SOURCE: Q 127 .U6 S325 AUTHOR: Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government DOCTITLE: Science and Technology in U.S. International Affairs SECTITLE: Science and Technology in U.S. International Affairs DATE: 1992 SUBJECT: science technology United States international policy S&T foreign policy history PUBLISHER: Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government DOCTYPE: Book TITLEID: CC4004 ISBN_ISSN: 1881054004 Text: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS January 1992 A Report of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government CONTENTS FOREWORD PREFACE 1.0 THE WAY FORWARD: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2.0 INTRODUCTION 3.0 GOALS: FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1990S AND BEYOND 3.1 Areas of Application 3.2 Democracy, Human Rights, and Free Markets 3.3 A Complex Challenge 4.0 HISTORY: TRYING TO BUILD THE CAPACITY 4.1 Rhetoric and Resources 4.2 Disparate Offshoots among the Agencies 4.3 Congressional Concern 4.4 Presidential Declarations 4.5 A Clear Goal 5.0 FUNCTIONS: FIELD AND HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITIES 5.1 Science and Technology in the Field 5.2 Science at State 5.3 The Big Picture 6.0 NEEDS: EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE CASES 6.1 The Executive Office of the President 6.2 Problems among the Agencies 6.3 A Tradition of Impasse 6.4 Gentlemen and Technocrats 6.5 The Congress 6.6 Congressional-Executive Interaction 7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS: COMMITMENT ACROSS GOVERNMENT 7.1 The Executive Office of the President 7.2 The Mission Agencies 7.3 The State Department 7.4 The Congress 8.0 PREMISES: THE CASE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION 9.0 APPENDIXES 9.1 Appendix A: Biographies of Authors and Contributors 9.2 Appendix B: Participants, Workshop on Organization and Resources of the U.S. Government for Science and Technology in International Affairs 9.3 Appendix C: Reviewers and Commentators 10.0 NOTES AND REFERENCES 11.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY 12.0 MEMBERS OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT 13.0 MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL, CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT 14.0 MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL STEERING GROUP FOREWORD Deep-seated reforms are required in the way the United States Government is organized for international affairs. These reforms must enable the government to take full account of the transformations being wrought in the world by science and technology. Revolutionary advances in physics have led to diverse applications in weapons, energy, materials, and medicine, with extraordinary impacts on the quality of life and on economic and political relationships among countries. As the 20th century closes, the powers of the physical and engineering sciences have been joined by equally revolutionary advances in the life sciences and by new frontiers for the environmental sciences. These advances exemplify the ways in which science and technology transform foreign relations and usher in new choices, risks, and benefits that societies around the world must confront individually and in common. Greenhouse gases, the AIDS virus, agricultural biotechnology, advanced energy systems, new pharmaceuticals, information technologies, and a host of other scientific and technological trends shape global competition and cooperation. The research base itself, supported by each nation, also needs cooperation if it is to grow and prosper. As a world leader in science and technology, the United States has a unique opportunity to use its S&T strengths to take international initiatives that can benefit both the U.S. and the world community. This report points the way toward a long-needed rethinking of U.S. international affairs for the 21st century. It calls for actions throughout the executive branch, within the White House and the State Department, and in the Congress. All must take bold and imaginative steps to adapt to a world in which the border between domestic and foreign affairs is crossed everywhere and most particularly by science and technology. Where might change begin? Because the international science and technology programs are government-wide, leadership in the White House and in Congress will have to place these issues much closer to the top of their agendas. This report outlines many constructive steps that, taken together, will produce a systematic, urgent process to improve organization for priority- setting and decision-making. The Assistant to the President for Science and Technology will necessarily play a key role in facilitating Presidential decisions and orchestrating discussions with the Congress about policies at the intersection of science and technology with international relations. The Secretary of State is the senior cabinet officer responsible for initiating changes necessary to integrate S&T in the conduct of foreign affairs. Thus, among the several complementary recommendations in this report is the proposal that the Secretary create the staff position of Counselor for Science and Technology, reporting to him, and filled by a scientist or engineer of distinguished stature or a specially qualified foreign service officer. Such an action, salutary on its own, could signal to the entire government the Secretary's intention to take bold steps toward firmly anchoring U.S. international relationships in the bedrock of America's strength in science and technology. William T. Golden, Co-Chair Joshua Lederberg, Co-Chair PREFACE This report of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government was prepared principally by Rodney W. Nichols, a member of its Advisory Council and Executive Committee. Jesse H. Ausubel, the Commission's Director of Studies, was the key collaborator throughout the organization of the project and the drafting process. The report was edited by Jeannette Lindsay Aspden. The report is based in part on discussions at a Workshop, cosponsored by the Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations, held June 24-26, 1990, at The Rockefeller University. (Workshop participants are listed in Appendix B.) It also reflects the insights gained from continuing reviews carried out during 1990-1991 by the Commission's International Steering Group. The report is endorsed by the Workshop Program Committee and the Steering Group: Jesse H. Ausubel Victor Rabinowitch Harry G. Barnes, Jr. Walter A. Rosenblith Justin L. Bloom Eugene B. Skolnikoff Harvey Brooks John Temple Swing Kenneth H. Keller John C. Whitehead Rodney W. Nichols, Chair Publication of this report is one of several activities of the Carnegie Commission aimed at strengthening the institutions and decision-making processes through which science and technology are wisely and effectively applied to world affairs. On the one hand, these activities address the way in which the United States is organized within its own government for improving the applications of science and technology in international affairs. On the other hand, these activities also seek to renew a positive, long-range vision of the international institutional infrastructure for science and engineering in which the United States is a partner. In the forthcoming reports the Commission will emphasize two major areas of concern: development of the less-advanced nations of the world, and how all countries work together multilaterally on matters of common interest involving science and technology, such as global environmental change. The Commission thanks the Council on Foreign Relations for its advice and assistance during the preparation of this report. George Shultz and Warren Christopher were very generous in sharing their wisdom and experience. The Commission is also grateful to the many people -- practitioners and analysts in foreign policy as well as advisors from the science and technology communities -- who commented on draft material; they are listed in Appendixes B and C. Georganne Brown, Margret Holland, David Kirsch, Doris Manville, and David Victor also contributed substantially to the success of the project. The Commission's Executive Director and Associate Director, David Z. Robinson and David Beckler, offered many valuable suggestions and consistent encouragement throughout the effort. While judgments certainly will differ on the detailed paths that might be taken by the federal government, all agree that the soaring global issues assessed here are crucial for the country in the years ahead. The report was approved by the Commission at its June 1991 meeting. 1.0 THE WAY FORWARD: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Serving the interests of the United States at home and abroad calls for sharply improved incorporation of scientific and technological insight into the nation's international policies. These policies span trade, defense, energy, health, agriculture, environment, space, and other critical fields. Every one demands scientific knowledge, every one calls for fresh thinking as science and technology advance. Equally important are the ever- increasing needs for international partnerships in most research and development conducted by U.S. universities and firms. Government plays an influential role in orchestrating the success and pace of the partnerships. The challenge for government is to organize the conduct of international affairs in order both to exploit the promise of rapid technological change and to help resolve the problems such change may generate. From pursuing the stunning economic and political benefits of the information revolution to relieving the tragic medical and social burdens of the AIDS epidemic, U.S. global policy must be technologically literate as well as diplomatically savvy. By tradition and law, the State Department has many responsibilities for overseeing this vast domain. In practice State has had neither the resources nor the organizational culture to fulfill all its responsibilities, except in paramount issues of national security. At the same time, most of the other federal "domestic" agencies have evolved major foreign capabilities in order to carry out their missions. Yet the agencies have many constraints on their flexibility to pursue their efforts with their counterparts abroad and with the many international scientific institutions. Overall, U.S. international relations have suffered from the absence of a long-term, balanced strategy for issues at the intersection of science and technology with foreign affairs. Sometimes this absence of analysis and policy leads to unpreparedness for major issues, bitter interagency disputes, and inadequate last-minute preparations for an international meeting. On other occasions, when diplomatic stalemates occur, American science may be used merely as a bargaining chip to achieve an underfunded, cobbled-together, disappointing technical exchange. Recent trends bring this subject to the forefront for the 1990s. In general, rapid shifts in political and economic balances anywhere in the world may promote or hinder technological modernization, and U.S. interests inevitably are engaged. For instance, enthusiasm for democracy within the republics constituting the former Soviet Union, and throughout Central and Eastern Europe, reduces East-West military tensions. These changes open new, if complex and uncertain, vistas for trade and collective security requiring reconsideration of many policies about technology. The trend toward unification in Western Europe offers prospects for both cooperation and competition with the United States. These prospects are entangled with issues about how firms and nations proceed with research and development, and with international standards, for new products and services. Reducing the proliferation of weapons throughout the world -- and clinching the cuts in strategic arms while enhancing stability -- requires global controls, continuous monitoring, and effective response, all informed by the most current knowledge of scientific and technological trends. Japan's technology-based economic power changes political and economic relationships for the United States in every region and offers opportunities for Japan-U.S. cooperation in international development. Environmental protection, which frequently must be transnational, demands worldwide coordination of assessments, research, and policies. Developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America need extensive technical cooperation as they seek higher standards in health and education, advances in physical and financial infrastructure, improvements in centers for science, and exports into sophisticated markets. So the situations and needs multiply countlessly. As the United States faces problems similar to those of other countries -- say, in energy -- collaboration will help to find better solutions. As the world's scientific community pursues common aspirations on the great research frontiers -- in physics and genetics, for example -- improved communications will spur mobility and exchanges involving U.S. participants as well as joint financing and planning of next-generation projects. As American openness and the tradition of an international process in science and engineering combine in U.S. global initiatives, the health of the American research and development enterprise itself will be strengthened. The private sector has often learned these lessons of interdependence more quickly than has the government. Yet, at home, attempts to set an internationally astute agenda for government often founder on obsolete distinctions between "domestic" and "foreign" objectives involving science and engineering. These backward- looking categories mislead the public and distract officials. Forward- looking policies must integrate national with international views in order to deal effectively with the global tidal waves of information, capital, technology, and people. Studies of American diplomacy since the late 1940s have struggled with the problem of bringing greater technological skill to bear on the organization and conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. The question is this: How can government use the nation's scientific and technological resources to plan coherent international actions, with an understanding of both American interests in the world and the influences of the rest of the world on the United States? Many constructive proposals have been made, but few have been implemented. Today there is usually a crazy-quilt of poorly defined responsibilities, inconsistent strategies, and inadequate resources, frequently knotted up and occasionally knitted together by ad hoc mechanisms of coordination. The unintended consequences have been frustrating at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. Hence this report, identifying the unanswered summons of past proposals for reform and charting the actions required by the imperatives of a new international order. The report begins with a brief description of the goals that compel a reevaluation. It then documents earlier efforts to anchor international policy in expert analysis, and sketches the areas now demanding more attention. The current patterns of activities are described and analyzed, and the need for change is illustrated by examination of specific cases. Next, recommended lines for change are traced. Finally, the premises for organizational change are restated. The study's recommendations are summarized below. - The President should clarify the international responsibilities and priorities for S&T among the mission agencies and should ensure their overall coordination with foreign policy through the Department of State. A White House review should be undertaken in order to gather the information and establish the framework for such Presidential decisions. Starting with an urgent Presidential request to all agencies, this year- long inquiry will lead to sharper designation of selected lead-agency responsibilities for implementing programs, operating under White House and State policy control. State must concentrate on foreign policy formulation and review, ensuring the consistency and reliability of the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. However, because many international programs are "orphans" in the technical agencies, immediate attention must also be given to clearing away the fog of ambiguity that surrounds each agency's identified roles. The National Science Foundation (NSF), for example, should manage many of the international basic scientific programs -- both bilateral and multilateral -- and should be given a larger budget for these activities. At the same time, clearer international responsibility for specific mission- oriented basic science should be given to Health and Human Services (HHS) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Department of Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Commerce (DoC), and other appropriate agencies. A few projects in "big science" and the astonishing variety of internationally productive "little science" must be evaluated for their foreign policy implications. Similarly, wherever the Congress and the White House have laid down clear international mandates to individual agencies -- as for Commerce -- these activities must be regularly reassessed, updated, and woven together in order to promote the national interest for the future. Overall, the three aims are to define afresh the U.S. international goals in and for S&T, to bring the increasingly important international programs into the mainstream throughout the S&T agencies of the government, and to orchestrate use of the nation's full technical assets in order to fulfill the goals of American foreign policy. Put another way, the Presidential decisions must integrate national policy for international S&T with bringing the nation's best S&T to foreign policy. - To help in preparing the Presidential decisions, and to pursue the long-term follow-ups, continue to strengthen the role of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the several White House councils covering international affairs, especially the National Security Council and the Economic Policy Council. The OSTP-chaired Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology -- through its State-chaired International Committee -- has embarked upon promising initiatives that should be buttressed and extended. This is particularly important for specific subjects such as energy, environment, relationships with developing countries, export controls, big- science projects, economic competitiveness, and the nonproliferation of weapons. Although such interagency committees typically elicit criticism, if not cynicism, about being little more than bureaucratic layers, in this case the President's Assistant for Science and Technology has crafted a useful instrument for cutting through the sensitive, irreducibly complex issues of interagency debate and decision on national assets. Modest added resources for OSTP, and continuity of policy attention, will be needed. - Open extensive Executive consultations with Congress to assess policies, priorities, and resources regarding S&T in international affairs. The Legislative-Executive process must elicit a firmer consensus on the resources needed by the State Department to fulfill its responsibility and by the mission agencies for their ineluctably growing international efforts. The Presidential reports to Congress on "Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy," required by law, should move further to emphasize evaluation of national trends and alternatives rather than compilation of historical facts. Congress should call upon its own support agencies -- notably the Office of Technology Assessment and the Congressional Research Service -- to deepen understanding of immediate choices and mid-range trends relating to S&T and foreign affairs. Drift has resulted from the failure to confront priorities for greater international cooperation in science and technology by and among the mission agencies. Although there is broad agreement on the sharply increased significance of anchoring many components of foreign policy in the nation's best science and technology, neither the Congress nor the Executive has looked at the system as a whole. Congress must find new ways to explore these issues among the dozens of committees involved. To be sure, sometimes the choices concern money, and a few programs may be able to justify added resources. But the worst constraints now are erratic policy, short time-horizons, and a chronic underestimate of the benefits of international components in national S&T efforts. - Take both immediate and long-range steps to ensure that officials of the State Department participate in more timely, continuing consideration of the aspects of science and technology pertinent to the foreign policy judgments and plans for which they have responsibility. Improved staffing and organization should be explored and major steps taken. A new post, a Science and Technology Counselor appointed by and reporting to the Secretary, should be created. Comparable in function to the President's Science Advisor, it would enhance the stature and influence of the work of the Assistant Secretary heading the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). A second recommendation for strengthening State's S&T capacity is to restructure the responsibilities of senior officials. Consolidating several S&T-related sectors and long-range planning under the leadership of an Under Secretary for Economic and S&T Affairs would bring greater line management attention, as several past proposals have urged. Third, the S&T staff at State in Washington merits modest expansion; the OES Bureau's budget in constant dollars has been cut by 40% over the past decade. Finally, the number of Science Officers at embassies abroad must be increased: only about 25 missions have qualified, full-time S&T staff. With its present resources, the State Department cannot adequately assert in Washington, or represent in the field, the unified political, economic, and S&T interests of the country. The goal is to spread throughout the State Department a lively awareness of science and technology in planning foreign policy, administering diplomatic operations, and facilitating efficient and flexible initiatives by the mission agencies. - Supplement and restructure the technical staffs of the mission agencies in foreign posts, including the Environmental Protection Agency, Commerce, Energy, Agriculture, National Science Foundation, Agency for International Development, and Health and Human Services. Doing this will require resolution of obstinate dilemmas arising from executive regulations about posting staff abroad. To control expenditure and assure security of personnel, there are strict ceilings on posting U.S. Government employees abroad; but to pursue U.S. interests and programs, more expertise is needed in the field. Given the nature of the international purposes of the mission agencies, a regional rather than a single-country outlook may be best, and regional coordination of technical staffs often will be cost-effective. For example, in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Africa, inter-Embassy and inter-agency analytical planning will often be preferred. Greater decentralization into field activities by many agencies is necessary in order to translate the rising interest in technical cooperation with the U.S. into action. At the same time, overarching political and economic issues must come together for review by the Ambassador in each country. The ambassadors' management challenges have been growing, and, because relations between most countries and the United States encompass many subjects with high scientific and technological content, ambassadors need skilled advice. Similarly, the State Department and the White House must oversee basic foreign policy decisions, building cohesion into the principles guiding the S&T efforts of multiple agencies. - Set plans for the long-term nurturing of human resources throughout the government, and especially in State, for work on global issues with a substantial scientific and technological character. In State, this will require an increased training budget, more aggressive and extensive recruiting of officers with technical backgrounds, more flexible exchanges with industry and universities, and enhanced incentives for those pursuing careers in international S&T. In the mission agencies, achieving this goal will demand more attention to professionalism in foreign policy and more reliable links with the foreign policymaking responsibilities of State and the White House. A single International Science Service for all agencies might be created within the federal career structure. Following the Presidential review and decisions recommended first, this concept should be examined not only in terms of the mixed past experiences with the Foreign Agricultural Service and the Foreign Commercial Service, but also with a consistent view of the 5-10-year needs in international programs among the agencies. - Increase the external research budget and advisory resources available to OSTP, State, and other agencies, for identifying and analyzing those functions of foreign policy that require technical expertise. Alone among the major agencies, State has virtually no external intellectual infrastructure to assist its planning on a regular basis. A modest research program should be coupled with greater interaction between the most senior officials and outside analysts and advisors. As part of this pattern, State's present, almost moribund, Science and Technology Advisory Committee, primarily linked to the OES Bureau, must be invigorated. The Committee should be available in meaningful ways to all senior officials, and should be linked with either the proposed Science and Technology Counselor and/or the proposed Under Secretary for Economic and Scientific and Technological Affairs. Such steps would broaden State's consultations with private-sector leaders and experts who are active at the convergence of science with foreign policy. Other agencies -- including the Fogarty Center at the National Institutes of Health and the Division of International Programs at the National Science Foundation -- also need greater external advisory and research back-up for long-range international efforts. The National Academies of Sciences and Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and the National Research Council (the Academy complex), perhaps the premier independent reservoir of national expertise, could do more to assist the State Department and the interagency Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the State Department should consider new ways to acquire the needed longer-range analysis and planning, such as through Academy advisory boards, studies, and conferences. Experience tempers optimism about the speed with which the desired new capacity can be built. If the pervasive connections of science and technology with international trends are to be recognized, understood, and exploited, it is high time to reverse the tendency revealed in the rueful Washington saying, "The urgent drives out the important." 2.0 INTRODUCTION Technology daily outstrips the ability of our institutions to cope with its fruits. Our political imagination must catch up with our scientific vision. -Henry Kissinger[1] For some time it has been clear that advances in science and technology are outdistancing the capacity of existing international organizations to deal with them. -Cyrus Vance[2] Since before the Revolution, our nation has been blessed with extraordinary representatives skillfully pursuing the national interest around the world. In 1775, for example, Benjamin Franklin was appointed to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, the direct forerunner of the State Department, and he was to promote his nation's interests abroad until 1784. His replacement as Minister to Paris was Thomas Jefferson, who later served as the first Secretary of State. Both men were deeply interested in "natural philosophy," as science was then known, and Franklin was better known as a scientist than as a statesman. Indeed, his scientific eminence underlay his success as a diplomat in Paris. Today, talented career foreign service officers and political appointees continue to work toward a world with greater prospects for peace, human rights, and economic development. Experienced negotiators often possess a combination of intensity, patience, and a deep understanding of American values. Yet, unlike Franklin and Jefferson, very few have had experience with science or technology. It is ironic, then, at the end of the 20th century, when "everything is global" and when science and technology drive many of the central issues on the world's agenda, that the federal government -- including both the Executive branch and the Congress -- has had limited success with the integration of science and technology into American foreign policy. This new challenge -- how to meet the demands of technical change affecting international affairs -- is the subject of this study. The State Department is by no means the only agency facing the challenge of organizational adaptation to the global effects of technological change. Most mission agencies, several key elements of the White House apparatus, and, significantly, many committees of the Congress, are involved in areas where science and technology converge with international affairs. Since science and technology will be prime tools for whichever nations lead the world in the coming decades, the crux of the matter is this: Only with broader and deeper scientific awareness and advice, achieved through education and improved organization, can American international leadership move into the 21st century. Two notes must be given about the character of this report. First, some skepticism is justified. Given the historical difficulties in bringing science and technology into the culture and context of diplomacy -- as will be described in detail -- some experienced observers believe there is little chance of transforming the State Department, or the U.S. foreign policy community generally, into a more technologically literate navigator. If so, some of this study might be futile, or at least seriously limited. But what is the alternative? The State Department has long been acknowledged, and will remain, the lead agency in foreign policy. Thus it must master the fundamentals, but not all the operating details, that influence the formulation and execution of that policy. This is true for finance and economics, for trade, for international security. During the 1990s and beyond, these fundamentals also include science and technology. Moreover, the programs of all the other units of government, the typically technology-intensive mission agencies, are affected every day, in a thousand ways, by international trends. Figure 1 is a reminder of the wide range of organizations involved in scientific and technological elements of international affairs. While every group needs flexibility, there ought to be high standards for S&T in each and international coherence for the whole. This, too, has proved to be such a refractory bureaucratic problem that many informed participants, in and out of government, despair of making much improvement. But the stakes are so high that the issue, fraught with uncertainty though it is, must be addressed. FIGURE 1: Selected Executive Agencies and Congressional Committees with Interests at the Intersection of Science and Technology with International Affairs Congressional Committees House Senate Agriculture Agriculture, Nutrition, and Appropriations Forestry Armed Services Appropriations Banking, Housing, and Urban Armed Services Affairs Banking, Housing, and Urban Budget Affairs Energy and Commerce Budget Foreign Affairs Commerce, Science, and Intelligence Transportation Science, Space, and Technology Energy and Natural Resources Environment and Public Works Foreign Relations Intelligence Labor and Human Resources Executive Agencies[a] Agriculture Interior[c] Commerce[b] Justice Defense Labor Education NASA Energy National Science Foundation Environmental Protection State Agency Transportation Health and Human Services Treasury Housing and Urban Development Endnotes [a] White House units, such as the National Security Council, are not listed here. [b] In Commerce, as in many other agencies, there are subdivisions showing even more visible S&T links to international trends: e.g., the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and the Patent and Trademark Administration (PTA). [c]In Interior, key units include the U.S. Geological Survey and the Fish and Wildlife Service. A second point about the report is its scope. It reviews both policy goals and the government's operating organization. Most past and current reviews of these issues have concentrated on only one of these aspects. Unhappily. however, protestation about desirable global goals can be so abstract that it obscures the difficulty in accomplishing them; and criticism about a scattershot international program can be so scorched with petty details that it overlooks the underlying problem of pervasive organizational incapacity. In contrast, this review aims to highlight the entire situation, top to bottom, immediate urgencies and long-term aspirations. Hence its interweaving and occasional repetition of related perspectives. Even a report of this length, however -- largely concerned with the federal government -- cannot cover the many crucial aspects of the private sector's activities in science and technology in international affairs. In universities and firms across the country, a complex process of "internationalization" is occurring; even where the process is succeeding, the institutions face problems comparable to those in the federal government.[3] More pointedly, these institutions would welcome greater clarity and purposefulness in the federal outlook. 3.0 GOALS: FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1990S AND BEYOND The revolution in communications, energy, environmental sciences and other aspects of science and technology has ... imparted an importance to S&T considerations in foreign affairs undreamed of a generation ago. -George Shultz[1] Just as political freedom and economic liberty go hand in hand, so, too, do sustained growth and a healthy environment. -James Baker[2] To begin with a broad canvas extending far beyond specialized roles for science and technology, consider the goals for U.S. foreign policy over the next decade or two. This is, of course, neither an authoritative text nor a political statement, and no rank order is implied. In reviewing these international purposes, keep in mind that all agencies of the U.S. Government increasingly must consider them. The State Department, as the principal steward of foreign policy, needs people with the intellectual flexibility and specific knowledge to integrate science and technology into decisions about whether and how to proceed with political relationships. - Resolve international security concerns. Sustaining deterrence in the face of a reduced threat, pushing ahead on arms control and disarmament with or without formal treaties, and addressing acute issues such as terrorism and regional conflict will continue to be crucial. The success of collective peacekeeping and cooperative regimes on nonproliferation will depend in part on technologies such as those applied in monitoring and verification as well as on the flows of technical knowledge and information. The stability of the world, given inevitable rivalries and access to modern weapons, will depend in part upon the continued vigor of defense research and development to assure effective U.S. capabilities. - Maintain and enhance economic performance. The nation's economic strength will depend increasingly on its scientific and technological base. Just as foreign policy in the past was conditioned by concerns for military preparedness, foreign policy in the future seems likely to turn on trends in the global economic system. Astutely crafted international policies for science and technology will enhance competitiveness. - Strengthen democratic institutions. Building and supporting democratic institutions will emphasize the values of an open and politically pluralist society, and schools and universities will play a special role in this endeavor. Education and research are crucial in the natural and social sciences, engineering, and medicine, as well as in the humanities. These activities have proven to be a wedge for human rights in many societies, a refuge where free thought survives against totalitarian regimes, and a reservoir for new leadership when democracy arrives. - Liberalize world trade. This process will be acceptable worldwide only if virtually all nations believe they have the opportunity to catch up technologically. Furthermore, incentives for invention and innovation, such as patent laws and intellectual property rights, must be extended and protected consistently around the world. Market competition, together with open networks among scientists and engineers, reinforce political pluralism. - Assess and address global environmental issues. For coping with environmental change and reversing environmental degradation, a clear understanding of the quality of the scientific evidence will be fundamental to policy setting. Moving to cleaner and more efficient energy systems will depend on shrewdly developed and applied technology, assessed in economic and social terms as well as from local, national, global, and intergenerational standpoints. - Facilitate sustainable development. In all countries, progress will depend in large part on the evolution and diffusion of technologies. In developing countries, democratic stability also depends on success in building indigenous capabilities. Global cooperation can surmount the national, regional, and global obstacles on the path to modernization. Although the meaning of sustainability remains imprecise, an international commitment to capacity-building will permit each nation to frame informed choices for the future. - Strengthen the base of science globally. Future gains in prosperity, health, and security will come from the productivity of research, rooted in both the philosophical aims of inquiry for its own sake and utilitarian goals set for science by society. This will entail reinvigorating old partnerships and inventing new international institutions serving science. Given the high costs of research and the uncertain distribution of its benefits, cooperative international arrangements will allow durable commitments that would stretch individual governments. - Increase the level of public understanding within the United States of the likely evolution of the international economic and political system. The setting in which U.S. foreign policy must be made and implemented will continue to be dramatically affected by technological developments. Global systems of communications and transportation, for example, shape the operating environment over decades for businesses, for state-craft and diplomacy, and for the individual. Both Congressional and Executive leaders will have to raise the priority they give to enhancing public awareness and support of the U.S. interests in international goals. - Strengthen the ability of the U.S. to influence the course of world events. Combined with American policies and values, U.S. leadership in science and technology will be one of the powerful assets that the nation can deploy to achieve its goals, to function as a reliable and desired partner, and to contribute to imaginative solutions of international problems. U.S. foreign policy would be lame without science, and international programs would be hollow without the U.S. commitments. Stated so generally, such goals seem unexceptional. Yet pursuing them requires not only professional skill but also sensitive awareness of powerful enmities and cultural clashes; any inherent instability could be moderated by technological cooperation. Furthermore, stating foreign policy goals with an emphasis on science and technology does not imply that less weight should be placed on other dimensions. 3.1 Areas Of Application Now consider three areas in which foreign policies intended to achieve these goals must take account of the extraordinary recent developments in science and technology, developments that call for major organizational changes. ECONOMIC TRENDS For economic reasons, the overall scope of U.S. foreign policy aims has been growing. International trade negotiators in the 1990s must wrestle with dramatically new needs and opportunities. These range at any moment from low to high technology, and from food exports to computer chip imports, interacting with all the rest of America's international relationships. For example, in the early 1960s the combined value of imports and exports was only about 10% of GNP. By the late 1980s this had grown to more than 25%. Exports exceeded 12% of GNP in 1989 and must grow further if the economy is to thrive. Hundreds of thousands of jobs are at stake, as "foreign" economic policy relates to "national" economic performance. Diplomacy dealing with these economic issues in evitably involves a technological base. Even in the "strictly science" international agreements from which little commercially relevant innovation might be expected, intellectual property rights loom large. This is because long-range and cumulative commercial advantages often turn on the fast-changing technological leadership that is affected by decisions about public and private investment. A new White House-level interagency group focuses on "technology and competitiveness," for reasons that are as deep as the buzzwords are common. As the well-known example of the semiconductor industry shows, the "critical technologies" being pioneered in laboratories today, such as advanced composite materials, will be translated into multibillion-dollar markets tomorrow.[3] Furthermore, leading U.S. industries such as computers, telecommunications, professional engineering services, pharmaceuticals, and aircraft already face growing competition. The political trade-offs for freer markets in such products and services will be settled in key forums such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), long the unsung province of experienced foreign service officers. The statistics on foreign direct investment provide further evidence that the U.S. participates more and more in a rapidly integrated one-world economy. For example, sales of U.S. subsidiaries in the countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are five times greater than U.S. exports to these countries; even in Japan, sales of U.S. subsidiaries exceed U.S. exports to Japan by about 10%. In general, foreign direct investment is even more technology-intensive than trade, and this works both ways, as shown by the $5 billion R&D expenditure by foreign-based firms in the United States.[4] The U.S. is deeply and irreversibly embedded in the world economy -- and in most respects, this is an asset. Yet the asset must be clearly related to foreign policies. And U.S. international negotiations must continue to build fair "rules of the game," as a Commerce official put it, for the development of the technologies that underlie economic competition.[5] MILITARY ASPECTS Military issues will become more complex, not disappear, in foreign policy puzzles. After all, U.S. spending for national security continues at almost $300 billion per year, and worldwide production and exports of arms show few signs yet of abating. The planned sharp decreases in U.S. defense spending -- by perhaps 25% or more within five years -- may well call for even more subtle integration of defense plans with "civilian" concerns in foreign policy. President Bush's dramatic announcements in September 1991, and the ensuing negotiations toward agreements with what was the Soviet Union on reducing strategic and conventional arms -- not to speak of building new forms of regional collective security will -- continue to test the technological and organizational savvy of staff in the State and Defense Departments. The Defense Department has had 600 bilateral agreements, with approximately 20 countries, addressing basic research topics. In the 1970s DoD entered into several major international co-development agreements; in the 1980s, it entered into many more such agreements (most of those in the latter half of the 1980s, in response to pressures from the Congress and Executive Branch political leaders). DoD annual spending on international S&T is approximately $2 billion, depending on how one does the counting. Individual co-development projects typically range between $100,000 and hundreds of millions of dollars (billions if such projects proceed into production).[6] No matter how all of this activity may change with likely policy and budget shifts over the next few years, one thing is clear: Desert Storm's lessons about the power of military technology must be applied with subtlety and prudence at the intersection of plans for defense cooperation and foreign policy.[7] Furthermore, direct military "aid" to the "Third World" -- about $8 billion currently -- will surely change character in the 1990s. Developing countries will more frequently think in terms of trade, finance, and immigration, rather than in terms of East-West geopolitics and military alliances. Astute analysis of high-tech and low-tech arms trading on a global scale will be required, as may entirely new concepts for limiting the arms trade and containing conflicts.[8] NATIONAL R&D IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETTING The 1992 U.S. expenditure on research and development is more than $150 billion, with about 45% funded by the federal government.[9] Almost three- quarters of the effort is carried out by the private sector. One might ask: should the State Department know more about this enormous effort and its implications? The answer is, surely, yes. One might also ask: does the U.S. effort, larger than the combination of the efforts of Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, assure technical leadership? The answer is, surprisingly to some, no. Developed countries must seek exchanges about (and deals with) each other's R&D. U.S. firms must seek alliances with foreign firms, while U.S. universities must make contacts with leading investigators around the world. Much of this focuses on excellent work in Europe[10] and Japan, and the Commerce Department has been active, for example, in stimulating private sector liaison for these most industrialized regions. Developing countries also will seek more cooperation with the United States in every field of the sciences and especially on the effective administration of market-competitive R&D enterprises. Whether the subject is environment or health, energy, or agriculture, South-North technological cooperation will he essential to meet the multiplication of needs as world population doubles over the next two generations. To cope with such growing calls for R&D partnerships, State's role in charting foreign policy must include the "advocacy" for international concerns among the traditionally domestic agencies, as Graham Allison and Peter Szanton emphasized some years ago.[11] Yet to play this role, State must have more than superficial familiarity with the texture of U.S. science and technology at home, public and private. And the mission agencies must move ahead, flexibly and intensively, to facilitate international activities not only by government but also throughout the private sector. GROWING DIFFICULTIES These rough indicators of the economic, military, and technical aspects of international issues are not enough in themselves to determine the scale and form of the Department of State's staff. Nor do they dictate the scale of efforts by the mission agencies, much less the particular form of coordination across the agencies. However, such indicators do help to explain the growing difficulties associated with the government's current modest attention to these trends. 3.2 Democracy, Human Rights, And Free Markets It is not just the quantitative scope of U.S. interests related to S&T that makes future foreign policy making so complex. Many intangibles bear on the responsibilities of foreign policy related to science and technology. As one example, consider a linchpin of U.S. foreign policy: building democratic institutions throughout the world, and particularly reinforcing respect for human rights. To achieve this goal often involves supportive networks of active scientists. Recall the domestic and international impact of the courage shown by Andrei Sakharov and Fang Li Zhi. Ponder the awful consequences for the people, and for the technological and intellectual community so essential for growth, of human rights violations in Africa. Another crucial U.S. goal is to encourage the spread of free markets. This requires liaison with experienced executives in the private sector, who are thinking both technologically and globally. The success of many forward- looking U.S. firms in Asia and Latin America shows what can be done. Achievements in development cooperation for the 21st century may well turn on creating patient partnerships between American foreign policy and the technology-based U.S. private sector, leveraging the modest amounts of available "aid" to achieve major goals for food, energy, health, and jobs. 3.3 A Complex Challenge In short, the formulation and implementation of modern foreign policy requires a continuing reconnaissance of science and technology mapped onto the topography of politics, culture, and economics among both friends and rivals. The government is not now fully equipped for this task. To explore these themes, a brief outline of the historical background will be useful. 4.0 HISTORY: TRYING TO BUILD THE CAPACITY The brotherly spirit of Science ... unites into one family all its votaries of whatever grade, and however widely dispersed through the different quarters of the globe. -Thomas Jefferson[1] If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations. -James Madison[2] Just as Jefferson understood the need for openness in the one-world of science, Madison saw the need for a unified foreign policy. Both principles were essential to the well-being of the new nation. Their leadership came to illuminate how the American system could tap the many scientific and technological benefits flowing from foreign sources. For example, specialized military and engineering prowess was imported during the Revolutionary period. Over the next decades, foreign patents were licensed, and skilled immigrants arrived. Such international activities provided the foundations of the mid-19th-century industrial expansion, and later, the beginnings of American research institutions. Diplomacy helped these trends, but mostly around the edges. Since the turn of the 20th century, to be sure, military issues often dominated technological currents in international affairs. After two wars, American leadership assured NATO's technological superiority in deterrence against East-West war. International institutions were created to control the use of atomic energy and brake the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Sophisticated intelligence-gathering techniques brought greater reliability to estimates of military threats and extraordinary national means for verifying arms control. Such defense activities, calling up large investments in R&D efforts, were associated with "international purposes." Generally, diplomacy ably understood, even anticipated, the military and political goals. But it did not regularly sense how technological trends rapidly changed the ways in which those goals would be seen, and then altered, at home and abroad. After World War II, more and more civilian initiatives began to link U.S. science with truly global goals. For instance, promoting public health and related institutions through international cooperation has always had robust U.S. leadership. This was dramatically exemplified in the successful cooperative efforts to eradicate smallpox and to capitalize on the "green revolution." Recent progress in the life sciences -- led by the United States -- now promises even greater improvements in health and agriculture. Yet these efforts have been, and remain, rather isolated from the corridors of diplomatic power. Often, cooperative health efforts are seen as a mere subsidiary business within a conglomerate, distant from the conglomerate's central line of work. The advent of AIDS has taught a different lesson: one world, vulnerable, looking to science for help. From Truman's Point IV program onward, heavy U.S. investments have also been made to assist developing countries. In foreign assistance, however, it was not always clear what goals were most important: shoring up geopolitical and military alliances to protect our interests and reward our friends, or giving aid and support to relieve immediate human needs, or cooperating in long-term alliances to build democratic institutions, market economies, and local technological capacity. Some of each, varying erratically, has been the pattern. The efforts of senior State officials, and of the Congress, have rarely aimed at framing a "development strategy" that integrates all U.S. scientific and technological resources in order to attain long-range objectives. Set aside for a moment these U.S.-centered historical perspectives. Consider the spectacular growth of mega-cities throughout the world, with their pockets of deepening squalor. Such issues have brought keener awareness of the urgent need for sharing expertise across many disciplines and across natural boundaries. Each nation's cities face problems that are highly individual, yet so similar as to be "universal" -- problems of water, transportation, communications, housing, and education. For dealing with such "local" problems, greater international cooperation will be helpful. It must be founded on merging the cross-cultural assessments from social, engineering, and natural sciences. Assessments of any nation's efforts must keep a keen eye on what works elsewhere, for how long, at what cost. The goals are daunting, the needs for technological insight are great, and the complexities for diplomacy are formidable. Bringing perhaps an even more extraordinary force to the international agenda for the next century are "global" environmental questions that cannot be resolved by purely local action, however necessary that may be. The problems include short-term and intense issues of trans-boundary pollution control, the longer-term and still fuzzy projections of climate change, and the many connections among them. International technical relations on these matters are not merely desirable, but imperative. The resulting global bargains will be ambitious, and continuous technical review will be required. As a final example, consider the powerful technologies of communications and computing. The information revolution, led by the United States, has had stunning impacts. It has nurtured freedom of speech and fostered commercial gains, and its potential for further political, economic, and social change is immense. To cope with these sweeping issues, individual professionals engaged in science and technology play increasingly transnational roles. In this domain of creating and applying knowledge, interactions of scientists and engineers occur in each country, in clusters of countries grouped either by region or by shared interest, and, through powerful tradition, as Jefferson knew, in the international scientific community as a whole. The education of the next generation of scientists and engineers is truly an international undertaking, and at the graduate level, the United States is the leader. American diplomacy plays a crucial role in facilitating easy international research exchanges, open mobility of students, and free choice in access to education. 4.1 Rhetoric And Resources A general question emerges from this sketch of the history of challenges and benefits in the relationship between foreign relations and complex technical topics: - What has been the government's capacity to anticipate the scientific needs of foreign policy, plan reliable programs and budgetary agreements, conduct imaginative and constructive negotiations, and gain a sure grasp of technical data? The short answer is that the situation has been clouded by hopeful rhetoric and undercut by inadequate resources. Taking just two of the many major reports since World War II as diagnostic aids, it becomes clear that there is a long history of frustrated aspirations. 1949-1950 BERKNER REPORT In 1949, at the request of the Acting Secretary of State, the eminent geophysicist and engineer Lloyd V. Berkner chaired a study of Science and Foreign Relations. His group, and their distinguished advisors and staff, which included both foreign policy and scientific experts, started with the following observation by the State Department's 1949 Reorganization Task Force: The Department is dealing on the one hand with foreign policy matters which have a great effect upon United States scientific policy and on the other hand with international scientific activities which have an impact on foreign policy. These matters are being handled at various points without adequate scientific evaluation.... We believe that the extent of the Department's responsibility for international scientific matters requires top policy consideration and the aid of professional scientific judgment....[3] In opening their report, filed in the spring of 1950, Berkner's team emphasized two important questions, both aimed at policies helping science: How can the potentialities of scientific progress be integrated into the formulation of foreign policy, and the administration of foreign relations, so that the maximum advantage of scientific progress and development can be acquired by all peoples? How can foreign relations be conducted in such a manner as to create the atmosphere that is essential to effective progress of science and technology?[4] Berkner and his colleagues concluded that "present organization is inadequate to assess with accuracy the nature of the broad policy issues involving science" (emphasis added).[5] The report went on to develop "cardinal principles" upon which its recommendations were based: 1) United States foreign relations with respect to science must take on a more positive and active character than has obtained hitherto. 2) The greatest benefit in this field will emerge if the Department of State encourages and facilitates the conduct of privately sponsored programs of exchange of scientific material and persons. 3) Closer relations between the Department of State and United States science must be established in furtherance of United States objectives and improvement of our foreign relations. 4) Competent consideration must be given to the potentialities and interests of science and technology along with political, economic, and social matters in the formulation of international policy.[6] Berkner's committee offered many constructive suggestions while noting that it was not necessary to establish "an imposing bureaucracy" for science and technology.[7] The depth and prescience of Berkner's recommendations were not recognized. Few follow-up actions were taken. One key step, establishing a small science office in State, was implemented, and a few science attaches began to be posted at selected U.S. embassies. But the overall force of Berkner's principles and, particularly, the idea of a "scientific culture" for diplomacy were not reflected during the 1950s and 1960s. Forty years on, there are few new insights into the matter. Just more, many more, reasons to move ahead. 1975 MURPHY REPORT In 1975 -- some twenty-five years after Berkner's review -- Robert D. Murphy covered even more ground when he presented, to both the President and the leadership of the Congress, the comprehensive results of the high- level Commission he chaired on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. Murphy and his colleagues, who were largely drawn from the government, proceeded from a series of penetrating case studies. They argued that "the most pervasive characteristic of international affairs in the next decades will be the growing interaction and tightening interdependence among the nations of the world. Almost certainly, economic issues will loom larger on the foreign policy agendas of the future.... Technological and environmental issues will continue to grow in importance" (emphasis added).[8] The Murphy Commission went on to underscore that "foreign policy and domestic policy merge.... The organizational implications of this mingling are numerous and important.... To meet these challenges successfully, U.S. policy-making will have to embody features not easy to combine: extensive public and Congressional participation, a clear sense of purpose, and continuity over time."[9] Then, as now, these challenges for foreign policy making were rooted in the complexities of integrating science and technology into international relations. For this reason, new leadership arrangements were seen to be crucial. Among the first specific recommendations of the Murphy Commission was a change concerning the science sector at the top of the Department of State. After exploring alternative roles for senior officials, Murphy urged broadening the post of the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs (now including Agricultural Affairs as well) into an Under Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs.[10] Furthermore, in discussing "international economic policy," the Murphy Commission emphasized that "the Department of State must significantly improve its capability to deal with the foreign policy aspects of economics, business, science, energy, transportation, food, population, development and related issues" (emphasis added).[11] Every one of the listed topics has substantial technological content. In its related discussion of "planning," the Murphy Commission suggested creating a new and regularly updated Global Systems Critical List. This was to be an "authoritative inventory of possible long-run problems or opportunities associated with such issues as food, population, weather modification, the environment, and natural resources."[12] Again, these themes are S&T-intensive. The State Department did not follow up these recommendations. Perhaps the Murphy Commission set too broad an agenda. Perhaps reorganizing required too much time, changes in the Department's culture that were too deep, Congressional participation that was too controversial and extensive. Nonetheless, the challenge remains: analyzing subjects at the intersection of technology, economics, and foreign policy demands technical assessments that are beyond the Department's present capacity. The "fix" is not to transform the State Department into a technical agency. Rather, it is to improve State's capacity to appreciate, manage, and translate technological considerations at the interface between science and policy, orchestrating what the technical agencies know and do best with what is best for American goals internationally. 4.2 Disparate Offshoots Among The Agencies The history of the international work of the technical agencies is so varied, and would take so long to document properly, that it is not feasible to cover the subject fully here. But the upshot of the history may be summarized quickly. Virtually every "national" R&D program has had to take account of international trends, both competitive and cooperative. The result within the government has been a checkerboard of international programs, centers, offices, exchanges, and liaison groups. Every major unit labeled "National" -- e.g., the Science Foundation, the Institute for Standards and Technology, the Institutes for Health -- now has a responsibility for "global" activities and communications. Many of the conventional international issues formerly handled largely by one of the traditional departments -- such as the economic negotiations that used to be managed mainly by State -- have grown complex and divisive. They now involve more agencies (e.g., Commerce and Treasury) and require new White House-level coordination (i.e., Special Trade Representative). Furthermore, most of these classical issues typically require, as noted earlier, new and more sophisticated analysis of technological trends. At NASA and EPA, to illustrate another facet of the scene, international contacts often used to be mostly ceremonial. But today, U.S. programs for space and for the environment require extensive international agreements (and, often, funding), or they do not proceed at all. Similarly, the National Science Foundation emphasized repeatedly during the 1980s that "international scientific cooperation ... bears directly on the health of American Science."[13] Yet, as subsequent sections illustrate, the international capability and organization of these agencies have been underdeveloped, undersupported, and awkwardly coordinated. 4.3 Congressional Concern The Congress has also devoted considerable attention to these matters. During the 1960s, its growing awareness of the need for a dedicated technical staff was marked by pioneering work of the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The 1969 CRS study entitled Technical Information for Congress, for example, covered a wide range of domestic and international problems and was influential in the creation in 1972 of the Office of Technology Assessment. OTA has built a distinguished record, naturally incorporating global issues into its work, in such studies as U.S. Technology Transfer to China and Global Arms Trade. By the mid-1970s and based upon recognition of the sharply growing significance of technical information and training for foreign policy, the House Foreign Affairs Committee developed an ambitious new charter for science and technology in the State Department. Supported by three volumes of studies led by Franklin Huddle of the CRS, this became Title V of the FY1979 appropriations statute regarding "Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy." Congress found that: (1) the consequences of modern scientific and technological advances are of such major significance in United States foreign policy that understanding and appropriate knowledge of modern science and technology by officers and employees of the United States government are essential in the conduct of modern diplomacy; (2) many problems and opportunities for development in modern diplomacy lie in scientific and technological fields; (3) in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of the technological aspects of United States foreign policy, the United States Government should seek out and consult with both public and private industrial, academic, and research institutions concerned with modern technology; and (4) the effective use of science and technology in international relations for the mutual benefit of all countries requires the development and use of the skills and methods of long-range planning.[14] Although Congress may not have fully anticipated the practical consequences of these propositions, the law calls upon the State Department to: have primary responsibility for coordination and oversight with respect to all major science or science and technology agreements and activities between the United States and foreign countries, international organizations, or commissions of which the United States and one or more foreign countries are members. In coordinating and overseeing such agreements and activities, the Secretary shall consider (A) scientific merit; (B) equity of access ... ; (C) possible commercial or trade linkages with the United States which may flow from the agreement or activity; (D) national security concerns; and (E) any other factors deemed appropriate.[15] For the past ten years, the State Department has been trying to fulfill this remarkable mandate, but without the resources to maintain an adequate effort. Attempts have been made, including an initiative in the late 1970s (and, again, in 1990-91) to develop a long-range planning unit within the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). The record of the Department has been, at best, mixed. Congress has expressed frustration with the Department's seeming inability to incorporate science and technology in foreign policy. For instance, congressional reviews of the annual reports required under Title V legislation have often been testy. House Foreign Affairs Chairman Zablocki, writing in 1983 with House Science Committee Chairman Fuqua, said the report "fails to meet the statutory requirements."[16] A year later, Congressmen Zablocki and Fuqua said the report "continues to be couched in the most general terms which is contrary to Congressional intent for a thorough and integrated discussion of the foreign policy implications of our international S&T activities."[17] House Foreign Affairs Chairman Fascell and Science Chairs Fuqua and Roe have said that key sections of the reports are "inadequate ... and ... oversimplified,"[18] cursory ... and ... inconsistent,"[19] and "more of a compilation of agreements rather than an in-depth analysis of the foreign policy implications of science and technology activities as required by law."[20] In truth, most of the Congress knows and cares little about the subject, and most of the past Title V reporting is, indeed, largely a retrospective catalog of activities. Only urgent issues elicit high interest in the ostensibly arcane role of science in international affairs. Such issues include the occasional surges of concern about protectionism, exports of high-tech know-how, arms negotiations, controlling the AIDS epidemic, membership in a UN body. These concerns quickly fade. They rarely lead to inquiry about the deeper choices of long-term foreign policy, much less about the squeeze on mission agencies' resources of talent, time, and funds for international relationships involving S&T. Still, Congress was prescient a decade ago in enacting Title V. With more professional staff now on the Hill, Congress can pursue the international agendas that the new world order, however it develops, will bring. 4.4 Presidential Declarations Despite the operational problems in the State Department, and in the other agencies, the White House has been forceful in declaring its broad intentions about most of the subjects reviewed here. President Reagan, for example, drew special attention to scientific cooperation in his March 1988 letter accompanying the annual Title V Report: Science and technology can be a powerful force to enrich cooperative relations with friends and adversaries, as well as to strengthen our Nation's competitive posture in the economic arena. international cooperation can accelerate the rate of scientific discovery and the development of new technologies to meet the needs and challenges of the future. In many cases, the benefits of such cooperation accrue first to the partners in the joint effort, and such returns make it feasible to sustain a long-term commitment to cooperation. Ultimately, however, all the world's people are beneficiaries.[21] Along similar lines, the tensions between desired cooperation and inevitable competition were clear in President Bush's reaffirmation in March 1990 of the vital role of science and technology in foreign affairs: A characteristic feature of our age is the unprecedented rate of change in science and technology.... We are moving toward a day when the responsibilities for supporting large basic science projects will be distributed around the world, reflecting the truly international character of modern scientific research and the shared financial and intellectual underpinnings of that research ... the internationalization of the marketplace emphasizes that we can no longer take our [science and technology] leadership for granted.... It has become increasingly clear that science and technology, the economy, and foreign relations are inextricably intertwined....[22] 4.5 A Clear Goal Since 1949 a clear, simple goal has repeatedly been expressed by successive presidents, by Congress, and by the State Department itself: tap the country's extraordinary strengths in science and technology to achieve American purposes in foreign policy. Yet emphatic recommendations, reiterated over more than forty years, have not been followed by appropriate organizational changes and incentives or by provision of financial resources required for their implementation throughout the agencies and in the Department of State. Even less has any clear policy been enunciated in sufficient detail to enable the many technologically muscular executive agencies to work effectively with State to carry out foreign policy. To diagnose the case in more detail, the next chapter reviews the functions of international action with respect to science and technology and then illustrates current patterns of operations in the field and at headquarters in Washington. 5.0 FUNCTIONS: FIELD AND HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITIES In this age of high technology communications and computers, it is easy to overlook the function of the diplomat ... however, negotiating success is still highly dependent on the imagination and skills of professional diplomats. -David Newsom[1] The overall attitudes of nations toward (international cooperation in science and technology) set the climate for person-to-person collaboration among scientists and engineers, and the involvement of professional societies, universities, and private industry. These relations may actually be the most important and positive of all. -Justin Bloom[2] National goals have been laid out, if sometimes rather grandly, in both Executive and Legislative statements. Career officials in the State Department -- like David Newsom, former Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and Justin Bloom, former science counselor in Tokyo -- have understood clearly the context, public and private, for needed action. But what actually has been going on? Why has there been so little concrete progress in incorporating S&T into diplomatic activities? How will enhanced S&T cooperation serve the nation's interests? To guide a search for the answers, first consider the details of achieving international objectives anchored in science and technology. The following essential tasks, not in any order of priority, must be done in many situations. - The government should muster as much reasoned, long-range anticipation as possible about how science and technology may be applied to any and all U.S. interests. It must be able to plan for contingencies, ranging from the possibilities of surprises in defense or the environment to the consequences of advances in manufacturing or communications. - The government should use the U.S. science base for shorter-range problem assessment. The nation's scientists and engineers assist the government's officials, acting as referees and analysts of information with respect to current international issues; this might include severity of a drought, reliability of arms disposal, or best practices for earthquake-resistant construction. - The government should monitor S&T developments abroad, focusing on what the government itself needs to know. It also needs to help minimize barriers to the much more extensive monitoring and dissemination efforts undertaken directly by industry and academia. Indeed, the government must facilitate the national diffusion of open information from all sources. - The government should monitor and understand the S&T policies and strategies of other nations and regional groupings. This may involve trade, research priorities, arms exports, or differing assessments of the potential payoffs from the promotion of investments in various engineering fields. - The government should prepare to take joint action with other nations to address transnational problems, through the necessary bilateral, multilateral, formal, and ad hoc frameworks. AIDS, narcotics traffic, immigration, global warming, use of the oceans, weapons limitations, and other topics periodically surge into importance. Any binding diplomatic arrangement rests upon technically based, long-term agreements as well as on specialized provisions to assure compliance. So preparations must begin well before the urgent negotiations are held. Authentication of the scientific facts often must be done on an international basis. - The government should be able to identify the critical needs and provide high-leverage technical cooperation with developing countries and then to evaluate the results of such programs. For too long, the science and technology components of relationships with the "Third World" have been subject to rapidly changing fashions, unrealistic hopes, and micromanagement with inadequate resources. - The government should be able to integrate expert knowledge in science and engineering into adjudication and regulation at the international level. For example, settling environmental disputes and setting common technical standards for changing products and processes call for political, economic, and scientific skills. Sometimes dispute resolution and mediation about, say, water supplies, demands great technical skill. - The government should use its technical expertise to support negotiation of new international agreements, conventions, and protocols in such areas as arms control, environment, trade, and migration. Sometimes, of course, negotiations take years -- even careers -- to conclude, and trained staff must stick with them, building upon institutional experience with the political issues that always arise in the governance of technologically complex regimes. - The government should develop and implement policies that will strengthen U.S. science and engineering through international cooperation. Although the United States is still the Everest of R&D, many countries now possess front-rank scientific centers doing world-class R&D, mostly aimed at achieving or sustaining economic advantage. Research alliances can coexist with the growing technological competition, but the outlook for enduring scientific success must be guarded unless governments smooth the search for shared benefits. A high priority should be placed on assuring the uninhibited flow of scientific information and skilled professionals. - The government should foster and participate in multilateral joint programs of monitoring and sharing of data. Understanding such issues as global climate change and ozone depletion requires global observational systems that no nation can implement alone. - The government should have mechanisms to participate in the key fields of research cooperation for the world scientific enterprise. Cooperation is central to fields such as space, biodiversity, and high-energy physics, where there is increasingly a unified, collective, and often expensive effort by the global scientific community. When leadership springs from other nations, the government should consider joining their meritorious projects (including supporting them financially), if it is in the national interest to do so; this has occurred only rarely in the past. Knowledgeable observers could supplement this list, and different people might assign quite different priorities to the tasks. But there is little doubt about the necessity of these science-based governmental and diplomatic functions. To produce wise policies, of course, the work must also be tackled with a sure sense of the historical and political context. In this domain there will always be conflicts: reasons either for acting too quickly (without sufficient information), or for moving too slowly (with poor understanding of the costs and consequences of delay). Technologically complex policy-making in national and international enterprises often exemplifies the iron law that "you want results and you get consequences." To minimize such risks, leadership is essential and the hard homework must be done. This means that organizational arrangements must be sound and effective for each and every one of the tasks listed above. How sound and effective are the present arrangements? 5.1 Science And Technology In The Field Most of the functions just summarized are supposed to be performed with and by the State Department. Accordingly, the main objective in this section is to document how this effort is carried out in offices normally unseen by the public, populated by mostly unknown officials, carrying out countless negotiations and visits. This is the nature of the State Department's work in the context of "globalism" affecting government as a whole. First, and in the interest of translating abstractions into specific situations, consider a "day in the life of an ambassador." Few outside the government, and not many inside, have a concrete notion of what such an official does. But much of what ambassadors do these days -- and, probably, what they will do even more frequently in the future -- relates to science. Figure 2, a composite of Ambassador Harry Barnes's day in Chile in 1987-88, shows the pattern. This ambassador's calendar reveals that "foreign affairs" in the field touches every federal agency at home. From Defense to the Park Service, from the National Institutes of Health to the Federal Aviation Administration, to the Departments of Labor and Commerce, international contacts are common. Most of these are specialized -- comparing notes on particular techniques, exchanges, prior agreements, results, plans. The contacts often reflect worldwide interest in U.S. progress in subfields in science and technology as well as in the management of enterprises in a market-oriented democracy. Few of these contacts rise to the level of "high diplomacy." Still fewer lead to foreign policy decisions by, or reports to, the Secretary of State or the President. But almost all such discussions and contacts require the participation of the State Department, in the field or in Washington, to provide informed liaison. In the aggregate, these working-level and middle- management efforts result in lessons learned, "open intelligence" gathered, expectations set, opportunities revealed, attitudes toward the U.S. changed, political and commercial networks extended in both directions. All of this must be weighed in charting the policies within which such day-to- day transactions are encouraged, tolerated, or prohibited. FIGURE 2: An Ambassador's Day What follows is a composite day's schedule of the U.S. Ambassador to Chile in 1987 or 1988. Uppermost in U.S. relations at that point was the question of how to assist in the return to democracy. The Pinochet government saw the U.S. as being unsympathetic to its aspirations to remain in power. The U.S. Embassy saw itself as helping to promote an early and free opportunity for Chileans to decide for themselves. Much of the day, enveloped by politics, concerned scientific and technical themes. 0730 Breakfast with AAAS-sponsored group of scientists exploring ways of reviving U.S.-Chilean scientific cooperation. 0900 Daily meeting with Deputy Chief of Mission to review current issues, including position to be taken at forthcoming World Bank meeting on loans for Chile -- to support or abstain. 0930 Meeting with NSF delegation that has just completed its review of Foundation programs in Chile. 1015 Attend opening ceremonies of conference sponsored by Embassy, Center for International Private Enterprise and Chilean Manufacturers Association on Free Enterprise and Democracy. 1200 Meeting with NASA representative, visiting U.S. professor of decision sciences, and head of University of Chile computer center to develop approach to link U.S. and Chilean universities through BIT-NET using NASA ground station. 1300 Lunch with science officials and representatives of Amcham (U.S. Chilean Chamber of Commerce) to discuss proposal for scholarships for outstanding science graduates. 1415 Lunch interrupted by phone call from Washington asking whether we can find out if Pinochet will be attending inaugural ceremonies for extended strip on Easter Island for emergency space shuttle landings (he won't). 1530 Meeting with representatives of National Endowment for Democracy to discuss assistance to the Committee for Free Elections to develop a computer network to provide a quick count at the time of the presidential plebiscite as a check on the government's tally. 1630 Call on the Minister of Commerce to explain U.S. insistence on a satisfactory set of changes in Chilean patent law if U.S. were to hold off further instituting a section 301 case against Chile for inadequate intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals. 1715 Telephone Norman Borlaug in Mexico to fill him in on our efforts to get Chilean government agreement to reopen a Peace Corps program, one that would involve a small group of foresters to work on the problems caused by the pine shoot moth. 1830 En route home stop at Science Attache's house for reception for visiting EPA scientist who was advising regional and municipal officials on monitoring Santiago's air pollution. 2000 Dinner for a group of educationists (university rectors, research institute directors) and Ford Foundation representative to discuss role of higher education in a future democratic Chile. 2300 Phone call from director Cerro Tololo Interamerican Astronomical Observatory confirming arrangements for visit at time when it would be possible to view Halley's Comet. Source: Ambassador and Foreign Service Director General (ret.) Harry G. Barnes, Jr. The United States is the "target" for S&T sharpshooting by many countries. One reflection of this priority is the staffing at foreign embassies in Washington. The estimates for selected countries given in Figure 3 do not include staff from agencies outside foreign ministries (such as Japan's several units) and they probably understate the staff devoted to space and defense topics (in the case of what was the Soviet Union, for example). But they suggest at least the magnitude of effort. FIGURE 3: S&T Staffing at 23 Diplomatic Missions in Washington, DC[a] Number of Country S&T Staff Argentina 1 Australia 3 Austria 1 Belgium 1 Bulgaria 2 Canada 2 China 8 Finland 1 France 14 Germany 10 Hungary 1 India 1 Italy 3 Japan 3 Netherlands 5 Poland 2 South Africa 2 Sweden 4 Switzerland 4 USSR 4 UK 10 Yugoslavia 1 EC 1 -- 84 Endnote [a] Excluding non-foreign-ministry staff. Source: State and Defense Departments (1990-1991) For comparison, Figure 4 details S&T positions, in relation to total staff, at some U.S. posts abroad. These data understate the total U.S. technical presence abroad: for example, they do not include multilateral agencies such as OECD or the agencies with special technical units, such as the Office of Naval Research, which covers Asia from Tokyo and Europe from London. Figure 5 illustrates the comparative diplomatic S&T effort of the United States and other nations over time. The gap, large in 1979, has widened considerably since. The Defense, Commerce, and Agriculture departments also have many technical staff around the world. The overseas S&T presence of the Defense Department, for example, grew significantly during the mid-1980s through the Offices of Defense Cooperation administered by the Secretary of Defense; these offices and other parts of the military with responsibility for international S&T account for about 50 professionals.[3] In addition, some states have their own technologically oriented representatives abroad. Most important for this review, such S&T outposts are not well integrated into the State Department's policy-guiding and oversight role, although they report to the U.S. ambassadors on a day-to-day basis. Neither the State Department in Washington nor embassies abroad have the resources to work closely with S&T personnel in other agencies. Further more, as will be discussed later, there is crippling interagency gridlock about the purposes and logistics of posting people abroad. FIGURE 4: American Staffing in Selected Countries, September 1990 Total FSO Country Staff State S&T[a] Brazil 231 110 1 China 174 108 2 Czechoslovakia 46 26 0 France 383 123 2 Hungary 37 22 1 India 256 94 2 Japan 284 87 3 Mexico 554 264 2 Soviet Union 156 66 3 United Kingdom 248 100 1 Endnote [a] Foreign Service Science and Technology positions. Source: State Department (1990) FIGURE 5: U.S. Science Officers Abroad and Foreign Science Officers in the United States, FY1979-FY1990 Next, consider the State Department's science and technology field positions. For some years, there have been only 25-30 full-time S&T positions, scattered from Buenos Aires to Jakarta and concentrated in Europe. Most of these slots are controlled by the geographic bureaus in the State Department. When ambassadors worldwide are instructed to scale down their embassies, as they have been during the past few years, the regional bureaus and the ambassadors start comparing S&T positions with political and economics positions. Since political and economics officers perform the core of "traditional" foreign policy functions in an embassy, S&T positions are likely to be the first to go. Overall, most observers see a large effort devoted by governments from the rest of the world to learning about U.S. science and technology, while the U.S. State Department and other executive departments proceed hesitantly and often without much intensity or strategy to pursue U.S. S&T-related interests abroad. It is fair to ask: does this make much difference and, if so, for what functions? After all, one "price" of R&D leadership -- the U.S. spends more on R&D than all of our allies combined -- is that the leader will be watched carefully, and, sometimes, the "first followers" will save resources by learning from the leader's mistakes. Then, too, U.S. foreign policy goals are not the same as those of other countries. So a mindlessly imposed symmetry in the field offices for S&T functions would make little sense. Still, how much technical reconnaissance should be done by the State Department and why? There are at least three factors to consider in addressing this question. The first is that for most of the U.S. private sector's specific purposes, the U.S. Government need not worry. Individual firms, universities, consultants, journalists, and scholars will carry out what may be called a "technical intelligence" function, focused on the particular goals of each firm or project. However, the often comforting vitality of the private sector reminds us of a fundamental problem: the government must not get in the way of market-fueled engines of scientific and engineering advance. And it often takes sensitive diplomacy to keep these engines tuned up. A second consideration is that the federal mission agencies gather information on international trends for their own purposes. Each of them has in Washington (and, sometimes, abroad) a staff concerned with the foreign components of its mission. This could hardly be supervised in detail by State. In the future, the missions of many agencies will have an even greater international component; in Chapter 7.0 (Figures 17 and 18), the constraints on staffing for this are reviewed in detail. As mission- oriented international efforts expand -- in areas of science generally, or in environmental projects, or in energy planning -- mission agencies should and must depend on the State Department to assist them. This is an essential part of the rationale to be given later for a modest increment in State's staff in the field: such staff would greatly increase the effectiveness -- and the consistency with all foreign policy considerations -- of the other agencies' efforts. In this connection, the CIA is a special case. Although its role surely will change if East-West relations continue to warm -- to emphasize economic and political trends rather than mainly military intelligence -- the agency's activities are not of direct concern here. Similarly, this review does not consider the even larger human and technological resources of the Defense Department's intelligence units. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that these capabilities could be applied in new ways and that, whatever the changes in intelligence tasks over the next few years, the intelligence community's strong technical skills could be used to serve other foreign policy objectives. The third and most important part of the answer to the question of scaling State's effort, however, is that State is not deeply enough engaged in tracking the overall results of the many international activities in the private sector and among its fellow federal agencies. Therefore, it cannot be aware of the often subtle contours of actions by other governments, of the private sector's experiences, or of the U.S. Government's mission agencies' hopes, gaps, flops, and jackpots. One indication of the incompleteness of the staffing situation worth reemphasizing is the small number of State S&T officers in all our embassies -- fewer than 30 worldwide! Although some missions have an economics officer who may devote up to 25% of his or her time to S&T, there are no qualified technical officers in Africa or Central America, none in Scandinavia, only two in South America, and only a handful in Asia. As observed earlier, S&T positions have been eliminated at some posts because of overall cuts in the State Department's staff. To give a feel for what such specialized officers do, Figure 6 is a composite of a day in the life of the Science Counselor in the U.S. Mission to the EC in Brussels. From escorting scientific visitors to explaining the technical news to lay audiences, it is a hectic schedule where science and diplomacy meet. While almost impossible to document comprehensively, plentiful anecdotes suggest that the workload of these professionals has grown, swamping them with administrative duties attributable to the otherwise welcome "globalization" of U.S. programs and to the many external requests for U.S. cooperation. Whereas most other countries view their S&T staff assigned to the U.S. as key agents in "technology scouting and transfer," the U.S. job description tends to concentrate on technical support for political and administrative functions. Unlike the situation of a generation ago, the U.S. has much to learn from others and much to do in R&D partnerships. So the State Department must provide intellectual value- added with its staff. What are the implications of these patterns? One is that U.S. science attaches cannot carry out the interpretive analysis mandated by repeated Congressional and Executive assertions of the State Department's responsibilities. The argument is both qualitative and quantitative. State's three S&T staff in Tokyo need not, and could not be expected to, monitor all significant Japanese results and trends. Various U.S. Government agencies -- and many private firms and academics -- assess the Japanese strategies, programs, and organizations in detail. Nonetheless, the State Department is required to oversee all S&T-related foreign policies in Japan and elsewhere. Yet it simply does not have the field representatives and headquarters analysts necessary to gather and digest the information needed to fulfill its task. Another consequence of the inadequacy of the size of the staff focused on international reconnaissance and management of S&T in foreign policy is that the United States is often caught napping. Frequently a "new issue" emerges -- such as the regulation of biotechnology, or planning for negotiations on global climate change. When this happens, the State Department's already overstretched staff must be jerked into yet another eleventh-hour exercise to catch up on the issues and assist the Secretary and President in organizing what to do, say, negotiate, and finance in international fora. Almost all of the issues that have revealed these dynamics in the past could have been better anticipated. The early preparations for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) illustrate not only this inappropriate modus operandi but also the interagency squabbles whose resolution required an authority and competence that State did not have: much of the policy action quickly began to move to the White House's staff. FIGURE 6: "Day in the Life" of a Science Officer 0800-0930 Participate in a breakfast briefing by the Ambassador of an MIT group touring countries to explore environmental issues. 0945-0955 In office, scan morning cables for action items. Skim newspapers for environment and S&T topics and politicians' statements about them. 1000-1045 Attend twice-weekly Country Team (CT) meeting (chaired by Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) to review with section and agency heads current agenda, problems and activities). With Economic Counselor, brief CT on impending national legislation on intellectual property protection (IPR). 1055 See DCM to discuss cable the Science Officer is to write on the IPR legislation. 1110 Meeting with two USGS scientists in-country for environmental research. 1200-1250 Continue work on a cable on host country nuclear activities. Ask staff to set up meetings with French and German science counselors. 1300-1430 Lunch. Main purpose: elicit from a senior foreign official the state-of-play of his country's S&T cooperation plans with the U.S., and the EC. 1500 Back in the office. Dictate quick memo to Amb/DCM, info POL, ECON and others, reporting the official's views. 1515-1545 Conduct scheduled meeting to brainstorm with SCI American staff and FSN (Foreign Service National) employees ideas for a report about the country's leading research laboratories and their scientific contributions and to ascertain the exact status of the Embassy's close-to-deadline annual Title V Report submission to OES. 1605 To airport to meet on behalf of the Ambassador an arriving Codel (Congressional Delegation) of six congressmen and five staffers headed by Chairman Roe of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee. 1645 Codel arrives. Science Counselor, SCI FSN and others from Embassy USIS and Admin staffs see them through travel formalities, press, welcoming remarks, and Q&A. Science officer accompanies Chairman Roe to the Ambassador's residence. 1800 See DCM urgently re a cable to Washington on aspects of what the senior foreign official told the Science Counselor at lunch. 1900 Arrive late at the Ambassador's 1830 reception for Codel Roe. 2030 Accompany members of Code Roe to restaurant for local flavor. 2330 Arrive home. Review heavy schedule of Roe calls which the Science Counselor will accompany to take notes and write reporting cables. 0045 Awakened by phone call from Washington from a staffer of EPA Administrator Reilly to clarify details of Reilly's impending visit next week. Source: State Department (1991). Refers to EC mission in Brussels. 5.2 Science At State The S&T staffing situation at the embassies is obviously not the only issue: it is important to turn to headquarters in Washington. Figure 7 is the organizational chart for the State Department, as of spring 1991. Virtually all of the thirty-five -- yes, 35! -- Assistant-Secretary-level posts have been created by law. And each reports more or less directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary! The core of senior officials -- and the most experienced career groups -- are responsible for major regions of the world. Other posts reflect the relentless accumulation of "priorities" on diverse subjects such as human rights and narcotics, each the prized theme of a distinct constituency that was successful in sponsoring and passing legislation. There are also some long-standing and important "sectoral" or functional areas such as economics, intelligence, and politico-military affairs. Typically, Assistant Secretaries rotate every two or three years. That is "the system." Appointments flow out of the Foreign Service's aim of fostering excellence through broad experience and of rewarding the seniority of accomplished generalists. Occasionally, and frequently in recent years, political patronage determines appointments. Most of these officials are highly capable. Sometimes they have a background in the subjects for which they are (briefly) responsible. Although the personnel selection system generally -- and the proportion of career appointments specifically -- are not within the scope of this review, it must be said that, for dealing professionally with science and technology, this system of short tours and thin qualifications is not optimal. State's "science office," the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, was established in 1973-74, amalgamating earlier advisory and line offices.[4] As of the spring of 1991, the Assistant Secretary heading OES reports through two senior Under Secretaries, one responsible for International Security Affairs and the other responsible for Economic and Agricultural Affairs. The fuzzy reporting line has often involved, if informally, other senior officials as well, such as the Under Secretary for Management. FIGURE 7: Organization of the Department of State, Spring 1991. The Assistant Secretaryship has been filled by career foreign service officers and by outside appointees, alternating about equally over the past decade or two, with selection evidently based largely upon general ability rather than specialized experience in science or technology. Figure 8 provides detail on the organization of OES. As with the rest of the top of the State Department, many of the small OES units are named for -- and respond to -- specific Congressional interests. Only one small unit, three levels away from the Assistant Secretary, is devoted mainly to planning issues. Figure 9 illustrates some of the several major issues covered by the staff. Over many years, for instance, nuclear weapons and non-proliferation have been key issues. Often, a single "politically live" topic will absorb virtually all of the Assistant Secretary's and key staff's time. This occurred, for instance, during the early 1980s in the Law of the Sea negotiations. More recently, the controversies and negotiations about climate change, along with overlapping preparations for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, have taken up the time of the leadership of the Bureau and demanded lengthy trips abroad. Over the past decade, funding for the Bureau has decreased by about 40% in real terms, and staffing levels have risen by only 10% (Figure 10). As other countries have become aware of the importance of S&T cooperation with the United States, the Bureau's workload, as reflected in the number of international S&T agreements, has increased sharply (Figures 11 and 12). Most experienced observers agree that only a few score of these hundreds of agreements are truly significant for the U.S. But every one requires extensive political negotiation and is important to the partners (or was at the time it was signed). Further, each one needs at least a bit of nurturing by diplomats as well as by technical specialists, who on occasion are recruited from other agencies and the private sector. Instead of being able to concentrate on key countries or on the most significant technical issues, most of the time OES deals with what can only be called "flaps," endemic to our pluralistic government and inevitable when the United States has relations with 150 or so countries. These urgencies may concern new bilateral technical exchange agreements being initiated by Presidential decisions at a summit, or a consuming dispute on, for example, forestry development. Many such topics crackle with political and commercial interests, yet seldom hinge on complex technical analysis. Why do these absorb so much time in OES? Usually, it is either because key officials at other agencies are ardently committed to one side of an international policy choice -- for instance, in a trade-off between environmental and business concerns -- or because no agency has the inclination or responsibility to deal with the international problem at all -- such as with many proposals arising from debates at the United Nations, or with the economic and immigration consequences of a civil war for neighboring countries. State must deal with "the whole" and with any problem raised by any country at any time. FIGURE 8: Organization of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). FIGURE 9: OES -- Organization and Activities The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) is the Department of State's focal point for foreign policy development in the areas of international science and technology cooperation, environmental protection, global climate change, nuclear energy and nonproliferation, oceans affairs and population policy. The Bureau is headed by an Assistant Secretary of State. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (PDAS) supports the Assistant Secretary in his leadership role. The Bureau is divided into four directorates, each headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (DAS): OES/E: Environment, Health, and Natural Resources OES/N: Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Affairs OES/O: Oceans and Fisheries Affairs OES/S: Science and Technology Affairs A Coordinator for Population Affairs reports directly to the Assistant Secretary. and the Executive Director (chief administrative officer) communicates with the PDAS. To illustrate one component, the Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Directorate is headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State who is responsible for policy formulation and action relating to nuclear non- proliferation policy, the application of international safeguards, nuclear export control policies, nuclear cooperative agreements, and international energy technology matters. Its activities include: - Technical assessments of the effect of energy developments on U.S. policies, particularly non-proliferation - Establishment of cooperative energy development programs and energy resource/demand assessment programs - Negotiation of international nuclear energy and energy technology agreements - Working with U.S. government agencies in encouraging international energy cooperation Source: State Department (1991). FIGURE 10: OES Bureau Staffing and Funds - Positions in 1990: 152 (105 officers and 47 support staff) -- growth of about 10% over past ten years. In 1978, there were 139 positions. - Approximately 30 Science officers posted abroad to 25 missions -- no growth during past decade. - FYI 990 operating budget approximately $1.6 million -- roughly constant in nominal dollars over past decade; thus roughly 50% reduction in buying power. Travel has been cut severely; little computer support; no discretionary funds for training, consultants, research, or advisory committee. GRAPHICS: OES Budgets FY1978-FY1990, nominal dollars vs. real dollars (adjusted for inflation) Note: the increase in fiscal year 1988 was due to a one-time allocation of $840,000 for a computer system Source: State Department/OES (1991). It is only fair to note that OES has enjoyed considerable success in recent years on issues in which the United States has a major interest. Perhaps most significant was the negotiation between 1985 and 1990, under U.S. leadership, of key agreements for the protection of the stratospheric ozone layer. Another major environmental accomplishment was the consummation of the Basel Convention, dealing with controls on the export of hazardous wastes. OES has also pressed forcefully over the past decade to ensure better global safeguards against the spread of nuclear weapons. While some question the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency after its apparent oversights in Iraq, U.S. efforts have been instrumental in recent decisions by Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities. FIGURE 11: S&T Agreements by Region, FY1979-FY1989, All Federal Agencies FIGURE 12: S&T Agreements by Subject, FY1979-FY1989 Source: State Department (1991). The reason for emphasizing the wide-ranging and often urgent negotiating and operating responsibilities of OES is that they drive out most analysis and planning. What little time has been devoted to strategic thinking has been bootlegged by the OES professional staff. There is, as well, little sustained planning on S&T in foreign policy by the other State Department offices that might be involved, such as those concerned with Economics, Politico-Military Affairs, or Policy Planning. Indeed, these offices rarely have staff with scientific or engineering experience. They also tend to prefer the politically subtle problems of immediate concern to the Secretary, the "this morning and sensitive" issues that are the traditional meat-and-potatoes of foreign affairs and of daily intelligence briefings for the Secretary and the President. 5.3 The Big Picture Overall, neither in the field nor in Washington are the government and the State Department able to identify, map, and respond adequately to international scientific cross-currents and the transformations they bring; they are thus unable to formulate a global strategy for the longer run, Nevertheless, U.S. foreign policy on some key issues has been farsighted and consistent. And on a few other highly visible issues, the government can and does patch together, often at the last moment, an intelligent, responsible position. But the price of thin staffing and hasty planning can be high: little evaluation of trends, fragmented preparation for contingencies, superficial anticipation of how best to use U.S. research resources, shallow preparation for negotiations, lost opportunities. As the S&T component of foreign policy increases in the 1990s, the nation can no longer afford to pay this price. 6.0 NEEDS: EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE CASES We must find more creative and effective ways to ensure that science and technology are an integral and important part of our foreign policy around the globe. -George Bush[1] Cooperative international efforts in health, agricultural productivity, and environmental pollution produce benefits for all associated nations.... Our own economy has become increasingly dependent on global markets and industrial competitiveness can no longer be measured on a national scale. -George B. Brown, Jr. Dante B. Fascell[2] No doubt about it: responsibility for foreign policy begins at the top. The President and the Secretary of State have the lead. The Congress, of course, must play a substantial role, not only because of its Constitutional responsibilities in such areas as appropriating funds and ratification of treaties, but also because the nation's domestic economy has become so thoroughly entwined with international trends. This chapter explores the broader character of current and future needs, explaining why the objectives are so pressing in specific cases. 6.1 The Executive Office Of The President At the outset, consider recent encouraging signs of renewal. For thirty years the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) has had a full-time staff member devoted to international subjects, but today there is an Associate Director for Policy and International Affairs. This is the first time in the history of the White House science staff that a senior deputy to the President's Science Advisor has been given explicit responsibility for the areas at issue here. This Associate Director and the Director of OSTP also have long-standing personal and professional commitments to an internationalist view of the U.S. research community. Figure 13 offers a capsule description of the Science Advisor's international role. The interagency Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET) has also been reinvigorated. It has an active international group, the Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology (CISET), chaired by State's Under Secretary for International Security Affairs (Figure 14). CISET has five subcommittees, dealing with the following subjects: S&T cooperation and initiatives with industrialized countries; S&T cooperation with less-developed nations; "megaprojects"; preparation of the Title V Report; and technology and competitiveness (Figure 15). FIGURE 13: Highlights of International Role of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President The Assistant to the President for S&T also serves as the Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). He is informally known as the Science Advisor. OSTP, which he heads, plays a central role in the shaping of policies and programs for the integration of S&T in the conduct of foreign affairs. The Science Advisor assesses S&T elements of foreign policy and helps the President in meetings with the heads of foreign governments that feature S&T initiatives and agreements. U.S. technical leadership is used constructively to achieve broader foreign policy objectives. The Science Advisor represents the U.S. at meetings of science ministers of OECD countries. As Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Science Advisor is served by a Presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed Associate Director for Policy and International Affairs, International areas of direct concern to the OSTP include environmental change (organization of the 1990 White House international conference); S&T in economic growth; the management of international cooperation for a growing number of science "megaprojects"; international S&T negotiation and implementation of bilateral agreements and the review of technology transfer arrangements; and the facilitation of nongovernmental international cooperation. OSTP participates in various White House groups, such as the Policy Coordinating Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) concerned with specific issues in the science, oceans, and environment area (see Figure 16). The Science Advisor chairs the Cabinet-level Federal Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering, and Technology. The Council coordinates international S&T activities through its Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology (CISET), as shown in Figures 14 and 15. Source: CCSTG staff reviews of past and current activities. These major improvements during 1989-91 are reinforced by the similarly revivified President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), chaired by the Science Advisor. The Council includes individuals with wide international experience in most fields of social, natural, and engineering science as well as representatives from industry and academe. Like the earlier President's Science Advisory Committee, which was active in international subjects ranging from arms control and food policy to space, the new PCAST is in a position to address long-term issues. There is now, therefore, a well-designed structure within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) -- with a strong staff in barely sufficient numbers for the first time in more than a decade, and with OSTP, PCAST, and FCCSET complementing each other. Yet, especially for international efforts, steely steadiness will be required over several years to bring coherence to interagency policy. For policy coordination -- given the all-too-familiar strains of multiple national and international choices competing for squeezed resources -- often can be done only at the White House level. 6.2 Problems Among The Agencies Following the White House lead, most Executive agencies are trying to identify, focus, and coordinate their international work with counterparts abroad and with international institutions. For example, the verve and comprehensiveness of recent initiatives to expand research on global climate change revealed the power of OSTP's leadership -- and FCCSET's ability to plan the use of added funds. The added funds did indeed smooth the coordination! But implementation of unified policies throughout the diverse international programs of the Executive agencies will have to surmount many obstacles. Most mission agencies still regard international programs as "orphans." Such programs are usually less important to their constituencies than their domestic tasks, especially as seen by most Congressional appropriations committees. The efforts are thus more vulnerable to fluctuations in funding and politics, both nationally and internationally. FIGURE 14: Membership of the Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology (CISET) of the Federal Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET) CHAIR Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Department of State VICE CHAIRS Deputy Director, National Science Foundation Director, Fogarty International Center National Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services MEMBERS Associate Director for Policy and Administrator of Research and International Affairs Special Programs Office of Science and Department of Technology Policy Transportation Deputy Associate Director Assistant Administrator of (Special Studies) International Activity National Security and International Environmental Protection Affairs Agency Office of Management and Budget Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research Assistant Administrator for Department of Housing and Science and Technology Urban Development Agency for International Development Associate Administrator for External Relations Assistant Secretary for the Office National Aeronautics and of Postsecondary Education Space Administration Department of Education Director of Governmental and Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Technology Policy Nuclear Regulatory Department of Commerce Commission Deputy Director for Assistant Secretary for Science Defense Research and and Education Engineering Department of Agriculture Department of Defense U.S. Trade Representative for Director for Energy Research Europe Department of Energy Office of the United States Trade Representative Assistant Secretary for Water and Science Department of the Interior Source: State Department/OES (1991). Indeed, in the past the White House science office, with the State Department, has sometimes been unable to obtain complete and reliable data on the agencies' existing international programs. This lack of information has been frustrating to everyone, including Congress, as the State Department has tried to cope with its statutory Title V reporting requirements. More significantly, the gap in information about internationally pertinent programs actually reveals a deadly quicksand in which most foreign efforts of most agencies are sinking. Bureaucratic fearfulness has even led to passive acceptance of drastic cuts in funding the international travel essential for knowing global trends. In short, battles over a few issues, and fuzzy priorities on programs and budgets, combine to undermine analytical work to shore up policy coordination. 6.3 A Tradition Of Impasse Many aspects of past interagency work on international priorities have caused "no win" standoffs that jeopardize U.S. interests. Lest such a generalization be unconvincing, consider the fol