The Back Page Fighting Terrorism: For the U.S. and Russia, One War but Two Agendas by Oksana Antonenko

In June, 2001, in Ljubljana, Slovenia, presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin-who had, collectively, been in office for less than 20 months-met for the first time. It quickly became apparent that, a decade after the end of the Cold War, U.S.-Russian relations were still dominated by issues that dated back to the period of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Before Ljubljana, President Bush had declared his commitment to developing a "new strategic framework" for the U.S.-Russian relationship, but during his first six months in office, the new president never offered a practical definition for what that might mean. Instead, the Bush administration seemed to be signaling that Russia's perceived weakness meant that its concerns were no longer going to be an important factor in the construction of U.S. policy as the nation pursued its objectives around the world.

The change of leadership in the Kremlin also brought about changes in Russia's attitude towards its relations with the U.S. and Europe. Unlike his predecessors, President Putin acknowledged the real limitations on Russia's resources. He also rejected the "multipolar world" doctrine of former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov (1998-99), which promoted Russia's great power status and opposed U.S. global dominance, often at the expense of Russia's own interests. Instead, Putin initiated a more pragmatic, Western-oriented foreign policy focused on Russia's economic interests and took personal charge of Russia's relations with Europe and the U.S. In the U.S.-Russian dialogue prior to the events of September 11th, 2001, Moscow combined its opposition to Washington's stated plans to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with an ambitious economic agenda that included trade and investment proposals. At the same time, Putin's war in Chechnya and his crackdown on an independent press became the main irritants to bilateral relations and real obstacles to achieving progress on some of the economic issues that required U.S. Congressional support.

After the Ljubljana meeting, all indications were that the U.S. and Russia were unlikely to produce any breakthroughs and were destined to balance differences on strategic issues with slow progress on a bilateral economic agenda. The September 11th terrorist attacks, however, prompted a radical shift in the focus of U.S. foreign policy, which, in turn, had a direct effect on almost every aspect of its dealings with Russia.

New Opportunities
Post-September 11th-and for the first time in almost half a century-Moscow and Washington recognized that they were facing a common threat, one that came not from a state but from a global network of terrorist groups seeking to undermine the security and well-being of citizens in both countries. Terrorism was already high on the Russian security agenda before the September 11th attacks on the U.S. because, in Russia, suspected terrorist-sponsored violence had already taken a heavy toll: in Moscow and other Russian cities, Chechen rebels were blamed for explosions that had ripped through apartment buildings in 1999, killing about 300 people. More incidents followed, also linked to Chechen separatists. The Russian government was pursuing what it considered to be counter-terrorist policies that included a military campaign in Chechnya, which Putin saw as a necessary measure to defeat a threat to Russia's security supported by international terrorist networks. But these actions, too, carried a heavy price: over 4,000 Russian servicemen were dead along with an estimated 15,000 residents of Chechnya. Prior to September 11th, Russia sought international assistance for its attempts to target external sources of support for Chechen warlords, but the brutality of the war in Chechnya along with perceived human rights violations in the region precluded a positive international response.

After September 11th, however, the U.S. quickly found itself echoing Russia's alarm about the growing threat of terrorism, and announced that it would bring military force to bear not only on terrorist networks but also on countries that harbored them. The American government also began preparing its citizens for the need to make some compromises in individual liberties and human rights for the sake of national security. These shifts in position had the effect of curtailing any major criticism about Russia's operations in Chechnya that might have come from the Bush administration before September 11th and lent some legitimacy to Russia's actions, both as viewed by the Russian public and the international community. Moreover, the new Western emphasis on combating terrorism-and the lengths that the international community seemed ready to go in order to dismantle terrorist networks-defused the issue of human rights in Chechnya as an obstacle to closer ties between Russia, the U.S. and Europe. Russia's anti-terrorist activities also benefited in a practical way from the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan, which destroyed terrorist training camps that had produced Chechen fighters and targeted sources of funding for the Chechen resistance.

Putin backed up his initial declaration of moral solidarity with the U.S. through concrete actions, including sharing intelligence about the Al-Qaeda terrorist network; supporting U.S. armed forces' use of Central Asian military facilities; providing increased military support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan; cooperating with the U.S. on freezing the assets of terrorist groups; offering to conduct joint search and rescue operations in Afghanistan; and signaling Russia's readiness to maintain a stable and affordable supply of oil and gas to international markets, including the U.S.

In return, the Bush administration offered support for efforts to shore up Russia's flagging economy by endorsing its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), promising greater U.S. investment in Russia, encouraging Congress to lift economic sanctions left over from the Soviet period, promising to grant Russia market economy status (which would reduce barriers for Russian exports to the U.S.) and boosting bilateral trade, among other measures..

Next page: While clearly, post-September 11th, there are a number of positive developments in the U.S.-Russia relationship, the big picture is not altogether rosy.

Page 1 | 2

Copyright information | Masthead | Carnegie Corporation of New York web site