SOURCE: Q 172.5 .K3 AUTHOR: Keynan, Alexander DOCTITLE: United States as a Partner in Scientific and Technological Cooperation SECTITLE: United States as a Partner in Scientific and Technological Cooperation DATE: 1991 SUBJECT: science technology international cooperation Europe United States PUBLISHER: Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government DOCTYPE: Book TITLEID: ISBN_ISSN: Text: THE UNITED STATES AS A PARTNER IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION: SOME PERSPECTIVES FROM ACROSS THE ATLANTIC A CONSULTANT REPORT Alexander Keynan JUNE 1991 CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT The goal of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government is a nation better prepared to respond to the opportunities and hazards of scientific and technological advances. The Commission was established by Carnegie Corporation of New York in 1988 to assess, and recommend improvements in, the mechanisms by which the federal government and the states incorporate scientific and technological (S&T) knowledge into policy and decision-making. The Commission's special focus is on the organization of government as it affects decision-making processes, rather than on specific policy options. The Commission is considering how government can be better organized so that policy options can be systematically formulated using the best available S&T expertise; what mechanisms for analysis need to be strengthened or created; and what technical competency is needed in government. Since policy-making in a democratic society requires balancing diverse and competing goals and values, the Commission is equally concerned that S&T- based policy options be framed in ways that are readily intelligible and accessible both to policymakers and the people who elect them. The Commission is an independent bipartisan body with a five-year charter. In addition to eminent scientists and engineers, the Commission and its Advisory Council include former officials who have served at high levels of government, as well as leaders from the private sectors of American society. This consultant report was prepared for the Commission's International Steering Group. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government or the Steering Group. CONTENTS FOREWORD by Walter A. Rosenblith PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 1.0 BASIC CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION 1.1 Universality Of Science 1.2 Science And National Interests 1.3 Conflict Of Loyalties 1.4 Levels And Modes Of Cooperation In Science And Technology 1.5 Motivations For International Cooperation 1.6 Goodwill Of The Scientific Community 2.0 ASPECTS OF THE U.S. RESEARCH SYSTEM RELEVANT TO INTERNATIONAL S&T COOPERATION 2.1 Size 2.2 Excellence 2.3 Mobility And Focus 2.4 Diversity And Decentralization 2.5 U.S. Attitudes Toward Centralization Of Government Functions 3.0 ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH SYSTEM RELEVANT TO INTERNATIONAL S&T COOPERATION 3.1 Organization Of Basic Research 3.2 Centralized National Mechanisms For Science Policy 4.0 EUROPEAN AND U.S. RESEARCH SYSTEMS: A MISMATCH? 4.1 Different Attitudes 4.2 Different Institutional Frameworks 4.3 Different Policy-Making Mechanisms 5.0 COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AS PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS 5.1 Some Voices From The Other Side Of The Atlantic 5.2 Historical Perspective 5.3 The Changing Image Of The United States 5.4 Mutuality Of Partnership In S&T Cooperation 6.0 THE UNITED STATES AS A PARTNER IN MULTILATERAL SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS 6.1 U.S. Image At The World Health Organization 6.2 Is The U.S. Image In WHO A Good Model? 6.3 Reflections On U.S. Participation In Multilateral Organizations 7.0 SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS 8.0 APPENDIXES 8.1 Appendix A: NASA Guidelines And Objectives For International Cooperation 8.2 Appendix B: International Cooperation In Engineering Research Guidelines 9.0 NOTES 10.0 ABOUT THE AUTHOR 11.0 MEMBERS OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT 12.0 MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL FOREWORD Around mid-century Edward R. Murrow pioneered in the creation of novel documentaries. His purpose was to allow Americans to look into a mirror which reflected the perceptions of people in other countries whether we saw them as allies, neutrals, or potential foes. Alexander Keynan presents us with a comparable report on how our partners in Science and Technology perceive the United States across the Atlantic. This extended essay derives its substance from the author's long experience in international science and from a series of special, rather candid interviews with scientists or science administrators, most of them longtime acquaintances of Keynan's and in the service of their government. Though Keynan's emphasis is on intergovernmental cooperation in the Science and Technology area, his inquiry ranges from aspects of cooperation involving U.S. governmental agencies to the perception of the role and behavior of individual U.S. scientists (or groups of scientists). The reader cannot help but be struck by the sharp contrast in perception that often emerges. Should we be surprised by such a finding? Such is the universal nature of Science that colleagues working in the same field have little difficulty in agreeing on what we might call substantive issues. It is not quite the same when attempts are made to identify "opposite numbers" to U.S. institutions or entities. This task is difficult enough in bilateral settings; when more than two partners are involved, the challenge is anything but trivial. Even national Academies -- or Academy-like bodies -- to which members are selected on the basis of their eminence in a scientific or technical discipline often differ in structure, coverage of disciplines, convening power, and resources, both human and financial. This leads Keynan to go to some length in describing in the requisite detail the U.S. research system and the research systems and policy mechanisms of our transatlantic partners. But these structures and mechanisms are far from holding still. We are entering an epoch in which the forthcoming changes related to the momentum of the European Community -- 1992 and all that -- the impact of the political earthquake in Eastern Europe in addition to the growing importance of the Global Change agenda promise to influence significantly the evolution of Science and Technology structures and policy mechanisms in many countries. The U.S. scientific and technical community which has since World War II played a leadership role in so many respects will profit from reading Keynan's thoughtful essay carefully. Whether his sensitively presented suggestions are realistic or not, it seems clear that we shall have to deal with new institutional arrangements, some governmental, some non- governmental and some "mixed." These new initiatives and partnerships will involve technology in industry, government, and academe; also, increasingly, organizational structures that encompass the social sciences. The search for "opposite numbers" will not become any simpler. This report is one of several activities the Carnegie Commission is carrying out aimed at strengthening the institutions and decision-making processes through which science and technology are wisely and effectively applied to world affairs. On the one hand, these activities address how the United States is organized within its own government for improving the applications of science and technology in international affairs. On the other hand, these activities also seek to renew a positive, long-range vision of the international institutional infrastructure in which the United States is a partner. The Commission is emphasizing two major areas of concern: development of the less-advanced nations of the world, and how nations work together multilaterally on matters of common interest involving science and technology, such as global environmental change. For all these studies, it was recognized that perceptions of the United States among its international partners are important in evaluating needs for change. We are very grateful to Alexander Keynan for undertaking the sensitive assignment of eliciting and describing these perceptions. The author, who is both a friend of the U.S. and of so many U.S. scientists, is rendering all of us a collegial service. We stand in his debt. Walter A. Rosenblith Massachusetts Institute of Technology Member, International Steering Group Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government PREFACE In dealing with theories of international conflicts, scholars have found that such conflicts can be best understood by realizing that each side in a conflict reacts more to its image, or perception, of the other side than to any reality, however it is defined. This is probably also true of the normal interaction between people, organizations, and nations: the images held by each partner of its other partners might be as important as, or even more important than, objective, measurable attributes. This study assesses the U.S. role in international scientific and technological (S&T) cooperation through the eyes of its cooperating partners. Thus, it deals with the images that the various cooperating parties have now of the United States. Such images, right or wrong, are a factor in any analysis of international cooperation. But images do, of course, change. We will deal here with a recent snapshot of the images of the United States at the end of the twentieth century; the images of the United States as a partner in S&T cooperation were quite different in earlier decades. The following is not a scholarly inquiry based on an intensive survey of the literature; rather, it borrows heavily from personal experience and oral evidence as well as from correspondence with a variety of people in different countries. Thus, it should be viewed as an impressionistic account of the problem reflecting the views of the author -- which certainly could be challenged by others who have had different experiences. Moreover, information is given on U.S. activities, policies, and behavior in the framework of international cooperation, exactly as described by the cooperating parties. These descriptions might be wrong, incomplete, or based on misunderstandings. No attempt has been made to verify such information because these descriptions, fight or wrong, represent the image that the cooperating party has of the United States. This study is limited in scope and concentrates mostly on U.S. government cooperation in S&T with the industrialized West European democracies, although the picture that emerges is probably shared by Japan and other non- European countries. It is not the purpose of this study to deal with the problem of whether or not the United States should increase its cooperation with other countries. Rather, it concentrates on those aspects of international S&T cooperation that involve the U.S. government and the problems that have emerged since the 1950s affecting U.S. participation in international S&T cooperation. Some account is given of the role of the U.S. scientist, but since the emphasis is on cooperation between governments, little emphasis is placed on cooperation between industries, or among scientists participating in international professional societies, which raise problems that differ from those described here. The first three chapters of this study summarize some basic concepts of international scientific cooperation and describe the U.S. and European research systems. They emphasize aspects of each research system relevant to international S&T cooperation. Chapter 4.0 then identifies and analyzes differences between the respective research systems, and Chapter 5.0 goes to the heart of the matter by describing specific images of the United States held by its partners in S&T cooperation. U.S. participation in multilateral scientific organizations is the focus of Chapter 6.0. This study does not include a set of concrete operational recommendations, but Chapter 7.0 offers some suggestions that might lead to better cooperation between the United States and other countries. Alexander Keynan Hebrew University, Jerusalem June, 1991 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author is grateful to the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, which commissioned this inquiry. The work was conducted during a year in which the author was a visiting professor at The Rockefeller University. For their useful discussions and their interest in this work, he expresses his gratitude to Joshua Lederberg, president emeritus of the university and co-chair of the Carnegie Commission; William Golden, also commission co-chair; and David Hamburg, president of Carnegie Corporation of New York. The inquiry also benefited from constructive criticism by the International Steering Group of the Commission: Rodney Nichols, Harvey Brooks, Victor Rabinowitch, and Walter Rosenblith, all of whom invested much time and effort in helping to clarify many aspects of the report and helped to shape its final form. The author would like to express his gratitude to Dorothy Nelkin for her creative criticism and help in shaping the first draft of this report. The author is specially indebted to Jesse Ausubel, Director of Studies of the Commission, who followed this work on a daily basis, for his encouragement, for his many intellectually stimulating discussions, and for his help in developing the concepts, ideas, and suggestions for the future, which are expressed in this work. Finally, the paper was skillfully edited by Sabra Bissette Ledent, who succeeded in turning the original drafts into a readable text. 1.0 BASIC CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION 1.1 Universality Of Science Two conflicting factors characterize international scientific cooperation. On the one hand, science is intrinsically international in scope. Progress is achieved through continual interaction among creative individuals or teams, sometimes remote geographically from each other. Results are published in international journals and are valid only if confirmed and accepted by one's peers, wherever they might be. On the other hand, scientists are members of nation states. Their abilities to pursue their work and conduct their lives are dependent on the social and political structures of the societies in which they live. Most important, their funding is national, reflecting national priorities for science. To understand formalized international cooperation in science one must understand these conflicting aspects of the scientific endeavor. Writing in 1942 on the "Normative Structure of Science" and addressing mostly the social aspects of science "as a set of cultural values governing the activities termed scientific," Robert K. Merton stated that "sets of institutional imperatives are taken to comprise the ethos of modern science." According to Merton, these imperatives are "Universalism," "Communism," "Disinterestedness," and "Organized Skepticism."[1] Universalism, central to the topic of this study, is defined in Merton's 1942 article: Universalism finds immediate expression in the canon that truth-claims, whatever their source, are to be subject to preestablished impersonal criteria, consonant with observation and with previously confirmed knowledge. The acceptance or rejection of claims entering the list of science is not to depend on the personal or social attitudes of their protagonist .... The Haber Process cannot be validated by a Nuremberg Decree nor can an anglophobe repeal the law of gravitation. The chauvinist may expunge the names of alien scientists from historical textbooks, but their formulations remain indispensable to science and technology. However "echt-Deutsch" or hundred percent American the final increment, some alliances are accessories before the fact of every new scientific advance. The imperative of Universalism is rooted deep in the impersonal character of science.[2] Merton is, of course, aware that the "institution of science is part of a larger social structure with which it is not always integrated. When the larger culture opposes Universalism, the ethos of science is subject to serious strain."[3] Merton's imperative should be viewed as an ideal ethical system to which the scientific community aspires but which, like all other ethical systems, is not universally reached in real life. Merton's consideration should not be viewed as an irrelevant philosophical theory, however. Scientists can establish the validity of their research only by publishing it in the international literature and exposing it to criticism not limited to national boundaries. Their careers therefore depend partly on the international community active in their fields, and each scientist's work is itself affected by whatever is done by scientists all over the world. With the increased mobility of scientists, the continual advances in rapid information transfer, the increasing frequency of international meetings in which accounts of "work in progress" are given (sometimes long before they are published), and the increasing number of journals that specialize in rapid publication of important results, there is a very good chance that scientists know what other scientists are doing in their field long before the official publication in journals. Such knowledge is often the basis for inflation of cooperation between laboratories. "Universality" as defined by Merton does not require any specific formal organizational structure. Still, it is easy to understand that scientists are the driving force in the formation of organizational structures that facilitate contact between scientists both nationally and internationally (see Chapter 6.0 on multilateral organizations). National organizations of scientists preceded international organizations by hundreds of years. In the seventeenth century, academies of science -- such as the British Royal Society of London (1660), and the French Academie des Sciences (1666) -- were sometimes formed under a royal charter or government blessing in order to institutionalize the legitimation of knowledge. With the professionalization of science in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, national scientific societies were established to promote science and facilitate encounters between scientists. Such exchanges, however, require meetings and scientific publications. Thus, the earliest scientific journals, even if not intended to be, were actually international and helped institutionalize the international nature of the scientific community. Only in the twentieth century did some of the national societies create international federations, usually in order to hold periodic meetings enlarging the scope of each of their national societies and ensuring that each individual was indeed exposed to the state of the art in his or her field. Such meetings often resulted in some form of publication and were conducive to the establishment of personal relations between scientists of different countries. They also were a factor in the accelerated internationalization of the scientific enterprise. A further step in the formalization of science as an international activity was the rounding of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) in 1931. ICSU is an international, nongovernmental organization whose principal objective is to encourage international scientific activity "for the benefit of all." As stated in its charter, ICSU has adopted "a policy of non-discrimination, affirming the right of all scientists throughout the world, without regard to race, religion, political philosophy, ethnic origin, citizenship, sex or language, to join in international activities." The members of ICSU are "national" (usually through a national academy of science) and "professional" (through the disciplinary societies, e.g., chemistry). ICSU is therefore a kind of organizational expression of Merton's doctrine on the universality of science. 1.2 Science And National Interests Although scientists need and want to cooperate internationally, their ability to do so often depends on their own governments. While the universality of science is not evident to the general public, its contribution to society is very much in the news. For example, the ability of the United States to put a man on the moon established the image of American superiority in science and technology in the world for at least a decade. It is now common belief that the achievements of science and their translation into technology have profoundly influenced the fate of modern society and that a country's ability to create and use science determines to a large extent its place in the family of nations. Against this background, it is not difficult to understand why since at least the mid- twentieth century governments have realized that science creates know-how that can provide both constructive and destructive power. Thus, governments have sought control over science and the use of its results. In the nineteenth century, most scientists, fearing government interference and control, were reluctant to accept government support for basic research. Government support of and involvement in science were therefore limited to applied research (agriculture, geology, military science). Significant government support of basic research started after World War II, during which governments realized the value of science. Scientists, however, continued to believe that they could both obtain government support and still maintain control over science.[4] Thus, after the war specific research projects were regulated by the scientific community itself (through peer review), while the government, through its federal agencies and congressional appropriations, determined the broad lines of support. The complex relationship between science and government has elements of both support and control. There is an emerging but fragile understanding that governments not only have to support technology but must support basic research as well. Indeed, the governments of most industrialized Western countries support basic research on a significant scale, but they also try to control the direction of research by selectively supporting fields they perceive to be of national interest as well as the use of the results of research. Control of the products of basic research, however, is limited because open publication is part of the basic research process. Thus, governments try to control the dissemination of the results of applied research and technology, especially those of military or economic importance.[5] High on the list of objectives of such control is the prevention of useful information in defense technology going to "enemy" countries and industrially useful information to competitor countries. All this being said, it must be recognized that scientists are not usually passive players in their involvement with governments. They initiate projects, suggest organizational frameworks needed for the advancement of science, and actively try (with varying degrees of success) to give government decision makers the scientific and technological underpinnings relevant to the issues the government is dealing with. In democratic societies, scientists sometimes lobby politically to influence governments in matters of their concern. In summary, the dependence of the modern scientist on government funding and policies, as well as government attitudes, are factors in international scientific relations and cooperation. The attitudes of governments toward such cooperation is very different from the attitudes of scientists. While scientists tend to cooperate with other scientists worldwide if this serves their own research objectives and the progress of science, governments have both positive and negative considerations in scientific cooperation with other governments. As we shall see later, governments are often national rather than global in their approaches but can be influenced by the scientific community to sponsor international cooperation if such cooperation serves their scientists. In other cases, governments are opposed to cooperation as a consequence of foreign policy considerations or the desire to control useful information and know-how that gives their country an advantage. In most cases, successful international cooperation depends on joint action between the government and the scientific or engineering community and is therefore a function of the goodwill of both partners in this enterprise. 1.3 Conflict Of Loyalties From the above, it is apparent that a conflict of loyalties for scientists between the universality of science and commitment to their countries might indeed exist. But, in reality, most scientists engaged in basic research have learned to strike a balance between participating in the international scientific community and serving their countries. In most democratic countries, scientific communities and the organizational frameworks they have created run their own affairs quite independently of governments. It is also accepted in most of these countries that the free flow of ideas and basic scientific information across political borders is essential for the progress of science. Although most national leaders, political parties, and political philosophies do not fundamentally understand the notion of "academic freedom," they usually do recognize that governmental interference in the conduct of science is counterproductive.[6] Yet, in most industrial societies government regulation of the international dissemination of the results of scientific research translated into technology is the accepted norm. This is not a new trend. Indeed, Daniel J. Boorstin, in his book The Discoverers, describes how Portugal's King Manuel had a policy of keeping secret the navigational charts of Portuguese explorers who discovered the sea route to Africa.[7] Still, it would be a mistake to assume that international communication between technologists is mostly limited by governmental or industrial interference. The fact is that communication between technologists nationally or internationally is altogether different from communication between scientists. This difference is stated best by Derek K. de Solla Price: The difference between science and technology in this new sense is pointed to most clearly by the sociology of publication. The scientist, it was remarked, is heavily motivated to publish -- this is the key to all the inner springs of his drive to do science. In technology it is otherwise; the tradition, crudely speaking, is to conceal in order to have a new product or process before others. It also happens that the scientist hears from his Invisible College about the new work on which he is going to build, and he therefore does not need to read the published journals very much, for by then they are old hat. However, in the other camp, the technologist is most eager, while revealing as little as possible himself, to pick up anything and everything that may be dropped his way by others. One may put the whole thing in an aphorism I have used before; the scientist wants to write but not read, the technologist wants to read but not write.[8] Likewise, international cooperation in basic science is quite different from cooperation in applied science and technology. International cooperation in basic research occurs continually between scientists. Governments are approached if funds are needed, but they do not usually dominate or regulate such relations with the exception of financial control. Indeed, government is often a silent partner in such cooperation. In contrast, international cooperation in the development of new technologies, initiated by scientists or by governments, is usually government dominated, especially in the field of military technology. Technology of military importance is, of course, subject to the reign of secrecy, and scientists and engineers dealing with technologies that are "classified information" or "military secrets" are restricted in their international contacts by stringent laws. To a lesser degree, this is true for industrial technology, even if such technology is protected by internationally honored patents. Industry exerts self-imposed secrecy (trade secrets) on its technological innovations out of commercial consideration.[9] International cooperation in industrial technology is generally a more complicated matter, especially if cooperation is between industries owned by multinational corporations and located in different countries. The government of the host country of such industries tries (not always successfully) to assure that it benefits from industrial research done in its country. There are also cases of self-imposed secrecy by scientists who would like to protect commercially usable information for their own or their country's use. This is especially true in such fields as biotechnology where patent laws are difficult to apply or have not yet been tested extensively. In summary, it can be said that while scientists engaged in fundamental research usually experience no conflict of loyalty between the universality of science and their commitment to their countries, the principle of universality prevails. But the principle of serving one's country (or company) prevails in the field of applied science and technology where the international flow of information is either self-controlled by commercial considerations or controlled by government regulation. The ability to keep new developments in technology secret is limited by time, however. Whenever such technologies are applied and appear in the marketplace, they can, in principle, by imitated. Thus, industry relies more on the protection of its intellectual property rights through trade secrets than through patents. A vast literature dealing with this problem exists. 1.4 Levels And Modes Of Cooperation In Science And Technology Scientific and technological cooperation occurs at all levels, from the interpersonal to the multinational. As the level of cooperation rises, so does its degree of formalization and the intervention of nonscientific considerations. In basic research, international cooperation between individuals, usually leaders of research teams or laboratories, is quite common. Such cooperative arrangements might take the form of loose agreements, leading to an exchange of methods, mutual visits, and the sharing of ideas and criticism. Sometimes, however, they are much more structured, based on an agreement to study the same problem by different approaches or techniques, or to divide the experimental work between the cooperating laboratories. Such cooperation is usually based on joint planning of experiments, joint publications, and often an exchange of graduate students or junior faculty. Unless joint funding is involved, most cooperative agreements of this type are based on mutual trust or exchange of letters, not on formal agreements. Such cooperation is often based on separate funding by each of the cooperating labs.[10] Thousands and thousands of such links exist. Cooperative agreements between national institutes have various degrees of formalization. Often they are so-called paper agreements, which are indications of good intent, very often between institutes with similar objectives. In the field of basic research, so-called framework agreements may be used to sponsor joint meetings and create a framework in which individual scientists can cooperate. International agreements for the exchange of relevant information at joint meetings (workshops, conferences, seminars, etc.) seem to be favored by institutes that are mission-oriented (oceanography, geological surveys, medicine, environmental studies). Agreements between universities in different countries are usually for teacher or student exchanges, sometimes joint seminars. Rarely do they also include joint research projects. An interesting example of fruitful multinational cooperation is the Centre Europeen de Recherche Nucleaire (CERN, European Center for Nuclear Research), located near Geneva, Switzerland. Founded by scientists, with the active good will of research ministers, all of whom saw the need to pool resources for highly complex and expensive experiments. CERN is based on intergovernmental agreements and financed by governments. But it is administered by scientists as an independent institute. By whatever criteria CERN is judged, all physicists agree that this is a very successful venture. International cooperative agreements in science and technology between governments, no matter the motivation, are usually quite formal in their objectives, management, modes of operation, financing, sharing of intellectual property, utilization of research results, and policy on patents, secrecy, and publications. Objectives and timetables are well defined. Any changes have to be agreed on by the cooperating parties, which normally are the institutions representing the respective governments. In addition to scientists, the agreements are written by diplomats and lawyers. Agreements between national agencies or government departments in different countries are usually similar to these intergovernmental agreements. With the recognition that many scientific problems require a global perspective, many multinational agreements in science have been oriented toward the earth sciences, resulting in such programs as the International Geophysical Year. A fair number of multinational agreements in science are based on cooperation in data collecting, in some cases with an agreement to conduct joint analysis of such data. With acceptance of the notion of a global economy and global problems, the near future may see international cooperation extend to other fields. In the same vein, the activities of international agencies are based on the sharing of human intellectual resources between countries for the solution of problems considered to be of universal importance. The World Health Organization (WHO), for example, has tried to engage the talents of many countries in its research on tropical diseases. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) uses its analysis of data received from many countries to develop a global perspective on problems of universal interest such as world energy resources or the influence of human activity on climatic change. Although international scientific frameworks do not necessarily ensure excellence in science, the international "umbrella" can have great advantages. For example, India or Africa might be reluctant to let former colonial powers investigate their epidemics, but they would gladly accept help from WHO. Elevating globally important research to the international level is also a way of depoliticizing such projects. Unfortunately, however, it is sometimes difficult to attract good scientists to international organizations. While their scientific activity might be depoliticized, such organizations are usually burdened with large bureaucracies and chronic political problems that could render them scientifically ineffective. International organizations managed by scientists or businesses are usually more effective than those managed by government representatives. The European Molecular Biological Organization (EMBO) and CERN are good examples. 1.5 Motivations For International Cooperation Merton's analysis of the universalism of science goes a long way toward explaining why individual scientists and scientific organizations involved in basic research are motivated to cooperate internationally. But international cooperation in science is not always motivated just by scientific considerations. Political or semipolitical considerations also play a role.[11] Scientist-Initiated Cooperation In democratic countries, scientists do not necessarily consult with their governments on international scientific cooperation and even may undertake such cooperation in the face of government opposition. Ten-year-old cooperation between a group of U.S. and Cuban biologists, for example, was opposed by the U.S. authorities. One of the participants summarized the U.S. scientists' motivation for such cooperation with Cuba: "The Cubans have some very talented young people and a strong wish to do good science. For science's sake we should help them." Some scientists and even some politicians believe that the double loyalty of the scientific community to both their respective countries and international science can help build bridges between countries in political conflict. Thus, the "network of international science" could be used to solve international problems. A case in point is the Pugwash Movement, rounded by a group of U.S. and Soviet physicists. They believed that by meeting each other and discussing problems of nuclear armament and disarmament on a "scientific level" they could build "bridges of confidence" that would create constructive dialogue between countries in conflict.[12] Nevertheless, scientists have to rely on governments when budgets for cooperation are needed. Scientific rather than political considerations are, of course, most often the motivation for scientists to initiate international scientific cooperation, but they sometimes use their strong influence in government to do so. For example, European scientists were able to convince their governments that each of their countries alone could not support the large institutes and expensive equipment, such as large accelerators, needed for nuclear and particle physics. They therefore cooperated and established CERN. Government-Initiated Cooperation Governments are sometimes motivated to use cooperation in basic research for political objectives. For example, the European Communities (EC) governments support a fair amount of cooperation in basic research through the EC Research Commissariat. These governments believe that such cooperation between scientists in different countries will facilitate Europe's unification. Cooperation between governments for joint projects in applied science and technology has very different motivations. In all cases, such cooperation has to be justified by serving national interests. In many instances, a mixture of different kinds of motivation leads to international cooperation. Eugene Skolnikoff[13] has suggested that U.S. government motivation for cooperation in S&T can be broken down roughly into three categories: 1. International cooperation directly supporting U.S. domestic research and development (R&D) objectives. This category includes cooperation and occasional support of foreign scientists in pursuit of common objectives, programs carried out internationally because of the requirements of the subject (such as in oceanography or global climate), and participation in internationally organized research endeavors (such as the International Geophysical Year). Joint financing through international cooperation can supplement large and expensive programs such as the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Station and the Department of Energy's Supercollider. 2. International cooperation carried out for mixed foreign policy and scientific purposes. In many such cases (for example, cooperation with the USSR, China, and Poland), foreign policy considerations prevail. This category also includes the use of U.S. S&T capability for U.S. policy purposes. Examples include sea-water desalination in the Middle East and efforts to stimulate energy-related R&D through the International Atomic Energy Agency. 3. Science and technology cooperation designed to serve international development objectives. Although this category has elements of foreign policy motivation, it deals specifically with the development assistance objectives of the United States and the problems of developing countries. Of these programs, which are large in magnitude, some deal mostly with economic and technical assistance, and others contain elements of S&T. Examples include bilateral agreements at the country or project level, support of R&D institutions in developing countries, commitment of U.S. R&D resources to development problems, and participation in international S&T programs (U.N. and others). Over the past few years, financial considerations have become an increasingly important factor in initiating international cooperation. For example, NASA must seek partners who will share in the expenses of very costly programs. And the United States asked Japan to participate in its large accelerator program, mostly because of financial considerations. In other cases, time rather than budget considerations predominate. For the 1940s' Manhattan Project, the availability of good scientists, not funds, was the factor limiting rapid progress, and cooperation with England was the result. Finally, in the study of the global environment, international cooperation is a must. Countries can participate if they wish, but no single country can carry out such research alone. Other kinds of political motivation by governments that might lead to scientific cooperation are bona fide efforts by nations that are in political conflict to work together, with the intention of decreasing the confrontational forces. Addressing the political motivation for international cooperation in science, Frank Press, president of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, observed that "nations cooperate [because] they need concrete expressions of mutual regard that go beyond words. International agreements to cooperate in science and technology serve that need very well. The symbolism of nations working together in an area as strategic as science is important."[14] Governments of small countries or countries not large enough to compete with the industrial superpowers will cooperate in order to "stay alive" in today's very competitive market. The best example of such cooperation can be found today in the framework of the European Communities. Its philosophy is that no one country is large enough to compete in the modern market but that a consortium of European countries could achieve this goal. The complicated cultural and political relationships between the various European countries, their more or less independent industries, and the bureaucracy in Brussels make this kind of cooperation an interesting objective for independent study. A different kind of technological cooperation characterizes the field of defense technology, where the primary motivations are a country's objectives in foreign policy (such as helping an ally to stay strong militarily). Sometimes, however, such agreements are also based on financial incentives to the country's own industry (which cooperates with the supported country) and are a way to sell technologies. In other cases, the sale of military technology may be purely commercial in nature. As part of their weapons sales policies, France, Germany, Italy, Israel, and other countries have sold technologies to Third World countries (Iraq, Syria, Pakistan); these sales were not based on other policy considerations. Another point stressed by Skolnikoff as a "technological imperative" that makes cooperation between the industrial nations essential is the fact that environmental changes created by industry affect not just the country in which such changes are produced but also neighboring countries and perhaps others. For example, some acid rain falling in Canada is a result of U.S. industrial air pollution. The contamination of the Rhine River originates in Switzerland but affects various countries in Europe. Such effects cannot be dealt with just by regulating national industry. They call for rethinking industrial policy and industrial research as well as imposing limitations on a global basis. 1.6 Goodwill Of The Scientific Community International science cooperation is thus a multifaceted activity based on a variety of very different motivations. The one common denominator of this activity is that, whatever the mode or scope of international scientific cooperation, to succeed it requires devoted scientists, technologists, and engineers, who are motivated to carry out whatever is agreed on. As described in the previous section, international cooperation in science can be divided roughly between cooperative programs initiated by scientists and those initiated by governments. Projects initiated by scientists might range from loose networks of scientists keeping in touch with each other to structured international programs financed by foundations or governments. By their natures, such projects are based on the strong support of the scientific community. Support of the scientific community is not self-evident in government- (rather than scientist-) initiated programs, however. The degree of interest of scientists and their motivation to invest a constant effort in a government-initiated program of international cooperation depend on many factors, some quite complicated. The subject matter of such projects is important. Scientists who deal with climatic change know that international cooperation as well as government support are essential to the advancement of their interests. The intrinsic priority of a subject in a given scientific discipline as perceived by the scientific community is important as well. In the field of tropical diseases, for example, although many scientists from developed countries have a potential interest in this field, few scientists actually work in it. The study of such diseases is an objective international priority but not a priority for the advancement of basic biology nor a priority of science funding agencies in developed countries. It is therefore difficult to convince highly talented scientists to adopt as their main interest a subject that does not have intrinsic scientific priority, even if funds were available for its pursuit (indeed, such funds are usually not available, at least not for long-term financing). Altogether, however, prospects of stable funding certainly have an influence on at least some scientists in their choice of problems to be studied. Ideological factors also figure in motivating scientists to cooperate in government-initiated projects. In his book American Science Policy since World War II, Bruce L.R. Smith suggests that in the postwar years 1945-1965, there was an informal consensus among U.S. political and scientific leaders on how science might best serve the nation and how government might support science.[15] During this period, some of the most prominent scientists were willing to cooperate with the government in the field of military research. But, according to Smith, this consensus broke up under the pressures created by the Vietnam War, and the willingness of scientists to cooperate in a variety of defense projects became problematic. In this case, ideological factors prevailed over the prospect of constant funding.[16] Finally, the quality of the research capacity of the cooperating partner is a positive incentive for scientists and engineers to cooperate internationally. It is easy to convince a team of scientists and engineers to cooperate with a group equal to or better in their performance from whom they can learn and advance themselves. It is much more difficult to convince scientists to cooperate with teams they consider to be inferior. This affects cooperation between scientists from developed and developing countries. In summary, when serious long-range international cooperation in science and technology is planned, the attitudes of the scientific and academic community are important, on the one hand, for the success of such ventures and cannot be ignored. On the other hand, international cooperation in basic research often needs funding and therefore government support. Successful international cooperation in science and technology is usually based on a partnership between governments and scientific communities. 2.0 ASPECTS OF THE U.S. RESEARCH SYSTEM RELEVANT TO INTERNATIONAL S&T COOPERATION To a foreign observer, the U.S. research system is unique in many of its facets. It is enormous in size, decentralized, excellent in its performance, composed of a variety of diverse institutions with little central coordination, and supported by a multichannel funding system. U.S. scientists and scientific institutions are known to have a fair amount of autonomy in managing their daily affairs. They also are believed to have the world's most open and fairest research system, which is second to none in basic research. But, many of these characteristics, often sources of strength, are also obstacles to international scientific and technological cooperation. The system's decentralized organization and its multistage and decentralized system of decision making make formalized cooperation in the framework of internationally financed and managed projects difficult. This chapter points out those aspects of the U.S. research system relevant to its ability to cooperate internationally. But this chapter is not intended to be an inclusive description of the system; a large body of literature on this subject is available. 2.1 Size In 1990, the total R&D expenditure of the United States was more than $150 billion. In real value this was a 400 percent increase from 1953. Some 14 percent of the R&D budget is spent on basic research; the average annual growth in basic research spending between 1986 and 1990 after adjustment for inflation was 2.9 percent. The number of scientists and engineers employed in R&D in 1988 was 949,200; of these, 417,100 had doctorate degrees.[1] These figures indicate the large scale of U.S. R&D activity. Indeed, the United States spends more money on R&D activity than France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan combined. If normalized, as a proportion of the gross national product (GNP) or as R&D expenditure per capita, the U.S. expenditure (2.8 percent of GNP) is about the same as that of Germany (2.8 percent), slightly below that of Japan (2.9 percent), and higher than those of the United Kingdom (2.2 percent) or France (2.3 percent). But when civilian R&D in the United States is compared to civilian R&D in other countries, the U.S. 2 percent ratio is lower than that of Japan (2.9 percent) or West Germany (2.6 percent). Thus on the face of it, U.S. expenditures on R&D might look similar to expenditures for science by other countries (West Germany, Japan). But such an analysis misses the impact that U.S. science has on a foreign observer because it does not consider the effect of the sheer size of the U.S. scientific endeavor. The United States has a critical mass of scientists working in nearly all fields of science and technology. Thus, while other countries have to make choices, especially in the field of "big science," and must decide in which fields they can or cannot be active, the United States can pursue research in a broad spectrum of areas. This means that every scientific team in the world can find its counterpart in the United States. 2.2 Excellence The U.S. research system is usually perceived as the best in the world. In whatever way it is measured -- by numbers of articles published in refereed journals, patents, or Nobel Prizes -- the U.S. research system is superior to any other in its total performance. Again, when normalized per population or GNP, some of the German or Japanese achievements can be compared to those of the United States. Still, size and critical mass in various competitive fields favor the total high performance of U.S. science. According to the Institute for Scientific Information, the United States is responsible for about 35 percent of all scientific publications in the world (compared with 8.2 percent for the United Kingdom, 7.3 percent for Japan, and 6 percent for West Germany). Moreover, their impact as measured by the citation index is greater than that of other countries. The United States has the highest citation ratio (1.37), indicating that U.S.-authored articles are cited 37 percent more often than would be expected given their total number. West Germany and the United Kingdom have ratios of about 1.0, while those of France and Japan are 0.85 and 0.86, respectively. If measured by fields, the U.S. citation ratio equals or exceeds 1.23 in all fields except engineering and technology. In these fields, citations of Japanese works are slightly higher than those of the United States.[2] Most basic research in the United States is performed in universities as part of their graduate and postdoctoral programs. Thus, U.S. research universities enjoy the reputation of having the best training system for scientists in the world. During the last decade, the U.S. political, economic and scientific communities in the United States have been concerned about the technological competitiveness of the United States versus that of other countries, especially Japan. This concern is based on the successful competition of Japanese consumer goods in international and U.S. markets and the negative trade balance of the United States. According to Japanese estimates, Japan is "ahead" in nine of 40 high-technology categories. Studies by U.S. experts agree that in some fields Japan's high-technology capabilities are on par with or lead the capabilities of the United States in research and production. A great number of studies have tried to identify the factors responsible for this perceived industrial decline of the United States. The reason for Japanese success in American and European markets is controversial and not well understood. But none of these studies seems to blame the U.S. research system, although some studies recommend stronger links between university and government research and industry. Most such studies recommend that the U.S. government renegotiate trade agreements and reach international agreements on the degree of government support of R&D for private industry, as well as agreements on mutality in the free flow of information on innovative government-supported technologies between trading partners. 2.3 Mobility And Focus The U.S. scientific community is characterized by high mobility among universities, industry, and government laboratories; a flexible career structure with multiple opportunities; a tradition of continual communication between research groups; and a high degree of sharing of research results between labs working in the same field. The "academic culture" of the U.S. scientific community -- based on U.S.-style democracy, a nonhierarchical structure, and a high degree of freedom to the individual scientist -- makes it most attractive to European scientists. The U.S. scientific community is organized around a great variety of professional societies and has its own self-governing system. To the extent there is a central focus, it is probably the complex of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Sciences is a nongovernmental organization which, under its congressional charter, advises the government on matters of science and technology. Though funded largely by government contracts, the Academy complex is the one organization outside the government formally chartered to represent U.S. scientists vis-a-vis the government. NAS also has agreements with the various foreign academies and represents U.S. science in various international scientific organizations. While usually acting in response to requests by the government to carry out exchanges and policy-relevant studies, the Academy also initiates international scientific cooperation from time to time. Still, in the context of international S&T cooperation, it is not an executive organization that conducts active international research projects, but rather provides analysis, advice, and forums and channels for communication. 2.4 Diversity And Decentralization Two characteristics of the U.S. research system are critical in considering cooperation: the extreme diversity of its organizational patterns and the absence of any central national authority for its supervision or coordination. The government is the largest supporter of research in the United States. In 1986, 51 percent of all U.S. research was financed by the government and 45 percent by industry.[3] The Department of Defense, NASA, and the Department of Energy all "farm out" research projects to industry and some to universities. A large proportion of the U.S. research effort (73 percent) is performed by industry in its own laboratories; universities about 9 percent and governmental research organizations, including the national labs, perform 20 percent.[4] About 12 percent of U.S. R&D expenditures (not including general university funds) goes to fundamental research. Although the United States has some 3,000 institutions of higher education, most of the basic research is carried out at about 185 so-called research universities, defined as those institutions with an average annual science and engineering Ph.D. production of 10 or more over the period 1966-1989. The main supporter of basic research is the federal government. As stated above, there is no uniform pattern of organization of the government research effort. Within some federal agencies there is an effort to coordinate research effort centrally (the Department of Defense, NASA, as well as the National Science Foundation); others have little central research authority or coordination (the Departments of Health and Human Services, Energy, and Agriculture). A closer look at some federal government offices and agencies will demonstrate the diversity and variety of the U.S. government's organization of science. Formally, the Department of Defense (DOD) coordinates its research activity through the undersecretary for acquisitions, but the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) program reports directly to the secretary of defense. The armed services (air force, navy, army) carry out their own programs, either in their own intramural facilities or contracted out. Of the three services, the Office of Naval Research has the most extensive basic research program. Some defense-oriented research is carried out by other parts of the government. For example, the Department of Energy (DOE), which inherited the Atomic Energy Commission, also runs defense programs. Although administered by DOE, these programs deal with weapons development and even administer weapons production facilities. This situation stems from the desire of the federal government not to place the responsibility for atomic weapons in the hands of DOD. The Department of Energy has a diversified organizational structure. Some of its laboratories support basic research and are administered by and open to the universities (for example, Brookhaven National Laboratory). These laboratories maintain large research facilities such as accelerators which serve research teams from all over the country and indeed the world. These government-owned research labs are administered in a manner unique to the United States: they are "government-owned, contractor-operated" laboratories. Such is the case for the eight national multipurpose laboratories that are owned and supported by the Department of Energy but are managed independently under contract with universities or industry. (The National Institute of Standards and Technology, a civil service lab, which is officially under the Department of Commerce, is also quite independently administered.) The Department of Energy's Office of Energy Research is responsible for funding fundamental and advanced research relevant to energy. It finances research in universities, industry, and government laboratories on a competitive basis. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has no central coordinating body for research within the secretary's office, but the assistant secretary for health is responsible for both the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA). Although the initiative for NIH programs and budgets comes from the individual institutes, the priorities for the extramural research of NIH are basically set by Congress. The intramural research funding levels are set by the agency director in his request to the President, and the President's request to Congress. (These are not formal ways of setting budgetary priorities based on legislation. Rather, these are based on a tradition that has been working for the last 20 years.) One of the oldest civilian research agencies, the Department of Agriculture, carries out and supports research through several independent organizations. The Agricultural Research Service (ARS) has research establishments in 140 locations. This service reports to an assistant secretary, but its program is set by the ARS program staff. The Cooperative State Research Service does not perform research but rather administers the funding of research conducted mostly outside the federal government. It gives block grants to universities, administers a program of special grants as line items in the federal budget, and handles competitive grants. The Department of Agriculture relies on policy directives and criteria and reviews projects at the proposal stage to ensure that monies are spent within the framework of their general objectives and priorities. Substantial research is carried out by the specialized mission-oriented agencies such as NASA, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Science Foundation, each with its own particular organizational structure. Overall priorities are set by each agency's Office of the Administrator. The respective administrators are also personally responsible to their governing bodies for initiation of large new research programs. NASA's basic and applied research effort is concentrated in two units: the Office of Science and Space Application (OSSA) and the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST). The OSSA administrator is responsible for funding research at NASA centers and administers a large extramural research funding program. The OAST program not only is based on NASA centers (60 percent of funds) and individual applied research projects but also gives block grants to university centers of excellence. The above descriptions of the U.S. federal research organization illustrate that the administrative structures of the various frameworks in which research is conducted or by which it is supported do not follow any specific pattern and are not the result of a specific master plan. Rather, they are a result of their particular history. In principle, it should be possible to counteract the dispersion of U.S. government science activity by developing a federal budgetary system intended to coordinate activity carried out independently by the various pans of the U.S. government. Indeed, such attempts have been made by the President's Office of Management and Budget, which has reorganized the budgets of the individual agencies into 21 "budget functions." Several of these relate to R&D. Thus, a document referred to as the "Federal R&D Budget" is appended each year to the president's annual budget. This analytical document highlights major changes in the respective agencies, but it is not based on the results of an overall R&D planning process. It is actually no more than an accounting of the various uncoordinated plans of the individual agencies. In a few areas, such as global climate, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy has sought to achieve a more coherent and tightly coordinated overall federal research budget and plan. Some 40 different Senate and House committees review various aspects of the R&D budget. In some instances, these committees are different in their main interests and perceived responsibilities. For example, the National Science Foundation is clustered with the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The National Institute of Standards and Technology and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration are clustered with the Departments of State and Justice and the judicial branch. All this demonstrates that the budgetary procedures used currently do not readily allow the coordination of research conducted in different parts of the government, thereby forming the framework of a national science policy. While an historical analysis might explain the diversity of the organizations that carry out research within the government, it cannot explain the lack of a strong and sustained federal government organization to oversee and take a degree of responsibility for the total U.S. scientific effort -- a fact critical to considering the facility of cooperation. Most industrialized countries have a ministry of science, chaired by a cabinet member who oversees and coordinates the R&D effort of the entire nation. No such organization exists in the United States. The federal organizations that do oversee U.S. scientific efforts are not executive decisionmaking organizations but are either advisory (such as the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology) or think-tank- like organizations such as the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. While these bodies do have influence on U.S. science policy, their influence is indirect and long term. The President's science adviser and his or her public committee and staff are organized to inform and advise the President on the science and technology content in matters of presidential interest. The authority of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) stems from the President's own interest in and priority for science and from the law that established the office in 1976. At times, the President's Assistant for Science and Technology has played the central role in coordinating S&T cooperation important to U.S. foreign policy -- for example, when U.S.- U.S.S.R., or U.S.-China cooperation in S&T became an important part of U.S. foreign policy. This also might be the case in U.S.-European cooperation. But this office has not played a consistent, permanent, defined role as the focal point of the U.S. international cooperation in S&T, and would be challenged to do so, as it is a small unit that must always attend first to matters on the Presidential agenda. At present, one of the associate directors of OSTP is explicitly responsible for international policy. The National Research Council advises the federal government on selected international science and technical matters, but it does not command budgets or have any other executive tools. Another organization that plays a part in coordinating U.S. international cooperation in S&T is the Bureau of Oceans, Environmental, and International Scientific Affairs (OES) of the State Department. Established in 1976, this Bureau is headed by an Assistant Secretary, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. One of its primary roles is to oversee the policy guidelines governing the various science attaches of the U.S. embassies in the world. The Bureau also performs certain operating functions and advises the Department of State on the science and technology component of its foreign agenda, which more and more contains elements of science and technology (space, nuclear energy, environment, oceanography, etc.). The OES coordinates the U.S. diplomatic effort related to these subjects, in bilateral, regional and international contexts. Although OES rarely initiates international cooperation in S&T and has very limited authority over the various agencies that do, it is an important element of the execution of U.S. foreign policy that has an S&T content. However, it has not been the focal point of U.S. S&T cooperation with foreign countries, preferring to play a major role in a small number of issues, and only receiving information on the great majority. 2.5 U.S. Attitudes Toward Centralization Of Government Functions A look at the history of U.S. science organization reveals several unsuccessful attempts to create a central authority for science.[5] For this analysis, it is important to realize that the pluralistic organization of U.S. science is not an accident but part and parcel of the U.S. political philosophy which has a strong distrust for central power. In addressing this problem in American Science Policy since World War II, Bruce Smith states: The impulse for society without government and for government without coercion is rooted in the only absolute of American pluralistic doctrine: the idea of individual liberty. The maximum freedom consistent with political order is tied to the corollary that power must be limited. To be limited means that it must be shared, narrow in scope, dispersed institutionally, and exercised lightly -- and with multiple checks.[6] Such an attitude leads not only to organizational diversification but also to a system of power sharing in decision making, which makes it more difficult to reach clear-cut decisions. The different levels and parts of the administrative machinery have to agree on a program; each one of them can then make its continuation more difficult. If this is the thinking of the American public, it is certainly also the attitude of scientists who are even more suspicious of any intervention into their affairs by nonscientists and distrust any central authorities. Scientists have contributed to keeping the various scientific institutions and organizations as separated as possible from government bureaucracies. As Don Price has observed, "Science and democracy are something like marriage partners who get along best when they respect each other's differences."[7] In summary, the pluralistic organization of U.S. science is based on a deep- rooted political philosophy and probably cannot be changed in the near future merely by administrative reorganization. Its large size, research excellence, and the nature of its scientific community make the United States a very attractive partner for international cooperation in R&D, but its decentralized organization and its multistage and decentralized system of decision making make difficult formalized cooperation within the framework of internationally financed and managed long-term projects. 3.0 ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH SYSTEM RELEVANT TO INTERNATIONAL S&T COOPERATION Modern science originated in Europe and some fundamental concepts of what is now considered to be the "national research system" are European in origin. One example of such a concept is Wilhelm Von Humbolt's proposal to bring together teaching, scholarship, and research in one so-called research university. Von Humbolt started his movement for the reform of German universities as early as 1810. The reform was first adopted by the University of Berlin and led to a policy of public support for basic research in universities. Although many of the industrialized Western democracies adopted Humbolt's principle of the centrality of research for graduate teaching, it reached its perfection during the early twentieth century in the modern American research universities. The institutionalization of long-term research efforts by industry was also pioneered in Europe. The German chemical company Bayer opened its first research laboratory in Germany at the turn of the century and embarked on a long-term project that led 15 years later to the production of synthetic indigo. This was one of the first instances of a successful long-term R&D project leading to a new commercial product and a breakthrough in the concept of industrial product-oriented research. 3.1 Organization Of Basic Research Although the principle of unity of teaching and research in universities, as suggested by Von Humbolt early in the nineteenth century, gained acceptance only after a long time in Europe and the United States, from the mid-twentieth century on, whatever diverse concepts different countries had of the university's role in their society, all accepted this principle. Universities are major performers of basic research in most European countries. European universities differ from American universities in their almost total dependence on government and in their generally autocratic, rigid, and strong hierarchical academic social system. Most European universities are financed entirely by their governments, and many are administered by government-appointed administrators. In some European universities professorial appointments must be approved by the government. While some (mostly German) universities have become more flexible and less formal in their internal social order, in others the old hierarchical system, which gives professors nearly complete control of their departments, has survived the student revolutions and prevails. The situation was, of course, more extreme in the past. Because at the end of the last century Europeans realized that the academic inflexibility of their university system made it difficult for universities to deal with interdisciplinary subjects or with new and emerging academic fields, they initiated a variety of systems of independent basic research institutes. Forerunners of such research institutes, which are not connected to universities or government offices, were the Pasteur Institute in France and the Lister Institute in England, both privately endowed research institutes (but both now heavily dependent on external sponsors). National laboratories for applied and mission-oriented research exist in most countries. Large networks of national laboratories for basic research are a European invention. The only comparable U.S. organization is the National Institutes of Health. Another reason for the establishment of such laboratories (not just for basic research) was the emergence, mostly after World War II, of new fields of science (atomic energy, space science, and oceanography) that require very large installations, larger than a university can manage. One of the first government-initiated and -funded nonuniversity institutes was the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, now the Max Planck Institutes, in Germany. Established at the turn of the century, these fully government-supported laboratories were especially organized for certain gifted individuals, with the intention of giving them maximum research freedom and constant support. The German government supports the Max Planck Institutes in addition to, not instead of, supporting basic research at universities. In France the institutes of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) were organized in the 1930s to create a national framework for basic research, which was underdeveloped at the universities. Basic research is also practiced in the laboratories of the College de France and in institutes affiliated with Les Grandes Ecoles, France's elite engineering and management schools. A similar pattern of national laboratories for basic research exists on a smaller scale in Italy, where the institutes of the Italian Research Council play a role similar to that of the CNRS institutes in France. British universities have carried out basic research for a long time, but after World War II some university-independent institutes were organized under the Medical Research Council to bridge the gap between medical and biological research. The Medical Research Council's well-known Institute for Molecular Biology at Cambridge, England, is one example. An important difference exists between the funding conditions of U.S. scientists pursuing basic research in American universities and the conditions of European scientists in their universities. University research in the United States is largely based on the continuing ability of a scientist to obtain research grants (of limited duration) from extramural sources. European scientists are partly supported by internal university research funds, or are members of a basic research institute that has permanent research funding. Thus, a director of a Max Planck or CNRS laboratory not only has tenure but also a commitment of research support for life. Such individuals have no teaching obligations, are free to pursue their own research and are able to invite foreign scientists to cooperate with them in the framework of their own research project. Thus, basic research undertaken in universities in the United States requires continual justification to secure funding, while research conducted in European research institutes has continuity and can afford to deal with less "fashionable" problems, which would not necessarily be supported by grants based on peer review. No other scientific community depends so much on professional entrepreneurship as does that of the United States. Basic research activity in European universities has increased enormously over the last 30 years. Today in the United Kingdom and Germany, and to a lesser extent in France and Italy, most basic research is carried out in universities. Still, the elite scientists of Europe are more often than not members of research institutes rather than of university faculties, although they are often associated with universities and supervise doctoral students. Although the basic research institutes of Europe are completely government supported, they are managed independently of government. In Germany, both the German Research Council, which finances basic research at universities, and the Max Planck Society, which manages research institutes, are private organizations funded by the government. In the United Kingdom, the five research councils that support both university research and their own laboratories are self-governed as is the CNRS in France. The European countries therefore now have a two-tier system for basic research: competitive university research and a very stable, slightly elitist system of permanently funded national research laboratories. Moreover, because part of basic research in European universities is financed by the ministries of education, as part of the core university budget, the basic research system in Europe is less competitive and more stable then that found in the United States. 3.2 Centralized National Mechanisms For Science Policy Although the United States and the European democracies share the same political philosophy, their attitudes toward the centralization of powerful government bureaucracies are very different. In his book America's Unwritten Constitution, Don Price notes that after the American and French revolutions, hereditary dynasties began to lose their power throughout the western world. The radical movements that replaced them were avowedly egalitarian in their purposes. But it is curious that in this democratic movement the United States was unique in at least one way. Everywhere else, from the mild Whig reforms in Great Britain to the Bolshevik terror in Russia, the result was to strengthen the administrative centralization of the state .... In the United States, however, the current of revolutionary democracy ran in the opposite direction .... In those decisive early years, the social attitudes of both modes of thought were against central authority and settled establishments in church or state.[1] All European governments have strong centralized administrations, which have in the past made several rather unsuccessful attempts to manage the research system in their countries. But the European governments' attitudes toward their relationships with the scientific endeavor have changed over the last 20 years. Thus, these governments have given up attempts to manage research directly. However, they have never abandoned their perceived national responsibility to program the development and direction of the R&D system at the national level, much more so for applied than for basic research. To this end, they have formed centralized mechanisms for the development of a "science policy" and the supervision of its implementation. Each European country has its own variation of such centralized organization. They are superimposed on the increasingly pluralistic scientific endeavor. But, in general, science is more decentralized -- but more in some countries than in others. Decentralization of operational parts of the research system is more marked in Germany, for example, than in other European countries. In Germany, support of the research effort is divided between the states and the federal government, and the system has achieved a high degree of pluralism. At the national level in Germany, two ministries are responsible for overseeing and coordinating the research effort of the country. The Ministry for Education and Science deals with basic research and universities (which are mostly supported by the states). The Ministry for Research and Technology deals with applied research, but it also finances the Max Planck Institutes and is responsible for the large German national research establishments in applied research (atomic energy, space, oceans). The Ministry for Education and Science provides the budget of the German National Science Foundation. There is some overlap between the two ministries in their perceived responsibilities, but there is usually good coordination of their activities. In Germany, the Ministry for Research and Technology is responsible for international cooperation. In the Ignited Kingdom, national responsibility for the research effort is shared between the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In France, an interministerial structure, La Delegation General a la Recherche Scientifique, reports to the minister of industrial and scientific development. These systems are dynamic and change as a function of different ideological or administrative attitudes of sequential governments. Still, the principle of a science policy-making body for the country, accountable to parliament for the state of science, is a permanent feature of the European research system. The minister of science or any other cabinet member in charge of science and technology is the country's focal point for the initiation of international scientific and technological cooperative programs, or for reactions to initiatives that come from other countries. When there might be different views, attitudes, or approaches in his or her country to a specific cooperative program, it is the minister's responsibility to create a consensus that enables a consistent, clear posture in the framework of international negotiation and agreement. Some European countries have long-range master plans for developing or changing their national research systems. Often such master plans are part of the ruling party's political program or ideology. When he assumed power in France in 1958, Charles De Gaulle declared scientific research to be a key factor in that country's progress, and he gave science a central role in the Fourth Economic Plan (1961-1965). During the years after World War II, the British Labour Party supported science and higher education, but since 1983 the ruling conservatives have insisted that England is overinvesting in government-supported research. They would like to decrease government spending in this area and give industry a stronger role in deciding funding priorities in science. Ideologies and overall "plans" are obviously only one kind of input into the science policy process. Bureaucrats and their interpretations of the country's needs, and scientists in their capacities as advisers or executors of national programs, all have a strong influence. Many European countries have long-standing practices that affect specific aspects of the national research system. Germany and France, for example, encourage their young scientists to go to the United States for their postdoctoral research period and have a support system for this purpose. They believe that such a policy increases the internationalization of their research systems. Most European countries cooperate in the framework of the European Communities, most prominently in futuristic technological megaprojects (ESPRIT, EUREKA, etc.) in which governments and industry join forces. When considering such policies of international cooperation, these countries usually weigh the implications carefully, and, if they decide to cooperate, their commitment is quite firm. When considering cooperation with other countries, scientists or scientific administrators expect the other side to have a focal point for negotiations, a policy framework in which it operates, and a mechanism that will lead to a clear decision and firm commitment. 4.0 EUROPEAN AND U.S. RESEARCH SYSTEMS: A MISMATCH? The previous highlights of the U.S. and European research systems revealed their differences. But because of the common roots and similar goals of European and U.S. science and technology, American and European research systems also have much in common. The distribution of expenditures among different R&D performing sectors in the United States and European countries is not very different. In both cases, a large share of R&D expenditure originates from and is carried out in industry. In the United States and most European countries, the distribution of research activity among sectors is also similar. In all European countries (as in the United States), much of the applied research is done in industry and some in government laboratories. Moreover, most of the defense-oriented research efforts in these countries are carried out in government laboratories, and some is farmed out to industry. A comparison of the investments made by different countries in different research objectives reveals that the United States spends more than any other country (with the possible exception of the USSR) on defense research. Germany and Japan, in contrast, spend only a small part of their research budget on defense-oriented research. At the same time, the percentage of the U.S. research budget spent on health-related research (about 10 percent) is double the amount that most other industrialized countries spend in this field. While there are some similarities between the European and U.S. research systems, there are also some significant differences that are important when considering cooperation between the systems. The significantly smaller size of each of the European research systems makes it difficult for them to reach a critical size in all fields of scientific endeavor. On the one hand, this forces them to make choices between different research objectives. On the other hand, it also encourages them to cooperate within Europe and with other countries to mitigate the effect of small size. The most significant difference between the U.S. and European research systems is the way in which these systems are handled by their respective governments. In both systems there are varying degrees of institutional dispersion between the different sectors of the economy and branches of government. But while in Europe the pattern is the establishment of some central authority that deals with science at the national level, such a central authority is not present in the American system. Such authority at least gives the aura of national coordination of the research effort and the development of a national science policy. In the United States, to the degree that such activities exist, they are dealt with not on a national level but on a sectoral level, uncoordinated by the different offices or agencies that conduct research. Before addressing the interaction of such diverse systems, we must first consider the varied motivations that these parties bring to efforts to cooperate in science and technology. 4.1 Different Attitudes The needs for international cooperation in S&T as perceived by Europeans and Americans are not symmetrical. This becomes clear both in talking with people who deal with this problem and in reading the relevant literature. While the European countries are clearly interested in international scientific cooperation and make this a point of their national science policy, the attitude of the United States is more ambivalent and more complex. European countries' motivation for cooperation is to a large degree based on their awareness of the constraints imposed on them by their relatively small sizes. In fact, the smaller the scientific community and resources of an industrialized democratic country, the greater the desire for cooperation. The pursuit of science in small- or medium-sized countries is based on the assumption that good ideas and originality, based on the creativity of the individual, are not limited to empires and superpowers. They may occur in any country that has a modern educational system and an infrastructure for science. Still, ideas are not enough. They have to be transformed into technology, and many small- and medium-sized countries do not have an adequate R&D infrastructure for realizing at least some of their good ideas. Thus, they may turn to international cooperation as a way of overcoming the constraints of size. For example, no single European country could affect space research, but cooperation within the framework of the European Space Agency, which also cooperates with the United States, has led to some successes in developing original space technologies. And Israel is able to carry out experiments in particle physics because it has an agreement to use the CERN facilities. The drive for international cooperation in the European democracies is a grass-roots movement. Scientists, technologists, and industrial entrepreneurs are all eager to expand their horizons by "going international." They desire to be part of, or at least cooperate with, those scientific teams that are leaders in their fields. Sometimes they are able to convince their governments to help them to do so by participating in international cooperative research agreements. It is also clear that the desire to cooperate is a learning experience for the junior partner, and there is a belief that cooperation might increase that partner's competitiveness in technology up to a point. The situation is different in the United States. Until the early 1980s, U.S. scientists and technologists and leaders of the U.S. scientific community had no perception of a need to cooperate with foreign countries. More than any other advanced industrialized country, the United States has long considered itself technologically self-sufficient and has relied heavily on the technological superiority of its companies and the excellence of its scientists. But three facts seem to contradict this statement. First, the United States has a great number of S&T agreements with many countries. Second, the United States is training an unusually large number of foreign graduate students, and this is a kind of S&T cooperation. And, third, after World War II until the early 1960s (during the period of the Marshall Plan), the United States government did cooperate much more than now with European countries. The rest of this section will elaborate on each of these points. S&T Agreements The large number of existing S&T agreements between the United States and foreign countries indicates an active program of international cooperation. The information on such agreements is compiled in the so-called Title V report (Title V of the 1979 Foreign Relations Authorization Act). This report, which is sent yearly by the President to Congress, reports on all international scientific agreements in which the United States is a partner. The 1989 edition of these yearly reports, Science, Technology and American Diplomacy, covered nearly 600 bilateral S&T agreements involving more than 20 U.S. agencies and 120 countries. In addition, the United States supported most of the existing multilateral organizations that deal with science. The Title V report describes a formidable number of activities and might lead to the conclusion that the United States has an intense interest in international scientific relations. But, as Skolnikoff described this report, "It is not an overly impressive document, notwithstanding its bulk. The list of activities appear substantial only until one recollects that this represents the international dimension of a very large federal R&D budget."[1] Indeed, on closer examination, if one looks for international cooperation in scientific research and technological development, this list is to some extent deceptive. It is actually a list of very different kinds of agreements; many have little to do with any substantial resources devoted to cooperation in science and technology. Some of the agreements with developing countries concern technical assistance rather than R&D cooperation. Many are agreements on exchange of data or other technical information. In the 1990 edition of this volume, special emphasis is placed on U.S. agreements with various countries that ensure U.S. intellectual property rights and reciprocal access to scientific and technological information generated with government support.[2] An examination of the history of those agreements that concern bona fide S&T cooperation reveals that in many cases the initiative and driving force for the establishment of such agreements were not Americans but scientists (or politicians) from other countries. While individual U.S. scientists always had interest in personal cooperation with scientific teams abroad, the U.S. scientific organizations as such had no strong motivation for much of the formal documented international cooperation in R&D. Postgraduate Training Exchange programs for students of science and technology as well as for investigators are one aspect of U.S. international R&D relations. Many more foreign students come to the United States than American students go abroad. Many of these foreign graduate and postgraduate students and visiting scientists contribute to the U.S. research effort. Moreover, a large number of students become American citizens and contribute to the growth of U.S. scientific human resources. Those graduates who return to their countries surely will constitute an important part of those countries' scientific infrastructures and will act as a link to U.S. science. Still, it is not the wish to cooperate with other countries that motivates these exchange programs. Postwar Cooperation According to Skolnikoff, following World War II and particularly after the initiation of the Marshall Plan, there was a substantial interest in S&T cooperation, which lasted until 1960. The reasons for the change in attitude of the United States toward S&T cooperation are complicated. Some decline might be based on a concern with controlling the transfer of security-relevant technology to potential enemies or industrial technology to commercial competitors. This trend began in the 1970s, when a key report of the era, the so-called Bucy Report, called for export control that focused on know-how rather than products.[3] It also suggested that the DOD should "study possible hazards involved in government-to-government scientific exchange," considering such exchanges to be active instruments of technology transfer. This first major public expression of concern led in the 1980s to a major DOD role in controlling participation from abroad in university laboratories engaged in DOD-supported research. The possible impact of such participation on national security, as perceived by DOD, is still a key factor in the consideration and development of agreements for scientific cooperation. The transfer of technology to potential economic competitors is also a major factor in cooperation with other countries. Herman Pollock, a keen observer of U.S. international relations in science and technology, noted: When once [in the 1960's] the emphasis was on promoting cooperation, today the emphasis is on controlling it. When the U.S. had such a dominant global lead in S&T that it was capable of influencing international behavior by denial of cooperation, the President and Secretary of State were promoting exchange of information. Today when our ability to influence the behavior of other nations through denial is at its lowest ebb in 50 years, the U.S. government, spearheaded by the Department of Defense and the National Security Council, is tending to bridle cooperation and information exchange.[4] At the end of the 1970s, U.S. government figures assessing the export of technology-intensive industries showed that while the largest U.S. firms held 79 percent of the world market in 1959 (including the U.S. domestic market), their share of the world market was only 47 percent in 1978. During that period, the market share of Japanese firms increased four times. In whatever way the trends were measured, it was clear that U.S. dominance in both high- and low-tech industrial production was decreasing, even if the postwar period was anomalous. These facts raised concern in the U.S. R&D community and the R&D policy establishment. Thus, a formidable intellectual effort has been made to look for remedies to this situation, and a large literature has accumulated on the subject of U.S. competitiveness in the "New Global Economy." For example, in a report prepared in 1990, National Interests in an Age of Global Technology, a committee of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering (NAE) concluded that: Although the United States remains the world's most technologically self-sufficient country, its economic prosperity and technical dynamism have already become highly dependent on foreign technology, capital, and markets and are likely to become more so in the coming decades. Indeed, the technical and economic vitality of the United States depends increasingly on the ability of companies operating within its borders to harness and exploit globally dispersed resources and technical capabilities rapidly and effectively. In addition, the rapid growth of technical competence beyond companies has made it increasingly difficult for U.S.-based companies to derive sustained competitive advantages from superior research capabilities alone. As foreign nations and companies have acquired greater technical capabilities, new knowledge or basic research increasingly has become a "global public good," impossible to bottle up within any one nation's borders, and easily accessible to any and all takers.[5] This assessment stresses the importance of foreign science and technology but falls short of recommending international cooperation in science. Moreover, it does not suggest that such cooperation could give the cooperating partner advanced knowledge of new findings relevant to technological innovation. Altogether, most studies on the problem of U.S. competitiveness recommend various kinds of "economic diplomacy," intended to put pressure on foreign governments to remove restrictions applied to U.S. goods in foreign markets and to set international standards for government support of market- oriented R&D, creating some kind of global regulation that would also be imposed on multinational companies. A change in U.S. economic policy, rather than science and technology policy, seems to be advocated as a remedy to increasing U.S. competitiveness. Thus, the main recommendation of the NAE report is as follows: The highest priority for strengthening the technical foundations and thereby the long-term wealth-generating capacity of the U.S. economy must be to make the United States a more attractive and advantageous place for individuals, companies and other institutional entities, regardless of national origin, to conduct the full complement of technical activities critical to the nation's long-term prosperity and security. To accomplish this, the United States must develop the necessary human, financial, physical, regulatory, and institutional infrastructures to compare more advantageously with other nations in attracting the technical, managerial, and financial resources of globally active private corporations or individuals. This is the single most important conclusion of this report.[6] International cooperation does not receive high priority. Thus, while the European countries have a clearly positive attitude toward international cooperation, the U.S. attitude seems to be complex and based on internal contradictions. At some times and in some fields the United States has a "global" approach toward S&T cooperation that also might enhance its technical resources. At other times and in other fields it exhibits a "parochial" approach, dominated by fear that cooperation might hurt the United States by supplying vital science or technology to enemies or industrial competitors. With the United States lacking a central policy- making mechanism to give its scientific endeavor and research operation compromise between diverse opinions, the policies of different sectors dominate at different times. 4.2 Different Institutional Frameworks As described in Chapter 3.0, the R&D systems of the various industrial European countries, like that of the United States, are to a certain degree decentralized and have a variety of organizations in which research is carried out. But, unlike the U.S. R&D system, they all have a national focus that deals with the development of national science policies. This national focus is usually a minister of science or of science and technology or an interministerial permanent committee. In Europe, this national focus is also responsible for the national representation of science of the country in bilateral or multilateral agreements. The United States, however, has no structure (at least not with any executive power) that can commit the U.S. government to international cooperation. According to Skolnikoff, writing in 1984, among the several reasons for the relative lack of support for international cooperation [in R&D] . . . is the organization of the U.S. government for policy making and funding of international cooperation in science and technology. In fact, the particular structure of the U.S. government and the government's budgetary process have a great deal to do with the difficulty of expanding such programs even under supportive administrations. The lack of clear understanding of this aspect of the subject . . . can frustrate efforts to build international cooperation even when the political will exists to do so. And it certainly goes a long way to explain why more projects and possibilities for international cooperation do not arise spontaneously, whatever the interest of a particular administration. Astonishing as it may be, the U.S. government has no clear governmental instrument for international cooperation and, in fact, some agencies are legally barred from using appropriated funds for other than domestic R&D objectives. Individual departments and agencies must carry out their own programs of cooperation as part of regular budgets, with little or no recognition of the problems and disincentives thus created.[7] One should add to Skolnikoff's description that while the core of those dealing with international scientific relations in Europe are members of the permanent government civil service. Many of their counterparts in the U.S. are political appointees. The situation as described by Skolnikoff has not changed since 1984. Currently, about 20 different federal agencies cooperate independently with several foreign countries and with the various international technical agencies, and various bodies in the administration have defined functions in coordinating scientific and technological international relations (see Chapter 2.0). The assistant to the president for science and technology (science adviser) is probably the President's highest U.S. official who deals with international scientific relations. He works closely with the interagency Committee on International Science, Engineering and Technology (CISET) and chairs its parent, the Federal Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering and Technology (FCCSET). In cases that appear to be of special foreign policy importance to the United States, the president's science adviser may take an active role in coordinating S&T agreements with foreign countries and invigorate the interagency framework. Generally, this framework has not been strong over the past couple of decades. 4.3 Different Policy-Making Mechanisms The industrial countries of Europe and Japan all have elaborate policymaking mechanisms for the formulation of national research and development policies. In most countries such mechanisms include input from the research and engineering community, industry, defense, and various economic ministries, but often research policy is also an item on the ticket of political parties. Some countries have fundamental long-range policies that are used as guidelines for setting current policies. For example, Germany has four "Basic Pillars" for its research policy. The fourth "pillar" is "the intention that German research be integrated closely and effectively in international research cooperation." Priority is given to cooperation with Europe. In the United Kingdom the government informs Parliament yearly about government-funded R&D and sometimes suggests organizational or policy changes. In 1987 the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology issued a comprehensive report with 39 recommendations for a new science policy for the United Kingdom. That country's policy of supporting fully European collaboration is well documented, with emphasis on collaboration between high-tech industries, academia, and institutes. Collaboration has become an accepted way of life among the high-technology committees within the European industrialized countries. (Many of the European countries' attitudes toward cooperation have been "Europe 1992"- oriented.) In France, planning and policy for R&D are concentrated in the hands of a high-level interministerial research and technology council which advises the minister of research and higher education. A special law passed in 1982 stipulates that each year the minister must present to Parliament a "report on research activity and technological development which underlines the strategic choices for national policy and illustrates the progress made towards achieving the objectives fixed by the law." The French government has a strong policy and is firmly committed to international cooperation in science which is part of its science policy. France also has initiated several programs under the aegis of the European Communities, and it is a major partner in and contributor to the European Space Agency. Such policy-making mechanisms, which have a strong influence on the funding and management of the European research system, do not exist in a similar form in the United States. As described in Chapter 2.0, in the United States there is no national mechanism for the formulation and implementation of a science policy. The one institution that could provide a mechanism in this field is the special assistant to the president for science and technology, who can propose a national science policy and its implementation by the various agencies. Over the years this office has occasionally taken responsibility for coordinating S&T cooperation, when such cooperation has high priority as part of U.S. international relations, but it has not done so continually and such coordination does not seem to have been a permanent, high-priority objective of this office. Although there is no comprehensive science policy in the United States, there are policy decisions that have a profound influence on international cooperation in science. Decisions on control of information flow have a profound negative effect on cooperation, while recent attempts to supplement budgets for large scientific installations in the United States by cooperative agreements with foreign governments might have a positive effect (for example, the U.S. attempt to finance the space station and the Supercollider). The United States also has mechanisms for the implementation of what might be called sectoral science policies. This means that the various departments and agencies all have their own science policies, which sometimes include international science cooperation. NASA, for example, has an ongoing policy of international scientific cooperation with the countries of Europe, Canada, and Japan. Such cooperation was well developed in the framework of some agreed-on guidelines during the so-called Golden Age of NASA (1961-1969). But because of financial constraints, cooperation decreased between 1970 and 1983. Although its official declared policy was to cooperate with Europe, there was always an ambivalence in these relations on the part of NASA. In the early 1980s, a growing concern in the United States that cooperative undertakings in space, including space science, could serve as a vehicle for the unwanted transfer of military or economy-sensitive U.S. technology to other countries became a strong negative factor for such cooperation. Other agencies of the federal government -- such as the Department of Agriculture and the Environmental Protection Agency -- have their own policies for international cooperation, but their abilities to carry out such policies are somewhat limited. By their nature sectoral policies do not include an overall national commitment, and because of personal and political changes they would tend to be less consistent than a national science policy. In summary, some inherent difficulties affect cooperation between the United States and the European countries on three levels. First, Europeans value international scientific cooperation as a way to serve their best interests. To this day, the United States has given low priority to such cooperation because it is not perceived to be of vital national interest or of interest to U.S. science. Second, the centralized system of organization and governance of European science and technology makes it relatively easy for European governments to accept and locate responsibility for international cooperation. In contrast, the decentralized U.S. system makes it difficult for the American government to accept responsibility for international cooperation, which is based on the activities of its independent agencies. Third, several European countries have developed long- range national policies for international scientific cooperation, which enable them to be consistent and reliable in their international commitments. The United States, however, has never developed such long-term policies and its ability to arrange its commitments are influenced by changes in personnel, financial considerations, administration, and legislation that is promulgated without much regard for international commitments. 5.0 COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AS PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS This chapter describes how some Europeans view their experience in cooperating with the United States in science and technology. It is important, however, to separate the views of the non-U.S. scientist on cooperation with American scientists from the views of the foreign administrator on cooperation with U.S. research agencies and government departments. Assessing the views of these two groups, one gets opposing opinions. While non-U.S. scientists usually have nothing but praise for collaboration with American scientists, European administrators, heads of agencies, or foreign government officials in charge of scientific and technological cooperation with the United States are full of complaints about the way the United States deals with international cooperation. Most non-U.S. scientists who cooperate informally with Americans and spend time in their labs are united in their view that it is an easy, profitable, and altogether enjoyable experience. Foreign scientists stress the openness of the U.S. scientific community, its willingness to share information and ideas, its informality, its open-mindedness to new approaches or interpretations, and its nonhierarchical structure. They all agree on the lack of xenophobia, the creative and pleasant atmosphere, and a stronger desire for cooperation than they find in European laboratories. European research administrators in charge of scientific and technological cooperation with the United States -- some of them high government officials with engineering or research experience -- have a different story to tell. They usually think that cooperation in science and technology with the United States is most desirable but is also very difficult. When asked about the nature of such difficulties, the answers usually are: "The difficulties are not with the scientists, but with the bureaucrats, or rather bureaucracies"; "Not enough interest in real cooperation"; or "The Americans do not know if they really want to cooperate, and if they do, what they actually want to achieve by cooperation." They also complain about inconsistency in policies and attitudes and instability in meeting commitments. Lack of mutuality in the cooperative agreements is yet another complaint. 5.1 Some Voices From The Other Side Of The Atlantic There is probably no better way to convey such opinions than to give some detailed accounts of cooperation with the United States in S&T as reported by several individuals who have been dealing with such cooperation on behalf of various European governments for prolonged periods. In order not only to give the facts but also to convey their subjective assessments of their experiences as well as their general attitudes, the opinions of these individuals are either repeated verbatim or closely paraphrased. Their comments were recorded either in meetings with this author or in letters received from them. 5.1.1 Retired High German Government In 1989 this author met with a high German government official who had dealt with German-U.S. cooperation in science and technology for 17 years. This official had retired a year earlier and therefore felt free to speak his mind. In discussing the incentives, disincentives, and difficulties encountered in cooperation between the German government and U.S. agencies, this official noted that "the most important incentive for cooperation with the U.S. is the fact that the U.S. has the largest volume of science and technology and the largest knowledge, know-how and information base in the world." Also on a positive note, he observed that, on a personal level, German scientists found cooperation with American scientists to be "very pleasant." He pointed out that many young German scientists go to the United States for postdoctoral training, which gives them both personal contact and experience with the U.S. research system. But in a negative vein, he acknowledged that, "although very desirable, cooperation with the U.S. is also very difficult . . . mostly bureaucratic problems." In elaborating on this point, he mentioned a number of specific problems. 5.1.2 Dealing with U.S. S&T Agencies Negotiating on cooperation with U.S. agencies is long and time-consuming, mostly because the authority of the negotiating partners from the U.S. side is sometimes ill-defined. Even heads of agencies have to get approval from various institutions in the U.S. and such approval sometimes is not easily forthcoming. It was never clear who has to approve what in the U.S. system. [Moreover,] each agency has different ground rules for international cooperation -- you do not negotiate with a government that has a clear overall policy or at least stable operational directions. Each agency has a different policy and different objectives, and it takes awhile to learn them. The change in heads of agencies is also often rapid, and such changes often mean a change in policy. [Finally,] there are differences between various U.S. agencies. NASA is the most difficult to cooperate with, while cooperation with the NIH and NSF is easier. Cooperation in technological projects is more difficult than cooperation in more "basic science" projects. 5.1.3 Project Instability Although most joint projects between Germany and the U.S. are scheduled for a period of a few years, their budgets must be reapproved every year, and such reapproval is not automatic. Congress may change budgets and is often influenced by various lobbies, mostly by industry. Therefore, there is an element of instability in cooperation with the U.S. The pace, direction, and scope of a renewal of a joint project are not exclusively determined by the project's success or by the evaluation of the scientists, project administrators, or the heads of agencies who are actually responsible for the research done, but sometimes by economic or internal U.S. factors which have very little to do with the project itself. The element of instability in cooperative agreements with the U.S. is much greater than with any of the other industrial countries. Not only financial considerations are responsible for this "instability." For instance, congressional decisions on the prevention of exports of equipment or restrictions on the flow of information which occur suddenly in the middle of a well-run cooperative project destabilize it and jeopardize its future. 5.1.4 Disincentives for Cooperation Sometimes there are also disincentives for cooperation on the level of scientists or technologists. A case in point is a specific incident that occurred with German astronauts during cooperation in the . . . "Man in Space" program. . . . During this project the Germans who joined the "ground control room," as well as the German astronauts themselves, had the feeling that they were denied access to a variety of technical information. Apparently, this was NASA's policy at that time. Germans were more eager than other Europeans to cooperate with the U.S. in "manned spacecraft" exploration. Still, apparently, they strongly felt a lack of the kind of mutuality that is expected between "bona fide" cooperating partners. This negative experience was a strong disincentive for the scientists themselves to further cooperation. [In a related area,] when encountering problems during U.S.-German cooperation, the experience was that the State Department could often help. Altogether the State Department is always willing and effective, but its authority and ability are limited. Sometimes the German ambassador himself had to be involved in such matters. This official then made a brief comparison of scientific cooperation with the United States and scientific cooperation with France, Germany's second largest partner in S&T cooperation after the United States. He noted that in negotiating with France it sometimes took awhile for both countries to decide on cooperation, but that when an agreement was signed it led to very stable cooperation. "Any misunderstandings, disagreements, or adjustments were taken care of during ministerial meetings and usually were easily resolved. Also, the influence of the scientists and technologists on such French-German programs was more extensive and decisive than in the U.S.- German program." In contrast, follow-up on agreements reached on U.S.- German cooperation was more difficult, usually involving a visit to Washington and meetings with the heads of many federal agencies and federal departments, often at different levels in each agency. He recalled that in addition to the technical departments, regular contact was maintained with the Office of the Science Adviser to the President, the National Academy of Sciences, and the National Science Foundation. This continual contact with the different agencies was necessary because it was not always clear who decided on what and who could help or harm. But in spite of all these problems, this official pronounced the results of German-U.S. cooperation to be very positive and, "at least from the German point of view, very successful. The difficulties were mostly administrative." He also called attention to the S&T cooperation taking place between German and U.S. industry, especially multinational companies, which has been very successful. Because the German government generally is not involved in such cooperation, "one should study it as an example of cooperation with much less bureaucratic involvement." 5.1.5 Senior French Scientist The German experience just described is similar to those of British and French officials or science advisers dealing with cooperation with the United States. A senior French scientist who has much experience at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and who has more understanding of the American system of government and more interest in long-term policy than administrative solutions, made several observations in 1989 about the decision-making process characterizing U.S. participation in S&T cooperation: First, the coordination between agencies in the U.S. is more often than not loose, and it is difficult to know where are the people who are responsible. Second, it happens often that a commitment (linked with a political initiative from the executive branch) is not followed up by the Congress, so that the cooperative activity remains without continuous financial backing. In brief (and it is not surprising in the view of the number of agencies, programs, and people involved) the decision-making bodies are confusing and the process sometimes inconsistent. How this can be improved is another question! On the U.S. desire for cooperation, this scientist observed that "except for specific 'important' programs or commitments" (from space research to energy issues), there is seldom great interest shown by the various agencies in the U.S. in the cooperative activities: "they don't appear important." He summed up his remarks by expressing his conviction that someone at the highest level of government (perhaps the Office of Science and Technology and the presidential science adviser) should be "responsible for coordinating a more coherent and consistent approach to U.S. involvement in international science and technology." 5.1.6 British Physicist and Government Adviser A British physicist and longtime adviser to the British government was less certain in his opinion. He looked on U.K.-U.S. scientific cooperation from a historical perspective, remembering the close cooperation between British and U.S. scientists on the Manhattan Project. English-U.S. cooperation in defense research, he claimed, has a long history (beginning with the Second World War) but is limited by two factors: secrecy and budgetary inconsistencies. Good cooperation in defense research exists when there is a "presidential decree" which enables complete freedom of exchange of scientific and technological information. Such agreements existed in projects between the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy and were very successful. In cases in which the flow of information was limited, cooperation was very difficult because it sometimes was not clear who in the United States had the authority to release classified information. Like the German government official, the British scientist also called attention to the strong element of instability characterizing S&T cooperation with the United States. For example, the budgetary commitments of the United States are adjusted "in every yearly budget cycle." Likewise, a long negotiation time is a problem with U.S.-British science cooperation, and there is no way to predict how much time will pass until an answer is received. In one instance, he got a rapid answer. The British wanted to build a telescope with the Australians, but the Australians wanted to cooperate with the United States rather than with England. England asked the United States for a rapid decision and was able to get a negative answer in a few weeks. But this physicist also had many good things to say about the attitudes of U.S. scientists cooperating with British scientists in science and technology. He found Americans generous and very cooperative. He reflected on definitions by U.S. scientists of the concept of "mutuality" in the framework of scientific cooperation and said that he often pointed out to his American colleagues the "asymmetry in size" of the two cooperating research systems, stating that the English contribution to such bilateral cooperation can only be very limited. The U.S. scientists' attitude was that each side "should do the best it could" and that they did not expect mutuality in size of the British contribution. "When bureaucracies and secrecy considerations do not interfere, Americans are very generous indeed and enjoy sharing results in science and in R&D." He hinted that not all European partners have the same attitude. But he also stressed that cooperation is better in some fields than in others. For example, in the joint deep-sea drilling project everything worked according to the agreement, but the agreement on joint research on breeder reactors is moving very slowly. In another area, he noted that all cooperation with NASA was and is very poor. In this context, he pointed out "the worst thing possible in cooperation is if you lose confidence in the judgment of your partner, especially if he is the leading partner." 5.1.7 NASA and the European Space Agency One of the most interesting case studies on U.S.-European cooperation in science and technology is the history of cooperation between NASA and the European Space Agency, an experience that continues to create unpleasant feelings for the European technological leadership. In the early 1960s, several European countries, in a reaction to the Russian Sputnik, started their own research programs. After a few years, the scientists of these countries realized that none of the European countries was large enough to carry out a succ