Carnegie
Corporation
of New York
Spring 2005
Cooperative Security
As the Soviet Union imploded in the early 1990s,
Carnegie Corporation’s commitment to Eurasia did not falter. Rather,
support was reoriented under the Cooperative Security (CS) program in
1991 to seize upon unprecedented opportunities for deepening crisis prevention
activities and redressing new global dangers posed by the uncontrolled
spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nationalism, and ethnic enmities
that were unleashed by the Soviet Union’s disintegration. Hamburg
likened the CS program to “preventive public health,” and
spurred on by the analytical and operational detail generated by a steering
committee composed of John Steinbruner, Ashton Carter and William Perry,
carved out an agenda for encouraging collective action to arrest these
new international security challenges. A priority was once again accorded
to Eurasia based on convictions that Russia remained a crucial but vulnerable
partner in promoting a stable and lasting peace, and that the primary
threats to new security regimes derived directly from the stress on political,
social and defense industrial infrastructures enfeebled by the post-Soviet
transition. Accordingly, the Corporation augmented the previous strategy
for improving mutual understanding with emphasis on stemming “loose
nukes” and other military dangers precipitated by the Soviet collapse,
strengthening democratic and market institutions and fostering creative
approaches to conflict resolution within the region.
The Corporation gave new priority to projects that facilitated understanding
of post-Soviet domestic politics and interaction among the newly independent
states (NIS). Institutional grants to Columbia University and the University
of California broadened support for training and research to dissect the
links between Soviet domestic politics and foreign policy behavior. The
CS program also sponsored efforts to build indigenous capacity for resolving
ethnic and nationalist conflicts. This featured development of a community
of U.S. and Russian scholars and experts organized by the Conflict Management
Group and the International Research and Exchanges Board, who were committed
to devising early warning systems, conducting training programs, and advising
officials in the region engaged in managing ethnic relations.
Another funding priority was placed on Western technical assistance projects.
Prominent grants to Harvard University produced a blueprint for U.S. government
action in support of the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, safe storage
of fissile material and environmental remediation of the downsized Soviet
nuclear complex. This was buttressed by grants to the Monterey Institute
of International Studies, Princeton University and Stanford University
for work with Russian partners, respectively, on training a new cadre
of nonproliferation specialists and developing a nuclear safeguards culture,
reprofiling nuclear weapons scientists and converting Russian defense
companies. At the same time, the CS program funded initiatives by prominent
scholars and experts at Harvard University to open direct dialogues and
workshops on military reform and democratic reorganization with senior
U.S. and Russian officers. Another set of grants channeled through Harvard
generated practical Western advice for crafting the complex macro-level
political, legal and financial institutions necessary to jump-start progress
towards democratic and market reforms in Russia and the NIS. These projects
enlisted diverse and highly influential partners that included legislators
at different political levels, emerging business leaders, and journalists
from across the former Soviet Union. In an effort to arrest the plight
of former Soviet scientists, the CS program also sponsored exchanges both
with each other and international counterparts via computer networks and
teleconferencing. This included discretionary support for various U.S.-Russian
scientific conferences that drew public, commercial and scholarly attention
to the state of Russian basic science, science policy and the domestic
and foreign dimensions of the country’s “brain drain.”