Science
and Technology and the President
A Report to the Next Administration
January 1997
A
Memorandum from the CARNEGIE COMMISSION
The Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government
was created in April 1988 by Carnegie Corporation of New York.
It is committed to helping government institutions respond to
the unprecedented advances in science and technology that are
transforming the world. The Commission analyzes and assesses the
factors that shape the relationship between science and technology
(S&T) and government and is seeking ways to make this relationship
more effective.
The Commission sponsors studies, conducts seminars, and establishes
task forces to focus on specific issues. Through its reports,
the Commission works to see that ideas for better use of science
and technology in government are presented in a timely and intelligible
manner.
Additional copies of this report may be obtained from the Commission's
headquarters.
Foreword
Preface
Executive Summary
Science and Technology and the President
The Overall Structure of Science and Technology
Advice to the President
The Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology
The National Science and Technology Council
The Office of Science and Technology Policy
The President's Committee of Advisors on
Science and Technology
Long-Range Goals
Science and Technology in International
Affairs
Conclusion
References
FOREWORD
Over the past 45 years, science advice to the President has been
institutionalized within the White House. The organizations through
which such advice is given have changed over the years, and different
presidents have used them in different ways. The original impetus
for establishing a permanent home for science advice within the
White House was the contribution that science and technology had
made to the winning of World War II, and the focus at the beginning
was on national security and the use of science and technology
in all aspects of the Cold War.
As the years went on, while some of the national security issues
remained, presidents came to recognize the importance of science
and technology in other policy areas, adding subjects such as
environment, science education and research, space, and technology
policy to the list of issues for which scientific and technological
expertise inside the White House was desirable. Now, as described
in this memorandum, the Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology directs the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
cochairs the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and
Technology, and leads the staff of the National Science and Technology
Council. In addition, the Assistant has a special relationship
with the Office of Management and Budget.
Between
1988 and 1993, the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology,
and Government studied the way that all branches of government
handled decisions on issues affecting and affected by science
and technology. The Commission focused both on institutions (among
them, the Executive Office of the President, Congress, the Judiciary,
the regulatory agencies, the states, and nongovernmental organizations)
and on key problem areas (including economic performance, national
security, the environment, science education, and international
relations). The Commission did not examine a number of areas of
concern where advances in science and technology, including the
behavioral sciences, can make major contributions, such as health
care, world population, and urban issues; other organizations
with special expertise are addressing these issues.
At
its first meeting in 1988, the Commission members agreed that
the first Commission report should be on the organization of the
White House to ensure the best possible science and technology
advice to the President. That report was issued shortly after
the election. In 1992, a report dealing with recommendations to
the President and Congress had a short chapter on the organization
of the Executive Office of the President for science and technology.
This memorandum updates the earlier reports. As this memorandum
makes clear, the overall structure now in place in the White House
for dealing with issues involving science and technology is sound
and can deal with the post Cold War issues that now face the nation.
The changes recommended here are relatively minor, but, if implemented,
they would substantially enhance the value of the office to the
President. We thank David Z. Beckler and David Z. Robinson, who
drafted the memorandum for Commission consideration, for their
efforts.
William T. Golden, Co-Chair
Joshua Lederberg, Co-Chair
PREFACE
The Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government
was established by Carnegie Corporation of New York in April 1988
to assess the process by which the government at all levels brings
scientific and technological knowledge to bear in setting policy
and making decisions. The Commission is an independent bipartisan
body of individuals with technical and government experience.
The Commission also established a distinguished Advisory Council.*
The
Commission met semi-annually from April 1988 until April 1993,
producing 19 reports with the help of task forces of highly qualified
experts: more than two hundred individuals served on these task
forces. The Commission also produced a number of consultant reports,
six of which were published, and sponsored six books and reports
published by other publishers. After 1993, Commission staff continued
to work to follow up on the reports, and task force chairs discussed
many of the recommendations with government officials.
On October 11, 1996, the Commission came together for a final
meeting. (Two Commissioners, William Perry and Sheila Widnall,
had resigned in 1993 when they accepted positions in the Clinton
administration.) In preparation for that meeting, a draft memorandum
on the White House organization for science and technology was
prepared for Commission approval. After discussion and some modifications,
the Commission approved the memorandum for distribution.
* Members of the Commission and its Advisory Council are listed
on pages 27 and 29.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
White House mechanisms for advice on science and technology have
been in place for over forty-five years, and the experience of
those years has demonstrated the value to the President of science
and technology (S&T) advice that is independent of individual
departments and agencies. Major issues involving science and technology
that arise at the presidential level usually transcend the responsibilities
of individual departments and agencies and are often embedded
in broad national policies.
The
Commission's principal recommendation is that the present organizational
structure for S&T advice in the White House--the Assistant
to the President for Science and Technology, the National Science
and Technology Council (NSTC), the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP), and the President's Committee of Advisors on Science
and Technology (PCAST)--be retained and that its operations be
fine-tuned to serve the needs of the President better.
The
Commission's proposals build on the substantial accomplishments
of the past eight years. They attempt to integrate the various
S&T advisory organizations more fully into the operations
of the White House and Executive Office and to focus the S&T
advice on presidential priorities and initiatives.
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The Assistant to the President for Science and Technology should
give primary attention to serving the President and should play
a policy and advisory role similar to that of other Assistants
to the President. The measures recommended in this report are
aimed at reinforcing the policy role of the Assistant for S&T
while allowing him to continue to carry out essential S&T
program and management functions as Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy.
THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
The organization, functions, and operations of the Office of Science
and Technology Policy should be assessed with a view to sharpening
its focus on matters of concern to the President and strengthening
its support of the NSTC the President's Committee of Advisors
on Science and Technology, and the Assistant to the President
for S&T.
An OSTP chief of staff should be appointed to strengthen management
and coordination within OSTP, so that the Director will have more
time to perform the duties of Assistant to the President.
There should be joint staff appointments between the OSTP and
the Economic Policy Council and the Domestic Policy Council similar
to OSTP arrangements with the National Security Council.
OSTP cooperation with the Office of Management and Budget should
be strengthened by regular consultation between the OSTP and OMB
directors and a written understanding on their working relationships.
THE NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL
The Commission recommends that the National Science and Technology
Council be oriented and structured primarily as a policy council
in accordance with its enabling Executive Order. The NSTC can
be an even more effective instrument for developing national S&T
policies if it concentrates its resources on a small number of
priority policy issues of concern to the President and reduces
its emphasis on detailed r&d program development and coordination.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The Commission recommends that the financial and staff resources
of the Committee be substantially increased to enable it to meet
more frequently and to undertake more in-depth studies on S&T
issues of importance to the President.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The White House should explore with the State Department measures
for improving the department's S&T capabilities.
SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY AND THE PRESIDENT
The various White House mechanisms for advice on issues of science
and technology have been in place for over 45 years, and the experience
of nearly half a century has demonstrated that the President needs
advice on S&T-related appointments and issues that is independent
of the advice of the federal departments and agencies. Issues
involving S&T that arise at the presidential level usually
transcend the responsibilities of individual agencies and are
often embedded in broader national policy issues. In the near
future, such crosscutting issues may involve, for example, budgetary
allocations for research and development (which accounts for a
large portion of discretionary expenditures), or the best mechanisms
for strengthening the American economy, maintaining environmental
quality, and exploiting the potential of the new information technologies
for education and the environment.
Since
its establishment in 1988, the Carnegie Commission on Science,
Technology, and Government has concerned itself with the best
ways of providing the President with scientific and technological
advice and assistance. The Commission's first report in October
1988, addressed to both presidential candidates, recommended that
the post of presidential science advisor be upgraded to Assistant
to the President for Science and Technology; it also recommended
that the President establish a group of senior scientific and
technical advisors drawn from outside government.1
In a second report on the subject, before the 1992 election,2
the Commission called for a high-level forum to assess national
S&T policies. It also recommended that the Federal Coordinating
Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology be convened at
cabinet level and that steps be taken to provide mechanisms for
integrating scientific and technical considerations into White
House policy formulation.
Both
Republican and Democratic administrations took actions that reflected
the substance of these recommendations. President Bush elevated
the science advisor post to Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology and upgraded the membership of the Federal Coordinating
Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology to cabinet level.
The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
was reestablished after a lapse of fifteen years in order to draw
on the expertise of the outside scientific and engineering community
(during the Reagan administration, a White House Science Council
reported to the President's science advisor rather than to the
President).
President Clinton appointed a President's Committee of Advisors
on Science and Technology and further strengthened decision making
for White House science and technology policy by establishing
the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), chaired by
the President and made up of cabinet secretaries, agency heads,
and senior White House staff members. The National Space Council
was also merged into the OSTP.
By strengthening the authority of the science advisor and increasing
the policy orientation of scientific and technical advice, the
steps taken by the Bush and Clinton administrations inaugurated
a new era for presidential science advising. In particular, the
National Science and Technology Council increased the emphasis
on policy formulation.
The following proposals build on the substantial accomplishments
of the past eight years. In particular, they attempt to integrate
the various S&T organizations more fully into the operations
of the White House and the Executive Office and to focus the S&T
advice on presidential priorities and initiatives.
THE
OVERALL STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT
The Commission's principal recommendation to the next administration
is that the present organizational structure for S&T advice
in the White House (see Figure 1)--the Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology, the National Science and Technology
Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the
President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology--be
retained and that its operations be fine-tuned.
THE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The
Commission recommends that the Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology give primary attention to serving the President
in a policy advisory role similar to that of other Assistants
to the President.
The Assistant to the President for S&T wears many hats. Besides
being a member of the President's senior staff and cochair of
the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology
and directing the activities of the NSTC, the Assistant has statutory
responsibilities as Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, has assigned responsibilities for the National Space Council,
and directs the activities of the NSTC. Although these responsibilities
overlap, the statutory functions of the OSTP director go beyond
direct advice to the President. OSTP provides leadership and coordination
of federal r&d programs and assists the Office of Management
and Budget throughout the budget development process. These broader
responsibilities compete for the time and attention needed to
respond to the priority policy concerns of the President. Nonetheless,
the Commission continues to oppose the fragmentation of the S&T
advisory function that would occur if the positions of Director
of OSTP and the Assistant for S&T were separated. The measures
recommended in this report are aimed at reinforcing the policy
role of the Assistant for S&T while allowing him or her to
continue to carry out essential S&T program and management
functions.
The effectiveness of the Assistant for S&T, like that of other
members of the senior White House staff, depends on his or her
access to the President. If the Assistant interacted more intensively
on a day-to-day basis with the President's senior staff and participated
in the work of White House policy councils, his effectiveness
would be greatly increased. That interaction can occur naturally,
if the Assistant focuses on the S&T components of Presidential
priorities and initiatives. FIGURE
THE
NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL
The
Commission recommends that the National Science and Technology
Council be oriented and structured primarily as a policy council
in accordance with its enabling Executive Order.
The
establishment of the NSTC by Executive Order in 19933
was a major step in the evolution of White House S&T advisory
mechanisms. The Executive Order directed the NSTC to
- Coordinate
the policymaking and implementation process for S&T across
federal agencies
-
-
Ensure
that scientific and technical policy decisions are consistent
with the President's stated goals
-
Ensure
that S&T issues are considered in the development and
implementation of federal policies and programs
-
Further
international cooperation in S&T
Like the other presidential councils, the NSTC is a "virtual
council," which seldom meets in plenary session at cabinet
level. The Assistant for Science and Technology communicates directly
with key individuals and achieves consensus by convening meetings
of subcabinet officials who are directly involved in particular
policy issues. NSTC's advantage over its Bush administration predecessor,
the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and
Technology, lies in its presidential chairmanship and the ability
of the Assistant for Science and Technology to exercise authority
on behalf of the President and the council through Presidential
Decision Directives (pdds) and Presidential Policy Reviews.
The
Vice President chairs the new National Science and Technology
Council in the absence of the President, and he has taken a deep
interest in S&T issues. The President has assigned him broad
responsibilities in science, technology, and environment. His
working relationship with the Assistant to the President for S&T
has contributed to the Assistant's effectiveness.
The
NSTC, staffed by OSTP, plays a significant role in S&T policy
formulation.4 In FY 1995, for example,
it established a National Bioethics Advisory Commission, developed
a national security science and technology strategy, prepared
a Presidential Decision Directive on national space policy, reviewed
options for reform of the federal laboratory system, established
a policy to address the global threat of emerging infectious diseases,
organized a national partnership in aeronautics research and technology,
and initiated policies for a better federal/state partnership
in S&T.
In
practice, the activities of the NSTC have not been limited to
priority policy issues. Its staff estimates that only 40 percent
of its activities concern policy. Most of its efforts involve
r&d program and budget coordination and convening private-sector
S&T forums and workshops. The number of working groups and
subcommittees of its nine committees has expanded (there are about
sixty), and some member agencies have become concerned about the
amount of time spent by their senior administrators in the NSTC
process. Staff members of the Office of Management and Budget,
a key player, have reduced their participation as NSTC interagency
groups have proliferated. The Commission believes that the NSTC
could be an even more effective instrument for developing national
S&T policies and that it should concentrate its resources
on a small number of priority policy issues of concern to the
President. Clearly, it is better for policies to guide programs
than to have programs determine policy. Focusing NSTC activities
on relatively few priority issues and objectives that involve
the President or Vice President will help ensure the full participation
of OMB and cabinet officers and will reduce the burden on departments
and agencies.
The
need for coordination of federal r&d programs is likely to
grow in light of budgetary constraints and the overlapping S&T
interests and objectives of federal departments and agencies.
The NSTC should emphasize policies and procedures for interagency
r&d coordination. It should look to OSTP for leadership in
devising and monitoring coordination arrangements, including crosscutting
programs that no longer require NSTC auspices.
The
Assistant to the President for S&T, working in close contact
with the President and his key staff advisors, should guide the
selection of priority S&T issues for NSTC action that correspond
with the President's objectives. These include broad policy issues
with substantial scientific and technological components, as well
as policies for S&T. A number of issues examined under NSTC
auspices via public forums and internal working groups have resulted
in policy documents, including technology for America's economic
growth; science in the national interest; technology in the national
interest; national security and S&T policy; technology for
a sustainable future; and food, health, and safety.
Both the examination of such broad policy areas and the translation
of policy conclusions into Presidential Decision Directives require
close cooperation and interaction among the presidential policy
councils--the NSTC, the National Economic Council, the National
Security Council, and the Domestic Policy Council--and the corresponding
Assistants to the President. Although there has been cooperation,
and, in the national security area, joint sponsorship, White House
organization and procedures for integrating S&T with economic,
national security, and domestic policy considerations need strengthening.
The
case for increased attention to policy integration at the presidential
level is made in the NSTC report Technology in the National Interest,
which points out that technology policy issues increasingly arise
in trade policy, economic policy, regulatory policy, national
security policy, and foreign policy. This is cogently stated in
the NSTC report: "Traditionally such areas of policy have
been treated separately with little coordination among policy-makers
in different disciplines. Now, technology issues increasingly
cut across policy lines and need to be integrated with other government
policies to better promote U.S. competitiveness and economic growth,
and to foster a better understanding of technology among policy-makers."
Environmental policy and education policy are among the other
policy areas that could be added to this list.
THE
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
The
organization, functions, and operations of the Office of Science
and Technology Policy should be assessed early in the next administration
by the Assistant to the President for S&T with a view to sharpening
its focus on matters of concern to the President and strengthening
its support of NSTC, PCAST, and the Assistant to the President
for S&T. To this end, the Commission has three recommendations.
The Commission recommends that an OSTP chief of staff be appointed
in order to strengthen management and coordination within OSTP
and thus give the Director more time to perform the duties of
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.
Many S&T policy, program, and budget issues rise to the White
House level because of their interagency character, resource implications,
and relationship to presidential goals. As a result, OSTP activities
have expanded, and professional staff from departments and agencies
have been detailed to supplement the official Executive Office
personnel complement. Yet OSTP remains substantially understaffed
and is unable to provide adequate support to the Assistant for
S&T, the NSTC, the Space Council, and PCAST. Besides increasing
its staff, more extensive use could be made of the federally funded
Critical Technologies Institute, which is authorized by Congress
to undertake analytical studies at the request of the OSTP director.
Clear objectives and priorities must guide OSTP's commitments
and initiatives so that it can conform to strict personnel and
financial resource limitations. Setting the goals, agenda, and
priorities of OSTP is a responsibility of the Director. With four
associate directors--appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate--involved in different agendas and priorities, it
is difficult to achieve overall focus and concerted effort unless
there is firm guidance, direction, and incisive decision making
by the Director.
To
maintain strong OSTP leadership and to enable the Director to
devote more time to his duties as Assistant to the President for
S&T, the Director needs assistance in two areas. He must now
spend significant amounts of time on general administration (including
recruiting, personnel items, and budget). In addition, the Director
needs assistance in coordinating the work of the associate directors.
A well-qualified chief of staff would carry out the administrative
duties and some of the coordination responsibilities.
The Commission recommends joint staff appointments between OSTP
and the National Security Council, the National Economic Council,
and the Domestic Policy Council.
The
strength of the S&T advisory apparatus depends on OSTP's relationships
with the other White House policymaking bodies. Of primary importance
is the arrangement of joint appointments of senior OSTP staff
members to the staff of other White House policy councils, not
merely for liaison purposes, but with full membership on both
staffs and dual reporting responsibilities (while maintaining
primary responsibility to the OSTP director). Such joint appointments
could provide necessary staff support to the Assistant for S&T,
who serves as a member of the National Economic Council and the
Domestic Policy Council and is a de facto member of the National
Security Council.
The usefulness of joint appointments has been demonstrated in
the national security area, where the OSTP Associate Director
for National Security and International Affairs is jointly appointed
as Senior nsc Director for S&T, reporting to the Assistant
for National Security and his deputy. The joint appointee brings
an S&T perspective and relevant OSTP expertise to the work
of the nsc, keeps the nsc informed of related OSTP activities
and capabilities, and provides the OSTP director with information
on matters of primary concern to the nsc.
The OSTP Associate Director for Science has worked closely with
the Domestic Policy Council. Since the Associate Director for
Environment and the Associate Director for Technology also have
interests that concern the dpc, the OSTP director has not proposed
that a single associate director be appointed to the staff of
the dpc. Similarly, all four associate directors have interest
in the actions of the National Economic Council. As a result,
the nec and dpc do not have single points of contact with OSTP.
The Director of OSTP should develop an arrangement with the dpc
and nec, like the arrangement with the nsc, whereby one associate
director would hold a joint appointment to the dpc and another
to the nec. Those associate directors would represent the overall
interests of the OSTP in the work of the councils and would involve
other associate directors in the business of these councils as
necessary.
The
Commission recommends that OSTP cooperation with the Office of
Management and Budget be strengthened by regular consultation
between the OSTP and OMB directors and by a joint memorandum of
understanding on working relationships between the two offices.
OMB is not well equipped to evaluate science and technology. It
should use OSTP more extensively for this purpose and should encourage
it to provide S&T assessments and to propose trade-offs. Since
OSTP is concerned largely with the success of programs while OMB
concentrates on budgets, it is especially important that OSTP
manage its participation in the budget process in such a way that
it is seen as representing all the interests of the President,
and not simply as an advocate for increased spending on science
and technology.
OSTP's enabling statute directs it to advise the President on
S&T considerations with regard to federal budgets, to assist
OMB with an annual review and analysis of funding proposed for
r&d in agency budgets, and to aid OMB throughout the budget
development process.
Close cooperation between OSTP and OMB is essential if OSTP is
to carry out this mandate. According to some OSTP participants,
there has been an unprecedented degree of productive cooperation
in recent years, with OMB and OSTP staff working together daily.
The view from the OMB is more circumspect. There appear to be
differences between OSTP and OMB in philosophy and objectives
in dealing with budgetary matters.
In the case of individual agency projects and programs, OSTP staff
participate in "stovepipe," or agency by agency, budget
reviews by OMB. There has been uneven involvement of the OSTP
director and staff in OMB higher-level "horizontal"
reviews. OMB is perceived by some OSTP staff to lack interest
in governmentwide interagency r&d crosscuts, particularly
in extending them beyond a small number of high-priority national
programs. On the other hand, there is concern within OMB about
the number of "priority" programs pressed by the OSTP.
Partnership between OSTP and OMB is essential in providing leadership
throughout the whole budget process. There is an annual communication
to the agencies on S&T priorities (in April), signed by the
Assistant for S&T and the Director of OMB, and there seems
to be substantial interaction in the final markups. Regular consultation
between the OSTP and OMB directors and their staffs throughout
the process can help resolve differences in approach to program
and budget issues and pave the way for agreement on ways to strengthen
OSTP OMB interaction. During the Bush administration, OMB offered
incentives (and disincentives) to agencies to encourage them to
conform to agreements on priority crosscutting programs and there
was a written understanding between OSTP and OMB on their working
relationship. Presidential objectives would be better served by
a formal arrangement between OMB and OSTP.
THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The
Commission recommends that the financial and staff resources of
the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST) be substantially increased to enable it to meet frequently
and to undertake in-depth studies on S&T issues of importance
to the President.
The history of science advisory committees to the President extends
back more than forty years. They made particularly important contributions
in the 1950s and 1960s, when issues of national security, arms
control, and space exploration were the principal S&T issues
on the President's mind. Today's S&T policy challenges and
needs are as great as they were during the Cold War, and the value
of impartial S&T advice to inform the presidential decision-making
process is no less. National security issues involving S&T
remain vitally important, and there is increasing concern about
economic, energy, and environmental issues.
When the President wants outside S&T advice, PCAST can be
an important resource, and indeed the President appears to welcome
its advice. Although PCAST is one of many channels for outside
S&T advice to the President, its closeness and access to the
President give it a unique responsibility and opportunity. Successful
matching of PCAST's advice to the needs of the President depends
on the Assistant to the President for S&T in his role as cochair
of PCAST. (One of the differences between the present PCAST and
previous committees is that the chairmanship of PCAST is shared
between the Assistant to the President and an outside cochair.
Having an outside cochair who is personally known to the President
can strengthen the relationship between the President and PCAST.)
The President looks to his Assistant for S&T to identify the
issues and depends on the Assistant to request the advisory committee
to report to the President. The Assistant is indispensable in
formulating an agenda for PCAST based on an intimate knowledge
of present and emerging issues confronting the President and of
the views of the President and key members of the President's
staff.
S&T advisory committees to federal departments and agencies
can also contribute to the White House policymaking process. Examples
of such committees are the National Science Board, the Defense
Science Board (and the armed services S&T advisory committees),
and S&T advisory bodies to the heads of the Department of
Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Institutes
of Health, and other agencies. Although PCAST has met with the
Vice President on a number of occasions, it has met with President
Clinton only once since the 1994 elections. A direct relationship
with the President is essential if the committee is to have a
first-hand understanding of the President's interests and concerns;
it would give the President a degree of familiarity with and confidence
in the committee's members that can only be instilled by personal
contact and would stimulate and focus the efforts of PCAST members.
That
an external committee of S&T advisors to the President can
play a vitally important role in presidential policymaking was
powerfully demonstrated in 1995 by the detailed report of a PCAST
panel on U.S. Russian cooperation to protect, control, and account
for weapons-useable nuclear materials. The chair of the panel
and the Assistant to the President for S&T personally presented
the report to the President, Vice President, White House Chief
of Staff, and National Security Advisor. The briefing served as
a catalyst for a joint statement by President Clinton and President
Yeltsin calling for accelerated and expanded cooperation to secure
and account for nuclear materials and led to a Presidential Decision
Directive on the subject.
That
experience was not the norm. PCAST, as currently funded and operated,
is limited in its ability to perform the in-depth analyses needed
to provide the President with such timely advice. The size of
the PCAST budget and staff are seriously inadequate and bring
into question the commitment of the White House to call on the
advice of an external S&T advisory committee (PCAST's annual
operating budget for meetings and studies has ranged between $60,000
and $80,000).
PCAST meets in plenary session only three or four times a year
and usually submits brief letter reports or memoranda after each
meeting. The President and Vice President reportedly read these
summary documents with interest. PCAST organized itself into subgroups
or panels to carry out analyses agreed upon by PCAST as a whole.
These panel studies are ultimately cleared by PCAST and then submitted
to the President and the NSTC as memoranda. In-depth memoranda
have been written on U.S. Russian cooperation on fissile materials,
the fusion r&d program, academic health centers, university
government partnerships, federal industry partnerships in r&d,
and r&d principles for budget allocation. As in the case of
NSTC committee reports, there is need for a systematic follow-up
process for deciding on recommendations for presidential action.
With increased resources for PCAST, the White House could take
much greater advantage of PCAST's potential as an extraordinarily
thoughtful, talented, experienced, and dedicated group of individuals.
Responsible reports on complex S&T policy issues require in-depth
examination, and PCAST must have the resources to convene a larger
number of well-staffed, multidisciplinary task forces of especially
qualified persons, including some who may not be members of PCAST
to respond to presidential concerns. PCAST can be most effective
when it addresses problems the White House wants it to take on.
This includes proposing initiatives when the committee believes
an issue should be of concern to the President.
There is concern within PCAST that the public openness requirements
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act limit its ability to advise
the President. Except for those dealing with classified national
security matters, plenary meetings of the committee are required
to be open to the press and general public. Although it is difficult
to assess the restrictive effects of public attendance on discussion
of sensitive policy issues and recommendations to the President
(and the attendant possibilities of public misunderstanding and
premature conclusions), PCAST plenary sessions have consisted
of unclassified briefings and exchanges with little time devoted
to policy discussions and recommendations. Much of the substantive
work of the committee has been carried out in subcommittees, which
are not covered by the Act insofar as they gather information,
analyze relevant issues and facts, and draft proposed position
papers for deliberation by the entire advisory committee. To the
extent that such deliberation is curtailed by real or perceived
inhibitions on full debate and expression by PCAST members in
plenary sessions, the benefit to the President of utilizing this
outside S&T advisory committee is inevitably lessened.
LONG
RANGE GOALS
The
Commission recommends that the White House S&T advisory mechanisms
pay more attention to longer-range goals for science and technology.
The President and his staff need to understand the longer-term
implications and impacts of S&T policies, as well as the effects
of other federal policies on future national S&T capabilities.
There is a fundamental mismatch between the short time horizon
of the political process and the inherently long time horizon
for advances in S&T and their application. Early attention
to the opportunities presented by advances in S&T and the
impediments to such advances, ranging from industrial competitiveness
to the quality of science education or the environment, can have
a substantial impact on the long-term health and prosperity of
the nation.
The President could call on the National Science Board (nsb) to
monitor and assess the long-term effects on the nation's research
universities and other research institutions of changes in federal
policies and programs for support of university research and graduate
education. The nsb has concerned itself primarily with oversight
of the programs of the National Science Foundation, although its
original statutory mandate gives it the responsibility to consider
national policies for the promotion of research and education
in science and engineering.
SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The
White House should explore with the State Department measures
for improving the department's S&T capabilities.
International issues involving science and technology are increasingly
important to the President, both in achieving U.S. foreign policy
objectives and in responding to S&T-related developments outside
the United States. This is illustrated by the report of the NSTC
Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology
(ciset) on the global health threat of emerging and re-emerging
infectious diseases. The report emphasized the need for U.S. leadership
to establish international coordination of infectious disease
prevention efforts. The ciset working group included representatives
of more than 17 government agencies and departments.
Although the White House should take the lead in dealing with
international issues of direct concern to the President, the S&T
capabilities of the Department of State should be substantially
strengthened so that it can carry out its responsibilities for
furthering international S&T cooperation and for integrating
S&T in the formulation of foreign policy. The White House
should explore with the State Department measures for improving
the department's S&T capabilities. Measures suggested in the
past include the desirability of a Science and Technology Counselor
and an outside S&T advisory committee reporting to the Secretary,
as well as restructuring Foreign Service career paths to require
rotations involving S&T issues along the path to senior Foreign
Service positions.
CONCLUSION
The structure for advising the President on issues involving science
and technology has been modified many times over the past forty-five
years. The present structure appears to be sound; the suggestions
in this memorandum are aimed at making it more responsive to presidential
needs and priorities by emphasizing policymaking functions, adopting
a more selective approach to priority problems and issues based
on presidential concerns, and involving the best scientists and
engineers from outside government in addressing these issues.
REFERENCES
1. Science & Technology and the President,
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government (October
1988).
2. A Science and Technology Agenda for the Nation,
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government (December
1992).
3. Executive Order 12881, November 23, 1993.
4. Summary of Accomplishments in FY 1995: OSTP,
NSTC, PCAST, available from OSTP.
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