Carnegie
Corporation
of New York
Spring 2005
Benchmark Achievements
The Corporation’s extensive investment in
Soviet/post-Soviet-related projects was successful in many ways at meeting
specified programmatic objectives. A seminal set of achievements pertained
to the direct-line effects that grant clusters had on U.S. and Russian
policymaking. For example, former U.S. Secretary of Defense William
Perry attributes much of his success in office at forging historically
unprecedented U.S.-Russian “military-to-military” cooperation
to the opportunity provided via Carnegie Corporation support (which
he received earlier, as a Stanford University scholar) to devise the
conceptual underpinnings of preventive measures. Similarly, the Corporation’s
funding provided a decisive catalyst for mobilizing the intellectual
critical mass needed to refine basic thinking, flesh out operational
details, promote the significance and update assessment of the landmark
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act in 1991 (or the eponymous “Nunn-Lugar”
after its bipartisan patrons in the U.S. Senate) and related legislation.
As recounted by former Senator Sam Nunn (who is also a former Corporation
trustee), Ashton Carter, a Carnegie Corporation grantee, gave a compelling
series of breakfast presentations on cooperative security before an
august group of Congressmen who were instrumental to his and Senator
Lugar’s efforts at securing “one of the fastest turnarounds
in both the Senate and House” in support of their sponsored legislation.
Senator Nunn also credits the Corporation with providing “unburdened
and uncompromising” travel to Russia for frank conversations with
Gorbachev about the seriousness of “new thinking” that were
critical for easing the politics to establish joint risk reduction centers.
Subsequent trips enabled Senator Nunn personally to gain a first-hand
appreciation for the chaos experienced within the Russian defense complex.
This, he claims, reinvigorated his subsequent campaign to convince skeptics
in the Congress and executive branch to unlock initial funding for U.S.
nuclear dismantlement and safety assistance to Russia.
The Corporation’s support also occasionally had a direct impact
on Russian policymaking. The Hague Initiative, for instance, brought
together senior Russian and Chechen political advisors for rare informal
discussions on settling the ongoing war in Chechnya in 1996. The meeting
produced a “ten-point” statement on resolving the conflict
that was embedded in the main provisions of the first, though illfated,
peace plan signed by both leaderships only several months later.
The Corporation’s Russia-related grants also indirectly influenced
policymaking in both countries. Sponsored dialogues and linkages between
Russian and American policymakers, officers, insiders and experts were
instrumental at dismantling stereotypes that, according to Senator Nunn,
“serve as the template for future efforts to clear the air with
America’s European allies.” The Aspen Institute’s
Congressional Program, led by former Senator Richard Clark, was especially
effective at building a bipartisan cadre of nearly 120 Congressional
leaders, first on arms control and then on a broader set of issues concerning
Russia. This group transcended the dramatic legislative turnover and
played integral roles in shaping U.S. policy debates on NATO expansion
and aide packages to the former Soviet Union. Several U.S. Senators
specifically acknowledged this experience as vital to their education
on Russia, as well as to making personal contact with respected experts
who they felt comfortable calling on for advice. The winning formula
of this ongoing dialogue on Russia, notes Clark, is that it “serves
as a unique forum for U.S. legislators to engage experts and distill
their own policy implications, while allowing them and their spouses
to fraternize free from the distractions of Washington and their home
districts.”
On the Russian front, support to Duke University produced guidelines
for election coverage that were used by the Russian government as a
guide for the election laws in 1993. The Carnegie Moscow Center also
played a crucial role, sustaining independent policy analysis amid shifting
political winds in Russia. As observed by Arsenian, the Center provides
a “safe home” for meaningful exchanges between Russian policy
analysts, journalists and officials that has become a model not only
for other NGOs but for budding Russian philanthropists interested in
creating additional sources of independent analysis within the country.
In addition to the impact on policymaking, the Corporation’s support
was integral to catalyzing knowledge-based communities composed of scholars
and researchers from the hard and social sciences. This produced collaborative
understandings of concepts such as “cooperative security”
and “preventive defense,” as well as via the Russia Initiative,
deeper appreciation for the interlocking travails of post-Soviet transformation.
Furthermore, the Corporation’s support for joint study groups
provided effective mechanisms for translating these collaborative problem-solving
approaches into the policy realm. Hamburg recalls that Gorbachev was
especially keen on using the findings generated by these groups to stretch
his thinking about the long-term implications of Soviet reforms and
the prospects for creating a “soft landing” for Russia’s
future relations with its new neighbors and the U.S. The same expert
findings also carried weight among American policymakers. On more than
one occasion, President Ronald Reagan’s senior advisors on the
Soviet Union turned to these groups for the substantive basis of their
policy recommendations for responding to Gorbachev’s reforms.
According to several sources, President Reagan personally enjoyed such
presentations and valued independent scholar-scientist contact, sometimes
incorporating group findings into his speeches, as well as using their
audience to send conciliatory signals to the Soviet Union.