larger ones, we must not only a priori establish political goals, determine needed resources, and calculate expected losses, but also anticipate domestic and international reactions to the use of force.

To a large extent, our country was not prepared to meet these challenges. We now have to study international experience and learn from our own mistakes. But with time, I believe that we will have the capability to act alone or in a coalition to prevent conflicts, to station troops in a given region without direct involvement in combat, or to select particular military operations.

Part Four

Regional and International Institutions in Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping

9. International Peacemaking on the Territory of the Former USSR: Problems and Prospects

Andrei Kortunov

The disintegration of the USSR and the end of the Cold War have quite naturally spurred interest in international organizations and raised hopes that these organizations could at last be instrumental in the formation of a new world order. The concepts of the "end of sovereignty," "crisis of the nation-state," and "world government," so popular in the early 1970s, have reemerged in the 1990s. Almost extinguished in the years of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, liberal internationalism again has become a goal of the West, and is supported by the willingness of new centers of power such as a unified Germany, an integrated Europe, and a strengthened Japan, to assert themselves in international relations without provoking old fears and suspicions on the part of their partners.

In the view of many liberals, the United Nations (as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] and analogous organizations in other regions of the world) could become the optimal mechanism for the gradual and most painless redistribution of political, military, and economic power in the world in conformity with the new global constellation of forces. The most radical proponents of multilateral diplomacy emphasize the need to set up a "world government" to efficiently regulate social, economic, ecological, and other developments at the global level. The United Nations was supposed to be a guarantee against fragmentation of world policy and disintegration of the global political space into mutually exclusive regional and continental blocs.

At the juncture of the 1980s and 1990s, at least three trends opened the possibility for an expansion of multilateral peacebuilding activities. First, the hard bipolar system of global policy which had contained many regional and domestic conflicts rapidly collapsed. Second, consent among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council was facilitated by the end of the Cold War, which made it possible to act multilaterally in areas of the world which had been closed off by spheres of influence during the Cold War. Third, technological progress in telecommunications made it easier to convey the tragedy of many conflicts to the world public, resulting in pressure on international organizations to take relevant actions. Finally, the end of the Cold War raised widely felt hopes concerning the international community's conflict-settling potential.

The end of the Cold War also generated hopes that multilateral peacekeeping operations would acquire new dimensions and significance. Indeed, the success of UN peacekeeping activities in the early 1980s and 1990s was impressive: termination of the Iran-Iraq war, settlement in El Salvador, contribution to the decolonization of Namibia, and withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. It seemed that the UN would continue to be effective in other regions of the world, and the remaining conflicts (Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia) could be resolved within several years, especially since most regional conflicts were seen as remnants of the Cold War, doomed to disappear by the course of history.

It was believed that the demonstration of success in settling conflicts would draw new sources of funding for peacebuilding operations. There were hopes that the massive peacedividends of the end of the Cold War would be earmarked by states to support multilateral peacebuilding activities which could then acquire a new scale of effectiveness.

The future of international organizations has become an issue of special importance for Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union. For the newly independent states, membership in the UN and OSCE has become the defining criterion of their new statehood and international recognition (in contrast, the refusal of international organizations to recognize Abkhazia or Chechnya seriously undermined the legitimacy of their independent existence). Even financially constrained states only able to open several diplomatic missions without exception sent representatives to the United Nations. Missions of the UN and OSCE and representatives of the UN secretary-general, as well as observers and emissaries from the UN's specialized bodies, have always been received with great hospitality in the new states of Eurasia.

Russia attached great importance to preserving its permanent membership in the UN Security Council, as this confirmed it as the successor of the collapsed Soviet Union. With its position in the Security Council, Russia could influence the course of conflict resolution throughout the world, substantiating its claim to great power status. As Russia's unilateral weight in global policymaking was decreasing, Russian state figures frequently emphasized the country's permanent membership in the Security Council.

However, the role of the UN and OSCE, as viewed by Russia and other post-Soviet states, extends far beyond the formal legitimization of their new status. More importantly, membership in these international organizations is seen by many of the new states as their mode of integration into the system of global policymaking. For many historical, economic, cultural, and political reasons, the states emerging from the territory of the former Soviet Union find themselves outside the frameworks of regional integration. While the foreign policies of many former Soviet republics are influenced to a considerable extent by the republics' desire to be involved in international organizations such as NATO and the European Union, the chances for their inclusion are close to nil.

Therefore, inclusion of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and other Eurasian states in the UN and OSCE is a kind of political compensation to them, a "consolation prize" for their exclusion from other organizations. It is not incidental that after the disintegration of the USSR, leaders of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia and other post-Soviet republics so often appeal to the UN and OSCE. How enduring this post-Soviet enthusiasm for international organizations will be is open to debate. There are signs that it is starting to wane as these organizations reveal their limited potential to resolve tensions in the hot spots of the former USSR. However, one cannot but agree that as a whole, the post-Soviet space, at both the elite and mass level, has so far demonstrated a benevolent attitude to international organizations.

The role played by the UN and OSCE in the post-Soviet states has direct relevance to the development of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If the UN, OSCE, and other external organizations play a minimal role in the territories of the former Soviet Union, then these states will more rapidly develop into an autonomous and closed system. Inevitably, the zone of the CIS would be Russia's exclusive sphere of influence because the states of the former Soviet Union cannot counterweight the economic, political, and military power of the Russian Federation. Even a hypothetical coalition of all 14 non-Russian republics would not be able to confront Russia successfully.

On the other hand, active involvement of international organizations in the territory of the former Soviet Union could transform the region from a closed to an open one. The internationalization of the region's problems would help mitigate Russia's implicit or explicit domination, while legitimating Russia's efforts to stabilize the region. Certainly, foreign involvement cannot be an alternative to Russia's involvement, whether in the Caucasus or Central Asia, but such mediation could supplement Russia's efforts and make them less threatening to other states of the CIS.

Initially, Moscow's approach to settlement of conflicts in the Soviet successor states was marked by willingness to defer responsibility for their settlement to international organizations, and to stand aside from existing (Nagorno-Karabakh) or potential (Trans-Dniester region) armed clashes. The passive approach was a result of two circumstances: first, Russian diplomacy of the time always emphasized its break with Soviet diplomacy. Russia's new leaders reacted with pain to accusations of "post-Soviet imperialism." Abstention from participation in the resolution of conflicts in the former Soviet Union's territory and appeals to international organizations were a signal to the West of the birth of a "new Russia."

Second, the liberal political and intellectual elite centered around Boris Yeltsin believed that with the disintegration of the USSR, conflicts would be self-extinguishing. Russia's foreign policy proceeded from the belief that purely diplomatic methods would be essential to building a broad "good neighbor" belt around Russia. Besides, Gorbachev's unsuccessful intervention in Baku and Karabakh acted as a warning to Yeltsin, who had strongly criticized Gorbachev's "imperialism" and use of force.

Moscow's early foreign policy aimed to maximize international organizations' involvement in resolution of conflicts in the territory of the former Soviet Union. Even in settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict of 1991-1992, in which Russia's intervention produced positive results (the Dagomys agreements of June 24, 1992, ended the bloodshed in South Ossetia), representatives of the UN and OSCE were actively involved in Moscow's diplomatic efforts.

The rise in the number of UN peacekeeping operations in other regions of the world supported the optimism about international efforts at peacebuilding. Indeed, the early 1990s saw a sharp escalation of UN peacekeeping operations (notably, this escalation was undertaken without any clear ideas about methods and ultimate objectives). In January 1993, the United Nations was engaged in 13 peacebuilding operations that involved 53,000 Blue Helmets. Having exceeded US\$3 billion in 1992, the cost of the UN peacebuilding operations in 1993 amounted to US\$4.5 billion. While the efficiency of nontraditional peacekeeping operations is a disputed issue, these operations were promising in that they brought the Soviet successor states into the focus of world attention, and allowed this region to claim its share of UN peacebuilding resources (though it is difficult to explain why Tajikistan and Georgia should deserve less attention than Somalia and Bosnia).

The above-cited nontraditional operations of the UN in Cambodia, Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia are relevant to the problems of the former Soviet Union. The situations in these countries—political and military polarization of society with no legitimate power and no mechanism for building national consensus in Cambodia; collapse of the state aggravated by ecological and malnutrition problems plus feudalization of social and political ties in Somalia;

illegitimate seizure of power by a military dictatorship in Haiti and massive violations of human rights resulting in refugee flows to neighboring states; and ethnic warfare in Yugoslavia involving border issues, the need for "fair" territorial and ethnic demarcation, and relocation of large groups of people—could all take place in various regions of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, the UN's positive and negative experience of settling those conflicts was a matter of far more than academic interest for the Eurasian states.

UN operations in the Soviet successor states would face a number of difficulties. First, there could be no guarantee that all the parties in conflict would unconditionally support UN intervention, especially if the operations were only formally under UN auspices but were actually implemented by Russia under the mandate of the UN or OSCE. Second, the scale of such operations could be much greater than traditional peacebuilding efforts. Dozens or even hundreds of thousands more soldiers and officers may be needed than those employed in Somalia, Cambodia, Haiti, or Bosnia. Finally, armed conflicts would be very difficult to localize. Among the UN's peacekeeping operations, Haiti was the only example of successful localization, which was possible because it is an island. There are no islands among the CIS states.

UN experience in recent peacekeeping operations shows that the best success can be reached via transnational rather than multinational operations: operations that are planned and implemented by one leading power with greater or lesser support from other countries. In recent years, that leading role was usually played by the United States, and in the territory of the former Soviet Union only Russia can play such a role. As shown by the five-year experience of the CIS, military and technical assistance by Russia's partners is even less reliable than the respective partners' assistance to the United States. For example, during the Persian Gulf War, U.S. allies defrayed the major burden of funding the coalition's combat operations. Intervention on the Tajik-Afghan border can be considered the sole attempt to conduct a collective peacekeeping operation on CIS territory. However, in relative terms, the participation of Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Kazak forces in these operations is tangibly lower than the U.S. allies' contribution to Desert Storm.

Expansion of UN peacebuilding activities and participation in conflict settlements naturally raised the question of the legal basis for such activities. The traditional task of the UN and especially the Security Council has been preventing and settling interstate conflicts. In 1945 the founders of the United Nations saw interstate conflict as the major threat to international security. However, as far as the former Soviet Union is concerned, most problems emerge within rather than between the successor states. By all evidence, even interstate conflicts bear a substantial domestic component (the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is largely driven by the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, which, at least legally, is not a matter of interstate relations).

Intrastate conflicts pose new challenges for the UN. Many new states are liable to obstruct UN peacemaking activities in their territories, viewing them as interference in domestic affairs. Britain, for example, persists in rejecting any involvement of the UN and OSCE in its settlement with Northern Ireland, and Iraq interpreted UN measures to protect its Kurdish population as interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Quite probably, Moldova and Georgia would refuse UN mediation in the Trans-Dniester area and in Abkhazia. Russia, too, would hardly accept UN mediation in issues it considers to be within its jurisdiction, such as Chechnya.

UN intervention cannot be imposed legally except in cases of total political and economic collapse, when the central government has lost control of the situation in its territory. An example is the humanitarian intervention of the United States in Somalia. Intervention can also be imposed when the central government's positions are so weak that UN mediation is viewed as the last resort to save a sinking regime. The UN and the government in question may have different definitions of what constitutes "total political and economic collapse." What is seen by the UN as humanitarian intervention can be interpreted in the target country as open aggression. On the other hand, UN support of a collapsing regime would certainly be resented by the opposition to the weak regime. Hence the UN would be blamed for violation of sovereignty and for intent to prop up the status quo. In the territory of the former Soviet Union, the definition of "collapse" is quite contested, especially in Tajikistan.

It is extremely difficult to elaborate universal norms of international law to regulate all peacemaking operations. But it would be worthwhile to consider criteria for international intervention when the agreement of the target government is lacking (for example, in instances of systematic violations of human rights, genocide, threat of domestic instability spilling across state borders, and massive refugee flows). Furthermore, the traditional concept of sovereignty must be revised to fit new realities. The classic Hobbesian or Machiavellian notion of sovereignty is clearly archaic, but new conceptions of sovereignty remain vague.

The international community's right to intervene in the domestic affairs of states is today fixed in political declarations and not in international law. UN activities in recent years amply demonstrate the malleable nature of sovereignty, however. Humanitarian assistance, usually the first step in UN "hot spot" interventions, has never been considered a violation of national sovereignty. In most cases, however, rather than providing assistance to all parties involved, the UN only offered it to those it considered victims. The definition of a "peaceful population," so often used as a guide in the distribution of humanitarian assistance, is a meaningless abstraction in the circumstances of civil war. The very mechanisms and geography of distribution reflect the UN's selective approach to conflicting parties. The danger is that selective humanitarian assistance affects the course of the civil conflict, changing the relative power of the conflicting sides.

Shipment and distribution of humanitarian assistance requires military protection, while rebuffering plundering requires preparedness for hostilities. Hence, it becomes necessary to plan for escalation at every stage of the conflict and prepare new contingents of troops. Despite beginning as humanitarian aid operations, UN actions can thus be transformed into large-scale armed intervention. The involvement in Bosnia and Somalia demonstrates this scenario.

Even military victory of UN forces over one (or all) of the confronting sides does not necessarily mean the end of intervention. Follow-up challenges include holding free elections, preparation of a constitution, and educational activities to prevent a resurrection of civil war. Without these measures the military success of UN forces is destined to be ephemeral and perhaps even counterproductive. It is difficult to say whether the new and more limited concept of sovereignty would be more acceptable to states generally driven by nationalism. There are no easy solutions to this problem.

A contradiction between recognition of the supreme value of human rights on the one hand and the prohibition of violation of sovereignty on the other is written into the UN charter. Article 2(7), which unambiguously bans intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, was written in response to World War II, which suggested that the major threat to human rights and democratic norms was posed by the aggression of one country against another. Moreover, the UN founders were motivated by myriad and often contradictory views of democracy and human rights.

A strictly legal interpretation of the UN charter imposes hard limits on the use of military force by the Security Council: the Charter permits economic or military measures only where peace is threatened or aggression has occurred (no specification of "threat to peace" is provided in the Charter, however). Violation of international legal norms or non-implementation of the General Assembly's or Security Council's resolutions does not provide sufficient grounds for military intervention in domestic affairs of sovereign states.

In the UN Charter, the only justification for international intervention can be found in Articles 34 and 39. The first entitles the Security Council to investigate the circumstances capable of threatening peace and international security, and the latter gives the Security Council the right to choose measures for preservation of peace and security. Theoretically, countries can pose a threat to international peace and security and consequently require relevant responses by the UN. However, as many international lawyers argue, Articles 34 and 39 should not be interpreted as *carte blanche* for international intervention in the affairs of sovereign states.

Meanwhile, criticism of state sovereignty is gaining momentum throughout the world. Russian liberals and conservatives, while engaging in this criticism, do so from different positions. Western tradition has two main justifications for international intervention in domestic conflicts. The first posits stability of the international system as the highest value and consequently, the use of military force is a valid means for restoring the balance of power when it is disturbed. Applied universally, this logic is extended to both great and small states, to the industrially advanced North and the developing South. In the post-World War II era, the importance of international stability was invoked in discussion of German reunification. It was understood that Germany could reunify only with the consent of the victorious powers and by undertaking certain commitments to its neighbors (attained through the 2 + 4 negotiations in 1990).

The other justification for foreign intervention is rooted in the West European tradition of dividing the world into "civilized" and "uncivilized" countries. The sovereignty of the latter (China, Ethiopia, Iran, Morocco), as a category of international law, was either contested or rejected entirely. International intervention in the domestic affairs of such states was seen more as police action than as action in respect to an independent state. Police action does not require justification by international law; it only requires keeping other states from undertaking the same action on that territory.

Intervention was considered more acceptable if it was undertaken by a group of powers (or at least with the consent of major international actors) rather than by one state. Collective intervention makes the action more legitimate and was applied as early as the nineteenth century by the European Concert and by individual members.

Both justifications for violation of sovereignty have been applied to the new Eurasian states that emerged from the Soviet Union. For example, demands that Ukraine abandon its nuclear weapons and threats to apply economic and diplomatic sanctions against Kiev are rationalized by reference to the priority of maintaining international stability over the national interests of any individual state. The theme of international stability, in this case at the regional level, is also used by those insisting on sanctions against Armenia, which had impressive military successes in its conflict with Azerbaijan.

With regard to Russia, the theme of international stability is usually raised in response to the prospects for more closely integrating CIS member states and building a confederation on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Occasionally, some in the West argue that for the sake of international stability it is necessary to oppose integration developments within the CIS, even if centripetal trends reflect the interests and political will of CIS member states.

Interference in the domestic affairs of the new states is justified by reference to their lack of consolidation in comparison with the stable Western countries. Furthermore, American political science recently coined the term "failed state" to refer to states that can no longer control domestic social, political, and economic relations and thus cannot claim any sovereignty. Somalia, Liberia, Peru, and Haiti are examples from the 1990s. Relations with failed states cannot be built on the basis of universally accepted norms of international law. In particular, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter forbidding intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states is not considered applicable to failed states.

The conceptual task is how to define the failed state. Advocates of classical international law consistently argue that intervention is only justified when the state is not able to provide for the security of its citizens or of foreigners on its territory. The objectives of intervention must be strictly limited by the task of providing security.

Recent years have seen calls for a broader interpretation of notions of security that would include, among other things, protection of human rights. For example, it should be acceptable to compromise national sovereignty when coping with the aftermaths of natural disasters, epidemics, or industrial catastrophes. However, the prevailing view is that an authoritarian or totalitarian state cannot be considered a failed state by virtue of its type of regime.

Another widespread definition to characterize countries whose sovereignty can be limited is the term "quasi state." This term is applied to states that have only formal attributes of statehood. Because the existence of such quasi states in most cases is dependent on the approbation of the international community (in the form of security guarantees, economic assistance, and formal membership in international organizations), it is acceptable to impose special demands on and regulate the domestic affairs of such states. In such cases, the international community, represented by multilateral organizations (the UN, the Organization of American States, the Organization for African Unity, and even the CIS, for example) would set the limits of real sovereignty for quasi states. If sovereignty is recognized by only one, albeit strong, power, the quasi state would be a puppet in the hands of its strong partner. Guarantees by a regional group of states carry more weight. UN support maximizes the value of the sovereignty of quasi states, making their rights equal to those of "real" states. However, unlike "real states," the sovereignty

of quasi states is not guaranteed forever, but needs to be reconfirmed continuously. When the UN issues recognition to states by extending membership to them, it can establish conditions for the respective states' membership.

The notions of "failed state" and of "quasi state" convey two parallel understandings of state sovereignty in international law: the advanced capitalist democracies are considered full states, while the developing nations of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union are quasi states. While intervention would not be conceivable for the first group of states, it would be legitimate and normal for the latter group. The challenge is to develop universally accepted criteria for identifying failed states and establishing the conditions which would necessitate intervention.

Currently, the Security Council's resolutions on applying sanctions are not based on any legal norms. Often they are determined by political bargaining: whether consensus can be reached among the members of the Security Council and whether sufficient numbers of votes can be raised from the alternate members. The Security Council's interpretations of what constitutes a "threat to peace" cannot be legally challenged since there are no written criteria for this ambiguous concept. The UN calls circumstances justifying intervention "complex emergencies" or "complex political emergencies," but these concepts remain vague. The decision to intervene is usually made based on the size of the conflict and its likely impact on the international community.

Intervention is more likely to occur when the following factors are present:

- A danger that the conflict may spill over a state's borders, challenging established borders and threatening to draw neighboring states into the conflict. The UN's involvement in Cambodia and Afghanistan are examples.
- Genocide or massive killing of civilians and large flows of refugees from the conflict zone. Examples include Cambodia and protection of Kurds in northern Iraq.
- Threat of famine, epidemics, or grand-scale ecological disasters. Examples are Somalia and Angola.
- A threat to democratic norms and human rights, as in Haiti.
- A threat of nuclear proliferation or of other weapons of mass destruction, as in Iraq, and potentially in North Korea.

Other factors include the threat of terrorism from a given state, the need to ensure access to vital raw materials, and the desire to provide national minorities with the right to self-determination to the point of secession. One or more of the above conditions are invariant facts of life in a number of the conflict-ridden regions of the former Soviet Union (for example, the Caucasus, Tajikistan, and the Trans-Dniester area), suggesting that intervention in these areas would be legitimate at any time.

In practice, the decision to intervene, and with how many soldiers and resources, is determined by the extent to which the conflict is detrimental to the national interests of major global actors, and especially of the members of the UN Security Council. Moreover, the following additional factors help determine the form and size of the intervention:

- The scale of the tragedy and the number of civilian casualties
- The expected losses to peacekeeping forces
- The likelihood of resolving the conflict quickly
- The public reaction to the conflict as measured by the degree of coverage in the mass media
- The capacity of the organization to undertake peacekeeping activities
- The availability of funds to finance the operation

One of the most sensitive issues facing international organizations today is whether intervention to save democracy is justifiable. The UN charter is conservative with regard to this question. Liberal-interventionist approaches to this question are being actively developed, however. The most extreme interpretation of international law claims that a state which violates basic human rights and democratic norms cannot be considered an equal member of the international community and is not entitled to having its sovereignty respected.

The above interpretation became quite popular in the United States and in the West after the end of the Cold War. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and defeat of communism were interpreted as evidence of the universality of the Western model of democracy. The survival of a group of authoritarian states could be seen from this perspective as an aberration which would naturally be corrected by the trajectory of history, and would require only minor prodding by outside forces. The supposed facility of change from authoritarian states removes the traditional ambivalence in the West between desire to support "humanitarian missions" and unwillingness to incur high costs for them.

Expectations about the ability to support democracy through intervention with minimal casualties were disappointed, however. UN intervention in interstate conflicts often lasts longer than the settlement process. In civil wars there is usually a diffusion of authority and group interests are more dynamic and less predictable. In some cases, what was originally planned as a surgical intervention develops into the UN's permanent presence in the region. The political and financial consequences of protracted involvement must be taken into account in advance.

Five levels of UN involvement are possible. The first is preventive diplomacy, which is mediation to induce the hostile parties to negotiate. Usually this has taken the form of observer missions sent by the secretary-general to potential conflict spots. Given the low cost of these missions and their nonconfrontational character, it would be easy for the UN to dispatch many such missions to the former Soviet republics, and thus demonstrate that they continue to be in the focus of UN attention.

The UN has also deployed military contingents for preventive purposes. For example, UN peacekeeping forces (UNPROFOR) were preventively deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The extent to which the presence of UNPROFOR troops was instrumental in preventing the outbreak of conflict in Macedonia is an open question; nevertheless, the Macedonian government repeatedly emphasized the importance of their presence.

Some former Soviet republics will most likely appeal to the UN to guarantee their security through preventive deployment. If the UN were to block borders in a few locations such as Georgia or Tajikistan, it could help localize, if not prevent, conflicts. Deployment of UN forces would help legitimate ruling regimes in the host states and consolidate their power vis-à-vis challengers. The UN missed opportunities for preventive diplomacy in Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Chechnya, and Moldova. Preventive diplomacy in other conflict-prone locations is more difficult because the host state continues to deny that a problem exists. This includes potential ethnic conflict in Kazakstan, the self-determination campaigns of the Crimeans in Ukraine or the Tatars in Russia, and the political radicalization of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Estonia. Inviting UN mediators would signal the government's inability to resolve problems on its own. Moreover, some preventive deployments would carry exorbitant costs, for example, dispatching troops to guard the Russian-Kazak border.

A second level of involvement is the traditional UN peacekeeping role: disengaging fighting parties after an agreement has been reached. By early 1994, close to 100,000 military and civilian personnel had been mobilized by the UN to take part in 17 peacekeeping operations, varying in scale from several UN representatives sent to El Salvador to thousands sent to Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia.

In the newly independent states, peacekeeping is more likely to be successful than preventive diplomacy, especially since peacekeeping involves not only the disengagement of forces but also assistance in organizing and holding elections and monitoring human rights. These latter functions may be of greater importance in the longer term. The main obstacle to deployment of peacekeeping troops is getting the confronting parties to agree to peace negotiations. In many cases there are more than two sides involved and the government of the state cannot control the situation, making the observance of agreements extremely difficult. The UN operation in Somalia is a case in point. The inability of contending sides to agree to a cease-fire or the lack of a responsible state actor to help enforce it might dissuade the UN from intervening in a conflict in the post-Soviet states.

A shortcoming of this type of intervention is that it is not a permanent solution. By upholding the aggressor's advantage, peacekeepers perpetuate the source of the conflict. The more rigorously the cease-fire agreements are enforced, the fewer chances are left for the losing side to change the status quo in its favor. Peace is attained at the expense of justice. In some instances, fighting is exacerbated just prior to UN intervention as the opposing sides scuffle to carve out a more favorable position in negotiations. For example, Russian peacekeeping efforts in Georgia advantaged the Abkhaz side, contributing to the consolidation of Abkhaz statehood. In the Trans-Dniester area the actions of the Russian 14th Army also played into the hands of separatists.

A third level of involvement is protective security measures, including creation of safe zones for civilians, defense of borders, or protection to humanitarian assistance convoys. Clashes between UN forces and conflicting parties are possible, as occurred in Somalia, Cambodia, and Yugoslavia. In many conflicts in the newly independent states peacekeeping missions would inevitably be translated into peacemaking efforts. The existence of quasi states in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, the disintegration of the armed forces in some republics, loss of control by state authorities, and the presence of unofficial armed groups and mercenaries would make

any peacekeeping operation hopelessly difficult. Conflicts in the newly independent states provide evidence of massive civilian casualties (Tajikistan) and plundering of humanitarian assistance (Transcaucasus). Most likely, the UN will be unwilling to be involved in the territories of the former Soviet Union.

What constitutes preventive security measures is a fluid matter, as exemplified by Alexander Lebed's activities as commander in chief of Russia's 14th Army in the Trans-Dniester area. The Army's initial task was to prevent the expropriation of Army property by the conflicting sides and to stop extremists' provocations against military servicemen. When Moldova violated a settlement signed by Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and the separatists, General Lebed threatened to march to the capital of Moldova. The fear of military defeat made the Moldovan leadership back down and abide by the settlement.

A fourth level of involvement is peacemaking, which abandons neutrality and pits the UN in direct confrontation against those actors who violate its resolutions. Usually such extreme measures are undertaken multilaterally, led by the United States under UN auspices, as in Korea or the Persian Gulf War. In many cases, however, U.S. participation can be counterproductive. The UN should therefore expand the possible scenarios for peacemaking to consider leadership by different countries.

Since most peacemaking operations are spearheaded by one state, a problem exists in maintaining consistency between the objectives of the UN and the state undertaking a leadership role. In the Persian Gulf War, for example, many observers noted that the United States exceeded the mandate issued by the Security Council. Supporters of the U.S. policy responded that since the United States had played the largest role and incurred more losses and costs than other coalition partners in liberating Kuwait, the UN should not try to restrict U.S. actions.

The above problem would be especially acute for UN interventions in the post-Soviet states. Russia would have to take the leadership role, and support by third countries would probably be even smaller than during the Persian Gulf War. However, calls for restraint on Russian actions would probably be greater than were demanded of the United States in the Gulf War. The Russian military is much less prepared than the United States for coordinated actions within an international coalition.

Peacemaking actions already undertaken by Russia within the CIS have enjoyed a much broader mandate than similar UN missions in other regions. In conflict zones such as South Ossetia, Tajikistan, Moldova, and Ingushetia, Russian peacekeepers were disarming troops of the contending sides, imposing strict passport control, and upholding an "enhanced security regime." If the UN were to suggest a more narrow interpretation of the Russian peacekeeping mandate, such recommendations would be received negatively in Russia.

The final level of UN involvement involves peacebuilding efforts in areas where social chaos and state collapse are looming threats. Actions would range from control of crime to establishment of a civilian administration. Peacebuilding involves giving up the role of unbiased broker and acting in solidarity with one of the opposing sides. One danger, however, is that the regime supported or installed by the UN may be considered a puppet of foreign forces.

Useful peacebuilding instruments could be borrowed from the UN experience in Namibia, Nicaragua, Western Sahara, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Haiti and applied to the post-Soviet states. These tools include measures to prevent intervention by neighboring states, demobilization and disarmament of rebel units, repatriation of refugees, retraining of military professionals, organization and monitoring of elections, assistance in writing a new constitution, and even, as occurred in Haiti, protection of democracy against revenge-seeking reactionary forces.

From UN reaction to recent conflicts in the newly independent states, we can conclude that the UN is developing a model of reaction to conflicts in this region. UN involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Moldova, and Tajikistan demonstrates the following type of response:

- Initiation of a fact-finding mission by the secretary-general's representative in the region to identify the origins of the conflict and prospects for its settlement.
- Passage of a resolution by the Security Council ordering that the conflicting sides cease hostilities immediately (in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Security Council's Resolution #853 demanded that Armenia withdraw troops from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan).
- Discussions with Russian leaders to provide international legitimation of Russian leadership in peacebuilding efforts. For example, after negotiations between the UN secretary-general's special representative Edward Brunner and Russia's deputy foreign minister Nikolai Pastukhov, Georgian-Abkhazian dialogue began under the direction of Russian leaders but under UN auspices. When third countries are substantially involved in a conflict, the UN initiates multilateral negotiations. For example, efforts to resolve the crisis in Tajikistan included officials from Russia, Iran, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and even Saudi Arabia.
- Consultation with regional collective security organizations to coordinate peacebuilding activities in the zone of conflict. In the Nagorno-Karabakh and Trans-Dniester conflicts, the UN cooperated with and deferred to OSCE initiatives.
- Evaluation of humanitarian assistance needs and coordination of activities of international organizations providing assistance.

By 1994, a shift had occurred in discussions about the role the UN would play in the post-Cold War world. Earlier attempts to justify broad intervention in legal, political, and moral terms were replaced by efforts to justify the UN's more limited and selective approach to interventions in various regions. Doubts have appeared about the alleged universality of Western norms of democratic capitalism, and the idea is being replaced by one suggesting the incompatibility of values and the inevitability of clashes between civilizations. This new idea helps legitimate the existence of double standards in UN activities. While consolidation of democracy is a "natural" process for Europe, imposing democracy on Asian and African countries is a futile effort that should be abandoned.

Thinking in such terms, the former Soviet states can be divided into two or three civilizations, calling for different criteria to be applied to each. The Baltic states are consistent with West European civilization and hence subject to the standards of mature Western democracies. The Slavic states are referred to as Orthodox European, not fitting neatly with Western norms of

democracy. The third group comprises the Islamic states, whose values are fundamentally different from those of the West.

In accordance with such logic, the West has relieved itself of responsibility for developments in Central Asia and the Caucasus, while reserving the right to correct Russia's policy in the European parts of the former Soviet Union. Such a division of labor is very convenient for the West because the major zones of conflict and instability demanding the greatest peacebuilding efforts are not in the European part of the former Soviet Union. The UN role in the former Soviet Union would hence be quite modest: to limit any spillover effects from conflicts in Eurasia which might pose wider regional or even global threats. The UN's priorities would then be focused on preventing the escalation of conflict, such as massive refugee flows, leakage of nuclear or other military technologies, and spread of fundamentalist ideologies capable of affecting regions surrounding the former Soviet Union.

Such a role for the UN and for the West in general in Eurasia is happily accepted by the advocates of a "Monroe Doctrine" for Russia, since it leaves Moscow with a nearly free hand in the "near abroad." Surrounded by unstable quasi states, Russia becomes a natural leader in the post-Soviet space. However, such a position is not necessarily a desirable one for Russia because it endangers the prospects for Russia's integration in the global political and economic structure. This would perpetuate the isolation of former Soviet republics and widen the gap between them and the industrially developed world.

Part Five

Conclusion

10. Lessons from the Russian Experience

Gail W. Lapidus

The presentations and discussions that took place in Moscow enriched our understanding of a number of important issues in conflict prevention. Several colleagues from the Russian Federation suggested that they were stimulated by the conference to reflect further on the possible relevance of institutional arrangements and experiences elsewhere in the world for the Russian scene. At the same time, these discussions also brought into focus for all of us a number of lessons suggested by the Russian experience, as well as important dilemmas that remain to be addressed by analysts and practitioners alike.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union—as we were reminded time and again—left in its wake a vast array of unprecedented problems, not only for the Russian Federation but for all the successor states. But as our discussions suggested, it also generated some innovative approaches. It was accompanied by the eruption of a considerable number of serious, and in some cases deadly, conflicts, of which the war in Chechnya was the most destructive. At the same time, by comparison with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the breakup of the Soviet Union was a remarkably peaceful process, particularly if we consider the enormous potential for instability created by the turbulent history of the region and the long accumulation of historical grievances

and perceived injustices. In our exploration of the sources of present and future conflict, and of approaches to preventing conflict, we have perhaps neglected to consider (in the vernacular of Sherlock Holmes) the dogs that did not bark—the reasons for the remarkable absence of conflict in the early stages of so massive and unprecedented a transformation.

I would like to focus attention, therefore, on two key features in the development of the Russian Federation—in effect, on two particularly innovative devices—that, however inadvertently, have played an extraordinary (if initially unintended) role in conflict prevention: the Belovezhsky agreement, and the invention and elaboration of a power-sharing mechanism based on bilateral treaties to regulate relations between the center and the subjects of the Federation.

A generation ago, the American political scientist Dankwart Rustow made the important observation that a fundamental and necessary prerequisite for the development of democratic institutions is prior agreement on the boundaries of the state and on membership in the political community. There is no democratic procedure, he noted, by which those could be determined. In the case of Yugoslavia, the absence of prior consensus on these questions precipitated protracted and bloody conflicts over control of territory and borders. Moreover, lacking clear principles to guide such decisions, and itself politically divided over the issue, the international community was unable to play a constructive role in preventing conflict.

Such a scenario was avoided, in the case of the Soviet Union, in large measure thanks to the Belovezhsky Forest agreement. Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the accord among Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus (and the subsequent adherence of other successor states in the Almaty agreement, as well as Mikhail Gorbachev's statesmanlike albeit reluctant acquiescence in it) had a number of beneficent results.

The very suddenness, haste, and secrecy of the proceedings precluded protracted and divisive public wrangling over borders and territory, and avoided the involvement of a large number of contending actors simultaneously competing for domestic political advantage in each of the prospective successor states. Moreover, the agreement settled the issue of borders simply and swiftly by recognizing the borders of the Union Republics as the new state boundaries. A good case can be made that, given the inevitable arbitrariness of any possible set of arrangements, these were neither more nor less "unjust," irrational, or arbitrary than any others. Indeed, in view of the continuing campaign in some circles over the status of Crimea and northern Kazakhstan, one shudders to imagine the consequences of open-ended negotiations over all borders among aspiring successor states. In effect, by presuming the dissolution of the Union into its constituent republics the agreement also avoided invoking the right of *national* self-determination as a guiding principle, one which, in the circumstances, would have been especially inflammatory and would have opened the floodgates to additional claims. By heading off a number of potentially destructive ethnic and interstate conflicts, it created the necessary foundation for the vital processes of democratization and economic reform, whether or not particular countries proved able to take advantage of the opportunities in the following years.

Where protracted negotiations could easily have poisoned relations and quite possibly led to open conflict, the agreement preserved decent—or better—relations among the successor states and created, in the Commonwealth, a new form of association that left open to the future the

particular forms that cooperation among them would take. It also avoided the equivalent of the "partition" of India, with the massive transfers of population it entailed. While the dissolution of the USSR has itself been accompanied by substantial population movements, most notably the outmigration of large numbers of Russians and Russian speakers from Central Asia, as well as by tragic forms of "ethnic cleansing" as a result of the Karabakh and Abkhaz conflicts, the Belovezhsky agreement facilitated a process of mutual accommodation within the new states as well as among them, and new minorities-their grievances notwithstanding-enjoyed a degree of security all too often absent in other circumstances.

If the agreement had a largely beneficial influence on relations among the former Union Republics, it also contributed significantly to broader regional stability. The agreement created a *fait accompli* which smoothed the way for the speedy, universal, and non-contentious international recognition of the new states, a recognition which in turn solidified and legitimized the agreed-upon arrangements and deterred or prevented potentially destabilizing challenges to them. It also avoided a situation in which international actors could later be blamed for imposing a particular set of arrangements, Versailles (or Dayton) style. Recognition in turn opened the door to the gradual political and economic integration of these states into Europe and into international institutions, facilitating their acceptance of new norms and providing incentives for responsible and cooperative behavior. In short, notwithstanding the understandable criticism of the agreement, its enormous contribution to stability and conflict prevention at a moment of considerable danger in the Eurasian region has not received the attention it surely deserves.

A second innovative contribution to conflict prevention by the Russian Federation that deserves greater attention from analysts of power sharing has been the effort to de-escalate potential conflicts, and to seek to accommodate some of the aspirations and demands of republic and regional elites and populations, by means of bilateral treaties regulating relations between Moscow and the subjects of the Federation. Admittedly, this process has not been without its serious problems: as Vladimir Lysenko, among others, has suggested, the proliferation of a variety of such bilateral treaties, with different provisions in each case, weakens or even threatens the development of a single legal and constitutional order for the Federation as a whole. Yet, on balance, it represents a creative and flexible response in a period of enormous fluidity to a Soviet legacy that gave rise to aspirations, expectations, and institutional arrangements that could not suddenly be pushed aside or dismantled without gravely destabilizing consequences. The alternative initially pressed by influential political actors, to abolish all ethnic republics within the Russian Federation and replace them with purely territorial administrative units along the lines of the Czarist *guberniya*, would have been highly destabilizing and widely perceived as provocative. Given a long history of extreme overcentralization, key actors in Moscow have tended to be overly fearful of the devolution of authority. But in the end, the process of mutual accommodation through negotiations and bargaining has defused separatist sentiments, enhanced the loyalty of republic elites, and made it possible-with the tragic exception of Chechnya-to avoid the deadly use of force.

The pattern of bilateral agreements, resulting in an asymmetrical federation with different rights granted to different constituent parts, may be treated as a novel form of power sharing. With all its uncertainties, ambiguities and potential sources of trouble, what has it accomplished?

It has tailored center-periphery arrangements to the varying needs, demands, and situations of the different subjects of the Federation—a pattern of diversity especially important in a country as large and variegated as the Russian Federation. It also creates opportunities for experimentation and institutional innovation in a field where creativity is needed.

It has created a framework for satisfying the needs and aspirations of major ethnic groups for recognition, security, and meaningful political participation, and opportunities for the preservation or enhancement of ethnolinguistic and cultural diversity. It has tended to strengthen the leverage of local elites in their dealings with Moscow. It has located decision making on some key issues closer to the ground and to those directly affected by it, thus echoing in some measure the principles of subsidiarity in the European Union. Above all, it has provided a mechanism for mutual accommodation and partnership between moderates and pragmatists in Moscow and their counterparts in the republics and regions, while helping to isolate or marginalize extremists on both sides. The protracted but ultimately successful negotiation of the treaty with Tatarstan sharply illuminates both the way in which extremists on both sides play into each other's hands, and the way in which creative statesmanship can defuse potential conflict.

The success of this process elsewhere in the Federation makes all the more vivid the failure in Chechnya. While a number of conference presentations illuminated various aspects of the conflict, perhaps the most striking feature of their analyses was the emphasis on the key role of elites, elite strategies, and decision-making processes as key factors in precipitating the conflict. Clearly, the use of force was by no means a last resort after all other avenues for peaceful resolution of the conflict had been exhausted. Nor did the situation in Chechnya threaten to unleash broader separatist tendencies in the Russian Federation, as the "domino theorists" tried to insist. A whole repertoire of tools for conflict prevention was available, but not utilized. Moreover, the terms of the peace agreement signed in May 1997, as a result of the negotiations that were already under way during our conference, were by and large available before the military intervention was launched. The entire experience, like the war in Yugoslavia, thus brings into sharp focus a central challenge for the theory and practice of conflict prevention; namely, how to prevent conflict in circumstances where major political actors believe it serves their own political interests to escalate conflict even to the point of violence.

The war in Chechnya highlights important issues for the international community as well. It focuses attention on an equally challenging and difficult question: what are the most effective ways to influence decision making in circumstances where elite behavior constitutes a deliberate violation of important international norms, and how can outside actors best support the efforts of domestic advocates of peaceful resolution?

The conference participants properly drew attention to the potential contribution of international organizations to the prevention and resolution of intrastate conflicts while also expressing disappointment with their inability to deal effectively with conflicts in the region. On the one hand, the organizations themselves (and their member governments) are understandably reluctant to put themselves in the middle of conflicts between internationally recognized governments and nongovernmental groups struggling for recognition, and confront genuine difficulty acting as neutral mediators under these circumstances. On the other hand, the states involved are frequently reluctant to accord them any serious role. The crisis in Chechnya highlighted the

resulting tension. The emergence of new norms of sovereignty, including recognition of the notion that the actions of states within their own borders may properly be an area of legitimate international concern, has created the basis for new approaches to conflict prevention. At the same time, the reluctance of elites and publics to embrace actions or even a foreign presence that may be perceived as a derogation of their sovereignty is by no means limited to Russia alone.

In the case of Chechnya, the Russian Federation set a constructive precedent in agreeing to a role for the OSCE, though regrettably only after the fighting was well under way. In fact, the mission played a highly constructive role in advancing the negotiating process and gaining the confidence of both sides in promoting a peaceful settlement.

As the conference indicated, and as the OSCE experience made clear, the involvement of international actors in preventing and resolving bitter and bloody intrastate conflicts poses a whole array of new challenges in a fluid and evolving international system. It proved to be exceptionally fruitful to identify issues and options in an earnest professional setting, in an atmosphere of collegiality and shared concerns, in which Russian and Western participants could together break difficult new ground.

Appendix A

About the Contributors

Alexei G. Arbatov is a deputy in the Russian State Duma and a member of the Yabloko party led by Grigory Yavlinsky. He currently serves as deputy chairman of the Committee on Defense. Prior to his service in the Duma, Mr. Arbatov was a visiting scholar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, as well as a visiting professor at the RAND Corporation. In 1993 he was appointed the head of the disarmament section at the Institute for World Economic and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and in 1986 was appointed head of the Department on Arms Control. In 1992 Mr. Arbatov founded the Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts, a nonprofit think tank, which is funded through contracts with military-industrial corporations and state agencies for defense. Mr. Arbatov has published extensively on security, defense and arms control problems, including *Lethal Frontiers: A Soviet View On Nuclear Weapons, Programs and Negotiations* (Praeger, 1988). Mr. Arbatov graduated from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations and received his Ph.D. from IMEMO.

Aleksandr O. Chubarian is the director of the Institute of Universal History at the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is the head of the Russian part of the project "The History of the Cold War" in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. Mr. Tchoubarian is a member of the Bureau of the International Committee of Historical Sciences, and is the vice president of the International Association of Contemporary History of Europe. He is the author of 200 scholarly works, including *Brest Peace* (Moscow, 1962), *European Ideas in History* (M. Nauka, 1982) and *European Ideas of History in the 19th and 20th Centuries: The View from Moscow*, published in German (1993) and in English (1994). Mr. Tchoubarian earned a degree in history from Moscow State University.

Leokadia Drobizheva is chair of the Department of Sociology and Inter-Ethnic Relations at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences. Prior to chairing that department she served as deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ethnology from 1982 to 1990. Ms. Drobizheva is also president of the Research Committee on Ethnic Sociology of the Russian Sociological Association. The author of seven books and nearly 200 scholarly articles, she serves as an expert advisor to the State Duma on issues of nationality and ethnicity. Ms. Drobizheva is currently directing a three-year project on "Post-Communist Nationalism, Ethnic Identity and Conflict Resolution" for the MacArthur Foundation. She holds degrees in history from Moscow State University and the Institute of Ethnology.

Jack R. Galvin is dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is also chairman of the American Council on Germany and a board member of various organizations, including the Center for Creative Leadership, the Atlantic Council, and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. During the 1994*-1995 academic year he was a visiting professor at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University. From 1992 to 1994 he was Olin Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. During six months of this time he also served as a special envoy with the rank of ambassador to assist in negotiations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Prior to his retirement from the United States Army at the rank of General, he was the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and concurrently the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command from June 1987 to June 1992. General Galvin's published books include *The Minute Men*, *Air Assault*, and *Three Men of Boston*. General Galvin earned his M.A. in English from Columbia University.

Mahmut A. Gareev is the president of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation. General Gareev served as the inspector general of the Soviet Army, then Armed Forces, from 1990 to 1992, and chief military advisor to President Najibullah, Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan Armed Forces, from 1989 to 1990. He was also deputy chief of the General Staff, Soviet Armed Forces, from 1984 to 1990, and head of the Military Sciences Department, Soviet Armed Forces, from 1974 to 1984. General Gareev commanded one of the Soviet armies in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in 1970-1971 he served as the chief military advisor in Egypt. General Gareev has published seven books, including *If a War Happens Tomorrow . . .* (1995), *Questionable Pages of History* (1995), and *National Interests and Military Security of Russia* (1994). General Gareev graduated from the Academy of the General Staff, and holds a Ph.D. in history and military science.

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, former president of the Soviet Union, is now president of the International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies. Born in 1931 in the village of Privolnoye in the Stavropol Region of southern Russia, President Gorbachev worked in agriculture until he undertook the study of law at Moscow State University in 1950. He worked in that field upon his return to Stavropol and pursued a political career in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Upon becoming first secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU, President Gorbachev was elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1970, and was selected as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party the following year. From 1970 to 1974, he worked on the Commission for the Preservation of Nature. He was elected secretary for agriculture of the Central Committee in 1978. In 1980, he became a member of the Politburo and in 1985 served as chairman of the Commission on International Affairs of the

Supreme Soviet. After being elected general secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, President Gorbachev initiated a series of radical alterations in the internal and external politics of the Soviet Union that brought about change of historic proportions during the six years of his presidency. President Gorbachev resigned from his post in December 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its replacement by 15 independent states.

David A. Hamburg was president of Carnegie Corporation of New York from 1983 until 1997. Formerly, he served as president of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences. He has been a member of the President's Committee of Advisers on Science and Technology since its formation in 1994. For a decade, Dr. Hamburg was on the Advisory Committee on Medical Research of the World Health Organization. He was trustee and vice chairman of the board of Stanford University, and was a member of the board of The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where he was also deputy chairman. He serves on the boards of The Rockefeller University; The Mount Sinai Medical Center, New York; The American Museum of Natural History; and the Johann Jacobs Foundation, Zurich. Dr. Hamburg is the author of *Today's Children: Creating a Future for a Generation in Crisis* (1992). He was chairman of the Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development, and founder of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government. He currently serves as cochair of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Dr. Hamburg's professorial appointments have included chairmanship of the department of psychiatry and behavioral sciences at Stanford University, Stanford's Reed-Hodgson Professor of Human Biology, and John D. MacArthur Professor of Health Policy at Harvard University. Dr. Hamburg earned his A.B. and M.D. degrees from Indiana University.

Jane E. Holl is the executive director of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Prior to joining Carnegie, Ms. Holl was a career officer in the United States Army and served most recently as director for European Affairs on the National Security Council staff. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University.

David Holloway is professor of political science and codirector of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University, a senior fellow at the Institute for International Studies at Stanford, and a member of the board of trustees of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. Before coming to Stanford, Professor Holloway was a reader in politics at the University of Edinburgh from 1984 to 1986. Professor Holloway's published books include *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939*-1956* (Yale University Press, 1994), which won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (Yale University Press, 1983), and *The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political, and Arms Control Assessment*, with Sidney Drell and Philip Farley (Stanford University, 1984). Professor Holloway earned his M.A. and Ph.D. from Pembroke College at Cambridge University.

Daniel J. Kaufman is professor and head of the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, West Point. He is chairman-elect of the International Security Studies Section, International Studies Association, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Political Science Association, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Colonel Kaufman has extensive military experience, and most recently (1991- 1992) was the special assistant to the chief of staff, U.S. Army. He has published many books, articles, and papers, including *Understanding International Relations* (McGraw-Hill, 1993), *U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990's* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), *NATO at Forty: Change, Continuity, and Prospects* (Westview Press, 1989), *Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam* (Lexington Books, 1987), and *U.S. National Strategy-A Framework for Analysis* (Lexington Books, 1985). Colonel Kaufman earned his Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, his M.P.A. from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and his B.S. from the United States Military Academy.

Andrei A. Kokoshin is first deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation, a post he has held since May 1992. Prior to his current appointment he served as director of the USA-Canada Institute. He is a specialist in political-military affairs and national security. He holds a doctorate in history and is an associate member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He earned his degree in technology from the Bauman Institute of Technology in Moscow.

Andrei V. Kortunov currently serves as an expert for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Russian State Duma and president of the Moscow Branch of the Russian Science Foundation. He is also a columnist for the newspaper *Moscow News* and has written articles for the *Washington Post*, *London Times*, *Newsweek*, and *Süd Deutsche Zeitung*. Mr. Kortunov is the coordinator of many international security projects with counterparts in the United States, Canada, France, Britain, Germany, and the Luxembourg Institute of International Relations. Mr. Kortunov is a member of the Advisory Board of the Eurasia Foundation (Moscow) and a counselor to the MacArthur Foundation (Chicago). Dr. Kortunov holds a degree in history from the Moscow State College of International Relations and pursued postgraduate studies at the USA-Canada Institute, where until recently he served as deputy director and head of the foreign policy department.

Gail W. Lapidus is a senior fellow at the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. A professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley from 1976 to 1994, she chaired the Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies from 1985 to 1994, and directed Berkeley's Center for Slavic and East European Studies from 1980 to 1985. A specialist on Soviet politics, society and foreign policy, she has authored and edited a number of books on Soviet and post-Soviet affairs, including *The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse*, with Alexander Dallin (Westview, 1995), *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation* (Westview Press, 1994), and *From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics*, with Victor Zaslavsky and Philip Goldman (Cambridge University Press, 1992). A graduate of Radcliffe College, she received her M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Vladimir Lukin is a deputy in the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a sitting member of the Duma Committee on International Affairs. In April 1996, he was elected vice president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He served as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the United States from 1992 to 1995. In 1990, he was elected People's Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Russia and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations. Previously he served as deputy head of the Foreign Policy Analysis and Prognosis Department of the USSR

Foreign Ministry. He worked as a researcher at the USA-Canada Institute for nearly two decades after being recalled from a journalistic post in Prague for his protest of the Soviet invasion there in 1968. Mr. Lukin holds a Ph.D. from the Institute of World Economic and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences and an honorary doctorate from Simon Bolivar University.

Vladimir N. Lysenko is chairman of the State Duma Committee on Federal Affairs and Regional Policy. Previously he was a member of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Inter-Republic Relations and Regional Policy, deputy chairman of the State Committee of the Russian Federation on National Policy, a member of the Inter-Regional Specialized Commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, and a member of the Russian Federation Supreme Council on the Media. In 1990 he was elected cochairman of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, and in 1994 was elected chairman of the Republican Party. Mr. Lysenko is the author of several books and numerous articles on problems of federalism and national relations. He earned his degree in history at Moscow State University.

Claus Offe is a professor of political sociology and social policy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. He previously taught from 1989 to 1995 at the Center for Social Policy Research at the University of Berlin. Professor Offe has been a visiting professor and fellow at several universities. His most recent fellowship was at the Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin, and he has also been a fellow at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld; at the Center for the Advanced Study of Behavioral Science, Stanford University; and at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, Wassenaar. From 1976 to 1982 Professor Offe was a member of the Joint Committee on Western Europe of the Social Science Research Council. He earned his diploma degree in sociology from the Free University, Berlin.

Olara Otunnu is president of the International Peace Academy, an independent institution based in New York that is devoted to promoting peacemaking and peacekeeping. Mr. Otunnu practiced and taught law before serving successively as a member of the Uganda Consultative Council (interim parliament), Uganda's permanent representative to the United Nations, and minister of foreign affairs. At the United Nations, Mr. Otunnu served as president of the Security Council, chairman of the UN Commission on Human Rights, chairman of the Contact Group on Global Negotiations, and vice president of the General Assembly. Before assuming his present position, he returned to academia, doing research and teaching in Paris. Mr. Otunnu is a member of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Commission on Global Governance, the Club of Rome, and the Council of African Advisors to the World Bank, and he also serves on the boards of several organizations, including the Aspen Institute, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Aspen Italia. Born in Mucwini, Uganda, Mr. Otunnu received his education at King's College, Budo; Makerere University; Oxford University, where he was an overseas scholar; and Harvard University, where he was a Fulbright scholar.

Emil A. Pain is a member of the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation and head of the President's Working Group on the Problems of Nationality Policy. Prior to his current post, he served as deputy director of the Analytical Center of the Russian President, and before that he was director of the Center for Ethnopolitical Studies of the Russian Foreign Policy Association. In 1994 he was a professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. The author

of numerous publications relating to ethnicity and social policy, Mr. Pain received his M.S. in history and ethnology from Voronezh State University and his Ph.D. in history and ethnosociology from the Institute of Ethnology at the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Mintimer Shaimiev is serving his second term as the first president of the Republic of Tatarstan, a post that was created by referendum in 1991, shortly before he was first elected. Since 1994, he has been a member of the Russian Federation Council and is also a member of the Committee on Federal Issues, the Federal Agreement and Regional Policy. In 1995, President Shaimiev was a member of the organizing committee of the "Our Home is Russia" movement. A former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, President Shaimiev also served as first secretary of the Regional Committee of Tatarstan, a People's Deputy of the Soviet Union and chair of the Council of Ministers of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. He received his degree in engineering from the Gorky Institute of Agriculture in Kazan.

Timothy D. Sisk is a program officer in the Grant Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He has been with the institute since 1989, specializing in conflict management in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East and focusing on topics such as negotiation, mediation, international organizations, and comparative political systems. In addition to *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*, he is the author of *Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract* (Princeton University Press, 1995) and *Islam and Democracy: Religion, Power and Politics in the Middle East* (U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1992). He recently completed a term as a visiting fellow at the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo, Norway, and was previously awarded a Fulbright scholarship for year-long field research in South Africa. He earned a Ph.D. in political science at George Washington University, and he earned an M.A. in international journalism and B.A. in foreign service at Baylor University. He is currently a professorial lecturer in the Liberal Studies Program at Georgetown University.

Frans C.G.M. Timmermans is a Dutch career diplomat currently seconded as an adviser to the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He was previously seconded to European Commissioner Hans van der Broek, for whom he was a member of the cabinet and an expert on Russia. From 1993 to 1994, Mr. Timmermans served as deputy head of the European Union Section of the Netherlands Ministry for Development Cooperation. He was a secretary in the Political Section of the Embassy of the Netherlands in Moscow (1990-1993). In the late 1980s, he served in the Department for European Integration of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Timmermans is a frequent contributor to publications on Eastern Europe and its security affairs. He lectures, inter alia, at the Academy of the Netherlands Ministry of Defense and the George C. Marshall Centre (U.S. Defense Department) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. He is a member of the Advisory Commission on European Affairs of the Dutch Labor Party. Mr. Timmermans served for two years in the Military Intelligence Service of the Royal Netherlands Army.

Valery A. Tishkov is the director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology. He has been working at the Russian Academy of Sciences since 1989, and is a senior research consultant at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). Previously he was chairman of the Ministry of Nationalities Affairs of the Russian Federation (February*-October 1992). Mr. Tishkov was a Maison des Sciences de L'Homme fellow in Paris, 1992; a Huntington Library Fellow, United States, 1990; an Eisenhower

Fellow, United States, 1980; and a Canada Council Fellow, Canada, 1974 and 1977. He is a member of the Russian Fund for Humanities and the Russian Academy of Sciences, president of the International Academy of Social and Education Studies, and vice president of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. Mr. Tishkov has published several books, including *History and Historians in the USA* (Nauka, 1985), *History of Canada* (Nauka, 1982), *Social and Reform Movements in Colonial Canada* (Nauka, 1978), and *The Maple Leaf Country: Beginnings of Canadian History* (Nauka, 1977). He also has a forthcoming book entitled *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. Mr. Tishkov received his degree from Moscow State University and his Doctorate of Historical Sciences from the Institute of General History, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

Appendix B

Agenda and Participants

Institute of Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions

August 14*-16, 1996

Moscow, Russia

AGENDA

WEDNESDAY, August 14, 1996

6:00-7:00pm Informal Reception

THURSDAY, August 15, 1996

9:30*-10:00am Welcoming Remarks

David Hamburg

President

Carnegie Corporation of New York

10:00am-12:00pm Session One: Power Sharing: Issues, Strategies, Institutions

Chair: David Hamburg

Presenter: Timothy Sisk

United States Institute of Peace

Discussants: Valery Tishkov

Director

Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology

Russian Academy of Sciences

Claus Offe
*Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Humboldt-Universität, Berlin*

12:00*-1:30pm Lunch

Introduction: Aleksandr O. Chubarian
*Director, Institute of Universal History
Russian Academy of Sciences*
Speaker: The Honorable Mintimer Shaimiev
President of the Republic of Tatarstan

1:30*-4:00pm Session Two: Power Sharing and the Experience of the Russian Federation

Chair: Aleksandr O. Chubarian
Presenters: Leokadia Drobizheva
*Chair, Department of Sociology and Inter-Ethnic Relations, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology
Russian Academy of Sciences*
Vladimir Lysenko
*State Duma Deputy
Chair, Committee on Federal Affairs and Regional Policy*
Discussant: Emil Pain
*Deputy Director
Analytical Center of the Russian President*

6:45*-9:00pm Dinner

Introduction: David Hamburg
Speaker: The Honorable Mikhail Gorbachev

FRIDAY, August 16, 1996

9:30am*-12:00pm Session Three: The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly Conflict

Chair: Jane Holl
*Executive Director
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict*
Presenters: Colonel Daniel Kaufman
United States Military Academy
General (Ret.) Mahmut Gareev
President, Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation
Discussants: Alexei Arbatov
*State Duma Deputy
Deputy Chair, Committee on Defense*
General (Ret.) John Galvin
Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

12:00*-1:30pm Lunch

Introduction: David Holloway

Center for International Security and Arms Control

Stanford University

Speaker: The Honorable Andrei Kokoshin

First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

1:30*-4:00pm Session Four: Regional and International Institutions in Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping

Chair: Olara Otunnu

President

International Peace Academy

Presenter: Andrei Kortunov

President, Moscow Branch

Russian Science Foundation

Discussants: Frans Timmermans

Advisor, Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Vladimir Lukin

State Duma Deputy

4:00*-4:15pm Concluding Remarks

Aleksandr O. Chubarian

David Holloway

David Hamburg

PARTICIPANTS

Bruce Allyn

Program Director

Conflict Management Group

Venali Amelin

Chair, Commission on National Relations

Orenburg

Alexei Arbatov

Deputy

State Duma of the Russian Federation

Deputy Chair, Committee on Defense

Deana Arsenian

Assistant Director

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Brown University*

*Sergei Arutiunov
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Vyacheslav Beldey Advisor to Ramazan Abdulatipov

Kirk Bennett Embassy of the United States to the Russian Federation

*Mikhail Bereznikov
Chief of Foreign Relations Department
Office of the Tatarstan Representative in Moscow*

*Scott Bruckner
Director
Moscow Carnegie Center*

*Aleksandr Chernykh
Deputy Director
Institute of Universal History
Russian Academy of Sciences*

*Aleksandr O. Chubarian
Director
Institute of Universal History
Russian Academy of Sciences*

*Aleksandr Dorokhov
Assistant to the Deputy Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy*

*Leokadia Drobizheva
Chair
Department of Sociology and Inter-Ethnic Relations
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Dean
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy*

General (Ret.) Mahmut Gareev
*President, Academy of Military
Sciences of the Russian Federation*

Mikhail Gorbachev
*President
The International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies*

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President
International Peace Academy

Emil Pain
Deputy Director
Analytical Center of the Russian President

Pavel Podlesny
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Institute of Europe
Russian Academy of Sciences

Sergei Popov
Chair
Commission on National Relations of the Stavropol Region

Aleksei Pushkov
Deputy Director-General
Russian Public Television (ORT)

Kyle Scott
Embassy of the United States to the Russian Federation

Mintimer Shaimiev
President
Republic of Tatarstan

Georgi Shakhnazarov
The International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies

Colonel Aleksandr Sirotkin
Deputy Chief of Peacekeeping Forces
Ministry of Defense
Russian Federation

Timothy Sisk
Program Officer, Grant Program
United States Institute of Peace

Mike Snowden
Embassy of the United States to the Russian Federation

Mikhail Stolyarov
First Deputy Representative of the Republic of Tatarstan in Moscow

Yevgeni Stepanov
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John Tefft
Deputy Chief of Mission
Embassy of the United States to the Russian Federation

Frans Timmermans
Advisor, Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Valery Tishkov
Director
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Appendix C

About the Sponsoring Institutions

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict was established by Carnegie Corporation of New York in May 1994 to address the looming threats to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. The Commission is examining the principal causes of deadly ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster or deter their outbreak. Taking a long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts that are likely to emerge, the Commission seeks to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented. The Commission is also looking at the strengths and weaknesses of various international entities in conflict prevention and considering ways in which international organizations might contribute toward developing an effective international system of nonviolent problem solving.

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The Center for International Security and Arms Control, part of Stanford University's Institute for International Studies, is a multidisciplinary community dedicated to research and training in the field of international security. The Center brings together scholars, policymakers, scientists, area specialists, members of the business community, and other experts to examine a wide range of international security issues.

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The Institute of Universal History is one of the leading historical research centers of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It was founded in 1936 as part of the Institute of History, and in 1968 it became an independent institution. The Institute's research covers the problems of methodology and philosophy of history, the political, economic, and social history of the countries of Europe, the Americas, and Africa, the relations of Russia/USSR with foreign countries, and international relations in general, including the theory and history of conflicts from antiquity to the twentieth century. The Institute publishes more than ten periodicals and several series, including *Civilizations*, *European Almanac*, and *American Yearbook*. The Institute has extensive contacts with foreign historical research centers with which it collaborates on international research projects.

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PUBLICATIONS OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT

The following reports are available free of charge from the Commission:

David A. Hamburg, *Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence*. Founding Essay of the Commission. April 1994.

David A. Hamburg, *Education for Conflict Resolution*. April 1995.

Comprehensive Disclosure of Fissionable Materials: A Suggested Initiative. Discussion Paper. June 1995.

Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives*. Report to the Commission. December 1995.

Andrew J. Goodpaster, *When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions*. Report to the Commission. July 1996.

Jane E. Holl, *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict: Second Progress Report*. July 1996.

John Stremlau, *Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations*. Report to the Commission. November 1996.

Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, *The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy*. Report to the Commission. May 1997.

John Stremlau with Helen Zille, *A House No Longer Divided: Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa*. Report to the Commission. July 1997.

Nik Gowing, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. Report to the Commission. September 1997.

Cyrus R. Vance and David A. Hamburg, *Pathfinders for Peace: A Report to the UN Secretary-General on the Role of Special Representatives and Personal Envoys*. Report of the Commission. September 1997.

Preventing Deadly Conflict: Executive Summary of the Final Report. Report of the Commission. December 1997.

Gail W. Lapidus with Svetlana Tsalik, eds., *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions*; Proceedings of a Conference in Moscow, Russian Federation. Report to the Commission. April 1998.

These reports are also available on the Commission's World Wide Web site:
<http://www.ccpdc.org>

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Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East; *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*; *Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict*; and *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, are books in the Commission series published by Rowman & Littlefield. Please contact the publisher at 1-800-462-6420 or 1-301-459-3366.

* Deceased September 1996.

** Deceased February 1995.