The Back Page Fighting Terrorism: For the U.S. and Russia, One War but Two Agendas continued from previous page Page 1 | 2

Addressing Domestic Challenges
While clearly, post-September 11th, there are a number of positive developments in the U.S.-Russia relationship, the big picture is not altogether rosy. One divisive issue is the Bush administration's decision to unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty, which, in Russia, continues to rankle. Though Putin himself reacted with surprising equanimity to the U.S. announcement-balancing, it seems, his concern for a strong economic and political relationship with the U.S. against any long-term implications for Russia's security-many political and military leaders in Russia were angered by the U.S. move, which they saw as representing both a practical danger to their nation and a diminution of Russia's importance on the international stage. So far, a high popular rating, the absence of strong political opposition and an effective public relations strategy have helped President Putin contain disenchantment with the U.S., but the sustainability of these instruments cannot be guaranteed.

For its part, the Bush administration faces domestic challenges that may well interfere with its economic pledges to Russia. The recession in America, which was deepened by the effects of September 11th, could affect the level of private investments in Russia. At the same time, it has become difficult to ignore powerful domestic lobbies in the U.S., such as steel producers, which are against granting market economy status to Russia prior to its admission into the WTO because it would mean lifting tariffs on Russian exports potentially undermining U.S. industry and causing job losses.

There are also bureaucratic and institutional barriers to continued advances in the U.S.-Russia relationship, which were erected in an atmosphere of pre-September 11th coolness and which, despite recent advances, show few signs of being easily torn down.

Tactical Coalition or Strategic Relationship?
Given all the issues that weigh upon both sides, is it possible to predict what the future holds for the relationship between the U.S. and Russia? While convergence might be the more desirable path, it is likely that a growing divergence between the domestic and international agendas of the two nations is a more realistic expectation.

The U.S. has made clear its intention to establish a new global norm under which terrorism is no longer just a domestic issue. This is in stark contrast to Russia's policy of maintaining that Chechnya is primarily an internal domestic problem. Moreover, the U.S. stand on terrorism is likely to result in unilateral or even multinational intrusions into the activities of states or nonstate actors that might be linked to terrorism. In such a scenario, it is plausible that U.S. concerns over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could make Russia a target of the U.S.-led war on terrorism, as opposed to a key member of a global anti-terrorist coalition.

Another area of difference involves much broader geopolitical considerations in U.S. and Russian policies. In his recent State of the Union address, President Bush named Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil." This vision does not correspond to Russia's attitude toward these nations (or much of Europe's, for that matter), which it has so far refused to recognize as legitimate targets for the war on terror. Russia, for example, has established a strategic partnership with Iran involving exports of Russia's conventional weapons worth over $300 million a year. Russia and Iran also continue to cooperate on issues such as oil and gas development and civilian nuclear power. Under these circumstances, it would not be to Russia's advantage to support aggressive political pressure or even military action against Iran, and it would not derive any direct benefit from endorsing similar actions against Iraq or even North Korea. The U.S. government, in turn, may have trouble maintaining its current forgiving attitude towards Russia's war in Chechnya, which is still the target of harsh criticism from American and international human rights organizations. In addition, over the longer term, the U.S.-led counter-terrorism campaign is likely to involve far more law enforcement and intelligence work than military action. As a consequence, the use of military force under the pretext of counter-terrorism will look more conspicuous as time goes on, and America and its allies may feel freer to criticize such measures as long as they themselves don't need to resort to them. Pressure for a less acquiescent U.S. position on Chechnya could also grow if Russia assumes a more aggressive posture towards some of its neighbors, such as Georgia, which Moscow accuses of harboring Chechen terrorists.

Some of these problems could be substantially resolved if Russia scales down its military operations in Chechnya, as it has, to an extent, over the past year. But the fact remains that, while a shared threat from the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan has brought Russia and the U.S. into a mutually convenient coalition, this one consideration alone cannot be depended upon to form a stable foundation for a new strategic relationship between the two nations. What is needed now is an expanded dialogue between the two countries focused on building policies that are demonstrably beneficial to both sides-domestically and internationally-and on dismantling the obstacles that stand in the way of continued improvement in bilateral relations. Without a real effort to strengthen ties between the U.S. and Russia, those that currently exist may well weaken, which poses a danger not only for those nations but for the wider world as well.

Page 1 | 2

Copyright information | Masthead | Carnegie Corporation of New York web site