Carnegie Reporter, Vol. 4, No. 2 | The Lost (And Found) Voters of Hurricane Katrina, page 2

Preparing for Spring Elections
Civil rights and community groups first tried to postpone the February 4 New Orleans city elections to the fall of 2006, but the date was deemed too late by city and state officials. Nearly all agreed that February was too soon because the city was in such disarray, including the destruction of at least half of its previous polling places. At stake in the city elections was the future of embattled Mayor Ray Nagin, along with City Council members, civil and criminal sheriffs, clerk and other local offices.

Suspicions were rampant that white Louisianans pushed for spring elections to seize control of city offices in the absence of black voters who decided most elections in recent years. For example, Rev. Jesse Jackson called the April 22 election date “a political land grab” similar to alleged disenfranchisement of black voters in Florida in 2000 and Ohio in 2004. Because of growing black voter majorities, New Orleans hadn’t elected a white mayor since 1974.

These suspicions were fueled by the lack of solid information about who remained in the city. Many assumed that whites were in the majority and would elect an all-white city government. Estimates varied about who was still a resident, who was only temporarily away and intended to return, and who had moved away permanently—and what the race of these potential voters was. Many people were living in hotel rooms or spare bedrooms. There was no way to obtain systematic data about address changes and, even if those data were in hand, to determine whose change was permanent.

State officials turned to FEMA for its database of 936,000 names of Louisiana residents who received aid, a high number that suggested numerous duplications and inaccuracies. Candidates and campaign organizers were further frustrated by federal privacy rules that prohibited their use of that data base, a prohibition affirmed by a federal judge who ruled that it was not a public record. The judge also denied activists’ demands for easier absentee ballot procedures and for out of state voting sites in major cities. In court filings, one group called the cost of transportation to vote in New Orleans “the equivalent of a poll tax.”

State and local elections officials countered these legal challenges by preparing a greatly expanded program of outreach and voting resources designed to include voters both in the city and elsewhere—more than tripling previous spending on these measures. Rigamer’s company, by then consulting for Louisiana’s secretary of state, helped target these efforts. Some of the program’s highlights leading up to the April 22 election were:

Media advertising in other Louisiana cities, Houston, Dallas and Atlanta and eleven other states where evacuees were concentrated.

Expanded and easier absentee and early voting. To facilitate this effort, the state sent everyone outside the city on the FEMA recipient list a packet of voter information, including instructions for applying for an absentee ballot.

Coordination with the U.S. Postal Service, which posted information in every branch post office in the nation about absentee ballots and mailing deadlines and lifted the local embargo on political mailings by candidates and organizations.

Consolidation of the city’s previous 275 polling sites into 76 new ones, including two “super sites” that would host over 50 precincts each. New billboards throughout the city displayed a toll-free hotline and web site to contact for new precinct locations and other voter information.

Setting up of ten early voting satellite centers throughout Louisiana, where displaced voters could vote in person.

Additional elections employees at polling centers, including about 100 “greeters” at the super sites with laptop computers to verify registration information and direct voters to their assigned precincts within the super site.

In case of legal challenges later, documenting every step of the election, including records of calls to the hotline and hiring a postal tracking service for absentee ballots.

Observers from the U.S. Justice Department to monitor compliance with the Voting Rights Act.

In all, the spring elections cost about $4 million in mostly state funds, compared to the city’s usual cost of about $400,000. FEMA refused to pay any of these costs above the $733,000 needed to replace voting machines and related equipment destroyed by Ka--trina. Secretary of State Al Ater and others criticized this decision in light of the nearly $8 million that FEMA paid for New York City’s 2001 mu-nic-ipal elections after the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Next page: New Orleans’ previous 275 polling sites were consolidated into 76 new ones, including two “supersites” that would host over 50 precincts each.

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