The Back Page Lessons of the Cold War: William J. Perry's Perspective

On May 22, 2000, Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation convened a meeting in Washington, DC to discuss the many issues surrounding the proposed development of a national missile defense system (NMD). This is an adaptation of the remarks made at the conference by William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense.

As we struggle to define a new security strategy for the Post-Cold War era, there is one specific issue that is thrusting itself upon us immediately. How do we deal with the emerging threat of nuclear-armed ICBMs being developed by hostile Third World nations? Dealing with this threat poses difficult technical problems; but it poses even more difficult geopolitical problems. For the actions we take to deal directly with the ballistic missile threat could stimulate another arms race with China or Russia, or possibly both acting together. This arms race, in turn, could be the first stage of another Cold War. And if I have learned anything at all from my own experiences in the Cold War, it is that we do not want to travel again that incredibly dangerous path.

In my talk I will summarize the likely geopolitical consequences of deploying a national missile defense system, with special reference to how it would affect our relations with China.

I start by agreeing with the Rumsfeld Commission that ICBMs being developed by three nations are, in fact, emerging as a potential threat to the United States, but I would qualify this threat in two ways:

These emerging ICBMs are only a significant increment to the military threat we already face if they have nuclear weapons as their warheads.

In responding to this threat, we could inadvertently stimulate responses that could actually increase the danger to us, rather than reduce it.

In dealing with the ICBM threat, we have three lines of defense, which, in order of priority, are: first, try to prevent the threat from emerging; second, if prevention fails, try to deter nations from using these weapons; and third, if both prevention and deterrence fail, be prepared to defend against their use.

Nearly all of the debate has been on this third line of defense, but I think that it is important to take a broader point of view. The first line of defense, and one that receives almost no attention, is to prevent the nuclear threat from emerging, or, failing that, to prevent the ICBM threat from emerging. There are many courses of preventive actions open to us. We could sustain and strengthen the already existing bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements dealing with nuclear weapons, including the NPT, the CTBT, START 2 and 3, and the Nunn-Lugar program. We could strengthen the non-proliferation programs that make it harder for nations to go nuclear or to get long-range missiles. Considering how many nations have sophisticated nuclear or missile technology, it is clear that non-proliferation programs can be successful only when these programs have international support. Thus if our relations with Russia or China become confrontational over our national missile defense deployment, it is less likely that we will get their cooperation in refusing to sell nuclear or missile technology to other nations. It is also less likely that we will get Russia’s continued cooperation in the Nunn-Lugar program, which plays an important role in preventing the leakage of nuclear technology, materials, or even weapons to other nations.

In addition to pursuing non-proliferation programs, we could practice diplomacy that provides disincentives for proliferation and incentives for non-proliferation. A good example of that are the multilateral diplomatic efforts now underway with North Korea.

In my judgment, prevention should be our first priority in dealing with this emerging threat, but I would concede that we cannot always count on its success. In North Korea, we have started a promising process, but are not yet sure of what its results will be. In Iraq, UNSCOM has curtailed the Iraqi nuclear program for almost a decade, but is losing supporters in the UN. And in Iran, we have hopes that the new reform-minded government will draw that nation back from their programs in nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, but the jury is still out.

So each of these non-proliferation programs has problems that are significant enough that we should not base our security on the assumption of success. But neither should we base our defense programs on the assumption that they will fail, particularly if the defense programs are likely to provoke reactions that can increase the severity of the threats.

Thus I believe that we should make prevention our first priority. But if prevention does fail we can still fall back on deterrence, as we did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Some discount whether we can deter nations that they call “rogue”; in fact, if there is any definition of that term, it is a tautological one—a “rogue” nation is one that is not deterrable. I will not use the term “rogue nation,” nor do I believe in its underlying concept, because I am persuaded that the threat of using American conventional military forces is a powerful deterrent, let alone the existential threat that we might respond with our nuclear forces. But I can conceive of situations where a hostile power, for coercive purposes, might threaten to use nuclear weapons against us or against one of our allies.

Considering the catastrophic consequences to their own nation, such a threat would likely be a bluff—but a bluff that could get out of their control. In an extreme case, our deterrence could fail if a regime was about to collapse, and decided to use nuclear weapons as a last desperate act.

Thus it is not unreasonable to consider the need for a defensive capability, as an insurance policy against the possible failure of our first two lines of defense. Before we buy that policy, however, we should ask two fundamental questions:

Will the insurance be collectible—that is, will the defense work?

And how much does the policy cost—considering both dollar costs and geopolitical costs?

While Russia has had an extremely negative political reaction to a national missile defense deployment, it is clear that their retaliatory capability would not be significantly affected by the national missile defense system proposed by the Administration. The situation with China is far different, in that their ICBMs could be significantly affected by even the first phase of our planned deployment. For many years they have had deployed about 20 ICBMs with single warheads, which gives them a minimal—but real—deterrent capability. It is likely that they would see our first phase deployment reducing this capability, possibly defeating it.

I want to be clear that I do not believe that we owe the People’s Republic of China a “free shot” at our country, or that we should be unduly concerned with whether they are “unhappy” with our deployment. My concern is much more pragmatic and it is tied to the steps they are likely to take to restore their deterrence, and whether those steps lead to increased or decreased security for the US. The most obvious response would be for them to build more launchers or to achieve more warheads through MIRVing.

The People’s Republic of China already has under development a new generation ICBM, presumably to replace the current system, and to make it less vulnerable by adding mobility. We do not know what their plans are for this new ICBM, but in the face of a national missile defense deployment they would have an incentive to build many more of these than are needed for replacement of the older system. They could also carry out a service life extension program on their older system, including the addition of multiple warheads. And they could embark on an aggressive program on countermeasures—in fact, they have already begun a discussion with the Russians about sharing technology in the field of ABM penetration aids.

I also want to be clear that I understand that the People’s Republic of China could take these actions even if we did not deploy our national missile defense system, and that their decisions on strategic weapons will be affected not only by our national missile defense actions but also by the political context in which their decisions were made. The desire for reunification with Taiwan influences China’s views on all issues, including missile defense.

Thus, China’s concern about the US deployment of theater or national missile defenses is intensified by the prospect of military confrontation over Taiwan, and the possibility that the US could be on the side of Taiwan in such a confrontation. So it is possible that the People’s Republic of China will decide to proceed on this expansion of their strategic missile program irrespective of our actions. But our national missile defense deployment, by itself, not only gives them considerable incentive to take actions to limit national missile defense effectiveness, but also undercuts any moves that we might make to limit their missile buildup through arms control agreements. Of course, if China is making significant additions to its missile forces, these additions can also be seen by India as threatening to them, and could result in an additional buildup in the Indian force of nuclear missiles. That in turn, would be seen by the Pakistanis as threatening to them, and could result in additional buildups to their nuclear missiles, with attendant responses in other Middle East nations, including Iraq, Iran, and Israel.

I have described just some of the unintended consequences of a national missile defense deployment by the US. Thus, a relatively small deployment of defensive systems could have the affect of triggering a regional nuclear arms race of considerable proportions. Such an arms race would create real and obvious dangers for nations in the region, but it could also undermine our own security.

I do not believe that this is a worst-case scenario. Indeed, I believe that it is the likely consequence in the Asia-Pacific region of a national missile defense deployment, and that this consequence is one important component of the high cost of our “insurance policy.”

Therefore, I believe that much greater effort should be put on trying to avoid the need for that insurance policy. That is, we should put a higher priority on the “preventive defense” programs that try to head off the threat from becoming serious, and for success these programs will require international cooperation, especially from the Russians and the Chinese.

I fully understand that this cooperation might not be forthcoming, but in light of the stakes, I believe that the U.S. should go the extra mile before we take actions based on that conclusion. I believe that today we have a window of opportunity to explore these possibilities with the Russians and the Chinese, but this window will close after we make a decision to deploy a national missile defense system. If that full exploration proves to be fruitless, then we should be prepared to take our third line of defense: active defenses. In the meantime, we should continue a robust development program so that we would have highest confidence in the system we are deploying if it comes to that.

Copyright information | Masthead | Carnegie Corporation of New York web site