Carnegie Reporter, Vol. 4, No. 1 | Nuclear Doomsday: Is the Clock Still Ticking? page 3

Pakistan
Pakistan’s 50 nuclear warheads and capacity to rapidly double that force represents “a vexing security concern,” says Ferguson, providing, perhaps, the greatest opportunity for terrorists interested in attacking the United States.

Pakistan’s reliability as a continued American ally in the war on terror is tenuous. The CIA contends that Osama bin Laden, his lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri and Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar are hiding in Pakistan’s mountainous region along the Afghan border, which is represented by the openly pro-Taliban, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, the third largest political party in Pakistan’s parliament.

Additionally, there have been two near-assassinations of Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf at the hands of pro-al-Qaeda forces. “If you can get pretty darn close to killing the Pakistani president, who presumably is one of the most heavily guarded targets in the country…it at least raises a question about other heavily guarded [targets] in the country,” says Bunn.

Musharraf dismisses American entreaties to increase security over his nuclear stockpile. According to Graham Allison, Musharraf walks a precarious tightrope. “It is a widely held belief among Pakistan’s scientific and military elite, that Pakistan, as the home of the first Islamic bomb, has a duty to share its knowledge,” writes Allison, whose work has been supported by Carnegie Corporation of New York. And, what if Musharraf is removed from power—by force or by ballot—and Islamist fundamentalist forces take control of Pakistan, its nuclear stockpile and nuclear weapons infrastructure? While the leaders of a pro-Islamic Pakistan would likely feel constrained by the threat of U.S. retaliation, the new government could be hard-pressed to contain its most zealous elements from assisting al-Qaeda or other militant elements.

Some fear the Pakistan dilemma is already beyond repair. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, infamously provided nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya from 1989 to 2000, according to his televised February 2004 confession in which he insisted the Pakistani government had no role or knowledge of his activities. Musharraf relieved Khan of his ministerial duties but pardoned him the next day, and refuses International Atomic Energy Agency requests to interview him. Among the questions UN and U.S. authorities have is whether Khan’s network—which included two top nuclear scientists arrested in late 2001 for their close ties to the Taliban—assisted al-Qaeda.

China
China aided Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in the 1980s and early 1990s, but for more than a decade has imposed nuclear controls, including regulations prohibiting export of nuclear technology. “A realistic estimate of China’s nuclear arsenal is a total force of 30 nuclear warheads operationally deployed on ICBMs and another 50-to-100 on medium-range ballistic missiles for a total force of 80-to-130 nuclear weapons,” writes Jeffrey Lewis in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. NTI estimates China’s stockpile at 400 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. As Lewis notes, however, “China seems intent on letting ambiguity enhance the deterrent effect of its nuclear forces.”

The commonly contemplated scenario for nuclear conflict with China arises in a dispute over Taiwan. But, Lewis writes, in response to the Bush administration’s efforts to field a missile defense system, China is taking initiatives to beef up its nuclear muscle, including doubling its nuclear missiles targeted on the U.S. from 12 to 24. Lewis writes: “So far, none of this has happened. Chinese nuclear forces today look remarkably like they have for decades. The picture of the Chinese nuclear arsenal that emerges from U.S. intelligence assessments suggests a country that—at least in the nuclear field—is deploying a smaller, less ready arsenal than is within its capabilities. That reflects a choice to rely on a minimum deterrent that sacrifices offensive capability in exchange for maximizing political control and minimizing cost.”

Iran and North Korea
Iran presents a severe regional dilemma. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has the qualified right to engage in the development of nuclear power for peaceful means. However, spent fuel from its nuclear reactors can be reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium. While there is broad divergence of expert opinions, retired General Barry McCaffrey claims diplomatic engagements only delay the inevitable: “They are going nuclear—they are going to have 20-to-30 nuclear weapons five years from now,” McCaffrey recently predicted on Meet the Press. Others see Iran’s posturing as a means to win concessions from Europe and the United States. Failing to win those concessions, a nuclear Iran threatens to spark an arms race as neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia are likely to stand by idly and become the last Middle Eastern power to go nuclear. “Saudi money and Egyptian technology gets an Arab Sunni bomb to confront the Persian Shia bomb,” McCaffrey said. Hence, Israel’s clearly stated position that a nuclear Iran simply is not a viable option; If U.S.-European diplomacy fails, Israel must act.

Like Iran, North Korea is likely to be constrained from striking America by the threat of devastating reprisal. However, Pyongyang finds comfort in developing long-range missiles to retaliate or serve as a deterrent to what it believes is America’s intention to invade its territory and carry out regime change. Of more immediate danger is the threat North Korea poses to South Korea, Japan and the rest of East Asia. Media reaction to the North’s July 4, 2006 failed missile firings was overstated, according to Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyst Anthony Cordesman. “It is far from clear that North Korea is any closer to a real-world capability to attack the U.S. than it was before this series of tests,” he wrote. On the other hand, say William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter who served, respectively, as Secretary of Defense and Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration, writing in Time magazine, “Even a failed test provides critical data.” And, to the extent that North Korea develops excess capacity for plutonium or HEU and its notoriously unstable leadership spins out of control, it cannot be ruled out as terrorist ally—just as Iran’s zealots might defy containment.*

Next page: Of the three potential nuclear threats facing America—a direct attack,an accidental launch or nuclear terrorism—only terrorist groups have stated their clear intent and therefore, Ferguson and others say, represent the threat we should most seriously contemplate and act upon.

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* North Korea's nuclear test on October 9, 2006, which was immediately condemned by the United Nations added more urgency to these issues.