By Susan Robinson King

"More and more nuclear materials are produced in Russia and the United States. Everywhere. The threat of nuclear material we will face forever and we must control it."-Roland Timerbaev, Chair, Center for Policy Studies in Russia

Thousands of nuclear weapons are still on hair-trigger alert in the United States and in Russia, all poised to start a nuclear confrontation. Yet the reduction of tensions in the post-Cold-War world and the personal relationship of presidents Bush and Putin have removed that superpower scenario of the nuclear nightmare from the front burner of security issues.

But in the post-September 11th world, there is another deadly nightmare that has surfaced on the consciousness of a newly aware American public: the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists. For the right price, can terrorists smuggle, trade and traffic enough nuclear material to cause a nuclear holocaust in any city of their choosing?

One of the best-positioned institutions to tackle such a question is located in a newly renovated, modern office building off one of Moscow's leading avenues, currently populated by haute couture stores like Prada. The Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR) was created in 1994 as the superpower confrontation wound down. Economic dislocation offered a new threat to a stable world as scientists within the Russian nuclear establishment faced an uncertain future. Leaders in Russia's policy and scientific community, and their counterparts in the United States, worried that, without safeguards, there were economic incentives for some within the Russian nuclear community to sell what they knew.

"The whole system broke down ten years ago. We needed to establish a system of control since the economic collapse meant a few people could grab a few grams of enriched uranium, thinking they could sell it," says Roland Timerbaev, chair of PIR, during a recent interview in Moscow. "There will be more bin Ladens, because the divide between [the developed and developing world] is growing, the divide between law abiding people and terrorism is growing and the situation has become more and more dangerous. That's why anything that contains a risk-nuclear, biological or chemical-must be controlled."

The center is not what one might expect of a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization in Russia: far from being dreary, dilapidated or struggling, it's a cheerful and lively place where even the walls-painted a bright pumpkin and raspberry-seem to reflect the intellectual energy within. Here, some of Russia's most respected and experienced nuclear nonproliferation experts are leading a bevy of young scientists and researchers who are examining issues pertaining to international security and arms control; PIR also sponsors training sessions that attract scientists, engineers and workers in the nuclear industry who come to Moscow to be schooled in a modern system of nuclear controls and safeguards. It is also the site of frequent briefings for the media, both Russian and international. In less than a decade, PIR has become a highly respected institution; its web site, for example, won a top ranking in the list of best arms control web sites as featured in the Washington, D.C.-based magazine, National Journal. Given this level of concern for assessing facts and interacting with the press, it is probably not surprising that PIR's founder and the man who has nurtured the institution to its present status in less than a decade, Dr. Vladimir A. Orlov, is a former journalist who experienced firsthand the pathbreaking challenges and opportunities underway in Russia in the early 1990s.

"We want our society to be sophisticated. To understand the threat and to prevent the threat," says Timerbaev. "We want a good order in our house, a nuclear order here and in the surrounding and adjacent countries."

In the story of PIR, one can discover glimpses of the story of the new Russia. Timerbaev, who has spent his life on the front lines of the nuclear issue, was an ambassador to the United Nations in the days of Communism and is a product of the Soviet system. He began his arms control career in the mid-1960s and, at 75, his life is animated by and focused on the prospect of building a system of controls that will ensure a stable Russia. He is dedicated to creating what he calls "accountability, protection and control" of nuclear materials.

In this endeavor he is joined by a new generation of Russians, like young researcher, 24-year-old Dmitry Kovchegin, a physicist who wants to work in the policy world rather than in theoretical science and who came to PIR as an intern. "I want to help save the world from the real threats," is how he puts it. Unlike Timerbaev, he has no grand views of world relations, just a determination to cull and analyze information that will define what the "real threats" really are. Besides his research responsibilities, he is the editor of Nuclear Russia Today, an electronic newsletter that follows official Russian documents dealing with nuclear concerns and related media coverage within Russia. Today, those real threats are less about superpower confrontations and focus more on terrorist standoffs. Kovchegin was invited by Timerbaev to join the interview and to detail research on illicit nuclear trafficking in Russia.

"There is little demand on the black markets for nuclear material," says Kovchegin. By researching and cataloging all media reports of nuclear smuggling with its Monterey, California partner, the Center for Non-proliferation Studies, they found the number of incidents of illicit trafficking has dwindled in the 1990s. "I don't think there is a threat that bin Laden will get a nuclear bomb," Kovchegin adds. "I don't believe that even a large terrorist network can make a real nuclear weapon, or create a nuclear explosion. They can't get enough of the necessary material. Maybe some crude dirty bomb," the young physicist says, his voice trailing off.

Timerbaev interrupts. "Perhaps North Korea, maybe Libya, but not bin Laden. You have to have an industry," he says, and both agree the terrorist network does not have the infrastructure to create a sophisticated nuclear threat.

And although enriched uranium from nuclear power plants is another radioactive threat that could be enticing to criminal elements focused on destruction, PIR's researchers don't see it as an appealing commodity on the open market. "I don't think most terrorists would want to handle fissible material because it would be dangerous for them. They could damage themselves," Kovchegin points out.

As the conversation about the terrorist network winds down, Timerbaev and Kovchegin agree that while smuggling nuclear materials may not be the major threat in today's uncertain world-one defined by unthinkable acts of terrorism-nuclear power plants in Russia and the United States do present a serious danger: they are inviting targets.

"The real threat today," says Timerbaev matter-of-factly, "is the bombing of a nuclear power plant." It's a chilling final thought.

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