Carnegie Reporter, Vol. 2, No. 1 | Homeland Security and Privacy Striking a Delicate Balance, page 2 (low bandwidth)

Alternatives
For those who fear a loss of privacy, there is reason for optimism. Many of the most promising and urgently needed security measures have little or nothing to do with privacy. Some of these measures are known as surveillance of means (which raises few privacy issues) rather than surveillance of people (which, by definition, compromises privacy). For example, security experts agree that the best protection against the terrifying prospect of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological and chemical—in the hands of terrorists is to do a much better job of securing these lethal materials at their source, whether in nuclear stockpiles, laboratories or warehouses in the U.S. or around the globe. (Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons but we are not sure exactly how many of these weapons exist or even where they are all kept. And nearly a year after the anthrax attacks, we still cannot definitively trace the source of the deadly agent.)

Similarly, we do not effectively safeguard the means—such as crop dusters, private aircraft and shipping containers—of deploying or transporting these materials. (Of the 2,000 shack-sized containers that enter the United States by land, sea and air each hour, less than two percent are opened for inspection). In addition, we must do much more to protect facilities such as nuclear reactors and water treatment plants, which are still frighteningly vulnerable targets.

More research and resources must be devoted to each of these critical components of homeland security. New technologies can help us to develop more effective devices to detect radiological (“dirty”) bombs before they detonate or to warn of a release of deadly chemicals. New scientific technologies can identify pathogens such as anthrax and smallpox before they spread. Vaccines against diseases dispersed by terrorists, as well as medicines to treat the fallout from radioactive or chemical attacks, would rob such assaults of their power to kill and terrorize. More efficient communications networks, especially between law enforcement agencies, emergency responders and medical personnel would also add to security. In June, the National Research Council (NRC), a committee of the nation’s leading scientists, engineers and physicians, issued a report lamenting our failure to harness and coordinate our country’s incredible scientific and technical resources to take these and other steps to protect ourselves. The NRC proposed a new think-tank agency, a Homeland Security Institute, to do so. The authors of the report deemed these measures “critical contributions to protect the nation from catastrophic terrorism.” None infringe on privacy.

Similarly, experts in international relations have urged that foreign policy and diplomacy (as well as education and training in these fields) be revamped to focus on gaining global cooperation to secure nuclear and other potentially devastating weapons, make countries less hospitable to terrorists, address reasons people turn to terrorism in the first place, rehabilitate America’s image in certain parts of the world and develop other strategies to help safeguard the United States. Again, these crucial steps have little to do with our privacy rights.

Of course the most far-reaching security proposal of all, restructuring the United States government to address glaring lapses in the infrastructure of homeland security, does not infringe on privacy. In fact, the task of merging all or part of 22 agencies into one Department of Homeland Security, as has been called for by President Bush, with the intent of fixing the rampant defects in each—as well as coordinate with the FBI and CIA—is so extensive and complex a project that it is possible we cannot truly know the extent to which additional intrusive security measures are necessary, or how beneficial they might be, until we get these sweeping changes in place.

Given that there are many directions to follow in pursuit of security, we need to be sure that our government has done everything possible to protect us and our nation without weakening our rights. And we have ample cause for concern. The list of shortcomings in existing security safeguards have already come to light. Recently, for instance, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced plans to have the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) fingerprint 100,000 Middle Eastern visa holders; the next day, the Justice Department’s own inspector general testified before Congress that the INS and FBI were “years away” from processing the fingerprint files already on hand. Tens of thousands of foreigners are illegally obtaining Social Security numbers each year (and the identification papers that go with them) by using fake documents such as visas and green cards simply because the Social Security Administration does not have a system to verify records with the INS. When this report appeared in The New York Times, readers wrote in with 800 numbers to call and web sites to check to find the information the Social Security Administration was unable to obtain. And this past July, John Magaw was forced to resign as head of the newly created Transportation Security Administration less than six months after taking the job because of the agency’s failures in a number of areas, including delays of many months in conducting tests on procedures to close loopholes in checked-baggage security and putting ordinary travelers under intense scrutiny while not putting measures in place to investigate passengers who should raise concerns. Is this really the best our nation can do?

Effectiveness of
Intrusive Measures
Even when we do consider intrusive new security devices or surveillance programs, we have a flawed process for doing so. Historically we often have begun with an inaccurate assumption, namely that more surveillance (and less privacy) must equal more security. How could it not, we think? If the authorities can see more of us, isn’t it less likely one of us will have an opportunity to do harm? Not necessarily.

Some new security measures simply do not work as we imagine. For example, one of the most highly touted devices is Face Recognition Technology (FRT), a system that, when coupled with closed-circuit surveillance cameras, can scan faces in a crowd and compare them to a data bank of suspected terrorists. Yet, by the Department of Defense’s own report, the best of such systems makes a correct match only about two-thirds of the time. Some systems have only a fifty percent success rate. More important, even if the identification component is improved, the system is only as good as its database—and the database of photographs of suspected terrorists is tiny: we simply do not have pictures of the many individuals around the globe who are a threat to us. For the most part, we aren’t even know who they are. Jeffrey Rosen, associate professor of law at George Washington University Law School, studied the FRT system in England, where it has been in widespread use for years. Rosen reports that British authorities have not captured a single terrorist using the system. Nonetheless, FRT is now gaining momentum in the United States. By relying on such a system, are we missing the opportunity to pursue the development of something else that may better protect us?

At airports, we are testing a new Superman-style x-ray device called a BodySearch that can see through your clothes, presenting a naked picture of you on a screen and revealing weapons or drugs concealed beneath your garments. But as the July 4th shooting at the El Al airlines ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport indicates, unless every individual who is allowed anywhere near an airport is stripped naked, even going to the BodySearch extreme may not improve airline security. Also, last spring, during an undercover investigation at 32 airports across the country, screeners missed guns 30 percent of the time, simulated explosives 60 percent of the time and knives 70 percent of the time. This was in the months immediately after September 11th. Security experts said they were not surprised and assured us that new federal baggage screeners being hired will do a better job.

But it is surprising—and appalling—that 70 percent of the weapons of choice for September 11th sailed through security and onto airplanes immediately following the carnage. Isn’t there even a normal post-tragedy uptick as those on duty work under increased scrutiny and fear of facilitating a catastrophe? Wouldn’t people with no training at all do roughly as well? Such an egregious across-the-board failure suggests, at least, that there is something fundamentally wrong with the process itself. Perhaps people staring at x-ray screens for hours on end, day after day, no matter how good the pay and training, is not the best setup for ensuring our safety, and laying ourselves bare, as we now do our luggage, is not going to change that. Some have called for a clean slate, saying that we should reconsider airport security from the ground up rather than layer new surveillance devices onto a faulty system. In its report, the NRC warned that while the new Transportation Security Administration is charged with overhauling airline safety, it does not have a systematic approach for evaluating the effectiveness of its programs, has no scientific expertise to identify technological needs, nor any scientists or engineers who can fulfill them.

In fact, we have never been particularly systematic or exacting when it comes to evaluating security measures. For instance, if crime rates fall in neighborhoods with surveillance cameras, the cameras tend to get the credit without considering whether the drop is due to social or economic changes in the area, or whether the criminal activity simply moved down the street. Now, when the proposed measures are as intrusive as the BodySearch or a national identification system, and the harm we are faced with is as devastating as September 11th, we have to be much more exacting in determining just how effective a proposed security device is. Sometimes more intrusive measures are not the best way to improve public safety, they are just the easiest.

Next page: Although we cannot always be sure whether or not security measures will keep us safe, we can be certain that there’s a good chance they will be abused.

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