Carnegie Reporter, Vol. 3, No. 3 | Track II Diplomacy, page 5

Gauging the Cost of Success

"Our founder, Andrew Carnegie, was a Track II man himself," says Vartan Gregorian, president of Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Indeed, Carnegie financed a 1910 European peace junket in which one of his heroes, recently retired President Theodore Roosevelt, would meet with his other hero, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, for a conference advancing Carnegie's concept for a "League of Nations." Carnegie's biographer, Joseph Frazier Wall, writes: "This visit of Roosevelt to the Kaiser could bring about the triumphant resolution of all he had worked for, written about, and dreamt for the past five years: Carnegie's two heroes, at last meeting face to face, reaching agreement, and by that forcing Britain into line. 'If any man can get the Emperor in accord for peace, you are that man,' [Carnegie] wrote to Roosevelt. 'He will go far to act in unison with you, of this I am sure. You are sympathetic souls.'"

Unfortunately, on May 6, 1910, just as the series of meetings was schedule to get under way, news came from London of the death of King Edward VII. Protocol demanded a suspension of plans which had taken more than 18 months to formulate. Undaunted, little more than six months later, on his 75th birthday, Carnegie launched the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with a $10 million gift, charging the organization's trustees to "hasten the abolition of international war, the foulest blot upon our civilization."

Though today the Carnegie Endowment is one of the world's most important organizations "dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations" (as its mission states, in part), that may not have been the way it was viewed in the early years of the 20th century. Says William Perry, "If you look at the [original] goal of Andrew Carnegie's endowment it's certainly possible to conclude that it was a failure because four or five years later, World War I started. Hardly a successful conclusion to [Carnegie's] effort."

Clearly, gauging success in this arena is really difficult, especially for funders like foundations, which continue to try to find indicators of success. Says Ronald Fisher, "Funders look for short-term results and that's just not realistic. Most of the successful interventions in this field involve a continuing series of interactions or workshops over time--sometimes ten years or more."

"We can't simply measure success by the direct impact on the United States government," argues Leon Sigal, Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council. "We have to think about the impact on other governments; we have to think of the impact on informed publics, on the press and on legislature." Sigal notes that foundations and funding agencies are, understandably, focused on results, on being able to find clear, quantifiable successes. But, he says, as in the case of North Korea "This is not simply about the North Korean nuclear issue. This is about the American relationship with Asia, and particularly, its presence in Northeast Asia and what the future of that relationship is."

The question of greater coordination and of avoiding stepping on toes is also an issue that foundations are concerned about, hoping to avoid duplication of efforts. However, as Krepon points out, it is frequently of value--particularly in tough cases--for the more resistant representatives to a dialogue to hear confirmation of a position from several voices.

In the administration of George H.W. Bush, the United States showed little willingness to engage with Mikhail Gorbachev. However, "The messages we were hearing in Track II from our Soviet counterparts were very different," says Krepon. "They were basically telling us, work with us, help us beat the old system." He adds, "We rarely know when the timing is right, except after the fact, so we need to be ready, we need to be positioned when the time is right. We are part of a process of reinforcement and repetition of messages that can lead to success. But governments work slowly and government workers tend to be risk averse; on the other hand, NGOs are impatient and they have little to lose by pushing the envelope."

For foundations and other funders of Track II activities, "It's a high-risk capital investment" says Sigal--certainly not a sure thing, perhaps not even a very likely thing, but a very necessary move for those looking towards long-term investments that go beyond immediate results.

Track II fills important gaps in social psychology, it promotes and provokes ideas and widens the scope of discussion for current and potential future leaders in ways that simply are not possible in formal settings, such as bilateral negotiations.

It produces results in good times and hard times, most especially when there is a very rare type of person at the table, those who Krepon characterizes as "tightrope walkers" -- people like Gorbachev and Anwar Sadat who recognize the need to invest their political capital in high-risk ventures.

And sometimes the return-on-investment won't be realized for a generation--or more. But as a senior Congressional staffer noted, "In every Track II dialogue there is the possibility that one participant might be a Gorbachev-in-the-making."

In that connection, several Track II practitioners have noted that many of those engaged in hammering out the Oslo Peace Accords enjoyed a familiarity with those on the other side of the table from years of working together in Track II sessions. "Down the road you have to believe that we can change both sides," says Sigal. "The United States and [North Korea], for example, can change their relationship with one another. If they do, victory will have a thousand fathers."

Resolving relationships, identifying success and defining terms in Track II diplomacy is a long-standing source of frustration for Joseph Montville. "Track II involves so many disciplines" that putting labels on it or evaluating it "drives social scientists nuts," says Montville, who when he is asked to identify his field, says, "I call myself a political psychologist."

That important social psychology factor was clearly on display at the Corporation-sponsored Track II meetings with North Korea, according to several of those in attendance, who noted how informal interaction permitted each side to find a comfort level to address real or imagined slights, resolving what Montville calls "the psychology of victimhood."

While that may sound like some kind of pop psychology, the value of Track II skill sets are the subject of a $500 million, five-year U.S. Agency for International Development grant program being launched this year. According to an administration official, the grants would be "a worldwide mechanism for any of our USAID offices and bureaus, as well as the State Department and the U.S. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization...providing a range of services, focusing on the themes of conflict, instability, fragility and extremism in regional crises." Grants and contracts would go to NGOs as well as to for-profit groups "able to combine Track II skill sets with thematic expertise in other areas, such as land management, governance practices, etc."

Montville hopes to take part in some of those projects. Meanwhile, he's writing a history of Moslem Spain, exploring the commonality of the Sephardic Jewish community and Islamic community in an effort to find closure between the two. Similarly, he's pursuing a program intended to resolve lingering hostilities from the U.S. Civil War, "transforming the polity of this country" through Track II workshops and dialogues to resolve generations of North-South resentments. Whether you're talking about individuals, married couples, sects or nations, he says, "The same rules of human psychology apply everywhere."

M.J. Zuckerman is a Washington, DC-based veteran journalist, author, newspaper reporter and editor, who has written extensively about the intersection of technology, security, democracy and justice for more than 20 years.